Littoral Area Domination Ship.

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Henry J. Cobb

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Dec 30, 2003, 2:03:00 AM12/30/03
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Given the mission of assuring access to the littorals in the face of
covert and overt enemy operations hidden in the clutter of commercial
traffic, what sort of ship design is best?

Well obviously each ship must continuously cover a large area and be
able to quickly react to problems anywhere in the area while engaging
in several different missions at once. So the speed of the ship isn't
as important as its reach.

This calls for a swarm of unmanned vehicles to watch for enemy
aircraft, ships and subs and clear a mine free area of operations,
along with at least a dozen helicopters to drop boarding parties on
any suspect ship in the area at any time and STOVL manned or unmanned
combat aircraft to engage the enemy over the horizon.

So the ship needs a flight deck, a hanger and a well deck to be able
to operate air, water and underwater manned and unmanned craft along
with internal space for controlling and maintaining the manned and
unmanned craft and bunking the boarding parties and vehicle crews.

The US Navy already has ships, that if properly equipped with a new
generation of unmanned vehicles, could do a much better job at
dominating the littorals than the LCSs ever could, but how could they
ever kick the Marines off?

-HJC

Dott. Piergiorgio

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Dec 30, 2003, 2:19:32 AM12/30/03
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Henry J. Cobb wrote:

>
> The US Navy already has ships, that if properly equipped with a new
> generation of unmanned vehicles, could do a much better job at
> dominating the littorals than the LCSs ever could, but how could they
> ever kick the Marines off?

IMHO the better LCS are the B*ttl*ships ;)

Joking aside, If you want a Wasp as LCS (If I understand well your specs)
you are firing long ;)

For me a better LCS is a ship around 2000-3000 tons, stealth, equipped much
more with sensors than weapons save some 3" gun and missiles smaller than
Harpoon (Penguin and the Italian Marte came in mind) to defend against
corvettes/FAC of the enemy, and 12.75" TT against coastal submarines An
small helo can be useful, but not necessary.

IIUC the main role of LCS is to render clean the brown water near hostile
coast to permit landing, and as EW against surface or air sorties. So
vbetter something like the European small frigates or large corvettes.

I appreciate much the HI-LO mix advocated in the US during late 70s and
early 80s, so the LCS will fill the LO slot and the DDX-CGX the HI slot.

The said LO slot LCS will be more near the hostile coastline and the HI slot
ships back and further in the rear the CVBG and the Landing Force.

Best regards from Italy.


--
Dott. Piergiorgio d' Errico- Naval and military historian

Niitakayama nobore ichi ni rei ya

Mark Test

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Dec 30, 2003, 9:33:54 AM12/30/03
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"Dott. Piergiorgio" <pg...@libero.it> wrote in message
news:8G9Ib.220338$e6.86...@twister2.libero.it...

> Henry J. Cobb wrote:
>
> >
> > The US Navy already has ships, that if properly equipped with a new
> > generation of unmanned vehicles, could do a much better job at
> > dominating the littorals than the LCSs ever could, but how could they
> > ever kick the Marines off?
>
> IMHO the better LCS are the B*ttl*ships ;)
>
> Joking aside, If you want a Wasp as LCS (If I understand well your specs)
> you are firing long ;)
>
> For me a better LCS is a ship around 2000-3000 tons, stealth, equipped
much
> more with sensors than weapons save some 3" gun and missiles smaller than
> Harpoon (Penguin and the Italian Marte came in mind) to defend against
> corvettes/FAC of the enemy, and 12.75" TT against coastal submarines An
> small helo can be useful, but not necessary.

Sounds like the specs for an LA or Virginia class SSN, minus the guns.
>
Snippage


Henry J. Cobb

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Dec 30, 2003, 9:56:53 AM12/30/03
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"Dott. Piergiorgio" <pg...@libero.it> wrote in message news:<8G9Ib.220338$e6.86...@twister2.libero.it>...
> Joking aside, If you want a Wasp as LCS (If I understand well your specs)
> you are firing long ;)
>
> For me a better LCS is a ship around 2000-3000 tons, stealth, equipped much
> more with sensors than weapons save some 3" gun and missiles smaller than
> Harpoon (Penguin and the Italian Marte came in mind) to defend against
> corvettes/FAC of the enemy, and 12.75" TT against coastal submarines An
> small helo can be useful, but not necessary.
>
> IIUC the main role of LCS is to render clean the brown water near hostile
> coast to permit landing, and as EW against surface or air sorties. So
> better something like the European small frigates or large corvettes.
>
> I appreciate much the HI-LO mix advocated in the US during late 70s and
> early 80s, so the LCS will fill the LO slot and the DDX-CGX the HI slot.
>
> The said LO slot LCS will be more near the hostile coastline and the HI slot
> ships back and further in the rear the CVBG and the Landing Force.
>
> Best regards from Italy.

OK, why does your mini-LCS need a crew?

Why send a man in harm's way when you can send a robot?

Make the LO really low. For each mission build a thing that has the
sensors, weapons, communications and brains needed to do just that
mission and enough propulsion to go out fifty miles, do that mission
for awhile then come back.

So some of these robots could be sweeping mines while others keep an
eye on commercial traffic and still others are hunting down an enemy
sub.

And what if a careful ambush blows up your minesweeper? Well I guess
you'll just have to get another one out of storage and be more careful
next time, but at least you won't have to write the bereaved family.

-HJC

Fred J. McCall

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Dec 30, 2003, 11:29:46 AM12/30/03
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hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:

:OK, why does your mini-LCS need a crew?

Because computers alone ain't that smart.

:Why send a man in harm's way when you can send a robot?

Because the robot can't do the job.

:Make the LO really low. For each mission build a thing that has the


:sensors, weapons, communications and brains needed to do just that
:mission and enough propulsion to go out fifty miles, do that mission
:for awhile then come back.
:
:So some of these robots could be sweeping mines while others keep an
:eye on commercial traffic and still others are hunting down an enemy
:sub.
:
:And what if a careful ambush blows up your minesweeper? Well I guess
:you'll just have to get another one out of storage and be more careful
:next time, but at least you won't have to write the bereaved family.

Why not just use the magical cruise missiles from another thread?
They're cheap and this would only be a small enhancement of the same
technology....

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

Penta

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Dec 30, 2003, 1:08:45 PM12/30/03
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On Tue, 30 Dec 2003 08:33:54 -0600, "Mark Test" <mgt...@the-i.net>
wrote:

>"Dott. Piergiorgio" <pg...@libero.it> wrote in message
>news:8G9Ib.220338$e6.86...@twister2.libero.it...

>> For me a better LCS is a ship around 2000-3000 tons, stealth, equipped


>much
>> more with sensors than weapons save some 3" gun and missiles smaller than
>> Harpoon (Penguin and the Italian Marte came in mind) to defend against
>> corvettes/FAC of the enemy, and 12.75" TT against coastal submarines An
>> small helo can be useful, but not necessary.
>
>Sounds like the specs for an LA or Virginia class SSN, minus the guns.

Problem would be, do you really want a nuclear craft that close in?

On the missile side, I'm thinking possibly the Gabriel II missiles
used on Saar 5?

Otherwise, I could see a big gap here that D/E subs would be very,
very useful for.

John

Dott. Piergiorgio

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Dec 30, 2003, 5:37:56 PM12/30/03
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Henry J. Cobb wrote:

> Why send a man in harm's way when you can send a robot?

Putting aside Asimov's Laws, I point that a Computer, wichever
sophisticated, can make only the things perdicted and programmed in it, and
warfare is ever a matter of ingenuosity, creativity and improvisation.

No robot can replace a true soldier/sailor/pilot.

Dott. Piergiorgio

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Dec 30, 2003, 5:39:28 PM12/30/03
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Mark Test wrote:

> Sounds like the specs for an LA or Virginia class SSN, minus the guns.

And 4000 tons less and minus the 21" torpedo ;)

Henry J. Cobb

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Dec 30, 2003, 8:46:52 PM12/30/03
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Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message news:<4q93vvk5hjjb44p56...@4ax.com>...

> hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
>
> :OK, why does your mini-LCS need a crew?
>
> Because computers alone ain't that smart.
>
> :Why send a man in harm's way when you can send a robot?
>
> Because the robot can't do the job.

Which is why you have manned terminals controlling the robots from your ship.

Exactly like all of the current LCS designs.

The only difference is that you are paying for far less overhead per unmanned
vehicle by launching and controlling dozens of robots from the same manned
ship.

-HJC

Ken Adams

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Dec 30, 2003, 10:06:56 PM12/30/03
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A long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away,
Henry J. Cobb <hc...@io.com> opposed the empire by writing:

So how do you communicate with all of these dozens of robots
simultaneously to provide man-in-the-loop control? Can you expect one
man to control 1 robot, or all 12? Assume that the ratio is 1:1 for
the sake of argument. You said dozens, so let's use the lowest
possible interpretation of that and say 2 dozen. This means you have
a 24-man watch section just to operate the offboard vehicles, plus
another bunch to operate the ship. How does 12 sound? Too many? OK,
knock it down to 9 for the ship. That adds up to ..... a 33-man watch
section. Which adds up to 99 watchstanders. Add in butchers, bakers,
and candlestick makers for a grand total of roughly 150, and you are
WAY out of the box for LCS. Your big ship needs a big crew. Big crew
means big overhead.

How much deck space do you need for all the antennas it will take to
talk to all these robots simultaneously? You can bet each one's going
to want its own dedicated circuit, if not 2 or three. UHF won't work,
since you want them to go OTH, so it's either HF or satellite. Either
one's a pretty big footprint -- HF for separation to avoid mutual
interference, satellite to get enough gain and the right beam pattern
to talk to the right bird. Round numbers, lets say that you need a
circle with a 2 meter radius for each antenna, with 2 meter separation
between circles. That means you would need a surface area (just for
antennas) of 22m x 34m, or about 750 square meters. For comparison,
the beam of an Arleigh Burke DDG is 18m at the waterline, and about
20m max. Your big ship is going to be bigger than the current billion
dollar destroyer. Lots of steel (or aluminum, or plastic) to put
together and maintain and push through the water means big overhead.

How survivable is this one large robot carrier? I would assume the
worst case -- an ASCM leaker gets past area defenses and point
defenses and you take a hit, or an undetected mine activates under
your keel. How much combat capability do you lose? My bet is 100%
for some period of time -- how long was Princeton unavailable during
Desert Storm after she hit a mine? Whether it's an hour or a day is
immaterial. You may lose that fraction permanently, but you can still
continue the fight. With smaller ships distributed throughout the
littoral, if the worst case scenario occurs you only lose a fraction
of the combat capability. Princeton's temporary loss during DS didn't
really hurt the total effort because area air defense was distributed
among multiple shooters.

In all, the idea of having dozens of unmanned vehicles controlled from
a single platform just doesn't hold water. A bigger ship costs more
to build, it costs more to operate, and it fails to distribute risk.
There's probably a reason that the three current LCS competitors are
in the size/cost range they are in - smaller than/faster than/cheaper
than/not quite as capable as an Aegis CG/DDG meets the mission
requirements.

--
Ken
http://www.geocities.com/kmadams85
I hate you, you hate me, we're a disfunctional family...

Fred J. McCall

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Dec 30, 2003, 10:41:37 PM12/30/03
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hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:

:Fred J. McCall <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message news:<4q93vvk5hjjb44p56...@4ax.com>...


:> hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
:>
:> :OK, why does your mini-LCS need a crew?
:>
:> Because computers alone ain't that smart.
:>
:> :Why send a man in harm's way when you can send a robot?
:>
:> Because the robot can't do the job.
:
:Which is why you have manned terminals controlling the robots from your ship.

Which works great until you have to actually use them, at which point
in time your control gets jammed out, spoofed, etc.

:Exactly like all of the current LCS designs.

Oh, really?

:The only difference is that you are paying for far less overhead per unmanned


:vehicle by launching and controlling dozens of robots from the same manned
:ship.

Which gives you a single point of failure that can fail in multiple
ways. One ship gets hit or jammed off the air and EVERYTHING is
useless.

Bad plan, unless you never intend to actually get into a fight with
this stuff (in which case, why build it at all?).

Henry J. Cobb

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Dec 31, 2003, 1:24:09 AM12/31/03
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"Dott. Piergiorgio" <pg...@libero.it> wrote in message news:<87nIb.221905$e6.86...@twister2.libero.it>...

> Henry J. Cobb wrote:
> > Why send a man in harm's way when you can send a robot?
>
> Putting aside Asimov's Laws, I point that a Computer, wichever
> sophisticated, can make only the things perdicted and programmed in it, and
> warfare is ever a matter of ingenuosity, creativity and improvisation.
>
> No robot can replace a true soldier/sailor/pilot.

But remote controled semi-autonomous robots are a vital part of the
LCS mission.

http://www.navysna.org/newsgram/files/Press/firescout_17JAN03.pdf
"We now needed something in the first [LCS] that was a UAV that could
do surveillance for us,"

http://www.navysna.org/newsgram/files/Press/Balisle_22JAN03.pdf
Lockheed Martin's [LMT] remote mine-hunting systems and perhaps other
unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV). These systems could be included in
an LCS "exploratory" mine warfare module.

http://www.naval-industrypartners.com/2003/pdf/NavalSurfaceForceTechnologyNeeds.pdf
Technologies and products that can contribute modular capabilities to
one or more LCS missions
Towed & deployable ASW sonar arrays for USV
Lightweight ASW sensor and weapons payloads
for UAV (e.g. LIDAR, MAD, mini-torpedo)
MIW UUV payloads
ASUW targeting systems and lightweight weapons for UAV and USV

Putting the speed in the robots instead of the main ship and
increasing the size of that main ship so it can take on multiple
missions at the same time isn't just a plan-B for dealing with reality
once the LCS program sinks under the same speed vs payload problems
that have swamped all of the Navy's "smaller, faster, cheaper"
platforms, it's a good idea in its own right.

-HJC

Howard Berkowitz

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Dec 31, 2003, 9:48:26 AM12/31/03
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In article <u3h4vv0quilk7bret...@4ax.com>,
fmc...@earthlink.net wrote:


Fred, you simply don't see the possibilities in this thread. I would
have thought you'd visualize a littoral area domination ship as a
sailing yacht with a leather-clad Ann Coulter draped across the bow and
wielding a whip.

Mark Test

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Dec 31, 2003, 10:02:14 AM12/31/03
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"Penta" <m...@privacy.net> wrote in message
news:8lf3vv8njk4btohu1...@4ax.com...

Hmmmm, but of course this is nothing new for either SSN's or SS's,
taking station of the coast and simply "listening" for weeks on end.

Mark


Fred J. McCall

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Dec 31, 2003, 10:40:23 AM12/31/03
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Howard Berkowitz <h...@gettcomm.com> wrote:

:Fred, you simply don't see the possibilities in this thread. I would

:have thought you'd visualize a littoral area domination ship as a
:sailing yacht with a leather-clad Ann Coulter draped across the bow and
:wielding a whip.

I try never to take Ann Coulter littorally....

[What? She can TALK????]


Joe Osman

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Dec 31, 2003, 12:11:35 PM12/31/03
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Are current torpedoes smart enough to be considered robots?

Joe


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Andrew Toppan

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Dec 31, 2003, 2:56:24 PM12/31/03
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On 30 Dec 2003 17:46:52 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:

>Exactly like all of the current LCS designs.

It's interesting that you suddenly know the details of all the LCS designs,
when recently you have demonstrated ignorance of the basic concepts of LCS.


--
Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
"Haze Gray & Underway" - Naval History, DANFS, World Navies Today,
Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more - http://www.hazegray.org/

Andrew Toppan

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Dec 31, 2003, 2:56:25 PM12/31/03
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On 30 Dec 2003 22:24:09 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:

>But remote controled semi-autonomous robots are a vital part of the
>LCS mission.

And you have somehow made the jump from this concept to a notion of how many
UxVs LCS can carry/control. In fact you really have no idea what the
capabilities of LCS will be, aside from some vague and general concepts.

>Putting the speed in the robots instead of the main ship and
>increasing the size of that main ship so it can take on multiple
>missions at the same time

Like, perhaps, what CG, DDG, and DDX can do? Revolutionary!

>isn't just a plan-B for dealing with reality
>once the LCS program sinks under the same speed vs payload problems
>that have swamped all of the Navy's "smaller, faster, cheaper"

I'm trying to think of the most recent "smaller, faster, cheaper" program that
"sank" as you describe. Perhaps you're referring to FFG, which must have
"sunk" after producing 51 USN ships and nearly 2 dozen for foreign navies....

Jack Love

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Dec 31, 2003, 3:48:38 PM12/31/03
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There are already the undersea 'gliders' which pretty clearly are at
least in some dim way.

Henry J. Cobb

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Dec 31, 2003, 8:51:20 PM12/31/03
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Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message news:<j3a6vv8oh82gkmaq7...@4ax.com>...

> On 30 Dec 2003 22:24:09 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
>
> >But remote controled semi-autonomous robots are a vital part of the
> >LCS mission.
>
> And you have somehow made the jump from this concept to a notion of how many
> UxVs LCS can carry/control. In fact you really have no idea what the
> capabilities of LCS will be, aside from some vague and general concepts.
>
> >Putting the speed in the robots instead of the main ship and
> >increasing the size of that main ship so it can take on multiple
> >missions at the same time
>
> Like, perhaps, what CG, DDG, and DDX can do? Revolutionary!
>
> >isn't just a plan-B for dealing with reality
> >once the LCS program sinks under the same speed vs payload problems
> >that have swamped all of the Navy's "smaller, faster, cheaper"
>
> I'm trying to think of the most recent "smaller, faster, cheaper" program that
> "sank" as you describe. Perhaps you're referring to FFG, which must have
> "sunk" after producing 51 USN ships and nearly 2 dozen for foreign navies....

Nope.

Now go read this.

And yes we all know that Joint Venture isn't an LCS. It doesn't
change the final result that small fast ships have been tried over and
over and they've been found wanting in payload, endurance and
seakeeping every time.

"Logistical Analysis of the Littoral Combat Ship"
http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion-image/03Mar_Rudko.pdf
Throughout history, the United States Navy has invested a considerable
amount of time and money in the development of high-speed ships. Since
World War Two, three high-speed ship classes have been commissioned
and tested in hopes of achieving great military usefulness: the
ASHEVILLE class patrol gunboats during the 1960s, the PEGASUS class
missile hydrofoils during the 1980s and the CYCLONE class patrol
coastal ships during the 1990s. However, each class failed to
capitalize on the speed they were designed for and, as a result,
failed to achieve the missions for which they were intended.

-HJC

phil hunt

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Dec 31, 2003, 4:15:11 PM12/31/03
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On Tue, 30 Dec 2003 22:37:56 GMT, Dott. Piergiorgio <pg...@libero.it> wrote:
>Henry J. Cobb wrote:
>
>> Why send a man in harm's way when you can send a robot?
>
>Putting aside Asimov's Laws, I point that a Computer, wichever
>sophisticated, can make only the things perdicted and programmed in it,

As Ada Lovelace observed.

>and
>warfare is ever a matter of ingenuosity, creativity and improvisation.

It is controversial whether these can be programmed into a computer.

>No robot can replace a true soldier/sailor/pilot.

Yet.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: <zen2...@zen.co.ku>, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).


Andrew Toppan

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Jan 1, 2004, 1:51:27 PM1/1/04
to
On 31 Dec 2003 17:51:20 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:

>World War Two, three high-speed ship classes have been commissioned
>and tested in hopes of achieving great military usefulness: the
>ASHEVILLE class patrol gunboats during the 1960s, the PEGASUS class
>missile hydrofoils during the 1980s and the CYCLONE class patrol

PEGASUS class: 265-ton gunboats
ASHEVILLE class: 265-ton gunboats
CYCLONE class: 328-ton gunboats

LCS: 1000 to 3000 ton fast light frigate/corvette

Any comparison between ships so different in size and concept is irrelevant.

Dott. Piergiorgio

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Jan 1, 2004, 3:42:06 PM1/1/04
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phil hunt wrote:

> It is controversial whether these can be programmed into a computer.

IMHO impossible.

sid

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Jan 1, 2004, 6:32:33 PM1/1/04
to
Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message news:<caq8vv41snv3bl4sv...@4ax.com>...

> On 31 Dec 2003 17:51:20 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
>
> >World War Two, three high-speed ship classes have been commissioned
> >and tested in hopes of achieving great military usefulness: the
> >ASHEVILLE class patrol gunboats during the 1960s, the PEGASUS class
> >missile hydrofoils during the 1980s and the CYCLONE class patrol
>
> PEGASUS class: 265-ton gunboats
> ASHEVILLE class: 265-ton gunboats
> CYCLONE class: 328-ton gunboats
>
> LCS: 1000 to 3000 ton fast light frigate/corvette
>
> Any comparison between ships so different in size and concept is irrelevant.

So each of the mentioned ship classes were intended for littoral
warfare and as the thesis noted each came up lacking. Conceptually,
the differences between them and the LCS are not as great as you
suggest.
As far as the LCS goes, its conceptual nature is still under debate as
evidenced by this January Proceedings article:
Lethal in the Littoral: A Smaller, Meaner LCS
By Lieutenant (junior grade) Jonathan F. Solomon, USN
The most important question has yet to be debated: What do we want
this combatant to do for us?

sid

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Jan 1, 2004, 6:50:22 PM1/1/04
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Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message news:<j3a6vv8oh82gkmaq7...@4ax.com>...

> On 30 Dec 2003 22:24:09 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
>
> I'm trying to think of the most recent "smaller, faster, cheaper" program that
> "sank" as you describe. Perhaps you're referring to FFG, which must have
> "sunk" after producing 51 USN ships and nearly 2 dozen for foreign navies....

Surely Andrew, since your are the "Great Knower Of All Things Knaval",
must agree that the FFGs bear little resemblance to the original PF
concept.

Andrew Toppan

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Jan 1, 2004, 9:20:11 PM1/1/04
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On 1 Jan 2004 15:50:22 -0800, sidi...@yahoo.com (sid) wrote:

>Surely Andrew, since your are the "Great Knower Of All Things Knaval",
>must agree that the FFGs bear little resemblance to the original PF
>concept.

And the point is?

LCS already bears little resemblance to the original concept (streetfighter),
and surely the final deployed LCS will not be the same as the existing
concepts.

That doesn't mean LCS, or PF/FFG, are failures.

Andrew Toppan

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Jan 1, 2004, 9:20:11 PM1/1/04
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On 1 Jan 2004 15:32:33 -0800, sidi...@yahoo.com (sid) wrote:

>So each of the mentioned ship classes were intended for littoral
>warfare and as the thesis noted each came up lacking. Conceptually,
>the differences between them and the LCS are not as great as you
>suggest.

By the same rationale, battleships and aircraft carriers are conceptually the
same, since they are both intended for high-seas warfare. But in practical
terms, they're quite different.

The three small classes mentioned earlier are/were essentially fast attack
craft, intended for a single, extremely focused mission, unsuited to
independent deployment, and unable to adapt to new missions. They would have
been good for their intended missions, had those missions actually existed.

But if you build a missile-armed FAC to attack enemy surface combatants, then
place it in south Florida, it just becomes a bloody expensive Coast Guard
boat, and of course is considered a failure.

LCS is fundamentally different, in being a full-sized ship, capable of
deploying on its own, capable of a variety of missions, and specifically
designed to be adaptable for other missions.

In this sense LCS is much more like FFG than any of the small attack craft.
Both LCS and FFG are, and will be, subject to criticism that they are not
equal to larger combatants (DDG, DDX). Some people really despise any
smaller, less-capable, less-expensive ship, and believe everything should be a
top-of-the-line DDG. This argument ignores the fact that one simply cannot
afford to build *every* ship as a billion-dollar top-line vessel, and there
are a great many missions that are best accomplished with the smaller, cheaper
vessel.

There always has been, and always will be, a "high-end" and a "low-end"
ship....even when the concept of "Hi-Low Mix" is out of fashion.

>As far as the LCS goes, its conceptual nature is still under debate as
>evidenced by this January Proceedings article:

Hell, there's still debate about the conceptual nature of carriers and DDGs,
and we've been building them for a long time.

The Navy is evidently sure enough about the "conceptual nature" of the LCS to
issue an RFP for design and construction of 2 of them, arguments in
Proceedings notwithstanding.

Henry J. Cobb

unread,
Jan 2, 2004, 1:53:14 AM1/2/04
to
Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message news:<94k9vv0ll6btg7bv5...@4ax.com>...

> LCS already bears little resemblance to the original concept (streetfighter),
> and surely the final deployed LCS will not be the same as the existing
> concepts.
>
> That doesn't mean LCS, or PF/FFG, are failures.

Right, the LCS will keep getting bigger and slower and more focused on
mission modularity through UVs and manned air and watercraft until
they become LADS. And then they will be successful.

More or less as predicted by Lieutenant Commander David D. Rudko in
that article I pointed to above.

-HJC

Henry J. Cobb

unread,
Jan 3, 2004, 12:47:27 AM1/3/04
to
Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message news:<j3a6vv8oh82gkmaq7...@4ax.com>...

> I'm trying to think of the most recent "smaller, faster, cheaper" program that
> "sank" as you describe. Perhaps you're referring to FFG, which must have
> "sunk" after producing 51 USN ships and nearly 2 dozen for foreign navies....

Does the G in FFG stand for Gelded?

http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/20040102-9999_1m2frigate.html
Without missiles, some sailors wonder if the Navy will also remove the
"G" – for guided missile – from the frigates' designation.

Seahandling seems to be one of the reasons for the gelding.

"The reduced weight also will increase the ship's stability in heavy
seas, he said."

But best of all is this bit.

In essence, by removing the missiles, frigates will become de facto
helicopter carriers, Friedman said. "As a small helicopter carrier, it
may make sense" to continue operating the frigates.

So that's how frigates dominate a large area, through the use of
carried craft rather than firing missiles directly or running around
at 40 knots?

I bet if that Frigate were twice as big it could carry more than twice
the number of helicopters without needing a crew twice as big, eh?

It might even have room for some unmanned surface and subsurface
vehicles.

-HJC

Kristan Roberge

unread,
Jan 3, 2004, 11:03:23 AM1/3/04
to

"Henry J. Cobb" wrote:

The italian navy was designing for shallow-water operations post WW2, which let's face it,
theres an awful lot of in the med, and have put more time and effort into helicopter carrying
destroyer and cruiser designs than any navy other than the russians. The Vittorio Veneto
is about 9k tons fully loaded and has deck and hanger space for 9 AB212 helos or 6 SeaKings
(though the latter are too big to fit the elevators to the hanger deck). While an AB212 isn't that large
and doesn't have the endurance of the SeaKing, it can still carry a decent sensor fit and a couple
lightweight torpedoes, or a couple ASMs capable of dealing with small patrol craft, or machine guns or
rocket pods. 9 of them are certainly enough air power to deal with most shallow-water type operations.
Now the ship is overall pretty well armed, with Standard ER missiles, ASROC missiles, 8 76mm guns,
3 twin-40mm guns, and 406mm torpedo launchers, not to mention the Otomat Mk2 SSMs. Cut down on
that heavy hardware a bit and you could shrink the ship's design.

Mark Test

unread,
Jan 3, 2004, 10:55:11 AM1/3/04
to
"Henry J. Cobb" <hc...@io.com> wrote in message
news:19c84c65.04010...@posting.google.com...

> Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message
news:<j3a6vv8oh82gkmaq7...@4ax.com>...
> > I'm trying to think of the most recent "smaller, faster, cheaper"
program that
> > "sank" as you describe. Perhaps you're referring to FFG, which must
have
> > "sunk" after producing 51 USN ships and nearly 2 dozen for foreign
navies....
>
> Does the G in FFG stand for Gelded?
snippage

> But best of all is this bit.
>
> In essence, by removing the missiles, frigates will become de facto
> helicopter carriers, Friedman said. "As a small helicopter carrier, it
> may make sense" to continue operating the frigates.

By removing the missles the Frigate can still perform a vital warfare
capability ASW. It's second mission area MIO and drug interdiction
Ops are also unaffected.

> So that's how frigates dominate a large area, through the use of
> carried craft rather than firing missiles directly or running around
> at 40 knots?

That's how they dominate the litorral ASW area, not the theater.
Can you call it dominating though? 6-8 OHP's conducting coordinated
ASW that might qualify as dominating.

Kristan Roberge

unread,
Jan 3, 2004, 11:38:52 AM1/3/04
to

sid wrote:

> Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message news:<caq8vv41snv3bl4sv...@4ax.com>...
> > On 31 Dec 2003 17:51:20 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
> >
> > >World War Two, three high-speed ship classes have been commissioned
> > >and tested in hopes of achieving great military usefulness: the
> > >ASHEVILLE class patrol gunboats during the 1960s, the PEGASUS class
> > >missile hydrofoils during the 1980s and the CYCLONE class patrol
> >
> > PEGASUS class: 265-ton gunboats
> > ASHEVILLE class: 265-ton gunboats
> > CYCLONE class: 328-ton gunboats
> >
> > LCS: 1000 to 3000 ton fast light frigate/corvette
> >
> > Any comparison between ships so different in size and concept is irrelevant.
>
> So each of the mentioned ship classes were intended for littoral
> warfare and as the thesis noted each came up lacking. Conceptually,
> the differences between them and the LCS are not as great as you
> suggest.

They came up lacking in that they were designed for duties that they for one reason or another, never
actually got to fulfill. They then got used for other secondary duties which they simply happened to be
better than anything else available was for.

The pegasus class was meant for the shoot first and hope you survive the counter strike philosophy that
comes with engaging the russian black sea fleet as it'd break out into the med. This never happened of
course
and after the breakup of the soviet union/end of the cold war, and after the Iraqi Turkey Shoot by the
British
navy using helicopters, there didn't seem much reason to keep things like the Pegasus class around except
for
border security in the gulf and caribean for chasing down drug smugglers..

The cyclones btw were designed for Navy Seals/special ops, not direct combat with other FACs
and the mighty russian navy. Except they're a bit big for what the seals want to do. The coast guard is
making fun use of them for homeland security work though, basically doing the same stuff they used the
pegasus class for, except the cyclones are better armed for the role since most drug smugglers do not
operate vessels that'd call for a harpoon missile or a 76mm shell to stop.

The Asheville's were originally built during the days of the evil cuban missile crisis as a way to
blockade
cuba if required without tying up larger destroyers and cruisers, but they were usedin the riverine
operations around vietnam quite successfully. But then lacking much in the way of SSMs (aside from a few
conversions for the anti-tattletale role carrying standard anti-radiation SSMs) and not as fast as
russian missile-hydrofoils (which is why the pegasus class came to be), they mostly got relagated to the
reserve fleet pending transfer to foreign countries.

Now canada has some coastal patrol vessels that are amazingly well suited to shallow water operations, and
at about
960 tons are right in the corvette displacement range, but they're a bit under armed as far as modern navy
vessels go, and
slow too (about 16 knts) but they're very maneurable using azipods for the propulsion units (basically
they can do a 360 inside their
own length if they wanted to). But they were designed for patrol work, and mine hunting, and as training
vessels for the naval
reserve, and they do those jobs well.

Fred J. McCall

unread,
Jan 3, 2004, 12:43:42 PM1/3/04
to
"Mark Test" <mgt...@the-i.net> wrote:

:By removing the missles the Frigate can still perform a vital warfare
:capability ASW.

You do know what the nickname for the sonar on the Perrys was amongst
the ASW community, don't you?

Andrew Toppan

unread,
Jan 3, 2004, 2:09:26 PM1/3/04
to
On 2 Jan 2004 21:47:27 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:

>So that's how frigates dominate a large area, through the use of

Frigates are not intended as area domination ships. That is a role for
cruisers.

>carried craft rather than firing missiles directly or running around
>at 40 knots?

The missiles that are being removed would not contribute to 'area domination'
anyway...hence their removal.

>I bet if that Frigate were twice as big it could carry more than twice
>the number of helicopters without needing a crew twice as big, eh?

DDs, DDGs, and CGs are twice (or more) the size of FFGs, and carry an equal or
smaller number of helos.

Dott. Piergiorgio

unread,
Jan 3, 2004, 2:25:29 PM1/3/04
to
Kristan Roberge wrote:

[1969 Vittorio Veneto]


> Now the ship is overall pretty well armed, with Standard ER missiles,
> ASROC missiles, 8 76mm guns, 3 twin-40mm guns, and 406mm torpedo
> launchers, not to mention the Otomat Mk2 SSMs. Cut down on that heavy
> hardware a bit and you could shrink the ship's design.

A magnificent ship indeed... sadly 30/11/2003 was decommissioned :((((((((((

The ex-sailors association of Taranto was attempted to preserve her as
museum ship ( so at least we can have one)

And a side note: the TT was 325 mm. not 406mm...

Howard Berkowitz

unread,
Jan 3, 2004, 4:00:16 PM1/3/04
to
In article <caq8vv41snv3bl4sv...@4ax.com>, Andrew Toppan
<acto...@gwi.net> wrote:

> On 31 Dec 2003 17:51:20 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
>
> >World War Two, three high-speed ship classes have been commissioned
> >and tested in hopes of achieving great military usefulness: the
> >ASHEVILLE class patrol gunboats during the 1960s, the PEGASUS class
> >missile hydrofoils during the 1980s and the CYCLONE class patrol
>
> PEGASUS class: 265-ton gunboats
> ASHEVILLE class: 265-ton gunboats
> CYCLONE class: 328-ton gunboats
>
> LCS: 1000 to 3000 ton fast light frigate/corvette
>
> Any comparison between ships so different in size and concept is
> irrelevant.
>

Andrew, while I realize it is not current, how would you put the Sa'ar V
with respect to possible LCS relevance?

Henry J. Cobb

unread,
Jan 3, 2004, 5:29:07 PM1/3/04
to
Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message news:<ok4evvohutaf8qej2...@4ax.com>...

> >I bet if that Frigate were twice as big it could carry more than twice
> >the number of helicopters without needing a crew twice as big, eh?
>
> DDs, DDGs, and CGs are twice (or more) the size of FFGs, and carry an equal or
> smaller number of helos.

Yes, but they have different missions.

The DD(X)is the escort leading the way with In-stride Mine Avoidance
and advanced sensors. It also does some land attack with AGS and
Tactical Tomahawk.

The CG(X) handles air and missile defense.

The CVN launches fixed wing aircraft for airspace domination, long
range attack and close air support.

The LADS provides manned and unmanned air and water craft for boarding
operations, minefield clearance and the search for and destruction of
enemy submarines and small watercraft.

So when these classes are combined with the subs, gators and usual
support ships the US Navy can deal with all of its missions without
needing any ocean crosser smaller than a destroyer.

They just need to can the LCS, build more DD(X) and convert a few
gators over to the LADS configuration to test and refine the concept.

It wouldn't hurt to build a modular design that can quickly be shifted
between the LADS and LPD missions.

-HJC

Andrew Toppan

unread,
Jan 3, 2004, 5:50:00 PM1/3/04
to
On Sat, 03 Jan 2004 16:00:16 -0500, Howard Berkowitz <h...@gettcomm.com> wrote:

>Andrew, while I realize it is not current, how would you put the Sa'ar V
>with respect to possible LCS relevance?

Well, it's certainly more similar in size and mission than PHM, PGM, and PC
are/were. 1,200 tons clearly puts it outside the realm of "fast attack
craft", and it's multi-mission and air-capable. In a sense, Sa'ar V might be
considered equivalent to one mission load-out for LCS.

The thing it's lacking is the modular, adaptable, mission-changing concept of
LCS. Sa'ar V is conventional, in terms of a fixed set of weapons and
missions. LCS is supposed to be an ASW platform one day, a MCM platform a few
days later, a SOF platform the next week....by changing the equipment, not by
carrying it all at once (which would require a much larger platform). That
sort of flexibility is only seen (on a limited basis) in the Danish Stanflex
ships.

Andrew Toppan

unread,
Jan 3, 2004, 5:50:01 PM1/3/04
to
On 3 Jan 2004 14:29:07 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:

>The DD(X)is the escort leading the way with In-stride Mine Avoidance
>and advanced sensors. It also does some land attack with AGS and
>Tactical Tomahawk.

You've got DD(X) somewhat backwards. At somewhere between 12k and 15k tons,
it's not the "escort", and it's not going to "lead the way" into hostile
waters. That's the purpose of LCS.

Henry J. Cobb

unread,
Jan 4, 2004, 2:00:23 AM1/4/04
to
Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message news:<8ihevv8np0sksb0lr...@4ax.com>...

> On 3 Jan 2004 14:29:07 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
> >The DD(X)is the escort leading the way with In-stride Mine Avoidance
> >and advanced sensors. It also does some land attack with AGS and
> >Tactical Tomahawk.
>
> You've got DD(X) somewhat backwards. At somewhere between 12k and 15k tons,
> it's not the "escort", and it's not going to "lead the way" into hostile
> waters. That's the purpose of LCS.

When you actually get to hostile waters you'll be using the UUVs of
the LADs to deal with minefields. The DD(X) deals with immediate
action before the UVs are deployed.

Now if the LCS would do the job for a lot less money than the LADS
then I could see some tradeoff of pushing more sailors forwards near
the hostile shore.

But while the LCS will cost $250 million each (
http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/article_217_Washington%2520Post.doc
), LPD 20 will cost less than twice that much
(http://www.ss.northropgrumman.com/pressrelease/news/000530.cfm ).

While the LPD-17 class isn't optimized for the LADS role, each of
these ships has three vehicle decks with a total of 2323 square meters
for vehicle storage which is many times the space available on the
LCS.

Yes the LPD-17 class isn't all that stealthy, but by deploying swarms
of smaller craft it can keep further away from the hostiles than the
LCS using ship mounted sensors and weapons would.

Just remember that distance does stealth a lot better than speed does
armor.

-HJC

Kristan Roberge

unread,
Jan 4, 2004, 2:24:25 AM1/4/04
to

Andrew Toppan wrote:

> On 2 Jan 2004 21:47:27 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:
>
> >So that's how frigates dominate a large area, through the use of
>
> Frigates are not intended as area domination ships. That is a role for
> cruisers.
>
> >carried craft rather than firing missiles directly or running around
> >at 40 knots?
>
> The missiles that are being removed would not contribute to 'area domination'
> anyway...hence their removal.
>
> >I bet if that Frigate were twice as big it could carry more than twice
> >the number of helicopters without needing a crew twice as big, eh?
>
> DDs, DDGs, and CGs are twice (or more) the size of FFGs, and carry an equal or
> smaller number of helos.

In the USA that's true... in other navies its not. Britain and Canada class ships
on their role, not their
displacement.

Andrew Toppan

unread,
Jan 4, 2004, 9:36:33 AM1/4/04
to
On Sun, 04 Jan 2004 07:24:25 GMT, Kristan Roberge <krob...@ca.inter.net>
wrote:

>In the USA that's true... in other navies its not. Britain and Canada class ships
>on their role, not their displacement.

Since we're talking about the US Navy, foreign practice is irrelevant.

(and since role and displacement are very closely linked, it's false to say
*any* navy uses one characteristic or the other exclusively. CGs, DDs, and
DDGs in the US Navy have essentially the same displacement, yet 3 different
classifications.)

Andrew Toppan

unread,
Jan 4, 2004, 9:36:34 AM1/4/04
to
On 3 Jan 2004 23:00:23 -0800, hc...@io.com (Henry J. Cobb) wrote:

>But while the LCS will cost $250 million each (
>http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/article_217_Washington%2520Post.doc
>), LPD 20 will cost less than twice that much
>(http://www.ss.northropgrumman.com/pressrelease/news/000530.cfm ).

And LPD 21 will be double that again, $816 million.

>While the LPD-17 class isn't optimized for the LADS role, each of
>these ships has three vehicle decks with a total of 2323 square meters
>for vehicle storage which is many times the space available on the
>LCS.

Which ought to be used for it's intended purpose, carrying Marine Corps
vehicles.

>Yes the LPD-17 class isn't all that stealthy, but by deploying swarms
>of smaller craft it can keep further away from the hostiles than the
>LCS using ship mounted sensors and weapons would.

Again, you fail to comprehend what an LCS is. Offboard vehicles are one of
the major payloads defined for LCS, so "ship mounted sensors and weapons" are
not a limiting factor.

Mark Test

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Jan 4, 2004, 12:52:30 PM1/4/04
to
"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:tovdvvoeo7f50pnlh...@4ax.com...

> "Mark Test" <mgt...@the-i.net> wrote:
>
> :By removing the missles the Frigate can still perform a vital warfare
> :capability ASW.
>
> You do know what the nickname for the sonar on the Perrys was amongst
> the ASW community, don't you?
>
Nope, never worked with the SQS-56 before (I'm assuming here you are
talking about the active side).

I've "heard" that it can exploit BB propagation (somewhat), which
would be nice in the littoral, lousy capabilities in blue water ops.

Along with the 19 tail, and LAMPS III not too shabby.


Fred J. McCall

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Jan 4, 2004, 4:26:55 PM1/4/04
to
"Mark Test" <mgt...@the-i.net> wrote:

:"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message


:news:tovdvvoeo7f50pnlh...@4ax.com...
:> "Mark Test" <mgt...@the-i.net> wrote:
:>
:> :By removing the missles the Frigate can still perform a vital warfare
:> :capability ASW.
:>
:> You do know what the nickname for the sonar on the Perrys was amongst
:> the ASW community, don't you?
:
:Nope, never worked with the SQS-56 before (I'm assuming here you are
:talking about the active side).

Both active and passive (but without the tail). It was generally
referred to in the community as 'Helen Keller'.

:I've "heard" that it can exploit BB propagation (somewhat), which


:would be nice in the littoral, lousy capabilities in blue water ops.

Very little of the sea bottom is actually composed of things where
bottom bounce works. Most littoral areas have too much mud and aren't
deep enough. The SQS-26/53 series sonars have a bottom bounce mode
for use in blue water.

:Along with the 19 tail, and LAMPS III not too shabby.

The tail and bouys ARE the Perry's ASW capability. :-)

Mark Test

unread,
Jan 4, 2004, 10:59:18 PM1/4/04
to
"Fred J. McCall" <fmc...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:0v0hvvs6mf29bjmrv...@4ax.com...

> The tail and bouys ARE the Perry's ASW capability. :-)
>
Agree 100 percent.

Mark


sid

unread,
Jan 8, 2004, 8:09:18 PM1/8/04
to
Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message news:<h9k9vvcdtdkp2f1ho...@4ax.com>...

> On 1 Jan 2004 15:32:33 -0800, sidi...@yahoo.com (sid) wrote:
>
> >So each of the mentioned ship classes were intended for littoral
> >warfare and as the thesis noted each came up lacking. Conceptually,
> >the differences between them and the LCS are not as great as you
> >suggest.
> The three small classes mentioned earlier are/were essentially fast attack
> craft, intended for a single, extremely focused mission, unsuited to
> independent deployment, and unable to adapt to new missions. They would have
> been good for their intended missions, had those missions actually existed.
Hmmm, PEO Crane says of the LCS:
"The transformation of the Navy's surface combatant fleet starts with
highly capable, multi-mission Destroyers, advanced Cruisers and a new
breed of focused mission ships, the Littoral Combat Ship."
Once deployed, the LCS will be "intended for a single, extremely
focused mission." By all accounts the LCS will need to leave the scene
to reconfigure, and it won't be able to do that at sea. So although
each "seaframe" may be able to deploy independently, support for the
LCS's overall will require a long, dedicated logistics trail. That
makes them inherently "un" independent.
Missions did in fact exist for those other ships. Each was lacking,
and as the NPS thesis pointed out, because of the compromises needed
for high speed. What was originally called the PF (and even CGs for
that matter)
http://www.news.navy.mil/management/photodb/photos/031231-N-2295R-001.jpg
have taken on much of the role envisioned for these ships.

Thomas Schoene

unread,
Jan 8, 2004, 10:13:23 PM1/8/04
to
sid wrote:
By all accounts the LCS will need to leave the scene
> to reconfigure, and it won't be able to do that at sea. So although
> each "seaframe" may be able to deploy independently, support for the
> LCS's overall will require a long, dedicated logistics trail. That
> makes them inherently "un" independent.

There are different issues here -- support required for day-to-day
operations and support required for role change.

The smaller ships were dependant on extensive external support for
day-to-day operations even with their single focused role. The PHMs (for
example) could not self-deploy across an ocean without a tender or maintain
themselves for more than a week or two without their maintenance vans. LCS,
in contrast, can operate in a single role much like any larger ship, staying
at sea for prolonged periods using UNREP. There is more emphasis on fly-in
support, but this is true of DD(X) as well. It's not an LCS issue, it's an
overall Navy mannpower issue.

LCS needs to return to port only if it has to change missions in
mid-deployment. (In contast, the earlier small combatants could not change
missions at all.) The general drift in LCS doctrine appears to be that
payloads will be selected pre-deployment based on the expected threats. If
the threats change in mid-deployment, LCS *can* change payloads, but this
would not be an every day occurrence. For one thing, the crew dynamics make
it a difficult change no matter where the swap is done.

> Missions did in fact exist for those other ships. Each was lacking,

Actually, the missions often did not exist. It was never really clear what
the PGs or PHMs were supposed to do. The PHMs are a particulalry good
example -- their histopry clealry shows that they were technologically
"sweet" platforms in seach of a mission. Once they were built, missions were
found, but not really ones they could do particularly well or that really
required that sort of ship. Only the PCs had a clearly defined mission.
--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)


sid

unread,
Jan 9, 2004, 7:20:08 PM1/9/04
to
"Thomas Schoene" <tasc...@earthlink.invalid> wrote in message news:<n%oLb.1023$

> Actually, the missions often did not exist. It was never really clear what
> the PGs or PHMs were supposed to do. The PHMs are a particulalry good
> example -- their histopry clealry shows that they were technologically
> "sweet" platforms in seach of a mission. Once they were built, missions were
> found, but not really ones they could do particularly well or that really
> required that sort of ship. Only the PCs had a clearly defined mission.

Gotta call you on your first statement here Tom, the mission has
traditionally existed, its just been fulfilled by FF/DD/CG types since
WWII. There is something wrong with that picture of the big,
expensive, scarce CG sitting DIW interdicting a dhow.
http://www.news.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=11247
We need ships optimized for such missions...and we have been needing
them for decades. The PHMs excelled at this particular job, but they
were orphans.
The PHMs were orphaned because they were too expensive to buy in the
numbers needed, and because of intrapolitical reasons.
(an openly partisan account but he essentially got it right-and it's a
good view into Navy politics)http://www.foils.org/phmhist.pdf
The Ashevilles had a defined mission by the LRO before the first dime
was spent on them.
Rudko makes a compelling argument that the Pegasus's and Ashevilles
utility and subsequent longevity suffered because of the speed
requirement.
Another NPS thesis suggests that the need for speed may not be as big
a necessity as convention wisdom suggests(don't bother to try and open
this with a dial up-its 389 pages):
http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/cgisirsi/Sun+Dec+28+16:27:55+PST+2003/0/520/03sep_Efimba.pdf
"AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS' ABILITY TO PROTECT
EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUPS"
"As modeled in this study, and if not used wisely, tactical speed is a
potential
liability to LCS protection of the ESG.'
"This research provides a quantitative basis for further, higher
resolution studies that should consider the measurable benefits of air
capability and stealth and the relative ineffectiveness of tactical
speed for this new
littoral combatant ship."


> LCS needs to return to port only if it has to change missions in
> mid-deployment. (In contast, the earlier small combatants could not change
> missions at all.) The general drift in LCS doctrine appears to be that
> payloads will be selected pre-deployment based on the expected threats.

All this is hunky-dory in peace time, but when hostilities start and
the LCS force takes its lumps...As a trip wire force its folly to
think it won't...Then rapid mission adjustments will be needed. As a
"system" the LCS is inflexible in this regard;unless many, many are
bought and deployed. That But we all know that's not going to happen.

> There is more emphasis on fly-in support, but this is true of DD(X) as well. > It's not an LCS issue, it's an overall Navy mannpower issue.

Again, great in peace time but this is a built in vulnerability once
bullets start flying, just more potential for mission stopping SAR
efforts...Which brings up a good point, will there be the collective
stomach to take significant losses in the LCS fleet?
The stop everything mentality in the late Vietnam air war to conduct
SAR efforts and the Somalia experience suggest that losses-or
disabling damage-of even one of these ships could well become a huge
operational and tactical liability.
Along with viewing potetial losses through spreadsheets PCO's of the
LCS's would do well to also read this rather more empirical study:
http://www.de413.org/textspirit_of_the_sammy.htm#CHAPTER%206
"About this time one of those disheartening things happened that puts
a lump in your throat. The destroyer HOEL had been hit pretty hard.
Her engine rooms were knocked out. We had to pass her by and leave her
lying there dead in the water with a big list on her. She was on fire.
We could see men scrambling around launching life rafts. We just had
to steam by. In combat you have to leave the wounded behind whether
they are men or ships and go on your way and fight. Nevertheless, it
was something that made every man on our topside feel the same as I
did, and it bothered us to leave those men to the mercy of the Japs,
but there was no other choice."

sid

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Jan 9, 2004, 8:01:22 PM1/9/04
to
"Thomas Schoene" <tasc...@earthlink.invalid> wrote in message news:<n%oLb.1023
>
> Actually, the missions often did not exist. It was never really clear what
> the PGs or PHMs were supposed to do. The PHMs are a particulalry good
> example -- their histopry clealry shows that they were technologically
> "sweet" platforms in seach of a mission. Once they were built, missions were
> found, but not really ones they could do particularly well or that really
> required that sort of ship. Only the PCs had a clearly defined mission.

Gotta call you on your first statement here Tom, the mission has

> LCS needs to return to port only if it has to change missions in
> mid-deployment. (In contast, the earlier small combatants could not change
> missions at all.) The general drift in LCS doctrine appears to be that
> payloads will be selected pre-deployment based on the expected threats.

All this is hunky-dory in peace time, but when hostilities start and
the LCS force takes its lumps...As a trip wire force its folly to
think it won't...Then rapid mission adjustments will be needed. As a
"system" the LCS is inflexible in this regard;unless many, many are
bought and deployed. That But we all know that's not going to happen.

> There is more emphasis on fly-in support, but this is true of DD(X) as well. > It's not an LCS issue, it's an overall Navy mannpower issue.

Again, great in peace time but this is a built in vulnerability once


bullets start flying, just more potential for mission stopping SAR
efforts...Which brings up a good point, will there be the collective
stomach to take significant losses in the LCS fleet?
The stop everything mentality in the late Vietnam air war to conduct

SAR efforts and the Somalia experience suggest that losses of even one

sid

unread,
Jan 9, 2004, 8:01:23 PM1/9/04
to
"Thomas Schoene" <tasc...@earthlink.invalid> wrote in message news:<n%oLb.1023
>
> Actually, the missions often did not exist. It was never really clear what
> the PGs or PHMs were supposed to do. The PHMs are a particulalry good
> example -- their histopry clealry shows that they were technologically
> "sweet" platforms in seach of a mission. Once they were built, missions were
> found, but not really ones they could do particularly well or that really
> required that sort of ship. Only the PCs had a clearly defined mission.

Gotta call you on your first statement here Tom, the mission has

> LCS needs to return to port only if it has to change missions in
> mid-deployment. (In contast, the earlier small combatants could not change
> missions at all.) The general drift in LCS doctrine appears to be that
> payloads will be selected pre-deployment based on the expected threats.

All this is hunky-dory in peace time, but when hostilities start and
the LCS force takes its lumps...As a trip wire force its folly to
think it won't...Then rapid mission adjustments will be needed. As a
"system" the LCS is inflexible in this regard;unless many, many are
bought and deployed. That But we all know that's not going to happen.

> There is more emphasis on fly-in support, but this is true of DD(X) as well. > It's not an LCS issue, it's an overall Navy mannpower issue.

Again, great in peace time but this is a built in vulnerability once

Andrew Toppan

unread,
Jan 9, 2004, 9:03:45 PM1/9/04
to
On 8 Jan 2004 17:09:18 -0800, sidi...@yahoo.com (sid) wrote:

>LCS's overall will require a long, dedicated logistics trail. That
>makes them inherently "un" independent.

The Fleet, as a whole, requires a long, dedicated logistics trail. Fuel,
stores, and munitions don't just appear without a logistics ship to deliver
them. On a day-to-day operational basis, the LCS requires the same logistics
as the rest of the fleet. This is in sharp contrast to the PHMs and the like,
which would require dedicated tender support, and perhaps even heavy lift
support, to conduct an overseas deployment. LCS is to steam with the fleet
like any other ship; the PHMs could never do this.

For mission changes, the PHMs didn't require any logistics because they
*couldn't* change missions at all. LCS is the first USN ship to have the
ability to change missions in this sense (whether at home between deployments,
or during a deployment). The "long, dedicated logistics trail" to accomplish
this would be....a freighter loaded with some containers, and a pier. Really
not the end of the world.

Andrew Toppan

unread,
Jan 9, 2004, 9:03:45 PM1/9/04
to
On 9 Jan 2004 16:20:08 -0800, sidi...@yahoo.com (sid) wrote:

>We need ships optimized for such missions...and we have been needing
>them for decades. The PHMs excelled at this particular job, but they
>were orphans.

First they detected the dhow, probably with the helicopter a PHM would not
have.

Then they put a boarding party onto the dhow, but the PHM hasn't got enough
crew for a boarding party.

Then they took the dhow's crew aboard the USN ship, but the PHM hasn't got
enough space to house them, much less in a secure lockup.

Then they had a prize crew operate the dhow, but the PHM hasn't got enough
crew to form a prize crew.

And they might have needed to tow the dhow, but the PHM can't tow.

So why is the PHM such a great platform for this mission?

A CG is admittedly overkill, but if there's no air threat to defeat, and no
Tomahawks to launch, it is better to use the CG than let it steam in slow
circles doing nothing.

Ideally you would use a small surface combatant for this mission, such as FFG
or LCS.

Thomas Schoene

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Jan 10, 2004, 10:57:00 AM1/10/04
to
sid wrote:
> Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message
> news:<caq8vv41snv3bl4sv...@4ax.com>...

>> PEGASUS class: 265-ton gunboats
>> ASHEVILLE class: 265-ton gunboats
>> CYCLONE class: 328-ton gunboats
>>
>> LCS: 1000 to 3000 ton fast light frigate/corvette
>>
>> Any comparison between ships so different in size and concept is
>> irrelevant.
>

> So each of the mentioned ship classes were intended for littoral
> warfare and as the thesis noted each came up lacking. Conceptually,
> the differences between them and the LCS are not as great as you
> suggest.

There are some significant differences, especially in how LCS relates to the
rest of the fleet. Unlike all these earlier concepts, LCS is designed to be
self-deployable, able to operate in adverse weather and sea conditions, and
have sufficient endurance to remain on-station with conventional ships.
Previous littoral combatants were short-endurance ships that could not
easily synchonize with fleet operations.

> As far as the LCS goes, its conceptual nature is still under debate as
> evidenced by this January Proceedings article:
> Lethal in the Littoral: A Smaller, Meaner LCS
> By Lieutenant (junior grade) Jonathan F. Solomon, USN
> The most important question has yet to be debated: What do we want
> this combatant to do for us?

I can't say this article impresses me much. He insists that LCS should not
be allowed to become a frigate and then defines the ship's characteristics
and armament almost exactly as a modern frigate (ESSM, Harpoon, etc.). The
rest is not too terribly different from what LCS is already supposed to do.
He's not breaking new ground.

Thomas Schoene

unread,
Jan 10, 2004, 11:01:41 AM1/10/04
to
sid wrote:
> "Thomas Schoene" <tasc...@earthlink.invalid> wrote in message
> news:<n%oLb.1023$
>> Actually, the missions often did not exist. It was never really
>> clear what
>> the PGs or PHMs were supposed to do. The PHMs are a particulalry
>> good
>> example -- their histopry clealry shows that they were
>> technologically "sweet" platforms in seach of a mission. Once they
>> were built, missions were
>> found, but not really ones they could do particularly well or that
>> really
>> required that sort of ship. Only the PCs had a clearly defined
>> mission.
>
> Gotta call you on your first statement here Tom, the mission has
> traditionally existed, its just been fulfilled by FF/DD/CG types since
> WWII.


There is something wrong with that picture of the big,
> expensive, scarce CG sitting DIW interdicting a dhow.
> http://www.news.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=11247
> We need ships optimized for such missions...and we have been needing
> them for decades. The PHMs excelled at this particular job, but they
> were orphans.

USN hydrofoils were not designed for maritime interdiction and are certianly
not optimized for it. If you look at their procurement history, there was
much uncertainty aas to what they would actually be used for, but it
certainly wasn't stopping merchant ships. hey got sued for drug
interdiction only because there was no other useful mission they could
accomplish.

My conclusion--based on research I did for NAVSEA a year ot two ago--is that
various people thought hydrofoils were neat ideas (high speed ships often
generate this reaction) and they set out to find a mission for them. The
USN looked at ASW, coastal warfar (PGHs), and even air defense before
settling on the narrow-seas anti-ship role. Oddly, however, the USN had not
seen a need for this mission in the 20-30 years before the PHMs were built,
nor diid is see a need for the mission after they were built. IOW, the
mission was contrived to justify procurement of the technologically "sweet"
hydrofoil concept.

> The PHMs were orphaned because they were too expensive to buy in
> the numbers needed,

In the numbers needed to do what? There was no credible mission put forward
to justify large-scale procurement. That was the whole problem.

and because of intrapolitical reasons.
> (an openly partisan account but he essentially got it right-and it's a
> good view into Navy politics)http://www.foils.org/phmhist.pdf

Its an interesting read, but not the full story by any means. It skips over
how the CINCSOUTH and NATO requirements came to be written in the first
place. Like many such "requirements", these were not exactly written from a
blank page. Rather, hydrofoil advocates created the requirements to justify
the construction of their favored ship.

In many ways, this is how the original LCS requirement came into being --
advocates fo advanced hullforms and distributed sensors created a
"requirement" for a small fast combatant to justify the construction of
their put projects. What the Navy is now doing (sensibly IMO) is stealthily
recasting the project so that LCS actually fills a requirement that the Navy
has had for several years but has been unwilling to articulate for political
reasons -- a frigate replacement project.

It';s been obvious for many years that the Navy was running nto a serious
numbers/mission mismatch, and that the planned all-high force of AEGIs ships
was not going to get the missions done past the mid 2010s. However, itr was
also understood that there was no support (from Congress or from the AEGIS
shipbuilding barons at NAVSEA) for a frigate program in parallel with the
SC-21/DD-21/DD(X). With tight budgets, a frigate might have replaced the
high-mix ships entirely, with equally bad consequences for the fleet.

When the new adminstration demanded that the Navy adopt the Streetfighter
concept (then LCS(X)) as the price for saving DD-21/DD(X), I'm sure the
AEGIS folks thought they woudl experiment for a couple of years and then let
it die on the vine after DD(X) was in construction. But the rest of the
Navy (notably the current CNO) recognized that LCS offers a way out of the
numbers bind the service has been in for so long. So we see LCS evolving
from a 600-ton expendable missile boat to a 2500-ton light frigate.

> The Ashevilles had a defined mission by the LRO before the first dime
> was spent on them.

The LRO requirement again seems to me to have been written to justify a
small combatant, not to fill a clear military need. Certainly, what was
built did not fulfill the fleet's actual operation needs. One way or
another, LRO's requiremetns were wrong.

> Rudko makes a compelling argument that the Pegasus's and Ashevilles
> utility and subsequent longevity suffered because of the speed
> requirement.
>
> Another NPS thesis suggests that the need for speed may not be as big
> a necessity as convention wisdom suggests(don't bother to try and
> open this with a dial up-its 389 pages):

No disagreement on these counts at all. High speed is likely to be the
least useful aspect of LCS or any equivalent ship. High speed was a mandate
from the transformation gurus without any particular operational analyis
behind it. LCS projected speed has slowly declined from 60 knots
(Streetfighter) to 50 knots (objective)/40 knots (threshold). I would not
be surprised to see actual service speed even slower.

>> The general drift in LCS doctrine appears to be that
>> payloads will be selected pre-deployment based on the expected
>> threats.
>
> All this is hunky-dory in peace time, but when hostilities start and
> the LCS force takes its lumps...As a trip wire force its folly to
> think it won't...Then rapid mission adjustments will be needed. As a
> "system" the LCS is inflexible in this regard;unless many, many are
> bought and deployed. That But we all know that's not going to happen.

You miss my point. When operating in a a single role, LCS is not
significantly more difficult to support than a conventional ship. But no
conventional ship can role-change to the same degree at all, so it's unfair
to say LCS requires more logisitcal support due to this feature. To get the
same flexibility from a conventional force, you'd need more ships, with far
more total cost.

> Again, great in peace time but this is a built in vulnerability once
> bullets start flying, just more potential for mission stopping SAR
> efforts...Which brings up a good point, will there be the collective
> stomach to take significant losses in the LCS fleet?

This is really no different than the current situation -- LCS won't be much
more vulnerable than a contemporary frigate. One solid hit on any modern
ship is at least a temporary mission kill and demands lots of extenal
assistance.

sid

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Jan 10, 2004, 11:57:19 AM1/10/04
to
Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message news:<1mmuvvkli38otuvue...@4ax.com>...

> On 8 Jan 2004 17:09:18 -0800, sidi...@yahoo.com (sid) wrote:
>
> >LCS's overall will require a long, dedicated logistics trail. That
> >makes them inherently "un" independent.
>
> The Fleet, as a whole, requires a long, dedicated logistics trail. Fuel,
> stores, and munitions don't just appear without a logistics ship to deliver
> them. On a day-to-day operational basis, the LCS requires the same logistics
> as the rest of the fleet. This is in sharp contrast to the PHMs and the like,
> which would require dedicated tender support, and perhaps even heavy lift
> support, to conduct an overseas deployment. LCS is to steam with the fleet
> like any other ship; the PHMs could never do this.
Whoa Nellie. I'm not advocating bringing back PHM's. I used to watch
them getting worked on at Runyan's from my home across Bayou Chico and
saw first hand how much maintenance they required. I've also been on
exercises with them and saw their operational limitations. Those were
the Blue Water Days-even though the real scraps we engaged in during
those days in Lebanon, Libya, and the Gulf were Littoral in nature.
Littoral just wasn't coined yet. The PHM's were too complicated , too
expensive, as you pointed out, too limited in endurance, and too few
in numbers to be effective Blue Water players so they got shitcanned.
Poor Runyan's went down the tubes with them.
The LCS is being touted as the greatest thing since sliced bread, but
it too (as currently conceived) has some serious shortcomings. Of
course every ship ever thought of has shortcomings, but its useful to
talk about them early and often. I think LCS should be built, but the
concept will undergo such big changes that it will make the PF/FFG
morph look like a wash coat.
First off I'll bet a paycheck they won't get bought in the numbers now
envisioned for the mission. Even the CONOPS admits the potential
complications of reconfiguring the ships on deployment. Force
protection, absence from the scene of conflict, etc. "Graceful
degradation" of the force is a pleasant way of saying bad things like
those that befell the Sammy B, Hoel, and Johnston in their Littoral
engagement is likely for the LCS's in any scrap. It also assumes that
there will be enough hulls present, and again I'll bet a paycheck no
Commander wil ever have "enough". Also, the current military mindset
of "leaving no one behind" will make LCS losses a big problem once
rounds start swapping. NAWCD says "that without FORCEnet the LCS will
be as limited as other previous small combatants". We already see some
of the weaknesses in net centric warfare being exploited. That will
not only continue, but accelerate. Eventually these ships will need
more and more autonomy. In short, they will become 21st century
Perry's.

>
> For mission changes, the PHMs didn't require any logistics because they
> *couldn't* change missions at all. LCS is the first USN ship to have the
> ability to change missions in this sense (whether at home between deployments,
> or during a deployment). The "long, dedicated logistics trail" to accomplish
> this would be....a freighter loaded with some containers, and a pier. Really
> not the end of the world.

In a far away scrap off hostile shores there is no guarantee the LCS
will be able to find a safe place to reconfigure. Along with that
freighter and pier you will likely need substantial force protection.
So its nowhere as simple as you envision except in peacetime.
Such limitations may not be the end of the world , but it could well
facilitate an unfavorable end to a battle...And how many of those can
we afford?

sid

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Jan 10, 2004, 12:16:58 PM1/10/04
to
Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message
>...

>
> So why is the PHM such a great platform for this mission?
Because they very effectively performed that mission-in a networked
environment which mitigated their limitiations-for some years. Isn't
the whole network thing supposed to be the secret behind the LCS
Andrew?

>
> A CG is admittedly overkill, but if there's no air threat to defeat, and no
> Tomahawks to launch, it is better to use the CG than let it steam in slow
> circles doing nothing.

Its a powerful statement for spending the money on multi-mission
capability. It seems like every time the Navy tries to get away from
it they end up coming back. No, I'm not saying build all CG's. I'm
saying that the budget process has not served the small combatant well
since WWII.


>
> Ideally you would use a small surface combatant for this mission, such as FFG
> or LCS.

Thats what I said too.

ZZBunker

unread,
Jan 10, 2004, 1:50:10 PM1/10/04
to
"Thomas Schoene" <tasc...@earthlink.invalid> wrote in message news:<FlVLb.2914$zj7....@newsread1.news.pas.earthlink.net>...

The hyrofoil concept wasn't sweet a idea, it was a terrific idea.
Since the Russians had already developed it with stealth hydrofoils.
And it only took the US Navy 30 years to catch up this time,
rather than their usual 400 years.

The navy only used the drug interdiction role for the ship,
given that that's the only role the US Navy has ever known
for ships. Since their beer allotment is still only two beers
per month, they have been able to calculate that the
only people their going to get volunteering for any of
their new ships is the US Surgeon General, rather
than people who actually understand how aircraft work.

>
> > The PHMs were orphaned because they were too expensive to buy in
> > the numbers needed,
>
> In the numbers needed to do what? There was no credible mission put forward
> to justify large-scale procurement. That was the whole problem.
>
> and because of intrapolitical reasons.
> > (an openly partisan account but he essentially got it right-and it's a
> > good view into Navy politics)http://www.foils.org/phmhist.pdf
>
> Its an interesting read, but not the full story by any means. It skips over
> how the CINCSOUTH and NATO requirements came to be written in the first
> place. Like many such "requirements", these were not exactly written from a
> blank page. Rather, hydrofoil advocates created the requirements to justify
> the construction of their favored ship.
>
> In many ways, this is how the original LCS requirement came into being --
> advocates fo advanced hullforms and distributed sensors created a
> "requirement" for a small fast combatant to justify the construction of
> their put projects. What the Navy is now doing (sensibly IMO) is stealthily
> recasting the project so that LCS actually fills a requirement that the Navy
> has had for several years but has been unwilling to articulate for political
> reasons -- a frigate replacement project.

But that political reason went away at least 30 years,
since the US navy hasn't had any cruisers in at least
30 years.

Henry J. Cobb

unread,
Jan 10, 2004, 2:22:31 PM1/10/04
to
"Thomas Schoene" <tasc...@earthlink.invalid> wrote in message news:<FlVLb.2914$zj7....@newsread1.news.pas.earthlink.net>...

> sid wrote:
> > There is something wrong with that picture of the big,
> > expensive, scarce CG sitting DIW interdicting a dhow.
> > http://www.news.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=11247
> > We need ships optimized for such missions...and we have been needing
> > them for decades. The PHMs excelled at this particular job, but they
> > were orphans.

OK, so you want something can can quickly go over and drop a boarding
party on such a target before they do anything funny.

My suggestion is to use a ship's boat or a helicopter and just put the
pilots and boarding crew at risk.

> No disagreement on these counts at all. High speed is likely to be the
> least useful aspect of LCS or any equivalent ship. High speed was a mandate
> from the transformation gurus without any particular operational analyis
> behind it. LCS projected speed has slowly declined from 60 knots
> (Streetfighter) to 50 knots (objective)/40 knots (threshold). I would not
> be surprised to see actual service speed even slower.

30 knots is all you need for an escort, 22 knots for a core ESG ship.

So make it big, make it slow and change missions by carrying a
different mix of manned and unmmaned craft.

After all, what happens when an LCS pulls up next to a suicide ship
that then blows itself up? Is that a mission accomplished?

-HJC

sid

unread,
Jan 10, 2004, 2:27:22 PM1/10/04
to
"Thomas Schoene" <tasc...@earthlink.invalid> wrote in message news:<FlVLb.2914

> Its an interesting read, but not the full story by any means. It skips over
> how the CINCSOUTH and NATO requirements came to be written in the first
> place. Like many such "requirements", these were not exactly written from a
> blank page. Rather, hydrofoil advocates created the requirements to justify
> the construction of their favored ship.
Again, I'm not advocating PHMs per se. However, I still don't agree
that "there was no mission." With the wholesale demise of small
combatants 60 years ago, its been the DD types that do the shallow
water jobs by default. The good thing is the USN hasn't been seriously
challenged in the green water environment since WWII. If we had, the
Port Royal would not be sitting DIW next to that dhow because the
right ship for the job would have been built.

>
> In many ways, this is how the original LCS requirement came into being --
> advocates fo advanced hullforms and distributed sensors created a
> "requirement" for a small fast combatant to justify the construction of
> their put projects. What the Navy is now doing (sensibly IMO) is stealthily
> recasting the project so that LCS actually fills a requirement that the Navy
> has had for several years but has been unwilling to articulate for political
> reasons -- a frigate replacement project.
It sounds like there is a chicken/egg conundrum when looking at
mission requirements. Makes sense. However flawed the process, there
is an operational niche-the small, expendable combatant in large
numbers-the USN historically has a hard time filling. The PHM's,
PC's, PG's were too small and too limited. The PF's morphed into major
warships called FFG's and were too big, too vulnerable, and too
expensive. Besides they, like the Sammy B(the WWII one), were built
for the blue water ASW world.
Based on your comments, it appears the LCS is headed down the same
road as Zumwalt's PF.

>
> It';s been obvious for many years that the Navy was running nto a serious
> numbers/mission mismatch, and that the planned all-high force of AEGIs ships
> was not going to get the missions done past the mid 2010s. However, itr was
> also understood that there was no support (from Congress or from the AEGIS
> shipbuilding barons at NAVSEA) for a frigate program in parallel with the
> SC-21/DD-21/DD(X). With tight budgets, a frigate might have replaced the
> high-mix ships entirely, with equally bad consequences for the fleet.

So its the budget driving mission requirements. Spangenburg's oral
history describes how the post war budget process turned a once
orderly-if not fair-aircraft procurement system driven by mission
requirements into a muddled, expensive mess. Same thing is true for
ships. Bring back the General Board!!

>
> When the new adminstration demanded that the Navy adopt the Streetfighter
> concept (then LCS(X)) as the price for saving DD-21/DD(X), I'm sure the
> AEGIS folks thought they woudl experiment for a couple of years and then let
> it die on the vine after DD(X) was in construction. But the rest of the
> Navy (notably the current CNO) recognized that LCS offers a way out of the
> numbers bind the service has been in for so long. So we see LCS evolving
> from a 600-ton expendable missile boat to a 2500-ton light frigate.

OK fine. So now you have a single mission FFG replacement that will be
regarded as a major warship. That doesn't sound like progress, and it
doesn't sound like the ship needed for the Littoral fight as
envisioned here:
http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Concepts/LCSCONOPS.asp
You have the inside knowledge Tom, is this document an historical
relic?

> The LRO requirement again seems to me to have been written to justify a
> small combatant, not to fill a clear military need. Certainly, what was
> built did not fulfill the fleet's actual operation needs. One way or
> another, LRO's requiremetns were wrong.

I'd say the final product was too flawed to accomplish the mission,
and the navy was preoccupied (albeit with good reason) with the Blue
Water fight. The mission still existed; it just wasn't as important as
others.


>
> No disagreement on these counts at all. High speed is likely to be the
> least useful aspect of LCS or any equivalent ship. High speed was a mandate
> from the transformation gurus without any particular operational analyis
> behind it. LCS projected speed has slowly declined from 60 knots
> (Streetfighter) to 50 knots (objective)/40 knots (threshold). I would not
> be surprised to see actual service speed even slower.

Sounds like speed was considered as part of the survivability by
NAWCD. Making it slower and bigger is means there will be a real
reluctance to put them up near the beach...Unless they morph into
fairly robust multi-mission platforms. But wait, isn't that the same
as DD(X)?



>
> You miss my point. When operating in a a single role, LCS is not
> significantly more difficult to support than a conventional ship. But no
> conventional ship can role-change to the same degree at all, so it's unfair
> to say LCS requires more logisitcal support due to this feature. To get the
> same flexibility from a conventional force, you'd need more ships, with far
> more total cost.

However the Figs can perform multi-missions. Load up the LCS with all
the modules and call a spade a spade...or call it a FFG.

> > Again, great in peace time but this is a built in vulnerability once
> > bullets start flying, just more potential for mission stopping SAR
> > efforts...Which brings up a good point, will there be the collective
> > stomach to take significant losses in the LCS fleet?
>
> This is really no different than the current situation -- LCS won't be much
> more vulnerable than a contemporary frigate. One solid hit on any modern
> ship is at least a temporary mission kill and demands lots of extenal
> assistance.

The NAWCD document, in polite terms, infers the LCS force will
overcome inevitable losses with numbers. It was a long time ago, but
the lessons of Samar should be studied by some Pentagonian
PowerPointers. If what you are saying is correct, yet another class of
ships will be built that will be badly mismatched for the shallow
water role.

Andrew Toppan

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Jan 10, 2004, 8:34:52 PM1/10/04
to
On 10 Jan 2004 09:16:58 -0800, sidi...@yahoo.com (sid) wrote:

>Because they very effectively performed that mission-in a networked
>environment which mitigated their limitiations-for some years. Isn't

They did? When did the PHMs make an operational deployment to anywhere?
Runnig around Key West chasing drug runners doesn't count!

>the whole network thing supposed to be the secret behind the LCS
>Andrew?

No. LCS is supposed to have enough onboard assets (helos, UAVs, UUVs, USVs,
whatever) to do missions *without* depending on someone else to provide all
the goodies. Small craft such as PHM cannot claim this capability.



>Its a powerful statement for spending the money on multi-mission
>capability.

That's why LCS is able to adapt to various missions, so you're not stuck with
a ship capable of the "wrong" mission.

Andrew Toppan

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Jan 10, 2004, 8:34:52 PM1/10/04