Eu3 Divine Wind

[Margarita Lovvorn]

Thelatter fleet, composed of "more than four thousand ships bearing nearly 140,000 men",[3] is said to have been the largest attempted naval invasion in history whose scale was only recently eclipsed in modern times by the D-Day invasion of allied forces into Normandy in 1944. The size of the fleet is often disputed by modern historians[who?], however.

In the first invasion, the Mongols successfully conquered the Japanese settlements on Tsushima and Iki islands. When they landed on Hakata Bay, however, they met fierce resistance by the armies of samurai clans and were forced to withdraw to their bases in China. In the midst of the withdrawal, they were hit by a typhoon. Most of their ships sank and many soldiers drowned.[4][better source needed]

The first incident took place in autumn 1274 when a Mongol fleet of 500 to 900 ships carrying 30,000 to 40,000 men attacked Japan. While in Hakata Bay, Kyushu, a typhoon hit the fleet. An estimated 13,000 men drowned, around one-third of the ships sank, and the rest were damaged.[5]

Seven years later, the Mongols returned. Unable to find any suitable landing beaches due to the walls, the fleet stayed afloat for months and depleted their supplies as they searched for an area to land. After months of being exposed to the elements, the fleet was destroyed by a great typhoon, which the Japanese called "kamikaze" (divine wind). The Mongols never attacked Japan again, and more than 70,000 men were said to have been captured.[6]

The second fleet was larger, comprising two forces with an estimated total of 4,400 ships and 140,000 men, greatly outnumbering the Japanese soldiers, who had an estimated 40,000 samurai and other fighting men. The typhoon led to the death of at least half the men, and only a few hundred vessels survived. Following the storm, most survivors were killed by the Japanese. This event is considered "one of the largest and most disastrous attempts at a naval invasion in history."[5]

In popular Japanese myths at the time, the god Raijin was the god who turned the storms against the Mongols. Other variations say that the gods Fūjin, Ryūjin or Hachiman caused the destructive kamikaze.

The name given to the storm, kamikaze, was later used during World War II as nationalist propaganda for suicide attacks by Japanese pilots. The metaphor meant that the pilots were to be the "Divine Wind" that would again sweep the enemy from the seas. This use of kamikaze has come to be the common meaning of the word in the English lexicon.

Recent science gives reason to trust the legends of typhoon winds known as kamikaze, said to have destroyed thousands of Mongol ships in the 13th century during attempts to invade Japan. Twice, Mongolian emperor Kublai Khan sent fleets across the Korea Strait, only to be struck by powerful storms and shipwrecked.

Divine WindFactionJapanTypeOrderRarity SpecialSetBaseAttributesCost3 KEffectDestroy a unit. Discard a random card from your hand.Divine Wind is a Strategic Order in Kards - The WWII CCG.

Divine wind is the English translation of the word Kamikaze, which allegedly were the two storms that saved Japan from two Mongol fleets under Kublai Khan. This word was later used during WWII for suicide attacks by Japanese pilots in the Pacific war. The metaphor meant that the pilots were to be the "Divine Wind" that would again sweep the enemy from the seas.

The military reasons behind the kamikaze operations were also numerous. Essentially these were identical with the reasons behind the initial suicide attacks in the Philippines; but the situation in which the Japanese found themselves in April, 1945, was even worse than it had been six months earlier. Due to the severe losses suffered at Leyte Gulf and in subsequent operations, and the strangle hold which our submarines had gained on their supply lines, shortages in planes, trained pilots, aircraft manufacturing materials, and fuel were even more acute. The Imperial Navy had been reduced to one organized combatant fleet consisting of the super-battleship Yamato, the cruiser Yahagi, and nine destroyers; and this force ceased to exist on April 7 when planes of Task Force 58 caught them coming out of the Sea of Japan and sank all but three destroyers.

Since the Japanese could not hope to match us in conventional combat, there remained only one alternative. Pilots with short training and little experience (many with as few as 100 flying hours) could best be used in suicide attacks; and there was no dearth of human material ready to die on the sacrificial altar for the god-Emperor. The Japanese Air Force was virtually forced into kamikaze tactics by the Bushido code.

And so the stage was set. Imperial General Headquarters was so fully convinced that it issued the unprecedented order that all armed forces should resort to suicide attack; and the special attack became virtually the sole method used in opposing our striking and amphibious forces.

The first major action of the Okinawa campaign occurred between March 18-21, 1945, when the eighty-two ships of Task Force 58 carried out air strikes against Kyushu airfields and fleet units at Kure and Kobe. 528 enemy planes were destroyed, sixteen enemy surface craft were damaged, and scores of hangars, factories, and warehouses were destroyed or damaged at a total cost of 116 American planes. This attack resulted in the Japanese being unable to mount any strong air attack against our forces for almost a week after the initial landings on Okinawa.

On April 1 the assault troops landed over the Hagushi beaches and drove toward Yon- tan and Kadena airfields. On April 6 and 7 the divine wind struck with all the fury of an empire on the brink of disaster. In this first of nine general kamikaze attacks, 355 special attack planes, accompanied by almost as many conventional fighters and reconnaissance planes, bore down on Okinawa. In the two days of vicious battle, twenty-two kamikazes succeeded in crashing ships. Total Japanese losses are unknown, but it is estimated that nearly 300 were stopped at the picket line; and of this number it is estimated that 275 fell victim to Navy carrier pilots. But our forces were not unscathed. Two destroyers, one high-speed minesweeper, and one LST went to the bottom; while eleven destroyers, one high-speed minesweeper, three escort vessels, three minesweepers, and the aircraft carrier Hancock were damaged.2

During the next two months the U. S. Navy absorbed a pounding unlike any it had ever experienced. The divine wind struck no fewer than eight more times in general attacks; but after each onslaught the Navy buried its dead, cared for its wounded, replaced its sunken and battered ships, and rose to fight again.

By June 10 the battle was all but over, and the fast carriers set their course for Leyte Gulf. On June 21, 1945, eighty-two days after the initial landings, organized resistance came to an end, and the Island was declared secured.

It should be understood, however, that not all of the suicide raids occurred during the nine general attacks. A total of 1,465 kamikaze missions were flown as part of the general attacks, while another 435 came in sporadic small-scale attacks, bringing the over-all total to 1,900 suicide sorties employed during the campaign. Of these 1,900 sorties, 1,650 originated in Kyushu, and the remainder came from Formosa.

The Japanese lost a total of 7,830 aircraft in the Okinawa campaign, including planes destroyed on the ground, in conventional combat, suicide crashes, operational accidents, and by all other causes. Of the 1,900 special attack missions flown, it is estimated that about 900 planes were expended; and of these 900, 182 scored hits, and 97 were credited with damaging near-misses.3

Our losses due to suicide air attacks totalled twenty-two ships sunk and 172 damaged. Total U. S. ship losses due to all causes during the campaign were thirty sunk and 223 damaged. The official report issued September 11, 1945, by Commander in Chief, Pacific Operating Area, listed our ship casualties due to kamikaze attacks:

United States aircraft losses amounted to 269 in combat, 229 aboard damaged carriers, and 292 by all other causes. More than 4,900 Americans in naval uniform were killed, and a slightly smaller number were wounded. Responsible for nearly 80% of these casualties was the kamikaze Special Attack Corps.

While the terrific losses we suffered demonstrate the effectiveness of suicide attacks, the kamikaze was not an unbeatable weapon; and we soon developed methods of countering it. In general, our defense fell into three parts: long range, medium range, and short range.

Long-range defense consisted primarily of three measures: B-29 raids, carrier fighter sweeps, and night heckler missions. Commander Ryosuke Nomura, IJN, commented in November, 1945, that these operations seriously interfered with kamikaze attacks against Okinawa.

The first appearance of the Special Attack Corps in the Philippines campaign clearly indicated the need for more fighter planes; and in November, 1944, it was decided to change the aircraft complement of our large carriers. The standard number of torpedo bombers was reduced from eighteen to fifteen, dive bombers from twenty-four to fifteen, and the number of fighters increased from fifty-four to seventy-three. Consequently we were able to provide more planes for combat air patrol, long range fighter sweeps, and night heckler missions. It is probable that the night heckler missions were more effective in breaking up enemy preparations for suicide raids than any other form of attack employed.

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