Cambodia’s war on scammers needs a blueprint built to last

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Asian AngleCambodia’s war on scammers needs a blueprint built to last

Rounding up foot soldiers is easy. The hard part is tracing cash, exposing high-level enablers and protecting coerced victime

Chheang Vannarith

Published: 12:00pm, 25 Jul 2026

Online scams have become one of the world’s most pressing non-traditional security threats in recent years, with Southeast Asia emerging as the site of rampant transnational criminal activity.

In response, Cambodia has stepped up efforts to fight back, moving in recent months from ad hoc enforcement towards more centralised, coordinated action.

While the political will is clear, implementation is now the issue. The question is not whether Phnom Penh is fighting the war against online scams, but whether it can win it.

Chheang Vannarith:https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3361790/cambodias-war-scammers-needs-blueprint-built-last

Published: 12:00pm, 25 Jul 2026

Online scams have become one of the world’s most pressing non-traditional security threats in recent years, with Southeast Asia emerging as the site of rampant transnational criminal activity.

In response, Cambodia has stepped up efforts to fight back, moving in recent months from ad hoc enforcement towards more centralised, coordinated action.

While the political will is clear, implementation is now the issue. The question is not whether Phnom Penh is fighting the war against online scams, but whether it can win it.

The government has enacted the Law on Combating Online Scams, which came into force in April, to provide a dedicated legal basis for criminalising technology-enabled fraud, organised scam operations, money laundering, illegal recruitment, forced labour and related offences. In November, it established the Commission for Combating Online Scams (CCOS) as a national coordinating body to detect, disrupt and dismantle scam networks.

Between November and May, Cambodian authorities reportedly raided more than 400 locations, revoked 25 casino licences and deported around 20,000 foreign nationals linked to scam operations.

These are important steps. They show that Phnom Penh now treats online scams not only as a law-enforcement issue but as a challenge to national security, the economy, governance and its reputation.

Prime Minister Hun Manet has framed the crackdown as part of efforts to restore Cambodia’s international standing. This matters. For a country seeking investment, tourism, digital transformation and regional credibility, an association with scam compounds is costly.

Despite these efforts, however, structural challenges remain. Cambodia is unlikely to eliminate online scams entirely in the short term. It might need one more year. A more realistic objective for now is sustained disruption: breaking the chain of operations and ending impunity for the culprits.

The online scam economy endures because it adapts. Recent reporting suggests that Cambodia’s crackdown has placed real pressure on scam operators, but it has also pushed some to change tactics and locations. Their durability lies in their networks, which sit at the intersection of transnational organised crime, human trafficking, illegal gambling, money laundering, corruption, weak regulation, porous borders and digital vulnerability.

Debris and barbed wire in front of buildings inside a former scam compound in O’Smach, Cambodia, near Thailand’s Chong Chom area, in March. Photo: Reuters

Three structural constraints stand out:

First, the scam economy is transnational. Victims may be located in Singapore or China; workers can be recruited from one country, trafficked through another and forced to operate in Cambodia. Money moves through banks, crypto wallets, informal brokers and offshore companies. Servers, platforms and messaging channels may be hosted beyond Cambodian jurisdiction.

This cross-border security threat demands cooperation, not a blame game. Cambodia and its neighbours need to share real-time intelligence, conduct joint investigations, offer mutual legal assistance and pursue extradition arrangements and coordinated victim repatriation.

Partners including China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam and the United States have already engaged on this front. These efforts should be further institutionalised.

Second, enforcement must move up the chain. Arresting frontline scammers or even ringleaders is insufficient if the landlords, recruiters, forgers, telecoms providers, payment intermediaries, financiers and others above them are not apprehended.

A serious crackdown requires a whole-of-system approach: tracing assets, enhancing oversight of company registries, regulating casinos and real estate, and strengthening financial and telecoms compliance – paired with consistent law enforcement, transparent reporting and space for public scrutiny. Some of these measures have been inclusively implemented but they need to be more coherent and systemic.

Third, credibility depends on transparency. International partners will not assess the sincerity of Cambodia’s crackdown based solely on official statements; they will look for verifiable outcomes.

CCOS has shared regular reports with key stakeholders and the general public, but it needs to offer more independent verification where possible. Cambodia has cooperated with embassies and victim-support groups and the government has claimed that prosecutions proceed regardless of a suspect’s social standing or connections. The message should be clear here: nobody is above the law.

A victim-centred outlook is equally essential. Screening procedures should distinguish between commanders of vast scam networks and the coerced foot soldiers beneath them. The latter need safe shelters, translation services, consular access, legal assistance, medical support and pathways for repatriation.

A more durable strategy should combine five tracks.

1. Command coordination: CCOS must be empowered to serve as a permanent national secretariat with real authority to coordinate law enforcement, immigration, justice, telecoms, banking, local administration and foreign affairs. A long-term war against scams requires such an approach.

2. Legal enforcement: the new law must be tested through serious prosecutions, especially of organisers and financiers. Convictions will matter more than arrests.

3. Financial disruption: Cambodia should target money flows, including cryptocurrencies, freeze suspicious assets, monitor high-risk real estate and casino-linked transactions, and strengthen cooperation between banks, payment providers and financial intelligence units.

4. Border and digital governance: border checkpoints, visa records, work permits, telecoms registration, internet service provision and company licensing should be integrated into a risk-based monitoring system.

5. International cooperation: Cambodia needs to further enhance cooperation and coordination with regional and global partners to crack down on online scams. Hosting the international conference on combating online scams in September demonstrates Cambodia’s efforts to promote international cooperation while creating a platform for sharing information and best practices.