Subject: Inhaling Bioweapons in Allen Steere's Lab and Ft. Detrick
Date: Apr 22, 2010 7:43 AM
INHALED BIOWEAPONS-LAB TULAREMIA, BELOW
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Yeah, Tularemia is inhaled, like
spirochetes - especially spirochetes
in Allen Steere's labs:
http://www.actionlyme.org/CRYMEDISEASE_CHP3_B.htm
The spheroplasts can be dessicated
but are still viable. "4/9 of Steere's
lab workers inhaled borrelia cysts,"
using the "seronegative Lyme T cell
assay."
Infectious Diseases Society of America
said for years that the cysts were
not viable:
http://www.actionlyme.org/IDSA_CYST_VIABLE.htm
knowing ^^^ for years that they *were,*
having referenced the work.
Another inconvenient set of truths.
People need to be most concerned at this
point about the psychopath Mark Klempner
who reported that the reason there is
a specific nerve and brain degrading
enzyme (MMP-130) in Lyme brain victims
was that ceftriaxone didn't kill all the
spirochetes even when there WEREN'T
any fibroblasts to hide inside:
http://www.actionlyme.org/Retro_Klempnerization.htm
http://www.actionlyme.org/Mark_Klempner_Fibroblasts.htm
This nutcase intends to run the CDC's
Biowarfare lab in South Boston.
Now Klempner says OspA induces anti-brain
antibodies:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20227484
In 1998, he said OspA caused anti-nerve
anti-brain antibodies (MS):
http://www.actionlyme.org/KFORSCHNER_DISCOVERS_LYME_TOXIN.htm
In between, nothing happened except
LYMErix was withdrawn by us'n plain
old witches:
http://www.actionlyme.org/070430.htm
and then they were sued by the Dangerously
Intelligent Unabomber Chemist, CT AG
Richard Blumenthal:
http://www.actionlyme.org/080430_RICO_CABAL_CAVES.htm
CDC's *LIES* are more dangerous to mankind,
globally than their local accidental releases:
http://www.actionlyme.org/PIIB.htm
In the 2000 and 2001 Albany Lobbying campaigns
where we weren't "stalking Steere," because
http://www.actionlyme.org/STEERE_FAIRY_UNSTALKED.htm
he was at Tufts and then Harvard at the time,
I discussed the viability of the spheroplast:
http://www.actionlyme.org/Actionlyme_History.htm
Reference #1:
1) "Composite, large spirochetes from microbial mats: spirochete
structure review."
Morphological changes may be responsible for relapsing, persisting
illness.
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/90/15/6966.pdf
Lynn Margulis, etc.
[The Bransfield group, MMI, will remember...
Or maybe they won't, because they're all
these psych types who don't recognize that
one really does not "make one's own reality"
and that humans are subservient to facts.]
Kathleen M. Dickson
http://www.actionlyme.org
http://www.relapsingfever.org
======================================
From: Steve Zeltzer <lv...@igc.org> [Add to Address Book]
To: Undisclosed-recipients@null, , null@null
Subject: Army investigators call for increased safety procedures at
lab
Date: Apr 22, 2010 2:11 AM
Army investigators call for increased safety procedures at lab
http://www.bioprepwatch.com/news/212798-army-investigators-call-for-increased-safety-procedures-at-lab
Army investigators call for increased safety procedures at lab
by Rita Uplend on April 20, 2010
ShareThis
Fort Detrick
Army investigators have recommended laboratory safety procedures at
Fort Detrick be reviewed after finding lapses following the infection
of a biodefense worker with tularemia.
The infected woman survived the tularemia infection, which is a
potentially fatal respiratory disease, following a brief
hospitalization at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in December.
The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, in an
executive summary of an internal investigation, said that the
unidentified woman probably inhaled the tularemia bacteria between
November 13 and November 17.
Investigators could not pinpoint one significant event, such as a
spill or dropped flask, but noted several lapses in proper laboratory
techniques that, when combined, may have increased the woman's risk of
exposure.
Among the lapses cited in the report was potentially contaminated
waste that wasn't placed in a cabinet designed to contain bacteria.
The waste was instead deposited in a waste container inside the sealed
laboratory suite.
The woman, who had not taken part in a voluntary immunization with an
experimental tularemia vaccine, wasn't wearing a battery-powered
device that delivers filtered air into a plastic hood, which is
required.
The woman instead wore a half-face filter respirator, which had been
deemed sufficient as blood tests showed the woman had developed
antibodies to tularemia.
The worker also was not clear on proper procedures for illness
reporting and did not immediately report her symptoms. When her
symptoms were finally reported, the woman did not immediately notify
the institute's Special Immunization Clinic for an evaluation to
determine if her illness was work-related.
Among the report's recommendations are a call for a review of standard
lab procedures for working with tularemia, a re-evaluation of
vaccination policies and the use of personal protective gear for
tularemia, and the formulation of an official policy for reporting
illnesses and monitoring employee absences.
"[Real] scientists are *fiercely* independent. That's the good
news."-- NIH's Top Fool, Anthony Fauci