Land tax -- the Hudson/Gaffney challenge (Re: better tax code: no income tax, head tax (&| ppty t)
RogerDodger
On Sat, 1 Mar 2008 01:41:25 +0100, a...@me.com (PeterBP) wrote:
>RogerDodger <no...@not-here.org> wrote:
>
>> Rent for
>> improvements to real estate goes under the table, or is sharply
>> reduced in back-room deals (I slash your rent, you hire my wife for a
>> no-show job, etc.)
>
>Roger,
>
>your post has some good points, but here you confuse the common-parlance
>rent (such as that for monthly tenure in a flat) with economic rent, and
>specifically the land rent.
>
>Land rent is not easy to hide. That is one of the strengths of the land
>taxation idea.
An assertion not only without evidence but directly contradicted by
logic, expert testimony and all human experience.
(1) Logic...
Why is it any harder to hide rent to land than to buildings or
anything else, when it is profitable to do so? It's even easier,
because land value can be and *is* shifted to buildings.
Why is it impossible to hide only rent to land? Please explain.
Georgists seem to think that by purportedly taxing "land" they
actually are taxing land itself -- but they are taxing only
contractual arrangements.
Why are contractual arrangements regarding land supposed to be more
difficult to obscure than any others?
(2) Expert testimony...
Hudson says 50% of land value is shifted away from land to other
things right now. Mason Gaffney, geeze, do I have to quote him on
this?
George Donatello, who managed the last Pittsburgh assessement that
collapsed the system with 170,000 appeals, said a big part of the
problem was that assessed land values going into it "were so low they
weren�t anywhere near reality. People in the past kept land values
low, artificially low, because of the way the tax rate was
structured.�
Hudson, Gaffney and Donatello of course are all big *pro* land tax.
You are saying they are all wrong?
If so, what mistake are they making?
(3) All human experience....
Whenever a power such as the state tries to confiscate the price to
sellers that sellers otherwise would command in a free market, a black
market, backroom deals, key money, under-the-table payments, favor
trades, etc. *always* result. You can't find any case *ever* where
they haven't.
The "wedge" between what is allowed to the seller under the rules and
what buyers are willing to actually pay creates both opportunity and
incentive to go outside the rules so both can benefit by splitting the
difference, sharing the wedge.
Why would this not happen with land in the future? And only in the
future, when it certainly has happened in the past!
I asked a question before -- let's now call it the Hudson/Gaffney/
Donatello challenge..
In light of the current tax disadvantage of value being attributed to
land, Hudson says land owners have succeeded in understating its value
by 50% and shifting this value to other things. As we know, Gaffney
and the Pittsburgh land assessor certainly agree in substance.
Question #1: Are they wrong? If no, then...
Question #2: How is the Georgist tax system going to remedy this???
What remedy do the Georgists have that they could offer the tax
asssessors who are missing 50% or so of land value today???
(And, of course, the tax cost of valuing land and incentive to move
its valye to other tax-free items will be hugely greater in Single Tax
Land than now.)
The answers I got when I asked before were...
* Today's tax collectors are DISHONEST, but Georgist tax collectors
will be honest. (Why? Because they will be genetically re-engineered?)
* The IRS and NYC tax assessors don't care if they don't collect tax
today. But Georgist tax collectors will care! (How come? They'll
attend motivational seminars??)
* <Snip> All reference to the issue deleted.
* Georgist tax assessors will use comparable sales! Unlike today's
tax collectors who use comparable sales. ;-)
C'mon -- you all know all these answers are entirely, um,
unimpressive.
Anyone want to take another shot at answering the challenge?
Les Cargill
> Why is it any harder to hide rent to land than to buildings or
> anything else, when it is profitable to do so? It's even easier,
> because land value can be and *is* shifted to buildings.
>
> Why is it impossible to hide only rent to land? Please explain.
>
> Georgists seem to think that by purportedly taxing "land" they
> actually are taxing land itself -- but they are taxing only
> contractual arrangements.
>
They are taxing land *rent* - the accrued increase in value
over time of a position due to network effects surrounding
that location. This is a positive externality created by
a community.
There's no particular contractual arrangement here. *As I understand it*
( and my understanding is in no way carefully vetted ), all
land is held in trust by the government, for lack of a better term.
A person cannot form a contract to sell that which he does not
own. I dunno if his license ( see below ) would be transferrable,
or what. I suspect it would simply end the license and a new
one be issued to the next occupier. This isn't that
far off a quitclaim deed in real estate.
This trust is administered by a board, which has employees that
execute the policies of the board. The trust tried to optimize
revenue, putting transactions with it in the realm of standard
price theory mechanisms.
Land use is licensed to a bidder who agrees to pay historically
appropriate land rent charges for use of it. Improvements remain
as property of whoever puts them in or would convey with a new
tenant. The license works out like a long-term lease.
The Henry George Theorem states that aggregate government
spending will equal land rent. It's been shown to be roughly
true empirically, although it can break down under some conditions
(no, I don't have a comprehensive idea of what they are ).
<snip>
--
Les Cargill
PeterBP
> On Sat, 1 Mar 2008 01:41:25 +0100, a...@me.com (PeterBP) wrote:
>
> >RogerDodger <no...@not-here.org> wrote:
> >
> >> Rent for
> >> improvements to real estate goes under the table, or is sharply
> >> reduced in back-room deals (I slash your rent, you hire my wife for a
> >> no-show job, etc.)
> >
> >Roger,
> >
> >your post has some good points, but here you confuse the common-parlance
> >rent (such as that for monthly tenure in a flat) with economic rent, and
> >specifically the land rent.
> >
> >Land rent is not easy to hide. That is one of the strengths of the land
> >taxation idea.
>
I'll give your post a quick shot.
> An assertion not only without evidence but directly contradicted by
> logic, expert testimony and all human experience.
>
> (1) Logic...
>
> Why is it any harder to hide rent to land than to buildings or
> anything else, when it is profitable to do so? It's even easier,
> because land value can be and *is* shifted to buildings.
If that is true, the land value should dive to zero if you bulldoze the
building on it away. Does it?
>
> Why is it impossible to hide only rent to land? Please explain.
I wrote 'not easy', not 'impossible'. But tbh, it is also dependent on
whatever measures the local council or government does to keep check on
the land value.
>
> Georgists seem to think that by purportedly taxing "land" they
> actually are taxing land itself -- but they are taxing only
> contractual arrangements.
A trade (where the exchange value of a good is determined, in this case
land) is usually exactly that.
>
> Why are contractual arrangements regarding land supposed to be more
> difficult to obscure than any others?
Because you cant hide land itself like you can with say a PC?
>
> (2) Expert testimony...
>
> Hudson says 50% of land value is shifted away from land to other
> things right now. Mason Gaffney, geeze, do I have to quote him on
> this?
I haven't read this; I'll do it later, but in fairness can't comment on
it now.
>
> George Donatello, who managed the last Pittsburgh assessement that
> collapsed the system with 170,000 appeals, said a big part of the
> problem was that assessed land values going into it "were so low they
> weren't anywhere near reality. People in the past kept land values
> low, artificially low, because of the way the tax rate was
> structured.‰
>
> Hudson, Gaffney and Donatello of course are all big *pro* land tax.
>
> You are saying they are all wrong?
>
> If so, what mistake are they making?
Again, what way was the Pittsburgh appraisal system made? I don't know,
you tell me.
And if people "..kept land value low.." - why were they allowed to do
this if the claimed values did not reflect reality, which I assume to me
actual market rates for land?
>
> (3) All human experience....
>
> Whenever a power such as the state tries to confiscate the price to
> sellers that sellers otherwise would command in a free market, a black
> market, backroom deals, key money, under-the-table payments, favor
> trades, etc. *always* result. You can't find any case *ever* where
> they haven't.
I agree. Problem is, you conflate the moral illegitimacy of taxing
private goods like labor and labor product with the moral legetimacy of
taxing public goods like land.
>
> The "wedge" between what is allowed to the seller under the rules and
> what buyers are willing to actually pay creates both opportunity and
> incentive to go outside the rules so both can benefit by splitting the
> difference, sharing the wedge.
>
> Why would this not happen with land in the future? And only in the
> future, when it certainly has happened in the past!
Bad rules and oversight perhaps?
>
> I asked a question before -- let's now call it the Hudson/Gaffney/
> Donatello challenge..
>
> In light of the current tax disadvantage of value being attributed to
> land, Hudson says land owners have succeeded in understating its value
> by 50% and shifting this value to other things. As we know, Gaffney
> and the Pittsburgh land assessor certainly agree in substance.
>
> Question #1: Are they wrong? If no, then...
>
> Question #2: How is the Georgist tax system going to remedy this???
> What remedy do the Georgists have that they could offer the tax
> asssessors who are missing 50% or so of land value today???
>
> (And, of course, the tax cost of valuing land and incentive to move
> its valye to other tax-free items will be hugely greater in Single Tax
> Land than now.)
How would you go about moving the value of land onto something else,
barring mindblowingly stupid tax rules?
>
> The answers I got when I asked before were...
>
> * Today's tax collectors are DISHONEST, but Georgist tax collectors
> will be honest. (Why? Because they will be genetically re-engineered?)
No, probably because the potential for gain through dishonesty will be a
lot lower.
> * The IRS and NYC tax assessors don't care if they don't collect tax
> today. But Georgist tax collectors will care! (How come? They'll
> attend motivational seminars??)
Good question. The best of yours in fact. I have no reason to believe
that government will be much more efficient than it is today - in any
area.
> * <Snip> All reference to the issue deleted.
>
> * Georgist tax assessors will use comparable sales! Unlike today's
> tax collectors who use comparable sales. ;-)
>
> C'mon -- you all know all these answers are entirely, um,
> unimpressive.
>
> Anyone want to take another shot at answering the challenge?
Don't be so confrontational. Boomerang effect and all that.
--
regards , Peter B. P. http://macplanet.dk
Washington D.C.: District of Criminals
"I dont drink anymore... of course, i don't drink any less, either!
Dan in Philly
>> Why are contractual arrangements regarding land supposed to be more
>> difficult to obscure than any others?
> Because you cant hide land itself like you can with say a PC?
His point is that you can hide the *value* of land. Instead of selling you a
piece of land for $500,000, I can officially sell it to you for $100,000 and
secretly give you $400,000. So the land tax will be based on the $100,000
number.
Dan in Philly
Andy F.
"Dan in Philly" <dj...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:lG6Ej.636031$X56....@fe06.news.easynews.com...
of other comparable properties.
ro...@telus.net
wrote:
>On Sat, 1 Mar 2008 01:41:25 +0100, a...@me.com (PeterBP) wrote:
>
>>RogerDodger <no...@not-here.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Rent for
>>> improvements to real estate goes under the table, or is sharply
>>> reduced in back-room deals (I slash your rent, you hire my wife for a
>>> no-show job, etc.)
>>
>>your post has some good points, but here you confuse the common-parlance
>>rent (such as that for monthly tenure in a flat) with economic rent, and
>>specifically the land rent.
>>
>>Land rent is not easy to hide. That is one of the strengths of the land
>>taxation idea.
>
>An assertion not only without evidence but directly contradicted by
>logic, expert testimony and all human experience.
No, that is just a bald lie.
Who is paying you to tell all these lies over and over again?
>(1) Logic...
>
>Why is it any harder to hide rent to land than to buildings or
>anything else, when it is profitable to do so?
Buildings do not command any economic rent.
>It's even easier,
>because land value can be and *is* shifted to buildings.
Only by collusion of the appraiser. And at any rate, at least the
value appears somewhere, and cannot be completed concealed as sales
and income can. Where valuations are publicly accessible, it is
extremely difficult to keep systematically falsified valuations secret
for long.
>Why is it impossible to hide only rent to land? Please explain.
Land cannot be hidden, and its value is easily compared with that of
comparable parcels. Income and sales can be hidden, and there is no
publicly available check on them.
This is self-evident and indisputable. But because it proves you flat
wrong, you must repeatedly deny it.
>Georgists seem to think that by purportedly taxing "land" they
>actually are taxing land itself -- but they are taxing only
>contractual arrangements.
No, that is false. You are still managing to keep yourself ignorant
of what land rent is.
>Why are contractual arrangements regarding land supposed to be more
>difficult to obscure than any others?
You are not even talking about the economic rent of land. Go and
learn at least the basics.
>(2) Expert testimony...
>
>Hudson says 50% of land value is shifted away from land to other
>things right now. Mason Gaffney, geeze, do I have to quote him on
>this?
>
>George Donatello, who managed the last Pittsburgh assessement that
>collapsed the system with 170,000 appeals, said a big part of the
>problem was that assessed land values going into it "were so low they
>weren’t anywhere near reality. People in the past kept land values
>low, artificially low, because of the way the tax rate was
>structured.”
Right. The Pittsburgh system did not so much collapse as suffer
deliberate demolition by systematic refusal of the assessment
authority to assess property. Bribery by landowners is one possible
reason for this sabotage. Another is the fact that land is far
cheaper to value than buildings, and the assessors may have feared
that if Pittsburgh's system was allowed to exist, let alone to expand,
their jobs would soon be gone.
>Hudson, Gaffney and Donatello of course are all big *pro* land tax.
>
>You are saying they are all wrong?
>
>If so, what mistake are they making?
They are right. But if the problems they identify in current
assessment systems are so fatal to LVT, as you claim, why do you think
they are all pro land tax?
>(3) All human experience....
>
>Whenever a power such as the state tries to confiscate the price to
>sellers that sellers otherwise would command in a free market, a black
>market, backroom deals, key money, under-the-table payments, favor
>trades, etc. *always* result. You can't find any case *ever* where
>they haven't.
It is certainly the case everwhere taxation of sales or income has
been tried. But in fact, well-designed property tax systems do not
suffer such evasion, and clandestine payments are effectively unknown.
The difference with LVT is, land can't be moved, and it can't be
hidden, and IT IS NOT THE TRANSACTIONS THAT WOULD BE TAXED.
You just refuse to know these facts, because they prove you wrong.
>The "wedge" between what is allowed to the seller under the rules and
>what buyers are willing to actually pay creates both opportunity and
>incentive to go outside the rules so both can benefit by splitting the
>difference, sharing the wedge.
LVT does not tax the transaction. Transactions are only used to
establish comparable values.
>Why would this not happen with land in the future? And only in the
>future, when it certainly has happened in the past!
Oh? Please provide your evidence that such clandestine payments are
commonly used to evade property taxes in places where assessments are
at market.
>In light of the current tax disadvantage of value being attributed to
>land, Hudson says land owners have succeeded in understating its value
>by 50% and shifting this value to other things. As we know, Gaffney
>and the Pittsburgh land assessor certainly agree in substance.
>
>Question #1: Are they wrong?
They are probably close to right; the amount of shifting might be
somewhat less, or perhaps more.
>Question #2: How is the Georgist tax system going to remedy this???
By not taxing the buildings or capital gains, thus eliminating both
the alternative place for value and the depreciation allowance that
creates the opportunity to profit by shifting it.
>What remedy do the Georgists have that they could offer the tax
>asssessors who are missing 50% or so of land value today???
Remove the tax they are helping local landowners avoid.
>(And, of course, the tax cost of valuing land and incentive to move
>its valye to other tax-free items will be hugely greater in Single Tax
>Land than now.)
But as long as the assessments are public, the opportunity to do so
and get away with it will be vanishingly small.
>The answers I got when I asked before were...
>
>* Today's tax collectors are DISHONEST, but Georgist tax collectors
>will be honest. (Why? Because they will be genetically re-engineered?)
That is a bald lie. Like all anti-geoist apologists for privilege and
injustice, you always lie about what the geoist side has clearly said.
>* The IRS and NYC tax assessors don't care if they don't collect tax
>today. But Georgist tax collectors will care! (How come? They'll
>attend motivational seminars??)
That is also, of course, a bald lie.
>* Georgist tax assessors will use comparable sales! Unlike today's
>tax collectors who use comparable sales. ;-)
Most current assessment systems systematically ignore comparable
sales.
>C'mon -- you all know all these answers are entirely, um,
>unimpressive.
Because you made them up.
>Anyone want to take another shot at answering the challenge?
Already answered, liar.
-- Roy L
ro...@telus.net
wrote:
All that would do is succeed in getting your competitors' land taxes
lowered.
-- Roy L
Dan in Philly
> a piece of land for $500,000, I can officially sell it to you for $100,000
> and secretly give you $400,000. So the land tax will be based on the
> $100,000 number.
"Andy F." <never...@tesco.net> wrote in message ...
> The land tax wouldn't be based on that number.It would be based on the
> price of other comparable properties.
<ro...@telus.net> wrote in message ...
> All that would do is succeed in getting your competitors' land taxes
> lowered.
a) If the official selling price was $100,000 then the govt would find it
very difficult to assess it at $500,000; the owner would claim that the
'comparable' properties are not really comparable.
b) Other land owners would also cheat, so all land prices would be
artificially low.
Dan in Philly
jmh
It would do more than that. Since the same incentives
exist for others to reduce their tax liability it would
increase the cost of adminstrating the tax system.
The issue is never about an individual's behavior
but the general behavior within the market.
jmh
ro...@telus.net
wrote:
>On 2008-03-19, ro...@telus.net <ro...@telus.net> wrote:
>> On Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:20:49 GMT, "Dan in Philly" <dj...@aol.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>"PeterBP" <a...@me.com> wrote in message ...
>>>
>>>>> Why are contractual arrangements regarding land supposed to be more
>>>>> difficult to obscure than any others?
>>>
>>>> Because you cant hide land itself like you can with say a PC?
>>>
>>>His point is that you can hide the *value* of land. Instead of selling you a
>>>piece of land for $500,000, I can officially sell it to you for $100,000 and
>>>secretly give you $400,000. So the land tax will be based on the $100,000
>>>number.
>>
>> All that would do is succeed in getting your competitors' land taxes
>> lowered.
>
>It would do more than that. Since the same incentives
>exist for others to reduce their tax liability it would
>increase the cost of adminstrating the tax system.
?? I just showed you why there would be no such incentive because it
_wouldn't_ reduce your tax liability.
>The issue is never about an individual's behavior
>but the general behavior within the market.
If there is no incentive for an individual to do it, why would a whole
bunch of individuals do it?
-- Roy L
ro...@telus.net
wrote:
>> His point is that you can hide the *value* of land. Instead of selling you
>> a piece of land for $500,000, I can officially sell it to you for $100,000
>> and secretly give you $400,000. So the land tax will be based on the
>> $100,000 number.
>
>"Andy F." <never...@tesco.net> wrote in message ...
>> The land tax wouldn't be based on that number.It would be based on the
>> price of other comparable properties.
>
><ro...@telus.net> wrote in message ...
>> All that would do is succeed in getting your competitors' land taxes
>> lowered.
>
>a) If the official selling price was $100,000 then the govt would find it
>very difficult to assess it at $500,000;
Nonsense. Properties sometimes sell now for $1, and that doesn't stop
property tax assessments from being accurate.
>the owner would claim that the
>'comparable' properties are not really comparable.
So what? There are lots of ways to establish value.
>b) Other land owners would also cheat, so all land prices would be
>artificially low.
There's a fairly easy way to deal with such fraudulent reporting:
tracking offers. A legitimate offer declined sets a minimum on value.
If the sort of thing you are suggesting were possible and profitable,
people would be doing it now.
And they aren't.
-- Roy L
jmh
Because people do tend to act strategicly and
cultural norms emerge to facilitate that
strategic behavor where it supports the individual
goals.
Why do we have so many tax loopholes? Why does
almost everyone speed on the highway when there
many cars, but no conjestion, when individually
they all have the incentive to go the speedlimit?
Your argument about the ease of assessing the
land value is premised on the information that
exists under the current structure of ownership
and taxation. Change that and your information
set will also change.
You can argue that behavioral changes might
be slow so since we're all dead in the long
run it doesn't matter to your position. That
could be it's own discussion.
jmh
ro...@telus.net
wrote:
>On 2008-03-21, ro...@telus.net <ro...@telus.net> wrote:
>> On Thu, 20 Mar 2008 22:28:28 GMT, jmh <jmh...@localhost.my.domain>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>The issue is never about an individual's behavior
>>>but the general behavior within the market.
>>
>> If there is no incentive for an individual to do it, why would a whole
>> bunch of individuals do it?
>
>Because people do tend to act strategicly and
>cultural norms emerge to facilitate that
>strategic behavor where it supports the individual
>goals.
If that were true, there would be nothing interesting about Prisoner's
Dilemma research.
>Why do we have so many tax loopholes?
Special interests.
>Why does
>almost everyone speed on the highway when there
>many cars, but no conjestion, when individually
>they all have the incentive to go the speedlimit?
Because the incentive to save time by speeding is greater.
>Your argument about the ease of assessing the
>land value is premised on the information that
>exists under the current structure of ownership
>and taxation. Change that and your information
>set will also change.
Sure. Just as weighing people naked instead of with their clothes on
will change the information set: you're not measuring the same thing.
So what?
-- Roy L
jmh
> On Fri, 21 Mar 2008 20:33:59 GMT, jmh <jmh...@localhost.my.domain>
> wrote:
>
>>On 2008-03-21, ro...@telus.net <ro...@telus.net> wrote:
>>> On Thu, 20 Mar 2008 22:28:28 GMT, jmh <jmh...@localhost.my.domain>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>The issue is never about an individual's behavior
>>>>but the general behavior within the market.
>>>
>>> If there is no incentive for an individual to do it, why would a whole
>>> bunch of individuals do it?
>>
>>Because people do tend to act strategicly and
>>cultural norms emerge to facilitate that
>>strategic behavor where it supports the individual
>>goals.
>
> If that were true, there would be nothing interesting about Prisoner's
> Dilemma research.
PD reinforces my point. The Jailer attempts to
establish a set of incentives and an environment
to reinforce those incentived. Criminals form
a set of norms -- don't talk -- that produce
the optimal outcome for them (but not the jailer).
You can impost a moral position that the
jailer is "good" and the criminals are
"bad" and say the structure fails from a
social standpoint since the criminals have
adapted their behavior and get off easy.
>>Why do we have so many tax loopholes?
>
> Special interests.
Which don't go away just because the tax
structure changes. Your claim that the
administration of the land value tax will
be lower cost comes into question.
>>Why does
>>almost everyone speed on the highway when there
>>many cars, but no conjestion, when individually
>>they all have the incentive to go the speedlimit?
>
> Because the incentive to save time by speeding is greater.
Greater than what? The incentive to save time
is really the same regardless of the number
of cars on the road.
>>Your argument about the ease of assessing the
>>land value is premised on the information that
>>exists under the current structure of ownership
>>and taxation. Change that and your information
>>set will also change.
>
> Sure. Just as weighing people naked instead of with their clothes on
> will change the information set: you're not measuring the same thing.
> So what?
Your claims are based on that ceterus paribus assumption.
jmh
ro...@telus.net
wrote:
>On 2008-03-21, ro...@telus.net <ro...@telus.net> wrote:
>> On Fri, 21 Mar 2008 20:33:59 GMT, jmh <jmh...@localhost.my.domain>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>On 2008-03-21, ro...@telus.net <ro...@telus.net> wrote:
>>>> On Thu, 20 Mar 2008 22:28:28 GMT, jmh <jmh...@localhost.my.domain>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>The issue is never about an individual's behavior
>>>>>but the general behavior within the market.
>>>>
>>>> If there is no incentive for an individual to do it, why would a whole
>>>> bunch of individuals do it?
>>>
>>>Because people do tend to act strategicly and
>>>cultural norms emerge to facilitate that
>>>strategic behavor where it supports the individual
>>>goals.
>>
>> If that were true, there would be nothing interesting about Prisoner's
>> Dilemma research.
>
>PD reinforces my point.
No, it doesn't.
>The Jailer attempts to
>establish a set of incentives and an environment
>to reinforce those incentived. Criminals form
>a set of norms -- don't talk -- that produce
>the optimal outcome for them (but not the jailer).
Prisoners have drastic sanctions they can impose on each other at
little cost. Taxpayers don't.
>>>Why do we have so many tax loopholes?
>>
>> Special interests.
>
>Which don't go away just because the tax
>structure changes. Your claim that the
>administration of the land value tax will
>be lower cost comes into question.
There are self-evident and indisputable reasons why it _should_ be
lower-cost, though no one can say what the end result will be after
landowners have arranged the assassinations of all the experts on LVT
implementation who could not be bribed to sabotage the system.
>>>Why does
>>>almost everyone speed on the highway when there
>>>many cars, but no conjestion, when individually
>>>they all have the incentive to go the speedlimit?
>>
>> Because the incentive to save time by speeding is greater.
>
>Greater than what?
The higher gas consumption and the risk of getting a ticket or having
an accident.
>The incentive to save time
>is really the same regardless of the number
>of cars on the road.
Of course. So people speed until traffic stops them.
>>>Your argument about the ease of assessing the
>>>land value is premised on the information that
>>>exists under the current structure of ownership
>>>and taxation. Change that and your information
>>>set will also change.
>>
>> Sure. Just as weighing people naked instead of with their clothes on
>> will change the information set: you're not measuring the same thing.
>> So what?
>
>Your claims are based on that ceterus paribus assumption.
?? No, of course they aren't. People obtain an economic advantage by
using good land rather than poor land. That advantage can be measured
-- indeed, it _must_ be measured if people are to make any money using
land -- and exists independently of whatever improvements happen to
have been made to the land, just as people's bodies exist
independently of their clothes. There is nothing very difficult about
measuring that advantage, as people who want to rent land to use are
obviously able to do it quite well enough, thank you very much.
Are you claiming that removing people's clothes before weighing them
somehow changes the weight of the body underneath?
-- Roy L
jmh
It's not at all clear that criminals do have
drastic sanctions or are able to impose them
"at little cost."
> little cost. Taxpayers don't.
You should read Ellickson's _Order without Law_.
It's not a matter of criminals being all
bad ass and not worried about police and
taxpayers not having any ability to impose
informal sanctions.
What would really drive the inability of the
tax payers from self-enforcement of the potential
norm would be excessive annonymity. This is
a problem in a rather mobile society that the
US has. Even in the US, however, mobility is
not that excessive and local community and
known neighbors exist.
>>>>Why do we have so many tax loopholes?
>>>
>>> Special interests.
>>
>>Which don't go away just because the tax
>>structure changes. Your claim that the
>>administration of the land value tax will
>>be lower cost comes into question.
>
> There are self-evident and indisputable reasons why it _should_ be
Roy's infamous fall back: "self-evident and indistputable".
The only thing that is self-evident and indisputable
is Roy's god complex.
> lower-cost, though no one can say what the end result will be after
> landowners have arranged the assassinations of all the experts on LVT
> implementation who could not be bribed to sabotage the system.
Or what the outcome will be once Government decides
what the "market value" are based on their comps
criteria when looking to serve the special interests
that always seem to dominate democratic decision-making.
I have what might be a question that allows
for more than your polemic and rhetoic.
Assuming your land ownship structure (goverment
owns it all and individuals rent), where does
the concept of Eminent Domain sit? Gone? Still
there?
>>>>Why does
>>>>almost everyone speed on the highway when there
>>>>many cars, but no conjestion, when individually
>>>>they all have the incentive to go the speedlimit?
>>>
>>> Because the incentive to save time by speeding is greater.
>>
>>Greater than what?
>
> The higher gas consumption and the risk of getting a ticket or having
> an accident.
Then you're not saying anything meaningful. All
you're saying is that it's done because it's
done (assuming normal economic decision criteria).
>>The incentive to save time
>>is really the same regardless of the number
>>of cars on the road.
>
> Of course. So people speed until traffic stops them.
But that's not the way most people act. If they
are alone they are more likely to keep their
speed nearer to the posted limit. If there
are 15 cars then they will drive faster.
Why won't tax payers also seek to collude in
a similar manner if all the taxing authority is
going to do is perform market comparisons of
prior sales?
>>>>Your argument about the ease of assessing the
>>>>land value is premised on the information that
>>>>exists under the current structure of ownership
>>>>and taxation. Change that and your information
>>>>set will also change.
>>>
>>> Sure. Just as weighing people naked instead of with their clothes on
>>> will change the information set: you're not measuring the same thing.
>>> So what?
>>
>>Your claims are based on that ceterus paribus assumption.
>
> ?? No, of course they aren't. People obtain an economic advantage by
> using good land rather than poor land. That advantage can be measured
"Good" verusus "poor" in this day and age is fairly
problematic as most land is fungible for most
activities -- at lease until one starts looking
at zoning or some strict liability conditions. That's
not to say that there is not any economies of scope
or network externalitie or what ever you wish to
call the phenominon. The old agricultural "more
fertile" bases to rent's is a very poor model
for today's world: it's too generalized.
> -- indeed, it _must_ be measured if people are to make any money using
> land -- and exists independently of whatever improvements happen to
? For people to make money it's only necessary that
it be measurable ex post. Ex ante it's merely the
subjective assessment that any profit venture
would require. If what you say were true the
we're not talking about Rent as classically treated
but about arbitrage and market inefficiencies -
that $5 bill lying on the ground in Harvard.
jmh
The Trucker
I am pretty sure that "RogerDodger" is actually a name for the same old
tired and defeated protector of the rich that has inhabited this news
group for many years. If not then it is just a new recruit to the cause
of serving the privileged individuals in the society.
>
> On Sat, 1 Mar 2008 01:41:25 +0100, a...@me.com (PeterBP) wrote:
>
>>RogerDodger <no...@not-here.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Rent for
>>> improvements to real estate goes under the table, or is sharply
>>> reduced in back-room deals (I slash your rent, you hire my wife for a
>>> no-show job, etc.)
>>
>>Roger,
>>
>>your post has some good points, but here you confuse the common-parlance
>>rent (such as that for monthly tenure in a flat) with economic rent, and
>>specifically the land rent.
>>
>>Land rent is not easy to hide. That is one of the strengths of the land
>>taxation idea.
>
> An assertion not only without evidence but directly contradicted by
> logic, expert testimony and all human experience.
>
> (1) Logic...
>
> Why is it any harder to hide rent to land than to buildings or
> anything else, when it is profitable to do so? It's even easier,
> because land value can be and *is* shifted to buildings.
>
> Why is it impossible to hide only rent to land? Please explain.
>
> Georgists seem to think that by purportedly taxing "land" they
> actually are taxing land itself -- but they are taxing only
> contractual arrangements.
>
> Why are contractual arrangements regarding land supposed to be more
> difficult to obscure than any others?
Georgists actually know that they are taxing land ownership as opposed to
taxing land itself. The "super-Georgist" understands that _privilege_ is
being taxed. Land ownership was merely the primary vehicle of privilege
in the past. At present, the privilege of money creation has actually
supplanted land ownership as the _best_ vehicle of privilege. Land
ownership is still however a major vehicle. Consider what would have
happened had land taxation been used as a monetary tool over the last 7
years: There would have been no "housing bubble".
> (2) Expert testimony...
>
> Hudson says 50% of land value is shifted away from land to other
> things right now. Mason Gaffney, geeze, do I have to quote him on
> this?
>
> George Donatello, who managed the last Pittsburgh assessement that
> collapsed the system with 170,000 appeals, said a big part of the
> problem was that assessed land values going into it "were so low they
> weren't anywhere near reality. People in the past kept land values
> low, artificially low, because of the way the tax rate was
> structured."
>
> Hudson, Gaffney and Donatello of course are all big *pro* land tax.
>
> You are saying they are all wrong?
>
> If so, what mistake are they making?
They are all essentially correct. But they are very concentrated on the
land privilege and seem to miss the money creation privilege.
> (3) All human experience....
>
> Whenever a power such as the state tries to confiscate the price to
> sellers that sellers otherwise would command in a free market, a black
> market, backroom deals, key money, under-the-table payments, favor
> trades, etc. *always* result. You can't find any case *ever* where
> they haven't.
If the ONLY means by which government can finance itself is with a land
tax then there can be no escape form the taxation other than to do away
with government. And when government is gone then there is no enforcement
of contracts. The enforcement of contracts is the primary reason for the
existence of government.
> The "wedge" between what is allowed to the seller under the rules and
> what buyers are willing to actually pay creates both opportunity and
> incentive to go outside the rules so both can benefit by splitting the
> difference, sharing the wedge.
>
> Why would this not happen with land in the future? And only in the
> future, when it certainly has happened in the past!
>
> I asked a question before -- let's now call it the Hudson/Gaffney/
> Donatello challenge..
Let us leave them out and just go head to head. It makes things much more
interesting and removes all the false claims.
> In light of the current tax disadvantage of value being attributed to
> land, Hudson says land owners have succeeded in understating its value
> by 50% and shifting this value to other things. As we know, Gaffney
> and the Pittsburgh land assessor certainly agree in substance.
>
> Question #1: Are they wrong? If no, then...
Probably not.
> Question #2: How is the Georgist tax system going to remedy this???
> What remedy do the Georgists have that they could offer the tax
> asssessors who are missing 50% or so of land value today???
It is not an offer to the assessors at all. As a matter of fact, if the
only place these assessors can get their income is from a tax on land
ownership then they have every incentive to overstate the value of such
ownership.
> (And, of course, the tax cost of valuing land and incentive to move
> its valye to other tax-free items will be hugely greater in Single Tax
> Land than now.)
But then the assessors will die of starvation. In a truly "republican
form of government", the assessors are trapped between their lust for
income and the public good.
> The answers I got when I asked before were...
>
> * Today's tax collectors are DISHONEST, but Georgist tax collectors
> will be honest. (Why? Because they will be genetically re-engineered?)
There is an assumption of a truly REPRESENTATIVE form of government in all
of the Georgist arguments. At present we know that we have "The Best
Congress That Money Can Buy". And until that is repaired then there can
be no "honest" tax system. It is speculated that a simpler tax system will
create a more transparent government. That may well be true but the
creation of such a system (and more importantly, the preservation of such
a system) is dependent upon a truly representative government that
represents a well informed citizenry. The "return" to a non land value
tax system is always achieved by false economics and dishonesty and greed.
And to a limited extent it is based on classic conservatism; the "rights"
of inheritance and political position.
> * The IRS and NYC tax assessors don't care if they don't collect tax
> today. But Georgist tax collectors will care! (How come? They'll
> attend motivational seminars??)
>
> * <Snip> All reference to the issue deleted.
Government (and tax assessors) are compelled to honesty ONLY by virtue of
a true representation of the people in THEIR government. If government is
not representative of the people then there is no HONEST government.
Georgist tend to concentrate on land value taxation because it is less
confusing than such vehicles as the misuse of money creation power.
Monetary economics is not simple and the current government
representatives are focused on their own privilege as opposed to actually
representing the people and the society. Until such time as the common
people are informed and actually represented by their government then the
government will continue to be a problem.
> * Georgist tax assessors will use comparable sales! Unlike today's
> tax collectors who use comparable sales. ;-)
>
> C'mon -- you all know all these answers are entirely, um,
> unimpressive.
>
> Anyone want to take another shot at answering the challenge?
You seem to like the straw stuff very much. The "challenge" is straw in
its entirety.
--
"I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers
of society but the people themselves; and
if we think them not enlightened enough to
exercise their control with a wholesome
discretion, the remedy is not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion by
education." - Thomas Jefferson
http://GreaterVoice.org/extend
The Trucker
If we are speaking of the "single tax" then it also results in government
going broke and the end of land deed enforcement by government. The
result of such shenanigans would seem to be an increase in the tax rate or
a better assessment of the taxed "value". Sales price is NOT value. Use
value is the only _real_ value.
PeterBP
> On Wed, 19 Mar 2008 21:55:03 +0000, royls wrote:
>
> > On Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:20:49 GMT, "Dan in Philly" <dj...@aol.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> >>"PeterBP" <a...@me.com> wrote in message ...
> >>
> >>>> Why are contractual arrangements regarding land supposed to be more
> >>>> difficult to obscure than any others?
> >>
> >>> Because you cant hide land itself like you can with say a PC?
> >>
> >>His point is that you can hide the *value* of land. Instead of selling you a
> >>piece of land for $500,000, I can officially sell it to you for $100,000 and
> >>secretly give you $400,000. So the land tax will be based on the $100,000
> >>number.
> >
> > All that would do is succeed in getting your competitors' land taxes
> > lowered.
>
> If we are speaking of the "single tax" then it also results in government
> going broke and the end of land deed enforcement by government. The
> result of such shenanigans would seem to be an increase in the tax rate or
> a better assessment of the taxed "value". Sales price is NOT value. Use
> value is the only _real_ value.
How would you quantify use value over market value?
The Trucker
> The Trucker <mik...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 19 Mar 2008 21:55:03 +0000, royls wrote:
>>
>> > On Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:20:49 GMT, "Dan in Philly" <dj...@aol.com>
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> >>"PeterBP" <a...@me.com> wrote in message ...
>> >>
>> >>>> Why are contractual arrangements regarding land supposed to be more
>> >>>> difficult to obscure than any others?
>> >>
>> >>> Because you cant hide land itself like you can with say a PC?
>> >>
>> >>His point is that you can hide the *value* of land. Instead of selling you a
>> >>piece of land for $500,000, I can officially sell it to you for $100,000 and
>> >>secretly give you $400,000. So the land tax will be based on the $100,000
>> >>number.
>> >
>> > All that would do is succeed in getting your competitors' land taxes
>> > lowered.
>>
>> If we are speaking of the "single tax" then it also results in government
>> going broke and the end of land deed enforcement by government. The
>> result of such shenanigans would seem to be an increase in the tax rate or
>> a better assessment of the taxed "value". Sales price is NOT value. Use
>> value is the only _real_ value.
>
> How would you quantify use value over market value?
When the price offered for an item (even a land deed) is not sufficient to
cause a trade it is because the current owner's "use value" for the item
is more than the market offers. Neoclassicals, in their attempt to sneer
at "use value", use the term "reservation price". The current "market
value" is the price at which the item will trade. Further, land may be in
use other than simply held for speculation. The return to the current use
of the land may be less or more than the discounted future value as seen
by the market or any particular buyer. The value of each parcel is
subjective and the buyers and the sellers have differing "use values".
Assessment is a collage of these different perceived values. The point is
that price does not determine value. The value(s) determine(s) the price.
PeterBP
That much is obvious.
But it this post your way of saying that productive value (what you call
'use value'?) determines market value?
The Trucker
Sure.
(but there need be no "production". I might value a hillside for the view
it offers me).
I have seen neoclassical economists argue the opposite; that the all
seeing Market God determines value. I have seen them claim that without
the God Almighty Market there is no value. I have even seen them claim
that by increasing the demand for land (witnessed by an increasing bid
price) then more land is "supplied" by land owners and then claim that
such activity is an illustration of the "elasticity" of land. And all of
this is because of a warped religious belief in the Market God and the
notion that trade price and value are equal. This illness is especially
prevalent among marginalists.
They then sometimes fly away into "utility land" and claim that value and
utility are two totally different things. In this version of the escape
they will claim that "use value" is "utility" and that "value" is the
price at which trades occur. If there is no market then there can be no
"value".
All of this is designed to allow neoclassical economists to escape
any need for a consistent "value theory". A consistent "value theory" is
too easily used to illustrate "common good". And it is this latter phrase
that scares the hell out of Libertarians, Republicans, and other anti
social groups.
PeterBP
Then why wrap it up in ten times the text needed to just say so?
>
> (but there need be no "production". I might value a hillside for the view
> it offers me).
I'm referring to productive also in the broad sense.
>
> I have seen neoclassical economists argue the opposite; that the all
> seeing Market God determines value.
Does that mean all neoclassicals argue as such? Who are those who argue
this anyway?
> I have seen them claim that without
> the God Almighty Market there is no value.
The obvious interjection here would be that you have a mighty hard time
determining and quantifying alleged value outside of the market process.
> I have even seen them claim
> that by increasing the demand for land (witnessed by an increasing bid
> price) then more land is "supplied" by land owners and then claim that
> such activity is an illustration of the "elasticity" of land.
There is some truth in this, namely that a higher _real_ bid price would
increase the amount of land that current land holders wish to sell. It
of course does not mean that more land is produced, which is an
absurdity, and I suspect that is what you are trying to tell here.
> And all of
> this is because of a warped religious belief in the Market God
I can only shake my head at this verbal drivel. Do you really think it
makes you seem more insightful by making vague claims about the supposed
religiosity of a group of economists you happen not to like? Think about
it.
> and the
> notion that trade price and value are equal.
Depends on the definitions being used.
> This illness is especially
> prevalent among marginalists.
The obfuscation of language is a widespread problem today and not
limited to whatever group of economists you happen to disagree with.
>
> They then sometimes fly away into "utility land" and claim that value and
> utility are two totally different things. In this version of the escape
> they will claim that "use value" is "utility" and that "value" is the
> price at which trades occur.
Seems reasonable to me.
> If there is no market then there can be no
> "value".
Again, whether this is true or not depends on teh definitions being
used.
>
> All of this is designed to allow neoclassical economists to escape
> any need for a consistent "value theory".
If that is so, even for all-neoclassicals, then they are not much
different from most other mainsteam economists of today or 5 decades
ago. Not much have changed in that regard.
> A consistent "value theory" is
> too easily used to illustrate "common good". And it is this latter phrase
> that scares the hell out of Libertarians, Republicans, and other anti
> social groups.
You know, this last sentence of yours establishes you as either a troll
or a dimwit on the subject of this oft-mentioned "common good". First,
you not only assume that there is one such, but you never elaborate on
what it might be and where it comes from and what constitutes it.
Second, you build on this very shaky foundation to give your favorite
targets a big fat rubber stamp on the forehead saying "anti social".
This is childish, contraproductive, wrong and basically fucking dumb.
Myself being a libertarian (who are, despite your association trick,
_not_ in bed woth the Republicans, thank you very much), I'm tired of
the eternal appeals to "common good" to justify whatever
well-intentioned but in the end harmful state programs, and the
emotional crap about whoever are in opposition to these programs are per
default "anti social". It reeks of the one who claims it have more
between his gums than his ears, and tries to get away with a poorly
thought out proposition by means of emotional appeal rather than facts
and rason.
I can only hope you will mature your debate MO compared to what you have
presented here.
The Trucker
No problem:
http://www.greatervoice.org/essays/TheBerryPatch.php
>> I have even seen them claim
>> that by increasing the demand for land (witnessed by an increasing bid
>> price) then more land is "supplied" by land owners and then claim that
>> such activity is an illustration of the "elasticity" of land.
>
> There is some truth in this, namely that a higher _real_ bid price would
> increase the amount of land that current land holders wish to sell. It
> of course does not mean that more land is produced, which is an
> absurdity, and I suspect that is what you are trying to tell here.
It devolves into absurdity when the neoclassical ninny spouts that
"elasticity is a measure of supply, and the land owners are supplying the
land. Therefore, the supply of land is not elastic". The intent of this
crap is to justify the existence of land owners as an integral part of
political economy. The reality, of course, is that land ownership
in this day and time serves no purpose other than the enrichment of a
privileged caste. There was a time when the nobility did serve a purpose
and it was to enforce the laws. Land rent could have been viewed as a
method of taxation in support of that particular arrangement. Once that
sort of political arrangement is abandoned then there is no further
justification for the privatization of land rent and no justification for
private rent collections from land ownership.
>> And all of
>> this is because of a warped religious belief in the Market God
>
> I can only shake my head at this verbal drivel.
Well, at least you spelled "drivel" correctly. Many of my rightarded
detractors aren't even capable of that :)
> Do you really think it
> makes you seem more insightful by making vague claims about the supposed
> religiosity of a group of economists you happen not to like? Think about
> it.
The neoclassicals and marginalists do not model the real world. They
model a mathematical world that does not exist and never will. They have
been shown to be wrong in their schemes of substitution and yet they still
insist on their "righteousness". That is a religious proposition.
>> and the
>> notion that trade price and value are equal.
>
> Depends on the definitions being used.
Of course it does. But it mainly depends on the degree to which one
aggregates terms that should be distinct in order to promote an
illegitimate thesis.
>> This illness is especially
>> prevalent among marginalists.
>
> The obfuscation of language is a widespread problem today and not
> limited to whatever group of economists you happen to disagree with.
Did you know that Henry George hid "profits" in "interest"? Did you know
that the two are distinct? In his drive to expose the illegitimacy of
rent privatization he ignored the same principles as they applied to money
and it is largely due to the aggregation of "interest" and "profit".
>>
>> They then sometimes fly away into "utility land" and claim that value and
>> utility are two totally different things. In this version of the escape
>> they will claim that "use value" is "utility" and that "value" is the
>> price at which trades occur.
>
> Seems reasonable to me.
Nope. It is merely yet another attempt to defy the labor theory of costs
and the fact that natural resources are free but for the want of many to
access or use them. It is an attempt to ignore the fact that rent is
caused by population and that the the entire population that causes the
rent should receive equal recompense for being deprived of the use. It is
done by classical economists by equating cost and value (labor theory of
value) and it is done by neoclassicals by (1) not using labor as the only
true unit in which value can be measured, and then, at the same time,
claiming that opportunity costs and markets are the manner in which of
value manifests.
>> If there is no market then there can be no
>> "value".
>
> Again, whether this is true or not depends on teh definitions being
> used.
It depends utterly on ones desire to escape from a coherent cost theory.
>>
>> All of this is designed to allow neoclassical economists to escape
>> any need for a consistent "value theory".
>
> If that is so, even for all-neoclassicals, then they are not much
> different from most other mainsteam economists of today or 5 decades
> ago. Not much have changed in that regard.
Nope. Smith had a consistent and logical value theory even as it ran
away from the value of natural resource rents. But I am probably now
being guilty of the same crime of aggregation. I refer to all non
classical economists with the exception of Henry George as "neoclassical"
economists.
>> A consistent "value theory" is
>> too easily used to illustrate "common good". And it is this latter phrase
>> that scares the hell out of Libertarians, Republicans, and other anti
>> social groups.
>
> You know, this last sentence of yours establishes you as either a troll
> or a dimwit on the subject of this oft-mentioned "common good". First,
> you not only assume that there is one such, but you never elaborate on
> what it might be and where it comes from and what constitutes it.
I am of the opinion that if one cannot express the definition of "good" in
a social sense then one is not ever going to be able to do anything in
political economy or economics that is worth spit. For me freedom and
equal opportunity are __**GOOD**__, and that is the "common good"; that is
what is to be maximized.
> Second, you build on this very shaky foundation to give your favorite
> targets a big fat rubber stamp on the forehead saying "anti social".
That is a proper definition of those who cannot elucidate and "common
good". For an anarchist the "common good" is probably the lack of any
form of common government. I am guessing because I have never seen such a
proclamation of "good" that is the goal of anarchy.
> This is childish, contraproductive, wrong and basically fucking dumb.
> Myself being a libertarian (who are, despite your association trick,
> _not_ in bed woth the Republicans, thank you very much), I'm tired of
> the eternal appeals to "common good" to justify whatever
> well-intentioned but in the end harmful state programs, and the
> emotional crap about whoever are in opposition to these programs are per
> default "anti social". It reeks of the one who claims it have more
> between his gums than his ears, and tries to get away with a poorly
> thought out proposition by means of emotional appeal rather than facts
> and rason.
I think you have confused me (a Liberal) with a "progressive".
> I can only hope you will mature your debate MO compared to what you have
> presented here.
It will not change. You are entitled to your own version of common good
even if it is chaos.
Les Cargill
I am in no way sure of that. I think it is more like an axiomatic
assumption - one system assumes it, the Georgist program
assumes not-it, inferred from Chapter Ten of Spencer's Statics,
and the assumed inherent morality of labor over land.
IMO, Spencer, as a Positivist, was always suspect anyway. His
would have been a tyranny of the competent, but a tyranny
nonetheless.
> There was a time when the nobility did serve a purpose
> and it was to enforce the laws. Land rent could have been viewed as a
> method of taxation in support of that particular arrangement. Once that
> sort of political arrangement is abandoned then there is no further
> justification for the privatization of land rent and no justification for
> private rent collections from land ownership.
>
But the nobility were both an economic thing and a political thing.
They were split asunder by substituting The People for the
royal class in the US version of a Republic. Now we have a seperate
political "class" ( with significant mobility ) and an
economic "aristocracy".
I am not done with it yet, but I think that between the lines of
Burke's "Reflections On The Revolution" largely answers this. Can't
believe I just now found that....
If I read this right, the Georgist phase of say, Japan's
history pretty much led directly to the rise of the
industrial class which implemented Japanese Fascism.
This should at least clarify the debate. Be gentle; I
really don't have the deep philosophical tools for this
part of the debate. Indeed, I think it's *the* debate,
and I am in no way sure it will ever resolve... it's
been around since "Rights of Man" by Paine....
<snip>
--
Les Cargill
ro...@telus.net
wrote:
>If I read this right, the Georgist phase of say, Japan's
>history pretty much led directly to the rise of the
>industrial class which implemented Japanese Fascism.
It's true that Japan's Meiji-era land tax created the industrial
wherewithal that allowed the militaristic elite to do what they had
been keen to do for centuries: conquer on the Asian mainland. This
was made possible by the youth and weakness of Japan's democratic
political institutions, which could not rein in fascism given a vacuum
on the Chrysanthemum Throne (i.e., the mentally defective Taisho
emperor).
-- Roy L
Les Cargill
It was barely a generation from 1870 to the
first invasion of China.
--
Les Cargill
ro...@telus.net
wrote:
>ro...@telus.net wrote:
>> On Thu, 08 May 2008 19:01:41 -0400, Les Cargill <lcar...@cfl.rr.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> If I read this right, the Georgist phase of say, Japan's
>>> history pretty much led directly to the rise of the
>>> industrial class which implemented Japanese Fascism.
>>
>> It's true that Japan's Meiji-era land tax created the industrial
>> wherewithal that allowed the militaristic elite to do what they had
>> been keen to do for centuries: conquer on the Asian mainland. This
>> was made possible by the youth and weakness of Japan's democratic
>> political institutions, which could not rein in fascism given a vacuum
>> on the Chrysanthemum Throne (i.e., the mentally defective Taisho
>> emperor).
>
>It was barely a generation from 1870 to the
>first invasion of China.
That's how powerful land value taxation is.
-- Roy L
PeterBP
snip
> >> A consistent "value theory" is
> >> too easily used to illustrate "common good". And it is this latter phrase
> >> that scares the hell out of Libertarians, Republicans, and other anti
> >> social groups.
> >
> > You know, this last sentence of yours establishes you as either a troll
> > or a dimwit on the subject of this oft-mentioned "common good". First,
> > you not only assume that there is one such, but you never elaborate on
> > what it might be and where it comes from and what constitutes it.
>
> I am of the opinion that if one cannot express the definition of "good" in
> a social sense then one is not ever going to be able to do anything in
> political economy or economics that is worth spit.
Which is in itself as religious a proposition as the concept of an
absolute "good" was in the first place (believe in a common good = youre
good. If you dont = you're bad. and so it goes.).
> For me freedom and
> equal opportunity are __**GOOD**__, and that is the "common good"; that is
> what is to be maximized.
Sounds so nice, but what you do not understand is that your alleged
commonality with other "good-seekers" starts falling apart when you have
to provide hard definitions of "freedom" and "equal oppertunity" (which
I can't avoid noticing that you never seem to do... there's a smoking
gun right there.). Then you'll quickly discover that you are just _one_
advocate of the very heterogenous and confused concept of the "common
good".
> > Second, you build on this very shaky foundation to give your favorite
> > targets a big fat rubber stamp on the forehead saying "anti social".
>
> That is a proper definition of those who cannot elucidate and "common
> good".
No, that is most certainly not the proper definition of a person who is
anti social (try a dictionary). It is in fact not a definition - it's
merely your way of expressing a ill-founded prejudice.
> For an anarchist the "common good" is probably the lack of any
> form of common government.
Perhaps for a few deluded individuals - but this is merely the
expression of your misconceptions about anarchists - both to the
intents of anarchists, plus the difference between government and state
- but in any case thats a horse I won't ride here.
> I am guessing because I have never seen such a
> proclamation of "good" that is the goal of anarchy.
That would for some people give a hint of the ideological foundation of
anarchism - not that it and its detractors does not want a "better"
world (whatever that is), but rather they they do not hang themselves on
such well-intentioned but poorly defined buzzwords.
In any case, I don't know why you brought anarchism into this, but I
suspect they are yet another of your beating childs.
>
> > This is childish, contraproductive, wrong and basically fucking dumb.
> > Myself being a libertarian (who are, despite your association trick,
> > _not_ in bed woth the Republicans, thank you very much), I'm tired of
> > the eternal appeals to "common good" to justify whatever
> > well-intentioned but in the end harmful state programs, and the
> > emotional crap about whoever are in opposition to these programs are per
> > default "anti social". It reeks of the one who claims it have more
> > between his gums than his ears, and tries to get away with a poorly
> > thought out proposition by means of emotional appeal rather than facts
> > and rason.
>
> I think you have confused me (a Liberal) with a "progressive".
Pray tell where I called you a progressive? Not that I find much
dfference between the two - both camps tend to be overflowing with
holier-than-thou sentiment, peretual disgust with the unwashed, egoistic
masses, and oodles of endlessly polished plans for making the world a
better place - well intentioned and with a complete disregard for the
effects of such plans once they are enacted.
In any case, you did not confront the criticism I offered, but I can't
say I'm surprised.
>
> > I can only hope you will mature your debate MO compared to what you have
> > presented here.
>
> It will not change. You are entitled to your own version of common good
> even if it is chaos.
Translated: I'm not registering your criticisms. I'll happily continue
living in my own world, denounching imaginary enemies in my crusade for
the holy, common good (which is better than yours!!). And I don't give a
fuck about the ignorance and disdain for rational thought implied in my
ideology, nor the sacrifices I'll impose on others in my quest for this
common good.
Too bad, Trucker, you used to have some insights I respected and took
note of, but that was then - now I'm sad to observe that you've
degenerated into religious-political advocacy largely devoid of
reational content - in short, that stuff I usually expect from fringe
Marxists and Maoists. Iow, a waste of time. My condolences.
The Trucker
> The Trucker <mik...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
> snip
>
>> >> A consistent "value theory" is
>> >> too easily used to illustrate "common good". And it is this latter phrase
>> >> that scares the hell out of Libertarians, Republicans, and other anti
>> >> social groups.
>> >
>> > You know, this last sentence of yours establishes you as either a troll
>> > or a dimwit on the subject of this oft-mentioned "common good". First,
>> > you not only assume that there is one such, but you never elaborate on
>> > what it might be and where it comes from and what constitutes it.
>>
>> I am of the opinion that if one cannot express the definition of "good" in
>> a social sense then one is not ever going to be able to do anything in
>> political economy or economics that is worth spit.
>
> Which is in itself as religious a proposition as the concept of an
> absolute "good" was in the first place (believe in a common good = youre
> good. If you dont = you're bad. and so it goes.).
I will not run away from that argument. I am of the opinion that ALL
expressions of "good" are a religious proposition.
>
>> For me freedom and
>> equal opportunity are __**GOOD**__, and that is the "common good"; that is
>> what is to be maximized.
>
> Sounds so nice, but what you do not understand is that your alleged
> commonality with other "good-seekers" starts falling apart when you have
> to provide hard definitions of "freedom" and "equal oppertunity" (which
> I can't avoid noticing that you never seem to do... there's a smoking
> gun right there.). Then you'll quickly discover that you are just _one_
> advocate of the very heterogenous and confused concept of the "common
> good".
What would you like as to a further definition of "freedom" or of "equal
opportunity". It seems to me that in order to maximize both "freedom" and
"equal opportunity" that these must be maximized far all as opposed to
maximized for just a few. I am not having any difficulty so far with my
definitions. Perhaps you'd like to clearly state your problem with my
definitions for all the rest of the readers here.
>> > Second, you build on this very shaky foundation to give your favorite
>> > targets a big fat rubber stamp on the forehead saying "anti social".
>>
>> That is a proper definition of those who cannot elucidate and "common
>> good".
>
> No, that is most certainly not the proper definition of a person who is
> anti social (try a dictionary). It is in fact not a definition - it's
> merely your way of expressing a ill-founded prejudice.
Horse crap.
>> For an anarchist the "common good" is probably the lack of any
>> form of common government.
>
> Perhaps for a few deluded individuals - but this is merely the
> expression of your misconceptions about anarchists - both to the
> intents of anarchists, plus the difference between government and state
> - but in any case thats a horse I won't ride here.
The problem gets down really to the lack of any definition of anarchy. It
seems to vary from one anarchist to the next.
>> I am guessing because I have never seen such a
>> proclamation of "good" that is the goal of anarchy.
>
> That would for some people give a hint of the ideological foundation of
> anarchism - not that it and its detractors does not want a "better"
> world (whatever that is), but rather they they do not hang themselves on
> such well-intentioned but poorly defined buzzwords.
>
> In any case, I don't know why you brought anarchism into this, but I
> suspect they are yet another of your beating childs.
That would be a "whipping boy" or a "straw man" or something like that. I
seem to have defined my concept of "good" and "common good" much better
than you have stated your counter proclamations and arguments against my
definitions.
>>
>> > This is childish, contraproductive, wrong and basically fucking dumb.
>> > Myself being a libertarian (who are, despite your association trick,
>> > _not_ in bed woth the Republicans, thank you very much), I'm tired of
>> > the eternal appeals to "common good" to justify whatever
>> > well-intentioned but in the end harmful state programs, and the
>> > emotional crap about whoever are in opposition to these programs are per
>> > default "anti social". It reeks of the one who claims it have more
>> > between his gums than his ears, and tries to get away with a poorly
>> > thought out proposition by means of emotional appeal rather than facts
>> > and rason.
>>
>> I think you have confused me (a Liberal) with a "progressive".
>
> Pray tell where I called you a progressive? Not that I find much
> dfference between the two - both camps tend to be overflowing with
> holier-than-thou sentiment, peretual disgust with the unwashed, egoistic
> masses, and oodles of endlessly polished plans for making the world a
> better place - well intentioned and with a complete disregard for the
> effects of such plans once they are enacted.
Wow! What a bloviation.
> In any case, you did not confront the criticism I offered, but I can't
> say I'm surprised.
I am having trouble sorting out the criticism. It seems to be a claim
that my definition of good is not precise enough and/or that my definition
is just an opinion or a religious view. I have no problem with the latter
because ANY definition of good is a religious proposition. We seem to be
at odds with how we can move from an "opinion" or "religious position" to
an acceptable definition. I am open to suggestions on a mechanism for
doing that. I am not open to the claim that such a thing is impossible.
If your position is that the maximization of anarchy is the only proper
definition of "common good" then say so and we can get on with the
definition of anarchy. But claiming that there is no common good is
a dodge at best.
>>
>> > I can only hope you will mature your debate MO compared to what you have
>> > presented here.
>>
>> It will not change. You are entitled to your own version of common good
>> even if it is chaos.
>
> Translated: I'm not registering your criticisms. I'll happily continue
> living in my own world, denounching imaginary enemies in my crusade for
> the holy, common good (which is better than yours!!). And I don't give a
> fuck about the ignorance and disdain for rational thought implied in my
> ideology, nor the sacrifices I'll impose on others in my quest for this
> common good.
Again... You are entitled to your religious position.
> Too bad, Trucker, you used to have some insights I respected and took
> note of, but that was then - now I'm sad to observe that you've
> degenerated into religious-political advocacy largely devoid of
> reational content - in short, that stuff I usually expect from fringe
> Marxists and Maoists. Iow, a waste of time. My condolences.
Too bad for you.