Commentary: What Prince Group allegations tell us about how financial crime is evolving
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Commentary: What Prince Group allegations tell us about how financial crime is evolving
Amid probes into Prince Group for alleged financial crimes, the question is whether Singapore's enforcement capabilities can evolve as fast as criminal methods, says lawyer Ben Chester Cheong.
A view of Prince Holding Group's headquarters in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. (File photo: Prince Holding Group's website)
SINGAPORE: After the United States seized over US$15 billion in bitcoin and issued sanctions in October against Prince Holding Group, the Cambodian group it accused of running a scam empire, other jurisdictions took actions of their own. Singapore seized S$150 million (US$115 million) in assets, with another US$150 million by Taiwan and US$354 million by Hong Kong. On Wednesday (Dec 3), Thailand announced it had seized more than US$300 million in assets linked to Prince Group and other scam investigations.
Yet beneath the numbers and headlines lies a more complex story of how transnational criminal organisations have evolved – and whether countries can tackle the new challenges they present.
The Prince Group allegations probably led many in Singapore to think back to the 2023 S$3 billion money laundering case, involving the so-called Fujian gang. But there are some fundamental differences.
That 2023 operation involved sequential crimes: Illicit proceeds generated overseas through scams and illegal gambling, then laundered through Singapore’s financial system. Investigators had to dig through a complex scheme involving forged passports, shell companies and draw links across a network of individuals, but there was a clear trail to follow: dirty money from foreign crimes flowing into luxury properties and bank accounts here.
The allegations against Prince Group and founder Chen Zhi paint a more sophisticated picture. In US filings and Department of Justice statements, prosecutors alleged that Prince Group itself generated vast proceeds by operating forced-labour scam compounds in Cambodia, where trafficked workers carried out “pig butchering” cryptocurrency investment fraud.
They further alleged that the enterprise used a web of affiliated businesses and ostensibly legitimate corporate vehicles across more than 30 countries, including 17 Singapore-registered entities listed in US Treasury designations, to hold assets, obscure ownership, move funds and provide commercial cover for the wider operation.
In this model, the boundaries between criminal activity, business infrastructure and financial services blur, creating an integrated ecosystem rather than the clean sequence of “crime abroad, laundering in Singapore” seen in the Fujian gang case.
If allegations are confirmed, this integrated structure creates detection challenges that sequential laundering does not.