Making Your Own Bioweapons (NIH Press Release)

[Mort Zuckerman]

To: kathleen...@hhs.gov, francis...@nih.hhs.gov,
margaret...@fda.hhs.gov, dwh...@forbes.com,
ca...@drcarolgoodheart.com, lPick...@cdc.gov, Durlan...@yale.edu,
Aa...@columbia.edu, gary_w...@nymc.edu,
scientifi...@ostp.gov, pkru...@princeton.edu,
Stanle...@fiu.edu, margaret...@hhs.fds.gov,
emcsw...@niaid.nih.gov, afa...@niaid.nih.gov,
Spin...@yahoogroups.com, kshe...@calea.org, fit...@gmail.com,
patrick.f...@usdoj.gov, model...@sbcglobal.net,
jdr...@nejm.org, let...@courant.com, Jgerb...@cdc.gov,
michae...@ct.gov, con...@po.state.ct.us, executive-
edi...@nytimes.com, managin...@nytimes.com, news-
ti...@nytimes.com, biz...@nytimes.com, for...@nytimes.com,
nati...@nytimes.com, dv...@cdc.gov, brigidc...@optonline.net,
tr...@hotmail.com, illino...@aol.com, jle...@courant.com,
tinaj...@yahoo.com, jhorn...@fff.org, thomas...@usdoj.gov,
thoma...@ct.gov, kur...@washpost.com, georg...@washpost.com,
p...@allegorypress.com, commissi...@po.state.ct.us,
brans...@comcast.net, vts...@comcast.net, o...@po.state.ct.us,
freet...@charter.net, scott....@po.state.ct.us,
govern...@po.state.ct.us, attorney...@ct.gov,
randall...@usdoj.gov, Robert....@yale.edu, editor@greenwich-
post.com, harol...@yale.edu, sedm...@nswbc.org, rrmcg...@aol.com,
fr...@nytimes.com, saint....@sbcglobal.net
Cc: fra...@ucia.gov, dr-ahma...@president.ir,
eugener...@washpost.com, bmi...@newstimes.com, tr...@hotmail.com,
rast...@aol.com, billc...@gmail.com, amcg...@rms-law.com,
rjmu...@aol.com, paulcrai...@yahoo.com,
criminal...@usdoj.gov, karla.d...@usdoj.gov,
christophe...@usdoj.gov, richar...@yale.edu,
harol...@yale.edu, james.p...@yale.edu, inq...@aldf.com,
ly...@idsociety.org, meganm...@theatlantic.com

Subject: Making Your Own Bioweapons (NIH Press Release)

Date: Dec 20, 2011 3:11 PM

On How to Make Your Own Homegrowns
(BELOW)

=====================================

We already know how it is all done.

You take an immunosuppressed individual
(like with Lyme or CFIDS), with the flu
and infect pigs and back and forth.

We learned all about it from the
Lyme disease scam and what happens
on Plum Island ("vector-pathogen
competence" "studies"):
http://www.actionlyme.org/PIIB.htm


You take one infection from one animal,
immunosuppress the second, etc. And
back and forth til you get a mutation
or variant that "takes."

Additionally:
Pandemic flu: "Reassortant viruses appear to have caused the
pandemics of 1957 and 1968; the 1957 H2 virus differed by three genes,
those for HA, NA and the RNA polymerase subunit PB1, from the H1 virus
that infected humans between 1918 and 1957; the 1968 H3 virus differed
by two genes, those for HA and PB1, from the H2 virus that infected
humans between 1957 and 1968 (Kawaoka et al., 1989). In both cases,
the genes for the H2 and H3 HAs are proposed to have been contributed
by avian viruses, ***during infection of an unknown host that was
infected simultaneously by the prevalent human virus."***
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC125880/?tool=pubmed

In 2001 I wrote about this to the Albany
Legislators when we were complaining to
them about the abuse of Lyme victims
and treaters:
http://www.actionlyme.org/Actionlyme_History.htm
("Lateral" and "transkingdom gene transfer"
between the various infections in ticks)


Oh, and the murdered Don Wiley said
the likeliest normal pandemic strain
would be H9N5, anyway. And with him
being murdered in the same way the
Iraqi Plum Island scientist was murdered,
well, ...
http://www.actionlyme.org/PIIB.htm

"Bumped off changing a flat tire..."


Us'n Lymies will be fine - we won't choke
to death from the pneumonia subsequent to
pandemic flu because we're already tolerant
to pneumonia's inflammatory-and-then-non-
inflammatory antigens cuz they're like OspA
or the Lyme vaccine.

The NIH calls this phenomenon:
http://www.jimmunol.org/content/170/1/508.full
"Reprogramming"


We chronic Lymies are the kind of hypothetical
folks who are the very disease nurseries about
which I speak/instruct.

Each one of us chronic Lyme (and EBV, CMV,
mycoplasma, etc) people have become, in
effect, our own little walking Plum Islands
and we hope your last thought as you ...

That is, we *know* what your last thought
will be...


:)))


http://www.actionlyme.org
Kathleen M. Dickson
----------------------------------------

http://www.nih.gov/news/health/dec2011/od-20.htm

Press Statement on the NSABB Review of H5N1 Research

The U.S. government remains concerned about the threat of influenza,
for the risks it poses seasonally, as well as its potential to cause a
pandemic. Our domestic and global influenza surveillance efforts have
become increasingly capable, along with expanded vaccine manufacturing
capacity and assistance to other countries in their efforts to detect
and respond to a pandemic. To enhance the detection of and response to
influenza outbreaks, the U.S. government supports a broad range of
domestic and global preparedness and response efforts that include
research on better diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics.

Currently, H5N1 avian influenza virus — the strain commonly referred
to as "bird flu" — rarely infects humans and does not spread easily
from person to person. However, many scientists and public health
officials are concerned that the virus could evolve in nature into a
form that is transmissible among humans — an event that could
potentially make this deadly virus an extremely serious global public
health threat. Thus research on factors that can affect the
transmissibility of the H5N1 virus is critically important to
international efforts to prepare and prevent threats to public health.

While the public health benefits of such research can be important,
certain information obtained through such studies has the potential to
be misused for harmful purposes. The National Science Advisory Board
for Biosecurity (NSABB) — an independent expert committee that advises
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other Federal
departments and agencies on matters of biosecurity — completed a
review of two unpublished manuscripts describing NIH-funded research
on the transmissibility of H5N1. These manuscripts — which describe
laboratory experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced
transmissibility in mammals – concluded that the H5N1 virus has
greater potential than previously believed to gain a dangerous
capacity to be transmitted among mammals, including perhaps humans,
and describe some of the genetic changes that appear to correlate with
this potential.

Following its review, the NSABB decided to recommend that HHS ask the
authors of the reports and the editors of the journals that were
considering publishing the reports to make changes in the manuscripts.
Due to the importance of the findings to the public health and
research communities, the NSABB recommended that the general
conclusions highlighting the novel outcome be published, but that the
manuscripts not include the methodological and other details that
could enable replication of the experiments by those who would seek to
do harm.

The NSABB also recommended that language be added to the manuscripts
to explain better the goals and potential public health benefits of
the research, and to detail the extensive safety and security measures
taken to protect laboratory workers and the public.

HHS agreed with this assessment and provided these non-binding
recommendations to the authors and journal editors.

Recognizing the significant potential benefit of the information about
the experimental details to the global influenza surveillance and
research communities, the U.S. government is working to establish a
mechanism to allow secure access to the information to those with a
legitimate need in order to achieve important public health goals. The
U.S. government is also developing a proposed oversight policy that
would augment existing approaches to evaluating research that has the
potential to be misused for harmful purposes.

The NSABB supports the overall goals of the National Institutes of
Health, in conducting safe, ethical and informative research to
enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce the burdens of illness and
disability. To learn more about the NSABB, visit www.biosecurityboard.gov.

About the National Institutes of Health (NIH): NIH, the nation's
medical research agency, includes 27 Institutes and Centers and is a
component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. NIH is
the primary federal agency conducting and supporting basic, clinical,
and translational medical research, and is investigating the causes,
treatments, and cures for both common and rare diseases. For more
information about NIH and its programs, visit www.nih.gov.

NIH...Turning Discovery Into Health



KMDickson