Soviet Strike Ps1

[Sean Vaidhyanathan]

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The U. S. Navy had no qualms about disclosing its defensive capabilities in 1986, when the opposition was not the supersonic Backfire, but the turboprop Tu-95 Bear of Soviet Long Range Aviation. The latter incident occurred during a U. S. amphibious exercise at Adak, Aleutian Islands, when then-CinCPac Admiral James Lyons ordered two Soviet Bear bombers intercepted when they approached the exercise area.14 In a subsequent interview, Admiral Lyons said:

Apart from complicating any U. S. surprise-attack option, these measures have also had other deleterious effects. One is to turn the Backfires into quick-reaction strike units demonstrating a relatively high peacetime operational tempo and, ipso facto, elevating the overall combat readiness of SPNA. Another is the forward basing of a proportion of SPNA Backfires to the Kamchatka Peninsula, thereby affording the Soviets an ideal jumping-off point for a major naval air campaign over much of the North Pacific. From the direction of Petropavlovsk, Backfires would be able to range out and strike U. S. surface units operating as far away as Guam, Midway, and the Philippines without in-flight refueling.19 According to naval analyst Floyd Kennedy, such a strike reach also allows SPNA to fully exploit the detection ranges and targeting data provided by space-based oceanic surveillance systems (the highly survivable RORSAT and EORSAT network).

The overall Badger modernization effort has included assigning to SPNA strike elements more suitably configured for antishipping operations and armed with more effective antiship missiles. First-line AS-6 Kingfish missiles have replaced AS-2 Kipper missiles on most Badger-C bombers and have been introduced into the larger force of Badger-Gs, apparently serving alongside the AS-5 Kelt.20

As an integral fleet component, SPNA has benefited enormously from this approach. Since the late 1970s, the newest Soviet fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft have deployed in considerable numbers to the Far Eastern theater. These deployments have for the first time been effected at a rate nearly equaling that in the more crucial Western theater. The great bulk of the newly deployed aircraft are concentrated within the Far Eastern Military district, operating from bases that are either close to those used by SPNA regiments or are joint facilities largely sub- rdinated to the requirements of the theater fleet command. The latter are constituted in the principal bases of: Alekseyevka; Dolinsk, on Sakhalin Island; Petropavlovsk; Komanovka, in the Vladivostok area; and Sovetskaya E*avan. From this geographic spread, it would appear that ne new Air Defense and Frontal Aviation forces are predominantly slated for contingencies against Japanese rces and (especially) forward-deployed U. S. forces in ue vast North Pacific/Northeast Asian region, and not along the Chinese frontier.

The Maritime Role of Long Range Aviation: In recent years, the Soviet command has attempted to blur the lines that distinguish naval strike aviation operations from those of Long Range Aviation (LRA). This policy has had a signal effect within the maritime environment of the Asia- Pacific region: the increasing dedication of Soviet LRA to operations against at-sea targets. As with the Soviet tactical air arms, the primary impetus for reconstituting the

Like those operating with naval aviation, LRA Backfires are armed with the AS-4 Kitchen missile, which can attack both land and sea targets. This sort of standardization in the principal weapon-delivery system provides flexibility and the potential for theater or strategic strike roles for the Backfires. In fact, the AS-4 Kitchens also arm the Bear-G bombers, three-quarters of which are de-

Since 1979, the Soviets gradually have turned the former U. S. facility at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, into a forward base of operations providing SPNA aircraft, such as the Bears and Badgers shown here, with a 2,200-nautical-mile threat coverage in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Java, South China, and Philippine seas.

ployed in the Soviet Far East.27 The AS-4 is also a secondary weapon load for the Bear-H bomber, which has been specifically configured to carry eight AS-15 Kent cruise missiles. With a maximum range of 1,500 nautical miles, the AS-15 is intended for intercontinental nuclear strikes.

Another factor that has mitigated the immediate necessity of basing a large SPNA force at Cam Ranh has been the establishment by the Soviets of a new air bridge connecting their distant Vietnamese outpost with Vladivostok. Using North Korean airspace, this air bridge is the

Archival documents also illustrate secret White House initiatives during the summer and fall of 1969 to turn a page in Sino-American relations. Convinced that Sino-Soviet tensions provided a basis for rapprochement but also determined to minimize the State Department's role, Nixon and Kissinger tried to open secret communications with China through Pakistan and Romania. Other documents show how State Department officials tried to assert a role in policymaking on rapprochement and, before they were cut out altogether, made important contributions to White House efforts to signal a friendly interest in communications with China.

This briefing book also includes some interesting CIA Directorate of Intelligence material released through the Archive's FOIA requests. Top-secret "Weekly Reviews", published every Friday at noon, helped keep officials "with a need to know" apprised of current events, such as the Sino-Soviet border clashes. A reference in a report on Chinese diplomacy (document 28) to a secret directive from Zhou En-lai suggest that U.S. intelligence, perhaps the Hong Kong "China watchers", could acquire significant information on Chinese policymaking from refugees and other contacts.

On 2 March 1969, the Sino-Soviet border dispute took an exceptionally violent turn when Chinese forces fired on Soviet border troops patrolling Zhenbao (Damanski), an island on the Ussuri River; some 50 Soviet soldiers were killed.2 Although this early State Department report is agnostic as to who sparked the fighting, apparently the Chinese initiated the clash in response to earlier Soviet provocations along the border. State Department analysts correctly opined that neither Beijing nor Moscow sought major conflict.

An early report from CIA's intelligence directorate accurately concluded that Beijing "triggered" the 2 March incident.3 Another bloody exchange took place on 15 March when the Soviets deployed forces for retaliatory action; CIA analysts saw that battle as a "Chinese effort to contest [the Soviet] presence."

CIA's "Weekly Review" appeared in two editions: one was classified "Secret"'; the other was highly classified--"Top Secret Umbra"--the code word then assigned to communications intelligence. Interestingly, the "warning" on the document notified readers that they could not "take action" on comint--for example, use it for diplomatic or military advantage--without the permission of the Director of Central Intelligence.

This CIA report highlights some of the problems that complicated Moscow's efforts to encourage negotiations with Beijing over disputed borders. Although the Soviets wanted to enter into border negotiations with the PRC, they refused to accede to Beijing's demands that Moscow acknowledge that the nineteenth century border agreements were "unequal treaties" akin to those forced on China by Western imperialism. Until the Soviets changed their policy (or the Chinese dropped this demand), Beijing would only agree to participate in comparatively low-level river navigation talks.

Partly based on information from sources in Hong Kong as well as a NCNA [New China News Agency] article, this report analyzed the anti-Soviet campaign then mobilizing in China. INR's China watchers suspected that Chinese authorities promoted the campaign to "coalesce internal unity" and strengthen the regime, but they also believed that it reflected a "genuine fear of [Soviet] attack." To that extent, Beijing designed the domestic mobilization--the manifestation of "national consciousness of the Soviet danger"--to have a deterrent effect on the Kremlin's decisionmaking. Significantly, the NCNA piece suggested some concern about Soviet nuclear-armed missiles on the border while INR cited a nuclear threat made during an unofficial Soviet radio broadcast during March 1969.

This document records a conversation between Soviet diplomat Yuri Linkov and John H. Holdridge, Director of Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific at INR, although he was about to join Kissinger's White House staff. More incidents of border fighting had broken out and the discussion gave Holdridge an opportunity to express concern that the conflict could escalate, especially if "some junior lieutenant [made] a wrong decision." Tacitly warning the Soviets to avoid escalatory measures, Holdridge referred to the unforeseen dangers of full-scale war: it could "extend into other areas of the world and indeed threaten a large proportion of the world's population."

Possibly written by John Holdridge, this report helps explain why he worried about the risks of escalation. Treating Beijing as the "provocateur" in the border conflict, INR analysts argued that Chinese "tactics make sense as an attempt to deter a Soviet attack, using traditional Chinese methods." The problem was that if the Soviets remained obdurate and the Chinese met obduracy with more provocations, there was an "increased chance of escalation into wider conflict."

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