X Force 2012 X64 Exe Lustre
Shay Silvertooth
> A raid logical volume on an oss has some problems and I'm trying to
> transfer one of two osts to another oss (I believe this is possible by
> umounting lustre from all servers/clients, executing a 'tunefs.lustre
> --writeconf' on all lustre servers and the related devices, and
> remounting --- with the copied ost replacing the problematic one).
>
> In order to minimize downtime, I would like to work with a static ost image
> -- so I can transfer a faithful copy back, after I repair the raid
> problem. I did deactivate the ost device on the mds, but I'm worried about
> changes to files that live on the ost (I wasn't planning on creating
> another image).
Now, I will do a few tests on the p1-client. Perhaps after a write
conf that is basically clean... and I can replace it... but currently
it contains lots of info about each of the OST's.All the OST's are happy mounting to the mdt and all think that they
are part of our p1 file system.Thanks.
On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 3:04 PM, Kit Westneat wrote:
> Oh right, that makes sense. I guess if I were you I would try one of two
> things. First, back up the MDT, and then try:
> 1) format a small loopback device with the parameters you want the MDT to
> have, then replace the CONFIGS directory on your MDT with the CONFIGS
> directory on the loopback device
> - OR -
> 2) use a hex editor to modify the UUID
>
> Then use tunefs.lustre --print to make sure it all looks good before
> mounting it.
>
> Though one thing I wonder about is, are the OSTs on the same page with the
> fsname? Like are they expecting to be part of the p1 filesystem?
The lnet kernel module can be loaded directly through the modprobe command or indirectly by loading a kernel module that has a dependency on LNet. In normal operation, the lnet module will be loaded indirectly as a consequence of attempting to start a Lustre service, e.g. by mounting a file system on a client. However, one can treat LNet as independent of Lustre and start it on its own. This is useful for testing and debugging purposes, and to provide some verification of correctness when a system boots up prior to committing to loading the higher-level services (i.e. Lustre).
Notice that a second module, called libcfs.ko, was also loaded. The libcfs module is an API used throughout Lustre and LNet and provides primitives for things like process management, memory management, and debugging.
The lnetctl configure command will not automatically configure networks that are specified in the kernel module parameters; the lnet service will start, but the interfaces will not be configured. Supplying the --all flag will cause all of the networks defined as kernel module options to be loaded and started.
lustre_rmmod is the recommended method for unloading Lustre and LNet kernel modules, because it will check for dependencies and eliminates any guesswork on the part of the systems administrator in trying to identify all of the modules to unload and the correct sequence for doing so.
LNet can also be loaded indirectly, as a dependency of the lustre kernel module. If LNet is loaded in this way, its start-up behavior is different because the LNet networks defined in kernel module options will be automatically configured and brought online. This is easily illustrated just by loading the Lustre module:
The lustre_rmmod behavior is also different in this circumstance, compared to loading LNet on its own. If the administrator loads and configures LNet on its own, independently of the Lustre module, then it is necessary to unconfigure the LNet networks before removing the kernel modules:
This behavior is consistent, but not entirely intuitive. The reason for this behavior has to do with a special function of LNet: routing. LNet routing enables a node that is connected to more than one LNet fabric to route traffic between the networks. LNet routing is a complex topic and is not discussed in this article. For more information on LNet routers, see:
Because routing is a function of the network, not of the Lustre file system itself, lustre_rmmod will effectively assume that if a host has only the lnet module loaded and running, then it is providing routing services. lustre_rmmod will therefore refuse to unload the modules unless the lnet service is explicitly unconfigured.
If, on the other hand, the lustre kernel module is also loaded, and there are no file systems mounted, then lustre_rmmod will assume that the host is either an idle server or client and will unload the entire stack, including the lnet modules.
From this example, it can be seen that because the MGS is mounted, lustre_rmmod takes no action to remove the kernel modules. Instead, it shows that there are active services running on the host and exits. The MGT is still mounted and the MGS is running. The lustre_rmmod command is a very useful tool for ensuring the correct and safe unloading of Lustre kernel modules.
Operation Lustre was an action during the Second World War: the movement of British and other Allied troops (Australian, New Zealand and Polish) from Egypt to Greece in March and April 1941, in response to the failed Italian invasion and the looming threat of German intervention.
Churchill thought it politically unacceptable not to support Britain's only effective ally in Europe under threat. In addition, use of Greek airfields would put the Romanian oilfields at Ploieşti, vital to Germany's war effort, within reach of Allied bombers. General Archibald Wavell, commander of all the Allied forces in the Middle East, was told in January 1941 that support for Greece must take precedence over all operations in North Africa and this order was reinforced in February.
Wavell's attitude is unclear. It had been generally believed that he was pushed into the Greek campaign, but recent writers believe that Wavell approved of it. British commanders [a] concluded that with British help, the Greek Army could hold the Germans at the Aliakmon Line. They knew German forces were being sent to Libya in Operation Sonnenblume, but thought these forces would be ineffectual until the summer. However, it is now accepted that given the disposition of Greek forces the transfer of further Allied forces to the Greek mainland had no chance of preventing a German victory there, as well as weakening Allied forces in North Africa, leading to the success of Rommel's counterattack in April and the failure of an Allied offensive, Operation Brevity, in May.
From 4 March, a series of convoys moved from Alexandria to Piraeus at regular 3-day intervals, escorted by warships of the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy. Although there were air attacks, these had little effect. Since January, when the Italian torpedo boats Lupo and Libra attacked convoy AN 14 off Suda bay and disabled the large tanker Desmoulea for the rest of the war, Allied shipping used to avoid passage into the Aegean Sea through the Kaso strait and chose the Antikithera strait instead, which was west of Crete.[2] The Italian fleet mounted a major attempt at the end of March to disrupt these convoys south of the island, but it ended in the stunning defeat at Cape Matapan.
The Allies initially planned to deploy about 58,000 personnel and their equipment to Greece by 2 April, including the British 1st Armoured Brigade, the New Zealand 2nd Division and the Australian 6th Division.[3] While it was intended that these units would be followed by the Australian 7th Division and the Polish Independent Carpathian Rifle Brigade, neither was deployed before the defeat of the Allies on the Greek mainland.
Two brigades of the New Zealand Division and an Australian brigade were in place on the Aliakmon Line, south-west of Thessaloniki (Salonica), and another Australian brigade and the weak British armoured brigade were blocking Kleidi Pass on the border when the Axis (German, Italian and Bulgarian) invasion (Operation Marita) began on 6 April.[citation needed] The Greek Army did not retire to the Aliakmon Line as expected for fear of being overrun by the more mobile German troops during a retirement and the Allied troops were left vulnerable. These forces had little effect on the German invasion and they were evacuated (Operation Demon) on and after 24 April.
This was the Allied movement of British, Australian and New Zealand troops from Egypt to Greece in response to the failed Italian invasion and the likelihood of a German invasion, a threat revealed through 'Ultra' decrypts (5 March/April 1941).
It was assessed that, in purely military terms, British and commonwealth aid would make it possible for the Greek army to hold the Germans at the Alikmon Line, extending from the Monastir gap in Yugoslavia to the Aegean Sea in the area to the west of the Thracian Khersonnesos, while German deployment to Libya would be ineffectual until the summer of 1941. Both of these assessments proved to be wrong: so far as the former was concerned, the British and commonwealth redeployment to Greece weakened British forces in North Africa to the point at which their 'Compass' offensive failed, and so far as the latter was concerned, the German build-up was more rapid than had been expected by the British, allowing the launch of 'Marita' in April rather than the summer.
In all, some 60,364 men and considerable quantities of weapons, equipment and supplies (equivalent to almost four divisions) had been carried across the eastern Mediterranean by 2 April in the face of the distinctly hazardous circumstances of Axis air superiority as manifested by bombing attacks from airfields on Italian-held Rhodes and the Dodecanese islands group. The sole major attempt by the Italian navy to interrupt the convoys was 'Gaudo', which was thwarted by the Italian defeat in the Battle of Cape Matapan.
The passages to the east and west of Crete and in the area to the south-east of this island were covered by patrols of Italian submarines including Anfitrite, Ondina, Beilul, Galatea, Malachite, Smeraldo, Nereide, Ascianghi, Ambre and Dagabur, but none of these achieved any success and, while attempting to attack the GA.8 convoy on 6 March, Anfitrite was sunk to the east of Crete by the destroyer Greyhound. On 30 March Dagabur was sunk by a British cruiser force, and on 31 March Ambergris was sunk by the light anti-aircraft cruiser Bonaventure.
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