On 2/2/2023 2:54 PM, Dan Christensen wrote:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactual/
Counterfactual Theories of Causation
...
| The chief obstacle in empiricists’ minds to
| explaining causation in terms of counterfactuals
| was the obscurity of counterfactuals themselves,
| owing chiefly to their reference to unactualised
| possibilities. The true potential of the
| counterfactual approach to causation did not
| become clear until counterfactuals became better
| understood through the development of possible world
| semantics in the early 1970s.
...
| The central notion of a possible world semantics
| for counterfactuals is a relation of comparative
| similarity between worlds. One world is said to be
| closer to actuality than another if the first
| resembles the actual world more than the second does.
| In terms of this similarity relation, the truth
| condition for the counterfactual “If A were
| (or had been) the case, C would be (or have been)
| the case” is stated as follows:
|
| (1)
|| “If A were the case, C would be the case” is true
|| in the actual world if and only if either
|| (i) there are no possible A-worlds; or
|| (ii) some A-world where C holds is closer to
|| the actual world than is any A-world where C
|| does not hold.
|
| We shall ignore the first case in which the
| counterfactual is vacuously true. The fundamental
| idea of this analysis is that the counterfactual
| “If A were the case, C would be the case” is true
| just in case it takes less of a departure from
| actuality to make the antecedent true along with
| the consequent than to make the antecedent true
| without the consequent.
FYI...
| There are deep metaphysical issues at stake here,
| then: one might view the SEF [Structural Equations
| Framework] approach as offering a more sophisticated
| variant of Lewis’s approach that shares the
| reductionist aspirations of that approach. Or one
| might – especially if one is sceptical about the
| prospects for those reductionist aspirations – take
| the SEF approach in anti-reductionist spirit,
| viewing it not as a way of defining causation in
| non-causal terms but rather as a way of extracting
| useful and sophisticated causal information from an
| inherently causal model of a given complex situation.