WWII Naval Navigation
VEWenneker
Nik Simpson
> How did Naval aircraft in World War II find their way back to their
> carriers?
Largely by dead reckoning, radio comms & the Mark 1 eyeball.
--
Nik Simpson
Vince Brannigan
VEWenneker wrote:
> How did Naval aircraft in World War II find their way back to their carriers?
Sometimes with great difficulty
It depended on several factors. was the carrier maintaining radio silence?
Was it night or day?
Even a very long carrier air mission only lasted 3 hours. navigating
the reverse course to take you back to the starting location was
fairly easy
If a carrier was not under radio silence it could pick up its aircraft
on radar at about 150 miles and vector them in. Picket ships were also
used for the same purpose.
the navy experimented with both blind flying and radio beacons at
College park airport in the early thirties.
Vince
Tom Vart
"Vince Brannigan" <fir...@pressroom.com> wrote in message
news:ZSk5c.22809$F9....@nwrddc01.gnilink.net...
>
<SNIP>
> If a carrier was not under radio silence it could pick up its aircraft
> on radar at about 150 miles and vector them in. Picket ships were also
> used for the same purpose.
>
WW2 Seaborne radar sets capable of detection's 150 NM out?
Do you have a source Vince?
Tom
Gernot Hassenpflug
> VEWenneker wrote:
>> How did Naval aircraft in World War II find their way back to their carriers?
>
>
> If a carrier was not under radio silence it could pick up its aircraft
> on radar at about 150 miles and vector them in. Picket ships were
> also used for the same purpose.
IIRC radio silence does not mean no rar used, but the voice channels
and possibly beacons (also VHF/UHF frequency). Off Okinawa and Japan,
radio silence was often enforced in the efforts to counter kamikazes,
but radar was a vital component to enable the TFs to change course to
try and avoid incoming strikes and to vector in the fighters. Or do I
have it wrong?
--
G Hassenpflug RASC, Kyoto University
John Phillips
<fir...@pressroom.com> wrote:
>
>Even a very long carrier air mission only lasted 3 hours. navigating
>the reverse course to take you back to the starting location was
>fairly easy
>
Vince,
I would have assumed that the planes would have to plot a course to a
designated location or did the carriers always steam in a box until
the strike returned?
Regards,
John Phillips
Vince Brannigan
Remember these are tall masts detecting high flying aircraft.
Morgan McMahon and Radar
Copyright Volume 2 SMEC Vintage Electrics 1989-1990 (now SMECC 2001)
"XAR was the prototype for the SC, SK and SA radars. SC and SK were
identical except for antenna size, was larger for the SK. Transmitter
power was 330 KW, pulse width 5 usec, and frequency in the 200 MHz band.
Maximum aircraft target range was about 80 miles for the SC and 150
miles for the SK. Large numbers (over 1,000) of these sets were built in
1942-45. SC’s were destined for destroyers, and SK’s for larger ships.
SA’s, not covered here, were used on smaller escort vessels."
http://www.smecc.org/mcmahon's_radars!.htm
My father in law Dr. Edward Dayhoff Was a physics student at Columbia
when he enlisted in the navy. He started a voyage to the pacific fleet
as a radar trainee and ended up spending the war in Hawaii as a radar
expert. He came back finished his Ph.D. and spent his career at the
Naval ordnance lab and similar weapons facilities.
Vince
Joel Shepherd
> How did Naval aircraft in World War II find their way back to their
> carriers?
(Speaking in USN terms only) One method was for the carrier to
estimate a "Point Option" -- the position the carrier would be
expected to be at by the time the planes returned -- and pass this
along to the aircrews before launch. In practice, estimates of the
carrier's progress were often overly optimistic, so planes would
arrive to find ocean and no flight deck.
There were also homing beacons: the ZB/YE setup used by the USN could
work effectively at ranges of 60 miles, perhaps more.
But, as another poster said, a certain amount of dead reckoning was
required on the return flight (implying care had to be taken on the
outbound flight to plot one's actual course).
--
Joel.
Vince Brannigan
Gernot Hassenpflug wrote:
Radio silence was only important if you were trying to surprise the
enemy. the Japanese knew we were at Okinawa You cant "vecotr" fighters
withou using radio.
Vince
Vince Brannigan
John Phillips wrote:
AIUI from a long ago conversation with Dan Gallery The aviator knew the
wind direction and the carrier followed the wind. If all else failed n
they would come back to the launch point and then move upwind.
Vince
Jack Love
<ats...@nyc.RoadRunner.com> wrote:
>And luck.
>
>It's worth remembering that it's not unheard of for land-based planes
>of that era to not be able to find their *stationary* home field.
The P-38 guys at the Red Barn show a few years ago (this was
essentially a talk put on by 10 or so of the Yamamoto shoot down team
to deny Lamphere's claim, after his death, and support Barber) talked
about the navigation for the interception (had a big Navy compass
mounted and swung the night before) as "I felt it was time to turn."
With at least 2 doglegs in the flight plan to avoid Japanese radar on
the mission, and making a perfect on time and point intercept
(according to Mitchell, who was there as well with the mission flight
plan in his pocket, "I drew it up, no one helped me except for one
Navy Commander who checked the math." 1-50000 (or maybe 1-5000000)
shot.
Also talked about one mission with a vicious dog fight not over until
near dark, returning in the dark got "What I thought was near the
airfield, and came on the radio, to my surprise they responded and
turned on the lights." The radios on board were extremely short
ranged by modern standards IIRC around 17 miles depending upon
conditions.
Proof, IMO, we're all created equal, just some more so than others.
raymond o'hara
"VEWenneker" <vewen...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20040315104044...@mb-m21.aol.com...
> How did Naval aircraft in World War II find their way back to their
carriers?
the day after the famed marianas turley shoot the fleet turned opn all
it's lights to guide the airgroup back after a long day of raids .
Jim McLaughlin
source.
Isn't it neat how the 'perfesser' constantly invents? Whether its data on
60 year old radars or this weeks world political situation, its all the
same.
Things are whatever Vknce says they are.
--
Jim McLaughlin
Please don't just hit the reply key.
Remove the obvious from the address to reply.
***************************************************************************
"Vince Brannigan" <fir...@pressroom.com> wrote in message
news:bVl5c.23745$F9.1...@nwrddc01.gnilink.net...
Keith Willshaw
"Vince Brannigan" <fir...@pressroom.com> wrote in message
news:ZSk5c.22809$F9....@nwrddc01.gnilink.net...
>
>
> > How did Naval aircraft in World War II find their way back to their
carriers?
>
>
> Sometimes with great difficulty
> It depended on several factors. was the carrier maintaining radio
silence?
>
> Was it night or day?
>
> Even a very long carrier air mission only lasted 3 hours. navigating
> the reverse course to take you back to the starting location was
> fairly easy
>
It would be hard enough if the carrier remained in the exact position you
left
from as you'd have to allow for drift but given that carrier was steaming
along
at anything up to 30 knots it tended to be a little trickier.
I've heard it called many things but fairly easy was never one of them
Keith
Vince Brannigan
I posted the cite, which is online
Morgan McMahon and Radar
> Copyright Volume 2 SMEC Vintage Electrics 1989-1990 (now SMECC 2001)
>
> "XAR was the prototype for the SC, SK and SA radars. SC and SK were
> identical except for antenna size, was larger for the SK. Transmitter
> power was 330 KW, pulse width 5 usec, and frequency in the 200 MHz band.
> Maximum aircraft target range was about 80 miles for the SC and 150
> miles for the SK. Large numbers (over 1,000) of these sets were built in
> 1942-45. SC’s were destined for destroyers, and SK’s for larger ships.
> SA’s, not covered here, were used on smaller escort vessels."
> http://www.smecc.org/mcmahon's_radars!.htm
the author had personal direct experience with wwII radar
Morgan McMahon joined the U.S. Navy in November, 1942. He attended naval
electronics schools at Oklahoma A&M, Treasure Island and MIT’s Radiation
Laboratory. He was assigned to teach loran at Pearl Harbor, but talked
his way onto a destroyer, the U.S.S. Stephen Potter, DD-538. He was
responsible for all electronic equipment aboard the ship from April 1944
until the ship was decommissioned in January 1946. The Potter
participated in all major operations of the Third and Fifth Fleets in
the Asiatic Theater of war. Mr. McMahon was particularly interested in
optimizing the ship’s then-primitive radar countermeasures equipment,
and was commended by Commander, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet, for "making
more effective important equipment in daily use against the enemy".
After the war, Mr. McMahon went on to U.C. Berkeley and a career in
solid-state electronics. He also wrote and edited the Vintage Radio book
series.
Jim McLaughlin wrote:
> In other words vCkne yet again is making it up as he goes along, and has no
> source.
>
> Isn't it neat how the 'perfesser' constantly invents? Whether its data on
> 60 year old radars or this weeks world political situation, its all the
> same.
>
> Things are whatever Vknce says they are.
>
The only thing "invented" here is an inability to recognize a citation
Vince
Duke of URL
VEWenneker <vewen...@aol.com> radiated into the WorldWideWait:
> How did Naval aircraft in World War II find their way back to their
> carriers?
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS
or
A WING AND A PURR
By Sqn Ldr G E Whitelam, Int 3, HQ STC
Most people wish to fly on the old gauges at one time or another but
are prevented by the high cost of the instruments necessary for this
form of flight. The following is a more or less known and extremely
simple method which may be used by all.
Place a live cat[1] on the cockpit floor, because a cat always remains
upright, he or she can be used in lieu of a needle and ball
instrument. Merely watch to see which way he leans[2] to determine if
a wing is low and if so, which one. This will enable you to keep your
aircraft level en-route with complete accuracy and confidence.[3]
A duck is used for final instrument approach and landing, because of
the fact that any sensible[4] old duck will refuse to fly under
instrument conditions[5], it is only necessary to hurl your duck out
of the cockpit window and follow her to the ground.
There are some limitations on the cat and duck[6] method, but by
rigidly adhering to the check list a degree of success will be
achieved which will not only startle you, but will astonish your
passengers as well, and may leave an occasional tower operator with an
open mouth.
[1] Get a wide-awake cat, most cats do not want to stand up all the
time, so it may be necessary to carry a fierce dog along to keep the
cat at attention.
[2] Make sure your cat is clean, dirty cats will spend all the time
washing. Trying to follow a washing cat usually results in a slow roll
followed by an inverted spin. You will see that this is most
unprofessional.
[3] Old cats are the best, young cats have nine lives, but an old used
up cat with only one life left has just as much to lose and will be
more dependable. Avoid stray cats. Try to get one with good character
because you may want to spend time with her.
[4] Beware of cowardly ducks, if the duck discovers that you are using
the cat to stay upright, she will refuse to leave the aeroplane
without the cat. Ducks are no better on instruments than you are.
[5] Get a duck with good eyes. Near sighted ducks sometimes fail to
recognise that they are on the old gauges and will go flogging into
the nearest hill. Very near sighted ducks will not realise that they
have been thrown out and will descend to the ground in a sitting
position. This is a most difficult manoeuvre to follow in an
aeroplane.
[6] Choose your duck carefully, it is easy to confuse ducks with
geese. Many large birds look alike. While they are very competent
instrument flyers, geese seldom want to go in the same direction that
you do. If your duck seems to be taking a heading to Ireland or
Sweden, you may be safe in assuming that someone has given you a
goose.
--
From the one-and-only Holy MosesŽ
Peter Skelton
<jim.mclaughl...@comcast.net> wrote:
>In other words vCkne yet again is making it up as he goes along, and has no
>source.
>
>Isn't it neat how the 'perfesser' constantly invents? Whether its data on
>60 year old radars or this weeks world political situation, its all the
>same.
>
> Things are whatever Vknce says they are.
This time Jim, you're utterly full of it. The request is proof
for something about as hard to prove as "water flows downhill"
yet Vince gave a reference:
Morgan McMahon and Radar
Copyright Volume 2 SMEC Vintage Electrics 1989-1990 (now SMECC
2001)
The early long-wave radars often saw aircraft to the line of
sight limit. You don't look into radar much before you find that
out.
Peter Skelton
W. D. Allen Sr.
letters in sectors radiating from the ship. Returning planes were to
approach the carrier in specified vectors to avoid getting shot down.
WDA
end
"VEWenneker" <vewen...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20040315104044...@mb-m21.aol.com...
William Donzelli
> How did Naval aircraft in World War II find their way back to their carriers?
They used the YE-ZB system. This was a carrier (and airfield) based
coded radio beacon. For more info, try:
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=3e3c828d.21878853%40news.pacific.net.au&output=gplain
William Donzelli
William Donzelli
> WW2 Seaborne radar sets capable of detection's 150 NM out?
SK-* and SR could on a good day. The PPI scopes maxed out at 200 NM.
William Donzelli
Tom Vart
<SNIP>
Thanks Vince, interesting stuff.
Joel Shepherd
Not for the first time. And both Spruance and Mitscher were present at
that earlier occasion as well.
--
Joel.
Vince Brannigan
Keith Willshaw wrote:
>>
>>Even a very long carrier air mission only lasted 3 hours. navigating
>>the reverse course to take you back to the starting location was
>>fairly easy
>>
>
>
> It would be hard enough if the carrier remained in the exact position you
> left
> from as you'd have to allow for drift but given that carrier was steaming
> along
> at anything up to 30 knots it tended to be a little trickier.
>
> I've heard it called many things but fairly easy was never one of them
>
did you miss the part were I posted
"AIUI from a long ago conversation with Dan Gallery The aviator knew the
wind direction and the carrier followed the wind. If all else failed n
they would come back to the launch point and then move upwind."
Returning to the "starting location" is obviously not the same thing as
returning to the carrier.
Vince
Keith Willshaw
>
>
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
> >>
> >>Even a very long carrier air mission only lasted 3 hours. navigating
> >>the reverse course to take you back to the starting location was
> >>fairly easy
> >>
> >
> >
> > It would be hard enough if the carrier remained in the exact position
you
> > left
> > from as you'd have to allow for drift but given that carrier was
steaming
> > along
> > at anything up to 30 knots it tended to be a little trickier.
> >
> > I've heard it called many things but fairly easy was never one of them
> >
>
>
> did you miss the part were I posted
>
> "AIUI from a long ago conversation with Dan Gallery The aviator knew the
> wind direction and the carrier followed the wind. If all else failed n
> they would come back to the launch point and then move upwind."
>
That was of course in a LATER post than the one I responded
to. Since I dont have a time machine reading it before replying would
have been somewhat tricky.
>
> Returning to the "starting location" is obviously not the same thing as
> returning to the carrier.
>
Just so and returning to the carrier is a rather important part
of the mission. The carrier is unlikely to simply keep sailing
upwind for the duration of the mission. Often the aircraft were given
an anticipated position to return to which was NOT the point of
departure and in the days before INS and GPS this was a tricky
piece of navigation, especially for the fighter pilots who had to
do their own navigation as well as flying the aircraft.
Keith
RENABORNEY
> How did Naval aircraft in World War II find their way back to their carriers?
They used the YE-ZB system. This was a carrier (and airfield) based
coded radio beacon. For more info, try:
SNIP
The RN also had a rdio beacon (looked like a lantern) see page 62 of Lenton &
College's "British & Dominion Warships of World War II" showing Ark Royal's
"distinctive aircraft homing beacon at the masthead."
The US YW antenna looked like a curved radar antenna
OF course, the RN also insisted that its fighters carry a full-time
navaigator...
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Keith Willshaw wrote:
> "
> > did you miss the part were I posted
> >
> > "AIUI from a long ago conversation with Dan Gallery The aviator knew the
> > wind direction and the carrier followed the wind. If all else failed n
> > they would come back to the launch point and then move upwind."
> >
>
> That was of course in a LATER post than the one I responded
> to. Since I dont have a time machine reading it before replying would
> have been somewhat tricky.
It was later than the post you responded to, but was it was posted before your
response was written
I certainly understand that in the vagaries of usenet crossposting is
routine.I thought I asked politely " did you miss the part were I posted" I
apologize if I was misunderstood
> >
> > Returning to the "starting location" is obviously not the same thing as
> > returning to the carrier.
> >
>
> Just so and returning to the carrier is a rather important part
> of the mission. The carrier is unlikely to simply keep sailing
> upwind for the duration of the mission. Often the aircraft were given
> an anticipated position to return to which was NOT the point of
> departure and in the days before INS and GPS this was a tricky
> piece of navigation, especially for the fighter pilots who had to
> do their own navigation as well as flying the aircraft.
Absolutely. in fact this was a major issue in tactical and ship design in the
1930s The need for carriers to operate completely separately from the battle
line was demonstrated as early as 1932 In the london naval conference the US
need for high speed, high endurance cruisers as carrier escorts was stressed
One of the functions occcasionally assigned to the scout planes operated by
cruisers and battleships was acting as direction finders for the attack
squadrons.
Vince
Keith Willshaw
"Prof. Vincent Brannigan" <fir...@umd.edu> wrote in message
news:40571929...@umd.edu...
>
>
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
> > "
> > > did you miss the part were I posted
> > >
> > > "AIUI from a long ago conversation with Dan Gallery The aviator knew
the
> > > wind direction and the carrier followed the wind. If all else failed
n
> > > they would come back to the launch point and then move upwind."
> > >
> >
> > That was of course in a LATER post than the one I responded
> > to. Since I dont have a time machine reading it before replying would
> > have been somewhat tricky.
>
> It was later than the post you responded to, but was it was posted before
your
> response was written
I posted before seeing your later message, this server has
occasional delays, especially on outgoing mail
> I certainly understand that in the vagaries of usenet crossposting is
> routine.I thought I asked politely " did you miss the part were I posted"
I
> apologize if I was misunderstood
>
Accepted
Keith
Keith Willshaw
"RENABORNEY" <renab...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20040316083402...@mb-m15.aol.com...
>
>
> OF course, the RN also insisted that its fighters carry a full-time
> navaigator...
How did they manage that in their Seafires, Corsairs, Wildcats and
Hellcats ?
Keith
RENABORNEY
> navaigator...
How did they manage that in their Seafires, Corsairs, Wildcats and
Hellcats ?
SNIP
He was in a drop tank and jettisoned when the call "Tally Ho!" went out over
the RT. Rather rough, old chap, but one did have to make sacrifices for King
and Country....
Seriously, the US Navy taught the Royal Navy how to navigate. A considerable
percentage of the FAA aircrew was trained in the US - if not from ab initio,
then in conversion after graduating from the Commonwealth Air Training Scheme
in Canada. The methods of instruction were that of the US Navy, complete with
navigation....
But in the early part of the war, the Fairey Fulmar (the principal FAA carrier
fighter 1940-43) had considerably lower performance than the contemporary
Hurricane and Spitfire in spite of using the same Merlin engine due due the
penalty of carrying the extra crewman. This was repeated with its replacement,
the Firefly, which was over 100 mph slower than a late mode SEafire, inspite of
both using Griffon engines.
The FAA turned to the Martlet (Wildcat-1940) and Sea Hurricane (1942) in
desperation. Once it was proven Not To Be Against The Laws of Physics for one
man to operate a naval fighter, the FAA took all the single seaters they could
get. Note, however, that the Hellcat and Corsair were Lend-Lease hardware and
the Seafire was a botch job of putting a marginally suitable aircraft to sea
(Weak undercart and frame not designed for carrier landings and a propensity
for ending up with its nose impacting the deck. If you want to read a real
horror story, check out the operational casualty rate of Seafires in calm airs
off Salerno...). Dur to the pre-war descisions on navigators not one British
designed single seat carrier fighter fought in the War (Yes, I know, I know,
but the Gladiator, Hurricane and Spit were adapations of RAF fighters, not
designed as naval aircraft).
See Captain Eric Brown's (Chief RN Test Pilot for many years and holder of the
record number of aircraft types flown) works for his opinions of the RN's WWII
fighters.
Peter Skelton
Homing lift pixies
Peter Skelton
Keith Willshaw
> OF course, the RN also insisted that its fighters carry a full-time
> > navaigator...
>
> How did they manage that in their Seafires, Corsairs, Wildcats and
> Hellcats ?
>
> SNIP
>
> He was in a drop tank and jettisoned when the call "Tally Ho!" went out
over
> the RT. Rather rough, old chap, but one did have to make sacrifices for
King
> and Country....
>
> Seriously, the US Navy taught the Royal Navy how to navigate.
I rather think you'll find the RN knew how to navigate before 1939
> A considerable
> percentage of the FAA aircrew was trained in the US - if not from ab
initio,
> then in conversion after graduating from the Commonwealth Air Training
Scheme
> in Canada. The methods of instruction were that of the US Navy, complete
with
> navigation....
>
Quite true
> But in the early part of the war, the Fairey Fulmar (the principal FAA
carrier
> fighter 1940-43) had considerably lower performance than the contemporary
> Hurricane and Spitfire in spite of using the same Merlin engine due due
the
> penalty of carrying the extra crewman. This was repeated with its
replacement,
> the Firefly, which was over 100 mph slower than a late mode SEafire,
inspite of
> both using Griffon engines.
>
The Firefly was a reconnaissance/strike fighter and not intended as
a fleet defence fighter. It was used in the recce, ASW and strike roles,
with a range of better than 2000 km and a warload of up 2000lbs
it remained in service throughout the Korean war alonside Corsairs
and Fury's
> The FAA turned to the Martlet (Wildcat-1940) and Sea Hurricane (1942) in
> desperation.
Incorrect. The Martlet was first ordered in August 1939 and delivered in
1940.
In fact Marlets were operating in service with the RN BEFORE the USN
commissioned its first squadron of Wildcats
> Once it was proven Not To Be Against The Laws of Physics for one
> man to operate a naval fighter, the FAA took all the single seaters they
could
> get.
The FAA had operated many type of single seat fighters, the last one
before the Seafire being the Gloster Gladiator
> Note, however, that the Hellcat and Corsair were Lend-Lease hardware and
> the Seafire was a botch job of putting a marginally suitable aircraft to
sea
> (Weak undercart and frame not designed for carrier landings and a
propensity
> for ending up with its nose impacting the deck. If you want to read a real
> horror story, check out the operational casualty rate of Seafires in calm
airs
> off Salerno...). Dur to the pre-war descisions on navigators not one
British
> designed single seat carrier fighter fought in the War (Yes, I know, I
know,
> but the Gladiator, Hurricane and Spit were adapations of RAF fighters, not
> designed as naval aircraft).
>
Largely because until 1938 the RAF was put in sole charge of aircraft
procurement.
> See Captain Eric Brown's (Chief RN Test Pilot for many years and holder of
the
> record number of aircraft types flown) works for his opinions of the RN's
WWII
> fighters.
I have.
Keith
Ray Trygstad
board, a large circular plotting board with a smaller attached circular
slide rule for groundspeed and fuel calculations.
RADM Don Engan, director of the National Air and Space Museum, discusses it
breifly in his article at http://www.airspacemag.com/asm/web/twd/Engen.html.
I'm just old enough to have flown on several cruises in pre-digital computer
days, and we did our navigation on the plotting board.
--Ray
Ray Trygstad, LCDR USN (Ret)
vewen...@aol.com (VEWenneker) wrote in message news:<20040315104044...@mb-m21.aol.com>...
Peter Skelton
Fleet defense fighters before the Pacific war were not intended
to have performance equal to land-based fighters. Their mission
was to protect6 the fleet from bombers and torpedo aircraft
operating beyond the range of protective fighters. In that role,
RN fighters were generally acceptable.
Peter Skelton
Jack Love
wrote:
But, was there a sound theoretical basis for the homing function? Did
anyone know how it worked? Could it be confused by jelly?
>Peter Skelton
Peter Skelton
Must be because it works, no, & only if vegimite is jelly
Peter Skelton
RENABORNEY
carrier fighter 1940-43) had considerably lower performance than the
contemporary
Hurricane and Spitfire in spite of using the same Merlin engine due due the
penalty of carrying the extra crewman. This was repeated with its replacement,
of both using Griffon engines.
>
The Firefly was a reconnaissance/strike fighter and not intended as a fleet
defence fighter. It was used in the recce, ASW and strike roles,
SNIP
I'm sorry, I have trouble with a "fighter" that needed to be escorted to and
from its target, Check out what you could do with Fleet Defence fighters in the
fighter-bomber role below....Once they got rid of their bombs, they could more
than take care of themself.
with a range of better than 2000 km and a warload of up 2000lbs
it remained in service throughout the Korean war alonside Corsairs
and Fury's
SNIP
It was used largely because nothing better was available to the RN during Korea
Consider this data (I don't have the data for the Korean era versions, if
applicable, but I think WWII data makes my point) for aircaft, speed (mph at
critical altitude), range (statute miles) and bomb load (lbs)
Firefly I (1943) : 316 1300 2000
Corsair IV (!943): 415 1015 2000
Hellcat II (1944): 380 1900 2000
SB2C-4 (1944): 295 1165 2000
F4U-4B (1945): 446 1005 2000
F8F-1B (1945): 425 1105 2000
AD-1 (1946): 366 1900 6000
So the Firefly is best compared to the much maligned Helldiver - nobody ever
called the Beast a fighter - and was outclassed by all USN Fleet Defence
fighter-bombers - the Bearcat was explicitly designed as an interceptor -
(admittedlty, they may not have had the same range as the Firefly while
carrying a ton of bombs - but none of these aurcraft carried a full load of
weapons and fuel simulatneously). Its running mate in the USN during Korea was
the Able Dog - which aircraft would you have taken?
> The FAA turned to the Martlet (Wildcat-1940) and Sea Hurricane (1942) in
> desperation.
Incorrect. The Martlet was first ordered in August 1939 and delivered in 1940.
In fact Marlets were operating in service with the RN BEFORE the USN
commissioned its first squadron of Wildcats
SNIP
While I did find one reference to the FAA ordering Martlets in 1939, the MkI's
delivered in August 1941 were from a French order, the FAA's order of MkII's
did not arrive until the following year.
As for the FAA operating F4F's before the USN - where do you think the
airframes came from but cancelled USN orders to support France and Britain at
war? The USn was perfectly willing so stand aside and allow the combatants to
snap up the early models in favor of better ones later.
I stand by my desperation comment - Britain and France were so desperate for
additional aircraft that they would practically take anything that flew to
flesh out their ranks. If Fairey could have cranked out more Fulmars, do you
think the FAA would have adopted the Martlet in 1940? (Maybe it would have
eventually, like the Sea Hurricane in 1942 - which was definitely born of
deperation at falling behind high performance Axis aircraft)
> Once it was proven Not To Be Against The Laws of Physics for one man to
operate a naval fighter, the FAA took all the single seaters they could get.
The FAA had operated many type of single seat fighters, the last one before the
Seafire being the Gloster Gladiator
SNIP
The Sea Galdiator was another result of desperation with the Lords
Commissioners being willing to settle for the "less than ideal" single-seat
aircraft in order to put something approacing modernity in the hands of the
fleet.
As far as operating many single seat aircraft - why, then, did the Admiralty
specify two seaters (no rearward gun, so you can't claim the influence of the
surprising success of the WWI 2-seater Brisfit) both in 1938 (Fulmar) and 1940
(Firefly)?
> Note, however, that the Hellcat and Corsair were Lend-Lease hardware and
> the Seafire was a botch job of putting a marginally suitable aircraft to sea
> (Weak undercart and frame not designed for carrier landings and a propensity
> for ending up with its nose impacting the deck. If you want to read a real
> horror story, check out the operational casualty rate of Seafires in calm
airs
> off Salerno...). Dur to the pre-war descisions on navigators not one
British
> designed single seat carrier fighter fought in the War (Yes, I know, I
know,
> but the Gladiator, Hurricane and Spit were adapations of RAF fighters, not
> designed as naval aircraft).
>
Largely because until 1938 the RAF was put in sole charge of aircraft
procurement.
SNIP
BUT, the specifications for both the Fulmar and Firefly were issued by the
Admiralty....
Ironically, those single-seaters mentioned above were procured under the RAF
regime. I need more proof of the malign influence of the RAF on RN procurement
to be convinced the Men in Light Blue influenced their counterpartst in Dark
Blue
to go to two-man fighters...
The bottom line is that Britain had airframe and engine designers of genius -
given the proper specifications, they could have equalled or bettered the US
(Sea Fury is a case in point). The tragedy is they weren't pointed down the
right path until it was too late to matter in WWII.
RENABORNEY
performance equal to land-based fighters. Their mission
was to protect6 the fleet from bombers and torpedo aircraft operating beyond
the range of protective fighters. In that role, RN fighters were generally
acceptable.
SNIP
I call that "Defining your problem away". After all, we all know that wars go
exactly to plan and weapons will only and always be used exactly as intended.
Hello. Gen Clausewitz, something about "Friction", you say?
Keith Willshaw
> > But in the early part of the war, the Fairey Fulmar (the principal FAA
> carrier fighter 1940-43) had considerably lower performance than the
> contemporary
> Hurricane and Spitfire in spite of using the same Merlin engine due due
the
> penalty of carrying the extra crewman. This was repeated with its
replacement,
> the Firefly, which was over 100 mph slower than a late model Seafire, in
spite
> of both using Griffon engines.
> >
>
>> The Firefly was a reconnaissance/strike fighter and not intended as a
fleet
>> defence fighter. It was used in the recce, ASW and strike roles,
>
> SNIP
>
> I'm sorry, I have trouble with a "fighter" that needed to be escorted to
and
> from its target, Check out what you could do with Fleet Defence fighters
in the
> fighter-bomber role below....Once they got rid of their bombs, they could
more
> than take care of themself.
>
Sure but they lacked the RANGE of the Firefly, thats why it was
in demand for reconnaissance. The USN tended to use Avengers
for the same role
>
>
>> with a range of better than 2000 km and a warload of up 2000lbs
>> it remained in service throughout the Korean war alonside Corsairs
> and Fury's
>
> SNIP
>
> It was used largely because nothing better was available to the RN during
Korea
> Consider this data (I don't have the data for the Korean era versions, if
> applicable, but I think WWII data makes my point) for aircaft, speed (mph
at
> critical altitude), range (statute miles) and bomb load (lbs)
>
> Firefly I (1943) : 316 1300 2000
>
> Corsair IV (!943): 415 1015 2000
>
> Hellcat II (1944): 380 1900 2000
>
> SB2C-4 (1944): 295 1165 2000
>
> F4U-4B (1945): 446 1005 2000
>
The Firefly designation was FRS - fighter reconnaisance strike it
was not ordered as a fleet defence fighter, it wasnt used in this role.
It was designed as a strike aircraft with some self defense capability.
What part of this dont you understand ?
> F8F-1B (1945): 425 1105 2000
>
> AD-1 (1946): 366 1900 6000
>
These 2 are post war aircraft
>> So the Firefly is best compared to the much maligned Helldiver - nobody
ever
>> called the Beast a fighter - and was outclassed by all USN Fleet Defence
>> fighter-bombers - the Bearcat was explicitly designed as an interceptor -
Not in the dive bombing role, which is why the USN used em
> (admittedlty, they may not have had the same range as the Firefly while
> carrying a ton of bombs - but none of these aurcraft carried a full load
of
> weapons and fuel simulatneously). Its running mate in the USN during Korea
was
> the Able Dog - which aircraft would you have taken?
>
The RN also used the Skyraider
>
> > The FAA turned to the Martlet (Wildcat-1940) and Sea Hurricane (1942) in
> > desperation.
>
>> Incorrect. The Martlet was first ordered in August 1939 and delivered in
1940.
>> In fact Marlets were operating in service with the RN BEFORE the USN
>> commissioned its first squadron of Wildcats
>
> SNIP
>
> While I did find one reference to the FAA ordering Martlets in 1939, the
MkI's
> delivered in August 1941 were from a French order, the FAA's order of
MkII's
> did not arrive until the following year.
>
In fact the first 54 Martket II's were shipped from New York in Dec 1941,
the second batch were delivered to HMS Audacity in Dec 21 1941
>> As for the FAA operating F4F's before the USN - where do you think the
>> airframes came from but cancelled USN orders to support France and
Britain at
>> war? The USn was perfectly willing so stand aside and allow the
combatants to
>> snap up the early models in favor of better ones later.
>
They came from orders placed by the French and British Purchasing
commissions.
The first Wildcats used by the Fleet Air Arm were 53 Grumman G-36a Martlet
I,
and 6 Grumman G-36a Martlet III diverted from a French order which had not
been delivered before the Fall of France in 1940. The aircraft were all
delivered
to the British Purchasing Commission on 23 August 1940 and transferred to
the first FAA unit 804 Hatston on 7 September 1940
> I stand by my desperation comment - Britain and France were so desperate
for
> additional aircraft that they would practically take anything that flew to
> flesh out their ranks.
No those aircraft were ordered BEFORE the war
> If Fairey could have cranked out more Fulmars, do you
> think the FAA would have adopted the Martlet in 1940?
Given that they did just that isnt the answer bloody obvious ?
After all by the end of 1940 the FAA had 4 squadrons of
Martlets in service and they had already shot down their
first enemy aircraft a full year before the USN aircraft saw combat.
> (Maybe it would have
> eventually, like the Sea Hurricane in 1942 - which was definitely born of
> deperation at falling behind high performance Axis aircraft)
>
The Sea Hurricane was mostly used on MAC and CAM ships to
provide defence against long range bomber attack on convoys.
For the most part they were converted RAF aircraft and were
phased out as the CVE's, carrying Martlets became available.
> > Once it was proven Not To Be Against The Laws of Physics for one man to
> operate a naval fighter, the FAA took all the single seaters they could
get.
>
> The FAA had operated many type of single seat fighters, the last one
before the
> Seafire being the Gloster Gladiator
>
> SNIP
>
> The Sea Galdiator was another result of desperation with the Lords
> Commissioners being willing to settle for the "less than ideal"
single-seat
> aircraft in order to put something approacing modernity in the hands of
the
> fleet.
>
No it was ordered at a time when the fron tline USN and IJN fighters
were also biplanes, entering service in 1938 it was as good as its
USN contemporary, the Grumman F3F - also a biplane
> As far as operating many single seat aircraft - why, then, did the
Admiralty
> specify two seaters (no rearward gun, so you can't claim the influence of
the
> surprising success of the WWI 2-seater Brisfit) both in 1938 (Fulmar) and
1940
> (Firefly)?
>
Because of their dual role as reconnaisance and fighter aircraft.
Two seat fighters were the exception, throughout the thirties
the main fighters carried were single seat aircraft such as the
Hawker Nimrod. A 2 seat version, the Osprey, was specifically
developed for the fighter reconnaisance role.
The bottom line is priority was given to home defence, the RAF
were given the lions share of the budget and resources and
that policy was vindicated in August and September 1940.
Having great carrier aircraft isnt much use if the enemy
can bomb the crap out of your homeland.
Meantime the RN HAD recognised the problem and was busily ordering
the most advanced US aircraft it could get. The FAA was operating
both Wildcats and Corsairs off its carriers BEFORE the USN
did so and FAA Martlets were busy defending the fleet as early
as 1940 and they knew how to navigate without being taught
by the USN.
Keith
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
keith...@kwillshaw.demon.co.uk (Keith Willshaw) wrote:
> especially for the fighter pilots who had to
> do their own navigation as well as flying the aircraft.
This was in fact, one of the major reasons for the reluctance of the
Fleet Air Arm to go to single seat aircraft.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
<ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <c36vle$gvk$1...@selma.aspentech.com>,
>keith...@kwillshaw.demon.co.uk (Keith Willshaw) wrote:
>
>> especially for the fighter pilots who had to
>> do their own navigation as well as flying the aircraft.
>
> This was in fact, one of the major reasons for the reluctance of the
>Fleet Air Arm to go to single seat aircraft.
Not sure how that fits in with the FAA having operated single-seat
fighters right from the word go (Nightjar, Flycatcher, Nimrod,
Sea Gladiator..). *Might* have been concerns due to the increased
performance of monoplanes, but it could also (and more likely) be
that:
(a) The FAA anticipated operating in areas where there was significant
land-based air opposition. Recon. a/c therefore needed to be capable of
looking after themselves - hence the combination of recon/fighter
by the FAA instead of recon/bomber (as favoured by the USN, or indeed the
FAA up until the early 1930s with the Fairey III)
(b) The move to monoplanes put more pressure on the size of air-group,
which was already a bit limited in some of the older RN carriers - hence
pressure towards multi-role aircraft (recon/fighter as in Fulmar,
fighter/bomber as in Skua, everything-but-fighter as in Stringbag)
(c) There seems to have been strong pressure from pilots towards
multi-role types and towards two-seat fighter/recon types
--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Time has stopped, says the Black Lion clock
and eternity has begun" (Dylan Thomas)
Peter McLelland
"ANDREW ROBERT BREEN" <a...@aber.ac.uk> wrote in message
news:c39m6h$a0pg$1...@central.aber.ac.uk...
> In article <c39l5h$9mm$1...@thorium.cix.co.uk>,
> <ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote:
> >In article <c36vle$gvk$1...@selma.aspentech.com>,
> >keith...@kwillshaw.demon.co.uk (Keith Willshaw) wrote:
> >
> >> especially for the fighter pilots who had to
> >> do their own navigation as well as flying the aircraft.
> >
> > This was in fact, one of the major reasons for the reluctance of the
> >Fleet Air Arm to go to single seat aircraft.
>
> Not sure how that fits in with the FAA having operated single-seat
> fighters right from the word go (Nightjar, Flycatcher, Nimrod,
> Sea Gladiator..). *Might* have been concerns due to the increased
> performance of monoplanes, but it could also (and more likely) be
> that:
> (a) The FAA anticipated operating in areas where there was significant
> land-based air opposition. Recon. a/c therefore needed to be capable of
> looking after themselves - hence the combination of recon/fighter
> by the FAA instead of recon/bomber (as favoured by the USN, or indeed the
> FAA up until the early 1930s with the Fairey III)
> (b) The move to monoplanes put more pressure on the size of air-group,
> which was already a bit limited in some of the older RN carriers - hence
> pressure towards multi-role aircraft (recon/fighter as in Fulmar,
> fighter/bomber as in Skua, everything-but-fighter as in Stringbag)
> (c) There seems to have been strong pressure from pilots towards
> multi-role types and towards two-seat fighter/recon types
>
Some good points Andy, but of course you have to remember the pure fighter
is either going to be near to Mum any way, or protecting the guys who have
the navigators. I agree that the limited size of the air group, and even
when that gets up to near 100 it is still limited, does mean that multi
tasking does become an advantage. I think the FAA has always liked the idea
of a 2 seat plane, as even today it does help with the work load problem,
and that is not trivial. Conducting a strike at or from the sea does need
good navigation, and good navigation does need time and concentration.
Peter
Guy Alcala
> In article <c39l5h$9mm$1...@thorium.cix.co.uk>,
> <ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote:
> >In article <c36vle$gvk$1...@selma.aspentech.com>,
> >keith...@kwillshaw.demon.co.uk (Keith Willshaw) wrote:
> >
> >> especially for the fighter pilots who had to
> >> do their own navigation as well as flying the aircraft.
> >
> > This was in fact, one of the major reasons for the reluctance of the
> >Fleet Air Arm to go to single seat aircraft.
>
> Not sure how that fits in with the FAA having operated single-seat
> fighters right from the word go (Nightjar, Flycatcher, Nimrod,
> Sea Gladiator..).
The early fighters were assumed to operate within visual sight of the
carrier. Once strike ranges increased the Brits tried providing two-seat
fighter navigational leaders (Ospreys) for their single-seat strike escorts
(Nimrods), but in practice it proved difficult for them to get back together
after combat. So they largely went with two-seat fighters for strike escort,
while being forced to use higher-performance minimal change single-seaters
from the RAF (like the Gladiator, Hurrican and Spitfire) for interceptors.
Getting back to the original question, in addition to using pilot plotting
boards, even before naval radar was installed both the RN and USN had
developed directional VHF radio beacons prior to the war, Type 71 which
surmounted the mast of all the British carriers from the late '30s on (until
replaced by YE), and the much lighter YE (transmitter)/ZB (receiver) for the
USN. Both were horizon-limited so could be used fairly freely unlike
omni-directional MF/HF beacons, or direction-finding on the pre-war HF
radios. IIRR Type 71 had a reliable range of 15nm or so, YE about 45nm, so
assuming no gross navigation errors arriving back in the general vicinity of
"Point Option," the carrier's planned location at recovery time, the beacon
receivers would allow the pilots to head towards the carrier if he couldn't
see it (always assuming the transmitter and receiver were working, you had
today's code card, etc.)
I'm not sure exactly how Type 71 worked, but YE broadcast a different Morse
code letter over each 15 degree segment of 360 degrees (keyed to the ship's
gyrocompass IIRR, so bearings weren't relative). The pilot had to have the
right frequency tuned in for his ship, then listened for the Morse letter,
looked it up on that day's code card (the letters were frequently changed) to
see in which 15 degree segment from the ship he was in, and then flew the
reciprocal course. If he strayed to one side or the other, he'd start to
hear the code for the adjacent sector mixed in with the current one's,
allowing him to correct for drift.
Pretty much what VOR or TACAN does automatically (with narrower sectors and a
visual display), but without the DME. TACAN replaced YE in the '50s.
Guy
Olivers
>
>
> VEWenneker wrote:
>> How did Naval aircraft in World War II find their way back to their
>> carriers?
>
>
> Sometimes with great difficulty
> It depended on several factors. was the carrier maintaining radio
> silence?
>
> Was it night or day?
>
> Even a very long carrier air mission only lasted 3 hours. navigating
> the reverse course to take you back to the starting location was
> fairly easy
....Except that carriers changed position (but pilots were provided with an
estimated position based on their projected mission and cycle time. In a 3
or 4 hour mnission, the CV could have moved 30 miles, depending on wind
conditions for foxtrot corpens.
>
> If a carrier was not under radio silence it could pick up its aircraft
> on radar at about 150 miles and vector them in. Picket ships were
> also used for the same purpose.
By 1943, the most likely detection range for a/c flying below 10,000' was
little more than 50 miles. The heaight above deck of a CV's antenna
provided it with somewhat greater radar horizon than that of the small
boys. Though radar improved by war's end, 150 miles was rare and certainly
inconsistent. In the early 60s, after great electronic advances, 250 miles
was "extreme" range and only likely on large multiengine a/c.
IFF transponders may occasionally provided longer range returns.
>
> the navy experimented with both blind flying and radio beacons at
> College park airport in the early thirties.
CVs not in "EMCON" certainly operated radio beacons, but it was not until
the late war intro of TACAN which provided both range and bearing to the
carrier for a pilot that returns became routine.
Most night flying a/c (routinely, of course there were exceptions, late
returning missions,etc.) carried radars which allow some potential for
locating the carrier.
"Night Flying" from CVs was based on a whole different set of procedures
for both departures and returns, with pre-planned "marshall" points and
scheduled descents - a highly esoteric and coordinated evolution requiring
substantial training of pilots, air controllers, approach controllers and
LSOs, and night ops only became "routine" in 1944-5 with the introduction
of specially equipped a/c and specially trained aviators.
TMO
Olivers
> On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 18:58:27 GMT, "Jim McLaughlin"
> <jim.mclaughl...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>>In other words vCkne yet again is making it up as he goes along, and
>>has no source.
>>
>>Isn't it neat how the 'perfesser' constantly invents? Whether its
>>data on 60 year old radars or this weeks world political situation,
>>its all the same.
>>
>> Things are whatever Vknce says they are.
>
> This time Jim, you're utterly full of it. The request is proof
> for something about as hard to prove as "water flows downhill"
> yet Vince gave a reference:
>
> Morgan McMahon and Radar
> Copyright Volume 2 SMEC Vintage Electrics 1989-1990 (now SMECC
> 2001)
>
> The early long-wave radars often saw aircraft to the line of
> sight limit. You don't look into radar much before you find that
> out.
In 1962, the radar most commonly found aboard US DDs, the SPS-6, would not
provide routine detection ranges of 100 miles. The SPS-12, carried aboard
most DDS with a dedicated AAW role, could not be expected to routinely
detect targets at 150 miles. Routine intercepts could not be conducted at
much more than 100 miles, and low flyers would only pop up much closer.
The SPS-37, the set installed in older ESSEX class CVs - with a giant
lattice antenna, 40' or so across, would detect Soviet Bears or B52s, both
substantial radar profiles, at 200 miles if the a/c were at high altitudes.
The replacement for the 37, the SPS-43, installed in '62 or later, with the
same antenna, offierd improved detection range.
Very honestly, from the standpoint of a former CIC Officer and well-
experienced Air Intercept Controller (GLYNCO, 1963, a log book full of
them, including several of the "This is no drill" sort), Vince's source is
simply erroneous.
In 1944, one might get a contact at 150 miles, even on a more than
occasional sweep, but tracking or identification (or interception or
"steer") would have been more than highly unlikely.
For working purposes, in 1945, inbound strikes by Kamikaze a/c in numbers
were often not detected until well within 80 miles.
I'll not bother you with sources, just that Popular Mechanics and press
releases seem to have been about as dependable as the cite used above. One
would have to surmise that substantial improbvements in the performance of
radar occurred after 1945. I know what it was in 1962, and cannot fathom
how equivaewlent performance could be claimed for two decades earlier.
I don't suspect that there were many land based radars providing routine
150 mile detection in 1945....
TMO
TMO
Olivers
>
> AIUI from a long ago conversation with Dan Gallery The aviator knew the
> wind direction and the carrier followed the wind. If all else failed n
> they would come back to the launch point and then move upwind.
>
It was/is simply not quite that simple or simplistic...CVs operated on a
predetermined plan and the wind's direction (and its capacity to change
vector/increase/diminish) and the flow of deck ops (and a WWII a/c into a
barrier or in later years a few "Bolters" could keep the ship going in the
wrong direction at 25 knots for 10 minutes longer during a recovery cycle,
resulting a substantial change in position relative to a "plan".
Having once had the deck whilst proceeding through the Straits of Bonifacio
- a narrow and crowded body of water not designed for flight ops -
recovering a/c that would have otherwise had to risk a night Bingo, I* can
assure you that ADM gallery was only providing you with the mere tip of an
iceberg.
TMO
BF Lake
"Olivers" <ol...@LOSETHIScalpha.com> wrote in message
news:Xns94B0668...@216.196.97.132...
> Vince Brannigan muttered....
>
>
> ....Except that carriers changed position (but pilots were provided with
an
> estimated position based on their projected mission and cycle time. In a
3
> or 4 hour mnission, the CV could have moved 30 miles, depending on wind
> conditions for foxtrot corpens.
Just to confuse things, in the RCN at least, "foxtrot corpen" in our carrier
meant Magnetic and "flying course" meant the True course predicted for
flying ops. (predicted because the recovery pattern was selected and the
returning aircraft put in their pattern (civilian term--in the "circuit" and
"stacked") before the carrier actually turned, so the real flying course
adopted might be a bit different if the wind had changed any by then). We
used the Tacan beacon for the pattern orientation and had different ones :
"Tacan One", "Tacan Two", etc.
You had to signal the "flying course" to the destroyers ( gyro compasses)
and radio the "foxtrot corpen" to the planes (which had only magnetic
compasses) When a shore-based maritime patrol plane joined (the Argus) you
could give him True directions since they had a gyro of sorts, but you had
to be specific so not to confuse things, such as when controlling an Argus
and a Tracker together in an ASW "plan"
The radio beacon direction read- out in the plane ISTR was tied to its
magnetic compass so there was always a lot of bother to make sure everyone
was clear on whether bearings were in True or Magnetic. If the aircraft
controller got his Variation backwards , as happened sometimes <G> , he
could be vectoring planes 46 degrees in the wrong direction ( variation W
vice E eg) if Variation were 23 degrees
The old timer "Observer" in planes was a useful fellow. In 1980 in an AOR,
one of our Sea King helos lost its radio, and appeared off the port wing of
the bridge unexpectedly. The door opened and there was the
nearing -retirement Naval Observer-trained- in- his- youth "navigator", with
a pair of Semaphore flags! He and the bridge signalman got into this, and
communications with our helo was restored <G>
Regards,
Barry
Peter Skelton
Aren't these 3-10 cm radars using PPI? It's most unlike you to
make such a fundamental and serious error.
>The SPS-37, the set installed in older ESSEX class CVs - with a giant
>lattice antenna, 40' or so across, would detect Soviet Bears or B52s, both
>substantial radar profiles, at 200 miles if the a/c were at high altitudes.
>The replacement for the 37, the SPS-43, installed in '62 or later, with the
>same antenna, offierd improved detection range.
>
>Very honestly, from the standpoint of a former CIC Officer and well-
>experienced Air Intercept Controller (GLYNCO, 1963, a log book full of
>them, including several of the "This is no drill" sort), Vince's source is
>simply erroneous.
Perhaps, I've not read it but it seems to agree with mine. Mine
are very damn reliable, there are several and they agree with
each other.
>In 1944, one might get a contact at 150 miles, even on a more than
>occasional sweep, but tracking or identification (or interception or
>"steer") would have been more than highly unlikely.
true
>For working purposes, in 1945, inbound strikes by Kamikaze a/c in numbers
>were often not detected until well within 80 miles.
These were not high altitude.
>I'll not bother you with sources, just that Popular Mechanics and press
>releases seem to have been about as dependable as the cite used above. One
>would have to surmise that substantial improbvements in the performance of
>radar occurred after 1945. I know what it was in 1962, and cannot fathom
>how equivaewlent performance could be claimed for two decades earlier.
Not equivalent perfomance, greater range. Think about it. Longer
range can be evaded simply by flying lower, and lower at 200
miles is around 10,000 feet. Metric wave radar gave really poor
definition compared to the stuff you used and had no real
advantage, so they moved away from it. (283? series sets survived
well past their time as early warning sets in RN capiutal ships
just the same.
>I don't suspect that there were many land based radars providing routine
>150 mile detection in 1945....
Chain Home being out of servioce by then. . .
Peter Skelton
BF Lake
"Olivers" <ol...@LOSETHIScalpha.com> wrote in message
> Vince Brannigan muttered....
> Having once had the deck whilst proceeding through the Straits of
Bonifacio
> - a narrow and crowded body of water not designed for flight ops -
Holy shit! <G>
Regards,
Barry
Guy Alcala
150nm range was certainly atypical for SK/SK-2 although it was occasionally
possible, especially on larger strikes. Here's Friedman, in "Naval Radar":
"A 1945 report on search radars noted that 'The SK provides the longest range
radar detection of aircraft targets', 100nm on a medium bomber @ 10,000 ft."
Here's some of what he has to say about SR:
"In 1945 its claimed detection range on a bomber @ 10,000 ft. was 110nm, on a
fighter at the same altitude 75nm, and on a bomber at 500 ft. 25nm." SR was
just being introduced at the time,
I've often seen the WW2 British Type 281 3.5m set credited with a fairly
reliable 120nm range (the postwar Type 960, using a very similar if not the
same antenna but more power, was credited with 150-170nm), while Friedman
("Naval Radar") says:
"Typical range figures were 88-115nm on aircraft @ 16,000 feet, 38-50nm on
aircraft @ 3,000 feet, 22-28 on a/c @ 1,000 ft., and 7-9 on a/c @ 100 ft." The
later 281BP and BQ had improved receivers and range increased to "120nm on an
airplane @ 20,000 ft. (110 in Type 281), 90 @ 10,000 ft., and 65 (compared to
58 in type 281) @ 5,000 ft.)"
What I believe you're not taking account of in your comments is the vast
decrease in RCS with jets compared to props. Friedman again, on SR:
"About 1955 SR performance was considerably improved by the application of a
new low-noise receiver, giving an 8 dB reduction, and a noise monitor which
permitted a technician obtain peak performance far more easily. With these
modifications, a destroyer which had obtained no better than 20nm on jets began
to detect such a/c consistently @ 90nm above 30,000 ft., and the 8dB
improvement alone . . . was considered to increase the range on a jet fighter
by 59 percent. At this time it was expected that some SRs would be fitted with
SPS-17 antennas, which provided 3dB more gain and had smaller sidelobes as
well. Such sets would also obtain improved performance through the
installation of the SPA-8 indicator used in SPS-17, especially for weak targets
such as jets at long range. In 1961 it was claimed that the SRb could detect a
1m^2 target, somewhat smaller than a jet fighter, at 114nm."
As far as SPS-6/12 go, the USN abandoned such L-band radars for long-range 2D
air search and went back to the longer wavelength P-band (which both SK and SR
used) for SPS-17/28/29/37/43, precisely because the L-band sets were proving
short-ranged on jets (for much the same reason that stealth a/c are harder to
detect at shorter wavelengths but the long-wave radars have less of a problem),
especially in the smoother Pacific. The L-band sets were also more subject to
ducting than the P-band ones, further decreasing their ability to detect high
altitude a/c. Friedman again:
"As in the case of radio, there were pressures on the Navy to choose radar
bands to accomodate civilian users, in particular television stations
(P-band). At the end of WW2 the navy was also beginning to use P-band (VHF)
radios, and there were complaints of interference. Hence the shift to L-band
in the postwar SR-2, -3 and -6 search radars [Guy note: L-band versions of the
P-band SR/SRa/SRb] -- in fact in a general distribution of frequencies in 1945
the Navy agreed as an ultimate goal to vacate P-band. L-band was considered
preferable in any case because of the greater gain, greater frequency
diversity, and better directivity possible.
"However, tests in 1949 and 1950 showed considerable failings. For example,
streamlined jet a/c showed very small cross-sections at L- as opposed to
P-band. At the latter wavelength the radar signals reflected off the whole a/c,
whereas at the former the returning signal was made up of reflections from
individual a/c surfaces -- and there were far fewer corners to reflect strongly
in a jet than in the older propeller a/c. It also appeared that higher
frequencies were more subject to atmospheric effects, or 'trapping'. NRL had
fought for the retention of P-band systems; now it developed prototypes for a
new generation of 1.5m and 75cm air search radars, the current [1981] members
of which include SPS-37, SPS-40, and SPS-43."
Guy
Guy Alcala
Peter, SPS-6/12 were L-band, i.e. approximately 30cm, not S-band (10cm) or
X-band (3cm). I'm not sure what having a PPI has to do with the detection
range, although both radars mentioned had such displays (and probably A-scopes
as well).
Guy
BF Lake
"Guy Alcala" <g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> wrote .
> > In 1962, the radar most commonly found aboard US DDs, the SPS-6, would
not
> > provide routine detection ranges of 100 miles. The SPS-12, carried
aboard
> > most DDS with a dedicated AAW role, could not be expected to routinely
> As far as SPS-6/12 go, the USN abandoned such L-band radars for long-range
2D
> air search and went back to the longer wavelength P-band (which both SK
and SR
> used) for SPS-17/28/29/37/43, precisely because the L-band sets were
proving
> short-ranged on jets (for much the same reason that stealth a/c are harder
to
> detect at shorter wavelengths but the long-wave radars have less of a
problem),
> especially in the smoother Pacific. The L-band sets were also more
subject to
> ducting than the P-band ones, further decreasing their ability to detect
high
> altitude a/c. Friedman again:
http://webhome.idirect.com/~jproc/sari/sarrad2.html
Has some info on the 6 and 12 (about 1/3 down). related to this thread.
The previous page( radar 1) has a quick history on wartime sets too.
In the RCN 205class from 1955 on , they had the 10 for surface and the 12
for air. The 12 was not much for low fliers, you were supposed to use the
10 in long pulse for that. For normal ASW air controlling , the 12 was
great. We didn't do AAW much so can't say much about it.
The attitude was if we were really attacked by enemy air we were screwed so
who cared?! In exercises of San Diego there were Blue Phantoms and Orange
Phantoms. They both had the same radar in the nose so EW was useless to
say which. The Orange ones had an orange dot painted on their tail so you
knew you were dead if one of them flew by. Luckily when Orange decided to
press a big air attack he always started jamming your radar first. This let
you know in time to get the guns and FC radar closed up. After a while the
jamming got worse so you knew things were about to happen. (by now everyone
was all set <G>) Next thing you saw was black smoke on the horizon! ahah!
then two dots would appear out of the black smoke just outside the range of
your FC radar ( this worked out great) So you got that going , acquired,
locked on , flashed your signal lamps at the planes indicating you were
firing your guns, and the Phantoms with the orange dots zoomed by. Wow! so
that was the big air attack. (San Diego Orange never got the idea to forget
about the jamming--one wonders if the Soviets would have been so helpful)
Ok, that's it everybody, back to the "real work" which was looking for
submarines! <G>
In 1967 , BONNIE got a new big Dutch antenna for her 12 plus they added
a parametric amplifier and it boosted results considerably. This new 12
combo was put in the new 280s when they came out soon after..
As the article says, the key was tuning the set properly , and we didn't
have a high skill level on that. Kind of depended on each air controller's
knowledge of how to get the most from his set (and display!) Some ships had
the set controls where the operator could get at them and others had the set
controls in a radar room miles from the ops room. Some senior radar
operators felt they were the only ones allowed to touch the set controls!
This could be good or bad depending on individuals.
Regards,
Barry
Peter Skelton
Thanks. (L band is 15-30 cm) The radars I was talking about start
at about a meter and go up to about 6.5.
Some of the early PPI's limited range because echos could be
literally off the scope. Most also had A-scopes (as you say) at
least in the war period I know a little about.
Peter Skelton
Jack Love
Would have depended upon whether it was in the protocol or not: "There
will be NO DEVIATIONS, comrade pilot."
Guy Alcala
<snip>
> What I believe you're not taking account of in your comments is the vast
> decrease in RCS with jets compared to props.
<snip>
Oh, and there was one other factor making things more difficult postwar, the higher
data rate (rpm) of SPS-6/12 compared to the earlier P-band radars, to allow
tracking/plotting at the higher jet speeds. The late war L-band SR-3 with a choice
of 2.5 or 5 rpm was replaced by the postwar SPS-6 with a choice of 5 to 15 rpm,
with a narrower beam as well (fewer pulses on target per scan). Kind of a "damned
if you do, damned if you don't" situation.
Guy
Olivers
>
> "However, tests in 1949 and 1950 showed considerable failings. For
> example, streamlined jet a/c showed very small cross-sections at L- as
> opposed to P-band. At the latter wavelength the radar signals
> reflected off the whole a/c, whereas at the former the returning
> signal was made up of reflections from individual a/c surfaces -- and
> there were far fewer corners to reflect strongly in a jet than in the
> older propeller a/c.
For working the SPS-12 (when visiting DDs) and the SPS-37 and later the
SPS-43 in SHANGRI-LA, until mid '64, we still embarked VA-176, all Spads,
and they flew a number of the missions against which we ran intercepts. On
either series, they remained good trackable targets out to "horizon", but
on the deck could come relatively close undetected. The 37/43 had a modest
"band of detection" within which low flyers were visible, but once through
it, the next target you saw might well be on the SPS-10C, too close for
comfort even for a Spad.
The A4 was pretty stealthy all on its own nose on and not squawking. All
too many times, playtime over and needing to return birds to night
marshall, there was that dangerous admission of just how little we "saw",
"Turn Right 90 degrees for positive ID.", before giving a pilot a steer to
help him convert ship's position to a vector for night marshall. F8s and
F3s showed up well, but again the SPS-12 simply was effectively range
limited when it came to trackable paints.
We had no A-scopes except in the radar transmission rooms, unusued for any
purpose, and the PPIs were almost all SPA-8s IIRC with adjustable range
settings and input from several sources, offset cursors, and reasonably
good capacity to adjust for sea states, non moving targets, etc.
My interpolation of WWII ranges has as much to do with a/c operating
parameters - other than occasional scout/photo recon bird, most Japanese
strikes, conventional or suicidal, were flown at low altitude, many at
Angels 12 or less, and few above 20, thus reducing detection rates for prop
driven a/c. There's a lot of contemporary accounts about in which inbounds
don't show up until 40nm, close, but an accurate rendering of what actual
performance was. Just because you might pick up a lumbering "Emily" 150
miles out and 15K high, hardly insured that sort of detection rate against
one or two single engine birds lower. Of course, "flocks" are noticeable.
I do recall my first Bear intercept quite clearly and logged it....we were
prevented by doctrine from initiating the intercept until the bogey was
within X (may still be classified) nm. The monster showed up on the 43 a
fur piece away. There was a long wait before steering the duty F8 toward
the intruder. The Bear filled about 3/8s of the scopes circumference with
return, far more than 707s or Caravels (or even the occasional
"Chromedome"), even more than the WillieVictors out of Sigonella.
> It also appeared that higher frequencies were
> more subject to atmospheric effects, or 'trapping'. NRL had fought
> for the retention of P-band systems; now it developed prototypes for a
> new generation of 1.5m and 75cm air search radars, the current [1981]
> members of which include SPS-37, SPS-40, and SPS-43."
>
The 43 seems to have been long-lived, but its monstrous antenna (shared
with the 37) limited its installations to large ships.
We will not go into the land of the big bluff....phased arrays.
As a time frame reference....
All 4 captains on whose bridges I stood watch in SHANGRI-LA had been WWII
carrier aviators, VF or VB, admittedly for short spans. My first OPS boss
had flown TBFs in the war's last few months, but never carried a torp. The
first CAG whose birds I controlled had been an enlisted CIC type during the
war, going off to Pensacola soon after. While it was hardly "war stories",
these were men who in an instructional vein imparted and implanted their
version of the "straight skinny" in the JOs with whom they had contact.
For them, the skinny was almost always viewed in the framework of their
perspective, somewhat molded by WWII.
As an example....We're steaming up NY Harbor, kinda adjusted over to Port,
for a visit to the World's Fair (and moored over at the line piers is along
way from Flushing Meadows). Scheduled in the POD is a "Man the rail"
evolution. The Captain calls the XO early to convey his
desire/whim/whatever. The ship will man the rail earlier than planned.
The ship will man the rail to honor an old empty hulk mouldering alongside
the long pier in Bayonne. The ship will man the rail and render passing
honors to FRANKLIN, as both the Captain and the Bosun shared the common
bond of having flown from or served in her. I'm sure that had he been able
to get away with it, we would have fired an unanswered salute.
After leaving active duty, I met an alumnus of the local college who had
been FRANKLIN's Flight Deck Officer, a billet for which mere survival
brought accolade, but his performance brought among the most substantial of
decorations. I passed on the story. He understood, but claimed that the
motives had as much to do with absent friends as the ship herself.
Thinking back, I can't really imagine running successful intercepts against
Luftwaffe F-104s flying maritime strike missions. Of course, their self-
attrition rate was high enough to exceed projected combat losses. Talk
about a detection problem.....
TMO
Jack Linthicum
There are great differences in range that can occur through tropical
tropospheric ducting, the old wives' tale about UHF being line of
sight has been proven incorrect many times. First instance I know of
was naval aircraft in Florida hearing tactical radio from San Diego or
reverse. Another phenomenon is inversion in which the layer acts like
a mirror and can reflect UHF over great distances. I have received a
UHF TV (probably Ch. 17, 490 MHz) station in Raleigh Durham with an
antenna pointed away from the source in Arlington Virginia during one
inversion. Picture grade 4.
Guy Alcala
<snip>
> There are great differences in range that can occur through tropical
> tropospheric ducting, the old wives' tale about UHF being line of
> sight has been proven incorrect many times. First instance I know of
> was naval aircraft in Florida hearing tactical radio from San Diego or
> reverse. Another phenomenon is inversion in which the layer acts like
> a mirror and can reflect UHF over great distances. I have received a
> UHF TV (probably Ch. 17, 490 MHz) station in Raleigh Durham with an
> antenna pointed away from the source in Arlington Virginia during one
> inversion. Picture grade 4.
Friedman relates the case of a Bombay, India, P-band radar with a normal range of 20nm or so (monsoon season), which was
able during the dry season (lots of water evaporation) to pick up returns from the Arabian Peninsula, ca. 1,500nm away. Now
that's a duct!
Guy
Jack Linthicum
May I be pedantic and ask you to use hertz when you cite a frequency?
The following include some but not all variations on band letters,
which even the US Military says you are not to use, but Colonel Puffin
wants his Q band and he shall have it.
http://www.radiodesign.com/legacy/ltrbands.htm
http://www.jneuhaus.com/fccindex/spectrum.html
http://www.serve.com/mahood/RCS/bands.htm
http://csd.newcastle.edu.au/users/staff/eemf/ELEC351/SProjects/Hall/transmis.htm
http://www.k5rmg.org/A-soup.html
The last site is a zinger.
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala <g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> wrote in message news:<405BBC06...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net>...
> > Jack Linthicum wrote:
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > > There are great differences in range that can occur through tropical
> > > tropospheric ducting, the old wives' tale about UHF being line of
> > > sight has been proven incorrect many times. First instance I know of
> > > was naval aircraft in Florida hearing tactical radio from San Diego or
> > > reverse. Another phenomenon is inversion in which the layer acts like
> > > a mirror and can reflect UHF over great distances. I have received a
> > > UHF TV (probably Ch. 17, 490 MHz) station in Raleigh Durham with an
> > > antenna pointed away from the source in Arlington Virginia during one
> > > inversion. Picture grade 4.
> >
> > Friedman relates the case of a Bombay, India, P-band radar with a normal range of 20nm or so (monsoon season), which was
> > able during the dry season (lots of water evaporation) to pick up returns from the Arabian Peninsula, ca. 1,500nm away. Now
> > that's a duct!
> >
> >
>
> May I be pedantic and ask you to use hertz when you cite a frequency?
Be happy to, if you prefer (and when I have the info; I don't in this case, as Friedman just says P-band, which equates to A/B
and maybe lower C for the ECM types). I tend to use band designations to indicate the general type of radar because the
boundaries ae anything but fixed, as indicated in the multiple sources you provided. About the only time there's a real potential
for confusion is when you're talking about C-band (is that RADAR C or ECM C?), and I'll always state which I mean in that case.
FWIW, here's the broad ranges I'm usually referring to:
1-500 MHz, P (A/B, VHF/lower UHF)
.5-2.0 GHz, L (C/D, UHF/L)
2.0-4.0 GHz, S (E/F)
4.0-8.0 GHz, C (G/H)
8.0-12.0 GHz, X (I/J)
Anything above that would normally be out of my interest, although there are some some Ku/J fighter/attack radars out there.
Guy
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
Vince Brannigan <fir...@pressroom.com> wrote:
>Jim McLaughlin wrote:
>
>> In other words vCkne yet again is making it up as he goes along, and has no
>> source.
>
I've been staying out of this one, but here you're wrong, Vince. The
problem the other poster has is an inability to recognise a clearly
labelled clue.
George
As I recall his comments it was a matter of dead reckoning, good
preflight briefing, 5,000 ft and the marvellous Mk1 eyeball
Nicholas Smid
True but remember the RN went to war pretty much with the aircraft a rivil
service desided to let it have. Naturaly within range of shore based
fighters the nice chape from the RAF would be there to do the job, honest.
The RN only regained control of its aircraft designs in1938 and had to
pretty much start from scratch desiding what it even wanted. It made some
bad choises, like the Roc, and some almost adiquit like the Fairey's. For a
pretty good dive bomber the Skua made a surprissingly good fighter but the
RN started off behind the 8 ball and never really got out with its aircraft.
RENABORNEY
service desided to let it have. Naturaly within range of shore based
fighters the nice chape from the RAF would be there to do the job, honest.
The RN only regained control of its aircraft designs in1938 and had to
pretty much start from scratch desiding what it even wanted. It made some
bad choises, like the Roc, and some almost adiquit like the Fairey's. For a
pretty good dive bomber the Skua made a surprissingly good fighter but the
RN started off behind the 8 ball and never really got out with its aircraft.
SNIP
Recenty I have been questioning the "RAF
messed up FAA aircraft procurement with effects lasting into WWII" line. The
aircraft in question were designed to Admiralty - NOT Air Ministry -
specifications. Specifications laid down by RN officers of the Air Branch,
supposedly qualified to make such decisions....