SafeIT it´s good
Eva-Marie Andersson
programme becomes better and better. I work with crypto and security
and I do agree that this is the best e-mailsecurityprogramme on the
market by the following reasons:
a)Wellknown cryptoalgoritms
b)Safer with symmetrical crypto than unsymmetrical
c)Smart system for changes of keys
d)Simple to use. You use your ordinary e-mailprogramme and it works
automatically. No previous knowledges to use it.
I have compared PGP and SafeIT (this comparison is now beeing
translated into english). SafeIT is safer and easier to use. PGP has
the advantage of having more users (future?…..) and it works on more
platforms. I beleive and hope that SafeIT will soon work on most of
the platforms.
I do beleive that the most important thing is that one protect ones
communications and also other types of computerprotection. If You like
PGP that is OK. If You like SafeIT that is OK. Of those who for the
first time test PGP and SafeIT, 95% choose SafeIT for the future.
I am also in contact with a lot of projects with very high security
demands and there I recommend SafeIT because I consider this technique
better and it works automatically so that the user will not be the
weak link and make misstakes.
My own website, http://hem.fyristorg.com/emailsynaren is for the
moment only in swedish but I am working on the english version.
Michael Scott
1. How is SafeIT protected from Man-in-the-Middle attacks. There is no
authentication?
2. Diffie-Hellman, as normally implemented, is an on-line key exchange
algorithm. So how do I negotiate a common key with my correspondent unless
they too are on-line? Put another way when the email is waiting on the
mail-server to be downloaded by the intended recipient, what key is it
encrypted with?
Mike Scott
"Eva-Marie Andersson" <eva.marie...@work.utfors.se> wrote in message
news:612dcf09.01062...@posting.google.com...
> I have been using SafeIT (http://safeit.com ) for a long time and the
> programme becomes better and better. I work with crypto and security
> and I do agree that this is the best e-mailsecurityprogramme on the
> market by the following reasons:
>
> a)Wellknown cryptoalgoritms
> b)Safer with symmetrical crypto than unsymmetrical
> c)Smart system for changes of keys
> d)Simple to use. You use your ordinary e-mailprogramme and it works
> automatically. No previous knowledges to use it.
>
> I have compared PGP and SafeIT (this comparison is now beeing
> translated into english). SafeIT is safer and easier to use. PGP has
> the advantage of having more users (future?...) and it works on more
Douglas A. Gwyn
> Of those who for the
> first time test PGP and SafeIT, 95% choose SafeIT for the future.
How do you know that?
Henrick Hellström
might send the two DH protocol messages by (unencrypted) e-mail. Once they
have established a shared key, either party might change the key by sending
it in an e-mail encrypted under the previous key. There could obviously
still be a MITM during the initial key exchange, and denial-of-service
attacks would be possible - the attacker simply deletes a message he
suspects contains a new key.
I don't know if this is what SafeIT does.
--
Henrick Hellström hen...@streamsec.se
StreamSec HB http://www.streamsec.com
"Michael Scott" <msc...@indigo.ie> skrev i meddelandet
news:Dc0%6.12164$Fk7.1...@news.indigo.ie...
Michael Scott
I gain fleeting access to one SafeIT users computer and get all his keys wrt
each correspondent. Then I can read all emails in the future. I wonder are
the keys even protected by a pass-phrase? The idea of the next random key
being embedded in each email is an old idea, but not I think a really good
one.
Mike Scott
"Henrick Hellström" <hen...@streamsec.se> wrote in message
news:9hi93h$d61$1...@taliesin.netcom.net.uk...
Joseph Ashwood
"Eva-Marie Andersson" <eva.marie...@work.utfors.se> wrote in message
news:612dcf09.01062...@posting.google.com...
> I have been using SafeIT (http://safeit.com ) for a long time and the
> programme becomes better and better.
Well I should hope it becomes better, judging from what I've seen of it, it
certainly can't get any worse.
> I work with crypto and security
I believe the primary quote from your job is "Can I see your pass" and "Ok
sir you may enter" I don't consider this to make you capable of convincing
us of the security of whatever worthless drivel you don't think we'll
realize you're peddling.
> and I do agree that this is the best e-mailsecurityprogramme on the
> market by the following reasons:
>
> a)Wellknown cryptoalgoritms
Gee, except for that pesky one that came out in the other conversation that
is quite damning
> b)Safer with symmetrical crypto than unsymmetrical
Which is a stupendouly stupid statement because according to the other
conversation it uses assymetric crypto.
> c)Smart system for changes of keys
Well according to the other conversation it's a really stupid way because it
results in not being able to decrypt. Of course if this is wrong that simply
means that you lie. So basically it's snake-oil if you do, snake-oil if you
don't. Take your pick it's snake-oil.
> d)Simple to use. You use your ordinary e-mailprogramme and it works
> automatically. No previous knowledges to use it.
Well I should hope it's simple to use. There certainly wasn't anyone capable
of doing crypto there, they must have spent money on something.
> I have compared PGP and SafeIT (this comparison is now beeing
> translated into english).
If you honestly have why have you decided on SafeIT, as I stated earlier
it's clearly snake-oil.
> SafeIT is safer [snip].
Well if it as was stated in the other conversation and simply results in not
being able to decrypt at all, then yeah it's secure, it's not usable but
it's secure.
> PGP has
> the advantage of having more users (future?...) and it works on more
> platforms.
PGP has other advantages too, like someone with more than a single digit IQ
trying to peddle it.
> I beleive and hope that SafeIT will soon work on most of
> the platforms.
I hope so too. The more money you spend on porting the sooner you'll run out
of money and go away.
> I do beleive that the most important thing is that one protect ones
> communications and also other types of computerprotection.
That is exactly why I believe you shouldn't touch SafeIT with a 10-foot Pole
(or a 6-foot Swede)
> If You like SafeIT that is OK. Of those who for the
> first time test PGP and SafeIT, 95% choose SafeIT for the future.
I think I'll call you on this. Since you have made a particular statement
about the desirability of your product. I am asking for proof of
examination. If you cannot provide that proof I encourage everyone who
purchased the product based on that claim so use the legal system to their
best advantage.
[I snipped several words out of the following sentence to make it easier to
understand]
> I recommend SafeIT so that the user will not be the
> weak link
Isn't that somewhat like, "I killed you so you wouldn't grow old"? I think
it is. You have clearly introduced something that is very much weaker than
anything else reasonable, specifically so that the user doesn't have to
suffer with the stress of being the weakest link, there's a weaker one now.
> My own website, http://hem.fyristorg.com/emailsynaren is for the
> moment only in swedish but I am working on the english version.
Please feel free to spend all your money doing that, I'd personally like to
see as many snake-oil peddlers as possible go out of business.
Joe
Eva-Marie Andersson
SafeIT (http://www.safeit.com) has a start sequence where
Diffie-Hellman is used. Theoretically it can be attacked by
man-in-the-middle. After that SafeIT transfres to a symmetrical crypto
which can not be attacked by man-in-the-middle.
There are several possibilities to control, for example by comparing
Your crypto with your counterparty. Once You have compared You know
for sure that there is no man-in-middle neither now nor in the future.
However, my opinion is that SafeIT should improve this control point
as it is a bit messy. There are two possible solutions, either some
kind of protocol or automate the controlfunktion.
By the start sequence the Diffie-Hellman key is not crypted and so it
shall not be. The publical key is sent by the first e-mail. The
counterparty calculates a startcryptokey with his secret key and at
the same time he sends his publical key to his counterparty. Bugging
of the start will not give You any key.
/Eva-Marie
"Michael Scott" <msc...@indigo.ie> wrote in message news:<Dc0%6.12164$Fk7.1...@news.indigo.ie>...
Eva-Marie Andersson
people that do not crypt. I have been using both PGP and SafeIT (and a
few others with bad function). The great advantage with SafeIT is that
you send and receive Your e-mail as usual. PGP leads to a lot of
difficulties for beginners. We are all beginners at a time. (Have You
read "Why Johny can´t use PGP"?)
/Eva-Marie
"Douglas A. Gwyn" <DAG...@null.net> wrote in message news:<3B3C9831...@null.net>...
Mok-Kong Shen
Eva-Marie Andersson wrote:
>
[snip]
> My own website, http://hem.fyristorg.com/emailsynaren is for the
> moment only in swedish but I am working on the english version.
If that contains some detailed description of the system,
maybe also your own critical comments, then please give
notice when it is ready.
M. K. Shen
Tom St Denis
> My experience is that 95% choose SafeIT. You may yourself test upon
> people that do not crypt. I have been using both PGP and SafeIT (and a
> few others with bad function). The great advantage with SafeIT is that
> you send and receive Your e-mail as usual. PGP leads to a lot of
> difficulties for beginners. We are all beginners at a time. (Have You
> read "Why Johny can´t use PGP"?)
95% of who? PGP in winblows can integrate into your email programs too.
I think you're just bordering on spam-troll now.
Tom
Henrick Hellström
meddelandet news:612dcf09.01070...@posting.google.com...
> SafeIT- no risk with man-in-the-middle.
This is simply not true.
> SafeIT (http://www.safeit.com) has a start sequence where
> Diffie-Hellman is used. Theoretically it can be attacked by
> man-in-the-middle.
If it can be done in theory, it can be done in practice. The company does in
fact emphazise the possibility of such attacks as one of the reasons for
using the product in the first place.
> After that SafeIT transfres to a symmetrical crypto
> which can not be attacked by man-in-the-middle.
The MITM attack only has to be launched once, so...
> There are several possibilities to control, for example by comparing
> Your crypto with your counterparty. Once You have compared You know
> for sure that there is no man-in-middle neither now nor in the future.
Now, that's an interesting argument. Why would the legitimate parties do
that? One argument for using SafeIT seems to be that it is (claimed to be)
fully transparent. That seems to imply that the users shouldn't even have to
worry about what the cipher text looks like. What would make them compare
the cipher text? Is it true that every pair of SafeIT users actually have to
compare the cipher text to make sure that there has been no MITM attack? If
this is so, is it really that convenient to use this product?
> However, my opinion is that SafeIT should improve this control point
> as it is a bit messy. There are two possible solutions, either some
> kind of protocol or automate the controlfunktion.
>
> By the start sequence the Diffie-Hellman key is not crypted and so it
> shall not be. The publical key is sent by the first e-mail. The
> counterparty calculates a startcryptokey with his secret key and at
> the same time he sends his publical key to his counterparty. Bugging
> of the start will not give You any key.
???
Tom St Denis
> "Eva-Marie Andersson" <eva.marie...@work.utfors.se> skrev i
> meddelandet news:612dcf09.01070...@posting.google.com...
> > SafeIT- no risk with man-in-the-middle.
>
> This is simply not true.
Hey hey, if he said so it *MUST* be true. [note sarcasm].
> > SafeIT (http://www.safeit.com) has a start sequence where
> > Diffie-Hellman is used. Theoretically it can be attacked by
> > man-in-the-middle.
>
> If it can be done in theory, it can be done in practice. The company does
in
> fact emphazise the possibility of such attacks as one of the reasons for
> using the product in the first place.
Yes and in theory I can break Twofish reduced to 10 rounds. in practice it
only requires over 2^200 work, etc...
Be careful how you generalize.
<snip>
Tom
Henrick Hellström
news:dRZ%6.75926$Mf5.20...@news3.rdc1.on.home.com...
>
> "Henrick Hellström" <hen...@streamsec.se> wrote in message
> news:UNZ%6.766$z21.1...@newsc.telia.net...
> > "Eva-Marie Andersson" <eva.marie...@work.utfors.se> skrev i
> > meddelandet news:612dcf09.01070...@posting.google.com...
> > > SafeIT- no risk with man-in-the-middle.
> >
> > This is simply not true.
>
> Hey hey, if he said so it *MUST* be true. [note sarcasm].
"She", not "he". (Unless "Eva-Marie Andersson" is a pseudonym, in which case
I can't tell, of course.)
> > > SafeIT (http://www.safeit.com) has a start sequence where
> > > Diffie-Hellman is used. Theoretically it can be attacked by
> > > man-in-the-middle.
> >
> > If it can be done in theory, it can be done in practice. The company
does
> in
> > fact emphazise the possibility of such attacks as one of the reasons for
> > using the product in the first place.
>
> Yes and in theory I can break Twofish reduced to 10 rounds. in practice
it
> only requires over 2^200 work, etc...
>
> Be careful how you generalize.
Yes, true. Nevertheless, it seems to be possible in practice to launch a
MITM attack against SafeIT. (Just so that there is no misunderstanding.)
> <snip>
David Hopwood
Eva-Marie Andersson wrote:
[snip]
Gotcha. Up to now, you'd been careful to use the utfors.se account to
post mail under the "Eva-Marie Andersson" address, and so I couldn't
prove any linkage between the two addresses. The NNTP-Posting-Host for
this post, though, was identical to that of one of "Erban Johnson"'s
posts: 213.131.144.217 (probably sent in the same session).
Trying to pass off this recommendation as an unbiased third-party
opinion (and creating a web site to support that impression) is a
pretty dispicable tactic, IMHO. Clearly Softnet Security are an
untrustworthy and disreputable company.
- --
David Hopwood <david....@zetnet.co.uk>
Home page & PGP public key: http://www.users.zetnet.co.uk/hopwood/
RSA 2048-bit; fingerprint 71 8E A6 23 0E D3 4C E5 0F 69 8C D4 FA 66 15 01
Nothing in this message is intended to be legally binding. If I revoke a
public key but refuse to specify why, it is because the private key has been
seized under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act; see www.fipr.org/rip
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Jakob Jonsson
> moment only in swedish but I am working on the english version.
Maybe you should have some expert check the content before you start
translating anything. Here is my own translation of the RSA section
with some additional comments:
>RSA
>
>Not only is the name RSA similar to NSA, the three founders are former
>NSA employees.
No, they are not. Adi Shamir was not even an American citizen.
>/.../
>
>Within the cryptographic community, there are rumors circulating that
>RSA can be broken with a simple PC program. Allegedly, NSA, among
>others, has access to this program. RSA [Security] claims that nothing
>is proved about RSA being breakable. RSA [Security] has not proved that
>it is impossible to break it either. This is contradictory, as RSA
>[Security] is presenting new algorithms.
RSA Security is using the very RSA algorithm to protect its own sensitive
information. Contradictory, isn't it?
>Rumors have it that [4096?-bit numbers] can be [factored] with fewer
>than 25 million instructions, starting with the last digit in the number
>and about 40 relations and probabilities, and then building the
>[prime factor] from right to left. If this is true, such a crypto is
>broken within seconds.
>
>/A fair amount of additional paranoia snipped/
More details on the "method" are given in another section on the web site,
and the claims are strengthened with links to the notorious Philippines
attack. The method is basically a less sophisticated variant of Michael
Brown's algorithm (see older threads in sci.crypt), which turned out to
fail for 5-bit primes.
Do you by any chance find it remotely discouraging for your theories that
several of the most brilliant number theorists in the world - Montgomery,
Lenstra, etc. - spent a huge amount of time and energy on factoring a
_512_-bit integer less than two years ago? If they don't believe in these
rumors, why do you?
Jakob
Tony L. Svanstrom
I've read it, just be thankful that you didn't waste any time on it...
/Tony
--
the truth is dead, faith is gone, reality killed... ruled by the plastic
laws of modern life we're pushed towards the hell of personal doubt,
betrayal, hate, lust and murder... the now has become an illusion, a
paradise of a dead tomorrow... (c)2000-2001 to...@svanstrom.com
Richard Herring
> "Douglas A. Gwyn" <DAG...@null.net> wrote in message news:<3B3C9831...@null.net>...
> > Eva-Marie Andersson wrote:
> > > Of those who for the
> > > first time test PGP and SafeIT, 95% choose SafeIT for the future.
> > How do you know that?
> people that do not crypt.
Ah. You mean that of that set (of unknown size) of people whose
first exposure to crypto was you demonstrating it, 95% chose SafeIT.
Big deal.
> I have been using both PGP and SafeIT (and a
> few others with bad function). The great advantage with SafeIT is that
> you send and receive Your e-mail as usual.
Odd, because that's exactly what I do with my own preferred email
client and PGP.
> PGP leads to a lot of difficulties for beginners.
Not if they use a suitable email client, with a PGPsdk plugin. In
that case it's practically transparent.
--
Richard Herring | <richard...@baesystems.com>