Tauno Voipio <tauno....@notused.fi.invalid> wrote:
> On 12.2.21 16.28, Peter wrote:
>>
>> Steve Wilson <
sp...@me.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Pitot tubes for airspeed indicators are also subject to icing, which
>>> brought down air France flight 447. They did not turn on the pitot
>>> heaters.
>>
>> They had pitot heat on, but the tubes got filled up with crystals
>> which overwhelmed the heating.
>>
>> There are general aviation avionics which become completely useless if
>> the pitot tube ices up. More recently they have been doing GPS backups
>> for airdata, which is a good idea.
>
> It seems that Steve does not believe what severe icing does.
Don't be a jerk. Of course I know what severe icing is. I was in the RCAF
and have flown in icing conditions you would not believe.
> It was a surprise that all five pitots on AF447 went out of service.
> The crew still had useable speed information from the navigation
> system, and the flight probably could have been salvaged if the crew
> had kept thrust and attitude constant after the upset. The gyros
> and engine instruments were fine.
Quote:
Yet, as the New York Times points out, "Investigators found that the loss
of valid speed readings lasted for no more than a minute of the plane's
terrifying four-minute descent." Even if the air-speed data had been lost
entirely, the pilots could have saved the plane, BEA director Jean-Paul
Troadec told reporters.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/insidenova/2011/07/air-france-flight-447-
could-have-been-saved.html
The big problem with Airbus is changing the flight characteristics when the
plane gets into trouble.
Quote:
There are four reconfiguration modes for the Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft:
alternate law 1, alternate law 2, direct law and mechanical law. The ground
mode and flare modes for alternate law are identical to those modes for
normal law.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_control_modes
With full up elevator, the plane stalled, but the stall warning was turned
off when the airspeed was below a certain level. As soon as the pilot
relaxed the control and the airspeed increased, the stall warning blared
again until he returned to full up. Here is what happened:
Quote:
At 02:10:05 UTC, the autopilot disengaged, most likely due to hailstones
blocking the pitot tubes, and the aircraft transitioned from "normal law"
to "alternate law 2".[64]
The engines' auto-thrust systems disengaged three seconds later. As the
pilot flying, first officer Bonin took over control of the aircraft, using
the command language "I have the controls." Without the auto-pilot, the
aircraft started to roll to the right due to turbulence, and Bonin reacted
by deflecting his side-stick to the left. One consequence of the change to
alternate law was an increase in the aircraft's sensitivity to roll, and
the pilot's input over-corrected.
During the next 30 seconds, the aircraft rolled alternately left and right
as Bonin adjusted to the altered handling characteristics of the aircraft.
[65] At the same time he abruptly pulled back on his side-stick, raising
the nose. This action has been described as unnecessary and excessive under
the circumstances.[66]
The aircraft's stall warning briefly sounded twice due to the angle of
attack tolerance being exceeded, and the aircraft's indicated airspeed
dropped sharply from 274 knots (507 km/h; 315 mph) to 52 knots (96 km/h; 60
mph). The aircraft's angle of attack increased, and subsequently began to
climb above its cruising altitude of 35,000 ft (FL350). During this ascent,
the aircraft attained vertical speeds well in excess of the typical rate of
climb for the Airbus A330, which usually ascend at rates no greater than
2000 feet per minute (10.16 m/s). The aircraft experienced a peak vertical
speed close to 7,000 feet per minute (36 m/s; 130 km/h),[65] which occurred
as first officer Bonin brought the rolling movements under control.
At 02:10:34 UTC, after displaying incorrectly for half a minute, the left-
side instruments recorded a sharp rise in airspeed to 223 knots (413 km/h;
257 mph), as did the Integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS) 33 seconds
later.[67] The right-side instruments were not recorded by the recorder.
The icing event had lasted for just over a minute,[68][69][2]:198[70] yet
first officer Bonin continued to make nose-up inputs. The trimmable
horizontal stabilizer (THS) moved from three to 13 degrees nose-up in about
one minute, and remained in the latter position until the end of the
flight.
At 02:11:10 UTC, the aircraft had climbed to its maximum altitude of around
38,000 feet (12,000 m). At this point, the aircraft's angle of attack was
16 degrees, and the engine thrust levers were in the fully forward
takeoff/go-around detent (TOGA). As the aircraft began to descend, the
angle of attack rapidly increased toward 30 degrees.
A second consequence of the reconfiguration into alternate law was that the
stall protection no longer operated, whereas in normal law the aircraft's
flight management computers would have acted to prevent such a high angle
of attack.[71] The wings lost lift and the aircraft began to stall.[3]
Confused, first officer Bonin exclaimed "[Expletive] I don't have control
of the airplane any more now", and two seconds later, "I don't have control
of the airplane at all!"[28] First officer Robert responded to this by
saying, "controls to the left", and took over control of the aircraft.[72]
[31] Robert pushed his side-stick forward to lower the nose and recover
from the stall; however, Bonin was still pulling his side-stick back. The
inputs cancelled each other out and triggered an aural "dual input"
warning.
At 02:11:40 UTC, captain Dubois re-entered the cockpit after being summoned
by first officer Robert. Noticing the various alarms going off, he asked
the two crew members, "er what are you (doing)?"[31] The angle of attack
had then reached 40 degrees, and the aircraft had descended to 35,000 feet
(11,000 m) with the engines running at almost 100% N1 (the rotational speed
of the front intake fan, which delivers most of a turbofan engine's
thrust). The stall warnings stopped, as all airspeed indications were now
considered invalid by the aircraft's computer due to the high angle of
attack.[73] The aircraft had its nose above the horizon but was descending
steeply.
Roughly 20 seconds later, at 02:12 UTC, Bonin decreased the aircraft's
pitch slightly. Airspeed indications became valid, and the stall warning
sounded again; it then sounded intermittently for the remaining duration of
the flight, stopping only when the pilots increased the aircraft's nose-up
pitch. From there until the end of the flight, the angle of attack never
dropped below 35 degrees. From the time the aircraft stalled until its
impact into the ocean, the engines were primarily developing either 100
percent N1 or TOGA thrust, though they were briefly spooled down to about
50 percent N1 on two occasions. The engines always responded to commands
and were developing in excess of 100 percent N1 when the flight ended.
First officer Robert responded to captain Dubois by saying: "We've lost all
control of the aeroplane, we don’t understand anything, we’ve tried
everything".[31] Soon after this, Robert said to himself, "climb" four
consecutive times. Bonin heard this and replied, "But I've been at maximum
nose-up for a while!" When Captain Dubois heard this, he realized Bonin was
causing the stall, and shouted, "No no no, don't climb! No No No!"[74][31]
When first officer Robert heard this, he told Bonin to give the control of
the airplane to him.[2] In response to this, Bonin temporarily gave the
controls to Robert.[31][74][2] Robert pushed his side stick forward to try
to regain lift for the airplane to climb out of the stall. However, the
aircraft was too low to recover from the stall. Shortly thereafter, the
ground proximity warning system sounded an alarm, warning the crew about
the aircraft's imminent crash with the ocean. In response, Bonin (without
informing his colleagues) pulled his side stick all the way back again,[31]
[2] and said, "[Expletive] We're going to crash! This can't be true. But
what's happening?"[74][31][2][75][28] The last recording on the CVR was
captain Dubois saying: "(ten) degrees pitch attitude."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
So the design of the aircraft caused the crash.
> In both cases when I have been in severe icing with an airplane
> not certified for it, I handled the situation with the navigation
> system information until out of the icing zone.
I doubt you know what severe icing is.