modernism or post-modernism
Stephen Montgomery-Smith
meta-narrative is that there is no meta-narrative. Obviously this
raised a contradiction, but then I realized that this was a modernists
disproof of post-modernism, and as such was invalid.
Then I started to think about why I accept modernism as so infallible.
The only answer I could come up with was "it just feels right!"
What do you think?
Stephen
Gerry Myerson
Stephen Montgomery-Smith <ste...@math.missouri.edu> wrote:
I recently heard some bank in Switzerland referred to as
the central bank for central banks. It led me to wonder whether
there is a central bank for non-central banks, and, if so,
whether such a bank would be a member.
--
Gerry Myerson (ge...@maths.mq.edi.ai) (i -> u for email)
Gib Bogle
I think these terms have virtually zero content.
porky_...@my-deja.com
wrote
>
> I recently heard some bank in Switzerland referred to as
> the central bank for central banks. It led me to wonder whether
> there is a central bank for non-central banks, and, if so,
> whether such a bank would be a member.
>
A member of what?
Stephen Montgomery-Smith
Do banks satisfy the axiom of foundation?
ju...@diegidio.name
wrote:
> A friend recently explained to me that post-modernism is where one's
> meta-narrative is that there is no meta-narrative.
Post-modernism is where one's meta-narrative is that there is nothing
but meta-narrative.
And that's the bright side.
-LV
Michael Press
Stephen Montgomery-Smith <ste...@math.missouri.edu> wrote:
Everybody has a hidden message except post-modernists.
Any post-modernist found to have a hidden message in
his published work voluntarily retires to a re-education camp.
--
Michael Press
Angus Rodgers
There will be a charge for answering that question.
--
Angus Rodgers
(twirlip@ eats spam; reply to angusrod@)
Contains mild peril
Timothy Murphy
>>Do banks satisfy the axiom of foundation?
>
> There will be a charge for answering that question.
Was it Dieudonne or Godement who gave the set of honest bankers
as an example of the empty set, in a textbook?
Angus Rodgers
Godement's /Algebra/, published in Paris in 1968 (that's the English
translation of the 1963 French original), has some exercises referring
to Algeria and suchlike matters. I haven't found the exact example
you mention, but there is Remark 6 in page 32: ``in everyday life,
the assertion "honest bankers exist" is not a very substantial piece
of information since, by itself, it does not enable one to /exhibit/
an honest banker.''
Exercise 13 of Chapter 0 (marked as "hard") reads:
On the planet Mars there are (at a first approximation) two sorts
of political opinions: right and left. On the other hand, the
Martian students are divided into two associations: the Planetary
Union of Martian Students (PUMS) and the Planetary Federation of
Martian Students (PFMS). Knowing that the left-wing students
belong to the PUMS, show that the PFMS is non-political.
amzoti
Maybe these help (I'm not sure)?
1. http://teleiaphilia.wordpress.com/2007/06/14/an-incredulity-toward-postmodernism/
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metanarrative (also see references)
3. https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/10250/1/Hutcheon1994Incredulity.pdf
4. http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/Museum/7101/picture/pomodef.html
5. http://epc.buffalo.edu/authors/perloff/postmod.html
6. http://www.rapidresponsereport.com/briefingpapers/Postmodernism58.pdf
8. http://www.postmodernpreaching.net/metanarrative.htm
9. http://www.masstheology.com/2008/04/16/a-formal-defintion-of-postmodernism/
10. http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/04/postmodern_truth_soup.html
There are even books on the matter, for example:
Challenging Modernity: Dada Between Modern and Postmodern (Cultural
Studies) (Hardcover)
by Mark A. Pegrum (Author)
HTH ~A
4.
Angus Rodgers
Postmodernism is the cloud of ink squirted out by the Despair Squid.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Back_to_Reality_(Red_Dwarf_episode)>
<www.book-of-thoth.com/archives-printpdf-7431.html>
Tron
"Stephen Montgomery-Smith" <ste...@math.missouri.edu> skrev i melding
news:sIKdnfh40-uMSvbV...@centurytel.net...
>A friend recently explained to me that post-modernism is where one's
>meta-narrative is that there is no meta-narrative. Obviously this raised a
>contradiction,
To restrict this to the logical aspect, there is that phenomenon of
something applied to itself which can give rise to anything, som useful
things like motorized locomotion ("Yes, put the the engine _on_the
wagon...") to the Liar's Paradox. If the former may be called benign (or
neutral) and the latter malign, I have always wondered where and how the
eventual paradoxes reside and arise: in the very fact of reflexivity (if
that is indeed the relevant genus)? Does it in a special way allow for
malignity? Does the malignity come from "somewhere else"? Do the good and
the bad side of reflexivity, or self-reference, or self-application, have
the same roots? And what are they?
So... is this already investigated to the end in language, or in logic?
AFAIK, the _effects_ of inconsistent self-reference have made a splash
(Russell vs. Frege, and Gödel) even out to a wider public (Hofstadter), but
does one know the entire mechanism?
This problem pops up in a lot of places, though. Hume's criticism of
induction can be translated into the statement "No universal proposition is
true". Unfortunately, this is a universal proposition, and so threatens to
make Hume circular in a way he wouldn't have liked. The same kind of
circularity is pointed out when argueing against the global sceptical claim
"We don't know anything".
So... how do we formulate general propositions in a way such that the
proposition itself does not fall under the scope of itself?
T
Jesse F. Hughes
> This problem pops up in a lot of places, though. Hume's criticism of
> induction can be translated into the statement "No universal
> proposition is true".
No, it can't.
--
Jesse F. Hughes
"Doesn't pay to lie if you aren't good at it."
-- Captain Friday, /City of the Dead/
Adventures by Morse radio show
galathaea
> On Wed, 02 Jul 2008 14:29:19 -0500, Stephen Montgomery-Smith
>
> >A friend recently explained to me that post-modernism is where one's
> >meta-narrative is that there is no meta-narrative. Obviously this
> >raised a contradiction, but then I realized that this was a modernists
> >disproof of post-modernism, and as such was invalid.
>
> >Then I started to think about why I accept modernism as so infallible.
> >The only answer I could come up with was "it just feels right!"
>
> >What do you think?
>
> Postmodernism is the cloud of ink squirted out by the Despair Squid.
> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Back_to_Reality_(Red_Dwarf_episode)>
> <www.book-of-thoth.com/archives-printpdf-7431.html>
postmodernism had some very noble beginnings
it was intended to be a move away from philosophies
that accept and use language
and towards a philosophy that studies how language arises
this is always a descent into the abyss
but two of the people i admire most in science
rene thom
and ilya prigogine
contributed to this notion of postmodernism
and these were in turn influenced by more classical analyses
like those of bergson and pierce
so when i first went into the philosophy half of my dual degree
(language and foundations of science and knowledge)
the postmoderns were a natural start
the whole order-out-of-chaos and self organisation thing
is very important to this whole enterprise
of constructing symbolic domains of information transfer
so it is clear why these two would be drawn to the postmoderns
but
as with many fads that become "cool"
postmodernism became infected with those who
to be blunt
don't like to think very hard
there were a lot of pretty stupid statements made
by people trying to get themselves involved
tossing words they knew nothing about around
once you give a group of ideas a name
as if it were a movement
and it takes on some kind of popularity as a name
this kind of thing is almost expected to happen
(as even some "postmodernists" point out :) )
now after prigogine and thom
on the purely mathematical (symbolic) side
people like manfred eigen and stuart kauffman
(among many many others)
have built some great models to extend self-organisation
to early biogenesis and discrete information systems
(autocatalytic networks, boolean graphs, ...)
the goals of postmodernism are advancing outside postmodernism
these days
even on the philosophical side
instead of passing through the muddle of deconstructionism
which made many good points on meaning
mathematical philosophers and logicians have returned to husserl
and his influence in the lvov-warsaw school of logic
phenomenalism and constructivism have become
the new mathematical tools of meaning
and besides
when i was much younger i had a crush on lister
but when i turned mostly veggie
i could never forgive his infatuation with chicken vindaloo
that should be enough to discredit all that i just said
and if not
i'll turn it into a movement
maybe call it "neopostmodernism"
and hire some high-school dropouts to write the main texts
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar
Tron
"Jesse F. Hughes" <je...@phiwumbda.org> skrev i melding
news:877ibxy...@phiwumbda.org...
> "Tron" <tron...@frizurf.no> writes:
>
>> This problem pops up in a lot of places, though. Hume's criticism of
>> induction can be translated into the statement "No universal
>> proposition is true".
>
> No, it can't.
I did.
T
Jesse F. Hughes
Well, if that's the measure, then I suppose that Kant's Categorical
Imperative can be translated into the command "Eat more fish".
I thought you meant something a bit more than that.
--
Jesse F. Hughes
"Such behaviour is exclusively confined to functions invented by
mathematicians for the sake of causing trouble."
-Albert Eagle's _A Practical Treatise on Fourier's Theorem_
Tron
"Jesse F. Hughes" <je...@phiwumbda.org> skrev i melding
news:87tzf1w...@phiwumbda.org...
> "Tron" <tron...@frizurf.no> writes:
>
>> "Jesse F. Hughes" <je...@phiwumbda.org> skrev i melding
>> news:877ibxy...@phiwumbda.org...
>>> "Tron" <tron...@frizurf.no> writes:
>>>
>>>> This problem pops up in a lot of places, though. Hume's criticism of
>>>> induction can be translated into the statement "No universal
>>>> proposition is true".
>>>
>>> No, it can't.
>>
>> I did.
>
> Well, if that's the measure, then I suppose that Kant's Categorical
> Imperative can be translated into the command "Eat more fish".
>
> I thought you meant something a bit more than that.
I did.
In my first post, I used a bit of shorthand, seeing that history of
philosophy may not be all that on topic in sci.logic.
I did happen to write my phil. bachelor thesis on (aspects of) Hume's
epistemology, and in that context his
criticism can be rewritten into a maxim that denies the validity of that
maxim also. To quote myself:
"Videre kan en si at kritikken av induksjon i vid forstand problematiserer
affirmative universelle slutninger. Nå er imidlertid selve benektelsen av
induksjonsmuligheten en affirmativ universell slutning; dersom analysen av
Hume's analyse som sann er sann, skulle han ikke engang kunne være i stand
til å formulere denne kritikken. Uttrykt som en variant av
Løgner-paradokset: "Universelle affirmative påstander er uholdbare; denne
også."
T
Jesse F. Hughes
> I did happen to write my phil. bachelor thesis on (aspects of)
> Hume's epistemology, and in that context his criticism can be
> rewritten into a maxim that denies the validity of that maxim also.
I don't see how. The entire argument that Hume gives is about the
kind of reasoning employed, not the kind of "maxim" (?) inferred.
But, as you say, this is off-topic. In any case, evidently your
prof. bought it, so there you go.
--
Jesse F. Hughes
"/Monster Ballads/ is packed with pure hits from the artists who taught
us how to love." -- As seen on TV
Tron
> "Tron" <tron...@frizurf.no> writes:
>
>> I did happen to write my phil. bachelor thesis on (aspects of)
>> Hume's epistemology, and in that context his criticism can be
>> rewritten into a maxim that denies the validity of that maxim also.
>
> I don't see how.
Well, if that's the measure, then I suppose that Kant's Categorical
Imperative can be translated into the command "Eat more fish".
T
galathaea
> Galathaea wrote
>> T.H. Ray" wrote:
>>> Hume's skepticism applies to one's inability to generalize fromm
>>> the particular, not to deduce from the general.
>>> What this has to do with postmodernism, I would venture to say, is
>>> that postmodernists seem to expect meaning to emerge from linguistic
>>> usage--rather than to accept the independence of language and meaning.
>>> This strikes me as Lamarckian, at odds with how nature and language
>>> really work. Just as one (Hume avers) cannot predict tomorrow's
>>> sunrise on the basis of n sunrises in the past--any inductive basis
>>> for language or meaning has to fail. I agree with Popper's solution to
>>> the induction problem; i.e., a good guess (bold conjecture) that is
>>> falsifiable, is a better gauge of truth than a conclusion made inductively.
>> strange that you link this with lamarckianism
>> since neolamarckian mechanism are all the rage in
>> in modern biology
> That's too bad. Larmarckism in the form of Lysenkoism
> almost sank Soviet science. I admit innocence of
> biology; however, what the "neo" means in this context
> would have to significantly depart from Lamarck's
> hypothesis that repeated external actions in one
> generation are instinctualized in the next. This, of
> course, corresponds to the falsified Marxist-Leninist
> economic philosophy, but has no scientific basis or value.
instinctualisation has nothing to with it
lysenko mostly worked with plants
for instance
what is in question is what became known as
the central dogma of neodarwinian theory:
information transfer occurs only in the direction of germ line to somatic line
(somatic line to germ line information transfer is not possible)
this is what lamarck is ridiculed for believing
from gould to kitcher to many intro philosophy of science classes
this has turned out to be quite wrong
both with the classical interpretation of
germ line = heritable traits
and with the neodarwinian
germ line = DNA
the former turns out wrong in many ways
upon which the field of epigenetics is founded
and there are many examples that also violate the latter
(though the fact that not all heritable information is stored in DNA
already requires a considerable rework of the neodarwinian theory)
what is becoming a classic example
points out the eggs have much of their future differentiation
stored not in their chromosomes but in the protein arrangement in their cell membranes
this is much more true in plant oocytes with their rigid cell walls
but animal eggs demonstrate this as well
and there are several known physiological mechanisms that can influence this arrangement
so the information of child development and somatic characteristics
may thus be influenced by activities of the adult and somatic interaction with environment
a much more in depth introduction to the many revolutionary experiments
that have been changing biology's fundamentalism about neodarwinian theory
can be found in a pair of books by jablonka and lamb
"epigenetic inheritance and evolution: the lamarckian dimension"
and
"evolution in four dimensions"
they are very research-bound and have huge bibliographies and citation lists
but in the latter book go well into the full theory of symbolic evolution
and the natural mathematical abstraction of the lamarckian mechanisms
lysenkoism was a horrid outreach of the system pushing its tendrils of power into science
and the consequent infiltration of blind fundamentalism into research and theory
that was the error
not the particular choice of fundamentalism
the same would be a problem (and has been) if neodarwinian dogma were chosen
the greater the extent of the censor
the more crippling the slow of science
>> (epigenetics
>> methylation patterns
>> reverse transcriptase
>> and many other mechanisms for somatic changes
>> to affect the germ line)
>>
>> which have already been linked intimately
>> with the whole notion of self-organisation
>>
> I looked up your references. I see no significant
> theoretical departure from conventional physical
> biology. I think you may be identifying chemical self-
> assembly with system self-organization? There's nothing
> wrong with that, but I would like to pursue this with
> you in a common context. We may not really be talking
> about different things, but rather different scales:
>
> See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organization
>
> I edited section 3.2, adding the reference to Prigogine
> (and Glansdorff) of whom you spoke earlier.
a symbol is a transfer of information
this is the foundation of information theory
and the whole point of why it speaks of channels
digraphs with their inputs and outputs
diedges always have both a domain and codomain
outputs of one agent
affect the behavior of the agent it inputs
the study of the ways input can tend (to determine) future state
is control theory
coming from the early cyberneticists
i know you know all this tom
in some form or another
(you've demonstrated similar knowledge many times in the past)
i'm just trying to establish a common framework
now
for any _given_ information system
the symbolic system of transfer is axiomatised in the model
so there is a sense in which meaning is independent of language _in_a_model_
but
we are not models
our view is not that of models
we are model-generators
we use models to fulfill our drives
and no model is given us a priori
that is where all kantian foundations fail
categories are never given us
all of the classical ones have fallen to the progress of knowledge
we do not live in a euclidean geometry as kant thought
time is not universal as kant had writ
the logic of the universe is not boolean
as kant had claimed
these all turned out slightly wrong
these are the follies of the a priori
we do get more confident of prediction as we learn
because of a fundamental decision capability
we can choose to use the most accurate models
"meaning as referrent" is only itself meaningful
if the referrent is a symbol used in decision making
modern mathematical theories of computational semantics make this explicit
that the meaning of meaning really relies upon the
"information manipulation actually involved in decision making"
models that apply to the historical evolution of information exchange in the universe
symbols and meaning arise together
and from first response to every subsequent
the relationship follows the dynamics of the system
evolving
both meaning and symbol can change
model bisimulation can never prove certainty
that is the point of ateleology
(purposelessness)
(which many darwinists profess an affinity for
despite many also being quite kantian)
that because there is no categorical certainty possible
purpose cannot meaningfully be defined in future goals
but in local attitudes
there is meaning in discussing
or assigning symbols
these future goals
it's just that the meaning is derived from a logic of prediction and knowledge
and is no longer a priori or unchanging
(george dance once suggested a bimodal epistemic-doxastic logic
but the brussels school has favored their own dynamic epistemic logic
which has many nice features here in paradox recovery)
everything we can discuss
everything that has ever been or ever will be symbolised
is only a posteriori meaningful in the context of the interpretations used (in decisions)
the postmodernists got a lot right here
but except for thom and prigogine and only a handful of others
there weren't many really qualified to build the right mathematical theory
and so the focus was more on the opaque deconstruction of information transfers
in the context of their environmental and cultural ephemera
and it became a game of who could spot trivia
but once freed of the cool trend names and "movement"
the math tended pretty hard
to the ateleological social constructivism inherent in evolutionary models
>> observation does not agree with your statements here
>>
> It most certainly does. Even though the theory is
> incomplete, self-organized models--e.g., punctuated
> equilibrium in evolutionary biology (Gould-Eldredge)
> supported by the mathematics of self organized criticality
> (Bak)--are abundant in nature, and may even extend all
> the way to a natural basis for string theory, the meaning
> for which that theory has long sought. The models
> incorporating chaos with feedback, however, will
> necessarily invoke nonlocal communication; scale
> independence will overwhelm time dependence.
i agree that this goes all the way down
the simplest information transfers are particle interactions
if our ontology is going to be consistent
we cannot stop the study once it reaches the limits of human written history
as there certainly was meaning in the exchange long before it was recorded
and we cannot start at the birth of humans
who merely perfected existing techniques
and once we realise that such external motions
and physical (acoustical and pressure) communication
date back to the beginnings of the eumetazoans
the model definitions must be general enough to apply even to this early stage
but of course even the first bacters
even the early archaea
had a variety of chemical interactions
by which to control their societies
at such a point in model-building
it should be apparent that their really isn't a good distinction
between environment and other agents
that information transfer is something occurring even billions of year before life
the control required for self-organisation
has a semantics and interpretable language
like all interaction
and biogenesis is just another instance of coordination of linguistic purpose
autocatalysis
hypercycles
all examples of the a posteriori dynamics of what can be seen as linguistic exchange
and i agree this leads us all the way back to the initial cascade
but i am also quite confident
that at this level the central dogma begins looking pretty absurd
because there is no longer any clear distinction between germ line and somatic line
the neolamarckian exchange mechanisms are the only ones definable
and only later is there any indication of collapse to control centers
>> (you might be interested in some of my past posts
>> on second-order logic
>> and purposeless [non-kantian] dynamics
>> but then again
>> your strong kantian leanings would probably revulse)
>>
> I don't really have any strong philosophical leanings.
> Like Popper, I take from Kant what is good for objective
> knowledge and I have no problem discarding the rest. I
> trust what I can calculate.
>
> I grok what you mean about dynamic systems. I prefer
> words like "acausal" and "random," for the reason that
> "purposeless" implies a prior assumption of purpose.
>
> Let's talk. Post links to your previous articles.
i wrote the logical aspects up at one point to get things clearer for me
but the only things i found with a search were
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/msg/3700f891ea56511e
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.politics/msg/c3e11d6f417d3a3b
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/msg/d056f73575e36adf
but at some point
i know i gave a more involved development of the logical points
to expose myself to better scrutiny
at least a couple of pages worth
moving on without that
though
i can give a basic outline of the formalism
the point is that i think that the evolution of life is nonfirstorderizable
and that this is crucial to an ateleologic viewing of evolution
george boolos has a classical paper called
"to be is to be a value of a variable
(or to be some values of some variables)"
in it
he points to some classic sentences that cannot be expressed in first-order logic
and in messing with the geach-kaplan sentence he gives:
"some computers communicate only with one another"
this had set me off at the time
because i had been working with the latter book of jablonka and lamb
and trying to give it a firmer formalised setting
and the process of localising definitions to structural information patterns
(typifying the agents involved)
had led me to quantifications over information collections
with just these kinds of interactions between sorts
individuals and environments
that natural dynamics could involve selections which do not rely upon
a priori definitions of what was being selected
that no prior purpose was needed in describing evolution
helped a long way for me to move away from darwin
darwin
both in his works
and from those that have interpreted him
repeatedly assumes some "given" translation of germ line to somatic expression
as if the language were somehow fixed
of course
this is not explicitly stated in the primary development of darwinism
and might not even be necessary
but it was telling that such slips were common in the texts
and i realised it was a crucial assumption
in the darwinian rebukes of lamarckianism
if the meaning of the germ line encoding could change with state
it meant that meaning was not a consequence of the (unchanging) dynamical laws
but was sensitive to the particulars of state at any instance
somatic expression then could be seen
at appropriate scales
to be influenced directly and heritably by environment
i'm in mexico right now so i won't have access to my notebooks for another week
but i remember an equation group i came up with to describe evolution through second-order logic
and a demonstration/derivation to show the lamarckian interpretation in time-varying germ translation
i'll try to post those in a week when i get back
or hopefully do some more searches and find my original post on the matter
Michael Press
galathaea <gala...@veawb.coop> wrote:
[...]
That is one hellacious run-on sentence.
--
Michael Press
knucmo
> T.H. Ray wrote:
> > Galathaea wrote
> >> T.H. Ray" wrote:
> >>> Hume's skepticism applies to one's inability to generalize fromm
>
> >>> the particular, not to deduce from the general.
>
>
>
>
>
> >>> What this has to do with postmodernism, I would venture to say, is
> >>> that postmodernists seem to expect meaning to emerge from linguistic
> >>> usage--rather than to accept the independence of language and meaning.
> >>> This strikes me as Lamarckian, at odds with how nature and language
> >>> really work. Just as one (Hume avers) cannot predict tomorrow's
> >>> sunrise on the basis of n sunrises in the past--any inductive basis
> >>> for language or meaning has to fail. I agree with Popper's solution to
> >>> the induction problem; i.e., a good guess (bold conjecture) that is
> >>> falsifiable, is a better gauge of truth than a conclusion made inductively.
> >> strange that you link this with lamarckianism
Neither modernism or postmodernism can offer the answer for me.
One of the presumptions is that we use language to organise and
construct reality. Language plays an active role in forming our
perceptions of reality. It is certainly evident too, that there are
many different types of languages, and that these different languages
may have different lexicons and structures. And hence, people may
conceptualise the world in completely different ways. One way of
showing this is to compare two languages, find a difference, and show
that they give us a difference in thought. But this simply presumes
what needs to be shown by the postmodernist - that linguistic
difference adds up to cognitive difference. And if the mind is, as
cognitive scientists believe it to be, modular, then something which
shows that an aspect of language influences a corresponding aspect of
cognition, would not tell us whether they influence other parts of
cognition.
Wittgenstein says a similar thing - the structure of the world that is
created by the structure of language. That means that the nature of
language itself is created by the structure of language. So any
theories, including Wittgenstein's, about language, is merely the
result of his own arbitrary, linguistic cut-up, which is just as good
as any other linguistic conceptualisation.
ju...@diegidio.name
> Wittgenstein says a similar thing -
> the structure of the world that is
> created by the structure of language.
No way.
-LV
Puppet_Sock
I wonder how postmoderninsts manage to pay their
laundry bills, what with laughing up their sleeves
so much. What a grotesque parody of rational thought
they present. It is word-saladism gone mad.
What need have you of "infallible" anyway? Is this
the test of the scheme you will adopt? If it's not
infallible, it's out? So, when you were learning to
ride your bike, you fell off once, and declared that
learning to ride a bike was not a social construct
and so was invalid.
Postmodernism gets around this by denying the difference
between correct and incorrect. There is no "fall" for
anything in postmodernism to be fallible over. Except
they are all pretty sure the govt should be taking money
off those rich bastards and giving it to them.
Socks
knucmo
> meta-narrative is that there is no meta-narrative. Obviously this
> raised a contradiction, but then I realized that this was a modernists
> disproof of post-modernism, and as such was invalid.
Hang on - that's a blatant ad hom. objection. It doesn't matter who
raises the objection that postmodernism itself is a 'meta-narrative',
nor is it clear that modernism is invalid.
I think you are assuming what you are trying to prove, and you need to
sort out that contradiction problem before you can call modernism
invalid, considering when 'postmodernism' has its own logical issues.