One-Time_Pad
Neko
generate any type of data (binary, hex, digits etc...) and I have a
computer to print it in any form I want. After I print this off, I
would make it into a little book that would be highly portable. I would
generate a copy of this pad and give it to my accomplice, and we would
keep our pads in sync by tearing off any pages that we use, if even we
only use one element of that pad. Maybe we'll even have two pads each,
one for messages both ways. What would be the best way to have the pad
set up? Should I do letters, and add them modulo 26, should I do
digits? If so, how many? I've seen a pad with rows of random 5-digit
numbers that looked pretty cool. Also, how on earth would I get it from
my computer to an easy way to cut it all out and attatch the pages
together? How many letters per page should I make it? I just want to
know if any of you make one time pads, and if so, how do you do it?
Again, any and all advice will be helpful. Thank you!!!
Neko
Alan Connor
You can just start with one OTP apiece. Compose your message, then
"weave" (in any number of ways) the OTP you want them to use to reply
with into the message.
Then encipher it in the OTP they are expecting and have the key for.
The "weaving" further obscures your actual message, as an added benefit.
--
Alan C this post ends with w
q
MacGregor K. Phillips
news:bnrp3q$154egi$1...@ID-198243.news.uni-berlin.de...
If you want to generate one-time pads of any length try my program Top
Secret Crypto Gold. It allows you to create one-time pads of any desired
length and it prints out two copies, one for you and one for the person you
want to correspond with. You can download the latest version at
http://www.topsecretcrypto.com/files/Tsc300.exe. I will be posting a free
for personal use version when I post the next update to my program, but it
can be downloaded now at http://www.topsecretcrypto.com/files/Tsc210.exe.
MacGregor K. Phillips
Alan Connor
>
<snip>
>
> If you want to generate one-time pads of any length try my program Top
> Secret Crypto Gold. It allows you to create one-time pads of any desired
> length and it prints out two copies, one for you and one for the person you
> want to correspond with. You can download the latest version at
> http://www.topsecretcrypto.com/files/Tsc300.exe. I will be posting a free
> for personal use version when I post the next update to my program, but it
> can be downloaded now at http://www.topsecretcrypto.com/files/Tsc210.exe.
>
> MacGregor K. Phillips
>
>
That's sound interesting. Will you be porting it to Linux/UNIX?
Michael Amling
> Ok. Lets say that I have a purely random (not pseudo) source that can
> generate any type of data (binary, hex, digits etc...) and I have a
> computer to print it in any form I want. After I print this off, I
> would make it into a little book that would be highly portable. I would
> generate a copy of this pad and give it to my accomplice, and we would
> keep our pads in sync by tearing off any pages that we use, if even we
> only use one element of that pad. Maybe we'll even have two pads each,
> one for messages both ways. What would be the best way to have the pad
> set up? Should I do letters, and add them modulo 26, should I do
> digits? If so, how many? I've seen a pad with rows of random 5-digit
Since those decisions don't affect OTP security, pick the format
that's easiest for the user to use. Since you're the user, that's up to you.
If it were me, I would probably want enough symbols to send source
code, e.g. ()+-=!^[]{};:,'"|?<>/*&% and space in addition to digits,
uppercase and lowercase. I'd use two decimal digits per symbol and print
the correspondence between the symbols and the decimals as a border
around each OTP page. But that's just me.
> numbers that looked pretty cool. Also, how on earth would I get it from
> my computer to an easy way to cut it all out and attach the pages
> together?
Sheets of labels with no glue or Post-it strength glue? If you're
making an actual pad, use ink that won't rub off onto the sheet above.
> How many letters per page should I make it? I just want to
> know if any of you make one time pads, and if so, how do you do it?
> Again, any and all advice will be helpful. Thank you!!!
The manual MAC is still an open problem.
--Mike Amling
Neko
I tried your program, and it was pretty neat, but the print feature on
it printed the pad way too big. I was looking for a way to print the
pad to make it highly portable, even if the font size would be very
small, like the Russian mini one time pad. How would I go about making
one of those things??? I mean, I have the random data, but I need to
format it in a way that can be easily printed off and cut into pages,
without running the risk of cutting the numbers in the process. In
other words, I need a (quick) way to format the pad so that groups of
numbers could be on each page, and the pad could contain alot of numbers.
Neko
Andrew Swallow
[snip]
>
> I tried your program, and it was pretty neat, but the print feature on
> it printed the pad way too big. I was looking for a way to print the
> pad to make it highly portable, even if the font size would be very
> small, like the Russian mini one time pad. How would I go about making
> one of those things??? I mean, I have the random data, but I need to
> format it in a way that can be easily printed off and cut into pages,
> without running the risk of cutting the numbers in the process. In
> other words, I need a (quick) way to format the pad so that groups of
> numbers could be on each page, and the pad could contain alot of numbers.
>
You can set the page size, width. font and character size. You can
even put a page number at the bottom of each page.
Andrew Swallow
Benjamin Choi
> If you want to generate one-time pads of any length try my program Top
> Secret Crypto Gold. It allows you to create one-time pads of any desired
> length and it prints out two copies, one for you and one for the person you
> want to correspond with. You can download the latest version at
> http://www.topsecretcrypto.com/files/Tsc300.exe. I will be posting a free
> for personal use version when I post the next update to my program, but it
> can be downloaded now at http://www.topsecretcrypto.com/files/Tsc210.exe.
You can't generate true random numbers from software... any numbers
generated by an algorithm make the one-time-pad into a stream cipher.
It becomes breakable.
However there are some quick hacks to generate almost-random numbers
from software... such as capture mouse coordinates every (1/random)
seconds while asking user to randomly move mouse. Also, record time to
an extremely high precision in between keystrokes. Maybe if all this
data were fed into a strong hash such as SHA-1, it would produce an
unpredictable one-time-pad... but it's still best to use coin or dice
or specialised hardware rather than software.
--
Benjamin Choi
Alan Connor
From MAN RANDOM(4):
The random number generator gathers environmental noise
from device drivers and other sources into an entropy
pool.
MacGregor K. Phillips
news:aekob.8877$Px2....@newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net...
Sorry, but I only program for Windows. Perhaps someday, I will try Linux.
MacGregor K. Phillips
MacGregor K. Phillips
> MacGregor K. Phillips wrote:
> > "Neko" <neutral_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > news:bnrp3q$154egi$1...@ID-198243.news.uni-berlin.de...
> >
>
> I tried your program, and it was pretty neat, but the print feature on
> it printed the pad way too big. I was looking for a way to print the
> pad to make it highly portable, even if the font size would be very
> small, like the Russian mini one time pad. How would I go about making
> one of those things??? I mean, I have the random data, but I need to
> format it in a way that can be easily printed off and cut into pages,
> without running the risk of cutting the numbers in the process. In
> other words, I need a (quick) way to format the pad so that groups of
> numbers could be on each page, and the pad could contain alot of numbers.
Right now the pages are designed to be cut in half so you can make smaller
pads. Perhaps in a future version I will add the ability to format the pages
to different formats.
MacGregor K. Phillips
Alan Connor
Thanks for the reply. If you are using ANSI C, I understand that the
differences are less than one might think.
MacGregor K. Phillips
"Alan Connor" <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message
> On Sat, 1 Nov 2003 10:28:19 +0800, MacGregor K. Phillips
<m...@topsecretcrypto.com> wrote:
> >> That's sound interesting. Will you be porting it to Linux/UNIX?
> >
>>
> > Sorry, but I only program for Windows. Perhaps someday, I will try
Linux.
> >
> > MacGregor K. Phillips
> >
> >
>
> Thanks for the reply. If you are using ANSI C, I understand that the
> differences are less than one might think.
I am using MS VC++ 6.0 for Win32.
MacGregor K. Phillips
Simon Johnson
> Secret Crypto Gold. It allows you to create one-time pads of any desired
> length and it prints out two copies, one for you and one for the person you
> want to correspond with. You can download the latest version at
> http://www.topsecretcrypto.com/files/Tsc300.exe. I will be posting a free
> for personal use version when I post the next update to my program, but it
> can be downloaded now at http://www.topsecretcrypto.com/files/Tsc210.exe.
>
> MacGregor K. Phillips
Where does this program get the entropy from?
Simon.
Mxsmanic
> Where does this program get the entropy from?
A free server based in Fort Meade.
--
Transpose hotmail and mxsmanic in my e-mail address to reach me directly.
MacGregor K. Phillips
"Mxsmanic" <mxsm...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:6a6aqvkebcq4h6un3...@4ax.com...
> Simon Johnson writes:
>
> > Where does this program get the entropy from?
>
> A free server based in Fort Meade.
Sarcasm. When will people first start looking in the obvious places, like
the help file, before they post anything that reveals their true
intellectual capacity.
MacGregor K. Phillips
MacGregor K. Phillips
news:f5668ae7.03110...@posting.google.com...
Download the program and see for yourself. The source code for the random
bits bin and encryption algorithms, etc., are in the help file, written in C
and assembly language.
MacGregor K. Phillips
r.e.s.
You might like to read this, purportedly
provided by "a retired CIA old-timer":
thisisme
Warning: Use of a one time pad in the way you
have described may be illegal. Destruction of
the pad after the message has been transmitted
could constitute destruction of evidence. Please
consider this before you use OTP in this way.
Mok-Kong Shen
thisisme wrote:
>
> Neko wrote:
........
[snip]
> Warning: Use of a one time pad in the way you
> have described may be illegal. Destruction of
> the pad after the message has been transmitted
> could constitute destruction of evidence. Please
> consider this before you use OTP in this way.
Indeed, at least in some (democratic) countries one
may be required to decrypt by the law enforcement,
if I don't err.
M. K. Shen
Mxsmanic
> Warning: Use of a one time pad in the way you
> have described may be illegal. Destruction of
> the pad after the message has been transmitted
> could constitute destruction of evidence. Please
> consider this before you use OTP in this way.
If you have any reason to consider such techniques in the first place,
the information you've encrypted might be more incriminating than your
attempts to conceal it.
Alan Connor
I communicate with a lot of people using OTPs that are "woven" into
the return message before enciphering. The OTPs disappear forever
after being used once (duh) and most are not even written to the single
floppy, which resides in a booby-trapped hideyhole when not in use.
In a room with good locks, better alarms, and steel door and frame.
No message, in or out, is ever copied to disk, though notes on a seperate
floppy may be typed (hope that's clear)
And I don't care whether this is legal or not. If I don't want anyone but
a specific person to read a particular message, then that's the way it is.
I have the right. And I WILL exercise it.
The best way is to make sure that only THAT person ever knows a message
has been sent in the first place.
Yesterday I posted a message on a busy newsgroup that included an
invisible message to someone. Looked just like a normal post.
I sent an email to a shell account on another continent, the body of the
mail which was copied into a blank newspost and sent off to a newserver
with utterly bogus headers.
Even being given all that information, you still wouldn't be able to
determine which post it was, what the message was, and who it was intended
for.
------------------------
There are always ways around fascists
Richard Heathfield
> Warning: Use of a one time pad in the way you
> have described may be illegal. Destruction of
> the pad after the message has been transmitted
> could constitute destruction of evidence. Please
> consider this before you use OTP in this way.
Warning: washing a wine-glass (and thus removing fingerprints) may be
illegal. Destruction of fingerprints after the wine has been consumed could
constitute destruction of evidence. Please consider this before you use
wine-glasses in this way.
The analogy is relevant, I think. Destroying an OTP after use is in
accordance with normal practice, just as washing a wine-glass after use in
in accordance with normal practice.
If, on the other hand, a crime had been committed, the police were holding a
wine-glass as evidence, and I were somehow to wipe it clean, yes, that
would be illegal. Similarly, if I were to destroy an OTP key that I knew
the police were aware of and which they wanted to have a copy of, that
destruction might be illegal too.
--
Richard Heathfield : bin...@eton.powernet.co.uk
"Usenet is a strange place." - Dennis M Ritchie, 29 July 1999.
C FAQ: http://www.eskimo.com/~scs/C-faq/top.html
K&R answers, C books, etc: http://users.powernet.co.uk/eton
Mxsmanic
> No message, in or out, is ever copied to disk, though notes on a seperate
> floppy may be typed (hope that's clear)
How do you prevent this? Most operating systems may swap processes to
disk without the knowledge or control of the processes in question,
leaving a lot of evidence on the drives, even for purely "memory
contained" applications.
> And I don't care whether this is legal or not.
If you live in a country where it is illegal, that's all the more reason
for using it!
> Yesterday I posted a message on a busy newsgroup that included an
> invisible message to someone. Looked just like a normal post.
>
> I sent an email to a shell account on another continent, the body of the
> mail which was copied into a blank newspost and sent off to a newserver
> with utterly bogus headers.
>
> Even being given all that information, you still wouldn't be able to
> determine which post it was, what the message was, and who it was intended
> for.
You must have a serious need for security. And yet you describe what
you are doing in this post. Is that wise?
Alan Connor
>
>
> Alan Connor writes:
>
>> No message, in or out, is ever copied to disk, though notes on a seperate
>> floppy may be typed (hope that's clear)
>
> How do you prevent this? Most operating systems may swap processes to
> disk without the knowledge or control of the processes in question,
> leaving a lot of evidence on the drives, even for purely "memory
> contained" applications.
>
The simple encipher/decipher program AND the minimal OS that allows it
to work is booted as a ram disk from a floppy. This "virtual OS" has no
way of transferring data to or from the hard disk. By design. You have
to use floppies and boot up each OS (there is one on the hard disk)
seperately. It was made from tomsrtbt.
>> And I don't care whether this is legal or not.
>
> If you live in a country where it is illegal, that's all the more reason
> for using it!
>
>> Yesterday I posted a message on a busy newsgroup that included an
>> invisible message to someone. Looked just like a normal post.
>>
>> I sent an email to a shell account on another continent, the body of the
>> mail which was copied into a blank newspost and sent off to a newserver
>> with utterly bogus headers.
>>
>> Even being given all that information, you still wouldn't be able to
>> determine which post it was, what the message was, and who it was intended
>> for.
>
> You must have a serious need for security. And yet you describe what
> you are doing in this post. Is that wise?
>
I wouldn't have any problem publishing the entire program we use.
I have several websites, and one of these days will do just that. Should
take maybe an hour to wrap it in simple HTML and some explanatory text.
As for having a serious need for security? No. I just like privacy.
Too many groups that I don't trust are doing too much snooping.
Mxsmanic
> I wouldn't have any problem publishing the entire program we use.
That's not what I mean. It's the fact that you mention you are using
it. Traffic analysis, in other words. You don't just try to crack
ciphers; you look at who is using them, and under what conditions, and
in which messages, and with whom.
> As for having a serious need for security? No. I just like privacy.
You must be extreme in your preference. That's a tremendous amount of
trouble to go to. And how do you manage to find correspondents who are
willing to do the same? I have a hard time just finding anyone willing
to use PGP, and that's even with extensive hand-holding.
> Too many groups that I don't trust are doing too much snooping.
Only a handful of government agencies have the means to snoop to an
extent that would justify your methods, and they are very unlikely to
care about you unless you are involved in activities of interest to
them.
In my own case, I usually draw the line at anything that presumes
physical insecurity of the machine. Securing communications when the
machines themselves are insecure is tremendously difficult, and too hard
to justify with ordinary adversaries, at least for me. In contrast,
securing communications outside of the physical machine is quite easy,
and extraordinarily secure.
Alan Connor
>
>
> Alan Connor writes:
>
>> I wouldn't have any problem publishing the entire program we use.
>
> That's not what I mean. It's the fact that you mention you are using
> it. Traffic analysis, in other words. You don't just try to crack
> ciphers; you look at who is using them, and under what conditions, and
> in which messages, and with whom.
I'm familiar with the concept. I like privacy, I'm not paranoid.
>
>> As for having a serious need for security? No. I just like privacy.
>
> You must be extreme in your preference. That's a tremendous amount of
> trouble to go to.
I didn't think so. It's just a bunch of simple shell scripts.
And how do you manage to find correspondents who are
> willing to do the same?
Not your concern.
I have a hard time just finding anyone willing
> to use PGP, and that's even with extensive hand-holding.
>
That's becaue PGP is a farce. And most people know it. And one hell of
a lot harder than our simple program.
>> Too many groups that I don't trust are doing too much snooping.
>
> Only a handful of government agencies have the means to snoop to an
> extent that would justify your methods, and they are very unlikely to
> care about you unless you are involved in activities of interest to
> them.
>
And you honestly think that I am going to accept that cute little paragraph
as the final word on the subject?
> In my own case, I usually draw the line at anything that presumes
> physical insecurity of the machine. Securing communications when the
> machines themselves are insecure is tremendously difficult,
Not when there is no trace of those communications left on the machine. Ever.
And that machine is never connected to the Internet.
and too hard
> to justify with ordinary adversaries, at least for me.
We don't have any adverseries. We just like privacy. Like I said.
This is hardly unusual. Look at all the people/orgs that use SSH.
I like our way because it is absolutely secure. SSH *might* be. And it
might not.
In contrast,
> securing communications outside of the physical machine is quite easy,
> and extraordinarily secure.
>
Yes.
You sure jumped to a bunch of conclusions that weren't justified by anything
*I* said.
If you have questions, just ask. There's no need to take such a circuitous
route.
There's nothing secret about OTPs. Been around for a long time.
Richard Herring
[...]
>
> I communicate with a lot of people using OTPs that are "woven" into
> the return message before enciphering. The OTPs disappear forever
> after being used once (duh) and most are not even written to the single
> floppy, which resides in a booby-trapped hideyhole when not in use.
Doesn't that mean that your messages are doomed to becoming
progressively ever shorter?
Mxsmanic
> Not your concern.
First you discuss it, then you say it's not my concern. Hmm.
> That's becaue PGP is a farce.
In what way?
> And you honestly think that I am going to accept that cute
> little paragraph as the final word on the subject?
I wasn't giving any though to what you would or would not accept, as
that is of no importance to me. I made my comment rhetorically, for the
information of all.
> Not when there is no trace of those communications
> left on the machine. Ever. And that machine is never
> connected to the Internet.
Famous last words. What do you do with your diskettes when you are done
with them? How do you protect against monitoring of the emanations from
your equipment? How do you avoid leaking information from your machine
into power lines? How do you make sure the memory is clean after you
use the machine?
> We don't have any adverseries. We just like privacy. Like I said.
Privacy serves no purpose if you have no adversaries. In cryptology, an
adversary is any party that might gain unauthorized access to
information.
> This is hardly unusual. Look at all the people/orgs that use SSH.
SSH is a cinch to use compared to your described methods.
> I like our way because it is absolutely secure. SSH *might* be. And it
> might not.
Part of your methods enjoys absolute security, but not all of it.
> You sure jumped to a bunch of conclusions that weren't justified by anything
> *I* said.
I don't recall drawing any conclusions.
> If you have questions, just ask. There's no need to take such a circuitous
> route.
I did, and you said it was not my concern.
> There's nothing secret about OTPs. Been around for a long time.
There are lots of secure ciphers. It's the implementation that often
counts the most, though.
Tom St Denis
"Alan Connor" <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message
<snip>
> I have a hard time just finding anyone willing
> > to use PGP, and that's even with extensive hand-holding.
> >
>
> That's becaue PGP is a farce. And most people know it. And one hell of
> a lot harder than our simple program.
Most people? Such as?
What does your "simple program" do that GPG/PGP can't? [chances are GPG
does more than your program does anyways].
Tom
Brad Murray
AC> I communicate with a lot of people using OTPs that are "woven" into
AC> the return message before enciphering. The OTPs disappear forever
AC> after being used once (duh) and most are not even written to the single
AC> floppy, which resides in a booby-trapped hideyhole when not in use.
This is a fairly clever way of permuting a OTP key though it appears
to have a couple of drawbacks:
1. You still need a first distribution of an OTP somehow. Not that
this is hard to solve or anything, I just wanted to be clear that the
key material in the system needs to be bootstrapped somehow.
2. It would appear that you can only use the system to securely
transmit strict conversations. That is, I talk, you reply, I reply to
you and so on. If I need to talk to you twice in a row then my second
message would appear to require either re-using the OTP (making it not
quite so O) or re-start the whole system somehow.
Thanks for posting the idea though -- I like the idea of using
steganography (not sure if this is a strict application of
steganography but it fits right in my head there) to hide a key for
future use, particularly an OTP key.
I guess "OTP key" is redundant. :)
--
Brad Murray * "Some anime is pornographic. However, lacking a pornograph,
VSCA Founder * I have never seen any."
* -- Yaakov
thisisme
> thisisme wrote:
>
> > Warning: Use of a one time pad in the way you
> > have described may be illegal. Destruction of
> > the pad after the message has been transmitted
> > could constitute destruction of evidence. Please
> > consider this before you use OTP in this way.
>
> Warning: washing a wine-glass (and thus removing fingerprints) may be
> illegal. Destruction of fingerprints after the wine has been consumed
could
> constitute destruction of evidence. Please consider this before you use
> wine-glasses in this way.
>
> The analogy is relevant, I think. Destroying an OTP after use is in
> accordance with normal practice, just as washing a wine-glass after use
in
> in accordance with normal practice.
This is an interesting point. But I think a
better analogy might be this: You buy a watch
from a man who opens his overcoat and he has
several watches on display inside his coat.
You discover some blood and a fingerprint on
the watch, and you wipe it off.
> If, on the other hand, a crime had been committed, the police were
holding a
> wine-glass as evidence, and I were somehow to wipe it clean, yes, that
> would be illegal. Similarly, if I were to destroy an OTP key that I knew
> the police were aware of and which they wanted to have a copy of, that
> destruction might be illegal too.
There does not have to be an actual investigation
ongoing. If you have reason to believe it is likely
to be evidence, then you can't destroy it. That's
why it's illegal to shred documents that are
incriminating.
thisisme
> thisisme wrote:
> >
> > Neko wrote:
> .........
> [snip]
>
> > Warning: Use of a one time pad in the way you
> > have described may be illegal. Destruction of
> > the pad after the message has been transmitted
> > could constitute destruction of evidence. Please
> > consider this before you use OTP in this way.
>
> Indeed, at least in some (democratic) countries one
> may be required to decrypt by the law enforcement,
> if I don't err.
Yes, I believe that is correct.
Not to mention that you could bring
a world of pain down on your own
head if you don't do what they "ask".
Alan Connor
>
>
> Alan Connor writes:
>
>> Not your concern.
>
> First you discuss it, then you say it's not my concern. Hmm.
>
>> That's becaue PGP is a farce.
>
> In what way?
Troll elsewhere
Alan Connor
The messages are not saved anywhere, so they can't take up space. The
floppy holds the OS and the scripts and the current "keys" is all.
The keys are all of the same length.....
I really don't see where you got that notion, but perhaps if you would
explain it I might learn something.
Alan Connor
>
>
>
> "Alan Connor" <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message
> news:9K4qb.946$Z25...@newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net...
><snip>
>
>> I have a hard time just finding anyone willing
>> > to use PGP, and that's even with extensive hand-holding.
>> >
>>
>> That's becaue PGP is a farce. And most people know it. And one hell of
>> a lot harder than our simple program.
>
> Most people? Such as?
Well, the 99.999% of the people on the Internet that don't even care
whether the PGPsigs they see are even real.
Alan Connor
>
>
> Alan Connor <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote:
> AC> I communicate with a lot of people using OTPs that are "woven" into
> AC> the return message before enciphering. The OTPs disappear forever
> AC> after being used once (duh) and most are not even written to the single
> AC> floppy, which resides in a booby-trapped hideyhole when not in use.
>
> This is a fairly clever way of permuting a OTP key though it appears
> to have a couple of drawbacks:
>
> 1. You still need a first distribution of an OTP somehow. Not that
> this is hard to solve or anything, I just wanted to be clear that the
> key material in the system needs to be bootstrapped somehow.
>
Yes. There are lots of ways.
> 2. It would appear that you can only use the system to securely
> transmit strict conversations. That is, I talk, you reply, I reply to
> you and so on. If I need to talk to you twice in a row then my second
> message would appear to require either re-using the OTP (making it not
> quite so O) or re-start the whole system somehow.
You are right. But it hasn't been a problem. If you really need to send
a second message, just send them a note in clear that says "hurry up and
reply, I have something else important to add."
:-)
>
> Thanks for posting the idea though -- I like the idea of using
> steganography (not sure if this is a strict application of
> steganography but it fits right in my head there) to hide a key for
> future use, particularly an OTP key.
>
> I guess "OTP key" is redundant. :)
> * -- Yaakov
The next time you visit someone you might want to communicate
securely with at some time in the future, hide a "key" someplace
in their house.
Or send pieces in 30 emails that you know they will save.
Tom St Denis
"Alan Connor" <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message
> > Most people? Such as?
>
> Well, the 99.999% of the people on the Internet that don't even care
> whether the PGPsigs they see are even real.
How so? I used to verify signatures via EnigMail [when I used Mozilla] all
the time.
Do you know 99.999% of the people on the net?
Just because quite a bit of people don't use PGP doesn't mean it's not
secure. It means quite a few people don't care for privacy or authenticity.
Tom
Alan Connor
>
>
>
> "Alan Connor" <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message
> news:bkbqb.1640$Z25...@newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net...
>> > Most people? Such as?
>>
>> Well, the 99.999% of the people on the Internet that don't even care
>> whether the PGPsigs they see are even real.
>
> How so? I used to verify signatures via EnigMail [when I used Mozilla] all
> the time.
>
> Do you know 99.999% of the people on the net?
No. I have eyes and ears though.
>
> Just because quite a bit of people don't use PGP doesn't mean it's not
> secure.
Nor does it mean it IS secure. Whatever the hell THAT means. (pgp fanatics,
like all fanatics, love their buzzwords)
It means quite a few people don't care for privacy or authenticity.
>
> Tom
>
>
That's YOUR interpretation of the data. I have a different one.
The cryptography of pggsig/keys is just fine. The REST of that scene
is garbage.
As anyone on this group will tell you, the cryptography is only a small
part of the picture. It can, and often is, rendered worthless by
mutlitudinous other variables.
Apparently you are a pgpnut, and I can tell you right now that I am not
engaging in another interminable debate on the subject.
It's about as fruitful as discussing the inerrancy of the Bible with
a fundamentalist Christian.
Richard Heathfield
> Richard Heathfield wrote:
>
<snip>
>
> There does not have to be an actual investigation
> ongoing. If you have reason to believe it is likely
> to be evidence, then you can't destroy it. That's
> why it's illegal to shred documents that are
> incriminating.
But then I would never send, nor would I expect to receive, anything
incriminating via any channel whatsoever. On the occasions when I use an
OTP, it is for much more trivial reasons than to transfer incriminating
information. The last time I used OTP, it was so that a friend of mine
could send me account details for a machine so that I could connect to it
over the Net. I felt no compunction about destroying the OTP afterwards.
Mxsmanic
> Troll elsewhere
You haven't answered my question.
Mxsmanic
> If you have reason to believe it is likely
> to be evidence, then you can't destroy it.
Then you can't ever destroy anything, since everything is evidence for
_something_.
Richard Heathfield
>
> "Alan Connor" <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message
> news:9K4qb.946$Z25...@newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net...
> <snip>
>
>> That's becaue PGP is a farce. And most people know it. And one hell of
>> a lot harder than our simple program.
>
> Most people? Such as?
Tom - I know we don't always see eye to eye, but I'm going to try to do you
a favour[1]. Before you spend too much time on this guy, you might want to
do a Google Groups "Advanced Search" with his name in the /subject/ line.
It may well lead you to the same conclusion as it led me with regard to the
usefulness or otherwise of interacting with this guy.
Just a word to the wise.
[1] A real, genuine favour. Honest.
Tom St Denis
"Alan Connor" <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message
> On Wed, 05 Nov 2003 19:01:53 GMT, Tom St Denis <tomst...@iahu.ca> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > "Alan Connor" <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message
> > news:bkbqb.1640$Z25...@newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net...
> >> > Most people? Such as?
> >>
> >> Well, the 99.999% of the people on the Internet that don't even care
> >> whether the PGPsigs they see are even real.
> >
> > How so? I used to verify signatures via EnigMail [when I used Mozilla]
all
> > the time.
> >
> > Do you know 99.999% of the people on the net?
>
> No. I have eyes and ears though.
So you have spoken/written to everyone on the net? Wow!
> > Just because quite a bit of people don't use PGP doesn't mean it's not
> > secure.
>
> Nor does it mean it IS secure. Whatever the hell THAT means. (pgp
fanatics,
> like all fanatics, love their buzzwords)
So you offer no proof one way or the other and form a conclusion? Who is
the fanatic?
> It means quite a few people don't care for privacy or authenticity.
> >
> > Tom
> >
> >
>
> That's YOUR interpretation of the data. I have a different one.
>
> The cryptography of pggsig/keys is just fine. The REST of that scene
> is garbage.
The math is sound. The society is flawed. Not enough people use PGP to
make it good.
> Apparently you are a pgpnut, and I can tell you right now that I am not
> engaging in another interminable debate on the subject.
You obviously don't know who I am. I written my share of code that has
already existed in some form [LTM/LTC]
Tom
Joe Peschel
> That's becaue PGP is a farce. And most people know it.
How is PGP a farce? Who do you think knows this?
>
> I like our way because it is absolutely secure. SSH *might* be. And it
> might not.
How is your system absolutely [sic] secure?
J
--
__________________________________________
When will Bush come to his senses?
Joe Peschel
D.O.E. SysWorks
http://members.aol.com/jpeschel/index.htm
__________________________________________
Mok-Kong Shen
Alan Connor wrote:
>
> Well, the 99.999% of the people on the Internet that don't even care
> whether the PGPsigs they see are even real.
It could be that they are (mis-)used to transmit stego
informations (i.e. disguised as sigs), couldn't it?
M. K. Shen
Alan Connor
>
>
> Alan Connor <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in
> news:9K4qb.946$Z25...@newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net:
>
>> That's becaue PGP is a farce. And most people know it.
>
> How is PGP a farce? Who do you think knows this?
>
Have discussed this ad naseum. See the archives.
>>
>> I like our way because it is absolutely secure. SSH *might* be. And it
>> might not.
>
> How is your system absolutely [sic] secure?
>
> J
>
No one can read our mails unless we want them to.
Read up on OTPs.
Alan Connor
>
>
>> Apparently you are a pgpnut, and I can tell you right now that I am not
>> engaging in another interminable debate on the subject.
>
> You obviously don't know who I am. I written my share of code that has
> already existed in some form [LTM/LTC]
>
> Tom
>
>
That's great. If it's free software I thank you very much.
As for PGP, I'm all talked out on the subject. I've investigated it and
think it's a farce and an elitist club, a political construction far more
than it is a computer science construction.
If you really want to know how I reached those conclusions, then there's
always the archives.
I killfile anyone using the in-your-face variety on the Usenet.
(many people put them in their headers and/or a legal sig.)
Joe Peschel
> On Wed, 05 Nov 2003 21:01:27 -0000, Joe Peschel <jpes...@no.spam.org>
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Alan Connor <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in
>> news:9K4qb.946$Z25...@newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net:
>>
>>> That's becaue PGP is a farce. And most people know it.
>>
>> How is PGP a farce? Who do you think knows this?
>>
>
> Have discussed this ad naseum. See the archives.
You brought it up here. Explain it here.
>
>
>>>
>>> I like our way because it is absolutely secure. SSH *might* be. And
>>> it might not.
>>
>> How is your system absolutely [sic] secure?
>>
>> J
>>
>
> No one can read our mails unless we want them to.
>
> Read up on OTPs.
One-time pads are not "absolutely secure."
Tom St Denis
"Alan Connor" <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message
> On Wed, 05 Nov 2003 20:55:01 GMT, Tom St Denis <tomst...@iahu.ca> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> Apparently you are a pgpnut, and I can tell you right now that I am not
> >> engaging in another interminable debate on the subject.
> >
> > You obviously don't know who I am. I written my share of code that has
> > already existed in some form [LTM/LTC]
> >
> > Tom
> >
> >
>
> That's great. If it's free software I thank you very much.
>
> As for PGP, I'm all talked out on the subject. I've investigated it and
> think it's a farce and an elitist club, a political construction far more
> than it is a computer science construction.
>
> If you really want to know how I reached those conclusions, then there's
> always the archives.
>
> I killfile anyone using the in-your-face variety on the Usenet.
Well I certainly agree with you that many standards are half-ass and poorly
written but PGP is fairly old, widepread and highly scrutinized. In fact a
PGP message has very low overhead compared to some other protocols.
That being said I'd much rather use PGP then some quickly written tool from
someone I don't know. [well depending on my problem].
Tom\
Alan Connor
>
>
> Alan Connor <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in
> news:1Jfqb.2114$Z25...@newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net:
>
>> On Wed, 05 Nov 2003 21:01:27 -0000, Joe Peschel <jpes...@no.spam.org>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Alan Connor <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in
>>> news:9K4qb.946$Z25...@newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net:
>>>
>>>> That's becaue PGP is a farce. And most people know it.
>>>
>>> How is PGP a farce? Who do you think knows this?
>>>
>>
>> Have discussed this ad naseum. See the archives.
>
> You brought it up here. Explain it here.
>
I talk about what I choose to talk about.
If that bothers you, feel free to sit on it and rotate.
Alan Connor
>
>>
>> I killfile anyone using the in-your-face variety on the Usenet.
>
> Well I certainly agree with you that many standards are half-ass and poorly
> written but PGP is fairly old, widepread and highly scrutinized. In fact a
> PGP message has very low overhead compared to some other protocols.
>
I am not referring to the standards, just the de facto violation of the
4-line sig limit: There is no need for them to get in our face with
the things. Many don't. It's just ego.
> That being said I'd much rather use PGP then some quickly written tool from
> someone I don't know. [well depending on my problem].
>
> Tom\
>
>
I haven't presumed to offer a substitute for pgpssigs. Where did you get
that idea?
Tom St Denis
"Alan Connor" <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message
> On Thu, 06 Nov 2003 03:17:50 GMT, Tom St Denis <tomst...@iahu.ca> wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> I killfile anyone using the in-your-face variety on the Usenet.
> >
> > Well I certainly agree with you that many standards are half-ass and
poorly
> > written but PGP is fairly old, widepread and highly scrutinized. In
fact a
> > PGP message has very low overhead compared to some other protocols.
> >
>
> I am not referring to the standards, just the de facto violation of the
> 4-line sig limit: There is no need for them to get in our face with
> the things. Many don't. It's just ego.
Trust me. When I'm "in your face" you will know it.
As for the "4 line sig limit" that's not a standard I know of or recognize.
Also PGP signatures are typically [specially made from DSS keys] very small.
If you don't like it.... TFB.
> > That being said I'd much rather use PGP then some quickly written tool
from
> > someone I don't know. [well depending on my problem].
> >
> > Tom\
> >
> >
>
> I haven't presumed to offer a substitute for pgpssigs. Where did you get
> that idea?
By talking about some OTP system and how bad PGP is. Obviously if you think
PGP is so bad it's because you think something else is better [or at least
this is often the case].
Tom
Alan Connor
Mxsmanic
> The math is sound. The society is flawed. Not enough people use PGP to
> make it good.
One of the interesting things about cryptography is that it only takes
two people to make it worthwhile.
> You obviously don't know who I am.
Of course not ... you haven't signed your post. You could be Louis
Tordella for all we know.
Mxsmanic
> One-time pads are not "absolutely secure."
They are if they are used correctly.
Richard Herring
> On 5 Nov 2003 03:32:03 -0800, Richard Herring <new...@clupeid.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Alan Connor <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message news:<qXXpb.8964$qh2...@newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net>...
> >
> > [...]
> >>
> >> I communicate with a lot of people using OTPs that are "woven" into
> >> the return message before enciphering. The OTPs disappear forever
> >> after being used once (duh) and most are not even written to the single
> >> floppy, which resides in a booby-trapped hideyhole when not in use.
> >
> > Doesn't that mean that your messages are doomed to becoming
> > progressively ever shorter?
>
> The messages are not saved anywhere, so they can't take up space. The
> floppy holds the OS and the scripts and the current "keys" is all.
> The keys are all of the same length.....
I think you'll find they get shorter.
>
> I really don't see where you got that notion, but perhaps if you would
> explain it I might learn something.
Key exhaustion. You can't transmit key material without consuming key
material.
Correct me if I got this wrong, but my understanding of your scheme is
as follows:
Initially, Alice and Bob each have a copy of a key of some finite
length, which was communicated between them by non-crypto means like a
face-to-face meeting or a trusted courier.
When Alice sends a message to Bob, she generates a new key, "weaves"
it into her message, encrypts the result with the old key, destroys
the old key and sends the ciphertext to Bob. On receipt, Bob decrypts
it with his copy of the old key, destroys the old key and "unweaves"
the message and the new key.
When Bob wants to reply, he repeats the process: he generates a new
key, weaves it into the reply, encrypts with the key he received from
Alice, destroys that key, sends the ciphertext. Ad infinitum...
Clearly the "weaving" must be done before encryption, because
otherwise the new key is available to any eavesdropper who can deduce
the weaving algorithm. Also, since you refer to OTP, each key must be
as long as the plaintext it enciphers.
And there's the problem: not only every bit of message, but also every
bit of new key transmitted, consumes a bit of the previous key. If you
start with N bits of key, and send a message of M1 bits, you can only
send N-M1 bits of new OTP. So the next message can only carry M2 bits
of plaintext and N-M1-M2 bits of new key...
However you slice it, the total size of plaintext exchanged cannot
exceed the size of the original key.
Brad Murray
RH> However you slice it, the total size of plaintext exchanged cannot
RH> exceed the size of the original key.
My guess is that he's not really using a one-time pad but rather is
simply using steganography to do per-message key changes for some
symmetric ciper, likely homegrown. The key is probably of fixed
length.
--
Brad Murray * "I laughed at a Prolog joke today. God help me."
VSCA Founder * -- fimmtiu
Phil Carmody
> Alan Connor <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message news:<akbqb.1638$Z25....@newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net>...
> > On 5 Nov 2003 03:32:03 -0800, Richard Herring <new...@clupeid.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > Alan Connor <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote in message news:<qXXpb.8964$qh2...@newsread4.news.pas.earthlink.net>...
> > >
> > > [...]
> > >>
> > >> I communicate with a lot of people using OTPs that are "woven" into
> > >> the return message before enciphering. The OTPs disappear forever
> > >> after being used once (duh) and most are not even written to the single
> > >> floppy, which resides in a booby-trapped hideyhole when not in use.
> > >
> > > Doesn't that mean that your messages are doomed to becoming
> > > progressively ever shorter?
> >
> > The messages are not saved anywhere, so they can't take up space. The
> > floppy holds the OS and the scripts and the current "keys" is all.
> > The keys are all of the same length.....
i.e. A.C. misses the point.
> I think you'll find they get shorter.
>
> > I really don't see where you got that notion, but perhaps if you would
> > explain it I might learn something.
>
> Key exhaustion. You can't transmit key material without consuming key
> material.
You can transmit key material between people.
OTPs have to be unidirectional (otherwise the two ends could use
the same part of the pad, and it would no longer be "one time").
Let's say that your setup is that Alice asks long questions, and
Bob only gives quick answers. Therefore Alice ensures that they have
10KB of pad for her to encrypt with, and Bob ensures they have 500B
of pad for him to encrypt with. However, one day Alice sends the
message "what's this about you, Eve, and the tequila slammers?".
Bob needs more pad to reply. Eve can transmit a new pad to Bob
under her own pad (thus using up exactly as much as she gives to
Bob), and Bob can answer.
Note that she could also say "you use bytes 9000-10000 of my pad
to answer", but I believe that that's less efficient on pad use!
[...]
> However you slice it, the total size of plaintext exchanged cannot
> exceed the size of the original key.
Indeed. Will the penny drop this time?
Phil
--
Unpatched IE vulnerability: WebFolder data Injection
Description: Injecting arbitrary data in the My Computer zone
Reference: http://msgs.securepoint.com/cgi-bin/get/bugtraq0305/13.html
David A. Scott
> In article <3FA824EC...@t-online.de>,
> Mok-Kong Shen <mok-ko...@t-online.de> wrote:
>
>> Indeed, at least in some (democratic) countries one may be required to
>> decrypt by the law enforcement, if I don't err.
>
> Excuse my language, but I say bollocks to those agencies. The whole point
> of using a OTP is for security in that it can't be decoded by those whom
> you don't want to decode it.
>
> I routinely destroy ALL secure communications once it's been transmitted.
>
> - --
> Paul Vigay
One very big advantage of an OTP is that you can always decrypt it
for those who want it. You just supply them a copy with whatever text you
wish to give them. Just as long as it fits in some compressed form
to be the same size or smaller than the ecnrypted message length.
David A. Scott
--
My Crypto code
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott19u.zip
http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/Misc/scott16u.zip
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip old version
My Compression code http://bijective.dogma.net/
**TO EMAIL ME drop the roman "five" **
Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged.
As a famous person once said "any cryptograhic
system is only as strong as its weakest link"
Joe Peschel
news:so9kqvgj91d49bvgl...@4ax.com:
> Joe Peschel writes:
>
>> One-time pads are not "absolutely secure."
>
> They are if they are used correctly.
>
Where did you get that idea? What's your source?
Joe Peschel
news:4c4d32c8...@segfault.co.uk:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> In article <Xns942AB6B2C131...@216.168.3.44>,
> Joe Peschel <jpes...@no.spam.org> wrote:
>
>> One-time pads are not "absolutely secure."
>
> True OTPs are, but you need to be careful that *every* process of
> encryption is secure.
My question to you is the same as my question to Manic.
thisisme
> Paul <nos...@segfault.co.uk> wrote in
news:4c4d3271...@segfault.co.uk:
>
> > In article <3FA824EC...@t-online.de>,
> > Mok-Kong Shen <mok-ko...@t-online.de> wrote:
> >
> >> Indeed, at least in some (democratic) countries one may be required to
> >> decrypt by the law enforcement, if I don't err.
> >
> > Excuse my language, but I say bollocks to those agencies. The whole
point
> > of using a OTP is for security in that it can't be decoded by those
whom
> > you don't want to decode it.
> >
> > I routinely destroy ALL secure communications once it's been
transmitted.
> >
> > - --
> > Paul Vigay
>
>
> One very big advantage of an OTP is that you can always decrypt it
> for those who want it. You just supply them a copy with whatever text you
> wish to give them. Just as long as it fits in some compressed form
> to be the same size or smaller than the ecnrypted message length.
I think this has been discussed before, but since this
is Re-Usenet, here it is. The problem with your scheme
is if the authorities intercept the transmission before
the recipient recieves it, and then ask the recipient
what the method and key was without showing the
recipient the message.
Alan Connor
<snip>
You are talking about a different sort of OTP than I use. Obviously.
Some more details:
I am referring to a substitution cipher that is 100 characters
in length: a=! b=) 1=F and so on.
These are generated randomly (yes, our random number generators are
set up correctly according to man random(4) and thanks to your FAQ
for that.)
If I want to send a message to John, I just type it out, using a reserved
character to indicate the end of any sentence.
When I have finished the message, the program lays in another, newly-generated
OTP by substituting fragments of it for the special 'end-of-sentence'
character (which is a substitute for the usual eos characters), the length of
the fragments being determined by the length of the
3rd word in the sentence. If there are not enough sentences, I get an error
message and then add nonsense sentences to the end of the message.
The whole thing is then enciphered in the OTP for him with every space being
assigned one of the ten characters assigned to it in the order they fall in
the OTP.
No shrinkage. No clue as to what you are talking about.
Alan Connor
>
>
> Richard Herring <new...@clupeid.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> RH> However you slice it, the total size of plaintext exchanged cannot
> RH> exceed the size of the original key.
>
> My guess is that he's not really using a one-time pad but rather is
> simply using steganography to do per-message key changes for some
> symmetric ciper, likely homegrown. The key is probably of fixed
> length.
I think that's right. But it sure is a one-time-pad according to a
cryptography book I read when I was a wee lad.
And the only people that MIGHT be able to read our messages wouldn't have
to bother: They'd just pick us up, give us drugs, and find out anything
they wanted to know....
I'll save a whole thread for you, give you the program, and you STILL would
not be able to decipher one sentence. Got $10,000 to bet on that.
Alan Connor
>
killfiled for 30 days for an illegal sig: more than 4 lines and not confined
to beneath the "-- -"
You can put the PGP stuff in your headers and/or a legal sig. Many do.
If you insist on getting in my face with it, I will never read one of
your messages again.
Alan Connor
killfiled for 30 days for having a sig over 4 lines long.
Brad Murray
AC> killfiled for 30 days for having a sig over 4 lines long.
Killfiled for 30 days for announcing killfile entries.
--
Brad Murray * "Some anime is pornographic. However, lacking a pornograph,
VSCA Founder * I have never seen any."
* -- Yaakov
Brad Murray
AC> I'll save a whole thread for you, give you the program, and you STILL would
AC> not be able to decipher one sentence. Got $10,000 to bet on that.
Given its limitations I'm already disinterested.
--
Brad Murray * "It is possible to forget that the vital idea of democracy
VSCA Founder * -- government of the people, by the people, for the people
* -- does not constitute a form of escape from government."
* -- Joseph Tussman through John Dixon
thisisme
> thisisme wrote:
>
> > Richard Heathfield wrote:
> >
> <snip>
> >
> > There does not have to be an actual investigation
> > ongoing. If you have reason to believe it is likely
> > to be evidence, then you can't destroy it. That's
> > why it's illegal to shred documents that are
> > incriminating.
>
> But then I would never send, nor would I expect to receive, anything
> incriminating via any channel whatsoever. On the occasions when I use an
> OTP, it is for much more trivial reasons than to transfer incriminating
> information. The last time I used OTP, it was so that a friend of mine
> could send me account details for a machine so that I could connect to
it
> over the Net. I felt no compunction about destroying the OTP afterwards.
If you have reason to believe that the authorities
might want the information for an investigation, it
would be a very bad idea to destroy it. And the
authorities want all encrypted information for an
investigation. You have, theorietically, the "right"
to avoid self incrimination. But invoking that
right will automatically place you under suspicion.
They will "throw the book at you". And most everyone
is guilty of something.
Brad Murray
AC> No shrinkage. No clue as to what you are talking about.
An OTP by definition has a key length the same size as the message it
encrypts. Consequently by adding the next key to the message before
encryption, your next message can be no longer than the sent key,
which is smaller than the previous message, which had a larger key
(same as message). That's why I say it's not really an OTP. You are
doing some kind of symmetric crypto with a key embedded in the prior
encrypted message.
Part of the power of the OTP is in the fact that the key is the same
length as the message. There is no algorithm to permute the message
based on a smaller key so you are XORing every bit with an effectively
random bit, meaning you have a ciphertext that is as random looking as
your pad. Your scheme can't possibly get that good unless the max
message size progressively shrinks.
I still think your system is kind of nifty (at least the mechanism for
exchanging keys) but I don't think it's an OTP. If it is then it's
even more limiting than I think, to the point of being useless.
Richard Heathfield
> If you have reason to believe that the authorities
> might want the information for an investigation, it
> would be a very bad idea to destroy it.
I have no reason to believe that they would. In any case, all they have to
do is point a gun at me and they can have the plaintext.
--
Richard Heathfield : bin...@eton.powernet.co.uk
"Usenet is a strange place." - Dennis M Ritchie, 29 July 1999.
C FAQ: http://www.eskimo.com/~scs/C-faq/top.html
K&R answers, C books, etc: http://users.powernet.co.uk/eton
David A. Scott
news:dGhpc2lzbWU=.f573efd69848c543...@1068146905.cotse.net:
>
> I think this has been discussed before, but since this
> is Re-Usenet, here it is. The problem with your scheme
> is if the authorities intercept the transmission before
> the recipient recieves it, and then ask the recipient
> what the method and key was without showing the
> recipient the message.
>
>
Since one gets much SPAM if the "authoriries get it first"
and ask for key in advance you can claim you don't have the
key after all you never recieved it. I get so much SPAM its
not funny some of my email address gets hundreds per day. I
suspect most are virsuses or penis enhancsores.
We could use usenet groups to send messages that way there
are never mailed to you. You could read them at a library or
internet cafe. Nothing would point to you as even getting or
seeing the messages.
David A. Scott
>
> killfiled for 30 days for having a sig over 4 lines long.
>
Killfiled for six months for not wanting to put up
with his mential problems. And like of creativeness.
Mxsmanic
> Where did you get that idea? What's your source?
Hmm. I thought this was common knowledge.
OTPs are perfectly secure because, without the key, any possible
plaintext is equally likely to be the source of the ciphertext, so there
is no way to know which plaintext is correct.
Joe Peschel
news:3ldlqv0lcgklcv6kt...@4ax.com:
> Joe Peschel writes:
>
>> Where did you get that idea? What's your source?
>
> Hmm. I thought this was common knowledge.
Common knowledge?
>
> OTPs are perfectly secure because, without the key, any possible
> plaintext is equally likely to be the source of the ciphertext, so there
> is no way to know which plaintext is correct.
>
That does not mean one-time pads are "absolutely secure" or "perfectly
secure."
Brad Murray
M> OTPs are perfectly secure because, without the key, any possible
M> plaintext is equally likely to be the source of the ciphertext, so there
M> is no way to know which plaintext is correct.
Unfortunately they have a very difficult key management problem.
--
Brad Murray * Always carry a short length of fibre-optic cable. If
Perl Geek * you get lost, then you can drop it on the ground, wait
VSCA Founder * ten minutes, and ask the backhoe operator how to get
* back to civilization. (Alan Frame)
Alan Connor
>
>
> Alan Connor <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote:
> AC> killfiled for 30 days for having a sig over 4 lines long.
>
> Killfiled for 30 days for announcing killfile entries.
>
Silent killfiling is for selfish cowards.
Which I am pleased to note that you are not, having announced the fact that
you are killfiling me.
Are you now going to killfile yourself? You can. I killfiled myself ages ago.
Why download posts that are in my memory and my outgoing file?
:-)
Alan Connor
>
>
> Alan Connor <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote:
> AC> I'll save a whole thread for you, give you the program, and you STILL would
> AC> not be able to decipher one sentence. Got $10,000 to bet on that.
>
> Given its limitations I'm already disinterested.
Yeh. It's just a mickey mouse way for a group of folks to communicate in
fair privacy.
Alan Connor
>
>
> Alan Connor <zzz...@xxx.yyy> wrote:
> AC> No shrinkage. No clue as to what you are talking about.
>
> An OTP by definition has a key length the same size as the message it
> encrypts. Consequently by adding the next key to the message before
> encryption, your next message can be no longer than the sent key,
> which is smaller than the previous message, which had a larger key
> (same as message). That's why I say it's not really an OTP. You are
> doing some kind of symmetric crypto with a key embedded in the prior
> encrypted message.
>
> Part of the power of the OTP is in the fact that the key is the same
> length as the message. There is no algorithm to permute the message
> based on a smaller key so you are XORing every bit with an effectively
> random bit, meaning you have a ciphertext that is as random looking as
> your pad. Your scheme can't possibly get that good unless the max
> message size progressively shrinks.
>
> I still think your system is kind of nifty (at least the mechanism for
> exchanging keys) but I don't think it's an OTP. If it is then it's
> even more limiting than I think, to the point of being useless.
>
Cool. And you surely have nailed it, Brad, quite a ways back, in fact.
Any improvements that you'd care to suggest would be much appreciated.
Just remember that I am but a humble shell scripter at this point. My
C is rudimentary indeed. Am actually learning Assembly Language at
present.
Mok-Kong Shen
Paul wrote:
>
[snip]
> I routinely destroy ALL secure communications once it's been transmitted.
The law could require that your ISP keeps records of
your communications. I don't know whether it is
actually the case for certain countries or the recording
is only restricted to the connection informations.
Perhaps some knowledgeable people could say something
about that.
M. K. Shen
Mxsmanic
> We could use usenet groups to send messages that way there
> are never mailed to you. You could read them at a library or
> internet cafe. Nothing would point to you as even getting or
> seeing the messages.
It should be very easy to send OTP ciphertext to correspondents via
USENET posts. They could be posted to just about any newsgroup that
accepts binaries, or to test groups, or anywhere, actually.
Mxsmanic
> Silent killfiling is for selfish cowards.
Putting people silently in a killfile is what one does when one wishes
to filter out their posts. Announcing an addition to a killfile on
USENET is what one does when one wishes to disguise ad hominem as
information (and often the killfile doesn't even change).
Mxsmanic
> Common knowledge?
Even the most superficial study of cryptography rapidly reveals that
OTPs provide perfect security.
> That does not mean one-time pads are "absolutely secure" or "perfectly
> secure."
Why not? With a OTP, you will never see the plaintext without the
correct key, period. There is no effective cryptanalysis against a
one-time pad, period.
Mxsmanic
> Unfortunately they have a very difficult key management problem.
They are difficult to justify for most real-world applications. They
seem to be popular with spies, for some reason.
Gregory G Rose
Alan Connor <xx...@yyy.zzz> wrote:
>killfiled for 30 days for an illegal sig: more than 4 lines and not confined
>to beneath the "-- -"
>
>You can put the PGP stuff in your headers and/or a legal sig. Many do.
>
>If you insist on getting in my face with it, I will never read one of
>your messages again.
One lives in hope!
Greg.
--
A
Signature
Specifically
Handcrafted
Of
Lengthy
Extent
Alan Connor
Obviously, I think you are wrong.
Alan Connor
What's a law? A group of people fancy that they have the means and the
right to enforce their will on another group of people, and write it
down somewhere.
Big deal. A bad law should be ignored and a way around whichever group of
arrogant thugs that is presently trying to run your life can always found.
Alan Connor
>
>
> David A. Scott writes:
>
>> We could use usenet groups to send messages that way there
>> are never mailed to you. You could read them at a library or
>> internet cafe. Nothing would point to you as even getting or
>> seeing the messages.
>
> It should be very easy to send OTP ciphertext to correspondents via
> USENET posts. They could be posted to just about any newsgroup that
> accepts binaries, or to test groups, or anywhere, actually.
>
Pick busy groups and post the same message to many of them. That makes it
impossible to even take an intelligent guess as to which one of the subscribers
the message was intended for.
--
Alan C
190181561530510167504851001120157141576325239965082176698065256566179322
373456081065818179209174628160962909841841937313789496217513296272010217
209392475825562305791988383018411010612843283632898619292370726287156631
Douglas A. Gwyn
> Even the most superficial study of cryptography rapidly reveals that
> OTPs provide perfect security.
I suppose a superficial study might lead to that conclusion.
David A. Scott
news:iillqvk93lsoatehb...@4ax.com:
>
> It should be very easy to send OTP ciphertext to correspondents via
> USENET posts. They could be posted to just about any newsgroup that
> accepts binaries, or to test groups, or anywhere, actually.
>
>
You could send then to even this group if you use something
like one of my conditional decompressors where you use some
subset of ascii letters.
Alan Connor
killfiled for 30 days for an illegal sig.
I think you'll live. And because you seem to be an airheaded smartass punk,
I imagine that I will too.
Gregory G Rose
Alan Connor <xx...@yyy.zzz> wrote:
>On 6 Nov 2003 16:16:09 -0800, Gregory G Rose <g...@qualcomm.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> In article <0ixqb.308$6c3...@newsread1.news.pas.earthlink.net>,
>> Alan Connor <xx...@yyy.zzz> wrote:
>>>If you insist on getting in my face with it, I will never read one of
>>>your messages again.
>>
>> One lives in hope!
>>
>> Greg.
>>
>> --
>> A
>> Signature
>> Specifically
>> Handcrafted
>> Of
>> Lengthy
>> Extent
>
>killfiled for 30 days for an illegal sig.
>
>I think you'll live. And because you seem to be an airheaded smartass punk,
>I imagine that I will too.
He lies! He promised "never"!
Greg
--
Greg Rose
232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C
Qualcomm Australia: http://www.qualcomm.com.au
Joe Peschel
news:qnllqv8ie85i9nft4...@4ax.com:
> Joe Peschel writes:
>
>> Common knowledge?
>
> Even the most superficial study of cryptography rapidly reveals that
> OTPs provide perfect security.
If your study reveals that one-time pads are perfectly secure, you need to
study a bit more thoroughly.
>
>> That does not mean one-time pads are "absolutely secure" or "perfectly
>> secure."
>
> Why not? With a OTP, you will never see the plaintext without the
> correct key, period. There is no effective cryptanalysis against a
> one-time pad, period.
>
That still doesn't make a one-time pad "absolutely secure" or "perfectly
secure." Again -- where are you getting this idea?
Alan Connor
>
>
> Mxsmanic <mxsm...@hotmail.com> wrote in
> news:qnllqv8ie85i9nft4...@4ax.com:
>
>> Joe Peschel writes:
>>
>>> Common knowledge?
>>
>> Even the most superficial study of cryptography rapidly reveals that
>> OTPs provide perfect security.
>
> If your study reveals that one-time pads are perfectly secure, you need to
> study a bit more thoroughly.
>
>>
>>> That does not mean one-time pads are "absolutely secure" or "perfectly
>>> secure."
>>
>> Why not? With a OTP, you will never see the plaintext without the
>> correct key, period. There is no effective cryptanalysis against a
>> one-time pad, period.
>>
>
> That still doesn't make a one-time pad "absolutely secure" or "perfectly
> secure." Again -- where are you getting this idea?
>
Congradulations, Joe. You are apparently the only person in the world that
doesn't know that what he is saying is true.
Maybe instead of playing silly word games you could like do a little homework?
Joe Peschel
> On Fri, 07 Nov 2003 05:09:09 -0000, Joe Peschel <jpes...@no.spam.org>
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Mxsmanic <mxsm...@hotmail.com> wrote in
>> news:qnllqv8ie85i9nft4...@4ax.com:
>>
>>> Joe Peschel writes:
>>>
>>>> Common knowledge?
>>>
>>> Even the most superficial study of cryptography rapidly reveals that
>>> OTPs provide perfect security.
>>
>> If your study reveals that one-time pads are perfectly secure, you
>> need to study a bit more thoroughly.
>>
>>>
>>>> That does not mean one-time pads are "absolutely secure" or
>>>> "perfectly secure."
>>>
>>> Why not? With a OTP, you will never see the plaintext without the
>>> correct key, period. There is no effective cryptanalysis against a
>>> one-time pad, period.
>>>
>>
>> That still doesn't make a one-time pad "absolutely secure" or
>> "perfectly secure." Again -- where are you getting this idea?
>>
>
> Congradulations, Joe.
Dhanks.
> You are apparently the only person in the world
> that doesn't know that what he is saying is true.
>
I am not the only person in the world who knows that what he and you are
saying is inaccurate.
> Maybe instead of playing silly word games you could like do a little
> homework?
>
I'm not playing word games. I suggest you and Manic both do some reading,
for instance, Shannon on secrecy systems. "Perfect security" and perfect
secrecy are not the same thing.
Alan Connor
Can't argue with that. Why didn't you state that clearly earlier? And offer
concise definitions for each term showcasing their differences?
Had no clue as to where you were coming from...
Richard Heathfield
> In article <0ixqb.308$6c3...@newsread1.news.pas.earthlink.net>,
> Alan Connor <xx...@yyy.zzz> wrote:
>>killfiled for 30 days for an illegal sig: more than 4 lines and not
>>confined to beneath the "-- -"
>>
>>You can put the PGP stuff in your headers and/or a legal sig. Many do.
>>
>>If you insist on getting in my face with it, I will never read one of
>>your messages again.
>
> One lives in hope!
Indeed. This guy has been making an idiot of himself in other newsgroups,
too. Grep Google Groups for articles with his name in the /subject/, and
you'll see what I mean.
> --
> A
> Signature
> Specifically
> Handcrafted
> Of
> Lengthy
> Extent
<grin> I think I'm already in the bin, but it might be fun to check.
--
Richard Heathfield : bin...@eton.powernet.co.uk
"Usenet is a strange place." - Dennis M Ritchie, 29 July 1999.
C FAQ: http://www.eskimo.com/~scs/C-faq/top.html
K&R answers, C books, etc: http://users.powernet.co.uk/eton
Avoiding fgets: http://users.powernet.co.uk/eton/c/fgetdata.html
My as yet unbroken contribution to the world of snake-oil:
http://users.powernet.co.uk/eton/crypto/cdx2.html
gcc C99 status: http://gcc.gnu.org/c99status.html
foo: http://www.foo.org
bar: http://www.bar.net
baz: http://www.baz.il
Richard Heathfield
> Announcing an addition to a killfile on
> USENET is what one does when one wishes to disguise ad hominem as
> information (and often the killfile doesn't even change).
On the very rare occasions nowadays when I announce an addition to a
killfile, it is indeed intended to convey an ad hominem attack, but this is
not /disguised/ as information. It /is/ information.
The last guy I can remember killfiling was around a year ago. Just a troll,
but a particularly verbose one. Life's too short.
Mxsmanic
> I suppose a superficial study might lead to that conclusion.
I guess Shannon never looked hard enough into the question.