ASW carrier vs. SSGN (UK defence minister's view in 1981)

[KDR]

John Nott, UK defence minister 1979-1983, said in a Parliament session
on 19 May 1981 that he would have not ordered the Ark Royal, the last
of the three Invincible-class ASW carriers ordered in 1978, if he had
been making the decision in 1981.

The reason he gave was that the Oscar class submarine with 250 mile
range missiles would make ASW carriers operationally irrelevant.

--------------------

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1981/may/19/defence-estimates-1981#S6CV0005P0_19810519_HOC_198

Mr. Nott: I do not know who has ever said that the "Ark Royal" or the
carriers are not going into service. I am not aware of having said or
suggested that. I said earlier that it seems that the ASW carriers are
ideal ships for out-of-area activities. I believe that.

My hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) put his finger
on the valid point. When the ASW carriers were ordered several years
ago—the first was ordered many more than three or four years ago—the
situation was not the same as it is today. Any decision that I make as
a result of the review will not flow through into the new shape of the
Fleet until 1990. The development of the Oscar class submarine—the
missile-firing submarine with a 250 mile range—involves a breakthrough
in technology. However much we may be using our ASW carriers, I do not
believe that we would order them if we were making the decision today.
Times have changed. However, I will be going to the launching of the
"Ark Royal".

[Eugene Griessel]

On Mon, 24 Oct 2011 23:57:36 -0700 (PDT), KDR
<human...@hanmail.net> wrote:

>John Nott, UK defence minister 1979-1983, said in a Parliament session
>on 19 May 1981 that he would have not ordered the Ark Royal, the last
>of the three Invincible-class ASW carriers ordered in 1978, if he had
>been making the decision in 1981.
>
>The reason he gave was that the Oscar class submarine with 250 mile
>range missiles would make ASW carriers operationally irrelevant.

Everyone is of course entitled to their opinions but there is also a
long history in the political world of declaring things irrelevant
only to have them live on and on. Manned aircraft were declared to be
irrelevant by a Biritish Labour government in the mid nineteen
sixties. Which resulted in the scrapping of several very promising
aircraft projects, something it took the British aircraft industry
many years to recover from. And forced the RAF to purchase Uncle
Sam's flying machines. Notice the disappearance of the RAF though?

Eugene L Griessel

A man needs a mistress, just to break the monogamy.

[KDR]

On Oct 25, 4:19 pm, Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:
> On Mon, 24 Oct 2011 23:57:36 -0700 (PDT), KDR
>

Theoretically the Oscar, supported by RORSAT/EORSAT targeting
satellites, could "out-range" the Invincible with its SS-N-19
missiles. Now let's think about possible ways for the Invincible to
counter the Oscar.

In many NATO exercises in the 1980's, was there a case where an Oscar
- played by a Western SSN - was declared sunk by Sea Kings from an ASW
carrier?

[Eugene Griessel]

Theoretically missiles always hit. Practice has shown this not to be
the case. The Oscar is a big boat and in the context of the cold war
would have to transit several rather confined bits of sea to get out
into deep water where it's range advantage might have been of less
importance. The idea that the Invincible class were ASW carriers
exclusively is one of those fictions, like through deck cruiser, the
military had to pull on the politicians to get the damned things built
in the first place. ASW being all the rage in the sixties. In
practice ASW is largely a fiction in the world of far ranging nuclear
boats. Unless the things pop up and start waving flags saying "I'm
here" the hunt for boats in wide oceans is a bit iffy, to say the
least. Of course if they come within fair range of a task force, or
are forced by circumstances to use choke points it becomes a little
easier to detect the things. As to the effectiveness of the SS-N-19
you should have a chat with some ex Russian navy types about that.
Bit of a paper tiger.

Eugene L Griessel

Circular Definition: see Circular Definition.

[William Black]

So why didn't everyone just scrap all their carriers when the 'Whiskey
'Long Bin' turned up?

Mind you, Knott was a spectacularly bad defence minister.



--
William Black

Free men have open minds
If you want loyalty, buy a dog...

[KDR]

On Oct 25, 9:04 pm, William Black <blackuse...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 25/10/11 07:57, KDR wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > John Nott, UK defence minister 1979-1983, said in a Parliament session
> > on 19 May 1981 that he would have not ordered the Ark Royal, the last
> > of the three Invincible-class ASW carriers ordered in 1978, if he had
> > been making the decision in 1981.
>
> > The reason he gave was that the Oscar class submarine with 250 mile
> > range missiles would make ASW carriers operationally irrelevant.
>
> > --------------------
>

> >http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1981/may/19/defence-estima...

>
> > Mr. Nott: I do not know who has ever said that the "Ark Royal" or the
> > carriers are not going into service. I am not aware of having said or
> > suggested that. I said earlier that it seems that the ASW carriers are
> > ideal ships for out-of-area activities. I believe that.
>
> > My hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) put his finger
> > on the valid point. When the ASW carriers were ordered several years
> > ago—the first was ordered many more than three or four years ago—the
> > situation was not the same as it is today. Any decision that I make as
> > a result of the review will not flow through into the new shape of the
> > Fleet until 1990. The development of the Oscar class submarine—the
> > missile-firing submarine with a 250 mile range—involves a breakthrough
> > in technology. However much we may be using our ASW carriers, I do not
> > believe that we would order them if we were making the decision today.
> > Times have changed. However, I will be going to the launching of the
> > "Ark Royal".
>
> So why didn't everyone just scrap all their carriers when the 'Whiskey
> 'Long Bin' turned up?
>
> Mind you,  Knott was a spectacularly bad defence minister.
>
> --
> William Black
>
> Free men have open minds
> If you want loyalty,  buy a dog...

Well, Nott said he would not order new ones. He did not say he would
scrap all existing carriers right away.

On the other hand he said "the ASW carriers are ideal ships for out-of-

area activities. I believe that."

From 1945 until today, carriers have been an ideal tool to clobber
weak countries. Against the Soviets in a real war? We simply don't
know.

[KDR]

On Oct 25, 5:02 pm, Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:
> The idea that the Invincible class were ASW carriers
> exclusively is one of those fictions, like through deck cruiser, the
> military had to pull on the politicians to get the damned things built
> in the first place.  ASW being all the rage in the sixties.  In
> practice ASW is largely a fiction in the world of far ranging nuclear
> boats.  Unless the things pop up and start waving flags saying "I'm
> here" the hunt for boats in wide oceans is a bit iffy, to say the
> least.  Of course if they come within fair range of a task force, or
> are forced by circumstances to use choke points it becomes a little
> easier to detect the things.

Then what would have been the main role of the Invincible class in a
NATO-Warsaw Pact war?

ASuW against Soviet surface ships? High-speed transports to Norway? Or
something else?

[Eugene Griessel]

Their Lordships were not so narrow minded as to confine their thinking
to so narrow an area even if the politicians did. Look at the number
of wars the UK have been involved in since 1945 - and you will be
astonished to see just how many that is - all of which could have, or
did in some cases, benefit from maritime airpower. The Warsaw Pact
NATO scenario was held by many in command to be a bit of an unlikely
scenario whereas there were real scenarios begging for carriers.

Eugene L Griessel

Get the facts first. You can distort them later.

[William Black]

On 25/10/11 13:51, KDR wrote:
>
> From 1945 until today, carriers have been an ideal tool to clobber
> weak countries. Against the Soviets in a real war? We simply don't
> know.

The major Soviet problem for their SSGN submarines was two fold.

First, knowing when war has broken out before learning it from a NATO
homing torpedo that has informed you with extreme prejudice.

Second, finding a suitably valuable target.

Blowing the crap out of a grain transporting freighter twenty miles out
in front of the carrier task group is a right bitch...

NATO's problem is finding the bloody thing...

As neither side gave up (Except for the aforementioned John Knott) it's
reasonable to assume that both sides thought they had a reasonable
chance of finding the other.

My money is on NATO...

[Airyx]

> carrier?- Hide quoted text -

The Soviet's RORSats could provide a general position, but not a
specific firing solution. That position would then be used to direct
an aircraft close enough to pop-up, get a good radar sweep, and then
datalink that information back to the launch platform (Oscar, Kirov,
Slava). Hopefully, the radar aircraft would survive long enough to do
another pop-up as the weapons were in-flight, so they could provide a
mid-course update.

If not, one of the SS-N-19s was programmed to fly a higher, more
ballistic flight path, and then use its own radar to provide targeting
information to the other SS-N-19s in the flight. In this scenario, the
weapons would just go after whatever gave the largest radar return,
which might well be a decoy, or large cargo vessel.

Needless to say, it probably would not have been the most economical
weapon platform. The US realized this themselves, and thus removed the
Tomahawk ASMs from service.

BTW - Scenarios showed that it was easy for a surface group to keep
tabs on Soviet missile ships via Sat, and just stay 350 miles away
while air power took its toll. Hence the Oscar.

[Dennis]

Everyone's forgetting that the Soviet submarines carried NUCLEAR weapons!
Even one of those's getting through could wipe out a CBG. It wouldn't
have to be an exact hit, either. I've even read speculation that the
Yankee class SSBNs were actually designed to attack CBGs.

Don't forget either that the Soviets do not appear to have made the sharp
distinction between nuclear and conventional warfare that the West did;
they did more exercises involving combined nuclear/conventional war.

Finally, most of their naval vessels, even the old clunkers, carried
nuclear weapons. The 'Whiskey-on-the-Rocks' incident would seem to
confirm that.

Dennis

[Airyx]

> Dennis- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

Most of the SS-N-19s had large conventional warheads. In general,
Oscars would carry only four (we think), with 50kt nuke warheads, and
the other 20 with conventional warheads.

There is a misconception that if you can get a nuke anywhere close to
a carrier, that it will sink.

US CVBGs assumed nukes would be used by the Soviets. If an escort,
patroling about 30nm away from the carrier, were to get hit with a
nuke (possibly decoyed), it would only temporarily disrupt the
carrier's combat operations (as it did a wash down, clean-up deck
debris, and a course change to avoid fallout).

The WWII Saratoga survived a 25kt air blast only 1.25 miles away.
Aircraft on deck caught fire, but the fires were put out and the ship
remained afloat. The radioactive fireball probably would have killed
the entire crew within 3 days, but the ship itself did not become
radioactive.

Saratoga was sunk by a 2nd, underwater blast, less than a mile away
(450 yards). Even then, she kept floating for quite awhile, and is
pretty much intact today sitting upright on the bottom. The Saratoga
was about 1/5th the size of a Nimitz, and with no NBC protection at
all.

So, as long as the carrier is outside of the fireball (more than 5
miles away), it should be able to evade the fallout and keep floating,
and probably even keep fighting. Of course, a direct hit is another
matter.

[Mark Test]

"KDR" wrote in message
news:d5593c6b-e45a-49c7...@f3g2000pri.googlegroups.com...

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Seriously flawed analysis. Just because you have a weapon with a 250 mile
range does not mean you can engage a target at that range....a moving target
no less. Also the allies had the ability to engage submarines at much
further
ranges than 250NM from the CVBG.

There was never and still is no reason to fear anything the Russians put to
sea.

Mark

[Paul J. Adam]

On 25/10/2011 21:08, Dennis wrote:
> Everyone's forgetting that the Soviet submarines carried NUCLEAR weapons!

Don't think so, somehow. Nuclear warfighting at sea was a popular
discussion topic in the 1980s.

> Even one of those's getting through could wipe out a CBG.

No, it couldn't. Nuclear warheads make big bangs, but against warships
they need to be within a mile or so to be immediately lethal: and the
formations of the day were widely dispersed precisely so that a nuclear
weapon would only destroy one ship at a time. You still have to find the
carrier group, identify which of the targets actually is the carrier,
launch weapons successfully and get them through the defences.

It wouldn't
> have to be an exact hit, either. I've even read speculation that the
> Yankee class SSBNs were actually designed to attack CBGs.

One experimental variant of their missile was, but - like most of these
bright ideas - the practical difficulties were enormous even before you
get into the strategic over-reaction to "SSBN launching missiles!"

> Don't forget either that the Soviets do not appear to have made the sharp
> distinction between nuclear and conventional warfare that the West did;
> they did more exercises involving combined nuclear/conventional war.

In the 1980s there was an argument that their going tactically nuclear
might actually favour the West in purely military terms, especially at
sea since it made all those nuclear depth bombs usable. Similarly, the
Kola Peninsula airfields are well away from large civilian populations
and are invitingly static.

Finally, against massed bomber raids, the US had at least some SAMs with
nuclear warheads, which would have... interesting results if detonated
amidst a regimental formation of Backfires.

Going nuclear opens the door on all sorts of fun and games, much of it
not to clear Soviet advantage.

> Finally, most of their naval vessels, even the old clunkers, carried
> nuclear weapons. The 'Whiskey-on-the-Rocks' incident would seem to
> confirm that.

We had nuclear weapons on warships down to frigate level when required
(the "Bomb, 600lb, Medium Capacity, Special" with its curiously
complicated interface wiring) too.

--
He thinks too much, such men are dangerous.

[tutall]

On Oct 26, 1:17 am, "Paul J. Adam" <paul.j.a...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 25/10/2011 21:08, Dennis wrote:

> > Don't forget either that the Soviets do not appear to have made the sharp
> > distinction between nuclear and conventional warfare that the West did;
> > they did more exercises involving combined nuclear/conventional war.

Have often read this asserted, but never supported, "doing exercises"
isn't.

[Eugene Griessel]

On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 06:44:46 -0700 (PDT), tutall <tut...@hotmail.com>
wrote:

Short of war what would support it? Whereas western forces seldom
included overt nuclear forces in their exercises these were routinely
included in Warsaw pact exercises. The use of nuclear weapons could
also devolve on quite low-level commanders in Warsaw pact exercises,
especially in cases where normal chains of command were disprupted or
decapitated. Quoting crudely and from memory Shelford Bidwell:
"nuclear weapons are regarded by Soviet commanders as routine options
to be used when the correct circumstances dictate it". (Cannot find
the exact quote on google right now, unfortunately). Certainly these
weapons were far more integrated into Soviet military organisation
than the West ever did.

Eugene L Griessel

Every revolution evaporates and leaves behind only the slime of a
new bureaucracy.

[Andy Breen]

On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 16:27:22 +0200, Eugene Griessel wrote:

> On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 06:44:46 -0700 (PDT), tutall <tut...@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>On Oct 26, 1:17 am, "Paul J. Adam" <paul.j.a...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On 25/10/2011 21:08, Dennis wrote:
>>
>>> > Don't forget either that the Soviets do not appear to have made the
>>> > sharp distinction between nuclear and conventional warfare that the
>>> > West did; they did more exercises involving combined
>>> > nuclear/conventional war.
>>
>>
>>Have often read this asserted, but never supported, "doing exercises"
>>isn't.
>
> Short of war what would support it? Whereas western forces seldom
> included overt nuclear forces in their exercises these were routinely
> included in Warsaw pact exercises.

I think it would certainly be both fair and uncontroversial to say that
during the later years of the cold war it was believed almost universally
across NATO services that the USSR drew a less distinct line between
nuclear and non-nuclear war than NATO did, and that this was factored
into planning decisions and appeared to be supported by the best
intelligence available. And, so far as I know, little has emerged in the
last 20 years to say that this view was not reasonably well founded.

--
Speaking only for myself

[Eugene Griessel]

On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 14:36:20 +0000 (UTC), Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk>

I think the attitude in Soviet thinking was "lets keep it conventional
but we'll haul out the tactical nukes when things look like they are
going against us" as a purely military decision while even on that
level it would have had to be a political decision for NATO under
similar circumstances. But theory and reality are not always anything
like each other - and short of a war having happened we will never
know what actually would have transpired if the scenario had
eventuated. Whether the use of tactical nukes could have been limited
to the theatre of operations or whether it would have precipitated
strategic retaliation is also a moot point.

Eugene L Griessel

The brain is not an empty vessel to be filled; it is a fire to be lit.
- Plutarch

[Andy Breen]

Agree, with the provisio that military and political were not as distinct
in the USSR as in most of the NATO countries (and certainly in those NATO
countries with nukes).

> But theory and reality are not always anything like each
> other - and short of a war having happened we will never know what
> actually would have transpired if the scenario had eventuated. Whether
> the use of tactical nukes could have been limited to the theatre of
> operations or whether it would have precipitated strategic retaliation
> is also a moot point.

I think it's safe to assume that events could have overtaken planning
very easily.
I'm profoundly grateful it never got put to the test.

[Jim Yanik]

Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote in
news:0c5ga7t7mj4bic6g3...@4ax.com:

would Soviet theater commanders have had the ability to use nukes on their
own decision,or would KGB(and/or Politburo) have had to give permission
first?

Nukes may have been in their inventories,but having the codes/keys to
actually arm and use them is another matter.

also,ISTR that Soviets did not allow their low-level commanders much
initiative/leeway,I believe they had to first get permission for everything
not already ordered from above.

--
Jim Yanik
jyanik
at
localnet
dot com

[Chris]

On Oct 26, 10:27 am, Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:

I'm going to play devil's advocate on this, because I'm suspicious of
a lot of NATO assumptions about internal USSR processes from the Cold
War. When the CIA writes (now declassified) NIE's on Soviet domestic
politics in 1989 that fail to mention Boris Yeltsin (far more popular
than Gorbachev at the time, according to Pryce-Jones, _The War That
Never Was_) I wonder how well exactly we understood what was going
politically within the Soviet world.

> Whereas western forces seldom
> included overt nuclear forces in their exercises these were routinely
> included in Warsaw pact exercises.  

But for most of the 1960's and 1970's tactical nuclear weapons were
definitely an unspoken part of NATO's defense plans. The Jupiter's in
Turkey that caused the Cuban Missile Crisis would be an example of
their actual deployment, but for most of the middle of the Cold War
the correlation of forces was simply not good enough for NATO to stop
a reasonably competent Soviet Army[1]. That meant that the use of
tactical nuclear weapons- as used by NATO on Soviet OMG's- was a major
possibility, and was why NATO never committed to a no-first-use of
nuclear weapons doctrine. And indeed, I have been informed by people
who were tangentially involved that NATO war games often ended with
NATO needing to use tactical nuclear weapons after a very brief
interval of conventional war. But NATO was, for domestic political
reasons, unwilling to express that publicly- how would it play in Bonn
or Copenhagen that there would probably need to be nuclear detonations
on their territory in order to keep the Soviet hordes at bay?

> The use of nuclear weapons could
> also devolve on quite low-level commanders in Warsaw pact exercises,
> especially in cases where normal chains of command were disprupted or
> decapitated.  

The Soviets always paid more attention to decapitation threats than
NATO did, but that's because NATO's C3 links were always better:
compare Looking Glass/TACMO with the Soviet Dead Hand system. Also it
is easier to keep political succession in a democracy than in a more
authoritarian system where power flows more unpredictably.

> Certainly these
> weapons were far more integrated into Soviet military organisation
> than the West ever did.

But how much of that was simply that the West German public would
never agree to SADM and W33 use all over their countryside before a
war started? The use of nuclear weapons on friendly territory is
obviously far more complex, politically, than using it on enemy
territory[2] and so it should not be surprising that NATO would try
very hard to avoid making it obvious to their own people that they
would use tactical nuclear weapons, while still trying to make it
clear to the Soviets that if they invaded there would be nuclear
weapon use. This was a major reason that the US spent much of the
1960's trying to get nuclear weapons into the hands of the Germans and
the Italians in ways that didn't freak the hell out of their
neighbors, e.g. the Lance, Honest John, Pershing-I's, etc. that they
owned and operated with their nuclear warheads in custody of the 59th
Ordinance Brigade. A very delicate dance indeed. I'm very glad that
all of this worked out and remains firmly a hypothetical discussion.

[1]: How good they actually were was another matter, but if they were
as good as they were supposed to be, an army that large would be
impossible to stop. By the 1980's, as the immediate post-WW2
generation of weapons reached block obsolescence, it is possible that
NATO's technological improvements did shift the balance, though I am
doubtful as to whether NATO had the ammo stocks necessary to stop a
good Soviet military.

[2]: Even if it was used on East German territory, would the Soviets
mind very much?

Chris Manteuffel

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 26/10/2011 18:06, Jim Yanik ha scritto:

> also,ISTR that Soviets did not allow their low-level commanders much
> initiative/leeway,I believe they had to first get permission for everything
> not already ordered from above.

AFAICT russians units are capable of long advances deep inside the enemy
lines only because was forgotten to issue the order to halt...

Russian mindset is well-known: do the work, and drop on higher-ups the
issues and troubles. this is the basic reasons why communism wasn't
adapt to Russians.

in the Red Army the least rank whose is expected to take decisions are
(pod)polvorniks (lt-col/col) and even today in Russia a retired
Podpolvornik or Polvornik command more prestige and respect that a
western Lt.Colonel or Colonel.

So I can reasonably guess that the regiment is the smallest Soviet units
enabled to take the decision on nuclear release, provided the general
directive on hands free on big shot are issued.

Russian command chain works on his peculiar way, whose is rooted in the
peculiarities of Russian military thinking.

of course these are the my 2 eurocents and IMHO.

Best regards from Italy,
dott. Piergiorgio.

[Dennis]

All of this brings me back to the question: what authority did commanders
on individual Soviet naval vessels have to use tactical nukes?

I remember in 'Rising Tide', the three Foxtrots that the USN forced to
the surface during the Cuban Missile Crisis carried nuclear torpedoes -
and each CO was sure he had authority on his own to use it. The XO and
the zampolit would also have had to use their codes, but apparently they
had whatever 'permission' they needed from HQ, though this is never
spelled out.

What can anyone else say on this?

Dennis

[Dennis]

I too am very grateful this was never put to the test!

However, we have a present-day situation which is worrisome: India and
Pakistan.

What do their respective military doctrines appear to be regarding the use
of nukes in another India/Pakistan faceoff? And what are C&C arrangements?

Dennis

[William Black]

On 26/10/11 21:05, Dennis wrote:
> I too am very grateful this was never put to the test!
>
> However, we have a present-day situation which is worrisome: India and
> Pakistan.
>
> What do their respective military doctrines appear to be regarding the use
> of nukes in another India/Pakistan faceoff? And what are C&C arrangements?

India has a formal system of control through a special section of the
Nuclear Command Authority which answers to, and accepts launch orders,
only from a cabinet committee headed by the Prime Minister.

In other words much the same as the UK except it's the Indian air-force
rather than the navy.

India is committed to a declared policy of 'No First Use'

Pakistan...

Well...

Nobody really knows.

They have a theoretical chart (
http://www.pakistanidefence.com/Nuclear&Missiles/nca.htm ) which seems
to imply that everyone has control.

They also have an organisation called 'Army Strategic Forces Command'
which may or may not actually hold or control the weapons, but they're
not saying, and neither are they saying who gives them orders.

There is also a Pakistani 'Naval Strategic Forces Command' and an 'Air
Force Strategic Command' who may or may not be under the control of the
'Army Strategic Forces Command'.

Anyway, a Pakistani politician, in the context of nuclear weapons use,
has said that 'We will not lose one square inch...".

As the USA didn't get attacked after they bumped off Osama we can
reasonably assume that this is just words...

The US government has given Pakistan a lot of money, in the range of
tens of millions of dollars, to ensure that their weapons are securely
stored.

One must assume that at least a couple of hundred dollars hasn't be
stolen...

So the blokes guarding them will at least have a pistol between them,
possibly, but we don't actually know...

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 26/10/2011 22:51, William Black ha scritto:

> Nobody really knows.
>
> They have a theoretical chart (
> http://www.pakistanidefence.com/Nuclear&Missiles/nca.htm ) which seems
> to imply that everyone has control.

O_O

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

OMG cubed !

WHEN was put together that chart ???

noticed THAT "By Invitation: Others As Required" ???????????

one really get WHAT imply ????????????

it's definitively a massive appalling thing that the chart imply that
the late OBL can have a word on the unleashing of the Wrath of Khan
(aside that the chart point also that the Wrath of Khan *is* literal,
Khan itself having a word on the unleashing....)

Really, the Divine seems to have done an first-rate blessing to America....

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 26/10/2011 22:02, Dennis ha scritto:
> All of this brings me back to the question: what authority did commanders
> on individual Soviet naval vessels have to use tactical nukes?
>
> I remember in 'Rising Tide', the three Foxtrots that the USN forced to
> the surface during the Cuban Missile Crisis carried nuclear torpedoes -
> and each CO was sure he had authority on his own to use it. The XO and
> the zampolit would also have had to use their codes, but apparently they
> had whatever 'permission' they needed from HQ, though this is never
> spelled out.
>
> What can anyone else say on this?

well, the "foxtrot dance" actually was inch from turning the Cuban
Missile Crisis into WWIII, in one of these boat, lacking contact to
higher-ups and being keeping down by an efficient ASW actions, was
seriously considered the fire in angry of the nuke torpedo aboard, whose
consequence are too obvious to figure....

I suspect that giving enough snort (and comm) time became an unwritten
rule of the Cold War underwater game....

[tutall]

On Oct 26, 7:36 am, Andy Breen <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote:
> On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 16:27:22 +0200, Eugene Griessel wrote:
> > On Wed, 26 Oct 2011 06:44:46 -0700 (PDT), tutall <tut...@hotmail.com>
> > wrote:
>
> >>On Oct 26, 1:17 am, "Paul J. Adam" <paul.j.a...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>> On 25/10/2011 21:08, Dennis wrote:
>
> >>> > Don't forget either that the Soviets do not appear to have made the
> >>> > sharp distinction between nuclear and conventional warfare that the
> >>> > West did; they did more exercises involving combined
> >>> > nuclear/conventional war.
>
> >>Have often read this asserted, but never supported, "doing exercises"
> >>isn't.
>
> > Short of war what would support it?

Exactly.

> I think it would certainly be both fair and uncontroversial to say that
> during the later years of the cold war it was believed almost universally
> across NATO services that the USSR drew a less distinct line between
> nuclear and non-nuclear war than NATO did, and that this was factored
> into planning decisions and appeared to be supported by the best
> intelligence available.

Was it the gaming for worst case scenario that impellled the
conclusion, or maybe, and more likely, made up as political support
for the placement of tactical nukes in the early 80's into the NATO
theatre? Was there during this and has the pleasure of being tasked to
try and observe and take pictures of (from the air) a few Peacekeepers
( got to love the ironic names the military is so fond of, eh? )
deployed in the field in W. Germany. We had to bust the air space of a
nuke power plant for one of them. Actually flew over the cooling
tower. Strange times. 96H

>And, so far as I know, little has emerged in the
> last 20 years to say that this view was not reasonably well founded.

Nor any support AFAIK.

[Chris]

On Oct 26, 8:28 pm, tutall <tut...@hotmail.com> wrote:

> Was there during this and has the pleasure of being tasked to
> try and observe and take pictures of (from the air) a few Peacekeepers
> ( got to love the ironic names the military is so fond of, eh? )
> deployed in the field in W. Germany.

A Peacekeeper? A LGM-118 inter-continental ballistic missile with 10
MIRV's? So far as I know they were only ever deployed in Wyoming. What
were they doing in a field in Germany? They were silo-only, again so
far as I'm aware. There was the relative named Midgetman which was
intended to be put into a rail car and shuffled around the western US
but none of them were ever built.

Are you sure you aren't thinking of a Pershing-II MRBM? Those were
definitely deployed to Germany and were road-mobile missiles. We even
sold the Germans a bunch of 'em. (Or Honest John or Lance or Pluton or
Hades or Thor or...)

Chris Manteuffel

[mike]

On Oct 26, 5:57 pm, "dott.Piergiorgio" <chiedet...@ask.me> wrote:

> well, the "foxtrot dance" actually was inch from turning the Cuban
> Missile Crisis into WWIII, in one of these boat, lacking contact to
> higher-ups and being keeping down by an efficient ASW actions, was
> seriously considered the fire in angry of the nuke torpedo aboard, whose
> consequence are too obvious to figure....
>
> I suspect that giving enough snort (and comm) time became an unwritten
> rule of the Cold War underwater game....

From what I recall, the Soviets had orders not to surface near
USN forces, while the USN had orders that unknown sub contacts
should be 'Induced' to surface.

That meant that the ASW efforts detected the Subs without much
trouble, so DDs sat ontop them, chucking practice bombs overboard
and active pings till they lost their nerve.

Now had the Soviet Skipper & Commisar decided for blaze of glory,
my guess as soon as the DD detected tubes flooding, the sounds
the Sov Sonarman would hear last would have been the splash
from an ASROC, and then the sounds from the acoustic mk46
running in.

**
mike
**

[Derek Lyons]

Chris <cman...@gmail.com> wrote:

>The Soviets always paid more attention to decapitation threats than
>NATO did, but that's because NATO's C3 links were always better:
>compare Looking Glass/TACMO with the Soviet Dead Hand system.

The mythical Dead Hand, or the real one? Because the real one was
pretty much the same as the US used - in the event of decapitation,
nuclear command authority shifted to CINCNORAD.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

[Dennis]

mike wrote:

... and the human race hope that the Mk46 would hit faster than the
Soviet nuclear torpedo could be launched!

AIRC, one Soviet skipper had live-fired a nuclear torpedo and watched
the explosion through his periscope during a test, so he was well aware
of what it could do. If US forces had attacked him, he would have used
it, though he knew he and his boat would die too.

The crew of another Foxtrot were worried about their skipper, who was a
hothead; they thought he was going to use his nuke, but he didn't.

It didn't help that the Foxtrots had been ordered to advance at a pace
that had mechanically damaged the boats, given the weather.

That's what I remember from *Rising Tide*. A lot of it is in *October
Fury* too.

[H. Wilker]

In article
<93c69ecb-e976-47b6...@z7g2000yqj.googlegroups.com>,

Suvorov's "Inside the Soviet Army" has a chapter on the Soviet way of
warfare, so to speak. The main difference, according to Suvorov, is that
Soviet generals will use all the weapons at their disposal as soon as
possible, in a major strike at the enemy - explicitly including nuclear
weapons.

The plan includes a number of phases. The first (from memory) is 30
minutes long and consists of a strike with all available weapons,
nuclear, chemical and conventional; missiles and aircraft, at enemy
targets. The second phase (90 minutes, I think) is BDA and
reconnaissance for mobile targets, and the third is a re-strike with
reloaded missile launchers (or "rockets", as he calls them) and
aircraft. Only then would the tanks start to move.

Google Books only shows snippets; this seems to be the relevant passage:

http://books.google.com/books?ei=-iqpTsTdDcySOv3BnQc&ct=result&id=i2eq463
J8FYC&dq=inside+the+soviet+army&q=%22overwhelming+proportion%22#search_an
chor

Helge

[H. Wilker]

In article
<3fff32df-f636-443b...@c1g2000vbw.googlegroups.com>,
Chris <cman...@gmail.com> wrote:

(snip)

> Are you sure you aren't thinking of a Pershing-II MRBM? Those were
> definitely deployed to Germany and were road-mobile missiles. We even
> sold the Germans a bunch of 'em. (Or Honest John or Lance or Pluton or
> Hades or Thor or...)

The Pershing II all belonged to US forces. German forces had Pershing
IA, and Lance. It was not a secret that they had nuclear warheads, under
US control.

During the eighties, one exercise or war plan became well-known in
Germany in which NATO would detonate dozens of nuclear warheads in the
Fulda gap in a short period of time (I'm not sure which one it was -
might also be a mix-up or misinterpretation of older plans (Zebra
package) and actual exercises). This then became one of the memes for
the futility of nuclear warfare.

Helge

[tutall]

On Oct 26, 9:22 pm, Chris <cmant...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> Are you sure you aren't thinking of a Pershing-II MRBM? Those were
> definitely deployed to Germany and were road-mobile missiles. We even
> sold the Germans a bunch of 'em. (Or Honest John or Lance or Pluton or
> Hades or Thor or...)
>

Yes, after I posted this remembered the less sexily named Pershing-II.
Which is really the name of a nice tank dammit, If the Pershing I is a
tank, how'd it morph into a tac nuke with V2, hows that work? Ah well.
Thank you for the correction.
The crews manning them were very, very good at camoflage. Hard to find
even at 150kts and 300'.

[Chris]

On Oct 27, 6:13 am, "H. Wilker" <news1.3.hwil...@spamgourmet.com>
wrote:
> In article
> <3fff32df-f636-443b-9766-067c3993c...@c1g2000vbw.googlegroups.com>,

>
>  Chris <cmant...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> (snip)
>
> > Are you sure you aren't thinking of a Pershing-II MRBM? Those were
> > definitely deployed to Germany and were road-mobile missiles. We even
> > sold the Germans a bunch of 'em. (Or Honest John or Lance or Pluton or
> > Hades or Thor or...)
>
> The Pershing II all belonged to US forces. German forces had Pershing
> IA, and Lance. It was not a secret that they had nuclear warheads, under
> US control.

Correct, I made a mistake, I meant the Pershing-I was sold to the
Germans. As were Honest John's and Sergeant's and Lance's. The 59th
Ordinance Battalion owned the nuclear warheads, though all (except the
Pershing, I think?) of them had conventional warheads as well, which
presumably the Germans could use without American control. Honest
John's at least had a Sarin warhead option- did the Germans own those
directly or did those belong to the 59th too? How developed was the
Bundeswehr chemical weapons capability?

Chris Manteuffel

[Derek Lyons]

tutall <tut...@hotmail.com> wrote:

>On Oct 26, 9:22�pm, Chris <cmant...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> Are you sure you aren't thinking of a Pershing-II MRBM? Those were
>> definitely deployed to Germany and were road-mobile missiles. We even
>> sold the Germans a bunch of 'em. (Or Honest John or Lance or Pluton or
>> Hades or Thor or...)
>>
>
>Yes, after I posted this remembered the less sexily named Pershing-II.
>Which is really the name of a nice tank dammit, If the Pershing I is a
>tank, how'd it morph into a tac nuke with V2, hows that work? Ah well.
>Thank you for the correction.

The Pershing I wasn't a tank, it too was a tactical missile...

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-31.html

[tutall]

On Oct 27, 10:17 am, fairwa...@gmail.com (Derek Lyons) wrote:
> tutall <tut...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >On Oct 26, 9:22 pm, Chris <cmant...@gmail.com> wrote:

> The Pershing I wasn't a tank, it too was a tactical missile...
>
> http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-31.html

Do I look like a nit or something?

[Chris]

On Oct 27, 1:46 am, fairwa...@gmail.com (Derek Lyons) wrote:

> Chris <cmant...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >The Soviets always paid more attention to decapitation threats than
> >NATO did, but that's because NATO's C3 links were always better:
> >compare Looking Glass/TACMO with the Soviet Dead Hand system.
>
> The mythical Dead Hand, or the real one?  Because the real one was
> pretty much the same as the US used - in the event of decapitation,
> nuclear command authority shifted to CINCNORAD.

The real one: both were similar, but the American one had much more
redundancy, with NORAD and Looking Glass and TACAMO and ERCS and NECAP
and the VLFnet and more that I'm not thinking of off the top of my
head: many different communication systems and ways of sending out the
end the world message. The Soviet Dead Hand involved, so far as is
publicly known, a single installation that, in the event of a war,
would be a second single point target. Also, as I understand it the
guys in the bunker for Perimetr were fairly junior officers compared
to the Flag Officers who manned Looking Glass, TACAMO and NORAD
continuously.

But this worry over decap is why the INF treaty was so attractive, and
the Pershing-II was such a threat.

Chris Manteuffel

[H. Wilker]

In article
<5a74052b-9927-4294...@4g2000yqu.googlegroups.com>,

Chris <cman...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Oct 27, 6:13�am, "H. Wilker" <news1.3.hwil...@spamgourmet.com>
> wrote:

snip

> > The Pershing II all belonged to US forces. German forces had Pershing
> > IA, and Lance. It was not a secret that they had nuclear warheads, under
> > US control.
>
> Correct, I made a mistake, I meant the Pershing-I was sold to the
> Germans. As were Honest John's and Sergeant's and Lance's. The 59th
> Ordinance Battalion owned the nuclear warheads, though all (except the
> Pershing, I think?) of them had conventional warheads as well, which
> presumably the Germans could use without American control. Honest
> John's at least had a Sarin warhead option- did the Germans own those
> directly or did those belong to the 59th too? How developed was the
> Bundeswehr chemical weapons capability?

Interesting question - I believe I never once heard about chemical
weapons in Bundeswehr arsenals. "Nuclear Sharing", for both
air-delivered and missile weapons, was relatively well-known. I don't
think the Bundeswehr had CW at any time during the Cold War - it would
have come out by now.

Helge

[Dennis]

No, you're a wit! :-)

Dennis

[Arved Sandstrom]

I had the good fortune back in the early '80's to have a PoliSci prof by
the name of Dan Middlemiss, who was then (and is now) a respected and
well-rounded Canadian military analyst. One course he taught was
specifically about nuclear weapons and warfare - the discussion was more
about the strategic level, but we touched on tactical. My memory of what
he had to say about Soviet thinking matches what you and Andy are saying.

My guess is that if the Russians in particular saw that success or
failure in a maritime mission hinged (or more importantly, seemed to
hinge) on a use of nuclear weapons, that they would've gotten used
without too much soul-searching. A NUCDET in an open expanse of sea is
much easier to explain (and has much less impact on subsequent
warfighting operations) than setting one off between German towns.

AHS
--
I tend to watch a little TV... Court TV, once in a while. Some of the
cases I get interested in.
-- O. J. Simpson

[Andrew Chaplin]

Arved Sandstrom <asandstr...@eastlink.ca> wrote in
news:K0erq.17557$vg7....@newsfe04.iad:

> I had the good fortune back in the early '80's to have a PoliSci prof
> by the name of Dan Middlemiss, who was then (and is now) a respected
> and well-rounded Canadian military analyst. One course he taught was
> specifically about nuclear weapons and warfare - the discussion was
> more about the strategic level, but we touched on tactical. My memory
> of what he had to say about Soviet thinking matches what you and Andy
> are saying.

My father knew and liked him him.

An example of a straw breaking a camel's back:
http://queensjournal.ca/story/2011-10-04/news/campus-catchup/
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)

[Arved Sandstrom]

On 11-10-30 12:48 PM, Andrew Chaplin wrote:
> Arved Sandstrom <asandstr...@eastlink.ca> wrote in
> news:K0erq.17557$vg7....@newsfe04.iad:
>
>> I had the good fortune back in the early '80's to have a PoliSci prof
>> by the name of Dan Middlemiss, who was then (and is now) a respected
>> and well-rounded Canadian military analyst. One course he taught was
>> specifically about nuclear weapons and warfare - the discussion was
>> more about the strategic level, but we touched on tactical. My memory
>> of what he had to say about Soviet thinking matches what you and Andy
>> are saying.
>
> My father knew and liked him him.
>
> An example of a straw breaking a camel's back:
> http://queensjournal.ca/story/2011-10-04/news/campus-catchup/

I remember that when it happened, it was in local news. Can't say I
blame him; his complaints are real. Dalhousie had those parking problems
over 30 years ago when I went to school there.

You'd think the powers that be would consider staff retention, and at
least have dedicated parking for them. Promoting sustainability is all
well and good but they've got plenty of students they can do that with.

[Andre Ilausky]

Arved Sandstrom schrieb:

> I had the good fortune back in the early '80's to have a PoliSci prof by
> the name of Dan Middlemiss, who was then (and is now) a respected and
> well-rounded Canadian military analyst. One course he taught was
> specifically about nuclear weapons and warfare - the discussion was more
> about the strategic level, but we touched on tactical. My memory of what
> he had to say about Soviet thinking matches what you and Andy are saying.
>
> My guess is that if the Russians in particular saw that success or
> failure in a maritime mission hinged (or more importantly, seemed to
> hinge) on a use of nuclear weapons, that they would've gotten used
> without too much soul-searching. A NUCDET in an open expanse of sea is
> much easier to explain (and has much less impact on subsequent
> warfighting operations) than setting one off between German towns.

But how much soul-searching would there be before the USN launches
Tomahawks with W80 nuclear warhead in retaliation against Soviet Naval
Aviation or the whole Soviet Navy? Something like an airfield might even
be a more cooperative target than say an aircraft carrier "hiding"
somewhere in the Atlantic at 30 knots.

Just like the US might e.g. have been reluctant to take out the Soviet
naval space reconnaissance and targeting system (RORSAT, EORSAT) in
case it turns out the USSR is superior at destroying satellites and
putting new ones into orbit.

[Arved Sandstrom]

On 11-11-01 05:02 AM, Andre Ilausky wrote:
> Arved Sandstrom schrieb:
>> I had the good fortune back in the early '80's to have a PoliSci prof by
>> the name of Dan Middlemiss, who was then (and is now) a respected and
>> well-rounded Canadian military analyst. One course he taught was
>> specifically about nuclear weapons and warfare - the discussion was more
>> about the strategic level, but we touched on tactical. My memory of what
>> he had to say about Soviet thinking matches what you and Andy are saying.
>>
>> My guess is that if the Russians in particular saw that success or
>> failure in a maritime mission hinged (or more importantly, seemed to
>> hinge) on a use of nuclear weapons, that they would've gotten used
>> without too much soul-searching. A NUCDET in an open expanse of sea is
>> much easier to explain (and has much less impact on subsequent
>> warfighting operations) than setting one off between German towns.
>
> But how much soul-searching would there be before the USN launches
> Tomahawks with W80 nuclear warhead in retaliation against Soviet Naval
> Aviation or the whole Soviet Navy? Something like an airfield might even
> be a more cooperative target than say an aircraft carrier "hiding"
> somewhere in the Atlantic at 30 knots.

A lot less if the Russians had already shot first. I'm not demonizing
the Soviets here (although I do not like Russians); we could as well be
discussing NATO/French first use if the entire Central Front had folded.

I expect that if the targets of NATO retaliation had indeed been
airfields in the Kola (related cool link:
http://englishrussia.com/2009/03/31/dead-towns-of-kola/) that there
might not have been much soul-searching at all.

> Just like the US might e.g. have been reluctant to take out the Soviet
> naval space reconnaissance and targeting system (RORSAT, EORSAT) in
> case it turns out the USSR is superior at destroying satellites and
> putting new ones into orbit.

I can't comment on that, but a related example is how NATO put itself in
a hole with regard to chemical weapons. The Soviets were always
substantially in the lead with regards to warfare on a chemical
battlefield. NATO therefore painted itself into a corner, having to
contemplate first-use of nuclear weapons in response to WP chemical
strikes. You can lump chemical, biological and nuclear all under
"weapons of mass destruction", but a lot of people actually draw a
distinction.

[scott s.]

Andre Ilausky <ai_...@abwesend.de> wrote in
news:4eafa7c7$0$4149$6e1e...@read.cnntp.org:

> But how much soul-searching would there be before the USN launches
> Tomahawks with W80 nuclear warhead in retaliation against Soviet
> Naval Aviation or the whole Soviet Navy? Something like an airfield
> might even be a more cooperative target than say an aircraft carrier
> "hiding" somewhere in the Atlantic at 30 knots.

TLAM-N was a strategic weapon, so targetting was at the NCA level.
USN had no control over how or where they might be used. They
were only the trigger-puller.

scott s.
.

[KDR]

On Oct 25, 10:42 pm, Eugene Griessel <eug...@dynagen.co.za> wrote:
> The Warsaw Pact NATO scenario was held by many in command to be
> a bit of an unlikely scenario whereas there were real scenarios begging
> for carriers.

Sounds like implying that the RN at that time admitted carriers had
relevance only in limited war scenarios in the East of Suez.

[Andre Ilausky]

Arved Sandstrom schrieb:

>> Just like the US might e.g. have been reluctant to take out the Soviet
>> naval space reconnaissance and targeting system (RORSAT, EORSAT) in
>> case it turns out the USSR is superior at destroying satellites and
>> putting new ones into orbit.
>
> I can't comment on that, but a related example is how NATO put itself in
> a hole with regard to chemical weapons. The Soviets were always
> substantially in the lead with regards to warfare on a chemical
> battlefield.

Dunno. There certainly were some covert tests undertaken during the Cold
War that were only leaked/released in the last decade or so. Like
Project SHAD (Shipboard Hazard and Defense) by the DoD which ran until
1973. Operation Steel Box moved 100,000 VX and Sarin shells from Germany
to Johnston Atoll in 1990. Or take the gas attack on Halabja during the
Iran-Iraq War involving foreign firms from places like Germany and the
Netherlands.

> NATO therefore painted itself into a corner, having to
> contemplate first-use of nuclear weapons in response to WP chemical
> strikes.

NATO also contemplated first use in response to a conventional attack
(massive retaliation, deliberate escalation). Today the US has the
Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (or not ;) which apparently covers
this too.

> You can lump chemical, biological and nuclear all under
> "weapons of mass destruction", but a lot of people actually draw a
> distinction.

A lot of people seem to think that troops can reasonable effective fight
through a lot of this and that it's better to blow stuff up.
Maybe it's triggering some kind of genetic imperative. In my youth, I
saw a documentary about WMD, including the suitcase nuke and I believe
even a nuclear weapon in a pen (Maybe not a documentary? ;), and some of
the other stuff sca^H^H^Hconcerned me more. (And indeed, we are (again,
e.g. lead poisoning in ancient Rome might have played a role in their
downfall) at a point were there is food out there trying to kill us (by
accident).)