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my take on Kodak downfall
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Dale
Feb 10, 2014, 12:28:28 AM2/10/14
to
having worked there
consumer film was where the big money was
too often consumer systems were developed and then a professional system
was hacked out of it
as opposed to developing professional systems and watering them down for
consumer applications
would have taken some quick work too keep up with the consumer demand,
but Kodak was big enough to keep up with that I think
then there is the general USA/UN/WTO issue of fair trade versus free
trade allowing cheap imports from places with less consideration of
workers and environmentalism, etc.
but Kodak had plants in Mexico after NAFTA, so they should have been
able to invest that consumer film money better I think
--
Dale
consumer film was where the big money was
too often consumer systems were developed and then a professional system
was hacked out of it
as opposed to developing professional systems and watering them down for
consumer applications
would have taken some quick work too keep up with the consumer demand,
but Kodak was big enough to keep up with that I think
then there is the general USA/UN/WTO issue of fair trade versus free
trade allowing cheap imports from places with less consideration of
workers and environmentalism, etc.
but Kodak had plants in Mexico after NAFTA, so they should have been
able to invest that consumer film money better I think
--
Dale
Brad Guth
Feb 10, 2014, 2:42:03 AM2/10/14
to
So much loot was taken in such a short time, that it no longer mattered how many Operation Paperclip Nazis they were protecting. What mattered is that they needed to get out before damaging information leaked out, or having to fairly compete on the open market, and because there's no longer the hundredfold mark up advantage.
nospam
Feb 10, 2014, 7:42:33 AM2/10/14
to
In article <796div....@news.alt.net>, Dale
although kodak pioneered digital photography, they completely failed to
manage the transition to digital and went bankrupt.
<dale2011...@hushmail.com> wrote:
> having worked there
>
> consumer film was where the big money was
the key is the word *was*.
> having worked there
>
> consumer film was where the big money was
although kodak pioneered digital photography, they completely failed to
manage the transition to digital and went bankrupt.
Dale
Feb 10, 2014, 7:55:59 AM2/10/14
to
across the imaging board, staarting with their focus on commercial and
prepress labs and going to other focuses
might be some hybrid stuff out their too, they could use/license
intellectual property
maybe even some analog stuff that they could use/license intellectual
property too
they might not be a propreitary closed system dealer in all areas, but
starting with open standards they might be an open systems player, and
eventually perhaps develop themselves into intellectual property for ne
propreitary systems
I think they should start with capture though, professional
cameras/lenses lighting, etc.
--
Dale
Dale
Feb 10, 2014, 7:59:03 AM2/10/14
to
On 02/10/2014 02:42 AM, Brad Guth wrote:
> Their internal corruption started to skyrocket along with the NASA/Apollo era.
>
> So much loot was taken in such a short time, that it no longer mattered how many Operation Paperclip Nazis they were protecting. What mattered is that they needed to get out before damaging information leaked out, or having to fairly compete on the open market, and because there's no longer the hundredfold mark up advantage.
Rochester's nickname is "smug town"
> Their internal corruption started to skyrocket along with the NASA/Apollo era.
>
> So much loot was taken in such a short time, that it no longer mattered how many Operation Paperclip Nazis they were protecting. What mattered is that they needed to get out before damaging information leaked out, or having to fairly compete on the open market, and because there's no longer the hundredfold mark up advantage.
Kodak, at least in R&D where I worked and the other places I interfaced
with, had pecking orders other than performance, no matter what
publications of "Kodak" culture said
corporate culture really is the cause of many USA business woes
--
Dale
Bowser
Feb 10, 2014, 9:04:03 AM2/10/14
to
On Mon, 10 Feb 2014 00:28:28 -0500, Dale
There was a story going around about the Kodak CEO making a statement
about the digital threat: "how can we stop this digital thing?"
Or something like that. If true, well...
Kodak's management screwed the pooch. Some of the earliest digital
SLRs were Kodak conversions. Kodak sold the first full frame DSLR!
Granted, it wasn't great, but they had the tech and just let it die.
No excuses, this is a business school case study now.
about the digital threat: "how can we stop this digital thing?"
Or something like that. If true, well...
Kodak's management screwed the pooch. Some of the earliest digital
SLRs were Kodak conversions. Kodak sold the first full frame DSLR!
Granted, it wasn't great, but they had the tech and just let it die.
No excuses, this is a business school case study now.
Paul Ciszek
Feb 10, 2014, 10:55:28 AM2/10/14
to
In article <100220140742333463%nos...@nospam.invalid>,
--
"Remember when teachers, public employees, Planned Parenthood, NPR and PBS
crashed the stock market, wiped out half of our 401Ks, took trillions in
TARP money, spilled oil in the Gulf of Mexico, gave themselves billions in
bonuses, and paid no taxes? Yeah, me neither."
Martin Brown
Feb 10, 2014, 1:13:49 PM2/10/14
to
On 10/02/2014 14:04, Bowser wrote:
> On Mon, 10 Feb 2014 00:28:28 -0500, Dale
> <dale2011...@hushmail.com> wrote:
>
>> having worked there
>>
>> consumer film was where the big money was
Which was surprising as anyone who tried Fuji film never went back!
> On Mon, 10 Feb 2014 00:28:28 -0500, Dale
> <dale2011...@hushmail.com> wrote:
>
>> having worked there
>>
>> consumer film was where the big money was
>> too often consumer systems were developed and then a professional system
>> was hacked out of it
largely out evolved by digital imaging and ever more sensitive CCDs.
>> as opposed to developing professional systems and watering them down for
>> consumer applications
>>
>> would have taken some quick work too keep up with the consumer demand,
>> but Kodak was big enough to keep up with that I think
>>
>> then there is the general USA/UN/WTO issue of fair trade versus free
>> trade allowing cheap imports from places with less consideration of
>> workers and environmentalism, etc.
>>
>> but Kodak had plants in Mexico after NAFTA, so they should have been
>> able to invest that consumer film money better I think
>
> There was a story going around about the Kodak CEO making a statement
> about the digital threat: "how can we stop this digital thing?"
>
> Or something like that. If true, well...
>
> Kodak's management screwed the pooch. Some of the earliest digital
> SLRs were Kodak conversions. Kodak sold the first full frame DSLR!
> Granted, it wasn't great, but they had the tech and just let it die.
> No excuses, this is a business school case study now.
Bryce Bayer and still bears his name. Obituary shows how far advanced
Kodak was along the digital imaging line. My first very early digital
camera was a Kodak DC-120 which was useful for scientific work as you
could access the raw Bayer array. Note the date of the patent 1976!!!
(They had a phenomenal technical lead at one point)
http://www.imaging-resource.com/news/2012/11/20/bryce-bayer-who-created-bayer-filter-for-digital-cameras-has-died
Even then they demonstrated a tremendous facility for shooting their
foot by releasing a similarly named DC-210 shortly afterwards.
My dealer was convinced he'd be stuck with the earlier and in some ways
better DC-120 so I got it at a knock down price. It was quite a cool
looking thing rather like a StarTrek tricorder and hammered its
batteries drawing nearly 2A out of a set of 4x AAs worst case.
But it was a damn good camera and served me well as backup and to do
various web photos even with its ~1Mpixel limitations.
A bit like the later Kodak launch confusing professional grade PhotoCD
scanning .PCD with the newer poxy consumer grade PictureCD with the same
acronym. You only got caught out once and went and bought your own
scanner. Shame as PhotoCD was a very good service until they ruined it,
but you could not afford to take the chance of getting a disk with toy
low quality consumer grade scans half the time.
--
Regards,
Martin Brown
nospam
Feb 10, 2014, 1:36:46 PM2/10/14
to
In article <7977q2....@news.alt.net>, Dale
> might be some hybrid stuff out their too, they could use/license
> intellectual property
>
> maybe even some analog stuff that they could use/license intellectual
> property too
that's about all they have now. they should sell their patents to
someone and call it a day.
> they might not be a propreitary closed system dealer in all areas, but
> starting with open standards they might be an open systems player, and
> eventually perhaps develop themselves into intellectual property for ne
> propreitary systems
>
> I think they should start with capture though, professional
> cameras/lenses lighting, etc.
what could they possibly do in that space that existing players haven't
done? nothing.
kodak never made cameras that were any good, although some were quite
popular such as the instamatic.
the kodak dslr hybrids were retrofitted canon/nikon cameras.
<dale2011...@hushmail.com> wrote:
> >> having worked there
> >>
> >> consumer film was where the big money was
> >
> > the key is the word *was*.
> >
> > although kodak pioneered digital photography, they completely failed to
> > manage the transition to digital and went bankrupt.
>
> it isn't too late for Kodak, it might make the investments in digital
> across the imaging board, staarting with their focus on commercial and
> prepress labs and going to other focuses
it's too late for kodak.
> >> having worked there
> >>
> >> consumer film was where the big money was
> >
> > the key is the word *was*.
> >
> > although kodak pioneered digital photography, they completely failed to
> > manage the transition to digital and went bankrupt.
>
> it isn't too late for Kodak, it might make the investments in digital
> across the imaging board, staarting with their focus on commercial and
> prepress labs and going to other focuses
> might be some hybrid stuff out their too, they could use/license
> intellectual property
>
> maybe even some analog stuff that they could use/license intellectual
> property too
someone and call it a day.
> they might not be a propreitary closed system dealer in all areas, but
> starting with open standards they might be an open systems player, and
> eventually perhaps develop themselves into intellectual property for ne
> propreitary systems
>
> I think they should start with capture though, professional
> cameras/lenses lighting, etc.
done? nothing.
kodak never made cameras that were any good, although some were quite
popular such as the instamatic.
the kodak dslr hybrids were retrofitted canon/nikon cameras.
nospam
Feb 10, 2014, 1:36:48 PM2/10/14
to
In article <lumhf9hl9e01rfiem...@4ax.com>, Bowser
replace film, but management didn't want to do anything to impact the
revenue from film. very stupid.
<id...@think.so> wrote:
> There was a story going around about the Kodak CEO making a statement
> about the digital threat: "how can we stop this digital thing?"
>
> Or something like that. If true, well...
>
> Kodak's management screwed the pooch. Some of the earliest digital
> SLRs were Kodak conversions. Kodak sold the first full frame DSLR!
> Granted, it wasn't great, but they had the tech and just let it die.
> No excuses, this is a business school case study now.
yep. kodak pioneered digital photography and knew it one day would
> There was a story going around about the Kodak CEO making a statement
> about the digital threat: "how can we stop this digital thing?"
>
> Or something like that. If true, well...
>
> Kodak's management screwed the pooch. Some of the earliest digital
> SLRs were Kodak conversions. Kodak sold the first full frame DSLR!
> Granted, it wasn't great, but they had the tech and just let it die.
> No excuses, this is a business school case study now.
replace film, but management didn't want to do anything to impact the
revenue from film. very stupid.
nospam
Feb 10, 2014, 1:36:50 PM2/10/14
to
In article <yF8Ku.13433$s74....@fx27.am4>, Martin Brown
restrictive on licensing it. few companies supported it and never
gained traction. plus, nobody wanted to buy a special player to watch
photos on a tv.
<|||newspam|||@nezumi.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> A bit like the later Kodak launch confusing professional grade PhotoCD
> scanning .PCD with the newer poxy consumer grade PictureCD with the same
> acronym. You only got caught out once and went and bought your own
> scanner. Shame as PhotoCD was a very good service until they ruined it,
> but you could not afford to take the chance of getting a disk with toy
> low quality consumer grade scans half the time.
photocd was doomed from the start. it was proprietary and kodak was
> A bit like the later Kodak launch confusing professional grade PhotoCD
> scanning .PCD with the newer poxy consumer grade PictureCD with the same
> acronym. You only got caught out once and went and bought your own
> scanner. Shame as PhotoCD was a very good service until they ruined it,
> but you could not afford to take the chance of getting a disk with toy
> low quality consumer grade scans half the time.
restrictive on licensing it. few companies supported it and never
gained traction. plus, nobody wanted to buy a special player to watch
photos on a tv.
Michael Black
Feb 10, 2014, 1:53:44 PM2/10/14
to
On Mon, 10 Feb 2014, Paul Ciszek wrote:
>
> In article <100220140742333463%nos...@nospam.invalid>,
> nospam <nos...@nospam.invalid> wrote:
>> In article <796div....@news.alt.net>, Dale
>> <dale2011...@hushmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> having worked there
>>>
>>> consumer film was where the big money was
>>
>> the key is the word *was*.
>>
>> although kodak pioneered digital photography, they completely failed to
>> manage the transition to digital and went bankrupt.
>
> The second mouse gets the cheese.
>
Sometimes the third or fourth.
>
> In article <100220140742333463%nos...@nospam.invalid>,
> nospam <nos...@nospam.invalid> wrote:
>> In article <796div....@news.alt.net>, Dale
>> <dale2011...@hushmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> having worked there
>>>
>>> consumer film was where the big money was
>>
>> the key is the word *was*.
>>
>> although kodak pioneered digital photography, they completely failed to
>> manage the transition to digital and went bankrupt.
>
> The second mouse gets the cheese.
>
But that's a good analogy, the computer mouse didn't take off till the
Macintosh in 1984, when it had been demonstrated in 1968 (so it had to
exist before that) and work done on it at PARC.
Michael
Dale
Feb 10, 2014, 2:13:40 PM2/10/14
to
On 02/10/2014 01:13 PM, Martin Brown wrote:
> the raw Bayer array
should never be used, an XYZ related array should be used
--
Dale
> the raw Bayer array
should never be used, an XYZ related array should be used
--
Dale
nospam
Feb 10, 2014, 2:52:25 PM2/10/14
to
In article <797tu6....@news.alt.net>, Dale
bayer is the best solution that exists today and will be for the
foreseeable future.
foveon's layered approach has been a disaster.
<dale2011...@hushmail.com> wrote:
> > the raw Bayer array
>
> should never be used, an XYZ related array should be used
what is an xyz related array??
> > the raw Bayer array
>
> should never be used, an XYZ related array should be used
bayer is the best solution that exists today and will be for the
foreseeable future.
foveon's layered approach has been a disaster.
Martin Brown
Feb 10, 2014, 3:44:37 PM2/10/14
to
is *nothing* more fundamental than that. You are showing your ignorance.
We can conclude that the reason Kodak failed was because they were daft
enough to employ people like you and the other fuckwits in marketing
that managed to launch products almost simultaneously with names that
were anagrams, homophones or synonyms of each other.
Kodak at one time had world leading digital technology but chose to
squander their advantage to milk the analogue film cash cow until dry.
They succeeded but the cash cow died as a direct result.
--
Regards,
Martin Brown
Martin Brown
Feb 10, 2014, 3:59:20 PM2/10/14
to
> plus, nobody wanted to buy a special player to watch
> photos on a tv.
and the archive quality of the media was for its time very innovative.
I suspect that without the train wreck that was PictureCD the
professional scanning service would have made it at least in the UK. The
technical quality was excellent and painless until they started randomly
returning crappy PictureCDs when you needed PhotoCDs.
--
Regards,
Martin Brown
nospam
Feb 10, 2014, 4:31:50 PM2/10/14
to
In article <J4bKu.5867$D27....@fx26.am4>, Martin Brown
photocd might have been innovative for the time but it was poorly
designed and poorly marketed and quickly obsoleted.
the clueless management had no idea what to do with it.
designed and poorly marketed and quickly obsoleted.
the clueless management had no idea what to do with it.
Alan Browne
Feb 10, 2014, 5:00:24 PM2/10/14
to
On 2014.02.10, 00:28 , Dale wrote:
> having worked there
>
> consumer film was where the big money was
IMO they should have broken up the company into oldco (Kodak) and newco
> having worked there
>
> consumer film was where the big money was
(DigKo). Use oldco to milk the brand in film, paper, chemicals and
related products and the newco, completely divorced from oldco, to
invest cash (from oldco and IPO) into new digital oriented imaging.
Eventually oldco would quietly wind down while newco developed new
markets without brand confusion.
That later bit could include new sensors, camera systems, printers,
inks, paper, processing, etc.
Instead they took an approach that underserved the milkable market
(FujiFilm have soaked that up by diligently serving it) and failed to
leverage their R&D in digital markets.
--
Those who have reduced our privacy, whether they are state
or commercial actors, prefer that we do not reduce theirs.
- Jaron Lanier, Scientific American, 2013.11.
Dale
Feb 10, 2014, 5:52:04 PM2/10/14
to
On 02/10/2014 01:36 PM, nospam wrote:
> yep. kodak pioneered digital photography and knew it one day would
> replace film, but management didn't want to do anything to impact the
> revenue from film. very stupid.
for the record I worked in R&D as a systems engineer
> yep. kodak pioneered digital photography and knew it one day would
> replace film, but management didn't want to do anything to impact the
> revenue from film. very stupid.
it really wasn't the money, it was the people
Rochester's nickname is "smug-town"
existing connection circles prevailed over performance and even
organizational responsibility
there were all kinds of groups vying too do the new stuff
film had the money, film people got the careers
remember this is entertainment technology careers for the most part and
entertaining work as opposed to necessity work, fun prevailed too
the last job I had was hybrid systems integration on the film side
we couldn't have the word integration in the name of our group, since
there was an equipment group was responsible for integration,, but we
got the budgets and careers, while the equipment people had "jobs" doing
not much
if it weren't an entertainment business that didn't really matter too
much, in much cases, the money and performance would have prevailed
there is your business case study
this was a publicly held company, public means socialism whether you
think so or not, and the public suffered, there needs to be better law
for socialized business
private companies can set pecking orders however you want
socialized companies have a trust, and pecking orders other than by
performance should be called anti-trust, in fact I can't think of any
other anti-trust that is worse
--
Dale
nospam
Feb 10, 2014, 6:20:16 PM2/10/14
to
In article <798ann....@news.alt.net>, Dale
which is why they went bankrupt.
they knew digital was going to replace film, but they refused to let go
of the film business.
had they invested in digital, like their competitors did, they'd still
be a player.
which is why they went bankrupt.
they knew digital was going to replace film, but they refused to let go
of the film business.
had they invested in digital, like their competitors did, they'd still
be a player.
Dale
Feb 10, 2014, 6:20:53 PM2/10/14
to
On 02/10/2014 05:52 PM, Dale wrote:
>
> there is your business case study
want some verification?
>
> there is your business case study
they tried George Fisher from Motorola as CEO with a BIG pay to shake
things up, he left
they tried Dan Carp from equipment side to shake up film probably, I
don't know where he went
might want to hear what these two have to say about their experience
--
Dale
Dale
Feb 10, 2014, 6:29:06 PM2/10/14
to
On 02/10/2014 05:52 PM, Dale wrote:
>
>
> there is your business case study
and cheap overseas products is not an excuse, they had NAFTA and were
making consumer digital cameras in Mexico
--
Dale
Dale
Feb 10, 2014, 6:56:54 PM2/10/14
to
time I tell you, it was not an accounting problem, or a strategic
problem, it was a corporate culture problem
--
Dale
nospam
Feb 10, 2014, 8:01:18 PM2/10/14
to
In article <798eh8....@news.alt.net>, Dale
what matters is as you say, corporate culture.
the management were a bunch of clueless fucks, who despite claiming
that digital was going to replace film, did not invest in digital.
<dale2011...@hushmail.com> wrote:
> >> film had the money, film people got the careers
> >
> > which is why they went bankrupt.
> >
> > they knew digital was going to replace film, but they refused to let go
> > of the film business.
> >
> > had they invested in digital, like their competitors did, they'd still
> > be a player.
> >
> they had NAFTA and a consumer camera plant in Mexico, they were right on
> time I tell you, it was not an accounting problem, or a strategic
> problem, it was a corporate culture problem
none of that matters.
> >> film had the money, film people got the careers
> >
> > which is why they went bankrupt.
> >
> > they knew digital was going to replace film, but they refused to let go
> > of the film business.
> >
> > had they invested in digital, like their competitors did, they'd still
> > be a player.
> >
> they had NAFTA and a consumer camera plant in Mexico, they were right on
> time I tell you, it was not an accounting problem, or a strategic
> problem, it was a corporate culture problem
what matters is as you say, corporate culture.
the management were a bunch of clueless fucks, who despite claiming
that digital was going to replace film, did not invest in digital.
nospam
Feb 10, 2014, 8:01:20 PM2/10/14
to
In article <798ct5....@news.alt.net>, Dale
other than the dslr hybrids which cost more than a car and were
basically a technology demo more than a commercially viable product,
kodak's digital cameras were *horrible*.
it doesn't matter where they were made (nobody really cares). they were
basically junk.
i remember trying one of them at a trade show, and to change the
shutter speed or aperture, you had to wade through *four* levels of
menus (no joke). who the hell thought that was a good idea?
basically a technology demo more than a commercially viable product,
kodak's digital cameras were *horrible*.
it doesn't matter where they were made (nobody really cares). they were
basically junk.
i remember trying one of them at a trade show, and to change the
shutter speed or aperture, you had to wade through *four* levels of
menus (no joke). who the hell thought that was a good idea?
J. Clarke
Feb 10, 2014, 10:01:47 PM2/10/14
to
In article <WSaKu.5866$D27...@fx26.am4>,
|||newspam|||@nezumi.demon.co.uk says...
An old story. American electronics manufacturers dinked around with
overpriced transistor radios. Then the Japanese introduced transistor
radios for cheap and followed up with transistor TVs and a bunch of
other solid-state consumer electronics products for not cheap and ate
their lunch.
|||newspam|||@nezumi.demon.co.uk says...
overpriced transistor radios. Then the Japanese introduced transistor
radios for cheap and followed up with transistor TVs and a bunch of
other solid-state consumer electronics products for not cheap and ate
their lunch.
Martin Brown
Feb 11, 2014, 3:36:16 AM2/11/14
to
On 11/02/2014 01:01, nospam wrote:
> In article <798ct5....@news.alt.net>, Dale
> <dale2011...@hushmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On 02/10/2014 05:52 PM, Dale wrote:
>>>
>>> there is your business case study
>>
>> and cheap overseas products is not an excuse, they had NAFTA and were
>> making consumer digital cameras in Mexico
>
> other than the dslr hybrids which cost more than a car and were
> basically a technology demo more than a commercially viable product,
> kodak's digital cameras were *horrible*.
Have you ever used one? The Kodak DC-120 served me well from the time I
> In article <798ct5....@news.alt.net>, Dale
> <dale2011...@hushmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On 02/10/2014 05:52 PM, Dale wrote:
>>>
>>> there is your business case study
>>
>> and cheap overseas products is not an excuse, they had NAFTA and were
>> making consumer digital cameras in Mexico
>
> other than the dslr hybrids which cost more than a car and were
> basically a technology demo more than a commercially viable product,
> kodak's digital cameras were *horrible*.
got it shortly after launch until the second generation digital Ixus
came out. It had a wide range of shutter settings and a fast f2.5 lens
of reasonable quality. It was perfectly good enough for website work
back them and it was about as sensitive as the human eye on its 16s
button setting. It did have a warm corner but you could fix that with
darkframe subtraction. It was widely used in early digital scientific
imaging because you could get it to return the raw Bayer sensor array a
feature not present on any other camera at the time or since.
>
> it doesn't matter where they were made (nobody really cares). they were
> basically junk.
They were not junk. Mine is still going although an only just a
> it doesn't matter where they were made (nobody really cares). they were
> basically junk.
megapixel camera now is nothing to write home about back in the late
1990's it was impressive (it also cost about £1000 back then).
>
> i remember trying one of them at a trade show, and to change the
> shutter speed or aperture, you had to wade through *four* levels of
> menus (no joke). who the hell thought that was a good idea?
The only problem I ever had with mine was that batteries didn't last
> i remember trying one of them at a trade show, and to change the
> shutter speed or aperture, you had to wade through *four* levels of
> menus (no joke). who the hell thought that was a good idea?
very long at all in it and it would eat a set a couple of hours use.
--
Regards,
Martin Brown
Dale
Feb 11, 2014, 8:53:31 AM2/11/14
to
unless bayer used an used big-CIE-RGB he made an assumption on the RGB
and the doubling of G cells that is not an assumption of the eyes
response like CIE-XYZ or CIE-bigRGB
--
Dale
Dale
Feb 11, 2014, 8:54:54 AM2/11/14
to
Kodak had a plant in Mexico making consumer digital cameras under NAFTA
--
Dale
Dale
Feb 11, 2014, 8:55:40 AM2/11/14
to
--
Dale
nospam
Feb 11, 2014, 11:56:17 AM2/11/14
to
In article <5ilKu.12416$cw4....@fx36.am4>, Martin Brown
their later cameras were pretty bad, especially with the easyshare
nonsense, and at that point, there were a *lot* of competitors and
kodak had nothing compelling to offer versus the competition.
<|||newspam|||@nezumi.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> >
> > other than the dslr hybrids which cost more than a car and were
> > basically a technology demo more than a commercially viable product,
> > kodak's digital cameras were *horrible*.
>
> Have you ever used one? The Kodak DC-120 served me well from the time I
> got it shortly after launch until the second generation digital Ixus
> came out. It had a wide range of shutter settings and a fast f2.5 lens
> of reasonable quality. It was perfectly good enough for website work
> back them and it was about as sensitive as the human eye on its 16s
> button setting. It did have a warm corner but you could fix that with
> darkframe subtraction. It was widely used in early digital scientific
> imaging because you could get it to return the raw Bayer sensor array a
> feature not present on any other camera at the time or since.
the dc120 might have been ok, but it came out very early in the game.
> >
> > other than the dslr hybrids which cost more than a car and were
> > basically a technology demo more than a commercially viable product,
> > kodak's digital cameras were *horrible*.
>
> Have you ever used one? The Kodak DC-120 served me well from the time I
> got it shortly after launch until the second generation digital Ixus
> came out. It had a wide range of shutter settings and a fast f2.5 lens
> of reasonable quality. It was perfectly good enough for website work
> back them and it was about as sensitive as the human eye on its 16s
> button setting. It did have a warm corner but you could fix that with
> darkframe subtraction. It was widely used in early digital scientific
> imaging because you could get it to return the raw Bayer sensor array a
> feature not present on any other camera at the time or since.
their later cameras were pretty bad, especially with the easyshare
nonsense, and at that point, there were a *lot* of competitors and
kodak had nothing compelling to offer versus the competition.
Brad Guth
Feb 11, 2014, 11:57:39 PM2/11/14
to
Once you become a trillionaire without having to do hardly anything, there's not much reason to go back into competitive work, much less risk being uncovered and held accountable. No amount of corporate logic will ever resolve this one, because they simply had to get out fast.
PeterN
Feb 13, 2014, 7:21:27 AM2/13/14
to
--
PeterN
nospam
Feb 13, 2014, 5:38:51 PM2/13/14
to
In article <ldida...@news1.newsguy.com>, PeterN
with a market share of under 1% and shrinking, sigma's cameras have
been a complete disaster. not only do they not sell particularly well,
but they are a money loser for the company.
foveon originally was backed by two venture capital firms, who soon
realized they'd been had and what a fuckup it was, so they bailed.
that left foveon, whose only customer was sigma, without any money and
about to file for bankruptcy.
had that happened, sigma would have been completely screwed, so sigma
bought foveon at firesale prices and has been sinking money into it
ever since.
the cameras are utter crap (and yes, i've used them).
they're anything but consistent. two photos in a row might look totally
different, despite the settings being identical. the sd14 was pig slow
(around 6 seconds write time) and you actually had to wait until it
finished, or the camera could lock up and you'd lose photos. the sd14
was *really* buggy and sometimes locked up even if you weren't taking
photos one after another
the sd14 originally was $2000 msrp ($1600 street), which quickly
dropped due to slow sales, and around a year later, it was being sold
off for $300-400, new, and even at that price, people still weren't
buying all that many.
the sd1 originally was pitched at a ridiculous $9700 msrp (~$6000
street) which was complete insanity for a 15 megapixel camera. even the
fanbois were stunned. not surprisingly, sigma did not sell very many
cameras at that price.
as best as i can tell, they sold about 10, total, based on posts in the
sigma forum and serial number analysis (which is encoded in every
photo, btw, so it's easy to track).
after tens of thousands of unsold cameras sat in warehouses, sigma
slashed the price by roughly $4000 in one day, and the price has
dropped even *further* since then.
the dp1/2/3 series have been riddled with lens motor failures, where
the lens just gets stuck extending out or back in, along with all the
usual problems with the sensor.
sigma tries to claim more accurate colour, but the delta-e is much
higher than bayer, which means *less* accurate colour.
sigma claims 'no guessing' of colour data, yet there's more 'guessing'
than bayer because they don't actually capture rgb at every location
(another lie of theirs). the spectra of the layers overlap by quite a
bit and there's a shitload of very complex math to extract rgb from it,
which is one reason why the software is slow and the results are noisy
and with weird colour casts.
the first foveon camera, the 3.4 megapixel sd9, did not sell well, so
they decided to lie about the number of pixels in the sd10 because
'bigger numbers are better', despite the camera having the same sensor.
normally that's called fraud, but somehow, they managed to get away
with it.
sigma's software is slow and buggy and there aren't any viable options
from third parties. even adobe has given up supporting it. part of the
'sigma look' is heavy sharpening. if you set the sigma software to 0
sharpening, you're actually getting a wallop of sharpening. you have to
set it to -1 to -2 to get 'none', depending on version.
foveon sensors are theoretically interesting, but they are riddled with
problems and actually don't offer anything the eye can see anyway. it's
a solution in search of a problem.
foveon sensors have substantially higher noise, lower colour accuracy,
lower resolution, worse high iso performance and higher manufacturing
cost.
that's a huge price to pay for 'full colour', something humans can't
even see anyway.
three layer sensors sound like a good idea on paper, and one day they
might be feasible without significant tradeoffs, but they sure as hell
are not now.
if that day comes, the technology won't need lies to market it. it will
sell itself because it's actually better.
on the other hand, bayer is a very clever design based on how the human
eye works. it's cost-effective to manufacture and works exceptionally
well for creating photos that humans look at.
<peter.n...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > bayer is the best solution that exists today and will be for the
> > foreseeable future.
> >
> > foveon's layered approach has been a disaster.
>
> facts?
oh, where to start.
> > bayer is the best solution that exists today and will be for the
> > foreseeable future.
> >
> > foveon's layered approach has been a disaster.
>
> facts?
with a market share of under 1% and shrinking, sigma's cameras have
been a complete disaster. not only do they not sell particularly well,
but they are a money loser for the company.
foveon originally was backed by two venture capital firms, who soon
realized they'd been had and what a fuckup it was, so they bailed.
that left foveon, whose only customer was sigma, without any money and
about to file for bankruptcy.
had that happened, sigma would have been completely screwed, so sigma
bought foveon at firesale prices and has been sinking money into it
ever since.
the cameras are utter crap (and yes, i've used them).
they're anything but consistent. two photos in a row might look totally
different, despite the settings being identical. the sd14 was pig slow
(around 6 seconds write time) and you actually had to wait until it
finished, or the camera could lock up and you'd lose photos. the sd14
was *really* buggy and sometimes locked up even if you weren't taking
photos one after another
the sd14 originally was $2000 msrp ($1600 street), which quickly
dropped due to slow sales, and around a year later, it was being sold
off for $300-400, new, and even at that price, people still weren't
buying all that many.
the sd1 originally was pitched at a ridiculous $9700 msrp (~$6000
street) which was complete insanity for a 15 megapixel camera. even the
fanbois were stunned. not surprisingly, sigma did not sell very many
cameras at that price.
as best as i can tell, they sold about 10, total, based on posts in the
sigma forum and serial number analysis (which is encoded in every
photo, btw, so it's easy to track).
after tens of thousands of unsold cameras sat in warehouses, sigma
slashed the price by roughly $4000 in one day, and the price has
dropped even *further* since then.
the dp1/2/3 series have been riddled with lens motor failures, where
the lens just gets stuck extending out or back in, along with all the
usual problems with the sensor.
sigma tries to claim more accurate colour, but the delta-e is much
higher than bayer, which means *less* accurate colour.
sigma claims 'no guessing' of colour data, yet there's more 'guessing'
than bayer because they don't actually capture rgb at every location
(another lie of theirs). the spectra of the layers overlap by quite a
bit and there's a shitload of very complex math to extract rgb from it,
which is one reason why the software is slow and the results are noisy
and with weird colour casts.
the first foveon camera, the 3.4 megapixel sd9, did not sell well, so
they decided to lie about the number of pixels in the sd10 because
'bigger numbers are better', despite the camera having the same sensor.
normally that's called fraud, but somehow, they managed to get away
with it.
sigma's software is slow and buggy and there aren't any viable options
from third parties. even adobe has given up supporting it. part of the
'sigma look' is heavy sharpening. if you set the sigma software to 0
sharpening, you're actually getting a wallop of sharpening. you have to
set it to -1 to -2 to get 'none', depending on version.
foveon sensors are theoretically interesting, but they are riddled with
problems and actually don't offer anything the eye can see anyway. it's
a solution in search of a problem.
foveon sensors have substantially higher noise, lower colour accuracy,
lower resolution, worse high iso performance and higher manufacturing
cost.
that's a huge price to pay for 'full colour', something humans can't
even see anyway.
three layer sensors sound like a good idea on paper, and one day they
might be feasible without significant tradeoffs, but they sure as hell
are not now.
if that day comes, the technology won't need lies to market it. it will
sell itself because it's actually better.
on the other hand, bayer is a very clever design based on how the human
eye works. it's cost-effective to manufacture and works exceptionally
well for creating photos that humans look at.
PeterN
Feb 13, 2014, 7:44:45 PM2/13/14
to
If you are saying that Foveon is not ready for prime time, you are
probably right.
What I am saying is that Foveon has potential worth exploring, if only
for scientific purposes.
think WordPerfect & Word
Both are examples of the triumph of marketing over quality.
--
PeterN
nospam
Feb 13, 2014, 8:31:50 PM2/13/14
to
In article <ldjos...@news3.newsguy.com>, PeterN
ok
> If you are saying that Foveon is not ready for prime time, you are
> probably right.
not only am i right, but foveon is never going to be ready for prime
time because it's not physically possible.
not even sigma can break the laws of physics.
> What I am saying is that Foveon has potential worth exploring, if only
> for scientific purposes.
exploring the technology is one thing. there's nothing wrong with that.
many companies are looking into multilayer sensors, including nikon,
canon and fuji and i think sony too.
the difference is that those companies are working on perfecting the
technology so that it actually *is* better than what exists now and
*then* turning it into a product.
what sigma is doing is taking half-baked technology that is clearly
worse than what exists now, lying about what it can and cannot do,
faking some of it in software and claiming it does stuff that is not
physically possible.
ok
> If you are saying that Foveon is not ready for prime time, you are
> probably right.
time because it's not physically possible.
not even sigma can break the laws of physics.
> What I am saying is that Foveon has potential worth exploring, if only
> for scientific purposes.
many companies are looking into multilayer sensors, including nikon,
canon and fuji and i think sony too.
the difference is that those companies are working on perfecting the
technology so that it actually *is* better than what exists now and
*then* turning it into a product.
what sigma is doing is taking half-baked technology that is clearly
worse than what exists now, lying about what it can and cannot do,
faking some of it in software and claiming it does stuff that is not
physically possible.
Dale
May 19, 2021, 2:29:51 PM5/19/21
to
On 2/10/2014 12:28 AM, Dale wrote:
> having worked there
>
> consumer film was where the big money was
>
> too often consumer systems were developed and then a professional system
> having worked there
>
> consumer film was where the big money was
>
> was hacked out of it
>
> as opposed to developing professional systems and watering them down for
> consumer applications
>
> would have taken some quick work too keep up with the consumer demand,
> but Kodak was big enough to keep up with that I think
>
> then there is the general USA/UN/WTO issue of fair trade versus free
> trade allowing cheap imports from places with less consideration of
> workers and environmentalism, etc.
>
> but Kodak had plants in Mexico after NAFTA, so they should have been
> able to invest that consumer film money better I think
>
this thread isn't from me ...
--
Mystery -> https://www.dalekelly.org/
Savageduck
May 19, 2021, 3:46:18 PM5/19/21
to
On May 19, 2021, Dale wrote
(in article <s83les$2qd$2...@dont-email.me>):
> On 2/10/2014 12:28 AM, Dale wrote:
> > having worked there
<anchient
--
Regards,
Savageduck
(in article <s83les$2qd$2...@dont-email.me>):
> On 2/10/2014 12:28 AM, Dale wrote:
> > having worked there
>
> this thread isn't from me ...
Then the mystery, as to why you chose to post this seven year old, obviously dead, cross posted screed to sci.engr.color, sci.image.processing, rec.photo.darkroom, rec.photo.digital, and comp.soft-sys.matlab remains.
> this thread isn't from me ...
--
Regards,
Savageduck
Martin Brown
May 19, 2021, 4:26:21 PM5/19/21
to
Kodak PCD digital scanning service was well ahead of the game at one
point and Bryce Bayer one shot colour mask designer worked for Kodak.
I recall the Kodak transition to digital cameras as an early adopter. I
got a massively discounted DC-120 1Mpixel camera "remaindered" when they
launched the confusingly named DC-210 a couple of months later.
Kodak marketing department really knew how to shoot themselves in the
foot with both barrels. Almost as bad as IBM with the PS/2 OS/2 debacle.
--
Regards,
Martin Brown
nospam
May 19, 2021, 5:21:44 PM5/19/21
to
In article <s83s98$edf$4...@gioia.aioe.org>, Martin Brown
> and Bryce Bayer one shot colour mask designer worked for Kodak.
long ago, yes. he invented what is now known as the bayer mask.
> I recall the Kodak transition to digital cameras as an early adopter. I
> got a massively discounted DC-120 1Mpixel camera "remaindered" when they
> launched the confusingly named DC-210 a couple of months later.
120 and 210 confuse you? seriously???
were you confused that canon had a d30 and 30d?
or that canon and nikon both had a d60?
or maybe that canon had a 300d and nikon had a d300?
or that linksys had a wrt54g and wtr54g router?
or that asus has a 68u and 86u wifi router?
> Kodak marketing department really knew how to shoot themselves in the
> foot with both barrels. Almost as bad as IBM with the PS/2 OS/2 debacle.
that was *very* different in many ways.
everyone, including kodak, knew that digital was going to make film
obsolete.
the problem was that kodak's management was incredibly stupid and
thought it would take much longer than it actually did.
it also didn't help that kodak's digital cameras were not competitive,
with the most convoluted user interface anyone could possibly have come
up with. i remember having to dig through 4-5 levels of menus to be
able to change the shutter speed. clearly a design by committee and not
by actual users. instant fail.
a better comparison would be with blackberry, which was once the most
popular smartphone.
when rim/blackberry first saw the iphone, they didn't think it would
amount to much, further confirmed by seeing their sales go up for a
year or two, only to be hit with reality.
everyone else saw the iphone train coming. they didn't.
even google knew the iphone was the future. android was originally
going to be a blackberry clone, and when they saw the iphone, they
immediately shifted gears and copied the iphone instead.
<http://allthingsd.com/files/2011/11/Android_before_after_iphone.png>
<'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:
>
> Kodak PCD digital scanning service was well ahead of the game at one
> point
hah, pcd was never ahead of anything. it was dead from the start.
>
> Kodak PCD digital scanning service was well ahead of the game at one
> point
> and Bryce Bayer one shot colour mask designer worked for Kodak.
> I recall the Kodak transition to digital cameras as an early adopter. I
> got a massively discounted DC-120 1Mpixel camera "remaindered" when they
> launched the confusingly named DC-210 a couple of months later.
were you confused that canon had a d30 and 30d?
or that canon and nikon both had a d60?
or maybe that canon had a 300d and nikon had a d300?
or that linksys had a wrt54g and wtr54g router?
or that asus has a 68u and 86u wifi router?
> Kodak marketing department really knew how to shoot themselves in the
> foot with both barrels. Almost as bad as IBM with the PS/2 OS/2 debacle.
everyone, including kodak, knew that digital was going to make film
obsolete.
the problem was that kodak's management was incredibly stupid and
thought it would take much longer than it actually did.
it also didn't help that kodak's digital cameras were not competitive,
with the most convoluted user interface anyone could possibly have come
up with. i remember having to dig through 4-5 levels of menus to be
able to change the shutter speed. clearly a design by committee and not
by actual users. instant fail.
a better comparison would be with blackberry, which was once the most
popular smartphone.
when rim/blackberry first saw the iphone, they didn't think it would
amount to much, further confirmed by seeing their sales go up for a
year or two, only to be hit with reality.
everyone else saw the iphone train coming. they didn't.
even google knew the iphone was the future. android was originally
going to be a blackberry clone, and when they saw the iphone, they
immediately shifted gears and copied the iphone instead.
<http://allthingsd.com/files/2011/11/Android_before_after_iphone.png>
Martin Brown
May 20, 2021, 3:45:16 AM5/20/21
to
On 19/05/2021 22:21, nospam wrote:
> In article <s83s98$edf$4...@gioia.aioe.org>, Martin Brown
> <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>
>> Kodak PCD digital scanning service was well ahead of the game at one
>> point
>
> hah, pcd was never ahead of anything. it was dead from the start.
It was very good at the time it was first introduced. You don't known
> In article <s83s98$edf$4...@gioia.aioe.org>, Martin Brown
> <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>
>> Kodak PCD digital scanning service was well ahead of the game at one
>> point
>
> hah, pcd was never ahead of anything. it was dead from the start.
what you are talking about so you must be the real Dale.
>
>> and Bryce Bayer one shot colour mask designer worked for Kodak.
>
> long ago, yes. he invented what is now known as the bayer mask.
>
>> I recall the Kodak transition to digital cameras as an early adopter. I
>> got a massively discounted DC-120 1Mpixel camera "remaindered" when they
>> launched the confusingly named DC-210 a couple of months later.
>
> 120 and 210 confuse you? seriously???
It confused the hell out of their UK *dealers* who immediately
>> and Bryce Bayer one shot colour mask designer worked for Kodak.
>
> long ago, yes. he invented what is now known as the bayer mask.
>
>> I recall the Kodak transition to digital cameras as an early adopter. I
>> got a massively discounted DC-120 1Mpixel camera "remaindered" when they
>> launched the confusingly named DC-210 a couple of months later.
>
> 120 and 210 confuse you? seriously???
remaindered the older model. I benefited nicely from their confusion.
> were you confused that canon had a d30 and 30d?
> or that canon and nikon both had a d60?
> or maybe that canon had a 300d and nikon had a d300?
>
> or that linksys had a wrt54g and wtr54g router?
>
> or that asus has a 68u and 86u wifi router?
>
>> Kodak marketing department really knew how to shoot themselves in the
>> foot with both barrels. Almost as bad as IBM with the PS/2 OS/2 debacle.
>
> that was *very* different in many ways.
>
> everyone, including kodak, knew that digital was going to make film
> obsolete.
deliberately held back to protect the lucrative wet chemistry film
market. They badly misjudged how long they had remaining.
I had abandoned Kodak film for the much better Fuji film by then anyway
and I suspect I was not alone in doing that.
> the problem was that kodak's management was incredibly stupid and
> thought it would take much longer than it actually did.
>
> it also didn't help that kodak's digital cameras were not competitive,
> with the most convoluted user interface anyone could possibly have come
> up with. i remember having to dig through 4-5 levels of menus to be
> able to change the shutter speed. clearly a design by committee and not
> by actual users. instant fail.
>
> a better comparison would be with blackberry, which was once the most
> popular smartphone.
>
> when rim/blackberry first saw the iphone, they didn't think it would
> amount to much, further confirmed by seeing their sales go up for a
> year or two, only to be hit with reality.
>
> everyone else saw the iphone train coming. they didn't.
>
> even google knew the iphone was the future. android was originally
> going to be a blackberry clone, and when they saw the iphone, they
> immediately shifted gears and copied the iphone instead.
>
> <http://allthingsd.com/files/2011/11/Android_before_after_iphone.png>
--
Regards,
Martin Brown
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