Spark 1 Student's.epub
Vasiliki Corvin
Some comrades in our Party still do not know how to appraise the currentsituation correctly and how to settle the attendant question of what actionto take. Though they believe that a revolutionary high tide is inevitable,they do not believe it to be imminent. Therefore, they disapprove of theplan to take Kiangsi and only approve of roving guerrilla actions in thethree areas on the borders of Fukien, Kwangtung and Kiangsi; at the sametime, as they do not have a deep understanding of what it means to establishRed political power in the guerrilla areas, they do not have a deep understandingof the idea of accelerating the nation-wide revolutionary high tide throughthe consolidation and expansion of Red political power. They seem to thinkthat, since the revolutionary high tide is still remote, it will be labourlost to attempt to establish political power by hard work. Instead, theywant to extend our political influence through the easier method of rovingguerrilla actions, and, once the masses throughout the country have beenwon over, or more or less won over, they want to launch a nation-wide armedinsurrection which, with the participation of the Red Army, would becomea great nationwide revolution. Their theory that we must first win over themasses on a country-wide scale and in all regions and then establish politicalpower does not accord with the actual state of the Chinese revolution. Thistheory derives mainly from the failure to understand clearly that China isa semi-colonial country for which many imperialist powers are contending.If one clearly understands this, one will understand first why the unusualphenomenon of prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes isonly to be found in China, why this warfare is steadily growing fiercer andspreading, and why there has never been a unified regime. Secondly, one willunderstand the gravity of the peasant problem and hence why rural uprisingshave developed on the present country-wide scale. Thirdly, one will understandthe correctness of the slogan of workers' and peasants' democratic politicalpower. Fourthly, one will understand another unusual phenomenon, which isalso absent outside China, and which follows from the first (that in Chinaalone there is prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes),namely, the existence and development of the Red Army and the guerrilla forces,and together with them, the existence and development of small Red areasencircled by the White regime. Fifthly, one will understand that in semi-colonialChina the establishment and expansion of the Red Army, the guerrilla forcesand the Red areas is the highest form of peasant struggle under the leadershipof the proletariat, the inevitable outcome of the growth of the semi-colonialpeasant struggle, and undoubtedly the most important factor in acceleratingthe revolutionary high tide throughout the country. And sixthly, one willalso understand that the policy which merely calls for roving guerrilla actionscannot accomplish the task of accelerating this nation-wide revolutionaryhigh tide, while the kind of policy adopted by Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung andalso by Fang Chih-min [1] is undoubtedly correct--thatis, the policy of establishing base areas; of systematically setting up politicalpower; of deepening the agrarian revolution; of expanding the people's armedforces by a comprehensive process of building up first the township Red Guards,then the district Red Guards, then the county Red Guards, then the localRed Army troops, all the way up to the regular Red Army troops; of spreadingpolitical power by advancing in a series of waves; etc., etc. Only thus isit possible to build the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughoutthe country, as the Soviet Union has built it throughout the world. Onlythus is it possible to create tremendous difficulties for the reactionaryruling classes, shake their foundations and hasten their internal disintegration.Only thus is it really possible to create a Red Army which will become thechief weapon for the great revolution of the future. In short, only thusis it possible to hasten the revolutionary high tide.Comrades who suffer from revolutionary impetuosity overestimate the subjectiveforces of the revolution [2] and underestimate the forcesof the counter-revolution. Such an appraisal stems mainly from subjectivism.In the end, it undoubtedly leads to putschism. On the other hand, underestimatingthe subjective forces of the revolution and overestimating the forces ofthe counter-revolution would also constitute an improper appraisal and becertain to produce bad results of another kind. Therefore, in judging thepolitical situation in China it is necessary to understand the following:1. Although the subjective forces of the revolution in China are now weak,so also are all organizations (organs of political power, armed forces, politicalparties, etc.) of the reactionary ruling classes, resting as they do on thebackward and fragile social and economic structure of China. This helps toexplain why revolution cannot break out at once in the countries of WesternEurope where, although the subjective forces of revolution are now perhapssomewhat stronger than in China, the forces of the reactionary ruling classesare many times stronger. In China the revolution will undoubtedly move towardsa high tide more rapidly, for although the subjective forces of the revolutionat present are weak, the forces of the counter-revolution are relativelyweak too.2. The subjective forces of the revolution have indeed been greatly weakenedsince the defeat of the revolution in 1927. The remaining forces are verysmall and those comrades who judge by appearances alone naturally feelpessimistic. But if we judge by essentials, it is quite another story. Herewe can apply the old Chinese saying, "A single spark can start a prairiefire." In other words, our forces, although small at present, will grow veryrapidly. In the conditions prevailing in China, their growth is not onlypossible but indeed inevitable, as the May 30th Movement and the Great Revolutionwhich followed have fully proved. When we look at a thing, we must examineits essence and treat its appearance merely as an usher at the threshold,and once we cross the threshold, we must grasp the essence of the thing;this is the only reliable and scientific method of analysis.3. Similarly, in appraising the counter-revolutionary forces, we must neverlook merely at their appearance, but should examine their essence. In theinitial period of our independent regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area,some comrades genuinely believed the incorrect appraisal made by the HunanProvincial Committee and regarded the class enemy as not worth a rap; thetwo descriptive terms, "terribly shaky" and "extremely panicky", which arestanding jokes to this day, were used by the Hunan Provincial Committee atthe time (from May to June 1928) in appraising the Hunan ruler Lu Ti-ping.[3] Such an appraisal necessarily led to putschism inthe political sphere. But during the four months from November of that yearto February 1929 (before the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsiwarlords), [4] when the enemy's third "joint suppressionexpedition" [5] was approaching the Chingkang Mountains,some comrades asked the question, "How long can we keep the Red Flag flying?"As a matter of fact, the struggle in China between Britain, the United Statesand Japan had by then become quite open, and a state of tangled warfare betweenChiang Kai-shek, the Kwangsi clique and Feng Yu-hsiang was taking shape;hence it was actually the time when the counter-revolutionary tide had begunto ebb and the revolutionary tide to rise again. Yet pessimistic ideas wereto be found not only in the Red Army and local Party organizations, eventhe Central Committee was misled by appearances and adopted a pessimistictone. Its February letter is evidence of the pessimistic analysis made inthe Party at that time.4. The objective situation today is still such that comrades who see onlythe superficial appearance and not the essence of what is before them areliable to be misled. In particular, when our comrades working in the RedArmy are defeated in battle or encircled or pursued by strong enemy forces,they often unwittingly generalize and exaggerate their momentary, specificand limited situation, as though the situation in China and the world asa whole gave no cause for optimism and the prospects of victory for therevolution were remote. The reason they seize on the appearance and brushaside the essence in their observation of things is that they have not madea scientific analysis of the essence of the overall situation. The questionwhether there will soon be a revolutionary high tide in China can be decidedonly by making a detailed examination to ascertain whether the contradictionsleading to a revolutionary high tide are really developing. Since contradictionsare developing in the world between the imperialist countries, between theimperialist countries and their colonies, and between the imperialists andthe proletariat in their own countries, there is an intensified need forthe imperialists to contend for the domination of China. While the imperialistcontention over China becomes more intense, both the contradiction betweenimperialism and the whole Chinese nation and the contradictions among theimperialists themselves develop simultaneously on Chinese soil, thereby creatingthe tangled warfare which is expanding and intensifying daily and givingrise to the continuous development of the contradictions among the differentcliques of China's reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradictionsamong the reactionary ruling cliques--the tangled warfare among thewarlords--comes heavier taxation, which steadily sharpens the contradictionbetween the broad masses of taxpayers and the reactionary rulers. In thewake of the contradiction between imperialism and China's national industrycomes the failure of the Chinese industrialists to obtain concessions fromthe imperialists, which sharpens the contradiction between the Chinesebourgeoisie and the Chinese working class, with the Chinese capitalists tryingto find a way out by frantically exploiting the workers and with the workersresisting. In the wake of imperialist commercial aggression, Chinesemerchant-capitalist extortions, heavier government taxation, etc., comesthe deepening of the contradiction between the landlord class and the peasantry,that is, exploitation through rent and usury is aggravated and the hatredof the peasants for the landlords grows. Because of the pressure of foreigngoods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the worker and peasant masses,and the increase in government taxation, more and more dealers in Chinese-madegoods and independent producers are being driven into bankruptcy. Becausethe reactionary government, though short of provisions and funds, endlesslyexpands its armies and thus constantly extends the warfare, the masses ofsoldiers are in a constant state of privation. Because of the growth ingovernment taxation, the rise in rent and interest demanded by the landlordsand the daily spread of the disasters of war, there are famine and banditryeverywhere and the peasant masses and the urban poor can hardly keep alive.Because the schools have no money, many students fear that their educationmay be interrupted; because production is backward, many graduates have nohope of employment. Once we understand all these contradictions, we shallsee in what a desperate situation, in what a chaotic state, China finds herself.We shall also see that the high tide of revolution against the imperialists,the warlords and the landlords is inevitable, and will come very soon. AllChina is littered with dry faggots which will soon be aflame. The saying,"A single spark can start a prairie fire", is an apt description of how thecurrent situation will develop. We need only look at the strikes by the workers,the uprisings by the peasants, the mutinies of soldiers and the strikes ofstudents which are developing in many places to see that it cannot be longbefore a "spark" kindles "a prairie fire".The gist of the above was already contained in the letter from the FrontCommittee to the Central Committee on April 5, 1929, which reads in part:The Central Committee's letter [dated February 9, 1929] makes too pessimistican appraisal of the objective situation and our subjective forces. TheKuomintang's three "suppression" campaigns against the Chingkang Mountainswas the high water mark reached by the counter-revolutionary tide. But thereit stopped, and since then the counter-revolutionary tide has gradually recededwhile the revolutionary tide has gradually risen. Although our Party's fightingcapacity and organizational strength have been weakened to the extent describedby the Central Committee, they will be rapidly restored, and the passivityamong comrades in the Party will quickly disappear as the counter-revolutionarytide gradually ebbs. The masses will certainly come over to us. The Kuomintang'spolicy of massacre only serves to "drive the fish into deep waters",[6] as the saying goes, and reformism no longer has anymass appeal. It is certain that the masses will soon shed their illusionsabout the Kuomintang. In the emerging situation, no other party will be ableto compete with the Communist Party in winning over the masses. The politicalline and the organizational line laid down by the Party's Sixth NationalCongress [7] are correct, i.e., the revolution at thepresent stage is democratic and not socialist, and the present task of theParty [here the words "in the big cities" should have been added][8] is to win over the masses and not to stage immediateinsurrections. Nevertheless the revolution will develop swiftly, and we shouldtake a positive attitude in our propaganda and preparations for armedinsurrections. In the present chaotic situation we can lead the masses onlyby positive slogans and a positive attitude. Only by taking such an attitudecan the Party recover its fighting capacity.... Proletarian leadership isthe sole key to victory in the revolution. Building a proletarian foundationfor the Party and setting up Party branches in industrial enterprises inkey districts are important organizational tasks for the Party at present;but at the same time the major prerequisites for helping the struggle inthe cities and hastening the rise of the revolutionary tide are specificallythe development of the struggle in the countryside, the establishment ofRed political power in small areas, and the creation and expansion of theRed Army. Therefore, it would be wrong to abandon the struggle in the cities,but in our opinion it would also be wrong for any of our Party members tofear the growth of peasant strength lest it should outstrip the workers'strength and harm the revolution. For in the revolution in semi-colonialChina, the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadershipof the workers, but the revolution is never harmed if the peasant struggleoutstrips the forces of the workers.The letter also contained the following reply on the question of the RedArmy's operational tactics:To preserve the Red Army and arouse the masses, the Central Committee asksus to divide our forces into very small units and disperse them over thecountryside and to withdraw Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung from the army, so concealingthe major targets. This is an unrealistic view. In the winter of 1927-28,we did plan to disperse our forces over the countryside, with each companyor battalion operating on its own and adopting guerrilla tactics in orderto arouse the masses while trying not to present a target for the enemy;we have tried this out many times, but have failed every time. The reasonsare: (1) most of the soldiers in the main force of the Red Army come fromother areas and have a background different from that of the local Red Guards;(2) division into small units results in weak leadership and inability tocope with adverse circumstances, which easily leads to defeat; (3) the unitsare liable to be crushed by the enemy one by one; (4) the more adverse thecircumstances, the greater the need for concentrating our forces and forthe leaders to be resolute in struggle, because only thus can we have internalunity against the enemy. Only in favourable circumstances is it advisableto divide our forces for guerrilla operations, and it is only then that theleaders need not stay with the ranks all the time, as they must in adversecircumstances.The weakness of this passage is that the reasons adduced against the divisionof forces were of a negative character, which was far from adequate. Thepositive reason for concentrating our forces is that only concentration willenable us to wipe out comparatively large enemy units and occupy towns. Onlyafter we have wiped out comparatively large enemy units and occupied townscan we arouse the masses on a broad scale and set up political power extendingover a number of adjoining counties. Only thus can we make a widespread impact(what we call "extending our political influence"), and contribute effectivelyto speeding the day of the revolutionary high tide. For instance, both theregime we set up in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area the year before last andthe one we set up in western Fukien last year [9] werethe product of this policy of concentrating our troops. This is a generalprinciple. But are there not times when our forces should be divided up?Yes, there are. The letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committeesays of guerrilla tactics for the Red Army, including the division of forceswithin a short radius:The tactics we have derived from the struggle of the past three years areindeed different from any other tactics, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign.With our tactics, the masses can be aroused for struggle on an ever-broadeningscale, and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with us. Ours are guerrillatactics. They consist mainly of the following points:"Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal withthe enemy.""The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires,we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.""To extend stable base areas, [10] employ the policyof advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policyof circling around.""Arouse the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time andby the best possible methods."These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment we should be ableto cast it or draw it in. We cast it wide to win over the masses and drawit in to deal with the enemy. Such are the tactics we have used for the pastthree years.Here, "to cast the net wide" means to divide our forces within a short radius.For example, when we first captured the county town of Yunghsin in theHunan-Kiangsi border area, we divided the forces of the 29th and 31st Regimentswithin the boundaries of Yunghsin County. Again, when we captured Yunghsinfor the third time, we once more divided our forces by dispatching the 28thRegiment to the border of Anfu County, the 29th to Lienhua, and the 31stto the border of Kian County. And, again, we divided our forces in the countiesof southern Kiangsi last April and May, and in the counties of western Fukienlast July. As to dividing our forces over a wide radius, it is possible onlyon the two conditions that circumstances are comparatively favourable andthe leading bodies fairly strong. For the purpose of dividing up our forcesis to put us in a better position for winning over the masses, for deepeningthe agrarian revolution and establishing political power, and for expandingthe Red Army and the local armed units. It is better not to divide our forceswhen this purpose cannot be attained or the division of our forces wouldlead to defeat and to the weakening of the Red Army, as happened in Augusttwo years ago when our forces were divided on the Hunan-Kiangsi border foran attack on Chenchou. But there is no doubt that, given the two above-mentionedconditions, we should divide our forces, because division is then moreadvantageous than concentration. The Central Committee's February letterwas not in the right spirit and had a bad effect on a number of Party comradesin the Fourth Army. At that time the Central Committee also issued a circularstating that war would not necessarily break out between Chiang Kai-shekand the Kwangsi warlords. Since then, however, the appraisals and directivesof the Central Committee have in the main been correct. It has already issuedanother circular correcting the one containing the wrong appraisal. Althoughit has not made any correction of the letter to the Red Army, its subsequentdirectives have not been couched in the same pessimistic tone and its viewson the Red Army's operations now coincide with ours. Yet the bad effect whichthis letter had on some comrades persists. Therefore, I feel that it is stillnecessary to give some explanation.The plan to take Kiangsi Province within a year was also proposed last Aprilby the Front Committee to the Central Committee, and a decision to that effectwas later made at Yutu. The following reasons were given in the letter tothe Central Committee:The armies of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords areapproaching each other in the vicinity of Kiukiang, and a big battleis imminent. The resumption of mass struggle, coupled with the spread ofcontradictions among the ruling reactionaries, makes it probable that therewill soon be a high tide of revolution. As for how our work should be arrangedunder these circumstances, we feel that, so far as the southern provincesare concerned, the armed forces of the compradors and landlords in Kwangtungand Hunan Provinces are too strong, and that in Hunan, more over, we havelost almost all our mass following, inside as well as outside the Party,because of the Party's putschist mistakes. In the three provinces of Fukien,Kiangsi and Chekiang, however, the situation is different. First, militarilythe enemy is weakest there. In Chekiang, there is only a small provincialforce under Chiang Po-cheng. [11] In Fukien, althoughthere are five groups of enemy troops totalling fourteen regiments in all,Kuo Fengming's troops have already been smashed; the troops under Chen Kuo-huiand Lu Hsing-pang [12] are bandits of small fightingcapacity; the two brigades of marines stationed along the coast have neverseen action and their fighting capacity is undoubtedly not high; Chang Chen[13] alone can put up some sort of a fight, but, accordingto an analysis made by the Fukien Provincial Committee, even he has onlytwo relatively strong regiments. In addition, Fukien is now in a state ofcomplete chaos, confusion and disunity. In Kiangsi, there are sixteen regimentsunder the two commands of Chu Pei-teh [14] and HsiungShih-hui; [15] they are stronger than the armed forcesof either Fukien or Chekiang, but far inferior to those of Hunan. Secondly,fewer putschist mistakes have been made in these three provinces. We arenot clear about the situation in Chekiang, but the Party's organizationaland mass base is somewhat better in Kiangsi and Fukien than in Hunan. TakeKiangsi for example. In northern Kiangsi we still have some basis in Tehan,Hsiushui and Tungku; in western Kiangsi the Party and the Red Guards stillhave some strength in Ningkang, Yunghsin, Lienhua and Suichuan; in southernKiangsi the prospects are still brighter, as the 2nd and 4th Regiments of`the Red Army are steadily growing in strength in the counties of Kian, Yungfengand Hsingkuo; and what is more, the Red Army under Fang Chih-min has by nomeans been wiped out. All this places us in a position to close in on Nanchang.We hereby recommend to the Central Committee that during the period of prolongedwarfare among the Kuomintang warlords, we should contend with Chiang Kai-shekand the Kwangsi clique for Kiangsi Province and also for western Fukien andwestern Chekiang. In these three provinces we should enlarge the Red Armyand create an independent regime of the masses, with a time limit of oneyear for accomplishing this plan.This proposal to contend for Kiangsi erred only in setting a time limit ofone year. It was based not only on conditions within the province itself,but also on the prospect that a nation-wide high tide of revolution wouldsoon arise. For unless we had been convinced that there would soon be a hightide of revolution, we could not possibly have concluded that we could takeKiangsi in a year. The only weakness in the proposal was that it set a timelimit of one year, which it should not have done, and so gave a flavour ofimpetuosity to the word "soon" in the statement, "there will soon be a hightide of revolution". As to the subjective and objective conditions in Kiangsi,they well deserve our attention. Besides the subjective conditions describedin the letter to the Central Committee, three objective conditions can nowbe clearly pointed out. First, the economy of Kiangsi is mainly feudal, themerchant-capitalist class is relatively weak, and the armed forces of thelandlords are weaker than in any other southern province. Secondly, Kiangsihas no provincial troops of its own and has always been garrisoned by troopsfrom other provinces. Sent there for the "suppression of Communists" or"suppression of bandits", these troops are unfamiliar with local conditions,their interests are much less directly involved than if they were local troops,and they usually lack enthusiasm. And thirdly, unlike Kwangtung which isclose to Hongkong and under British control in almost every respect, Kiangsiis comparatively remote from imperialist influence. Once we have graspedthese three points, we can understand why rural uprisings are more widespreadand the Red Army and guerrilla units more numerous in Kiangsi than in anyother province.How then should we interpret the word "soon" in the statement, "there willsoon be a high tide of revolution"? This is a common question among comrades.Marxists are not fortune-tellers. They should, and indeed can, only indicatethe general direction of future developments and changes; they should notand cannot fix the day and the hour in a mechanistic way. But when I saythat there will soon be a high tide of revolution in China, I am emphaticallynot speaking of something which in the words of some people "is possiblycoming", something illusory, unattainable and devoid of significance foraction. It is like a ship far out at sea whose mast-head can already be seenfrom the shore; it is like the morning sun in the east whose shimmering raysare visible from a high mountain top; it is like a child about to be bornmoving restlessly in its mother's womb. NOTES1. Comrade Fang Chih-min, a native of Yiyang, Kiangsi Province,and a member of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,was the founder of the Red area in northeastern Kiangsi and of the TenthRed Army. In 1934 he led the vanguard detachment of the Red Army in marchingnorth to resist the Japanese invaders. In January 1935 he was captured inbattle against the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang troops and in July hedied a martyr's death in Nanchang, Kiangsi.