Fwd: interesting and informative article by shri s.gurumurthy
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May 16, 2006, 5:39:51 AM5/16/06
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From: narasimhamurthy l <narasimh...@yahoo.com>
Date: 16-May-2006 07:06
Subject: Fwd: interesting and informative article by shri s.gurumurthy
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From: narasimhamurthy l <narasimh...@yahoo.com>
To: narasimh...@yahoo.com
Date: Mon, 15 May 2006 18:32:53 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: interesting and informative article by shri s.gurumurthy
s Vijayakant de-freezes anti-DMK votes in TN
Tuesday May 16 2006 00:00 IST
S Gurumurthy
Indeed a bizarre, but instructive, idea. Imagine Karunanidhi, not Jayalalithaa, were the AIADMK chief. The AIADMK alliance led by Karunanidhi would have won not 69 seats as it did, but 171 seats. And the DMK alliance would have won only 63 seats instead of the 163 seats it actually won. The DMK promise of colour TV and 20 kgs of rice at Rs 2 a kilo would not have improved its position beyond that. But this did not happen because Karunanidhi was not the AIADMK chief.
What magic would Karunanidhi have woven to do this which Jayalalithaa did not? Simple. Karunanidhi as the AIADMK head would not have left Vijayakant's party, the DMDK, out of the alliance, particularly when the alliance led by DMK on the other side was numerically strong.
Imagine if the AIADMK alliance had roped in DMDK. How many seats would Vijayakant have shifted to the AIADMK alliance from the DMK alliance? Hold your breath, 105 seats, assuming that he shifted all his votes to the alliance!
Yes, if the AIADMK alliance had brought in Vijayakant into its calculus it would have won not 69 seats, but 171. Imagine this had taken place, what would have been the tally of the DMK. Just 53 seats instead of 96 it won! How about the Congress? Just 3 instead of 37! PMK? Just one instead of 17! CPM? Again, just one, instead of 9! CPI? None instead of 7! Unbelievable, yet, true.
Why would Karunanidhi have done it, if he were the AIADMK chief, and Jayalalithaa who was the AIADMK chief did not? Simple. Karunanidhi knew that in the 2006 Assembly elections, the arithmetic of alliances, not issues or performance or even leadership, would be the clincher. That is why despite the resounding victory of the DPA in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections he did not take chances. He accommodated his allies generously and at the cost of the DMK. It was known from the word go that he had decided to go for majority for his alliance and he had given up the ambition for majority for his party.
The way Karunanidhi structured the DMK-led alliance indicated his understanding of the mood of the people. He judged that there was no anti-incumbency, nor any pro-incumbency, mood in people. He knew that Jayalalithaa had vastly improved her position in the last two years and so he needed the alliance even more now than in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. So he rooted for electoral physics.
In contrast, save for her wooing Vaiko, Jayalalithaa relied more on electoral chemistry to overcome the effect of electoral physics. Perhaps she was also influenced by pollsters who had initially predicted her victory. The result was that she left out Vijayakant and thus did not complete the process of bipolar contest.
Thus, the election threw up the Vijayakant space between the bipolar alliances incomplete on one side. The result was what should have been a resounding victory for her alliance turned into a defeat brought about by an omission, and a costly one at that. It is Karunanidhi's greater reliance on the power of alliance as compared to Jayalalithaa's that turned the results in his favour and against her.
But what does this Vijayakant space mean to the future of Tamil Nadu politics? This contains some significant messages. The foremost is that the people of Tamil Nadu have begun demonstrating their fatigue for Dravidian parties. Over 27 lakh voters rooted for Vijayakant knowing full well that his party was not going to win.
They had decided to show their urge to move away from the Dravidian parties. Normally these 27 lakh voters would have chosen one or the other of the two parties or their alliances so as not to waste their votes. But this time around they had decided to break that mould of not voting wastefully only to demonstrate that they wanted a break from both Dravidian parties.
Second, Vijayakant is the second phase of re-nationalisation of Tamil Nadu politics after MGR broke from the DMK and formed an all India DMK in the name of the founder of the DMK, Anna, who had the courage to give up separatism.
The advent of MGR first and now Vijayakant have firmed up the nationalist regionalism which has been influencing Tamil Nadu politics since the birth of AIADMK. It is this nationalist drive concealed in regionalist exterior that made the anti-DMK voters prefer MGR over even the legendary Kamaraj as the credible candidate to defeat the DMK.
The Dindigul by-election which turned Tamil Nadu politics replaced MGR's AIADMK for the Congress as the choice of the anti-DMK voters. So the floating nationalist votes which the Congress used to monopolise constituted a major support base of MGR's party which the voters felt had greater potential to defeat the DMK.
It is this support base which is being threatened and poached by Vijayakant and the 2006 elections is the first indication of this new turn. So a defreezing of the anti-DMK votes seems to be taking place and that is shifting the votes to Vijayakant. This defreezing will gain momentum when Vijayakant emerges as the likely winner.
Likewise defreezing of the anti-AIADMK votes, which is comparatively small in size, may also occur in the coming days which will also seek asylum in Vijayakant's outfit. On the whole Tamil Nadu politics is moving towards nationalist regionalism and away from separatist regionalism.
Imagine a Rajnikant joins hands with or supports Vijayakant. What NT Rama Rao did to the Congress may happen to the DMK and the AIADMK put together in Tamil Nadu. The 2006 Assembly elections contain this significant message for all - that Vijayakant has begun the process of defreezing of the anti-DMK votes.
What magic would Karunanidhi have woven to do this which Jayalalithaa did not? Simple. Karunanidhi as the AIADMK head would not have left Vijayakant's party, the DMDK, out of the alliance, particularly when the alliance led by DMK on the other side was numerically strong.
Imagine if the AIADMK alliance had roped in DMDK. How many seats would Vijayakant have shifted to the AIADMK alliance from the DMK alliance? Hold your breath, 105 seats, assuming that he shifted all his votes to the alliance!
Yes, if the AIADMK alliance had brought in Vijayakant into its calculus it would have won not 69 seats, but 171. Imagine this had taken place, what would have been the tally of the DMK. Just 53 seats instead of 96 it won! How about the Congress? Just 3 instead of 37! PMK? Just one instead of 17! CPM? Again, just one, instead of 9! CPI? None instead of 7! Unbelievable, yet, true.
Why would Karunanidhi have done it, if he were the AIADMK chief, and Jayalalithaa who was the AIADMK chief did not? Simple. Karunanidhi knew that in the 2006 Assembly elections, the arithmetic of alliances, not issues or performance or even leadership, would be the clincher. That is why despite the resounding victory of the DPA in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections he did not take chances. He accommodated his allies generously and at the cost of the DMK. It was known from the word go that he had decided to go for majority for his alliance and he had given up the ambition for majority for his party.
The way Karunanidhi structured the DMK-led alliance indicated his understanding of the mood of the people. He judged that there was no anti-incumbency, nor any pro-incumbency, mood in people. He knew that Jayalalithaa had vastly improved her position in the last two years and so he needed the alliance even more now than in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. So he rooted for electoral physics.
In contrast, save for her wooing Vaiko, Jayalalithaa relied more on electoral chemistry to overcome the effect of electoral physics. Perhaps she was also influenced by pollsters who had initially predicted her victory. The result was that she left out Vijayakant and thus did not complete the process of bipolar contest.
Thus, the election threw up the Vijayakant space between the bipolar alliances incomplete on one side. The result was what should have been a resounding victory for her alliance turned into a defeat brought about by an omission, and a costly one at that. It is Karunanidhi's greater reliance on the power of alliance as compared to Jayalalithaa's that turned the results in his favour and against her.
But what does this Vijayakant space mean to the future of Tamil Nadu politics? This contains some significant messages. The foremost is that the people of Tamil Nadu have begun demonstrating their fatigue for Dravidian parties. Over 27 lakh voters rooted for Vijayakant knowing full well that his party was not going to win.
They had decided to show their urge to move away from the Dravidian parties. Normally these 27 lakh voters would have chosen one or the other of the two parties or their alliances so as not to waste their votes. But this time around they had decided to break that mould of not voting wastefully only to demonstrate that they wanted a break from both Dravidian parties.
Second, Vijayakant is the second phase of re-nationalisation of Tamil Nadu politics after MGR broke from the DMK and formed an all India DMK in the name of the founder of the DMK, Anna, who had the courage to give up separatism.
The advent of MGR first and now Vijayakant have firmed up the nationalist regionalism which has been influencing Tamil Nadu politics since the birth of AIADMK. It is this nationalist drive concealed in regionalist exterior that made the anti-DMK voters prefer MGR over even the legendary Kamaraj as the credible candidate to defeat the DMK.
The Dindigul by-election which turned Tamil Nadu politics replaced MGR's AIADMK for the Congress as the choice of the anti-DMK voters. So the floating nationalist votes which the Congress used to monopolise constituted a major support base of MGR's party which the voters felt had greater potential to defeat the DMK.
It is this support base which is being threatened and poached by Vijayakant and the 2006 elections is the first indication of this new turn. So a defreezing of the anti-DMK votes seems to be taking place and that is shifting the votes to Vijayakant. This defreezing will gain momentum when Vijayakant emerges as the likely winner.
Likewise defreezing of the anti-AIADMK votes, which is comparatively small in size, may also occur in the coming days which will also seek asylum in Vijayakant's outfit. On the whole Tamil Nadu politics is moving towards nationalist regionalism and away from separatist regionalism.
Imagine a Rajnikant joins hands with or supports Vijayakant. What NT Rama Rao did to the Congress may happen to the DMK and the AIADMK put together in Tamil Nadu. The 2006 Assembly elections contain this significant message for all - that Vijayakant has begun the process of defreezing of the anti-DMK votes.
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