Ultimate Theory / Theory of Everything

[Ross A. Finlayson]

Ultimate Theory / Theory of Everything

The other day Burse pointed to an article of
Feferman on the operational, Feferman refers
to Bishop on the constructive as about the
necessarily intensional and extensional, and
also to descriptive set theory as the pulling
together of arithmetic, topology, algebra,
then set theory and otherwise all the usual
fields (with geometry as itself being descriptive
or described by usual structures of algebra
per Hardy about Euclid).

Goedel arrives via the meta to both completeness
results then incompleteness results as so follow
a conclusion of direct induction of regular set
theory as inspired foundationally. Feferman notes
Goedel's mark of relevance of the first or naive
principles as the "logical" (the clear) extension
beyond the regular or ordinary.

Then, with various aspects of the naive as the new
again, universal quantification yields a universe
and infinity is extra-ordinary, with all the re-
realization of the impact and import of the modern
platform, and, its necessary compliance with the
deductively established and the qualia of there
being a theory.

The extensions of the modern, adoptable for the
modern's completion of finite bounded combinatorics
(or "set theory"), goes to both contingent models
(the large cardinals) or rephrasing an inductive
course as from a different primitive (parts instead
of sets as of category theory, Homotopy Type Theory,
and univalency instead of emptiness as primitive),
among other initiatives that are either framed in
the modern set theory or fragments of alternative
theories.

Then, one might look to aspects of theory (as about
the meta of the theory, the theory-theoretical), to
determine per axiomatics what systems of relatively
independent axioms of expansion and restriction of
comprehension offer the most general theory with the
goals of constancy, consistency, completeness, and
concreteness. All these otherwise independent theories
are yet one course of theories, interchangeably considered
in the abstract above per the constructivists, but
not whole, that's there's one theory or A Theory. Per
axiomatics, the theory would be most expansive and
least restrictive.

Besides axiomatics, there are representations. Usually
definitions of objects so follow the axiomatics, then
for all that objects are (and must be). The arbitrary
theory might be strongly related or modeled by objects
of any sort, here of the abstract and of any of the
abstract. (These are logical objects, with the logics
of usual matters of correctness in inference as general.)


So, this theory can't have any false axioms, and can't
have any false objects. Starting from none, those are
the axioms and that's the objects. This theory must have
all true axioms, and all true objects. Starting from
none, thus are all and they're the objects.

This is a usual philosophical approach to theoretical
reasoning, then on re-realization, informedly and
formally, then, the beginning of what is relevant
in the interpretation of the canon and the dogmatic
as constant, consistent, complete, then concrete.

[Julio Di Egidio]

On Sunday, January 8, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC+1, Ross A. Finlayson wrote:
> Ultimate Theory / Theory of Everything

<snip>

> This is a usual philosophical approach to theoretical
> reasoning, then on re-realization, informedly and
> formally, then, the beginning of what is relevant
> in the interpretation of the canon and the dogmatic
> as constant, consistent, complete, then concrete.

The not so usual as in the serious philosophical approach is to recognise that
there is no such thing as the ultimate theory. Wittgenstein ends up in silence,
so does Heidegger, but even in less absolute terms the point is that every
discipline, including the discipline of all disciplines, defines the world,
its world, *from within* its own boundaries. Philosophy is the discipline of
boundaries from within the boundaries: not a discipline of totalities, for
which the philosopher would rather advocate some sane spiritualism, that is, to
put it simply, the non-logical, the irrational, the mystic... Another way to
put it is that the ultimate knowledge is not a theory, the ultimate truth is
exactly the truth that cannot be told. Any "TOE", as such, is a derangement.

Julio

[Ross A. Finlayson]

The TOE exists even if Wittgenstein and Heidegger leave
it not in their grasp. This is besides the completeness
of the regular, with Frege and Wittgenstein and ZF, or
with Russell and Whitehead or Peano. The extra-ordinary
then, of Archimedes, Spinoza, Scotus, Kant and Hegel,
Quine and Popper, Russell about the extra-ordinary
of objects and conclusions, are all within our one
sphere of reasoning and reckoning.

The point here is that the TOE will have various properties,
axiomatically and as of its objects, and that it contains
interpretations of all the great theories in their consistency,
that the TOE does exist, then for what it is.

Then, there's that it's minimal to the point of vacuous,
then replete instead of trivial. This is simply due its
properties.

What this gives then is that a foundation, and the goal
of the foundation besides being the platform of last resort
is that it is consistent _and_ complete, that a foundation
will necessarily start with the extra-ordinary, and be
founded in the extra-ordinary, then that the classical
and regular is contained within it. Though "nothing"
(or null, void) is arrived at most directly, then
indirectly (as above, the re-realization), it's
arrive at with "everything" (from simply being,
the universe, or absolute).

So, it's a logical recourse that the purely logical
includes the primary objects of the technical
philosophy as its primary objects, and no less
(and that it needs no more).

Then, from that, usual regular theories can have
a framework advised that they are modeled in this
TOE, for what it is and must be.

This is the idea of a "Null Axiom Theory" as "axiomless
system of natural deduction".

Thank you

[Ross A. Finlayson]

On Sunday, January 8, 2017 at 6:15:34 AM UTC-8, Julio Di Egidio wrote:

The noted difference between knowledge and theory,
eventually there's a context where the image of
one is the complement of the other, indeed it is
the context of the other. This is with the parallel
view that the knowledge and theory coincide. It's
the strong platonist that has both views, that the
knowledge is what we know and knowledge is what we
don't know. One and the same, this dually-self-
infraconsistent nature has the strong platonist's
consistent and complete theory being concrete as
thus a theory of truth and with knowledge as fact.

[Julio Di Egidio]

On Sunday, January 8, 2017 at 7:46:49 PM UTC+1, Ross A. Finlayson wrote:
> On Sunday, January 8, 2017 at 6:15:34 AM UTC-8, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
> > On Sunday, January 8, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC+1, Ross A. Finlayson wrote:
> > > Ultimate Theory / Theory of Everything
> > <snip>
> > > This is a usual philosophical approach to theoretical
> > > reasoning, then on re-realization, informedly and
> > > formally, then, the beginning of what is relevant
> > > in the interpretation of the canon and the dogmatic
> > > as constant, consistent, complete, then concrete.
> >
> > The not so usual as in the serious philosophical approach is to recognise that
> > there is no such thing as the ultimate theory. Wittgenstein ends up in silence,
> > so does Heidegger, but even in less absolute terms the point is that every
> > discipline, including the discipline of all disciplines, defines the world,
> > its world, *from within* its own boundaries. Philosophy is the discipline of
> > boundaries from within the boundaries: not a discipline of totalities, for
> > which the philosopher would rather advocate some sane spiritualism, that is, to
> > put it simply, the non-logical, the irrational, the mystic... Another way to
> > put it is that the ultimate knowledge is not a theory, the ultimate truth is
> > exactly the truth that cannot be told. Any "TOE", as such, is a derangement.
>

> The TOE exists even if Wittgenstein and Heidegger leave
> it not in their grasp. This is besides the completeness
> of the regular, with Frege and Wittgenstein and ZF, or
> with Russell and Whitehead or Peano. The extra-ordinary
> then, of Archimedes, Spinoza, Scotus, Kant and Hegel,
> Quine and Popper, Russell about the extra-ordinary
> of objects and conclusions, are all within our one
> sphere of reasoning and reckoning.

Yes, with-in, not with-out: the fact being that you just don't know what you
are talking about...

Julio

[Ross A. Finlayson]

We're all within their one sphere of reasoning and reckoning.

There are then avenues from the philosophical and fundamental
to the logical to the mathematical (as of the logical, before
the properly- or non-logical), then the natural and physical,
about what simplest properties as conservation, symmetry,
diversity, and variety (as logical) see a theory of "truth"
be a theory of "truth" (and explaining the difference of
truth and non-truth purely logically, then properly logically).

This is first that there is, then how instead of why.

[Julio Di Egidio]

> We're all within their one sphere of reasoning and reckoning.

There is so much more under the sun than just what is "reasonable"...

Please desist: you do not have a point, at best a question.

Julio

[Ross A. Finlayson]

There is all that there is, and how it is,
and otherwise as of the establishment (as
of then natural language, symbolically)
of all the question words and all their
answers of matters of fact or their non-
answers as matters of logic.

You may point to the difference between
the availability of a fact and its
existence, but not to its inexistence
as it's fact.

Admittedly this is a strong platonist's
view and that is compatible with there
being absolute truth (which need not
necessitate having a strong platonist's
view, that only fact is material, but,
that is a naive strong platonist's view).

Thank you and again your understanding
and opinion is refreshing and appreciated.

[Julio Di Egidio]

On Sunday, January 8, 2017 at 11:20:51 PM UTC+1, Ross A. Finlayson wrote:

> There is all that there is, and how it is,
> and otherwise as of the establishment (as
> of then natural language, symbolically)
> of all the question words and all their
> answers of matters of fact or their non-
> answers as matters of logic.

Wake up: 5000 years of wisdom that tells you not everything can be talked
about!!

> You may point to the difference between
> the availability of a fact and its
> existence, but not to its inexistence
> as it's fact.
>
> Admittedly this is a strong platonist's
> view and that is compatible with there
> being absolute truth (which need not
> necessitate having a strong platonist's
> view, that only fact is material, but,
> that is a naive strong platonist's view).

Not even a true Platonist would be that wrong: namely not even a Platonist would
claim that the absolute can be put into the finite words of our language and
mundane understanding. Don't you know anything at all?? E.g. the very
origins of Platonism have to do with mysticism. And how the fuck am I
supposed to communicate anything to you without being obscene when you are
simply SO FUCKING CLUELESS THAT YOU JUST KEEP SPOUNTING THE WORST FUNDAMENTAL
BULLSHIT ALL OVER THE PLACE!!??

Shut the fuck up: get a *serious* course in philosophy if you really care.
Philosophy is not a bunch of fairy tales and the word games you keep playing:
that is the magic of kids...

EOD.

Julio

[Ross A. Finlayson]

We're humans in the middle,
of the tower of dust that is
the universe, and all our words
and what could be expressed and
so on toward infinity. Coming
back from that (and it remains)
reason as root gives a way to
put off paradox for place,
that we are and not just aren't.

Our philosophy isn't just our thoughts,
it's a canon and a dogma, relayed to us,
these notions of the Nothing and Being
and noumenon and the continuum
are part and parcel of reason for our
philosophy, a re-realization of the
understanding we have as from our place
and what we've learned (that we can
reproduce as from reason, as so exists
for the platonist).

Again, this isn't so much that "here
is the absolute" as "there exists" and
_then_ "this is" the absolute, that
the absolute has its place (just as
it's everywhere, and as the origin
is everywhere, again with the distinguished
conflation as proper and correct).

This continues toward the mathematics
and further for the strong platonist's
concreteness and a philosophy of the
natural as a natural philosophy. (Indeed,
one might consider this as the same origin
as that, of "natural philosophy").

These follow from reason as simply
not absurd itself (besides for where
it is), then that when other modern
formalist initiative find their limits,
the natural philosopher can point back
to a true, sole foundation for the
re-realization of a true formalism
(of truth altogether). Furthermore,
for the truth-formalist, pure logic
must support all of philosophy's
correctness, simply that it does.

[Julio Di Egidio]

On Sunday, January 8, 2017 at 11:48:29 PM UTC+1, Ross A. Finlayson wrote:

> We're humans in the middle,

And you are a Platonist?? We are Gods and even Demons!!
But you feel free to stay stuck in Maya land, just speak
for yourself, unless you really are an enemy of life and
intelligence...

> These follow from reason as simply not absurd itself

Reasonable as e.g. in studying Cardinality on the Collins??
Because that is all you keep concocting: word salad. Indeed,
not "absurd", you almost manage to keep the subject-predicate
there, it's just so utterly clueless, as in you literally don't

know what you are talking about.

And now I have wasted more than an hour with you, and all you keep offering
is your broken record, so EOD for real.

Julio

[Ross A. Finlayson]

I'm a "strong platonist", that what's
true for me is true for you, too.

This is of the fundament and firmament,
here in the middle we remain ignorant as babes,
but this invincible ignorance
is not the insufferible kind.

I'd certainly hope to convince you
that this opinion will be the same
and besides that it simply reflects
what is the real and true, after
the analysis, and as the synthesis.

Clearly it's some self-serving element,
that I hope to point to the necessary
features of "A Theory", then for that
I'd have a pretty strong idea of how
to apply the result to the middle, too.

(Flexes, points.)

Thank you for the remark reminding of
the humility of the realization, then
for the august of the re-realization,
for strong platonism to be true for
you, too.

Then, for reason then philosophy
(or, vice versa) then logic then
philogeny, this readily arrives as
the foundation.

[Ross A. Finlayson]

As you can tell, this is very much a neo-classical
approach, classical, with all the results of the
classical, and neo-classical, with all the results
of the modern, then the new again, sweeping under
each as both, toward a modern mathematical apologist's
sole, true foundation (the dually-self-infraconsistent
dialetheic paraconsistent Null Axiom Theory, "A Theory",
"A-Theory".)

[burs...@gmail.com]

Actually the below is wrong. Feferman came up by Muckefunk,
whereby its my opinion that Muckefunk cited Feferman wrongly.
Muckefunk used name dropping for his purpose.

See for yourself:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/sci.math/_SFoXz4dwrQ/l0pBVRAVEgAJ

No aspiration whatever for some ultimate theory etc..
on my part what ever this means. So much to the quality of
posts by fruit cake.

[Ross A. Finlayson]

Sure, "Ultimate Theory / Theory of Everything"
is really just such a thing as it is. Then,
as accessible to our reason and philosophy,
and logic and mathematics, and sense or physics,
or reason and rationale, the "theory-theoretic"
builds (or reduces) that these are the properties
of a theory of everything, which is singular,
the ultimate theory, and eventually a simple
comprehensive basis of reasoning.

It is what it is.

Set theory in its generality led into the airy
heights or "tower of rain" of trans-finite
cardinals, that it was formalized, but the
restriction of comprehension is its flaw,
because the infinite set naively is not the
ordinary infinite set, there is more to it
than that. Then, instead of that leading to
conundrum or paradox, the foundation is built
from the simple consideration of a truth-theoretic
setting, one-way as it were, with only truisms
as well formed and validities. This formalism
escaped those formalists because those were
formalists who were not platonists and didn't
have that the extra-ordinary existed regardless
their proscription of it, writing it out.

Instead this neo-classical strong platonist
(and formalist) re-approach sees the proper
axiomatization as refinement, not fiat, because
only the expansion of comprehension is truly
axiomatic (and here that it's thus just a
reflection of the structure as it is from
nothing to everything).

This quite well satisfies the formalist's
requirements, then indeed is the only
thing that does.

True theory is always right.





You can remove this part, then, though it
was really just a comment, meaning to be
inclusive.

"The other day Burse pointed to an article of

Feferman on the operational", ....

(On this side of the world, fruit cake is a
holiday cake made with booze. I am not it.)

[Julio Di Egidio]

On Thursday, January 12, 2017 at 5:05:24 AM UTC+1, Ross A. Finlayson wrote:
<snip>

> Sure, "Ultimate Theory / Theory of Everything"
> is really just such a thing as it is. Then,
> as accessible to our reason and philosophy,
> and logic and mathematics, and sense or physics,
> or reason and rationale, the "theory-theoretic"
> builds (or reduces) that these are the properties
> of a theory of everything, which is singular,
> the ultimate theory, and eventually a simple
> comprehensive basis of reasoning.
>
> It is what it is.

Reasoning is not everything, so that is properly a misnomer.
As a "theory for reasoning" I quite like it...

Yes, I agree, it very much reminds me of Inductive Logic: one should just be
cautious that here induction really and immediately means infinite induction.
I'd just suggest you give a better look at Univalent Foundations, and how sets
specifically are just not an adequate (formal) foundation.

Truth preserving theories... What's happened to para-consistent systems, then?
What about "partitioned" systems instead?

Julio

[Ross A. Finlayson]

The "theory of truth" fundamentally is the paraconsistent,
it starts with all the formulas, (which are all validities
because there are only truisms), then the very existence
of falsity as the Liar isn't a consequence of quantification
that is ill-defined, instead, it's a consequence of quantification
that's the alternate value.

Paraconsistent then, is the "nil-valent".

Then, the "theory of objects" fundamentally is the paraconsistent,
it starts with either empty or full, void or universal (which then
proceeds as via quantification through all the relations), then
the very primary dialetheic ur-element is both and either the
empty and void, and the reverse of all the relations, yields
the same theory.

Paraconsistent, then, is the "primary".

Then, the "theory of geometries", then the "theory of numbers",
then, the "theory of sets", .... These have their "paraconsistent"
definitions (constants) largely from the primary.

Among those, then, all as one, is something like a model of ZF,
or HTT, because those are regular theories and they have co-
consistency results with other theories.

This Null Axiom Theory then has those other theories as simply
inside the theory.

[Ross Finlayson]

More about question words ....

[Jeffrey Rubard]

"This one is sorta funny, on account of how dubious paraconsistent logic is."
#wevebeenherebefore

[Ross Finlayson]

The goal is "infraconsistency".

These kinds of things are so simple and fundamental
that even twittery bird-brains can peck at it.

Bringing this kind of thing down and for monism really
is relevant to a usual psychology of philosophy.

"Right, Einstein?" "Yeah, straight down."

[Jeffrey Rubard]

"You go, girl."

[Ross Finlayson]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h5fp3De0SfI

Here Maugin introduces a definition of "monomode process".

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7PY3QK8pyMY

Yesterday's, talks about mathematical models of physics.

[Jeffrey Rubard]

Is the idea of you that you are a "world-class spammer", or something?

[Ross Finlayson]

Here's some reading a few words from Nozick's "Philosophical Explanations",
with some verbal explanation of the notion of the above.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6BNDx-FUwKM

You might need not notes because it's mostly canon.

[Jeffrey Rubard]

"People like you are called 'dimwits', I think."

[Ross Finlayson]

Hmm., it's kind of like when Public Broadcasting thanks its sponsors instead of
intrusive advertising, they often include their general sponsors or "people like you",
where, "like" the word, that's both for simile and amity, also "like" is one of those "fill-in"
words, like, like, like, you know.

Filling in the simile is an old-fashioned exercise about the names of the relations of
things and the relations of the names of things.

So, at least some people who watch that are as of being held in very high regard,
I suppose then that they match in that they don't match.

Now you might notice I've used grammar for example "that" and "as of", where there
is as of filling in answers and abstracting simile, which if you don't think so makes for
very easy reading, or, not.

Then, it's not like I arrived at that description of a true theory from just picking up
the book and starting at the beginning, though, I'm very familiar with that act,
where, there is basically making an acquaintance with "Nozick" and "DesCartes"
and "Dzogchen" and "Leibniz" that I've made them familiar with me, too.

"Uncle Rene" as I call him, kind of like "Uncle Abe", is a touchstone but not the end-all be-all
of a font of wisdom about the dialectic and the abstraction of meaning and a true theory.
His reflections on objectivity in monism can help though if that there is and where there is,
a true theory, that, through each our lenses it offers the same truth to all. That for example
"science" is so successful goes a long way, for example for those who don't believe in atheists,
why "science" gives reason quite all what tools reason needs to fulfill itself, found just laying about.

[Jeffrey Rubard]

Jack Handey would send these back as "vapid", dude.