> This change is a watershed that simply must come – there is too
> much effort being spent at present on masking the natural transparency
> of the traditional number line (without complete success) as the
> selection domain for use as the raw data in encryption transformations
> being made by design cryptographers.
What you seem to be saying here is that if the *PLAINTEXT* is in
ASCII and is English text, then *GAME OVER*, you (or anyone else)
is going to fail trying to keep it secret by encrypting it. That
seems to be throwing your ciphers under the bus along with everyone
else's. It also seems to mean that no matter how much one pre-scrambles
that plaintext before getting on to the main encryption (like, say,
translating it to Egyptian hieroglyphics), you're still going to
fail to keep it secret.
You don't get to control plaintext.
> I repeat, cryptography is an industry that goes out – not up –
> there are no principles to be salvaged from defunct cryptography
> that would suggest retaining them as building blocks for future
> ciphers that might say cryptography goes up - it doesn't.
There are a couple of things you might learn from old ciphers.
A few of these are definitions of terms you don't seem to
know the meaning of but use anyway:
plaintext
ciphertext
key (a message is encrypted using one key, although you
may split that into as many subkeys as you like).
Every time someone tries to figure out about how many bits are in
the key you are using, you dodge the question. At one point you
said that you could set up a shared key by exchanging two integers
(presumably 16-bit or less, from your examples).