Although wikipedia thinks that principle 1 is undisputed
and lists some doubts for principle 2. We can use the
same list of doubts for principle 1 to challenge it:
They all challenge the F in the "conception of properties
used to define indiscernibility":
- pure vesus impure properties
- qualitative versus non-qualitative properties
- intrinsic versus extrinsic properties
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles#Indiscernibility_and_conceptions_of_properties
***********************************************************
You could add "transcending values versus non-transcending
values", where for Dan-O-Matik f(x) is transcending when
x is not element of a domain A. He clearly lives not in the
***********************************************************
world of first order logic (FOL), where any formula A(x) is
Ok for principle 1, its part of (FOL=), i.e. first order logic with
equality. He lives in a world different from first order logic
with equality, where certain formulas A(x) are meaning less,
even when they are wellformed, because they invoke transcend
values in some function application. This is in stark contrast to
first order logic with equality (FOL=) where a wellformed
formula has a truth value from {true,false} in a model.
There is no third truth value {true,false,meaningless}.
But did DC Proof succeed in providing a calculus for such a
logic that sees formulas A(x) from a 3-valued viewpoint? He
never defined some model theory for his DC Proof.
What would be a model theory that can do that?