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LAVROV on American *PIGS* and low-lives; "when militant secularism acts from positions which differ little from state religion"

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Mort Zuckerman

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Aug 17, 2008, 5:47:12 AM8/17/08
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Subject: LAVROV confronts Heiney and the NeoCons: "when militant
secularism acts from positions which differ little from state
religion"

Date: Aug 17, 2008 5:42 AM

"militant secularism acts from positions which differ little from
state religion"

Americans DON'T CARE about the hardships of others.

TRUE!!!
Look at Lyme Disease. No one would help me, personally, or even with
the Lyme activism,
so that I would not have THAT to do, too, but everyone is my critic,
once the crime
is solved:
http://www.actionlyme.org/DCF_NANCY_MARTIN_BLOW_ME_OFF_1996.htm
vs:
http://www.actionlyme.org/Hilarious.htm

EVERYONE is my critic, while doing nothing themselves. (Except for the
part where
Pam Weintraub is snuck onto my list via the lies of Ellen Lubarsky,
and then Pat
Smith tells me to my face at the Albany Rally, that I can take a hike,
because Pam
has my data and was paid $4,000 to add to it and publish it:
http://www.lymediseaseassociation.org
vs
http://www.actionlyme.org/Actionlyme_History.htm
(Conflicts of Interest).


They're all *PIGS* and low-lives.


- - -
Compare what Lavrov says about Heiney Kissinger saying people have to
give up religion
and nationalism to accept the new world order:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4bKwH3kJew4


Russians are very stubborn. They will not back down from this
position, so unless
the West does, Baddaboom!


http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/08-08-2008/106033-lavrovfundamentalaspect-0

Lavrov: The fundamental apect of the present stage of world
development
08.08.2008 Source: URL: http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/106033-lavrovfundamentalaspect-0

In contemporary international relations it is difficult to find a more
fundamental
question than defining the present stage of world development. This is
important
for any country in order to correlate its development strategy and its
foreign policy
with a vision of the world in which we live. It appears that consensus
is already
on its way in this regard, although so far at the level of the expert
community
- Russian and foreign alike. This state of affairs results largely
from the debates
on which Russia has insisted. Moreover, a sketch of that agreement
reproduces to
a significant extent the analysis that is set forth in Vladimir
Putin's speech at
Munich in February 2007 and which has become a starting discussion
position of Russia.

It is obvious that without sizing up the "big issues" in world
development, without
reaching a common understanding on them the international community
just cannot
succeed in coping with particular problems in world politics.

I shall try to outline some of these questions having a direct bearing
on the arrangement
of the foreign policy strategy of Russia.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR: UNDER WHAT THE LINE HAS BEEN DRAWN

There is no longer any doubt that with the end of the Cold War a
lengthier world
development period came to an end, spanning 400-500 years during which
European
civilization had dominated in the world. The historical West had
consistently advanced
on the edge of this dominance.

There are two principled approaches to assessment of what the content
of the new
stage in human development consists of.

The first - the world should gradually, via adopting western values,
become a Greater
West. In its way, this is a version of the "end of history."

The other approach, which we share, consists in that competition now
becomes truly
global, acquiring a civilized dimension; that is, value guidelines and
development
models are becoming an object of competition among other things.

The new stage is occasionally defined as "post-American." But, of
course, this is
not a "world after the US" and even less so without the US (see
article of Richard
Haas "The Age of Nonpolarity" in this issue of the magazine). It is a
world where
as a result of the rise of other global power centers and the
strengthening of their
influence, the relative significance of America's role is dwindling,
as has already
been the case over recent decades in the global economy and trade.
Leadership is
an entirely different question though; it's above all the question of
achieving
consensus within a circle of partners and of the ability to be the
first, but among
equals.

To define the content of an emerging world order, such terms as
multipolar, polycentric,
and non-polar are also put forward. In particular, Richard Haas,
president of the
Council on Foreign Relations and former director of policy planning at
the US Department
of State, favors this last definition. It's hard not to agree with him
that power
and influence are becoming more diffuse. But even he acknowledges that
a core group
of major powers is needed to ensure governable world development under
the new conditions;
that is, in any case it is about the need for collective leadership,
of which Russia
has been consistently supportive. Of course, the world's diversity
requires that
such collective leadership be truly representative, geographically and
civilizationally.

We do not share the concerns that the current reconfiguration in the
world unavoidably
leads to "chaos and anarchy." There goes the natural process of the
formation of
a new international architecture - political as well as economic and
financial -
which would correspond to the new realities.

One of them is Russia's comeback to global politics, economy, and
finances as an
active and full-fledged "player." This concerns our place in the world
market (not
only of energy carriers, but also of grain) and our leader positions
in space and
nuclear energy and our capabilities in land, air and sea transit and
the ruble's
role as one of the most reliable world currencies.

Unfortunately, the Cold War experience has distorted the consciousness
of several
generations, the political elites in particular. Many believe that any
world politics
should be ideologized. Even now that Russia is guided in international
affairs by
comprehensible, pragmatic interests, devoid of any ideological motives
whatsoever,
not everyone is in a position to take this adequately. "Wounded
feelings," "hidden
agendas," "neo-imperial aspirations," and things like that are being
ascribed to
us.

This situation is unlikely to change soon, because at issue are
factors of a psychological
nature - after all, at least two generations of political elites have
been raised
in a definite ideological system of coordinates and sometimes are
simply unable
to think in terms lying outside of it. Quite specific understandable
selfish interests
also declare themselves, resulting from the privileges that the
existing global
economic-financial architecture provides for certain countries, for
example.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT MODELS: PLURALISM AND SYNTHESIS

Russia conceives itself as part of European civilization that has
common Christian
roots. This region's experience offers material that enables modeling
future global
processes. Thus, even the most perfunctory analysis suggests
definitively that the
Cold War termination did not solve the ways of social development
problem. Rather,
having removed extreme attitudes, it helped to approach its solution
on a more realistic
basis, especially given that the ideological considerations had used
to distort
the play of market forces, as well as the notion of democracy at every
step.

The rigid Anglo-Saxon socioeconomic model is now again, as was the
case during the
1920s, beginning to wobble. This time around, the structural breakdown
between the
real sector and financial system in the US makes itself felt. On the
other hand,
there is the socially oriented West European model, resulting from the
evolution
of European society during virtually the entire 20th century,
containing the tragedy
of two world wars, the Cold War and the USSR experiment. It was not
the least role
that the Soviet Union had in this process - it not only signified a
"Soviet threat"
that rallied the West, but also served as a stimulus for
"socialization" of the
economic development of the western part of Europe.

Therefore, as it proclaims the aim of creating a socially oriented
economy, the
new Russia draws upon our common European legacy. Herein is one more
proof of Russia's
compatibility with the rest of Europe.

Attempts to bring the development of our continent into line with the
Anglo-Saxon
model coincided with the end of the Cold War. But one has the
impression that Europe
is unlikely to part with its own development model, which corresponds
to its attitude
towards the world and has a more solid economic and financial
foundation beneath
it. Rebalancing acts on both sides of the Atlantic are possible and,
apparently,
inevitable. The New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt comes to mind in
this context;
a policy that denoted a moment of convergence in America's
development.

It is probable that one of the determinant world trends in the
foreseeable future
will be a kind of synthesis of different models - notably as a
process, not the
end result. Accordingly, the multiformity of the modern world will
remain in place,
reflecting its more fundamental characteristic, that of cultural and
civilizational
diversity. One may also assume that the global "rules of the game" in
these conditions,
in order to be effective, should be freed of the "ideological load."

A different, unifying, approach leads to interventionism - a strategy
which is hardly
realistic as its effectiveness can be ensured only in the conditions
of a shift
to global imperial building. Movement in this direction would trigger
growth of
tension in global and regional politics and would aggravate the
unsettledness of
practically the entire range of global problems. The present
exacerbation of the
global food crisis points to this, for example.

All of this certainly speaks in favor of pluralism across a broad
spectrum of parameters
for social development as the unalternative and, most importantly,
nonconfrontational
method of existence of the international community at this stage.

Whatever the concrete circumstances of what is called the
"revalorization" of natural
resources, this trend establishes conditions for movement forward
along the road
of equalizing development levels in the world today. The task is to
create the modalities
and mechanisms of effective use of reallocatable global financial
resources for
the purposes of universal development. Thus, sovereign wealth funds
already participate
in refinancing the US banking system.

THE GAP BETWEEN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORDERS

International experts, including American, speak in favor of such
analysis when
they write about the "world turned upside down," criticize the "weak-
dollar" policy
and so on. For example, Henry Kissinger in the pages of the
International Herald
Tribune (May 30, 2008) calls the International Monetary Fund as
presently constituted
an "anachronism" and even speaks of the necessity of restoring the
moral component
in economic and financial activities.

One cannot but agree with the Kissinger thesis that a gap has emerged
between the
global economic and political orders. And here let's get a couple of
things clear.

Firstly, there is no reasonable alternative to the global political
architecture
with reliance upon the United Nations Organization and the rule of
international
law. Let us not forget that the UN was established with focus on a
multipolar international
system even before the start of the Cold War. That is to say, its
potential can
be fully unfolded only now.

Secondly, the global economic and financial architecture was largely
created by
the West to suit its own needs. And now that we're witnessing a shift
of financial-economic
power and influence towards the new fast-growing economies, such as
China, India,
Russia and Brazil, the inadequacy of the previous system to the new
realities becomes
all too obvious. In reality, an economic and financial basis is needed
which would
conform to the polycentricity of the contemporary world. The
manageability of world
development can't be restored otherwise.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev spoke of this at length in Berlin
and at the St.
Petersburg Economic Forum. Reforming international institutions was
one of the themes
at the Group of Eight summit in Hokkaido, Japan. So the urgency of the
issue evokes
no doubt among our G8 partners, either. Russia is ready to participate
constructively
in this joint work.

THE WIND OF CHANGE: RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

As soon as these important issues are duly grasped, all the others,
including the
set of problems in relations within the Euro-Atlantic Region, are
going to be tackled
more easily.

In his day Fyodor Tyutchev wrote that "by the very fact of its
existence Russia
negates the future of the West." We can refute Tyutchev only together,
by building
a common future for the entire Euro-Atlantic Region and the world as a
whole, in
which security and prosperity will be truly indivisible.

New things are always scary. At the same time they're inevitable. And
there is only
one rational response to this challenge: accept this reality. When
they are threatening
us with the danger of "anarchy" in the modern world (which is very
Russian-like,
but done, as a rule, from the outside), they forget that any system
can be self-regulatory.
Effective, adequate institutions are needed for this purpose, and
they're going
to be created.

I would like to say it loud and clear: Russia, as no other country,
understands
the painfulness of the changes occurring. No one can get away from
them. Moreover,
as experience shows, adaptation at the level of foreign policy can
only result from
serious changes within the states themselves. Therefore Russia has
quite realistic
expectations regarding when changes should be awaited in the foreign
policy philosophy
of its international partners.

In contemporary conditions it is hardly appropriate to use the terms
of a "challenge"
thrown down by some states to others. This only gives rise to an
obsession of foreign
policy strategy with virtual dangers. The interdependence brought on
by globalization
practically leaves nobody any stimuli to "throw down the challenge" to
whomsoever.
And Russia is the last one to need this: we've got enough on our plate
just dealing
with our own problems of which we are fairly well aware, while at the
same time
understanding the interests of our partners. Dangerous is another
thing, notably
- being uncooperative and holding aloof from the problems of a partner
- all that
which makes collective action to tackle common tasks impossible.

All countries and peoples have had enough national catastrophes and
tragedies in
their history. The longer is the history, the greater the number in it
of all kinds
of moments, positive as well as negative. I fully agree with Vladislav
Inozemtsev
in that "the Soviet Union and the United States, even in a standoff
with each other,
remained remarkably alike" (see his article "Post-American World:
Dream of Laymen
and Uneasy Reality," published in the World Economy and International
Relations
journal, March 2008). Often our actions, which used to be taken in the
name of asserting
opposed ideals, were remarkably similar in the means involved and
their practical
consequences.

Alexis de Tocqueville predicted a common future for our countries. An
interconnection
has always existed between Russia and America. This interconnection
also found reflection
in the US gradually and in some respects even unwillingly replacing
Russia in the
European balance after 1917. That there is currently no need for
Europe to have
any external balancers, be it Russia or the US, is another matter. We
are perfectly
well aware of this - and hence favor equal relations in a triple
format between
Russia, the European Union and the US.

In the 20th century this interconnection was borne out by convergence
episodes,
not limited to the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt and allied
relations within
the Anti-Hitler Coalition. Thus, the election of John Kennedy as US
President may
be attributed to, among other things, the reaction of America to the
upswing of
the Soviet Union, not only technological and military-technical, but
also spiritual,
at the level of its entirely new attitude to the world, stemming from
the Thaw and
the completion of postwar reconstruction.

John Kennedy undertook a bold attempt to abandon the logic of
militarization of
foreign policy thinking, of whose dangers his predecessor had warned.
Unfortunately,
the pendulum of foreign policy philosophy swung toward politics based
on instincts
and ideological prejudices subsequently. Now everyone's wondering when
this pendulum
will swing backwards, on which depends what kind of America the world
will have
to deal with.

Russian-US relations would have gained strongly if an atmosphere of
mutual trust
and mutual respect had been established in them. Although distinctive
of the relationship
between the presidents of both countries during the last eight years,
it was not
always manifest at the lower floors. It sounds paradoxical, but there
was more mutual
trust and respect in the Cold War period. Perhaps this was due to
there having been
less lecturing on how one should behave. There was awareness of the
need - alongside
the wish - to deal with truly significant issues for our two countries
and the world
as a whole.

We understand that the tasks facing America are not easy ones.

Among the positive tendencies we see that comprehension is beginning
to prevail:
first of all, they are the problems of America itself, including the
necessity to
accept "a world with a diversity of voices and viewpoints" (see Fareed
Zakaria's
book The Post-American World [W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2008] and
his article
"The Future of American Power" in Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008).
Intellectual
rigidity will only restrain America's inherent ability to adapt to
changing realities.
History "happens" to all nations and peoples and of Russia this can be
said to a
significantly greater extent than of any other country. But this
teaches tolerance,
without which empires do not survive and normal equal relations
between states are
impossible.

It is gratifying that in the course of the current presidential
campaign in the
United States voices resound ever more loudly in favor of preserving
and developing
the disarmament and arms control process. Such cooperation alone would
be enough
to ensure the stability of our bilateral relations until there appears
a mutual
readiness for their substantial modernization in line with the
requirements of our
time.

THE EURO-ATLANTIC SPACE: BETWEEN FRAGMENTATION AND A COMMON FUTURE

The question of the destinies of diverse European civilization
presents itself in
a new way. On the political level there is demand for equal
interaction among its
three autonomous, but related component parts. The confrontational
paradigm of Cold
War era relations within Europe is giving way to a cooperation
paradigm. And this
means tolerance towards heterodoxy, pluralist views and attitudes.
Democracy is
always historical and national by its nature.

The proposals of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, advanced in
Berlin, rest on
a sober analysis of the situation. The Cold War-vintage European
architecture precludes
overcoming the negative dynamics that are set by the inertia of past
approaches
and by the contradictions now piling up in European affairs. Only one
thing remains:
to look further than what we have; that is, try and create something
uniting the
whole Euro-Atlantic Region at the level of the principles by which we
ought to be
guided in our relations. It will be possible to move on afterwards.
But without
this clarity it will be difficult to build up the critical mass of
trust needed
to construct positive, forward-looking relations in this region.

That principles are important is evident if only from the circumstance
that for
the space of several years now, at the annual OSCE ministerial
meetings, we have
been unable to achieve consensus on reconfirmation by all of adherence
to the principles
of the Helsinki Final Act. What other proof is required to show the
ill health of
the entire Euro-Atlantic politics?

There is a need for a positive process, including convening a pan-
European summit,
to fill the political vacuum that is forming in the Euro-Atlantic
Region and to
shape a positive agenda which we lack so badly at present. Over time
we could make
up our minds about which elements of European architecture are
promising and which
are not, what stands as a hindrance and what can be taken into the
future with us.
Why not insure ourselves, especially when much is still unclear?

This would not be a means to lean on any existing structures or
organizations. It
is about creating a new atmosphere of trust in the Euro-Atlantic
Region which could
help to look anew, in particular, at the relevance of arms control
too. Rather than
along bloc lines, let us develop it on a modern universal basis.
Otherwise the legacy
inherited by us from the previous era will only feed a sense of the
lingering possibility
of war in Europe.

It wouldn't hurt us all to think and look around a bit - that's what
the "pause"
we suggest is all about. But this means that the disputed projects
should all be
terminated, be it the unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence,
the plans
to deploy elements of a US global missile defense system in Eastern
Europe or NATO's
eastward expansion. Because any striving to complete at any cost by a
specific date
that which causes categorical non-acceptance by partners and threatens
a collapse
of the established relations will trigger a reaction. This vicious
circle needs
to be broken.

What is the alternative? A further accumulation of "electricity" in
the atmosphere
of Euro-Atlantic relations? Do things need to be messed up any
further? Will it
be good for everyone if we just merely watch detachedly how, for
example, the European
Union proves its postmodernism or NATO its capability in Afghanistan?
Likewise,
we would not want our partners to be left aloof from efforts to
implement Russia's
modernization project.

Finally, we all need to step over ourselves and stop conducting the
unnecessary
talk about "veto power" outside the UN Security Council, about
"spheres of influence"
and the like. It is quite possible to dispense with all this since
there are more
vital things where we undoubtedly have common interests. Trust has to
be built on,
and skills must be honed for joint work on truly significant issues of
a strategic
nature. Then a lot of things will look different. Let life decide and
put everything
in its place. What really depends on us and calls for political
decisions is this.
We must stop sliding into the past, into an absurdity we will
ourselves be ashamed
of. And then also history won't forgive us. Is it not in our common
interest to
have "a coherent Europe," all parts of which are united, as US
Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice wrote recently, by "workable relations" (see her
article "Rethinking
the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008)?

IT'S TIME TO TACKLE GLOBAL PROBLEMS TOGETHER

Everybody has their own problems; everybody has something to be
engaged in. The
US electorate is going to have to make a choice. The European Union is
living through
the process of adaptation. In the EU countries, processes of ethno-
religious self-determination
are coming to a head, at the level of the indigenous population and in
the communities
of recent immigrants as well. The "wealthy" regions aspire towards
their autonomous
existence in order not to pay for the development of the "poor"
regions within one
and the same state. This is a serious test of strength for the EU
commitment to
the ideas of tolerance and solidarity.

Psychologically those can be understood who wish to leave everything
the way it
is, in order to die in the Europe or in the America in which they were
born. But
the swift changes do not allow any such luxury. They presuppose, inter
alia, civilizational
compatibility, tolerance not only in word but also in deed. And this
will be hard
to achieve in conditions when militant secularism acts from positions
which differ
little from state religion.

No less importantly, the time has come to tackle global problems to
which the world
never got around during the Cold War. There were other, ideological
priorities then.
If not now, then when will we fight global poverty, hunger and
disease? The international
community has not managed to achieve great progress so far.

We see nothing in our approach which would be contrary to the
principles of rationalism,
intrinsic to Europeans' attitude to the world. Acting differently
means to pile
up problems upon problems and make the future of Europe and of the
entire Euro-Atlantic
Region hostage to hasty and rash decisions. This would be a huge waste
of time,
resulting in a multitude of lost opportunities for joint action. We do
not hurry
anybody; we only urge all nations to think together about what awaits
us. But a
breakthrough into our common future requires new, innovative
approaches. The future
belongs to them.

Sergei LAVROV

(c) 1999-2006. <<PRAVDA.Ru>>. When reproducing our materials in whole
or in part,
hyperlink to PRAVDA.Ru should be made. The opinions and views of the
authors do
not always coincide with the point of view of PRAVDA.Ru's editors.

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the 3rd Man

unread,
Aug 18, 2008, 11:52:02 AM8/18/08
to
On Aug 17, 4:47 am, Mort Zuckerman <morph...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> Americans DON'T CARE about the hardships of others.
>
> TRUE!!!
> Look at Lyme Disease.  

No one would help me, personally, or even with
> the Lyme activism,

I think you would be surprised to find that people WILL help...if you
are humble enough to admit that you need help and ask for help.

But doing what you want...may not be HELPING you.

Arrogantly telling others (some of whom may actually be trying to help
you) that they are "stupid" and that they have small penises really
doesn't win friends and influence others...or rally others to your
cause.

And your 'cause' seems to be extremely offensive, negative, hurtful
and insulting.

Lisa tried to assist you...in your "activism" (although I doubt that
was really helping you)...and you repaid her with your neo-Nazi
bashing of her ancestors...for which you even refused to apologize.

> so that I would not have THAT to do, too, but everyone is my critic,
> once the crime
> is solved:>

There is NO "crime", except in your imagination. (Actually, maybe it
is your imagination that is the crime, if you think about it).

> EVERYONE is my critic, while doing nothing themselves.

> and then Pat


> Smith tells me to my face at the Albany Rally, that I can take a hike,

Well, good for the "Pat".

For once, she managed to do something useful.

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