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Elena Piersanti
No, ESU is not a general update that can be added in Gold Master image like what we do usually, it needs a complex process to apply.
Please refer to the following guide for a detailed process:
Obtaining Extended Security Updates for eligible Windows devices
-it-pro-blog/obtaining-extended-security-updates-for-eligible-windows-devices/ba-p/1167091
Joshua and Stephanie noticed mold growing on the windows, which were original to the 1970s house, and knew they needed to be replaced. With their home-repair fund depleted, they could not stretch the family budget to cover the estimated $20,000 cost for new windows.
Part of my exploring Lincoln for book research involved visiting churches. Someone told me that there was a stained glass window featuring Abraham Lincoln. When I checked out the location, I discovered that the large rotunda window included many American symbols beyond the former President. Then I discovered that Lincoln actually has patriotic stained glass windows in TWO of its churches. Both of them are connected by the same sponsor. The GAR.
What I know: two of the stained glass windows are in Lincoln. I am not sure where the other four are in Nebraska. But I did find some patriotic windows online that are in Iowa, Illinois and Wisconsin. So this is the reality of the life of the researcher. There is always more to find out and discover. But I do think discovering these two patriotic stained glass windows was a great find!
Enemy extended stand-off capabilities are few in number but exceptionally lethal and effective, requiring less time and more expensive capability to penetrate. More numerous mid-range fires, however, take significant time and capability to attack and degrade sufficiently to open windows for maneuver. The corps, converging as much multi-domain capability as is available, times attacks against enemy mid-range fires to enable seamless divisional maneuver to the front to contest threat fait accompli operations.
However, it is still unclear how this works and, as importantly, who does this work. This poses significant tactical problems for the Army. For one, how do divisions and brigades understand and observe windows of opportunity provided through convergence operations of army and corps headquarters and exploit them in communications-degraded environments? Once through a convergence window, how does a brigade or division converge its organic capabilities to penetrate and dis-integrate tactical threats? Perhaps most importantly, if any command and control node can employ any shooter at any time for convergence, do divisions and brigades fight using their own capabilities?
Identifying and exploiting windows of advantage in a dispersed and highly lethal MDO battlefield requires rethinking current visualization and situational understanding approaches. Today, simply gaining situational awareness of all domains requires stacks of computer servers, top secret intelligence processing facilities, and special technical operations vaults, most of which reside in static positions. Further, sharing information with subordinate organizations; allies; and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners is difficult due to the limited data rates of the current tactical networks, insufficient access due to security clearance requirements, and intelligence-sharing limitations. Ideally, access to all domain data is ubiquitous, mobile, and shared with allies and partners; in reality, it is not.
Solutions to the above gaps must be identified and developed in order to exploit windows of opportunity generated by converging effects. Further, any solutions must account for growing communications-related constraints as the force integrates better automation and autonomous systems. Quantum-computing, cloud-based big data, and advanced high-speed computers require sizeable, largely immobile, and vulnerable infrastructure. These new technologies could also limit the employment of forces and headquarters if they require the addition of large facilities and air-conditioning or even refrigeration for processing of multi-domain information.12
Conversely, development of analog indicators will assist commanders in identifying windows of advantage without computer aids. These indicators include the integration of American or coalition fourth-generation fighters into attacks or the lack of enemy electronic interdiction at certain points in the operation. These indicators help commanders understand the operational environment even if they do not have perfect communications or situational awareness. However, analog metrics are insufficient to support highly centralized decision-making in widely distributed operations. Thus, in MDO, empowered tactical commanders must take on more responsibility in decision-making and execution of operations.
There is no single solution to operating in an information-contested environment, and a combination of advanced information systems, analog indicators, and AI-enabled staffs is required for MDO. These solutions simply enable tactical formations to see and exploit windows provided by higher echelons. The next question is how maneuver formations create their own opportunities.
Upon the transition to armed conflict, army and corps headquarters attack and defeat high-value, long-range threat systems, enabling divisions and brigades to maneuver within threat A2/AD coverage. This advantage is temporary, and in a matter of hours, the window of advantage closes. Threat forces, now leveraging operational capabilities, find and attack friendly tactical formations with numerous drones, cyber, and kinetic fires capabilities.19 Simultaneously, threat forces amplify electronic warfare measures, complicating efforts to distribute data, avoid detection, and coordinate follow-on operations.
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