Another NUKE bites the dust ...
Robert L. Howard
A few points.....
[ This was quoted material ]
>JAPANESE PLANT BARELY AVERTS CORE MELTDOWN
"Barely" What does that mean? The headline warns me right away
that this may be sensationalized.
>TOKYO (AP) -- A mistaken flip of a switch by a nuclear power plant
>worker caused a reactor's cooling pumps to fail, a government official
>said Wednesday, but an emergency system took over and prevented a
>nuclear meltdown.
Well, the emergency system worked...
>The automatic activation of the emergency cooling system prevented
>radiation from being released by the plant in the Fukushima district,
>70 miles northeast of Tokyo.
I don't know that this follows logically. It's sort of like saying
"Plant operates normally. No radiation released today. Film at 11"
Now, *perhaps* a leak could have occured in this accident but then
again maybe it wouldn't have....
>Local officials sharply criticized the Tokyo Electric Power Co., the
>plants owner, for not notifying residents for hours about the
>emergency shutdown of the 18-year-old reactor.
What are they supposed to do? Have strobe lights and klaxons
go off everytime some reading wavers? The emergency backup
systems worked! Everyone was safe!
>It was the first shutdown using the emergency system since Japan's
>worst nuclear accident, at Mihama in western Japan in February 1991,
>when a small amount of radioactivity was released into the atmosphere.
Aarrgghhh....radioactivity! We're all going to die!
What is a small amount? Even TMI's releases wer pretty insignificant.
[ This is EMS speaking ]
>There you have it. All the things that cause one pause about
>a nuclear plant in the back yard.
>One guy makes a mistake, and per the article, the plant is one system
>away from a meltdown. Then the folks who are in charge don't bother
>to tell the public for the better part of a day...
Well, that's why they had that system too. The system worked, I
don't see any point in notifying people (or calling out the
national guard, etc.)
Note too that this was an 18 year old reactor. I bet you can't
even make that kind mistake on a US plant anymore (even older
ones probably have had that switch / computer controller modified
5 times over).
>The article may be wrong, but that type of article is why the non-nukers
>take a bit of a circumspect view of a nuke in every village ...
Considering, I'd much rather have the nuke plant than about a hundred
other kinds of industrial facilities I can think of...
Robert
--
| Robert L. Howard | Georgia Tech Research Institute |
| robert...@matd.gatech.edu | MATD Laboratory |
| (404) 528-7165 | Atlanta, Georgia 30332 |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
| "See, when the GOVERNMENT spends money, it creates jobs; whereas when |
| the money is left in the hands of TAXPAYERS, God only knows what they |
| do with it. Bake it into pies, probably. Anything to avoid creating |
| jobs." -- Dave Barry |
mor...@ramblr.enet.dec.com
>From the Oct 1 San Jose Murkey News, page 14A, dateline TOKYO (AP)
>
>Quoted without permission:
>
>*** BEGIN EXCERPTED QUOTE *** (elipsis ... denote deletions)
>
>JAPANESE PLANT BARELY AVERTS CORE MELTDOWN
[ridiculous sensationalist story deleted]
Another recent example of how the media goes loony when anything 'nuclear'
goes wrong:
I heard this from someone who is on the emergency response team of a major
corporation, which runs a nuclear research center. At another location,
MegaCorporation has a laboratory building, which due to the history of
the building the employees still call the building "Nuclear", because it
either was used for nuclear procedures in the past or had a NMR (MRI)
machine in it (I didn't quite catch this). It has nothing nuclear now.
Anyway, they have a smallish fire in "Nuclear" Building. The Emergency
Response team was using 2 way radios for their normal communication, referring
to the building as "Nuclear", and occasionally using a choice phrase such as
"Shut down cooling water to Nuclear" (meaning the air conditioning water). A
local TV station apparently was monitoring all this, called the nuclear
research center and DEMANDED to know the status of the meltdown there, and
practically chewed out the poor person who answered the phone when they told
them they knew nothing of any meltdown there. They apparently called around
trying to get information, upsetting many people who knew nothing about any
problem and getting chewed out for "covering up".
(even if there was a problem at the nuclear research center, all the chatter
would be on another frequency)
-Mike
E. Michael Smith
Quoted without permission:
*** BEGIN EXCERPTED QUOTE *** (elipsis ... denote deletions)
JAPANESE PLANT BARELY AVERTS CORE MELTDOWN
Backup system cools reactor after switch is flipped by mistake
TOKYO (AP) -- A mistaken flip of a switch by a nuclear power plant
worker caused a reactor's cooling pumps to fail, a government official
said Wednesday, but an emergency system took over and prevented a
nuclear meltdown.
The automatic activation of the emergency cooling system prevented
radiation from being released by the plant in the Fukushima district,
70 miles northeast of Tokyo.
Local officials sharply criticized the Tokyo Electric Power Co., the
plants owner, for not notifying residents for hours about the
emergency shutdown of the 18-year-old reactor.
"The case is very serious because it triggered (the emergency
core-cooling system)," said Jinzaburo Takagi, a physicist who
heads the Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, an anti-nuclear group.
It was the first shutdown using the emergency system since Japan's
worst nuclear accident, at Mihama in western Japan in February 1991,
when a small amount of radioactivity was released into the atmosphere.
Tuesday's accident, at the number 2 reactor of Fukushima Nuclear
Plant No. 1, involved a 784-megawatt light-water rector, the most
widely used reactor design in the world.
[...]
The emergency system that went into effect at the plant is the last
reliable defense against a core meltdown. The system pours cooling
water onto a reactor's nuclear fuel rods to prevent them from
reaching dangerously high temperatures.
[...]
Tuesdays accident was caused when a plant operator reportedly flipped a
switch by mistake. That informed the control computer that a backup
water pump was operating when it actually was not, said Ryuko Fujii,
chief of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's nuclear
safety division.
*** END QUOTED MATERIAL ***
There you have it. All the things that cause one pause about
a nuclear plant in the back yard.
One guy makes a mistake, and per the article, the plant is one system
away from a meltdown. Then the folks who are in charge don't bother
to tell the public for the better part of a day...
The article may be wrong, but that type of article is why the non-nukers
take a bit of a circumspect view of a nuke in every village ...
--
E. Michael Smith e...@apple.COM
'Whatever you can do, or dream you can, begin it. Boldness has
genius, power and magic in it.' - Goethe
I am not responsible nor is anyone else. Everything is disclaimed.
Cameron Randale Bass
>From the Oct 1 San Jose Murkey News, page 14A, dateline TOKYO (AP)
>
>Quoted without permission:
>
>*** BEGIN EXCERPTED QUOTE *** (elipsis ... denote deletions)
>
>JAPANESE PLANT BARELY AVERTS CORE MELTDOWN
>
>Backup system cools reactor after switch is flipped by mistake
>
>TOKYO (AP) -- A mistaken flip of a switch by a nuclear power plant
>worker caused a reactor's cooling pumps to fail, a government official
>said Wednesday, but an emergency system took over and prevented a
>nuclear meltdown.
CHARLOTTESVILLE (notAP) -- This is what is supposed to happen.
dale bass
--
C. R. Bass cr...@virginia.edu
Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia (804) 924-7926
Paul Dietz
>>The automatic activation of the emergency cooling system prevented
>>radiation from being released by the plant in the Fukushima district,
>>70 miles northeast of Tokyo.
>
>I don't know that this follows logically. It's sort of like saying
>"Plant operates normally. No radiation released today. Film at 11"
...
In contrast, the following story was also on the news wires...
"Three missing, presumed dead in Indiana power plant fire"
SULLIVAN, Ind. (UPI) -- Three people were missing and presumed
dead Monday afternoon after fire raced through a power generating
station at Merom along the Wabash River in western Indiana. ...
This was a fossil fuel plant, and they did not die from
exposure to ionizing radiation. I am sure their families are
overjoyed at their good fortune.
Paul F. Dietz
di...@cs.rochester.edu
E. Michael Smith
>>JAPANESE PLANT BARELY AVERTS CORE MELTDOWN
>
>"Barely" What does that mean? The headline warns me right away
>that this may be sensationalized.
Just a (meta?)explanatory note: I'm not able to 'explain' the article.
It is what it is, whatever the author of it meant.
Neither am I endorsing it nor denying it.
I posted it only as an example of what is 'typically' written in
the general press about a nuclear accident. If it has errors, please
point them out (as if encouragement was needed ...). But also note
that this is what has to be overcome for nuclear to be accepted
in every back yard ...
>>TOKYO (AP) -- A mistaken flip of a switch by a nuclear power plant
>>worker caused a reactor's cooling pumps to fail, a government official
>>said Wednesday, but an emergency system took over and prevented a
>>nuclear meltdown.
>
>Well, the emergency system worked...
Maybe part of the problem is terminology. 'Emergency' system? If
it is a 'normal' activity of the plant, then should it be called
an 'emergency' system? Would anyone be nearly as worried if it
were called 'secondary cooling system'? 'Redundant cooling system'?
'Spare cooling system'? 'Passive cooling system'? ...
>>Local officials sharply criticized the Tokyo Electric Power Co., the
>>plants owner, for not notifying residents for hours about the
>>emergency shutdown of the 18-year-old reactor.
>
>What are they supposed to do? Have strobe lights and klaxons
>go off everytime some reading wavers? The emergency backup
>systems worked! Everyone was safe!
Ahh... but it is a 'rare' event for the ECCS to be used. Not exactly
and everyday reading wavering ... AND it was an 'emergency', by
definition ... The analogy is like a 747 that loses 2 engines and
still limps back to the airport. Not quite a 'normal' situation
and, by implication, close to disaster. If that isn't the case,
then why feed the analogy with terms like Emergency Core Cooling System?
>>It was the first shutdown using the emergency system since Japan's
>>worst nuclear accident, at Mihama in western Japan in February 1991,
>>when a small amount of radioactivity was released into the atmosphere.
>
>Aarrgghhh....radioactivity! We're all going to die!
>
>What is a small amount? Even TMI's releases wer pretty insignificant.
I read 'small' as 'not to worry, but there could have been more if
things got really radical, then you should really worry' which causes
some folks to start worrying right now... If 'small' doesn't imply
that 'large' is possible, then there is another PR issue to work...
>[ This is EMS speaking ]
>
>>There you have it. All the things that cause one pause about
>>a nuclear plant in the back yard.
>
>>One guy makes a mistake, and per the article, the plant is one system
>>away from a meltdown. Then the folks who are in charge don't bother
>>to tell the public for the better part of a day...
>
>Well, that's why they had that system too. The system worked, I
>don't see any point in notifying people (or calling out the
>national guard, etc.)
Is the article correct that there was no additional system after this
to prevent a core meltdown?
Is the article correct in the implication that a core meltdown is
a Bad Thing and would cause people to suffer Bad Things? If not,
then how do you communicate that a core meltdown is not a Bad Thing?
Perhaps we have a failure of terminology here, too? Instead of
core meltdown, would things be as 'bad' if it were 'core overheat'
or 'fuel integrity loss'? Would it even be possible to substitute
a new term without suffering terrible PR flak for 'NewSpeak'?
>>The article may be wrong, but that type of article is why the non-nukers
>>take a bit of a circumspect view of a nuke in every village ...
>
>Considering, I'd much rather have the nuke plant than about a hundred
>other kinds of industrial facilities I can think of...
Can you explain WHY the article doesn't cause you concern and WHAT
the article said that is wrong or misleading? (Or just panders to
a misperception by the public?) Then you will have a handle on
where to begin to salvage the future for nuclear power.
>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
>| "See, when the GOVERNMENT spends money, it creates jobs; whereas when |
>| the money is left in the hands of TAXPAYERS, God only knows what they |
>| do with it. Bake it into pies, probably. Anything to avoid creating |
>| jobs." -- Dave Barry |
I LOVE this! Great .sig! An excellent example of how Econ is corrupted
in the hands of GovtSpeak. (WE create jobs, YOU squander wealth ...;-)
E. Michael Smith
In article <1992Oct6.0...@michael.apple.com> e...@michael.apple.com (E. Michael Smith) writes:
>>e...@michael.apple.com (E. Michael Smith) writes:
>>>One guy makes a mistake, and per the article, the plant is one system
>>>away from a meltdown.
>Is the article correct in the implication that a core meltdown is
>a Bad Thing and would cause people to suffer Bad Things? If not,
>then how do you communicate that a core meltdown is not a Bad Thing?
>Perhaps we have a failure of terminology here, too? Instead of
>core meltdown, would things be as 'bad' if it were 'core overheat'
>or 'fuel integrity loss'? Would it even be possible to substitute
>a new term without suffering terrible PR flak for 'NewSpeak'?
Another question: Is there a reactor design that CANNOT have a
core meltdown? (I think I remember that the HTGCR is designed
so that it stabilizes at a non-melt temperature...).
If a meltdown is defined as a disaster, then a plant that cannot have
a meltdown would be a much easier system to sell...
I like the idea put forward by John De Armond for a string of several
small nuke plants feeding one large turbine house (lets you have some nice
throtling, maintenance, and shutdown modes, if the economies of scale
work out). If each were 'unable to have a meltdown' and 'passively
safe' with no 'emergency cooling systems' required, I think one would
be a long way toward solving the 'sensation' problem...
John De Armond
>From the Oct 1 San Jose Murkey News, page 14A, dateline TOKYO (AP)
>Quoted without permission:
>*** BEGIN EXCERPTED QUOTE *** (elipsis ... denote deletions)
>JAPANESE PLANT BARELY AVERTS CORE MELTDOWN
>*** END QUOTED MATERIAL *** (thankfully)
>There you have it. All the things that cause one pause about
>a nuclear plant in the back yard.
>One guy makes a mistake, and per the article, the plant is one system
>away from a meltdown. Then the folks who are in charge don't bother
>to tell the public for the better part of a day...
>The article may be wrong, but that type of article is why the non-nukers
>take a bit of a circumspect view of a nuke in every village ...
Funny reaction, Mike. Based on what you've heard from us on the net,
your instinct SHOULD have been to wonder just how inaccurate the news
report was. Frankly I've not seen worse reporting since TMI.
I really have no idea what happened. The "facts" presented fit nothing
I know about a nuclear plant. Japan is a big fan of Westinghouse so
it almost surely was a Big W unit. I'll call a friend at INPO
tomorrow and see what I can find out.
I don't even know where to start taking this one apart. Let's see.
No way I know of for an operator to dummy in a false permissive.
A technician could by manipulating wires, but only after clearing some access
control points that are opened only under procedural control. Don't know
what "plant's cooling pumps" are. Maybe the reactor coolant circulating
pumps? Tripping these would cause a routine ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling
System) activation. Nothing in the CVCC or makeup system, the only
other systems communicating with the primary during normal operation,
could do it. In the distorted media's sense of how things work,
it MIGHT have been a secondary feedwater pump trip. Kinda seems likely
now that I think of it.
Some background. Assume a Westinghouse PWR. The concept of Defence in
Depth dictates there be multiple heat sinks for the reactor. The NORMAL
heat sink is the turbine and/or condenser. Heat flows through the primary
system, boils water in the secondary system and steam carries heat out
of the containment. If the turbine trips, steam is routed directly
to the condenser in what is known as bypass mode. The turbine/condenser
is also the ONLY NORMAL heat sink during shutdown. The normal shutdown
mode is to trip the reactor (and because some obscurities from TMI Lessons
Learned, also the turbine) and bypass steam to the condenser. The
reactor coolant pumps (RCP)(devices that circulate coolant from the reactor
to the steam generators) are left on. They input about 10 MWT in pumping
loss and the reactor inputs another 100 MWt or so dropping rapidly
to about 10 MWt 10 minutes after rod insertion. As the energy content
in the primary drops, both the primary pressure and the steam pressure
drop. At some predeterminad point the RCPs are stopped. When the
primary pressure reaches about 400 psi (from a normal 2250 psi), the steam
dump is secured and the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system is activated.
This takes the reactor to cold shutdown and continuously removes decay
heat.
The only part of the above chain that is considered safety-related is
the RHR system. Feedwater is not, RCPs are not (though there's been talk
about making RCPs safety-related.)
If the main heatsink is gone (feedwater pumps off, condenser unavailable,
etc), then the aux feedwater pumps, which are safety-related, start.
Any of these pumps, typically 3 - two electric and one steam driven -
can supply enough feedwater to remove shutdown heat. THe steam is simply
dumped to the atmosphere (non-radioactive) via the atmospheric dumps.
IF the feedwater pumps trip or something else causes loss of
normal heatsink, (what I SUSPECT happened here), the pressure
and temperature spike in the primary system will cause the
Emergency Core Cooling System to activate. ECCS is fired on
high or low pressurizer level, high rate of change of
pressurizer level, low reactor coolant temperature, low primary
pressure and a few other things I cannot remember. The first
line of defence in the ECCS is the Safety Injection System
(SIS). This consists of multiple redundant high pressure, high
flow (hundreds of GPM) centrifugal pumps capable of pumping into
the full reactor pressure head. Another pump, a high pressure
positive displacement pump called the Charging Pump, is pressed
into emergency service. This pump is run on high speed to
deliver about 100 GPM and is capable of up to about 5000 psi
service.
The typical procedure is for the operator to determine what caused
the ECCS actuation and then shut down those parts not needed. The
Charging Pump can supply enough water for small break LOCAs (like
TMI) while the SIS can supply enough flow to cool the reactor during
the magical, mythical double-ended guillotine break. Both SIS and CP
can be aligned to take suction from a number of sources. The normal
source is the CVCC (chemical and volume control) storage tank that
contains heated, borated water. When that is empty, suction is switched
to the reactor building sump for recirculation mode. If that fails,
the condensate storage tank, used to hold deionized water for the
steam side, can be sourced. About 2 million gallons worth. If that fails,
then the pumps can draw from river water.
If the break/leak is large enough the SIS cannot maintain head, when the
pressure drops to about 400 psi, the RHR system can be switched in for
emergency mode. These pumps take suction from the same places in
the same sequence.
If the break is large enough that the pressure does drop, the next
line of defence is the passive accumulator system. this constists of
nothing more than a couple of 50,000 gallon tanks filled with borated
water and pressurized to about 2000 psi under nitrogen. they are
connected to but separated from the reactor system by checkvalves.
When the pressure drops, the checkvalves open and the contents dump into
the reactor.
So far we have three layers of protection, the SIS, the accumulators
and the RHR. I've not mentioned the Component Cooling System which has
an emergency cooling mode. Couple more I can't recall the names of.
My best guess is the operator did something to trip the feedwater pumps
which caused a semi-routine ECCS activation. They determined what
caused it and secured it. What we'd have called a "Green Book Event"
at Sequoyah. (named because of the succession from white (normal),
green (not normal), yellow (serious), and red (head for the hills))
Claiming the core was one system away from a meltdown is like saying
that after someone pulls out in front of you and you use your brakes
normally to slow down, you then say you were one brake application
away from death.
[Editorial mode on]
Mike, I know you like to post ridiculous stuff just to stir
shit. Is this one of those occasions? I hope you're not stupid
enough to take seriously what you posted, as indicated in your
trailer. Whatever, I've had enough. I've typed my last
multipage treatise to try to counter this ignorance. It's
futile. (Using "you" collectively now) You'll believe this kind of
shit for the same reason you'll read and believe the National
Enquirer. You want to find a Martian around every corner and a
conspiracy under every rock. So be it. I'm going to leave it to
you to get your nuclear info from the likes of Yackadamn. He's
the arm-chair expert, after all. I don't care anymore. I've
been out of the business for almost a decade and I've nothing to
lose or gain either way. I make enough money and am crafty
enough that I don't have to worry about energy costs. If there's
any energy to be had, I'll have what I need. If you want to
spend your time installing CFs and packing cracks and such
because you can't afford your power rate, that's fine with me.
We of the industry did our dead-level best to give you power
that approached that ideal of being too cheap to meter. We have an
unblemished safety record (yes, even TMI was a safety success of the
first order) and yet you rejected it, perferring to fear things that
don't EVEN go BUMP in the night. You get what you deserve.
I once had a plant manager tell me "If the public wants us to burn cow
shit at a dollar a KWH, we'll do it. No more fighting. I get paid the same
regardless." My attitude exactly.
AMF,
John
--
John De Armond, WD4OQC |Interested in high performance mobility?
Performance Engineering Magazine (TM) |
Marietta, Ga |Interested in high tech and computers?
j...@dixie.com |Write me about PE Magazine
Need Usenet public Access in Atlanta? Write Me for info on Dixie.com.
Jeremy Whitlock
*** BEGIN QUOTE***
JAPANESE CAR BARELY AVERTS CAR CRASH
HAMILTON, ONT. (crAP) -- A morning commuter reached for his coffee while
driving along Hwy. 99 today, taking his eyes off the road and failing to
notice a crowd of pre-schoolers crossing the road ahead of him. Looking
up, he applied the brakes and took emergency swerving steps, thus barely
avoiding a major Plowdown. Nobody was hurt, and the car (a Toyota Tercel,
one of the more popular cars on the road today) will require
minor repairs to its right tie-rod after hitting the curb during the
swerving maneuver.
A spokesman for Citizens Against Cars asked why this near-accident was not
reported to them immediately. "It's a significant near-accident," he said,
"because the Emergency Swerving Maneuver had to be used."
*** END QUOTE ***
There you have it. All the things that cause one pause about having cars
on our streets.
One guy makes a mistake, and per the article, the car is one system
away from a plowdown. Then the folks who are in charge don't bother
to tell the public for the better part of a day...
--
Jeremy Whitlock "My thoughts are mine, not Mac's"
Dept. Engineering Physics
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
Jeremy Whitlock
>Another question: Is there a reactor design that CANNOT have a
>core meltdown? (I think I remember that the HTGCR is designed
>so that it stabilizes at a non-melt temperature...).
We cannot really use the word "cannot", but the CANDU is one type of reactor
with an extremely low probability of having a meltdown. This is primarily
due to the presence of a separate, low-pressure, low-temperature moderator
(heavy water) which is massive in proportion to the fuel and coolant volume,
and which acts as a heat sink if fuel ever overheats.
Anmar Caves
>In article <rhoward.718317620@matd> rho...@matd.gatech.edu (Robert L. Howard) writes:
>
>>>The automatic activation of the emergency cooling system prevented
>>>radiation from being released by the plant in the Fukushima district,
>>>70 miles northeast of Tokyo.
>>
>>I don't know that this follows logically. It's sort of like saying
>>"Plant operates normally. No radiation released today. Film at 11"
>
>...
>
>In contrast, the following story was also on the news wires...
>
> "Three missing, presumed dead in Indiana power plant fire"
>
> SULLIVAN, Ind. (UPI) -- Three people were missing and presumed
> dead Monday afternoon after fire raced through a power generating
> station at Merom along the Wabash River in western Indiana. ...
>
I also heard on the Radio this morn that 34 were injured. Meanwhile,
I have yet to fall off my roof, or get hit by a falling solar panel.
I do stand a risk of developing skin cancer if I expose myself to my
power source for too long, but it gives me such a nice tan :-)
Go fusion!
--
Anmar Mirza # Mayor of Dogspit, IN #My Opinions! NotIU's! #Purveyor of
EMT-D # Located somewhere in # Legalize Explosives! #nontraditional
N9ISY (tech) # the Outback of the #I've got my own fusion#family values
Networks Tech.# Mirza Ranch.C'mon over#plant. Just ask me. #Space For Rent
Steinn Sigurdsson
From the Oct 1 San Jose Murkey News, page 14A, dateline TOKYO (AP)
Quoted without permission:
*** BEGIN EXCERPTED QUOTE *** (elipsis ... denote deletions)
JAPANESE PLANT BARELY AVERTS CORE MELTDOWN
Backup system cools reactor after switch is flipped by mistake
...
The article may be wrong, but that type of article is why the non-nukers
take a bit of a circumspect view of a nuke in every village ...
Fascinating choice of deletions, the Sentinel also published the AP
story along with the 18 worst nuclear accidents, what it boiled down
to is that nothing happened, nobody was hurt, the core remained
covered and cooled and 16 of the 18 other incidents listed were
non-events as far as harm to the public goes (exceptions were
Chernobyl and Windscale). You are right though, this sort of article
is precisely why people are afraid of things nuclear.
* Steinn Sigurdsson Lick Observatory *
* ste...@lick.ucsc.edu "standard disclaimer" *
* Just because there's a reason *
* Doesn't mean it's understood Specials, 1979 *
Don Palmrose
>
> Is the article correct that there was no additional system after this
> to prevent a core meltdown?
>
> Is the article correct in the implication that a core meltdown is
> a Bad Thing and would cause people to suffer Bad Things? If not,
> then how do you communicate that a core meltdown is not a Bad Thing?
>
> Perhaps we have a failure of terminology here, too? Instead of
> core meltdown, would things be as 'bad' if it were 'core overheat'
> or 'fuel integrity loss'? Would it even be possible to substitute
> a new term without suffering terrible PR flak for 'NewSpeak'?
>
> the article said that is wrong or misleading? (Or just panders to
> a misperception by the public?) Then you will have a handle on
> where to begin to salvage the future for nuclear power.
>
>
What is missing from the article is this: to have a meltdown, the fuel must
go above a certain temperature which is either its melting point or the point
at which steam/zirconium reaction begins. At no time in the article was the
temperature margin to failure even mentioned. My guess is that once the
reactor scramed due to the pump being inadvertenly turned off and the ECC
activated, core temperature WENT DOWN! Plus, having the ECC turn on is a
safety precaution incase none of the reactor coolant pumps could not be turned
back on. Since this was an operator error, I am certain that the operators
verified their margins to safety, cutback on the ECC system, and then restored
the plant to a normal shutdown operating line-up.
Again I am willing to bet that no safety margins even decreased during this
whole incident. Thus, the hysteria generated by the article is completely
and absolutely unfounded. Just another reason why many anti-nukes cannot be
trusted since they are not concerned with the truth but rather with pursuing
their own politically correct plans for telling the rest of us what is good
for us.
Don Palmrose
========== long legal disclaimer follows, press n to skip ===========
Neither the United States Government or the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory or any of their employees, makes any warranty, whatsoever,
implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility regarding any
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and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
e...@ccu.umanitoba.ca
>I also heard on the Radio this morn that 34 were injured. Meanwhile,
>I have yet to fall off my roof, or get hit by a falling solar panel.
Isn't falling off ladders a major cause of accidental death?
Robert Thompson
>In article <1992Oct6.0...@michael.apple.com> e...@michael.apple.com (E. Michael Smith) writes:
>
>>Another question: Is there a reactor design that CANNOT have a
>>core meltdown? (I think I remember that the HTGCR is designed
>>so that it stabilizes at a non-melt temperature...).
>
>We cannot really use the word "cannot", but the CANDU is one type of reactor
>with an extremely low probability of having a meltdown. This is primarily
>due to the presence of a separate, low-pressure, low-temperature moderator
>(heavy water) which is massive in proportion to the fuel and coolant volume,
>and which acts as a heat sink if fuel ever overheats.
Most of the advanced light-water reactor designs put forth as the
next generation of power plant design are "inherently safe" designs;
that is even in the event of all-rods-out major LOCA there is enough
water left in the vessel and containment to absorb the decay heat--
i.e. huge thermal sink. This is achieved in a number of ways I
can't really remember right off the top of my head--I'm taking
shielding this semester. Also the integral fast reactor being
developed by the folks at Argonned National Lab is another
inherently safe design. This liquid-sodium cooled, pool-type reactor
has enough thermal capacity in the liquid Na pool, in combination
with natural convection off the vessel walls, to absord decay heat.
By the way the all-rods-out scenario means literally the operators
pull the rods out and walk away from the plant. Natural reactivity
effects keep the pile sub-critical.
--Another environmentalist for nuclear energy--
Mike Smith
It is worth noting that I saw 'film at 11' of the fossil fuel plant
on the nightly news complete with 'choppers' rescuing folks from
the rooftop; yet saw not a word about the Japanese nuke on the
nightly TV news ... only on the 11th page of the paper... Could it
be that the news media did, in fact, cover the two accidents in
an appropriate ratio?
Mike Smith
>e...@michael.apple.com (E. Michael Smith) writes:
>>From the Oct 1 San Jose Murkey News, page 14A, dateline TOKYO (AP)
>>JAPANESE PLANT BARELY AVERTS CORE MELTDOWN
>>*** END QUOTED MATERIAL *** (thankfully)
>
>>There you have it. All the things that cause one pause about
>>a nuclear plant in the back yard.
>
>>One guy makes a mistake, and per the article, the plant is one system
>>away from a meltdown. Then the folks who are in charge don't bother
>>to tell the public for the better part of a day...
>
>>The article may be wrong, but that type of article is why the non-nukers
>>take a bit of a circumspect view of a nuke in every village ...
>
>Funny reaction, Mike.
How so? I see an article that I think is a bit simplistic, but
where I'm in no position to evaluate it fairly, and post it for
others to comment on. I flag that the article may, in my oppinion,
be wrong, but also note that even if it is wrong, it is a good
example of how wrong journalism can cause problems for the nuclear
industry (the implication being that a way needs to be found to
reduce or counter such wrong articles). Seems reasonable to me.
I'm just trying not to particularly take sides on this one while
hoping to see the article ripped to shreds so that I can learn
a bit more from observing the process ;-)
>Based on what you've heard from us on the net,
>your instinct SHOULD have been to wonder just how inaccurate the news
>report was.
And my instinct DID, which is why I posted it! If I thought it was
exactly right, I wouldn't have bothered, since it would not have
gained me any new information that I would have believed ... (BTW,
most of that instinct comes from my personal interaction with the
media which has UNIVERSALLY shown them to be most interested in
creating a 'story' and only interested in reporting the facts to
the extent that they fit the {preconcieved} story line...)
>Frankly I've not seen worse reporting since TMI.
So rip it to shreds and show us where it is bogus!
>I really have no idea what happened. The "facts" presented fit nothing
>I know about a nuclear plant. Japan is a big fan of Westinghouse so
>it almost surely was a Big W unit. I'll call a friend at INPO
>tomorrow and see what I can find out.
Great!
>I don't even know where to start taking this one apart. Let's see.
{... great ripping to shreds job deleted! ...}
>My best guess is the operator did something to trip the feedwater pumps
>which caused a semi-routine ECCS activation. They determined what
>caused it and secured it. What we'd have called a "Green Book Event"
>at Sequoyah. (named because of the succession from white (normal),
>green (not normal), yellow (serious), and red (head for the hills))
So it IS a case of reporting 'not much happend'.
>[Editorial mode on]
>
>Mike, I know you like to post ridiculous stuff just to stir
>shit.
I prefer the phrase 'stir the pot' ... In this case, though, it
was more motivated by a desire to find out more about what REALLY
happened (since the odor detectors had been tripped by the article
title ...) and a desire to point out that such articles existed and
that they do, right or wrong, shape the public perceptions. (Which
implies that there is some specific PR stuff that could be identified as
important to deal with in future plans...)
>Is this one of those occasions?
Not really. I was aware that it would start alot of discussion, but
hoped that some good info would be found among the obligatory slams...
Your article, BTW, I count among the 'good info' in that it provided
a nice synopsis of what REALLY happens (and it has been archived ...).
>I hope you're not stupid
>enough to take seriously what you posted, as indicated in your
>trailer.
Re-read the trailer. Notice that I say nothing like 'I believe this
really happened' or 'what can be done to shut down such lousy nukes?'.
Notice that it says 'The article says {foo} and this causes the
anti-nukers to get worried. This is a PR problem for the nukers,
even if the article is wrong.' and says so without endorsement.
This is as close to a non-biased non-commital stance as I can take!
>Whatever, I've had enough. I've typed my last
>multipage treatise to try to counter this ignorance. It's
>futile.
Illegitimus non carborundum!
Hey, just 'cause I show you what your up against is no reason
to throw in the towel...
Think of it as an opportunity to show how bogus the media are...
Mike Smith
>
>>Another question: Is there a reactor design that CANNOT have a
>>core meltdown? (I think I remember that the HTGCR is designed
>>so that it stabilizes at a non-melt temperature...).
>
>We cannot really use the word "cannot", but the CANDU is one type of reactor
>with an extremely low probability of having a meltdown. This is primarily
>due to the presence of a separate, low-pressure, low-temperature moderator
>(heavy water) which is massive in proportion to the fuel and coolant volume,
>and which acts as a heat sink if fuel ever overheats.
Interesting... Perhaps you could describe the CANDU design a bit more?
How is the moderator kept in close proximity to the core, yet
kept cool and low pressure? Or is 'low-temperature' a relative term?
How low is extremely low probability? Is it a theoretical possibility
by no one can count that many decimal places, or is it a small but
finite and demonstrable quantity? If the probability is so low that
there is no need for an 'emergency' cooling system, then one might
still be able to solve the PR issues of 'emergency' cooling ...
From what I've heard of the CANDU design, it has some nice features,
but I don't know what architechture leads to those features ...
Mike Smith
>In article <1992Oct5.0...@michael.apple.com> e...@michael.apple.com (E. Michael Smith) writes:
> From the Oct 1 San Jose Murkey News, page 14A, dateline TOKYO (AP)
>Fascinating choice of deletions, the Sentinel also published the AP
>story along with the 18 worst nuclear accidents,
The (numbered) deletions were:
*** BEGIN DELETIONS POST ***
1)
It uses ordinary water for cooling and to moderate the flow of neutrons
that split the atoms that produce nuclear reactions.
2)
A meltdown could occur if a reactor's rods heat to the point where their
uranium fuel starts to melt and collects in a puddle on the reactor floor.
A partial meltdown occurred during the nuclear accident at Three Mile
Island in Middletown, Pa., on March 28, 1979, the worst commercial
accident in U.S.History.
The world's worst nuclear accident occurred April 26, 1986, at the
Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine, then part of the Soviet Union.
It involved an explosion at a graphite-block-moderated reactor.
3)
An arial photograph of the reactor site with the caption: A worker
flipped a switch by mistake at the Fukushima nuclear power plant,
70 miles northeast of Tokyo
*** END DELETIONS POST ***
I deleted these two text blocks since they seemed to be material that
was clearly well known to folks in this group. The photo was deleted
since I don't have a scanner ...
I don't see a thing about them that is 'facinating'. In fact, I think
they are rather dull and boring blocks of text, which is why I deleted
them...
Perhaps you paper had a longer version of the AP story? Local papers
WILL often edit wire stories to fit the page ... I'd be interested
in knowing what the Murkey News editor choose to throw away... There
was no list of 18 accidents in my paper...
>what it boiled down
>to is that nothing happened, nobody was hurt, the core remained
>covered and cooled and 16 of the 18 other incidents listed were
>non-events as far as harm to the public goes (exceptions were
>Chernobyl and Windscale). You are right though, this sort of article
>is precisely why people are afraid of things nuclear.
So what can be done about it?
Anmar Caves
Which illustrates why one should use a proper belay when climbing a
ladder. Oh, we weren't talking about British caving techniques?
Nevermind.
Jeremy Whitlock
>Interesting... Perhaps you could describe the CANDU design a bit more?
>
>How is the moderator kept in close proximity to the core, yet
>kept cool and low pressure? Or is 'low-temperature' a relative term?
The CANDU core consists of hundreds of separate pressure tubes (about 6"
diameter) holding fuel and pressurized heavy water coolant (essentially,
a subdivided pressure vessel). These pressure tubes sit it a large
calandria filled with heavy water moderator, separated from this moderator
by an annular gas-filled space and a second tube. The annular space is
what cuts down on heat loss from the coolant to the moderator. Moderator
design temperature is 93 deg. Celsius, and it is unpressurized. Coolant
design temp. is about 360 deg. Celsius, and pressurized to 10 MPa.
>How low is extremely low probability?
I've seen studies that demonstrate the ability of the moderator to
adequately remove heat from the fuel under extreme LOCA. I don't recall
what quantification was placed on the reliabilty of these results.
>If the probability is so low that
>there is no need for an 'emergency' cooling system, then one might
>still be able to solve the PR issues of 'emergency' cooling ...
By the time the moderator becomes effective as a heat sink, the fuel
must have come in thermal contact with it, meaning the core is deformed.
In other words, this is a last-ditch inherent safety feature that you
would still try to avoid by using emergency core cooling.
>From what I've heard of the CANDU design, it has some nice features,
>but I don't know what architechture leads to those features ...
Check out the September 1992 issue of Nuclear News!
Snide Pucker
#>>[...]. You are right though, this sort of article
#>>is precisely why people are afraid of things nuclear.
#>
#>So what can be done about it?
Continued proliferation of heaps and gobs of accurate, objective information.
(preferably without beating people over the head with textbooks yelling about
how stupid and Liberal they are =).
Naturally, this will take a long time to fix (...still going...).
On a side note via press bashing, I saw a pretty good special on CNN
about the press-bias covering the Presidential race (with numerous
analogies to other topics as well). One of the people interviewed said
that the press holds the Constitutional Right to Free Speech(tm) dear
but shirks the responsibility that freedom entails (as in the responsibility
to not publish lies, crap, and hoakiness in the name of responsible
journalism).
By the way, I don't believe that the AP press release bias was due to
anti-nuclear sentiment, but sensationalism in the first degree. The
anti-nuke stuff was consequential.
---
"Unfortunately, I belong to that satan-worshipping breed of neofascists
who have the gall to support the obviously idiotic, environmentally-
disastrous notion that nuclear power can be used in constructive
ways without converting the planet into an uninhabitable wasteland"
--me
--
---
Jerry W. Miller # "Opinions? Of course they
mil...@gn.ecn.purdue.edu # are mine, do YOU want them?"
Purdue Univ. School of Nuclear Engg//Argonne Nat'l Lab--Reactor Engg
Steinn Sigurdsson
In article <STEINLY.92...@topaz.ucsc.edu> ste...@topaz.ucsc.edu (Steinn Sigurdsson) writes:
>In article <1992Oct5.0...@michael.apple.com> e...@michael.apple.com (E. Michael Smith) writes:
> From the Oct 1 San Jose Murkey News, page 14A, dateline TOKYO (AP)
>Fascinating choice of deletions, the Sentinel also published the AP
>story along with the 18 worst nuclear accidents,
The (numbered) deletions were:
*** BEGIN DELETIONS POST ***
...
*** END DELETIONS POST ***
I deleted these two text blocks since they seemed to be material that
was clearly well known to folks in this group. The photo was deleted
since I don't have a scanner ...
I don't see a thing about them that is 'facinating'. In fact, I think
they are rather dull and boring blocks of text, which is why I deleted
them...
Yes, I believe the Sentinel story was longer - of course I've deleted
your original post now and trash pickup was yesterday... basically
the Sentinel as I remember had a 2-3 paragraph discourse on worst case
scenarios and locals being upset
Perhaps you paper had a longer version of the AP story? Local papers
WILL often edit wire stories to fit the page ... I'd be interested
in knowing what the Murkey News editor choose to throw away... There
was no list of 18 accidents in my paper...
Yup, they often sit on them too until they need a filler. The 18
accidents was a separate boxed item, replaced the photo by the sound
of it. Most of the list was "steam pipe burst, nobody hurt, somebody
shut of the steam and the pipe was replaced..."
>Chernobyl and Windscale). You are right though, this sort of article
>is precisely why people are afraid of things nuclear.
So what can be done about it?
Haven't got the foggiest.
* Steinn Sigurdsson Lick Observatory *
* ste...@lick.ucsc.edu "standard disclaimer" *
* But, oh, love is strange *
* and you have to learn to take the crunchy with the smooth, *
* I suppose - B.B. 1983 *
keel...@wl.aecl.ca
>>>
>>> "Three missing, presumed dead in Indiana power plant fire"
>>>
>>>exposure to ionizing radiation. I am sure their families are
>>
>>nightly TV news ... only on the 11th page of the paper... Could it
>>be that the news media did, in fact, cover the two accidents in
>>an appropriate ratio?
Aha! Obvous evidence of a conspiracy on the part of the military,
industrial, nuclear complex in order to play down, or indeed bury, from
the public the obvious deficiencies inherent in nuclear power generation.
"Nuke Scientists Bomb Hydrocarbon Plant in Attempt To
Smother News Of Yet Another Near Disaster In A
Nuclear Plant"!
:-) :-) :-)
>>E. Michael Smith e...@apple.COM
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| keel...@wl.aecl.ca AECL - Whiteshell Labs, Pinawa, MB., Canada R0E 1L0 |
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Mark Wilson
>I've typed my last
>multipage treatise to try to counter this ignorance.
Mr. De Armond.
I tried to mail this to you but it bounced.
I am sorry to hear that you want be posting any more of your treatise.
I have saved most of the ones I have seen so far. I have been able to
use them when arguing with others.
Your analysis have been very concise and readable. And I for one will
miss them.
--
Mark
My opinions are mine, all mine. Unless someone else claims them first.
Mark....@AtlantaGA.NCR.com