Ha. Comprehension in the naive is really quite usual and very well-explored.
The finite combinatorics of course, make for that while lots of naive
theorems immediately allow usual deduction for example about bounds,
actually constructively enumerating the bounds, is itself a task in bounds.
Those worked all the way out make closures and arithmetics,
models of arithmetic and arithmetizations. Then mostly those
are as simply defined as orders, in class comprehensions, even
in the same orders, as the usual naive deductive apparatus about it.
Cantor's paradise might be his domain
but Knuth's paradise is a system of counting arguments.
It nice to have both paradises.
Basically, in set theory, "types" are in set theory, and "classes" are out.
It's "group nouns", for what sets model like ordinals, that basically
"ordering theory is actually primitive in set theory".
In "Borel vs. Combinatorics" is for examples of conjectures not
necessarily just "decided" but for example "independent", the
existence any "standard, regular, complete model of integers",
that for example itself is independent the theory, besides axioms.
For example "Knuth's 2-normal and absolutely normal or 2-distributed
and *-distributed, sequences, occupy half of a binary Cantor space,
according to a partitioning, in sets". That's along the lines of a conjecture
independent ordinary set theory, and about what exists in extra-ordinary set theory.
I found an identity like Stirling's in very usual concrete terms in this,
about number theory, function theory, and those being objects for
models of arithmetic in set theory, and even primary, primitive, ur-elements.
I.e. after "half the sequences in Cantor space are half 0's and half 1's",
and some differential parameterization, I wrote out some equations
to compute the factorial, which isn't even decided by ordinary set theory.
About "why is choice/well-ordering an axiom", it's primary for ordering theory,
which "decides all the ordinary".
It's like "why sets instead of parts", "Brentano has a theory of parts".
The "existence results according to axioms" and "structure results
an example after enumeration", are very different in their strengths
as independent, proving an example exists and providing an example.
The only relation in set theory is "elt", but: sets are defined by their membership.
So, being able to prove "well-ordering the reals exists" but not "here is
an example, but according to comprehension a subset exists their
normal order, contradiction of each to next containing rationals",
it is a usual balk, that is for point-set topologists to establish in
the real-valued, where continuum theory is primary. (Elementary.)
Anyways the old "Factorial/Exponential Identity, Infinity" thread involves
both the undecideable and independent, "Borel vs. Combinatorics".
Besides for ordering then number theory for function theory
that "infinitesimals are integrable and sum to 1, even though
standardly modeled sum to 1/2", makes for "re-Vitali-izing measure
theory", both demonstrates "well-ordering the reals" and builds
out from set theory its usual objects the ordinals, numbers, functions,
and so on, all ordinary and decided.
Then "point-sets live in a space".
That's a set theory, ....
The unbounded finite combinatorics doesn't need an axiom, it's
as defined all together, already complete its constructions.
But, unrestricted comprehensions also makes for one. Then,
is for that unbounded finite combinatorics, is for a Cantor's domain,
Russell's types, Goedel's arithmetic, still independent that there
is one, thus according to comprehension, what exists.
Anyways decideability and independence are two different things.