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Chive Mynde
Dec 12, 2000, 10:10:19 PM12/12/00
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In article <916bj5$9t9$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
Blue Resonant Human <brothe...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> ::: The Scientific Community and Intelligence Collection :::
>
> by Mark F. Moynihan
>
> Academic scientists continue to play a vital role in helping the
> intelligence community exploit technology for national security.
>
> "We have slain a large dragon. But we now live in a jungle filled with
> a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes."
> -R. James Woolsey, former director of the CIA, at his Senate
> confirmation hearing, March 1993.
>
> Jim Woolsey's statement before the US Senate presaged a dramatic shift
> in the way the US intelligence community collects intelligence. Before
> the end of the cold war, intelligence personnel almost exclusively
> focused on only one target: the Soviet Union. Now, however, they must
> pursue that bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And quite a
> challenge it is. From understanding the intentions of foreign leaders,
> such as Saddam Hussein, to detecting modern threats, such as those
> posed by bacteriological and chemical warfare, the challenges faced by
> the intelligence community push it to the very limits of its
> capabilities and expertise.
>
> The modern era of US intelligence collection began in World War II
with
> the formation of the precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency
> (CIA): the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). From that point on, the
> US intelligence community has recognized that it cannot succeed alone.
> Tackling hard intelligence problems requires the best and brightest
> minds from inside and outside the intelligence community. Battling
> Woolsey's poisonous snakes is a constant and troubling reality that
> requires our eternal vigilance. In retrospect, Secretary of State
Henry
> Lewis Stimson's remark, in 1929, that "gentlemen do not read each
> other's mail" seems to belong to a different world.
>
> Several years ago, I took part in a CIA recruiting drive at a job fair
> at the University of South Carolina. The most frequently asked
question
> from students was, Why does the CIA need scientists and engineers?
> Reflected in this question is the common notion of the CIA as an
> organization of espionage and covert operations. But if you examine
CIA
> history, you see an organization whose mission to inform US leaders
and
> protect US security has always depended on science and technology.
>
> ::: The War Years :::
>
> The father of the US scientific intelligence community was an
> industrial chemist named Stanley Lovell. One day in 1942, while
> crossing Boston Common, Lovell was approached by MIT President Karl T.
> Compton, who asked him to join the National Defense Research Committee
> (NDRC), a group of academics consulted by the government on the war
> effort. After some consideration--and the warning that if he did not
he
> would "regret all of your life if you refuse Uncle Sam now"--Lovell
> left his job as executive vice president of the Beckwith Manufacturing
> Co and reported to NDRC headquarters in Washington, DC.
>
> At NDRC, Lovell met Vannevar Bush, who gave his aides, including
> Lovell, the following challenge: "You are about to land at dead of
> night in a rubber raft on a German-held coast. Your mission is to
> destroy a vital enemy wireless station that is defended by armed
> guards, dogs, and searchlights. You can have with you any one weapon
> you can imagine. Describe that weapon."
>
> After some thought--and rejection of outlandish ideas, such as death
> rays--Lovell proposed a completely silent and flashless gun. His
> concept was selected by Bush, and he was told to report to an office
at
> 25th and E streets in northwest Washington. There, he met the director
> of OSS, Colonel William Donovan, who introduced himself and said, "You
> know your Sherlock Holmes, of course. Professor Moriarty is the man I
> want for my staff here at OSS. I think you're it." Although he
objected
> to the characterization of himself as Holmes's evil archenemy, Lovell
> accepted the position knowing the importance of the war effort.
Donovan
> stated one more thing: "No matter what you do or hear when you are
with
> me, I must have your word of honor that you'll write nothing until 20
> years from now." Lovell accepted. His OSS memoir, Of Spies and
> Stratagems, was published in 1963.
>
> After meeting Donovan, Lovell asked a colleague what exactly his job
> would be. "It is whatever you can make it," was the reply. "Colonel
> Donovan is a lawyer, not a scientist or an inventor. Never ask him
what
> to do. Do it and show him what you have done." Lovell's flashless gun
> was developed, and Donovan demonstrated it--in the Oval Office. Much
to
> the chagrin of the Secret Service, Donovan fired several shots into a
> nearby sandbag and handed the weapon, still hot, to President Franklin
> D. Roosevelt. Although quite surprised, Roosevelt stated that he had
> not heard a single shot.
>
> Thus, in the work of NDRC was born the integration of science into the
> US intelligence community. That partnership continues to this day, but
> its emphasis has shifted from tools of war to tools of knowledge--
tools
> that provide our leaders with greater knowledge and understanding and
> tools that buttress arms control agreements and reduce the possibility
> of conflict through misunderstanding.
>
> One such knowledge tool was the stroboscope, which was developed in
the
> 1920s and 1930s by Harold Edgerton, a professor of electrical
> engineering at MIT. In 1939, the US Army Air Corps asked Edgerton to
> design a strobe lamp powerful enough for use in nighttime aerial
> photography. This effort required the development of stroboscopes
> powered by large electrical capacitor banks to take photographs from
> altitudes of several thousand feet. Technically, the system worked,
but
> air crews were less than eager to fly over targets and take pictures
> while simultaneously revealing their position to antiaircraft
batteries
> on the ground. Another problem encountered was in the testing of the
> strobes before a mission. The heat generated by the stroboscopic flash
> often burned the tarmac, causing a plane's fuel tanks or its bombs to
> catch fire.
>
> Later, in 1944, Edgerton served in Italy, England, and France as a
> technical representative for the US Army Air Force. Edgerton's strobes
> were used in the nights immediately preceding the D day invasion of
> Normandy, during the Battle of Monte Cassino, and in campaigns in the
> Far East.
>
> Back in the US, the government's nuclear weapons program made use of
> Edgerton's expertise in the development of photographic
instrumentation
> for observing nuclear explosions. Edgerton's Rapatronic camera could
> record the earliest stages of a nuclear explosion: the formation and
> growth of its fireball, as shown in figure 1. The exposures were often
> as short as 10 nanoseconds, and each Rapatronic camera could take
> exactly one photograph. A bank of 410 or more Rapatronic cameras were
> arranged to record different phases of nuclear explosions. The images
> provided scientists and engineers with invaluable technical
> information.
>
> ::: Aerial and Satellite Reconnaissance :::
>
> Edgerton's photographic strobes were sufficient for aerial
> reconnaissance during World War II. With the advent of the cold war,
> however, more innovative--and clandestine--approaches were needed to
> gather intelligence about the Soviet Union and its allies. Security
> along the borders of the Soviet bloc severely hampered the
infiltration
> of spies, and traditional high-flying aircraft, such as the Boeing RB-
> 29 and RB-47 (see figure 2), although successful early on, soon became
> vulnerable to air defenses.
> Indeed, as early as 1949, the Soviet air force possessed MiG-15
> fighters capable of reaching an altitude of 51 000 feet. To elude
those
> interceptors, the US had to develop aircraft that could operate at
> altitudes of 65 000 feet or higher. Out of this requirement came the
U-
> 2 aircraft.1 A remarkable achievement for its time, the U-2 continues
> serving the US even now.
>
> The origins of the U-2 lay in the foresight of visionaries, such as
> Eastman Kodak's Richard S. Leghorn and the CIA's Richard M. Bissell
Jr.
> However, these men were helped behind the scenes by scientists who
> advised the government through various scientific panels.
>
> One such panel was known as the Beacon Hill Study Group. Chaired by
> Kodak physicist Carl Overhage, the group included James G. Baker and
> Edward Purcell from Harvard University, Allen F. Donovan from the
> Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Peter C. Goldmark from Columbia
> Broadcasting System Laboratories, Edwin H. Land of Polaroid Corp,
> Stewart Miller of Bell Laboratories, Richard S. Perkin of the Perkin-
> Elmer Co, and several other noted academicians and industry
scientists.
>
> The Beacon Hill members were chiefly interested in new approaches to
> aerial reconnaissance and high-resolution photography with the aim of
> improving intelligence collection. At the conclusion of its work in
> 1952, the group published a highly classified report that advocated
> innovative developments in photographic reconnaissance, as well as
> exploiting radar and the radio, microwave, and infrared bands.
>
> As is often the case with government studies, the recommendations of
> the Beacon Hill report were not adopted immediately. A year after the
> report's publication, the US Air Force created the Intelligence
Systems
> Panel (ISP) to implement the report. James G. Baker of Harvard College
> Observatory chaired the panel, which included several Beacon Hill
> members, among them Land, Overhage, Donovan, and Miller, and, at the
> insistence of the Air Force, CIA officers Edward Allen and Phillip
> Strong.
>
> ISP's work gained new momentum when US intelligence detected the
> detonation on 12 August 1953 of the Soviet Union's first hydrogen
bomb.
> ISP was persuaded about the merits of high-flying aircraft for
> surveillance, but the panel reported to the Air Force, which could not
> afford to develop such an aircraft. Support had to be found elsewhere.
>
> Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration was becoming increasingly
> concerned that the Soviet Union could mount a surprise attack. ISP
> members briefed the Office of Defense Mobilization's Science Advisory
> Committee, which was chaired by Lee DuBridge, president of Caltech. At
> the briefing, the ISP pointed out that existing intelligence systems
> could not provide warning of a surprise attack. DuBridge and the
> Science Advisory Committee, in turn, approached President Dwight D.
> Eisenhower about the issue. Eisenhower told the committee about his
> concerns about a Soviet surprise attack. He also told them about a new
> Soviet bomber, the Myasishchev-4 (code-named "Bison"), that appeared
> capable of delivering a hydrogen bomb. The president asked the
> committee to advise him on issues relating to defense and
intelligence-
> gathering.
>
> With this presidential mandate, DuBridge sought the help of MIT
> president James R. Killian to conduct a comprehensive scientific
review
> of the nation's defense capabilities. And in July 1954, Eisenhower
> asked Killian's panel to study the country's technical capabilities
and
> how they might be used for national defense. The outcome was the
> formation of the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP), which
> comprised 42 of the nation's leading scientists. TCP's intelligence
> subpanel later recommended the construction of what became the U-2 and
> further recommended that it be developed under the direction of the
> CIA.
>
> Inspired by TCP's example, the CIA formed its own scientific advisory
> group. Known as the Land Panel after its chairman, the group served
the
> CIA for many years.
>
> In 1956, Eisenhower formed another scientific advisory panel, the
Board
> of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which was chaired
by
> Killian. Under President John F. Kennedy, the board was renamed the
> President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, but Kennedy did not
> appoint it until shortly after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Since that
time,
> the board has served all presidents--except Jimmy Carter, who saw no
> use for it.
>
> By the late 1950s, Soviet air defenses had advanced to the point that
> high-flying aircraft were no longer invulnerable. Indeed, a U-2
piloted
> by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union in May
1960.
> Clearly, other means had to be developed to spy on the Soviet Union
and
> its allies. Fortunately, long before the shooting down of Powers's U-
2,
> the government had been investigating spying from space (see box
> below). In 1958, the government turned to satellite-based
> reconnaissance with a program known as Corona.
>
> Developing one of the first satellites was a daunting challenge. It
> took 13 launches until the first successful image was taken. However,
> one technical problem was so serious that it endangered the success of
> the program. A series of bright streaks appeared across the
satellite's
> acetate film, in some cases completely covering the film. Ironically,
> given the satellite's name, these streaks were coronal discharges
> caused by the buildup and release of static electricity aboard the
> spacecraft. But where did the static electricity originate? To solve
> the problem, scientists and engineers in the program were joined by
> scientists from academia, among them Luis Alvarez, Sidney Drell, and
> Malvin Ruderman.
>
> Working together, these scientists correctly identified that the
static
> discharge was a result of outgassing from the rubber rollers that
> transported the film through the camera. They also recommended a
series
> of corrective actions, ranging from better grounding of components on
> the spacecraft to vacuum testing of components before launch. These
> corrective actions solved the problem, and the techniques identified
by
> the panel are used on virtually all US reconnaissance satellites to
> this day. (For an overview of the Corona program, see Albert D.
> Wheelon's article "Corona: The First Reconnaissance Satellites,"
> Physics Today, February 1997, page 24.)
>
> ::: Signals Intelligence :::
>
> In 1998, Keith Hall, director of the National Reconnaissance Office
> (NRO), and Rear Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, director of Naval
> Intelligence, announced the declassification of the Galactic Radiation
> and Background (GRAB) satellite system, the first satellite system for
> signals surveillance, shown in figure 3.
>
> GRAB, as it can now be told, was a US Navy electronic intelligence
> (ELINT) satellite. Launched in June 1960 and operated until August
> 1962, GRAB obtained information on Soviet air defense radars, whose
> locations, deep within the Soviet Union, were inaccessible to Air
Force
> and Navy ELINT aircraft, which had to fly outside the borders of the
> Soviet bloc to avoid Soviet antiaircraft missiles.
>
> The GRAB satellite was proposed by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)
> in the spring of 1958 to support the intelligence needs of the Office
> of Naval Intelligence. The director of Naval Intelligence was in
charge
> of the program. With the concurrence of the Departments of State and
> Defense, as well as the CIA, President Eisenhower approved the project
> in August 1959. Security for the project was unusually tight. Fewer
> than 200 government officials knew about it. To maintain the project's
> low profile, the first GRAB satellites, the primary and a spare, were
> shipped to Cape Canaveral in an employee's station wagon.
>
> After NRL completed development of the GRAB satellite and established
a
> network of overseas ground collection sites, Eisenhower approved the
> first launch in May 1960, just four days after Powers was shot down.
>
> GRAB carried two electronic payloads, the classified ELINT package and
> an unclassified package of instrumentation to measure solar radiation.
> This latter package, known as the SolRad experiment, was publicly
> disclosed by the Department of Defense at the time and was used as the
> cover story for this and subsequent launches. The SolRad experiment
was
> not without merit. It provided measurements of solar radiation, which
> interested the Navy because of its effect on the ionosphere and,
hence,
> on high-frequency radio communications.
>
> Accommodating the two payloads within the modestly sized GRAB
> spacecraft was a tough technical challenge, as was limiting the power
> consumption of the spacecraft. To help conserve power, NRL engineers
> designed a timer circuit that powered down the GRAB payload 55 minutes
> after its detection phase. Thanks to the timer, data could be
collected
> over the Soviet Union, while battery power could be preserved when the
> satellite was over nontarget countries.
>
> GRAB beamed down the radar signals it intercepted to a series of small
> huts built near Soviet borders, where one- and two-man teams saved the
> information on magnetic tapes (figure 4). Couriers took the tapes to
> NRL, where the data were then evaluated, duplicated, and forwarded for
> analysis and processing to the National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort
> Meade, Maryland, and to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) at Offutt Air
> Force Base in Nebraska. SAC's processing was aimed at defining the
> characteristics and location of Soviet air defenses to support the
> development of SIOP (single integrated operations plan--the US plan
for
> nuclear war).
>
> Many technical challenges were encountered in the processing of the
> data, including severe wow and flutter and poor signal-to-noise
ratios.
> These problems were soon solved, but analysts were surprised by the
> greater-than-expected amount of data from the intercepts. Many
theories
> were considered to explain the abundance of data, among them the
> possibility that the satellite's bandwidth was greater than expected,
> that Soviet radars were stronger than believed, or that the satellite
> receiver's sensitivity was greater than advertised. In the end, the
> volume of data turned out to reflect the magnitude of the Soviet air
> defense system.
>
> In searching the tapes for new and unusual signals, NSA found that the
> Soviets were already operating a radar that supported a capability to
> destroy ballistic missiles. In addition, NSA discovered many more
> extremely powerful S-band radars than were expected, as well as many
> early warning, height-finding, and shipborne radars.
>
> The success of the GRAB program exemplifies the many contributions of
> NRL's talented scientists and engineers to the nation's defense. What
> is not generally known is that Richard Garwin, who was a researcher at
> IBM Corp's Thomas J. Watson Research Center, also played a key role in
> the GRAB program.
>
> The GRAB satellite detected radars as it passed within the line of
> sight of a transmitting radar system (figure 5). At an altitude of 500
> miles, GRAB's omnidirectional antenna could detect a radar's main
beam,
> using a crystal video receiver, anywhere within a 3500-mile swath.
> Radar pulses would be detected each time a radar's beam rotated until
> the satellite passed over the radar's vertical beamwidth. Then, as the
> satellite passed back into the radar's beamwidth, pulses would be
> detected until the satellite passed over the horizon.
>
> Because of its large beamwidth and omnidirectional antenna, GRAB's
> ability to locate radars was limited to country-sized areas. When
> briefed on this limitation and provided with technical details of the
> satellite, Garwin asked why there were small overlaps in the radio
> frequency bands of both the GRAB and its follow-on satellites. It
> turned out that this overlap was not a deliberate design feature, but
> an indirect consequence of the state of the art in receiver and filter
> design.
>
> Garwin was able to see some benefit in the overlap and proposed a
> technique that significantly increased the ability to locate Soviet
> radars. Using this technique, space-based systems could potentially
> locate radars to within areas the size of military districts.
>
> Garwin postulated that if more than one satellite could view a
> particular radar, then positional information could be greatly
refined.
> To obtain such refinement, very precise time coordination and
> measurement, as well as very accurate knowledge of satellite orbital
> dynamics, would be needed.
>
> Garwin's suggestion pioneered the exploitation of the time domain from
> space, and has been successfully applied to several overhead systems,
> including the global positioning system (GPS) for satellite
navigation.
>
> Although the technology of GRAB and other early satellites is now
> obsolete, the concept of having electronic surveillance from orbit
> continues to this day. Their technological capabilities and
unobtrusive
> nature make satellites one of the intelligence community's tools of
> choice for modern surveillance. Future satellite systems are being
> planned using modern techniques, such as synthetic aperture radar. The
> Discoverer II program is a joint project of the Defense Advanced
> Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Force, and the NRO. If
> approved, Discoverer II will, among other things, be able to spot
> moving targets on the ground and generate digital three-dimensional
> maps of the terrain.
>
> ::: Modern-Day Collaboration :::
>
> There are many more examples of collaboration between the science and
> intelligence communities. Unfortunately, most of the fruits of these
> collaborative efforts remain classified. However, several US
> intelligence agencies now have outside advisory panels, including the
> CIA, NRO, and NSA. And within these agencies, there are more
> specialized panels of outside advisers. One such panel is the
> Technology Advisory Group to the Applied Research and Technology
> Directorate in the NRO. This group, comprising scientists and
engineers
> outside of government, advises NRO on all of its research and
> development activities, as well as on NRO's future satellite concepts.
>
> One long-standing community-wide collaborative effort, established in
> 1960 and continuing to this day, is JASON. An independent problem-
> solving group, JASON is composed chiefly of scientists from leading
> academic institutions, all of whom have national security clearances.
> Most members of JASON are trained in physics and mathematics, but
> several other scientific disciplines are also represented, including
> astronomy, biology, chemistry, computer science, and various
> engineering disciplines. JASON's chief purpose is to provide
government
> managers with independent scientific and technical expertise to
address
> technical problems and challenges facing the intelligence and defense
> communities. JASON topics are selected based on the nature of the
> technical issue, the expertise available to address the issue, and the
> availability of JASON members to participate.
>
> JASON is sponsored by DARPA, but is supported by several elements of
> the intelligence community, including the CIA, NRO, the National
> Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Department of Energy, NASA, and other
> federal departments and agencies. The JASON program is administered by
> MITRE Corp.
>
> The members of JASON meet regularly with their government counterparts
> and conduct studies relating to intelligence and national security.
One
> recent study, a report on US nuclear testing, reached the following
> conclusion: The United States can, today, have high confidence in the
> safety, reliability, and performance margins of the nuclear weapons
> that are designated to remain in the enduring stockpile. This
> confidence is based on understanding gained from 50 years of
experience
> and analysis of more than 1000 nuclear tests, including the results of
> approximately 150 nuclear tests of modern weapon types in the past 20
> years.2 (For more about stockpile stewardship, see Raymond Jeanloz's
> article on page 44 of this issue.)
>
> Today, the intelligence community regularly consults JASON on
> scientific and technical approaches to overhead reconnaissance,
> technical surveillance, and arms control verification. Depending upon
> their classification, many JASON studies are published for broad
> intelligence community distribution in the Journal of Intelligence
> Community Research and Development. Recent reports include "Signatures
> of Biological Weapons," "Civilian Biodefense," "Fast Ships:
> Hydrodynamics of Fast Ocean Transport," and "Data Mining and the Human
> Genome."
>
> With the explosive growth in information technology (IT) and the
> emergence of Internet commerce, the intelligence community realized
> that its traditional means of collaboration were not enough. Not only
> was the government unable to compete with dot-coms for scientific and
> engineering talent, but also its usual pool of consultative support--
> the defense industry--was facing similar challenges in recruiting
> scientific and engineering talent.
>
> The CIA's traditional mission is intelligence collection, analysis,
and
> dissemination, not innovation in IT. In 1998, the CIA began studying
> how best to collaborate with the IT world. A year later, to provide
the
> CIA intelligence community with better access to technical personnel
> and emerging IT, the CIA funded a new nonprofit corporation, In-Q-Tel.
>
> The CIA envisions that In-Q-Tel will become its leading source of
> solutions to IT problems and an important contributor to the
> intelligence community at large. Through its In-Q-Tel Interface Center
> (QIC), the CIA will present intelligence-related problems to In-Q-Tel.
> From those problems, an annual set of intelligence-related problems is
> derived for In-Q-Tel to address. In defining these problems, QIC will
> collaborate with IT specialists from the CIA and the rest of the
> intelligence community, intelligence consumers, and In-Q-Tel's own
> scientists and software engineers. And in solving those problems, In-
Q-
> Tel expects to find the basis of potential products to develop and
> market.
>
> In-Q-Tel has offices in two locations: Washington, DC, and Menlo Park,
> California. It employs a small professional staff and a smaller group
> of business and technology consultants.3
>
> ::: The Future :::
>
> The US intelligence community must monitor the behavior of countries
> worldwide. Furthermore, it must have access to closed societies whose
> interests conflict with those of the US. Several countries are "of
> concern," and are typically categorized as being part of Woolsey's
> bewildering variety of poisonous snakes.
>
> To increase the intelligence community's collection and analysis
> capabilities, the CIA's current director, George Tenet, has
established
> a new process. Over the past several years, top experts on each
country
> have joined forces, developed collection plans, identified the most
> critical intelligence gaps, and developed strategies to close those
> gaps. Through such teamwork, intelligence customers have gained
> important insights into the societies that pose the greatest threats
to
> our own. Consequently, the intelligence community is better prepared
to
> support policymakers, military commanders, and law enforcement
> officials. The cross-discipline, cross-agency approach used in this
> process is likely to be the model for future efforts against difficult
> threats.4
>
> From biological and chemical warfare to terrorism and nuclear
> proliferation, the dangers facing the US today are far more complex
and
> challenging than those of the cold war. Dealing with these dangers
> requires a multifaceted approach that combines human intelligence,
> analytic prowess, and the best scientific and technical minds that the
> nation has to offer.
>
> At the beginning of the modern era of US intelligence, the
intelligence
> community realized that it could not go it alone--it had to work
> collaboratively with the scientific and academic communities to
produce
> the tools that, frankly, prevented a third world war by reducing the
> risk of uncertainty. From the U-2 to Corona, from GRAB to In-Q-Tel, to
> other systems that cannot be discussed, scientists and engineers both
> in and out of government have worked together to preserve the peace.
> Today, more than ever, as we face a bewildering array of threats and
> uncertainties, the need for collaboration between the intelligence
> community and academia--to develop new technical solutions to our most
> pressing problems and to bolster our technical expertise--is more
vital
> than ever before.
>
> *** The views in this article are those of the author and do not
> reflect the official policy or position of the Central Intelligence
> Agency, the intelligence community, or the US government. ***
>
> References:
>
> 1. For a detailed history of the U-2 program, see G. W. Pedlow, D. E.
> Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, 19541974, Center for the
Study
> of Intelligence, Washington, DC (1988). The book is now out of print,
> but it can be found on the Web at http://www.odci.gov/csi/books/U2/.
>
> 2. Nuclear Testing, (JASON Report JSR 3955-4803). Can be found in Arms
> Control Today, September 1995.
>
> 3. For more information about In-Q-Tel, see R. E. Yannuzzi, Defense
> Intelligence Journal 9 (1), (2000).
>
> 4. Annual Report on FY 1997 Intelligence Community Activities,
Director
> of Central Intelligence, 10 March 1998.
>
> Mark Moynihan works at the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley,
> Virginia.
>
> Sent via Deja.com
> http://www.deja.com/
>
Blue Resonant Human <brothe...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> ::: The Scientific Community and Intelligence Collection :::
>
> by Mark F. Moynihan
>
> Academic scientists continue to play a vital role in helping the
> intelligence community exploit technology for national security.
>
> "We have slain a large dragon. But we now live in a jungle filled with
> a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes."
> -R. James Woolsey, former director of the CIA, at his Senate
> confirmation hearing, March 1993.
>
> Jim Woolsey's statement before the US Senate presaged a dramatic shift
> in the way the US intelligence community collects intelligence. Before
> the end of the cold war, intelligence personnel almost exclusively
> focused on only one target: the Soviet Union. Now, however, they must
> pursue that bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And quite a
> challenge it is. From understanding the intentions of foreign leaders,
> such as Saddam Hussein, to detecting modern threats, such as those
> posed by bacteriological and chemical warfare, the challenges faced by
> the intelligence community push it to the very limits of its
> capabilities and expertise.
>
> The modern era of US intelligence collection began in World War II
with
> the formation of the precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency
> (CIA): the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). From that point on, the
> US intelligence community has recognized that it cannot succeed alone.
> Tackling hard intelligence problems requires the best and brightest
> minds from inside and outside the intelligence community. Battling
> Woolsey's poisonous snakes is a constant and troubling reality that
> requires our eternal vigilance. In retrospect, Secretary of State
Henry
> Lewis Stimson's remark, in 1929, that "gentlemen do not read each
> other's mail" seems to belong to a different world.
>
> Several years ago, I took part in a CIA recruiting drive at a job fair
> at the University of South Carolina. The most frequently asked
question
> from students was, Why does the CIA need scientists and engineers?
> Reflected in this question is the common notion of the CIA as an
> organization of espionage and covert operations. But if you examine
CIA
> history, you see an organization whose mission to inform US leaders
and
> protect US security has always depended on science and technology.
>
> ::: The War Years :::
>
> The father of the US scientific intelligence community was an
> industrial chemist named Stanley Lovell. One day in 1942, while
> crossing Boston Common, Lovell was approached by MIT President Karl T.
> Compton, who asked him to join the National Defense Research Committee
> (NDRC), a group of academics consulted by the government on the war
> effort. After some consideration--and the warning that if he did not
he
> would "regret all of your life if you refuse Uncle Sam now"--Lovell
> left his job as executive vice president of the Beckwith Manufacturing
> Co and reported to NDRC headquarters in Washington, DC.
>
> At NDRC, Lovell met Vannevar Bush, who gave his aides, including
> Lovell, the following challenge: "You are about to land at dead of
> night in a rubber raft on a German-held coast. Your mission is to
> destroy a vital enemy wireless station that is defended by armed
> guards, dogs, and searchlights. You can have with you any one weapon
> you can imagine. Describe that weapon."
>
> After some thought--and rejection of outlandish ideas, such as death
> rays--Lovell proposed a completely silent and flashless gun. His
> concept was selected by Bush, and he was told to report to an office
at
> 25th and E streets in northwest Washington. There, he met the director
> of OSS, Colonel William Donovan, who introduced himself and said, "You
> know your Sherlock Holmes, of course. Professor Moriarty is the man I
> want for my staff here at OSS. I think you're it." Although he
objected
> to the characterization of himself as Holmes's evil archenemy, Lovell
> accepted the position knowing the importance of the war effort.
Donovan
> stated one more thing: "No matter what you do or hear when you are
with
> me, I must have your word of honor that you'll write nothing until 20
> years from now." Lovell accepted. His OSS memoir, Of Spies and
> Stratagems, was published in 1963.
>
> After meeting Donovan, Lovell asked a colleague what exactly his job
> would be. "It is whatever you can make it," was the reply. "Colonel
> Donovan is a lawyer, not a scientist or an inventor. Never ask him
what
> to do. Do it and show him what you have done." Lovell's flashless gun
> was developed, and Donovan demonstrated it--in the Oval Office. Much
to
> the chagrin of the Secret Service, Donovan fired several shots into a
> nearby sandbag and handed the weapon, still hot, to President Franklin
> D. Roosevelt. Although quite surprised, Roosevelt stated that he had
> not heard a single shot.
>
> Thus, in the work of NDRC was born the integration of science into the
> US intelligence community. That partnership continues to this day, but
> its emphasis has shifted from tools of war to tools of knowledge--
tools
> that provide our leaders with greater knowledge and understanding and
> tools that buttress arms control agreements and reduce the possibility
> of conflict through misunderstanding.
>
> One such knowledge tool was the stroboscope, which was developed in
the
> 1920s and 1930s by Harold Edgerton, a professor of electrical
> engineering at MIT. In 1939, the US Army Air Corps asked Edgerton to
> design a strobe lamp powerful enough for use in nighttime aerial
> photography. This effort required the development of stroboscopes
> powered by large electrical capacitor banks to take photographs from
> altitudes of several thousand feet. Technically, the system worked,
but
> air crews were less than eager to fly over targets and take pictures
> while simultaneously revealing their position to antiaircraft
batteries
> on the ground. Another problem encountered was in the testing of the
> strobes before a mission. The heat generated by the stroboscopic flash
> often burned the tarmac, causing a plane's fuel tanks or its bombs to
> catch fire.
>
> Later, in 1944, Edgerton served in Italy, England, and France as a
> technical representative for the US Army Air Force. Edgerton's strobes
> were used in the nights immediately preceding the D day invasion of
> Normandy, during the Battle of Monte Cassino, and in campaigns in the
> Far East.
>
> Back in the US, the government's nuclear weapons program made use of
> Edgerton's expertise in the development of photographic
instrumentation
> for observing nuclear explosions. Edgerton's Rapatronic camera could
> record the earliest stages of a nuclear explosion: the formation and
> growth of its fireball, as shown in figure 1. The exposures were often
> as short as 10 nanoseconds, and each Rapatronic camera could take
> exactly one photograph. A bank of 410 or more Rapatronic cameras were
> arranged to record different phases of nuclear explosions. The images
> provided scientists and engineers with invaluable technical
> information.
>
> ::: Aerial and Satellite Reconnaissance :::
>
> Edgerton's photographic strobes were sufficient for aerial
> reconnaissance during World War II. With the advent of the cold war,
> however, more innovative--and clandestine--approaches were needed to
> gather intelligence about the Soviet Union and its allies. Security
> along the borders of the Soviet bloc severely hampered the
infiltration
> of spies, and traditional high-flying aircraft, such as the Boeing RB-
> 29 and RB-47 (see figure 2), although successful early on, soon became
> vulnerable to air defenses.
> Indeed, as early as 1949, the Soviet air force possessed MiG-15
> fighters capable of reaching an altitude of 51 000 feet. To elude
those
> interceptors, the US had to develop aircraft that could operate at
> altitudes of 65 000 feet or higher. Out of this requirement came the
U-
> 2 aircraft.1 A remarkable achievement for its time, the U-2 continues
> serving the US even now.
>
> The origins of the U-2 lay in the foresight of visionaries, such as
> Eastman Kodak's Richard S. Leghorn and the CIA's Richard M. Bissell
Jr.
> However, these men were helped behind the scenes by scientists who
> advised the government through various scientific panels.
>
> One such panel was known as the Beacon Hill Study Group. Chaired by
> Kodak physicist Carl Overhage, the group included James G. Baker and
> Edward Purcell from Harvard University, Allen F. Donovan from the
> Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Peter C. Goldmark from Columbia
> Broadcasting System Laboratories, Edwin H. Land of Polaroid Corp,
> Stewart Miller of Bell Laboratories, Richard S. Perkin of the Perkin-
> Elmer Co, and several other noted academicians and industry
scientists.
>
> The Beacon Hill members were chiefly interested in new approaches to
> aerial reconnaissance and high-resolution photography with the aim of
> improving intelligence collection. At the conclusion of its work in
> 1952, the group published a highly classified report that advocated
> innovative developments in photographic reconnaissance, as well as
> exploiting radar and the radio, microwave, and infrared bands.
>
> As is often the case with government studies, the recommendations of
> the Beacon Hill report were not adopted immediately. A year after the
> report's publication, the US Air Force created the Intelligence
Systems
> Panel (ISP) to implement the report. James G. Baker of Harvard College
> Observatory chaired the panel, which included several Beacon Hill
> members, among them Land, Overhage, Donovan, and Miller, and, at the
> insistence of the Air Force, CIA officers Edward Allen and Phillip
> Strong.
>
> ISP's work gained new momentum when US intelligence detected the
> detonation on 12 August 1953 of the Soviet Union's first hydrogen
bomb.
> ISP was persuaded about the merits of high-flying aircraft for
> surveillance, but the panel reported to the Air Force, which could not
> afford to develop such an aircraft. Support had to be found elsewhere.
>
> Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration was becoming increasingly
> concerned that the Soviet Union could mount a surprise attack. ISP
> members briefed the Office of Defense Mobilization's Science Advisory
> Committee, which was chaired by Lee DuBridge, president of Caltech. At
> the briefing, the ISP pointed out that existing intelligence systems
> could not provide warning of a surprise attack. DuBridge and the
> Science Advisory Committee, in turn, approached President Dwight D.
> Eisenhower about the issue. Eisenhower told the committee about his
> concerns about a Soviet surprise attack. He also told them about a new
> Soviet bomber, the Myasishchev-4 (code-named "Bison"), that appeared
> capable of delivering a hydrogen bomb. The president asked the
> committee to advise him on issues relating to defense and
intelligence-
> gathering.
>
> With this presidential mandate, DuBridge sought the help of MIT
> president James R. Killian to conduct a comprehensive scientific
review
> of the nation's defense capabilities. And in July 1954, Eisenhower
> asked Killian's panel to study the country's technical capabilities
and
> how they might be used for national defense. The outcome was the
> formation of the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP), which
> comprised 42 of the nation's leading scientists. TCP's intelligence
> subpanel later recommended the construction of what became the U-2 and
> further recommended that it be developed under the direction of the
> CIA.
>
> Inspired by TCP's example, the CIA formed its own scientific advisory
> group. Known as the Land Panel after its chairman, the group served
the
> CIA for many years.
>
> In 1956, Eisenhower formed another scientific advisory panel, the
Board
> of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which was chaired
by
> Killian. Under President John F. Kennedy, the board was renamed the
> President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, but Kennedy did not
> appoint it until shortly after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Since that
time,
> the board has served all presidents--except Jimmy Carter, who saw no
> use for it.
>
> By the late 1950s, Soviet air defenses had advanced to the point that
> high-flying aircraft were no longer invulnerable. Indeed, a U-2
piloted
> by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union in May
1960.
> Clearly, other means had to be developed to spy on the Soviet Union
and
> its allies. Fortunately, long before the shooting down of Powers's U-
2,
> the government had been investigating spying from space (see box
> below). In 1958, the government turned to satellite-based
> reconnaissance with a program known as Corona.
>
> Developing one of the first satellites was a daunting challenge. It
> took 13 launches until the first successful image was taken. However,
> one technical problem was so serious that it endangered the success of
> the program. A series of bright streaks appeared across the
satellite's
> acetate film, in some cases completely covering the film. Ironically,
> given the satellite's name, these streaks were coronal discharges
> caused by the buildup and release of static electricity aboard the
> spacecraft. But where did the static electricity originate? To solve
> the problem, scientists and engineers in the program were joined by
> scientists from academia, among them Luis Alvarez, Sidney Drell, and
> Malvin Ruderman.
>
> Working together, these scientists correctly identified that the
static
> discharge was a result of outgassing from the rubber rollers that
> transported the film through the camera. They also recommended a
series
> of corrective actions, ranging from better grounding of components on
> the spacecraft to vacuum testing of components before launch. These
> corrective actions solved the problem, and the techniques identified
by
> the panel are used on virtually all US reconnaissance satellites to
> this day. (For an overview of the Corona program, see Albert D.
> Wheelon's article "Corona: The First Reconnaissance Satellites,"
> Physics Today, February 1997, page 24.)
>
> ::: Signals Intelligence :::
>
> In 1998, Keith Hall, director of the National Reconnaissance Office
> (NRO), and Rear Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, director of Naval
> Intelligence, announced the declassification of the Galactic Radiation
> and Background (GRAB) satellite system, the first satellite system for
> signals surveillance, shown in figure 3.
>
> GRAB, as it can now be told, was a US Navy electronic intelligence
> (ELINT) satellite. Launched in June 1960 and operated until August
> 1962, GRAB obtained information on Soviet air defense radars, whose
> locations, deep within the Soviet Union, were inaccessible to Air
Force
> and Navy ELINT aircraft, which had to fly outside the borders of the
> Soviet bloc to avoid Soviet antiaircraft missiles.
>
> The GRAB satellite was proposed by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)
> in the spring of 1958 to support the intelligence needs of the Office
> of Naval Intelligence. The director of Naval Intelligence was in
charge
> of the program. With the concurrence of the Departments of State and
> Defense, as well as the CIA, President Eisenhower approved the project
> in August 1959. Security for the project was unusually tight. Fewer
> than 200 government officials knew about it. To maintain the project's
> low profile, the first GRAB satellites, the primary and a spare, were
> shipped to Cape Canaveral in an employee's station wagon.
>
> After NRL completed development of the GRAB satellite and established
a
> network of overseas ground collection sites, Eisenhower approved the
> first launch in May 1960, just four days after Powers was shot down.
>
> GRAB carried two electronic payloads, the classified ELINT package and
> an unclassified package of instrumentation to measure solar radiation.
> This latter package, known as the SolRad experiment, was publicly
> disclosed by the Department of Defense at the time and was used as the
> cover story for this and subsequent launches. The SolRad experiment
was
> not without merit. It provided measurements of solar radiation, which
> interested the Navy because of its effect on the ionosphere and,
hence,
> on high-frequency radio communications.
>
> Accommodating the two payloads within the modestly sized GRAB
> spacecraft was a tough technical challenge, as was limiting the power
> consumption of the spacecraft. To help conserve power, NRL engineers
> designed a timer circuit that powered down the GRAB payload 55 minutes
> after its detection phase. Thanks to the timer, data could be
collected
> over the Soviet Union, while battery power could be preserved when the
> satellite was over nontarget countries.
>
> GRAB beamed down the radar signals it intercepted to a series of small
> huts built near Soviet borders, where one- and two-man teams saved the
> information on magnetic tapes (figure 4). Couriers took the tapes to
> NRL, where the data were then evaluated, duplicated, and forwarded for
> analysis and processing to the National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort
> Meade, Maryland, and to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) at Offutt Air
> Force Base in Nebraska. SAC's processing was aimed at defining the
> characteristics and location of Soviet air defenses to support the
> development of SIOP (single integrated operations plan--the US plan
for
> nuclear war).
>
> Many technical challenges were encountered in the processing of the
> data, including severe wow and flutter and poor signal-to-noise
ratios.
> These problems were soon solved, but analysts were surprised by the
> greater-than-expected amount of data from the intercepts. Many
theories
> were considered to explain the abundance of data, among them the
> possibility that the satellite's bandwidth was greater than expected,
> that Soviet radars were stronger than believed, or that the satellite
> receiver's sensitivity was greater than advertised. In the end, the
> volume of data turned out to reflect the magnitude of the Soviet air
> defense system.
>
> In searching the tapes for new and unusual signals, NSA found that the
> Soviets were already operating a radar that supported a capability to
> destroy ballistic missiles. In addition, NSA discovered many more
> extremely powerful S-band radars than were expected, as well as many
> early warning, height-finding, and shipborne radars.
>
> The success of the GRAB program exemplifies the many contributions of
> NRL's talented scientists and engineers to the nation's defense. What
> is not generally known is that Richard Garwin, who was a researcher at
> IBM Corp's Thomas J. Watson Research Center, also played a key role in
> the GRAB program.
>
> The GRAB satellite detected radars as it passed within the line of
> sight of a transmitting radar system (figure 5). At an altitude of 500
> miles, GRAB's omnidirectional antenna could detect a radar's main
beam,
> using a crystal video receiver, anywhere within a 3500-mile swath.
> Radar pulses would be detected each time a radar's beam rotated until
> the satellite passed over the radar's vertical beamwidth. Then, as the
> satellite passed back into the radar's beamwidth, pulses would be
> detected until the satellite passed over the horizon.
>
> Because of its large beamwidth and omnidirectional antenna, GRAB's
> ability to locate radars was limited to country-sized areas. When
> briefed on this limitation and provided with technical details of the
> satellite, Garwin asked why there were small overlaps in the radio
> frequency bands of both the GRAB and its follow-on satellites. It
> turned out that this overlap was not a deliberate design feature, but
> an indirect consequence of the state of the art in receiver and filter
> design.
>
> Garwin was able to see some benefit in the overlap and proposed a
> technique that significantly increased the ability to locate Soviet
> radars. Using this technique, space-based systems could potentially
> locate radars to within areas the size of military districts.
>
> Garwin postulated that if more than one satellite could view a
> particular radar, then positional information could be greatly
refined.
> To obtain such refinement, very precise time coordination and
> measurement, as well as very accurate knowledge of satellite orbital
> dynamics, would be needed.
>
> Garwin's suggestion pioneered the exploitation of the time domain from
> space, and has been successfully applied to several overhead systems,
> including the global positioning system (GPS) for satellite
navigation.
>
> Although the technology of GRAB and other early satellites is now
> obsolete, the concept of having electronic surveillance from orbit
> continues to this day. Their technological capabilities and
unobtrusive
> nature make satellites one of the intelligence community's tools of
> choice for modern surveillance. Future satellite systems are being
> planned using modern techniques, such as synthetic aperture radar. The
> Discoverer II program is a joint project of the Defense Advanced
> Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Force, and the NRO. If
> approved, Discoverer II will, among other things, be able to spot
> moving targets on the ground and generate digital three-dimensional
> maps of the terrain.
>
> ::: Modern-Day Collaboration :::
>
> There are many more examples of collaboration between the science and
> intelligence communities. Unfortunately, most of the fruits of these
> collaborative efforts remain classified. However, several US
> intelligence agencies now have outside advisory panels, including the
> CIA, NRO, and NSA. And within these agencies, there are more
> specialized panels of outside advisers. One such panel is the
> Technology Advisory Group to the Applied Research and Technology
> Directorate in the NRO. This group, comprising scientists and
engineers
> outside of government, advises NRO on all of its research and
> development activities, as well as on NRO's future satellite concepts.
>
> One long-standing community-wide collaborative effort, established in
> 1960 and continuing to this day, is JASON. An independent problem-
> solving group, JASON is composed chiefly of scientists from leading
> academic institutions, all of whom have national security clearances.
> Most members of JASON are trained in physics and mathematics, but
> several other scientific disciplines are also represented, including
> astronomy, biology, chemistry, computer science, and various
> engineering disciplines. JASON's chief purpose is to provide
government
> managers with independent scientific and technical expertise to
address
> technical problems and challenges facing the intelligence and defense
> communities. JASON topics are selected based on the nature of the
> technical issue, the expertise available to address the issue, and the
> availability of JASON members to participate.
>
> JASON is sponsored by DARPA, but is supported by several elements of
> the intelligence community, including the CIA, NRO, the National
> Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Department of Energy, NASA, and other
> federal departments and agencies. The JASON program is administered by
> MITRE Corp.
>
> The members of JASON meet regularly with their government counterparts
> and conduct studies relating to intelligence and national security.
One
> recent study, a report on US nuclear testing, reached the following
> conclusion: The United States can, today, have high confidence in the
> safety, reliability, and performance margins of the nuclear weapons
> that are designated to remain in the enduring stockpile. This
> confidence is based on understanding gained from 50 years of
experience
> and analysis of more than 1000 nuclear tests, including the results of
> approximately 150 nuclear tests of modern weapon types in the past 20
> years.2 (For more about stockpile stewardship, see Raymond Jeanloz's
> article on page 44 of this issue.)
>
> Today, the intelligence community regularly consults JASON on
> scientific and technical approaches to overhead reconnaissance,
> technical surveillance, and arms control verification. Depending upon
> their classification, many JASON studies are published for broad
> intelligence community distribution in the Journal of Intelligence
> Community Research and Development. Recent reports include "Signatures
> of Biological Weapons," "Civilian Biodefense," "Fast Ships:
> Hydrodynamics of Fast Ocean Transport," and "Data Mining and the Human
> Genome."
>
> With the explosive growth in information technology (IT) and the
> emergence of Internet commerce, the intelligence community realized
> that its traditional means of collaboration were not enough. Not only
> was the government unable to compete with dot-coms for scientific and
> engineering talent, but also its usual pool of consultative support--
> the defense industry--was facing similar challenges in recruiting
> scientific and engineering talent.
>
> The CIA's traditional mission is intelligence collection, analysis,
and
> dissemination, not innovation in IT. In 1998, the CIA began studying
> how best to collaborate with the IT world. A year later, to provide
the
> CIA intelligence community with better access to technical personnel
> and emerging IT, the CIA funded a new nonprofit corporation, In-Q-Tel.
>
> The CIA envisions that In-Q-Tel will become its leading source of
> solutions to IT problems and an important contributor to the
> intelligence community at large. Through its In-Q-Tel Interface Center
> (QIC), the CIA will present intelligence-related problems to In-Q-Tel.
> From those problems, an annual set of intelligence-related problems is
> derived for In-Q-Tel to address. In defining these problems, QIC will
> collaborate with IT specialists from the CIA and the rest of the
> intelligence community, intelligence consumers, and In-Q-Tel's own
> scientists and software engineers. And in solving those problems, In-
Q-
> Tel expects to find the basis of potential products to develop and
> market.
>
> In-Q-Tel has offices in two locations: Washington, DC, and Menlo Park,
> California. It employs a small professional staff and a smaller group
> of business and technology consultants.3
>
> ::: The Future :::
>
> The US intelligence community must monitor the behavior of countries
> worldwide. Furthermore, it must have access to closed societies whose
> interests conflict with those of the US. Several countries are "of
> concern," and are typically categorized as being part of Woolsey's
> bewildering variety of poisonous snakes.
>
> To increase the intelligence community's collection and analysis
> capabilities, the CIA's current director, George Tenet, has
established
> a new process. Over the past several years, top experts on each
country
> have joined forces, developed collection plans, identified the most
> critical intelligence gaps, and developed strategies to close those
> gaps. Through such teamwork, intelligence customers have gained
> important insights into the societies that pose the greatest threats
to
> our own. Consequently, the intelligence community is better prepared
to
> support policymakers, military commanders, and law enforcement
> officials. The cross-discipline, cross-agency approach used in this
> process is likely to be the model for future efforts against difficult
> threats.4
>
> From biological and chemical warfare to terrorism and nuclear
> proliferation, the dangers facing the US today are far more complex
and
> challenging than those of the cold war. Dealing with these dangers
> requires a multifaceted approach that combines human intelligence,
> analytic prowess, and the best scientific and technical minds that the
> nation has to offer.
>
> At the beginning of the modern era of US intelligence, the
intelligence
> community realized that it could not go it alone--it had to work
> collaboratively with the scientific and academic communities to
produce
> the tools that, frankly, prevented a third world war by reducing the
> risk of uncertainty. From the U-2 to Corona, from GRAB to In-Q-Tel, to
> other systems that cannot be discussed, scientists and engineers both
> in and out of government have worked together to preserve the peace.
> Today, more than ever, as we face a bewildering array of threats and
> uncertainties, the need for collaboration between the intelligence
> community and academia--to develop new technical solutions to our most
> pressing problems and to bolster our technical expertise--is more
vital
> than ever before.
>
> *** The views in this article are those of the author and do not
> reflect the official policy or position of the Central Intelligence
> Agency, the intelligence community, or the US government. ***
>
> References:
>
> 1. For a detailed history of the U-2 program, see G. W. Pedlow, D. E.
> Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, 19541974, Center for the
Study
> of Intelligence, Washington, DC (1988). The book is now out of print,
> but it can be found on the Web at http://www.odci.gov/csi/books/U2/.
>
> 2. Nuclear Testing, (JASON Report JSR 3955-4803). Can be found in Arms
> Control Today, September 1995.
>
> 3. For more information about In-Q-Tel, see R. E. Yannuzzi, Defense
> Intelligence Journal 9 (1), (2000).
>
> 4. Annual Report on FY 1997 Intelligence Community Activities,
Director
> of Central Intelligence, 10 March 1998.
>
> Mark Moynihan works at the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley,
> Virginia.
>
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> http://www.deja.com/
>
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