FredJeffries schrieb:
> On Jan 22, 5:46 am, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
> > FredJeffries schrieb:
> >
> >
> >
> > > On Jan 20, 12:58 pm, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
> > > > FredJeffries schrieb:
> >
> > > > > On Jan 20, 12:26 am, Han de Bruijn <Han.deBru...@DTO.TUDelft.NL>
> > > > > wrote:
> >
> > > > > > Please gimme back the good old delta's and epsilon's ..
> >
> > > > > > Han de Bruijn
> >
> > > > > delta's and epsilon's do not give an accurate definition of continuity
> > > > > in the real world. Aren't you the one always quoting Leibniz on
> > > > > continuity?
> >
> > > > Which better definition of continuity do you have in mind? Is there a
> > > > accurate and sound definition of continuity?
> >
> > > > Albrecht
> >
> > > The delta/epsilon definition is about preserving closeness. The real
> > > world notion is about having no gaps or drawing without lifting your
> > > pencil from the paper.
> >
> > I'm waiting for your better definition of continuity.
> >
>
> Why would you think that I have a better definition? I'm just pointing
> out the absurdity of someone rejecting the "Actual Infinite" because
> it "doesn't exist in the real world" while accepting the delta-epsilon
> definition of continuity which gives us functions that are continuous
> at irrational numbers and discontinuous at rationals which I haven't
> been able to draw without lifting my pencil from the paper. Maybe I'm
> just not artistic enough (or coordinated enough).
Continuity is an antinom concept as infinity is. And there is no way
out.
Consider a body which moves from point A to point B. Consider the
barycentre Z (Schwerpunkt) of this body. Now the point Z, if it moves
from A to B, at first has to move from the point A to a point which
lays next to the point A. But there is no such next point. Between any
two points on the real line there are infinity many other points.
How is continuity possible? And in which way do you have a concept
which leads out of this absurdity?
Do you think nondenumerable many points made anything better in this
concern?
Best regards
Albrecht S. Storz
> Consider a body which moves from point A to point B. Consider the
> barycentre Z (Schwerpunkt) of this body. Now the point Z, if it moves
> from A to B, at first has to move from the point A to a point which
> lays next to the point A. But there is no such next point. Between any
> two points on the real line there are infinity many other points.
> How is continuity possible? And in which way do you have a concept
> which leads out of this absurdity?
You're confusing "discrete, contiguous steps" and "continuous".
--
"So, at this time, I'd like to assure you that I am not interested in
making sure mathematicians worldwide get fired."--JSH Apr 28, 2003
"I'll have prosecutors knocking on your doors. I have no problem with
any number of mathematicians spending time in jail."--JSH Jun 10, 2003
Jesse F. Hughes schrieb:
Google Groups is not longer able to manage this thread correctly. So
it ends.
Best regards
Allbrecht S. Storz
>
> Consider a body which moves from point A to point B. Consider the
> barycentre Z (Schwerpunkt) of this body. Now the point Z, if it moves
> from A to B, at first has to move from the point A to a point which
> lays next to the point A. But there is no such next point.
If there is no such point then Z does not have to move to it.
> How is continuity possible?
I thought that's what I was asking.
> And in which way do you have a concept
> which leads out of this absurdity?
> Do you think nondenumerable many points made anything better in this
> concern?
>
Look up Benardete's Paradox
>
>
> Continuity is an antinom concept as infinity is. And there is no way
> out.
The English word you apparently want is 'antinomy', not 'antinom'.
>
> Consider a body which moves from point A to point B. Consider the
> barycentre Z (Schwerpunkt) of this body. Now the point Z, if it moves
> from A to B, at first has to move from the point A to a point which
> lays next to the point A.
Even Zeno knew better than that.
> But there is no such next point.
Then in your world, no such motion is possible, but in ours, it is
trivial.
> Between any
> two points on the real line there are infinity many other points.
> How is continuity possible?
In our world, it is easy. It is only in your world that there is any
problem with it.
> And in which way do you have a concept
> which leads out of this absurdity?
In the sane way which, is out of Albrecht's reach.
> Do you think nondenumerable many points made anything better in this
> concern?
Yes, indeed! Among other things, it solves Zeno's paradoxes.
> Jesse F. Hughes schrieb:
> > Albrecht <albs...@gmx.de> writes:
> >
> > > Consider a body which moves from point A to point B. Consider the
> > > barycentre Z (Schwerpunkt) of this body. Now the point Z, if it moves
> > > from A to B, at first has to move from the point A to a point which
> > > lays next to the point A. But there is no such next point. Between any
> > > two points on the real line there are infinity many other points.
> > > How is continuity possible? And in which way do you have a concept
> > > which leads out of this absurdity?
> >
> > You're confusing "discrete, contiguous steps" and "continuous".
>
> Google Groups is not longer able to manage this thread correctly. So
> it ends.
>
> Best regards
> Allbrecht S. Storz
It is more that Allbrecht S. Storz and his idiot arguments have run out
of steam.
FredJeffries schrieb:
> On Jan 25, 5:12 am, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
>
>
> >
> > Consider a body which moves from point A to point B. Consider the
> > barycentre Z (Schwerpunkt) of this body. Now the point Z, if it moves
> > from A to B, at first has to move from the point A to a point which
> > lays next to the point A. But there is no such next point.
>
> If there is no such point then Z does not have to move to it.
>
>
>
> > How is continuity possible?
>
> I thought that's what I was asking.
And I was asking what the idea of actual infinity changes in this
concern?
>
> > And in which way do you have a concept
> > which leads out of this absurdity?
> > Do you think nondenumerable many points made anything better in this
> > concern?
> >
>
> Look up Benardete's Paradox
Funny.
> FredJeffries schrieb:
> > On Jan 25, 5:12 am, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
> >
> >
> > >
> > > Consider a body which moves from point A to point B. Consider the
> > > barycentre Z (Schwerpunkt) of this body. Now the point Z, if it moves
> > > from A to B, at first has to move from the point A to a point which
> > > lays next to the point A. But there is no such next point.
> >
> > If there is no such point then Z does not have to move to it.
> >
> >
> >
> > > How is continuity possible?
> >
> > I thought that's what I was asking.
>
> And I was asking what the idea of actual infinity changes in this
> concern?
If there are only a finite set of points in any interval, then velocity
and acceleration are impossible concepts.
Virgil schrieb:
Really? Please explain, how that works.
Why should I try to explain anything to one who rejects the very basis
of that explanation?
Is is all very well to _say_ Daemon_n takes action A at
time 1/2^n if action A is not performed by time 1/2^n.
It is another matter to formalize the injunctions.
Of course all Daemons are guilty of murder, as is Zeus.
Mathematics is not a defense in a court of law.
Your Honor, I was just practicing my Dedekind cuts,
and poor Joe got in the way.
--
Michael Press
You mean Joe the Hyperbola?
Cheers - Chas
> Jesse F. Hughes schrieb:
>
>>Albrecht <albs...@gmx.de> writes:
>>
>>>Consider a body which moves from point A to point B. Consider the
>>>barycentre Z (Schwerpunkt) of this body. Now the point Z, if it moves
>>>from A to B, at first has to move from the point A to a point which
>>>lays next to the point A. But there is no such next point. Between any
>>>two points on the real line there are infinity many other points.
>>>How is continuity possible? And in which way do you have a concept
>>>which leads out of this absurdity?
>>
>>You're confusing "discrete, contiguous steps" and "continuous".
>>
>>"So, at this time, I'd like to assure you that I am not interested in
>>making sure mathematicians worldwide get fired."--JSH Apr 28, 2003
>>"I'll have prosecutors knocking on your doors. I have no problem with
>>any number of mathematicians spending time in jail."--JSH Jun 10, 2003
>
> Google Groups is not longer able to manage this thread correctly. So
> it ends.
I've noticed the same. Weird ..
Han de Bruijn
Virgil schrieb:
There is no sound answer on the question how extensionless points
should build up extensions.
You are dreaming.
Albrecht
No extensions needed. Enough points are enough.
> You are dreaming.
That's what mathematics is all about,
dreams having no physical reality,
but strongly affecting our perception of physical reality.
>
> There is no sound answer on the question how extensionless points
> should build up extensions.
> You are dreaming.
>
Teamwork.
Each acting alone, they accomplish nothing. But when they allow
themselves to be ordered in certain ways -- voila.
Look up "Linear Order"
Contemporary mathematics doesn't bother about points and their extensions
(whatever this might be). There's completeness, thus no need for that kind
of crap any longer.
But it marks the wall well you ran into with those historic problems.
Keep rejecting intellectual progress (meaning when there's no satisfying
answer to a question, possibly the question is crap and you need to rethink
it), it's nothing more than your declared will to stay ignorant.
BTW: I support your vow for using the good old epsilons and deltas, because
it must mean, that your notion of continuity is nothing different than
this:
continuity in x_0 for a function f:IR -> IR:
for all eps > 0 there exists a delta > 0 such that for all x holding
| x-x_0| < delta, |f(x) - f(x_0)| < eps holds.
If you maintain, that continuity means some ancient philosphical babbling,
you're wrong. What might have been continuity then, is called completeness
today.
Viele Grüße
Klaus
> Google Groups is not longer able to manage this thread correctly. So
> it ends.
Alas, I'm afraid your optimism is quite without foundation.
--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.kos...@uta.fi)
"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Aatu Koskensilta wrote:
> Albrecht writes:
>
> > Google Groups is not longer able to manage this thread correctly. So
> > it ends.
>
> Alas, I'm afraid your optimism is quite without foundation.
No, no -- it's quite impossible that this thread could continue.
--
hz
Virgil schrieb:
Nobody consider only finite many points in an interval. The
alternative is not finite/infinite as you seem to imply.
Your concept of infinity is wrong, that's the problem: There is no
consistent cardinality of infinity.
We've all been using the simple term 'infinity'. Maybe the
inconsistency you see is really the varieties of things that might be
called infinity, each consistent in its own way.
The following might give you a start:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardinality
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordinal_number
You're right, it seems counter-intuitive that the set of even integers
is the same size (equinumerous, has the same number/cardinality) as
all integers. But mathematical investigation has given consistent
meanings to all these terms. If you learn the meanings of those terms,
you'll see that things work out nicely. Those meanings may not match
the ones you have now though.
Mitch
How is Aleph_0 inconsistent?
> Virgil schrieb:
> > In article
> > <ad9d7fe8-cfcc-4bdd...@b38g2000prf.googlegroups.com>,
> > Albrecht <albs...@gmx.de> wrote:
> >
> > > FredJeffries schrieb:
> > > > On Jan 25, 5:12?am, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Consider a body which moves from point A to point B. Consider the
> > > > > barycentre Z (Schwerpunkt) of this body. Now the point Z, if it moves
> > > > > from A to B, at first has to move from the point A to a point which
> > > > > lays next to the point A. But there is no such next point.
> > > >
> > > > If there is no such point then Z does not have to move to it.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > How is continuity possible?
> > > >
> > > > I thought that's what I was asking.
> > >
> > > And I was asking what the idea of actual infinity changes in this
> > > concern?
> >
> > If there are only a finite set of points in any interval, then velocity
> > and acceleration are impossible concepts.
>
> Nobody consider only finite many points in an interval. The
> alternative is not finite/infinite as you seem to imply.
"->NOT<- only finitely many" is a definition of "infinitely many", so
any extension beyond "only finite many" implies infinitely many.
>
> Your concept of infinity is wrong, that's the problem: There is no
> consistent cardinality of infinity.
My concept of "infinitely any" is "NOT only finitely many".
Mitch Harris schrieb:
> On Jan 29, 2:15 am, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
> > Virgil schrieb:
> >
> > > If there are only a finite set of points in any interval, then velocity
> > > and acceleration are impossible concepts.
> >
> > Nobody consider only finite many points in an interval. The
> > alternative is not finite/infinite as you seem to imply.
> >
> > Your concept of infinity is wrong, that's the problem: There is no
> > consistent cardinality of infinity.
>
> We've all been using the simple term 'infinity'. Maybe the
> inconsistency you see is really the varieties of things that might be
> called infinity, each consistent in its own way.
>
> The following might give you a start:
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardinality
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordinal_number
>
> You're right, it seems counter-intuitive that the set of even integers
> is the same size (equinumerous, has the same number/cardinality) as
> all integers.
That's not the problem. The probem is, that there is no concept which
is able to describe coherently the quantity of infinite many objects
As the unary system
O
OO
OOO
OOOO
OOOOO
...
easily shows is there either a natural number which describes the
quantity of the natural numbers or there is no number which discribes
the quantity of the natural numbers since the natural numbers numbered
themselves. A number or a concept which describes a quantity which is
larger than any natural number is unavoidable too large to describe
the quantity of the natural numbers or any other manifold of "the same
size".
Infinity is no size and infinity is no quantity. Infinity is a mode, a
potentiality. The concept of infinity as an actual and complete entity
is wrong and indefensible.
Best regards
Albrecht S. Storz
> But mathematical investigation has given consistent
> Mitch Harris schrieb:
> > On Jan 29, 2:15 am, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
> > > Virgil schrieb:
> > >
> > > > If there are only a finite set of points in any interval, then velocity
> > > > and acceleration are impossible concepts.
> > >
> > > Nobody consider only finite many points in an interval. The
> > > alternative is not finite/infinite as you seem to imply.
> > >
> > > Your concept of infinity is wrong, that's the problem: There is no
> > > consistent cardinality of infinity.
> >
> > We've all been using the simple term 'infinity'. Maybe the
> > inconsistency you see is really the varieties of things that might be
> > called infinity, each consistent in its own way.
> >
> > The following might give you a start:
> >
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardinality
> >
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordinal_number
> >
> > You're right, it seems counter-intuitive that the set of even integers
> > is the same size (equinumerous, has the same number/cardinality) as
> > all integers.
>
> That's not the problem. The probem is, that there is no concept which
> is able to describe coherently the quantity of infinite many objects
How about the concept "more that expressed by any natural number"?
It works for me.
Virgil schrieb:
You don't understand my considerations (you must not follow my
considerations in spite of understanding my considerations!; in
reverse, I understand your considerations, and I understand the way
how they lead to wrong results).
Again: Since the manifold of all natural numbers only contains natural
numbers, and since any natural number expresses exactly the number of
the foregoing natural numbers _inclusively the number itself_ the
quantity of the natural numbers can not go above the quantity which is
expressable by every/all of the natural numbers.
The natural numbers count themselves! Infinity is not larger than _all
natural number_, it is only "larger" than _any natural number_ ---
since any natural number has a successor and con not be the largest
one.
Brouwer had said: In Invinity the concept of the 'tertium non datur'
fails. That's right.
The concept of set theoretic cardinality leads to the illusion that
the natural numbers are more than they are. But the fundamental
concept of discrete quantity leads to the essential consequence that
"there is no quantity of infinity", there is no cardinality of the
manifold of the natural numbers, there is no set of all natural
numbers, there is only a proper class of all natural numbers. --- The
lucky news: in math does this fact changes almost nothing.
Albrecht is expressing the (IMHO overly correct) idea that infinity is
not quite different from _very large_ (but let nobody ask _how_ large).
So he is looking at an initial segment of the naturals and he concludes
that "the" naturals should have NO properties different from properties
of an arbitrary (large) such initial segment. Seems reasonable enough.
> The natural numbers count themselves! Infinity is not larger than _all
> natural number_, it is only "larger" than _any natural number_ ---
> since any natural number has a successor and con not be the largest
> one.
>
> Brouwer had said: In Invinity the concept of the 'tertium non datur'
> fails. That's right.
>
> The concept of set theoretic cardinality leads to the illusion that
> the natural numbers are more than they are. But the fundamental
> concept of discrete quantity leads to the essential consequence that
> "there is no quantity of infinity", there is no cardinality of the
> manifold of the natural numbers, there is no set of all natural
> numbers, there is only a proper class of all natural numbers. --- The
> lucky news: in math does this fact changes almost nothing.
In "real" math, not "standard" mathematics, that is.
Han de Bruijn
Han de Bruijn schrieb:
No. Your interpretation of my arguments is not right.
If there is a "all of the natural numbers" they coud not be more than
some of them denote since the ordinal and the cardinal aspect of
numbers are intrinsic aligned in the natural numbers. The number n is
at the nth position. There is no natural number which is on a position
"outside of the positions the natural numbers are able to denote". And
there are not more numbers than there are positions.
Infinity as a fixed quantity is an antinomy.
Best regards
Albrecht S. Storz
>
> Albrecht is expressing the (IMHO overly correct) idea that infinity is
> not quite different from _very large_ (but let nobody ask _how_ large).
>
> So he is looking at an initial segment of the naturals and he concludes
> that "the" naturals should have NO properties different from properties
> of an arbitrary (large) such initial segment. Seems reasonable
> enough.
Any arbitrarily large initial segment of naturals has the following
two properties.
(1) It is finite.
(2) It has a maximal element.
Thus, according to your own claim, we are met with the same two claims
for N.
(1) There are finitely many natural numbers.
(2) There is a maximal natural number.
Do you find those two claims reasonable?
--
"Do you know why I'm tall?" "Why?"
"Because I eat apples." "Do you know why I'm short?"
"Why?" "Because I'm a kid."
--Quincy P. Hughes (age almost 4) bests his father.
What is antinomous is a continuum made of points, which are discrete
entities. Points, no matter how many, don't add up to the continuum.
Regards
LauLuna wrote:
> What is antinomous is a continuum made of points, which are discrete
> entities. Points, no matter how many, don't add up to the continuum.
So what do they add up to?
I think the word 'number' and 'natural number' is being used here
unfortunately in ways that make the concepts hard to follow. But that
is what the idea of infinity helps explicate.
What is a number? What is a natural number? What is infinity? What
does 'count' or 'how many' mean?
Zero is a natural number, right? (if that bothers you then start with
one.)
If you have a natural number, and you add 1 to it, that new thing is a
natural number, right?
What does it mean that two collections have the same size? It's been
agreed that the best way to do this is to put them into one-to-one
correspondence. (Notice I didn't mention number or natural number of
infinity)
'How many' means 'what is the size of' a collection.
But what is a 'size'? Natural numbers are a good possibility for size
(and they work well using elementary arithmetic).
Now what is the size of the set of natural numbers? That sentence
works syntactically, but it -is- hard to digest because we're not sure
what 'the set of natural numbers' really is.
First, back to the defintion of 'a' natural number, it is pretty
reasonable to accept that, given -a- natural number n (we don't know
what it is at all, just that it -is- some kind of natural number), we
can -always- get another natural number bigger than n (by adding one).
That is what is meant by 'unending' or 'infinite'. Given any natural
number we can always get another, so the process of getting another
will never end. (may never?). There's no stopping point.
If you start counting at 1, you can always give the size of a
(ahem...finite) set to be the natural number you stopped on when you
stopped tallying. Yes, that's circular.
But for the set of all natural numbers, since you don't stop creating
them, doesn't have a natural number to count them (since each natural
number -is- the stopping point for some set).
The whole point is that at this point, in trying to come up with a
'size' or a 'counting number' for the set of -all- natural numbers, we
punt. We give up, we do the time honored mathematical trick of saying,
I don't know what it is, it doesn't fit anything we've seen before, it
ain't a natural number, instead of burning it at the stake, let's name
it something weird and move on. The number...sorry, the -thing- that
we'll call the size of the set of all natural numbers, we'll give it
the name aleph_0.
That thing, aleph_0, has some properties in common with natural
numbers, but a lot that are not (aleph_0 + 1 = aleph_0 for example,
for appropriate understanding of addition). This aleph_0 is the
smallest -infinite- number...er...thing that acts like 'size of a
set'.
The word 'number' might be problematic because it has overloaded and,
separately, informal uses.
> A number or a concept which describes a quantity which is
> larger than any natural number is unavoidable too large to describe
> the quantity of the natural numbers or any other manifold of "the same
> size".
>
> Infinity is no size and infinity is no quantity. Infinity is a mode, a
> potentiality. The concept of infinity as an actual and complete entity
> is wrong and indefensible.
That may be so, but it is a useful and coherent concept. Frankly, the
naming of something like aleph_0 is really just the formalization of
the idea in the middle of the above explanation that, if you define
'natural number' inductively (as ''0, or a natural number plus 1),
then there's no stopping doing that. and that is an unending process,
resulting in an unending # of possibilities for natural numbers. Which
is what is called 'infinite'.
Mitch
LauLuna wrote:
> What is antinomous is a continuum made of points, which are discrete
> entities. Points, no matter how many, don't add up to the continuum.
Don't two continuous lines intersect at a point?
--
hz
Doesn't that depend strongly on how one defines "continuum"?
On the other hand, according to the usual notions of continuous, a set
of points can be continuous.
Jesse F. Hughes schrieb:
> Han de Bruijn <Han.de...@DTO.TUDelft.NL> writes:
>
> > Albrecht is expressing the (IMHO overly correct) idea that infinity is
> > not quite different from _very large_ (but let nobody ask _how_ large).
> >
> > So he is looking at an initial segment of the naturals and he concludes
> > that "the" naturals should have NO properties different from properties
> > of an arbitrary (large) such initial segment. Seems reasonable
> > enough.
>
> Any arbitrarily large initial segment of naturals has the following
> two properties.
>
> (1) It is finite.
>
> (2) It has a maximal element.
>
> Thus, according to your own claim, we are met with the same two claims
> for N.
>
> (1) There are finitely many natural numbers.
>
> (2) There is a maximal natural number.
>
> Do you find those two claims reasonable?
>
In my opinion: no. Correct is:
1.) there are infinitely many natural numbers what means: the natural
numbers go on and on without end
2.) there is no quantity or cardinality of all of them since the
concept "all of them" is inconsistent.
But you has asked Han, right?
So that the number of naturals is not a ->natural<- , a conclusion with
which everyone agrees.
> And
> there are not more numbers than there are positions.
There are not more naturals than positions, but there are things which
are not naturals
>
> Infinity as a fixed quantity is an antinomy.
Only those who claim exactly one such infinity are discombobulated by
that pronouncement.
For the rest of us, infiniteness is not fixed.
Okay. (When starting from 1).
>
> What does it mean that two collections have the same size? It's been
> agreed that the best way to do this is to put them into one-to-one
> correspondence. (Notice I didn't mention number or natural number of
> infinity)
>
> 'How many' means 'what is the size of' a collection.
Okay.
>
> But what is a 'size'? Natural numbers are a good possibility for size
> (and they work well using elementary arithmetic).
Cardinality is size in this context, I think.
>
> Now what is the size of the set of natural numbers? That sentence
> works syntactically, but it -is- hard to digest because we're not sure
> what 'the set of natural numbers' really is.
>
> First, back to the defintion of 'a' natural number, it is pretty
> reasonable to accept that, given -a- natural number n (we don't know
> what it is at all, just that it -is- some kind of natural number), we
> can -always- get another natural number bigger than n (by adding one).
Okay.
>
> That is what is meant by 'unending' or 'infinite'. Given any natural
> number we can always get another, so the process of getting another
> will never end. (may never?). There's no stopping point.
>
> If you start counting at 1, you can always give the size of a
> (ahem...finite) set to be the natural number you stopped on when you
> stopped tallying. Yes, that's circular.
Why circular? And what is the problem if so? The natural numbers are a
inevitable given property of our being. As e.g. time, space,
structure, causality, ... They are the roots of any math,
unchangeable, perfect, good to use, ubiquitous, ...
>
> But for the set of all natural numbers, since you don't stop creating
> them, doesn't have a natural number to count them (since each natural
> number -is- the stopping point for some set).
No. And you don't have any other number or any well-defined concept
for their quantity.
>
> The whole point is that at this point, in trying to come up with a
> 'size' or a 'counting number' for the set of -all- natural numbers, we
> punt. We give up, we do the time honored mathematical trick of saying,
> I don't know what it is, it doesn't fit anything we've seen before, it
> ain't a natural number, instead of burning it at the stake, let's name
> it something weird and move on. The number...sorry, the -thing- that
> we'll call the size of the set of all natural numbers, we'll give it
> the name aleph_0.
You can't do like this. Aleph_0 is defined as being larger than any
natural number. And so it is too large to denote the quantity of all
natural numbers since they count themseves. There could not be
something out of them to count them because they count themselve and
don't go beyond them at any stage.
>
> That thing, aleph_0, has some properties in common with natural
> numbers, but a lot that are not (aleph_0 + 1 = aleph_0 for example,
> for appropriate understanding of addition). This aleph_0 is the
> smallest -infinite- number...er...thing that acts like 'size of a
> set'.
>
> The word 'number' might be problematic because it has overloaded and,
> separately, informal uses.
Is "quantity" better for you?
>
>
> > A number or a concept which describes a quantity which is
> > larger than any natural number is unavoidable too large to describe
> > the quantity of the natural numbers or any other manifold of "the same
> > size".
> >
> > Infinity is no size and infinity is no quantity. Infinity is a mode, a
> > potentiality. The concept of infinity as an actual and complete entity
> > is wrong and indefensible.
>
> That may be so, but it is a useful and coherent concept. Frankly, the
> naming of something like aleph_0 is really just the formalization of
> the idea in the middle of the above explanation that, if you define
> 'natural number' inductively (as ''0, or a natural number plus 1),
> then there's no stopping doing that. and that is an unending process,
> resulting in an unending # of possibilities for natural numbers. Which
> is what is called 'infinite'.
>
Aleph_0 is not just a name. If so, why don't use just "Infinity"? But
Infinity is no quantity and the talking about the quantity of all
natural numbers is just a talking " as if". A "facon de parler" as
someone (Gauss?) has said.
Not according to any logic with an excluded middle.
So that Albrecht must be claimng "Tertium Datur".
Albrecht wrote:
> You can't do like this. Aleph_0 is defined as being larger than any
> natural number. And so it is too large to denote the quantity of all
> natural numbers since they count themseves. There could not be
> something out of them to count them because they count themselve and
> don't go beyond them at any stage.
Not at any /finite/ stage in the counting, of course.
And, of course, at each stage where you have counted some
number of naturals, you have a lot more naturals left that you
have /not/ counted yet. Do you have a way of describing how
many of them are left to count?
How much too large? Let us subtract the difference and get an exact
measure.
> There could not be
> something out of them to count them because they count themselve and
> don't go beyond them at any stage.
A good reason for using the Von Neumann model which does not have that
problem.
>
> >
> > That thing, aleph_0, has some properties in common with natural
> > numbers, but a lot that are not (aleph_0 + 1 = aleph_0 for example,
> > for appropriate understanding of addition). This aleph_0 is the
> > smallest -infinite- number...er...thing that acts like 'size of a
> > set'.
> >
> > The word 'number' might be problematic because it has overloaded and,
> > separately, informal uses.
>
> Is "quantity" better for you?
Then there are natural "quantities" and non-natural "quantities", and
the quantity of all naturals quantities is not a natural quantity.
>
> >
> Aleph_0 is not just a name. If so, why don't use just "Infinity"?
Among other reasons, there are different infinities, so one must
specify which infinity. Aleph_0 is one of them.
> But
> Infinity is no quantity
But infiniteness encompasses many quantities.
> and the talking about the quantity of all
> natural numbers is just a talking " as if".
Does Albrecht mean that there is no boundary between what are naturals
and what are not?
> A "facon de parler" as
> someone (Gauss?) has said.
Gauss would probably have said it in German.
> > A "facon de parler" as someone (Gauss?) has said.
>
> Gauss would probably have said it in German.
They were so cultured back then...
"Das Unendliche ist nur eine Facon de parler"
--
Mitch
> > That is what is meant by 'unending' or 'infinite'. Given any natural
> > number we can always get another, so the process of getting another
> > will never end. (may never?). There's no stopping point.
>
> > If you start counting at 1, you can always give the size of a
> > (ahem...finite) set to be the natural number you stopped on when you
> > stopped tallying. Yes, that's circular.
>
> Why circular?
Well, counting is usually defined with respect to the natural numbers,
and I was trying to explain how to count natural numbers.
> And what is the problem if so? The natural numbers are a
> inevitable given property of our being. As e.g. time, space,
> structure, causality, ... They are the roots of any math,
> unchangeable, perfect, good to use, ubiquitous, ...
Uh...neat. But that doesn't help explain anything.
> > But for the set of all natural numbers, since you don't stop creating
> > them, doesn't have a natural number to count them (since each natural
> > number -is- the stopping point for some set).
>
> No. And you don't have any other number or any well-defined concept
> for their quantity.
aleph_0 is pretty well-defined. weird, yes, but still well-defined.
> > The whole point is that at this point, in trying to come up with a
> > 'size' or a 'counting number' for the set of -all- natural numbers, we
> > punt. We give up, we do the time honored mathematical trick of saying,
> > I don't know what it is, it doesn't fit anything we've seen before, it
> > ain't a natural number, instead of burning it at the stake, let's name
> > it something weird and move on. The number...sorry, the -thing- that
> > we'll call the size of the set of all natural numbers, we'll give it
> > the name aleph_0.
>
> You can't do like this. Aleph_0 is defined as being larger than any
> natural number. And so it is too large to denote the quantity of all
> natural numbers since they count themseves.
How do the natural numbers count themselves? Which natural number is
the 'size' of the natural numbers? Remember there is no 'last' natural
number.
> There could not be
> something out of them to count them because they count themselve and
> don't go beyond them at any stage.
There's no natural number that gives you the 'size' of the natural
numbers. Right. So if you want to manipulate the concept 'the size of
the natural numbers' then you have to create a label that stands for
something that is not a natural number, yet still gives their size.
Let's call it infinity or aleph_0 (or something).
> > The word 'number' might be problematic because it has overloaded and,
> > separately, informal uses.
>
> Is "quantity" better for you?
Sure. 'size' is another.
> Aleph_0 is not just a name. If so, why don't use just "Infinity"?
There are other things that are not finite but act differently from
aleph_0. For example, the 'size' of the continuum (the 'number' of
'points' between 0 and 1).
Or the ordinal for the univariate polyomials with integer
coefficients.
> But
> Infinity is no quantity and the talking about the quantity of all
> natural numbers is just a talking " as if". A "facon de parler" as
> someone (Gauss?) has said.
Talking about 2 is a manner of speaking also.
--
Mitch
To a set of points, of course.
But this does not imply that continuous lines are made up of points. A
point is a location on the line, not a component of it.
Yes, but usual definitions of continuity may well not match the
intuitive geometrical continuum.
And sometimes a continuous set of points, even if some people do not
wish to accept it as a continuum.
What are 'components' of a line if they are not points?
Or are lines to be understood as not having any 'components'?
> > > What is antinomous is a continuum made of points, which are discrete
> > > entities. Points, no matter how many, don't add up to the continuum.
> >
> > Doesn't that depend strongly on how one defines "continuum"?
> >
> > On the other hand, according to the usual notions of continuous, a set
> > of points can be continuous.
>
> Yes, but usual definitions of continuity may well not match the
> intuitive geometrical continuum.
That would certainly depend on WHOSE "intuitive geometrical continuum"
one were matching it to.
It matches mine quite nicely.
And I suspect it matches the "intuitive geometrical continuum" of many,
even most, mathematicians.
And non-mathematician's "intuitive geometrical continuums" are
mathematically irrelevant.
David R Tribble wrote:
>> So what do they add up to?
>
LauLuna wrote:
> To a set of points, of course.
Is that set like a line?
LauLuna wrote:
> herbzet wrote:
> > LauLuna wrote:
> > > What is antinomous is a continuum made of points, which are discrete
> > > entities. Points, no matter how many, don't add up to the continuum.
> >
> > Don't two continuous lines intersect at a point?
>
> But this does not imply that continuous lines are made up of points. A
> point is a location on the line
Right -- at whatever location on a line you're at, you're at a point -- no?
> not a component of it.
Very well, then -- what are the components of a continuous line?
Oh, never mind that, actually -- the answer's got to be silly at some level.
--
hz
David R Tribble schrieb:
> Mitch Harris wrote:
> >> The whole point is that at this point, in trying to come up with a
> >> 'size' or a 'counting number' for the set of -all- natural numbers, we
> >> punt. We give up, we do the time honored mathematical trick of saying,
> >> I don't know what it is, it doesn't fit anything we've seen before, it
> >> ain't a natural number, instead of burning it at the stake, let's name
> >> it something weird and move on. The number...sorry, the -thing- that
> >> we'll call the size of the set of all natural numbers, we'll give it
> >> the name aleph_0.
> >
>
> Albrecht wrote:
> > You can't do like this. Aleph_0 is defined as being larger than any
> > natural number. And so it is too large to denote the quantity of all
> > natural numbers since they count themseves. There could not be
> > something out of them to count them because they count themselve and
> > don't go beyond them at any stage.
>
> Not at any /finite/ stage in the counting, of course.
There is no infinite stage anywhere.
>
> And, of course, at each stage where you have counted some
> number of naturals, you have a lot more naturals left that you
> have /not/ counted yet. Do you have a way of describing how
> many of them are left to count?
We have a word for that, but no quantity. Infinite is just a mode, not
a number, not a quantity. Infinity is a concept at the boundary of our
understanding. It is a helpless attempt to understand the not-
understandable.
Virgil schrieb:
There is no infinite quantity. But if there would be one, this
infinite quantity would be too large to denote the quantity of the
naturals.
>
>
> > There could not be
> > something out of them to count them because they count themselve and
> > don't go beyond them at any stage.
>
> A good reason for using the Von Neumann model which does not have that
> problem.
They have exactly that problem. But with them the problem is much more
veiled.
> >
> > >
> > > That thing, aleph_0, has some properties in common with natural
> > > numbers, but a lot that are not (aleph_0 + 1 = aleph_0 for example,
> > > for appropriate understanding of addition). This aleph_0 is the
> > > smallest -infinite- number...er...thing that acts like 'size of a
> > > set'.
> > >
> > > The word 'number' might be problematic because it has overloaded and,
> > > separately, informal uses.
> >
> > Is "quantity" better for you?
>
> Then there are natural "quantities" and non-natural "quantities", and
> the quantity of all naturals quantities is not a natural quantity.
> >
> > >
>
> > Aleph_0 is not just a name. If so, why don't use just "Infinity"?
>
> Among other reasons, there are different infinities, so one must
> specify which infinity. Aleph_0 is one of them.
>
> > But
> > Infinity is no quantity
>
> But infiniteness encompasses many quantities.
Senseless wording?
Mitch Harris schrieb:
> On Jan 30, 4:34 pm, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
> > Mitch Harris schrieb:
> > > On Jan 30, 2:35 am, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
> > > > Mitch Harris schrieb:
> >
> > > > > On Jan 29, 2:15 am, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
> > > > > > Virgil schrieb:
>
>
> > > That is what is meant by 'unending' or 'infinite'. Given any natural
> > > number we can always get another, so the process of getting another
> > > will never end. (may never?). There's no stopping point.
> >
> > > If you start counting at 1, you can always give the size of a
> > > (ahem...finite) set to be the natural number you stopped on when you
> > > stopped tallying. Yes, that's circular.
> >
> > Why circular?
>
> Well, counting is usually defined with respect to the natural numbers,
> and I was trying to explain how to count natural numbers.
Natural numbers will be counted exactly as any other manifolds:
1.: 1, 2.: 2, 3.: 3, 4.: 4, ...
>
> > And what is the problem if so? The natural numbers are a
> > inevitable given property of our being. As e.g. time, space,
> > structure, causality, ... They are the roots of any math,
> > unchangeable, perfect, good to use, ubiquitous, ...
>
> Uh...neat. But that doesn't help explain anything.
Neat? No. Rigorous!
>
>
> > > But for the set of all natural numbers, since you don't stop creating
> > > them, doesn't have a natural number to count them (since each natural
> > > number -is- the stopping point for some set).
> >
> > No. And you don't have any other number or any well-defined concept
> > for their quantity.
>
> aleph_0 is pretty well-defined. weird, yes, but still well-defined.
Well-definde in spite of the fact that the concept is antinome?
>
>
> > > The whole point is that at this point, in trying to come up with a
> > > 'size' or a 'counting number' for the set of -all- natural numbers, we
> > > punt. We give up, we do the time honored mathematical trick of saying,
> > > I don't know what it is, it doesn't fit anything we've seen before, it
> > > ain't a natural number, instead of burning it at the stake, let's name
> > > it something weird and move on. The number...sorry, the -thing- that
> > > we'll call the size of the set of all natural numbers, we'll give it
> > > the name aleph_0.
> >
> > You can't do like this. Aleph_0 is defined as being larger than any
> > natural number. And so it is too large to denote the quantity of all
> > natural numbers since they count themseves.
>
> How do the natural numbers count themselves? Which natural number is
> the 'size' of the natural numbers? Remember there is no 'last' natural
> number.
There is no coherent concept of the quantity of the naturals. Yet
forgotten?
>
> > There could not be
> > something out of them to count them because they count themselve and
> > don't go beyond them at any stage.
>
> There's no natural number that gives you the 'size' of the natural
> numbers. Right. So if you want to manipulate the concept 'the size of
> the natural numbers' then you have to create a label that stands for
> something that is not a natural number, yet still gives their size.
> Let's call it infinity or aleph_0 (or something).
Any concept of a quantity of the naturals is wrong since either it is
too small (a natural number) or it is too large (something which is
larger than any natural number). So the concept of a quantity of the
natural numbers is antinome.
>
>
> > > The word 'number' might be problematic because it has overloaded and,
> > > separately, informal uses.
> >
> > Is "quantity" better for you?
>
> Sure. 'size' is another.
>
>
> > Aleph_0 is not just a name. If so, why don't use just "Infinity"?
>
> There are other things that are not finite but act differently from
> aleph_0. For example, the 'size' of the continuum (the 'number' of
> 'points' between 0 and 1).
> Or the ordinal for the univariate polyomials with integer
> coefficients.
This concepts are all senseless since there is no infinite set.
>
> > But
> > Infinity is no quantity and the talking about the quantity of all
> > natural numbers is just a talking " as if". A "facon de parler" as
> > someone (Gauss?) has said.
>
> Talking about 2 is a manner of speaking also.
>
> --
Arguing with someone who claims that the concept of 2 and the concept
of infinity is the same seems senseless to me.
Leaving aside the ambiguous notion of adding points, a continuum is
not just a set of individual points. The points have to work together
and arrange themselves (or allow themselves to be arranged) into a
type eta linear ordering to produce a continuum.
> David R Tribble schrieb:
> > Mitch Harris wrote:
> > >> The whole point is that at this point, in trying to come up with a
> > >> 'size' or a 'counting number' for the set of -all- natural numbers, we
> > >> punt. We give up, we do the time honored mathematical trick of saying,
> > >> I don't know what it is, it doesn't fit anything we've seen before, it
> > >> ain't a natural number, instead of burning it at the stake, let's name
> > >> it something weird and move on. The number...sorry, the -thing- that
> > >> we'll call the size of the set of all natural numbers, we'll give it
> > >> the name aleph_0.
> > >
> >
> > Albrecht wrote:
> > > You can't do like this. Aleph_0 is defined as being larger than any
> > > natural number. And so it is too large to denote the quantity of all
> > > natural numbers since they count themseves.
Which natural does Aleph_0 count twice or what does it count that is
not a natural? Unless you can answer this, you are dead wrong.
> > > There could not be
> > > something out of them to count them because they count themselve and
> > > don't go beyond them at any stage.
Then do you claim that there is some natural that counts all naturals?
Unless you do, you cannot say that they count themselves, but only that
one of them counts one of them.
> >
> > Not at any /finite/ stage in the counting, of course.
>
> There is no infinite stage anywhere.
Perhaps not in Albrecht's philosophy, but we can all see how little that
is worth.
>
> >
> > And, of course, at each stage where you have counted some
> > number of naturals, you have a lot more naturals left that you
> > have /not/ counted yet. Do you have a way of describing how
> > many of them are left to count?
>
> We have a word for that, but no quantity. Infinite is just a mode, not
> a number, not a quantity. Infinity is a concept at the boundary of our
> understanding. It is a helpless attempt to understand the not-
> understandable.
That something is not understandable by Albrecht only makes it not
understandable by Albrecht, but in no way makes it necessarily not
understandable in general.
> David R Tribble schrieb:
> > Mitch Harris wrote:
> > >> The whole point is that at this point, in trying to come up with a
> > >> 'size' or a 'counting number' for the set of -all- natural numbers, we
> > >> punt. We give up, we do the time honored mathematical trick of saying,
> > >> I don't know what it is, it doesn't fit anything we've seen before, it
> > >> ain't a natural number, instead of burning it at the stake, let's name
> > >> it something weird and move on. The number...sorry, the -thing- that
> > >> we'll call the size of the set of all natural numbers, we'll give it
> > >> the name aleph_0.
> > >
> >
> > Albrecht wrote:
> > > You can't do like this. Aleph_0 is defined as being larger than any
> > > natural number. And so it is too large to denote the quantity of all
> > > natural numbers since they count themseves. There could not be
> > > something out of them to count them because they count themselve and
> > > don't go beyond them at any stage.
> >
> > Not at any /finite/ stage in the counting, of course.
>
> There is no infinite stage anywhere.
There is in ZFC.
>
> >
> > And, of course, at each stage where you have counted some
> > number of naturals, you have a lot more naturals left that you
> > have /not/ counted yet. Do you have a way of describing how
> > many of them are left to count?
>
> We have a word for that, but no quantity.
We, on the other hand, have both, the quantity being Aleph_0, which is
as much a quantity as any natural
> Infinite is just a mode, not
> a number, not a quantity.
So is "natural number", but particular examples of each are numbers.
> Infinity is a concept at the boundary of our
> understanding. It is a helpless attempt to understand the not-
> understandable.
You speak only for yourself, Albrecht. There are others with better
understanding.
> Virgil schrieb:
> > In article
> > <63f2f328-2736-416d...@a39g2000prl.googlegroups.com>,
> > Albrecht <albs...@gmx.de> wrote:
> >
....
> > > > But for the set of all natural numbers, since you don't stop creating
> > > > them, doesn't have a natural number to count them (since each natural
> > > > number -is- the stopping point for some set).
> > >
> > > No. And you don't have any other number or any well-defined concept
> > > for their quantity.
Storz may not but others do.
> >
> > > You can't do like this.
We HAVE done it.
> > > Aleph_0 is defined as being larger than any
> > > natural number. And so it is too large to denote the quantity of all
> > > natural numbers since they count themseves.
No natural "counts" any of its successors so that the naturals do NOT
count themselves in any reasonable sense.
> >
> > How much too large? Let us subtract the difference and get an exact
> > measure.
>
> There is no infinite quantity. But if there would be one, this
> infinite quantity would be too large to denote the quantity of the
> naturals.
Repeating a falsehood does not make it any less false.
>
> >
> >
> > > There could not be
> > > something out of them to count them because they count themselve and
> > > don't go beyond them at any stage.
> >
> > A good reason for using the Von Neumann model which does not have that
> > problem.
>
> They have exactly that problem. But with them the problem is much more
> veiled.
Neither version has any such problem as no natural in either system can
"count" any of its successors, so that the naturals cannot "count
themselves".
> > Among other reasons, there are different infinities, so one must
> > specify which infinity. Aleph_0 is one of them.
> >
> > > But
> > > Infinity is no quantity
> >
> > But infiniteness encompasses many quantities.
>
> Senseless wording?
Only to the senseless.
>
> >
> > > and the talking about the quantity of all
> > > natural numbers is just a talking " as if".
> >
> > Does Albrecht mean that there is no boundary between what are naturals
> > and what are not?
Can't find an answer?
> Mitch Harris schrieb:
> > On Jan 30, 4:34 pm, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
> > > Mitch Harris schrieb:
> > > > On Jan 30, 2:35 am, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
> > > > > Mitch Harris schrieb:
> > >
> > > > > > On Jan 29, 2:15 am, Albrecht <albst...@gmx.de> wrote:
> > > > > > > Virgil schrieb:
> >
> >
> > > > That is what is meant by 'unending' or 'infinite'. Given any natural
> > > > number we can always get another, so the process of getting another
> > > > will never end. (may never?). There's no stopping point.
> > >
> > > > If you start counting at 1, you can always give the size of a
> > > > (ahem...finite) set to be the natural number you stopped on when you
> > > > stopped tallying. Yes, that's circular.
> > >
> > > Why circular?
> >
> > Well, counting is usually defined with respect to the natural numbers,
> > and I was trying to explain how to count natural numbers.
>
> Natural numbers will be counted exactly as any other manifolds:
>
> 1.: 1, 2.: 2, 3.: 3, 4.: 4, ...
Cardinality necessarily starts with zero.
Ordinality starts with "first".
>
>
> >
> > > And what is the problem if so? The natural numbers are a
> > > inevitable given property of our being. As e.g. time, space,
> > > structure, causality, ... They are the roots of any math,
> > > unchangeable, perfect, good to use, ubiquitous, ...
> >
> > Uh...neat. But that doesn't help explain anything.
>
> Neat? No. Rigorous!
Not rigorous as described by Storz.
>
> >
> >
> > > > But for the set of all natural numbers, since you don't stop creating
> > > > them, doesn't have a natural number to count them (since each natural
> > > > number -is- the stopping point for some set).
> > >
> > > No. And you don't have any other number or any well-defined concept
> > > for their quantity.
> >
> > aleph_0 is pretty well-defined. weird, yes, but still well-defined.
>
> Well-definde in spite of the fact that the concept is antinome?
Since that "antinome" does not exist for most of us, aleph_0 is
well-defined for all but that unhappy antinomous few.
> >
> > How do the natural numbers count themselves? Which natural number is
> > the 'size' of the natural numbers? Remember there is no 'last' natural
> > number.
>
>
> There is no coherent concept of the quantity of the naturals. Yet
> forgotten?
Then they do not count themselves. In particular, none may "count" any
of its infinitely many successors. so that no natural may count more
than a miniscule minority of naturals.
>
> Any concept of a quantity of the naturals is wrong
Only to those who assume a priori that it is wrong.
> >
> > > Aleph_0 is not just a name. If so, why don't use just "Infinity"?
> >
> > There are other things that are not finite but act differently from
> > aleph_0. For example, the 'size' of the continuum (the 'number' of
> > 'points' between 0 and 1).
> > Or the ordinal for the univariate polyomials with integer
> > coefficients.
>
> This concepts are all senseless since there is no infinite set.
The senselessness is all in Albrecht, who rejects what he is too thick
to comprehend.
>
> Arguing with someone who claims that the concept of 2 and the concept
> of infinity is the same seems senseless to me.
Then stop doing it. only the terminally stupid kdeep doing what they
believe to be senseless.
We, on the other hand, while knowing that it is useless to persuade
sense into Storz, keep posting to prevent Storz from infecting others.
> > > > If you start counting at 1, you can always give the size of a
> > > > (ahem...finite) set to be the natural number you stopped on when you
> > > > stopped tallying. Yes, that's circular.
>
> > > Why circular?
>
> > Well, counting is usually defined with respect to the natural numbers,
> > and I was trying to explain how to count natural numbers.
>
> Natural numbers will be counted exactly as any other manifolds:
>
> 1.: 1, 2.: 2, 3.: 3, 4.: 4, ...
I think that's the circularity I'm thinking of.
> > > And what is the problem if so? The natural numbers are a
> > > inevitable given property of our being. As e.g. time, space,
> > > structure, causality, ... They are the roots of any math,
> > > unchangeable, perfect, good to use, ubiquitous, ...
>
> > Uh...neat. But that doesn't help explain anything.
>
> Neat? No. Rigorous!
Rigorous? A repetition of adjectives is considered reasoning? OK, but
it is not very convincing reasoning to me.
> > aleph_0 is pretty well-defined. weird, yes, but still well-defined.
>
> Well-definde in spite of the fact that the concept is antinome?
Nope just well-defined. You think it is whatever 'antnome' means, I
don't.
> > How do the natural numbers count themselves? Which natural number is
> > the 'size' of the natural numbers? Remember there is no 'last' natural
> > number.
>
> There is no coherent concept of the quantity of the naturals. Yet
> forgotten?
I don't think you've established that by any reasoning. I think I have
established it by explanation. Yes, I must have already forgotten
that. What explanation did you offer? (link,summary?)
> > There's no natural number that gives you the 'size' of the natural
> > numbers. Right. So if you want to manipulate the concept 'the size of
> > the natural numbers' then you have to create a label that stands for
> > something that is not a natural number, yet still gives their size.
> > Let's call it infinity or aleph_0 (or something).
>
> Any concept of a quantity of the naturals is wrong since either it is
> too small (a natural number)
Right. the quantity of the natural numbers -cannot- be a natural
number. Excellent, we've mutually established that.
> or it is too large (something which is
> larger than any natural number).
Hm. Yes, the quantity of natural numbers is larger than any natural
number. Why is that wrong?
> So the concept of a quantity of the
> natural numbers is antinome.
What is 'antinome'? Is that 'die Antinomie'? A paradox? A
contradiction?
If a contradiction, one of those possibilities works. It's not the
first one. You haven't shown how the second one is wrong.
> > > Aleph_0 is not just a name. If so, why don't use just "Infinity"?
>
> > There are other things that are not finite but act differently from
> > aleph_0. For example, the 'size' of the continuum (the 'number' of
> > 'points' between 0 and 1).
> > Or the ordinal for the univariate polyomials with integer
> > coefficients.
>
> This concepts are all senseless since there is no infinite set.
- 'is'? There is no 2 either.
- They make sense to some people. And they have some useful
consequences. Could we get those useful consequences without bothering
with the 'nonsense' of infinity? Maybe, but I'll let you do that work.
> > > But
> > > Infinity is no quantity and the talking about the quantity of all
> > > natural numbers is just a talking " as if". A "facon de parler" as
> > > someone (Gauss?) has said.
>
> > Talking about 2 is a manner of speaking also.
>
> Arguing with someone who claims that the concept of 2 and the concept
> of infinity is the same seems senseless to me.
- I don't think I called them the same. I pointed out one similarity.
- "Arguing with someone who claims" ... "seems senseless to me".
Touche
Mitch
Instantaneous velocity and acceleration are impossible concepts,
average acceleration and velocity are quite possable.
Using the rules of standard mathmatics and logic please derive the statement
A = ~A from the concept "all of them".
In math and physics, velocity and acceleration unmodified ordinarily
mean the instantaneous variety.
That's clear. But it's not so clear that they reach out to producing a
continuum even so ordered.
I think it's common sense that the analytical continuum is only a
representation, within the possibilities of the discrete, of the
geometrical continuum.
If we wish to have a numerical representation of the geometrical
continuum, the analytical continuum is likely to be the best we can
get, at least if we reject infinitesimals. But what we get is,
nonetheless, a representation of, not the geometrical continuum itself.
Segments can be taken as components of a line, not points.
> And non-mathematician's "intuitive geometrical continuums" are
> mathematically irrelevant.
Big mistake. Whatever makes sense and might be true is relevant,
disregarded of who says it.
Or, do you think there is a proletarian and a capitalist biology, an
Aryan and a Jewish physics?
Regards
At every finite stage in the generation of naturals, we find a natural
that tells us how many naturals have been produced SO FAR. But 'so
far' is never 'in the end', concerning naturals.
Now, there is no reason to assume that what holds for the finite also
holds for the infinite. There might be no natural counting all natural
numbers. And the fact that every finite amount of naturals is counted
by a natural is no good argument against the existence of a nonnatural
number counting all naturals.
I do think infinity is no cardinality but your way of arguing it, is
not the best.
There is no inconsistency in admitting infinite cardinalities, most
probably because it is ultimately a question of how we name things;
you can restrict or expand what you understand by a cardinality at
will.
Nevertheless, there are consistent impossibilities, impossibilities
that do not imply contradiction (in the sense that no contradiction is
a logical consequence of them). Consider the negation ~G of Gödel's
sentence G, or consider 'something pops out of absolute nothingness'.
As I see it, these are consistent impossibilities.
So perhaps, looking for an inconsistency in the theory of the
transfinite is not the best way to disprove it.
Regards
> A number or a concept which describes a quantity which is
> larger than any natural number is unavoidable too large to describe
> the quantity of the natural numbers or any other manifold of "the same
> size".
>
> Infinity is no size and infinity is no quantity. Infinity is a mode, a
> potentiality. The concept of infinity as an actual and complete entity
> is wrong and indefensible.
>
> Best regards
> Albrecht S. Storz
>
>
>
> > But mathematical investigation has given consistent
> > meanings to all these terms. If you learn the meanings of those terms,
> > you'll see that things work out nicely. Those meanings may not match
> > the ones you have now though.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
Yes, that's a good point. Most likely, there is no inconsistency in
that concept.
Nevertheless, don't forget there are consistent impossibilities.
> Nevertheless, don't forget there are consistent impossibilities.
If you are not speaking of logical impossibilities nor of physical
impossibilities, then what kind do you have in mind?
--
Jesse F. Hughes
"I mean it's just kind of like ... whatever ... I'm here for a
purpose. I know what my purpose is. I'm not a ... moron, you know
what I mean." -- "Kristen", Gov. Spitzer's philosopher/"escort"
Since 'continuum' is as yet undefined, it is hard to argue with that.
However, the facts of the existence of a non-trivial Lebesgue measure
on, the non-meagerness of, the completeness of,... a set of order type
eta indicates that SOMETHING is going on. It may not satisfy your
notion of continuum, but it isn't just a "set of points".
>
> I think it's common sense that the analytical continuum is only a
> representation, within the possibilities of the discrete, of the
> geometrical continuum.
>
> If we wish to have a numerical representation of the geometrical
> continuum, the analytical continuum is likely to be the best we can
> get, at least if we reject infinitesimals. But what we get is,
> nonetheless, a representation of, not the geometrical continuum itself.
If I knew more precisely what you mean by "THE geometrical
continuum" (my emphasis) I would probably agree with you.
LauLuna schrieb:
1.) I'm convinced that it is possible to create a stringent theory of
the discrete quantities (the natural numbers) with at least the same
strenght as there is a theory of sets like ZFC (respectively theories
of sets, e.g. ZFC, NBG, ...). Up to now Math lacks of such a theory.
Set theories are not the most fundamental theories of Math. Discrete
quantities (natural numbers) are more fundamental than sets. Natural
numbers are the essential roots of any mathematics, inclusively of any
set theories.
2.) To discuss the problem of infinite quantities we have to consider
the relation "larger than" (>).
The set theoretic definiton is an "artificial" definition which don't
satisfy our intuitive understanding of that relation.
I claim that the definition of "larger than" of discrete quantities
has to cover the condition:
If a > b than a = b+1 or a > b+1
or, for sure, in another notation:
a > b <=> a = b+1 or a > b+1
I hope the notation is clear.
Some may claim that this notation is circular, but we are satisfied
with the condition that a has to be at least one unity larger than b
to be larger than b (thus a > b holds).
With this considerations, if someone claims that the quantity of the
natural numbers (let's call it A*) is larger than any natural number,
he has to show that:
A* > n forall n in N (with N is the proper class of the natural
numbers) is true.
Thus: The quantity of the natural numbers has to be at least one unity
larger than any natural number.
The axiom of Infinity implies this claim since infinite sets has to
have a cardinality and cardinality is the quantity of the elements of
a set.
This claim leads to two contradictory sentences:
(1) If the cardinality (or quantity) of the natural numbers is at
least one unity larger than any natural number, there has to be at
least one element more in the manifold of the natural numbers as there
are natural numbers.
But (2) The manifold of natural numbers consists only of natural
numbers (by definition).
This facts are easely apparent with the unary notation of the natural
numbers:
O
OO
OOO
OOOO
OOOOO
...
or with the notation of the ordianl and cardinal oneness of the
natural numbers:
1. <-> 1
1. 2. <-> 2
1. 2. 3. <-> 3
1. 2. 3. 4. <-> 4
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. <-> 5
...
The pretence of the soundness of a quantity of infinity disappears
with putting down the set-theoretical glasses.
But every natural number is finite. There is no infinite natural
number. So there is no reason why the well proved finite laws should
not apply here.
There is a simply proof to show that they do: The sequence of all
natural numbers cannot be larger than a natural number (of course we
cannot name that number. Therefore let us call it ?). The proof is as
follows:
Theorem: For all n in N: the initial segment {1, 2, 3, ..., n} is
finite and has cardinality n.
Proof by induction. For "all" n.
So, if there should be an actually infinite set (different from a
potentially infinite set that is always finite but not fixed), then it
is forced to contain elements that are not subject of my theorem. But
that would be non-natural numbers, as my theorem covers all natural
numbers.
Can you really imagine a reason why this theorem should not hold?
Further we should analyze the concept of "all". What does it mean?
1) If you consider a number, then you can tell whether it is a
natural. That is ok, but that does not say that all naturals "are
there".
2) Actually, all naturals are there. Then the concept of "all" has to
be proved by showing all - not of course by the ridiculous three
points or by the even more ridiculous "axiom".
Regards, WM
> There is a simply proof to show that they do: The sequence of all
> natural numbers cannot be larger than a natural number
A sequence larger than a number? A category mistake surely.
> Theorem: For all n in N: the initial segment {1, 2, 3, ..., n} is
> finite and has cardinality n.
> So, if there should be an actually infinite set
> then it
> is forced to contain elements that are not subject of my theorem.
So Fuckenheim regards the observation that {1,...,n}
has n elements "his" theorem. Certainly the ego has landed :-(
So let's analyse this utterance. Now
"elements that are not subject of my theorem" are presumably
natural numbers. So Fuckenheim asserts that any "actually" infinite
sets can't contain natural numbers. Proof by fiat!
Dik T. Winter schrieb:
> In article <7996c514-6675-4635...@e1g2000pra.googlegroups.com> Albrecht <albs...@gmx.de> writes:
> ...
> > 2.) To discuss the problem of infinite quantities we have to consider
> > the relation "larger than" (>).
> > The set theoretic definiton is an "artificial" definition which don't
> > satisfy our intuitive understanding of that relation.
> > I claim that the definition of "larger than" of discrete quantities
> > has to cover the condition:
> > If a > b than a = b+1 or a > b+1
> > or, for sure, in another notation:
> > a > b <=> a = b+1 or a > b+1
>
> So you claim that in the floating-point numbers on a computer (actually
> discrete quantities and finitely many too), the relation
> 1.5 > 1
> is false? Bizarre.
A first element (1.) together with five elements (5) is greater than
1? But thats true, not false! :-)
>
> > With this considerations, if someone claims that the quantity of the
> > natural numbers (let's call it A*) is larger than any natural number,
> > he has to show that:
> > A* > n forall n in N (with N is the proper class of the natural
> > numbers) is true.
>
> But that is easy. For each n in N, A* > n+1 (as n+1 is also in N), so it
> satisfies the condition.
Hahahah.
>
> > Thus: The quantity of the natural numbers has to be at least one unity
> > larger than any natural number.
>
> No. It has to be at least one unity larger than *each* natural number.
Okay. *Each* number.
> Actually it is infinitely much larger than *each* natural number.
There is no quantity "infinity". And surely not actually. Let's say:
Potentially it is infinitely larger than each natural number. The
question is only: What is that "it"? There is nothing which could be
larger than any natural number, since the natural numbers increases
infinitely. That means: without end ... unendingly ... in
eternally ... for ever ... beyond all boundaries ...
infinitely ... ... ... ....
>
> > (1) If the cardinality (or quantity) of the natural numbers is at
> > least one unity larger than any natural number, there has to be at
> > least one element more in the manifold of the natural numbers as there
> > are natural numbers.
>
> Unfounded conclusion. Why has there to be at least one element more?
By definiton of "larger than".
... every natural number is finite. There is no infinite natural
> number. So there is no reason why the well proved finite laws should
> not apply here.
>
> There is a simply proof to show that they do: The sequence of all
> natural numbers cannot be larger than a natural number (of course we
> cannot name that number. Therefore let us call it ?). The proof is as
> follows:
>
> Theorem: For all n in N: the initial segment {1, 2, 3, ..., n} is
> finite and has cardinality n.
> Proof by induction. For "all" n.
>
>
No sequence that has an end is the sequence of all natural
numbers. So any property that holds for each of theses sequences
may may not hold for the union of theses sequences
the initial sequence {1,2,3,...} that does not have a end.
Indeed, this initial sequence is not finite and
does not have a cardinality that is a natural number.
- William Hughes
Name calling to someone known with his real name, while being anonymous
yourself, is typical for a coward.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Foot_in_the_Grave
Search for "Victor Meldrew" and "I don't believe it".
Han de Bruijn
Eh? You claim:
a > b <=> a = b+1 or a > b+1
for 1.5 and 1 that means:
1.5 > 1 <=> 1.5 = 1+1 or 1.5 > 1+1
that is *your* definition. So according to *your* definition 1.5 > 1 is
false.
> > > With this considerations, if someone claims that the quantity of the
> > > natural numbers (let's call it A*) is larger than any natural number,
> > > he has to show that:
> > > A* > n forall n in N (with N is the proper class of the natural
> > > numbers) is true.
> >
> > But that is easy. For each n in N, A* > n+1 (as n+1 is also in N), so it
> > satisfies the condition.
>
> Hahahah.
Yeah, so whats is wrong with it?
> > > Thus: The quantity of the natural numbers has to be at least one unity
> > > larger than any natural number.
> >
> > No. It has to be at least one unity larger than *each* natural number.
>
> Okay. *Each* number.
Why each *number* and not natural number? You state *explicitly* has to
show A* > n forall n in N. What that statement by you wrong?
> > Actually it is infinitely much larger than *each* natural number.
>
> There is no quantity "infinity". And surely not actually.
Do I claim that? If so, where?
> Let's say:
> Potentially it is infinitely larger than each natural number. The
> question is only: What is that "it"? There is nothing which could be
> larger than any natural number, since the natural numbers increases
> infinitely. That means: without end ... unendingly ... in
> eternally ... for ever ... beyond all boundaries ...
> infinitely ... ... ... ....
Right. But why is it not possible that something is still larger, except
that it hurts your feelings?
> > > (1) If the cardinality (or quantity) of the natural numbers is at
> > > least one unity larger than any natural number, there has to be at
> > > least one element more in the manifold of the natural numbers as there
> > > are natural numbers.
> >
> > Unfounded conclusion. Why has there to be at least one element more?
>
> By definiton of "larger than".
Give a proof that there has to be at least one element more. *That* was
the unfounded conclusion.
--
dik t. winter, cwi, science park 123, 1098 xg amsterdam, nederland, +31205924131
home: bovenover 215, 1025 jn amsterdam, nederland; http://www.cwi.nl/~dik/
Dik T. Winter schrieb:
> In article <68576828-007b-40c4...@z6g2000pre.googlegroups.com> Albrecht <albs...@gmx.de> writes:
> > Dik T. Winter schrieb:
> > > In article <7996c514-6675-4635...@e1g2000pra.googlegroups.com> Albrecht <albs...@gmx.de> writes:
> > > > If a > b than a = b+1 or a > b+1
> > > > or, for sure, in another notation:
> > > > a > b <=> a = b+1 or a > b+1
> > >
> > > So you claim that in the floating-point numbers on a computer (actually
> > > discrete quantities and finitely many too), the relation
> > > 1.5 > 1
> > > is false? Bizarre.
> >
> > A first element (1.) together with five elements (5) is greater than
> > 1? But thats true, not false! :-)
>
> Eh? You claim:
> a > b <=> a = b+1 or a > b+1
> for 1.5 and 1 that means:
> 1.5 > 1 <=> 1.5 = 1+1 or 1.5 > 1+1
> that is *your* definition. So according to *your* definition 1.5 > 1 is
> false.
Nice. Have you some other funny arithmetic challenges? (Apart from
that: I'd talked about discrete quantities/natural numbers. But I'm
sure, in fact you'd understood that.)
>
> > > > With this considerations, if someone claims that the quantity of the
> > > > natural numbers (let's call it A*) is larger than any natural number,
> > > > he has to show that:
> > > > A* > n forall n in N (with N is the proper class of the natural
> > > > numbers) is true.
> > >
> > > But that is easy. For each n in N, A* > n+1 (as n+1 is also in N), so it
> > > satisfies the condition.
> >
> > Hahahah.
>
> Yeah, so whats is wrong with it?
And what is with: For each n in N, A* > 1+n
>
> > > > Thus: The quantity of the natural numbers has to be at least one unity
> > > > larger than any natural number.
> > >
> > > No. It has to be at least one unity larger than *each* natural number.
> >
> > Okay. *Each* number.
>
> Why each *number* and not natural number? You state *explicitly* has to
> show A* > n forall n in N. What that statement by you wrong?
Okay. *Each* *natural* number.
Now you are able to ask: Why "*Each* *natural* number" and not "Each
natural number"? And then: Why "Each natural number" and not Each
natural number? And so on. Very funny.
>
> > > Actually it is infinitely much larger than *each* natural number.
> >
> > There is no quantity "infinity". And surely not actually.
>
> Do I claim that? If so, where?
hahahah.
>
> > Let's say:
> > Potentially it is infinitely larger than each natural number. The
> > question is only: What is that "it"? There is nothing which could be
> > larger than any natural number, since the natural numbers increases
> > infinitely. That means: without end ... unendingly ... in
> > eternally ... for ever ... beyond all boundaries ...
> > infinitely ... ... ... ....
>
> Right. But why is it not possible that something is still larger, except
> that it hurts your feelings?
Hahahahhaha
>
> > > > (1) If the cardinality (or quantity) of the natural numbers is at
> > > > least one unity larger than any natural number, there has to be at
> > > > least one element more in the manifold of the natural numbers as there
> > > > are natural numbers.
> > >
> > > Unfounded conclusion. Why has there to be at least one element more?
> >
> > By definiton of "larger than".
>
> Give a proof that there has to be at least one element more. *That* was
> the unfounded conclusion.
Are you part of a dutch clown company? Very good. Very funny.
If by 'quantity' you mean some natural number, then yes, of course
that is the case. Nobody is disputing the fact, everyone is in
agreement that each (or any, or every) natural number is finite. Of
all the possible things that 'infinite' might mena, we certainly don't
mean to call any particular natural number infinite.
But...
The thing the rest of us are calling infinity is what we are using to
put a handle on the 'quantity' (a generalized concept that goes beyond
getting the size of sets in one-to-one correspondence with the natural
numbers).
You seem to not like calling the collection of natural numbers a set,
and you'd prefer to call it a class. That's fine...whatever you'd like
to call it (it's not following the standard technical meanings of
those terms but no matter).
But that collection of things (1, 2, 3, etc., keep going) does it have
a member of it that counts the -entire- collection? No, it can't. Does
17 count that -collection-? No, because you can add 1 to 17 to get
another item that's in the collection. Consider any natural n...can it
count all the items in the collection? No because you can add 1 to get
another item that -is- in the collection, so your number n cannot be
the 'size'.
I think you are also saying this. There is no natural number that
counts all the natural numbers.
But now, it might be useful (you might disagree) to have a thing, a
concept that somehow captures -something- about that entire collection
of natural numbers, and that concept has many similarities with
particular natural numbers when they are used for sizes of finite
sets. That's what all this infinity talk is about, allowing people to
talk coherently about size when applied to something other than finite
sets. It may sound weird, and the concept of infinity may not act
exactly like a natural number, in fact very counter to many of the
usual properties of natural numbers, but it still works.
Don't try to force the concept of infinity to be just like a natural
number and you might get past your distaste for it. Think of negative
numbers... you can't hold negative 3 apples in your hand like you can
positive 3 apples in your hand, and -1*-1 = 1 (totally weird, right?)
but you get used to manipulating negatives, and it all seems to work
out.
Mitch
Please refrain from elucidating your convictions but show the point
where you think that the logic of my proof fails.
Regards, WM
Mitch Harris schrieb:
Negative numbers are a sound enhancement of the concept of numbers (i.
e. discrete quantities) which starts from the naturally given natural
numbers which are essentially this numbers which perform the oneness
of the ordinal and cardinal numbers.
Actual infinity, an infinite quantity, the cardinality of an infinite
set is no sound enhancement of the concept of numbers because infinity
is no quantity and is not able to carry properties of quantities.
Actual infinity is not sound and not consistent and math lose it's
ability of prediction with the use of the concept of actual infinity.
You have given a correct proof of the wrong thing.
You need to show that the *union* of all initial seqments
of the form {1, 2, 3, ..., n} (where n is a natural number)
has as a cardinality something that is not larger
than every natural number.
You show that all initial segments of the form
{1, 2, 3, ..., n} (where n is a natural number)
have as a cardinality something that is not larger
than every natural number.
(This theorem is correct and your proof is correct,)
The point at which the logic of your proof fails is when
you try to take a theorem that holds for every set in the
union and say that it holds for the union.
- William Hughes
Your Theorem is correct, your proof
It fails exactly where people have told it fails for about, at least,
the last three years.
It is correct that any finite sequence of natural numbers has finite
cardinality. But you've shown no rule of logic by which that entails
that the cardinality of an infinite sequence of natural numbers is a
natural number. You may posit an axiom that there are no infinite
sets, thus no infinite sequences. No one disputes that with such an
axiom (while dropping the axiom of infinity), there are no infinite
cardinalities and that there is no sequence that does not have a
finite cardinality. Or, you can posit an axiom schema that what holds
for all finite set holds for all infinite sets, but that is self-
inconsistent, since the property of being finite is not one held by
any infinite set (with Tarski definition of 'finite' and 'infinite').
So, the best you could do is to posit an axiom: If all finite
sequences have finite cardinality then all infinite sequences have
finite cardinality. But that also is inconsistent with other set
theory axioms.
This has been explained to you over and over and over by many people
and in many variations. Yet you remained so fixated that you refuse to
understand the most simple things.
MoeBlee
Except his clowning is infinitely closer to truth than yours ever gets.
You claim that what is true for each member of the "quantity of
naturals" must be true of "the quantity of naturals", which is nor more
true than that a quantity of empty sets must be an empty set.
Your "theorem" speaks only of finite intitial segments of N, so until
you prove that N is one of its own initial segments, you have failed to
prove anything about N itself.
Do you claim that N I one of its own initial segments?
If so, you should be able to name the largest member of N, or at least
prove that there is one.
But the successor rule for naturals makes such a proof impossible, so
that WM's arguments are refuted by the very nature of naturals.
> Negative numbers are a sound enhancement of the concept of numbers (i.
> e. discrete quantities) which starts from the naturally given natural
> numbers which are essentially this numbers which perform the oneness
> of the ordinal and cardinal numbers.
Does one have to stand on one's head, as Storz does, to "perform the
Correction: If there should be an actually infinite set, then it is
forced to be of a form other than {1,2,3,...,n}, because all the
sets of this form are finite initial segments, and thus an actually
infinite set is not subject to your theorem.
> But that would be non-natural numbers, as my theorem covers all natural
> numbers.
> Can you really imagine a reason why this theorem should not hold?
Obviously it holds for all finite initial sets of the form
{1,2,3,...,n}.
Can you really imagine a reason why your theorem should
hold for sets other than that form, such as the set {1,2,3,...}
which has no last element n and is not an initial finite segment?
> > Don't try to force the concept of infinity to be just like a natural
> > number and you might get past your distaste for it. Think of negative
> > numbers... you can't hold negative 3 apples in your hand like you can
> > positive 3 apples in your hand, and -1*-1 = 1 (totally weird, right?)
> > but you get used to manipulating negatives, and it all seems to work
> > out.
>
> Negative numbers are a sound enhancement of the concept of numbers (i.
> e. discrete quantities) which starts from the naturally given natural
> numbers which are essentially this numbers which perform the oneness
> of the ordinal and cardinal numbers.
Yes, negative numbers are a sound, coherent enhancement or extension
of the natural numbers.
Can you produce an -actual- negative number?
> Actual infinity, an infinite quantity, the cardinality of an infinite
> set is no sound enhancement of the concept of numbers because infinity
> is no quantity and is not able to carry properties of quantities.
Don't worry about this actual or potential stuff. It's a red herring.
I think your definition of 'quantity' is restricted to natural numbers
and so by definition -cannot- apply coherently to whatever infinity
might be because it is just not allowed to be applied at all.
So now my advice is to not not bother with 'quantity' at all. And just
worry about one-to-one correspondences.
When you do that, you'll find that it is coherent to say that a set
that can be placed in 1-1 correspondence with the first n natural
numbers has a property involving n and is identical to what you call
quantity.
And then you can also have a 1-1 correspondence between some sets and
the -entire- collection of natural numbers. That correspondence
(explained elsewhere in this thread) is sound, coherent, kosher, all
sorts of other adjectives connoting 'OK'.
And so here is the weird thing...many people call that particular kind
of correspondence aleph_0 or infinity. And despite its weirdness, it
has many properties in common (surely not all) with those things that
you call quantity.
> Actual infinity is not sound and not consistent and math lose it's
> ability of prediction with the use of the concept of actual infinity.
Math loses its ability of prediction? Really? How? Any examples?
Mitch
What was to be be proven:
The sequence of natural numbers cannot be larger than a natural number.
What was proven:
Every natural number fails to be as large as the sequence of natural numbers.
How amusing!
--
hz
In what way are the floating-point numbers in which I am doing this *not*
discrete quantities? I thought you had read my original post!
So I ask again. What about your definition of ">" for discrete quantities?
> > > > But that is easy. For each n in N, A* > n+1 (as n+1 is also in N),
> > > > so it satisfies the condition.
> > >
> > > Hahahah.
> >
> > Yeah, so whats is wrong with it?
>
> And what is with: For each n in N, A* > 1+n
Nothing, because that is also true. But what is the relevance?
> > > > No. It has to be at least one unity larger than *each* natural
> > > > number.
> > >
> > > Okay. *Each* number.
> >
> > Why each *number* and not natural number? You state *explicitly* has to
> > show A* > n forall n in N. What that statement by you wrong?
>
> Okay. *Each* *natural* number.
Now we are back were we where, in what way is A* not at least one unity
larger than each natural number?
> > > > Actually it is infinitely much larger than *each* natural number.
> > >
> > > There is no quantity "infinity". And surely not actually.
> >
> > Do I claim that? If so, where?
>
> hahahah.
Yeah. If you do not have an answer you weasel out.
> > > Let's say:
> > > Potentially it is infinitely larger than each natural number. The
> > > question is only: What is that "it"? There is nothing which could be
> > > larger than any natural number, since the natural numbers increases
> > > infinitely. That means: without end ... unendingly ... in
> > > eternally ... for ever ... beyond all boundaries ...
> > > infinitely ... ... ... ....
> >
> > Right. But why is it not possible that something is still larger, except
> > that it hurts your feelings?
>
> Hahahahhaha
See my remark above.
> > > > > (1) If the cardinality (or quantity) of the natural numbers is at
> > > > > least one unity larger than any natural number, there has to be at
> > > > > least one element more in the manifold of the natural numbers as there
> > > > > are natural numbers.
> > > >
> > > > Unfounded conclusion. Why has there to be at least one element more?
> > >
> > > By definiton of "larger than".
> >
> > Give a proof that there has to be at least one element more. *That* was
> > the unfounded conclusion.
>
> Are you part of a dutch clown company? Very good. Very funny.
See my remark aboven.
That need not be shown because I do not consider the union at all. I
consider only every natural number. The only thing of interest is: Is
there a natural number in N that requires or causes or even allows N
to be actually infinite. This is disproven.
Your approach comes from the other side. You assume that N is larger
than every initial segment. But, as my proof shows, that approach is
wrong from the outset, because you cannot justify it by showing at
least one natural number that is not covered by my proof.
>
> You show that all initial segments of the form
> {1, 2, 3, ..., n} (where n is a natural number)
> have as a cardinality something that is not larger
> than every natural number.
>
> (This theorem is correct and your proof is correct,)
>
> The point at which the logic of your proof fails is when
> you try to take a theorem that holds for every set in the
> union and say that it holds for the union.
So you think that the union is more than every initial segment. Either
your logic is invalid or there is a natural number outside of every
initial segment.
Regards, WM
> That need not be shown because I do not consider the union at all. I
> consider only every natural number. The only thing of interest is: Is
> there a natural number in N that requires or causes or even allows N
> to be actually infinite. This is disproven.
There is no single natural number in N that makes
N infinite. This is correct and totally beside the point. There is
no single natural number that makes N infinite, but this does not
mean that N is not infinite. If a union of elements has property
P, this does not mean there is a single element of the union
that means that the union has property P (e.g. P is "has no
largest element").
- William Hughes
It seems we have someone here who does not believe in teamwork...
My theorem holds for every n, for every finite initial segments and
for every union
U[k=<n] {1, 2, 3, ..., k}.
Unless there is something in N that does not belong to such a union,
my proof holds for N.
>
> Do you claim that N I one of its own initial segments?
Of course. That is the most basic property of nartural numbers.
> If so, you should be able to name the largest member of N, or at least
> prove that there is one.
I cannot name it - among other reasons, because it is not fixed
But the proof has been given:
Consider all natural numbers by letting n run through 1, 2, 3, ...,
n, ....
Obviously this does not leave out any natural number.
And obviously you will never get in trouble with infinity, if you only
consider all segments that are not larger than {1, 2, 3, ..., n}.
But if this does not leave out any natural number, then it holds for
all of them, doesn't it?
>
> But the successor rule for naturals makes such a proof impossible, so
> that WM's arguments are refuted by the very nature of naturals.
But if my proof does not leave out any initial segment of natural
numbers, then it holds for all of them, doesn't it?
The contradictory requirements posed by you and by me do not show that
one of them were false but they show that it is nonsense to attribute
a cardinal number to infinity.
Otherwise you must claim that a proof that does not leave out any
finite initial segment of natural numbers, does not hold for all
natural numbers. And that is obviously nonsense, if N is nothing but
the assembly of all its finite initial segments.
Regards, WM
When you talk about the totality of finite initial segments, you bring
into consideration its union, whether you care to notice it or not.
> I
> consider only every natural number.
Then you must not be considering finite intial segments of naturals,
which are not themselves naturals, except in the von Neumann model.
The only thing of interest is: Is
> there a natural number in N that requires or causes or even allows N
> to be actually infinite. This is disproven.
While no one element of an infinite set makes the difference between it
and finite sets, the totality of such elements does.
>
> Your approach comes from the other side. You assume that N is larger
> than every initial segment.
If you assume otherwise, then can you display that hypothetical initial
segment that N is NOT larger than?
Only when you have done that will anyone accept your silly thesis.
> But, as my proof shows, that approach is
> wrong from the outset, because you cannot justify it by showing at
> least one natural number that is not covered by my proof.
Your "proof" proves nothing except your own incompetence.
> >
> > You show that all initial segments of the form
> > {1, 2, 3, ..., n} (where n is a natural number)
> > have as a cardinality something that is not larger
> > than every natural number.
> >
> > (This theorem is correct and your proof is correct,)
> >
> > The point at which the logic of your proof fails is when
> > you try to take a theorem that holds for every set in the
> > union and say that it holds for the union.
>
> So you think that the union is more than every initial segment.
Not quite. What we DO think is that every ->finite<- initial segment is
a proper subset of the union of all of those initial segments.
And we will keep thinking that until someone can show a ->finite<-
initial segment as large as N.
Can you show us such a finite initial segment, WM?
> Either
> your logic is invalid or there is a natural number outside of every
> initial segment.
False dichotomy, as logically there is nothing prohibiting a non-finite
initial segment containing all naturals.
It is trivial that for each finite initial segment of naturals(FISONs),
there is a natural outside it, but that does not imply that there is a
natural outside the union of all those FISONs, which is an ISON but not
a FISON.
But all sets consisting of natural numbers only are of this form
{1,2,3,...,n}.
You seem to claim that N is not covered by a proof that is correct
forall n.
A n : U[k =< n] {1,2,3,...,k} is finite.
I am happy with the set that is subject to this proof.
>
> > But that would be non-natural numbers, as my theorem covers all natural
> > numbers.
> > Can you really imagine a reason why this theorem should not hold?
>
> Obviously it holds for all finite initial sets of the form
> {1,2,3,...,n}.
>
> Can you really imagine a reason why your theorem should
> hold for sets other than that form, such as the set {1,2,3,...}
> which has no last element n and is not an initial finite segment?
I cannot imagine what you understand by (a set that has) "no last
element". This "no last element" obviously is not a natural number.
Have you in omega in mind? Of course, my proof holds only for natural
numbers - indeed for all of them.
Consider all natural numbers by letting n run through 1, 2, 3, ...,
n, ....
Obviously this does not leave out any natural number.
And obviously you will never get in trouble with infinity, if you
only
consider all segments that are not larger than {1, 2, 3, ..., n}.
But if this does not leave out any natural number, then it holds for
all of them, doesn't it?
Otherwise you must claim that a proof that does not leave out any
But if my proof does not leave out any initial segment of natural
numbers, then it holds for all of them, doesn't it?
If you deny that, then you must claim that a proof that does not leave
My proof dhows that every natural number and all smaller natural
numbers are within a finite set.
> If a union of elements has property
> P, this does not mean there is a single element of the union
> that means that the union has property P (e.g. P is "has no
> largest element").
Obviously you imagine some union N that is different from the assembly
of all natural numbers and in particular is not covered by the
assembly of all finite initial segments {1, 2, 3, ..., n}. The
assembly of all finite initial segments {1, 2, 3, ..., n} of natural
numbers is not actually infinite. To see this you cannnot assume an
actual infinity assembly of such segments, because for every segments
you csan prove that there are only n-1 segments that are smaller. So
you can do the proof by letting n start from 1 and run through all
natural numbers. At no n you have to consider infinitely many
segments, because at no n you have infinitely many such segments. This
proof has the advantage that is covers all (infinitely many, if
available) natural numbers but need not and cannot run into the
problem of starting with the assumption of an infinitude.
A n : {1, 2, 3, ..., n} is finite
and
A n : U[k =< n] {1, 2, 3, ..., k} is finite
If you feel that
for all n the union U[k =< n] {1, 2, 3, ..., k}
is different from N, then you have only two possible logical excuses
for lack of comprehension:
Either you assume that N is not covered by the union of all finite
initial segments, or you do not accept that a proof covering all
finite initial segments of natural numbers covers all finite initial
segments of natural numbers. Well the latter is not really an excuse.
Regards, WM
>
> - William Hughes
Not quite. My sentence above should by understood as: That need not be
shown because I do not consider the union at all. I consider only
every natural number and all its predecessors. Of course this covers
the complete assembly of all natural numbers. But I would like to
avoid the magic action of set theoretic unions. I simply mean every
and all natural numbers.
Regards, WM
> But all sets consisting of natural numbers only are of this form
> {1,2,3,...,n}.
No, they're not.
{1 3} is a set of natural numbers not of that form.
{1 3 100} is a set of natural numbers not of that form.
w (omega) is a set of natural numbers not of that form.
{n | n is even} is a set of natural numbers not of that form.
{3 5} u {n| n is even} is a set of natural numbers not of that form.
{p | p is prime} is a set of natural numbers not of that form.
{n | n is the Godel number of a sentence of PA true in the standard
model for the language of PA} is a set of natural numbers not of that
form.
Did you fall on your head this morning?
> You seem to claim that N is not covered by a proof that is correct
> forall n.
>
> A n : U[k =< n] {1,2,3,...,k} is finite.
Yes, for each n in w, we have U[k=1 to n] {1 2 ... k} is finite.
For each n in w, we have that U[k=1 to n] {1 2 ... k} is a finite
union of finite sets. And a finite union of finite sets is finite.
So what? It doesn't prove that the set of natural numbers is finite.
MoeBlee