Economist John Maynard Keynes Said Whites Had The Right To KILL Non-Whites

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Keynes: The Young Imperialist, 1906–13 | Edward W. Fuller

"He felt that his supposedly superior race had the right, and even the
duty, to exercise imperialistic violence against inferior races."


BLACKS, BROWNS, YELLOWS and other indigenous people should have APPLIED
the "SAME STANDARDS" to the "RACIST WHITE XTIAN THIEVES", Whites APPLIED
to Non-Whites and this houston white applied to "neighbor's burglars",
and SLAUGHTERED the "RACIST GENOCIDAL WHITE XTIAN THIEVES" like FUCKING
PIGS on sight.


Houston White Man Cleared for Killing Neighbor's Burglars
https://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5278638&page=1


If they did, the CONCEPT of RACISM would have NEVER EVEN EXISTED.

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Keynes: The Young Imperialist, 1906–13

03/21/2020Edward W. Fuller

John Maynard Keynes was the most influential economist of the twentieth
century. Those interested in modern economics must ask: how did he
become so influential? It is well known that his 1919 polemic The
Economic Consequences of the Peace launched his career. But how did he
come to be in a position to write the book?

The story of Keynesian economics starts with his work on India. Between
1909 and 1913, he was the most important defender of British monetary
imperialism in India. For this work he was awarded a position at the
British Treasury during the First World War. Thus, it was his faithful
defense of the British Empire that allowed Keynes to become the
century’s most influential economist after the war.
The Young Imperialist at the India Office

To comprehend his work on Indian affairs, it must be realized that
Keynes was an imperialist. Of course, his defenders are deeply
embarrassed by his imperialism and seek to deny it. For example, Robert
Skidelsky insists, “Keynes was neither a jingoistic imperialist, nor an
economic imperialist.”1 But Keynes proudly described himself as an
imperialist: “We, who are impe­rialists…think that British rule brings
with it an increase of justice, liberty, and prosperity.”2

His views on race made him a particularly zealous one. As John Toye
admits, Keynes believed that it was important to the highest degree that
Europeans should triumph in the coming global struggle of races.”3
Keynes declared: “Almost any measures seem to me to be justified in
order to protect our standard of life from injury at the hands of more
prolific races. Some definite parceling out of the world may well become
necessary; and I suppose that this may not improbably provoke racial wars.”4

But Keynes was not simply thinking in terms of a “global struggle of
races.” He felt that his supposedly superior race had the right, and
even the duty, to exercise imperialistic violence against inferior races:

It is only during the present reign that we have begun to realize the
responsibilities of the Empire and to see our duties to subject races.
We have begun to see that Great Britain may have a high destiny and a
great future before her. We have before taken up “the white man’s
burden” and we must endeavor to wield the power of Empire with more
lasting effect and to greater good than the mighty empires that have
risen and fallen through the course of history.5

It is commonly said that the British ruled India for two hundred years,
but the story is a little more complicated. The British ruled territory
in India beginning in the 1650s, but it was not until after 1757, when
Robert Clive won the Battle of Plassey, that their control expanded
significantly. Even so, the region did not become an official part of
the British Empire until after 1857.

The period of direct British rule over India from 1858 to 1947 is known
as the British Raj (raj is Hindi for “rule”). The British Raj emerged
after the Indian Rebellion of 1857. This widespread and unsuccessful
mutiny by Indian soldiers of the East India Company, sometimes called
the First War of Independence, was aimed at overthrowing British rule.
Britain tightened its control after the rebellion, and the India Office
was created in 1858 as its chief instrument of imperial control.

Keynes started his undergraduate studies at the University of Cambridge
in 1902, during the height of the British Raj. From the time of his
adolescence, his goal was to work in the British Treasury. So, despite
pressure to pursue an academic career, he decided to enter the civil
service. He took the civil service examination in 1906 but placed
second. This meant that he would not receive a position in the Treasury.
Instead, he took a position in the India Office, where he served as a
clerk from October 1906 to June 1908.

The India Office was essentially the government of India, and Keynes’s
work there reflects his support for British rule over Indians. Indeed,
he condemned the Indian Rebellion of 1857: “If the Indian Mutiny had
been successful, India would have become the home of anarchy and
bloodshed, and the rest of the world would have been the poorer for its
isolation.”6 He insisted that institutionalized British coercion was
good for the uncivilized Indians: “It would not be true to say that the
material condition of the ryot [Indian peasant] and the fellah [Egyptian
peasant] has not been somewhat improved by the British occupation of
their countries.”7

From the beginning, Keynes was an ardent advocate of British state
power at home and abroad. As Austin Robinson suggests, his time in the
India Office reinforced his early statism: “His short period—a little
less than two years—in the India Office was not wasted. He had learned
there a great deal about the way the machinery of government operated,
and in particular to see the problems of economics from the angle of the
administrator.”8
India in Crisis

Unfortunately, conventional accounts of Keynes’s work on India ignore
the most important people in the drama—namely the Indians. Sympathetic
reporters such as Skidelsky distort his role by failing to emphasize a
vital point: India was in economic turmoil throughout the period in
which Keynes worked on Indian problems. Keynes called this time one of
the “most trying periods in the history of India, when plague, famine
and political unrest quickly followed one another, revenues fell, prices
rose to an unprecedented level, and the currency system seemed at one
moment to be in danger.”9

From 1858 to 1913, recurring famines killed as many as 30 million
Indians.10 These famines were not acts of God. As Adam Smith wrote in
1776, “Famine has never arisen from any other cause but the violence of
government.”11 The India Office, not crop failures, was responsible for
the misery: “The basic economic feature of Indian famines [was] that
they indicated a famine of purchasing power and a general erosion of
people’s capabilities to acquire food and of their exchange entitlements
rather than of crop failures and reduced availability of food grains.”12

From 1900 to 1913, British mismanagement of the Indian monetary system
was the crux of the problem. Keynes reported, “It is at least true that
there was a substantial rise in the general level of prices in India
during the three years preceding 1908, accompanied by correspondingly
large issues of notes.”13 According to his figures, the Indian money
supply increased by 43 percent between 1903 and 1907, and the Indian
price level rose 40 percent during this period.14

The problem in India was price inflation. Keynes confessed, “It is
recognized in India that there was, prior to the famine of 1907–08, a
fall in the food-purchasing power of the rupee” and “the volume of
currency was so rapidly expanded.”15 British mismanagement of the money
supply was the cause of the price inflation. In turn, the price
inflation produced economic problems in India, including famine.

At this time, Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866–1915) was the key figure in
the Indian independence movement. He harshly criticized British monetary
policy in India: “During the last ten years [1898–1908] the Government
have made a net addition to this stock [of rupees] of over [1 billion].
Such a sudden inflation is bound to result in a general rise in
prices.”16 As Gokhale and other members of the Indian independence
movement realized, monetary reform was required to solve the economic
problems that plagued India.

The Indians’ call for monetary reform posed a threat to British rule in
India. An empire can only control a colony if it controls its money.
British rule over India required British control of the Indian monetary
system. The British were being asked to relinquish this control, and it
posed a strategic threat to their rule.
Indian Currency and Finance: A Collaboration with the India Office

Published in 1913, Keynes’s first book was Indian Currency and Finance.
His defenders represent the book as a value-free, scientific work on
monetary theory. But Keynes never worked on economic theory without some
political purpose. Austin Robinson reported, “I can think of no original
piece of theoretical economics which Keynes conceived as an exercise in
pure economics.”17

The practical motivation behind the book was to defend British
imperialism. To protect its rule over India, the British Empire needed
an intellectual justification for maintaining, and even expanding, its
control over the Indian monetary system. Indian Currency and Finance
supplied this justification.

Although Keynes formally left the India Office in June 1908 to become an
economics lecturer at Cambridge, his role in Indian affairs expanded
greatly soon after. In October 1909, Lionel Abrahams (1869–1919),
secretary of the financial department of the India Office, recruited him
as an academic apologist for the India Office.

Although he appeared to be an independent academic, Keynes was in bed
with Abrahams and the India Office establishment in the years before his
book was released. Extant letters between Keynes and Abrahams, the key
figure in its production, prove that Indian Currency and Finance is not
an objective, value-free work on economic science. It was produced with
the assistance of high-ranking officials in the India Office.

The editors of the Collected Writings admit that Abrahams vetted the
book before it was published: “By February 1913 Keynes was sending out
proofs of Indian Currency and Finance…Abrahams greeted the proofs…Many
times he supplied or corrected matters of information.”18 Moggridge
confirms this as well: “[Discussions] with Abrahams concerning both
matters of fact and opinion were particularly intense and Keynes made
numerous alterations to meet his official critic.”19

What about the economics of the book? The main takeaway is that Keynes
was a lifelong advocate of an elastic, fractional reserve banking system
managed by a powerful central bank. Indeed, the book contains many of
the monetary ideas that shaped his work at the Bretton Woods Conference
in 1944.

The Indian economist S. V. Doraiswami recognized this: “Mr. J. M. Keynes
and Sir Ernest Cable…desire that the Paper Currency system in India
should be elasticised, and do not follow the cautious policy laid down
by the Bank Charter Act of Sir Robert Peel for the maintenance of the
paper currency of England.”20 He continues, “Mr. Keynes…holds the view
that the gold exchange standard marks an advanced stage in monetary
evolution. I am not aware of any economist of repute who holds that
view. Be that as it may, the Indian currency system should not be
tampered with to suit the whims of an armchair doctrinaire.”21

Though reviewers at the time could not have known that Indian Currency
and Finance was produced in collaboration with the India Office, they
were on to his sympathies. The economist B. R. Ambedkar observed, “Mr.
Keynes [is] anything but an unfriendly critic of the Government’s
policy.”22 Reviewing the book, Herbert S. Foxwell was sympathetic to
Keynes’s position but seemed to recognize the book’s origins: “The time
of its appearance may have been determined by the very energetic but
ill-considered attack on the Indian monetary administration made last
autumn, but the phrasing of some passages rather suggests that they were
originally written as a memorandum or report for official use.”23

Naturally, Keynes’s seemingly independent findings cleared the India
Office of any blame for India’s economic problems. And, predictably, his
policy recommendations coincided perfectly with the India Office’s
desires. His solution was more British control over India, not less. He
advocated imposing a British-controlled central bank on India to
implement an elastic, fractional reserve banking system, a plan he
elaborated in “Memorandum on Proposals for the Establishment of a State
Bank in India.”24
Conclusion

Indian Currency and Finance was a piece of government-sponsored
propaganda designed to placate critics of British imperialism in India.
In writing the book, Keynes helped perpetuate the system of imperialism
that caused immense human suffering in India. He was incapable of
empathizing with the misery of the Indian peasant.25

In early 1915, Keynes was rewarded for his work defending British
imperialism with a position in the British Treasury. Indian Currency and
Finance had landed him a spot on the 1913 Royal Commission on Indian
Currency and Finance. As his Bloomsbury friend Clive Bell wrote, “He
…consequently had begun to make friends in high places.”26 These
friends—specifically, Basil Blackett and Edwin Montagu—got him into the
Treasury in the opening months of the war.27 As his Bloomsbury
companions complained, he spent the war in the Treasury “finding ways of
killing the maximum number of Germans at the minimum expense.”28

In 1919 The Economic Consequences of the Peace launched John Maynard
Keynes to the top of the economics profession, but the story of
Keynesian economics starts with his defense of British imperialism in
India. A passionate British imperialist, he became nothing less than the
government’s official apologist for British monetary rule over India,
and this work is what won him his coveted position in the Treasury,
which amplified his influence on policy.

In writing Indian Currency and Finance, Keynes was not a neutral
economic theorist committed to the development of objective, value-free
economic science.29 Rather, he was an official apologist for the
state—nothing more, as Joseph Schumpeter put it, than “a civil servant
in an academic gown.”30