Moral Dilemma Pdf

[Azalee Rowling]

Whatis common to the two well-known cases is conflict. In each case,an agent regards herself as having moral reasons to do each of twoactions, but doing both actions is not possible. Ethicists have calledsituations like these moral dilemmas. The crucial features ofa moral dilemma are these: the agent is required to do each of two (ormore) actions; the agent can do each of the actions; but the agentcannot do both (or all) of the actions. The agent thus seems condemnedto moral failure; no matter what she does, she will do something wrong(or fail to do something that she ought to do).

We shall return to the issue of whether it is possible to precludegenuine moral dilemmas. But what about the desirability of doing so?Why have ethicists thought that their theories should preclude thepossibility of dilemmas? At the intuitive level, the existence ofmoral dilemmas suggests some sort of inconsistency. An agent caught ina genuine dilemma is required to do each of two acts but cannot doboth. And since he cannot do both, not doing one is a condition ofdoing the other. Thus, it seems that the same act is both required andforbidden. But exposing a logical inconsistency takes some work; forinitial inspection reveals that the inconsistency intuitively felt isnot present. Allowing \(OA\) to designate that the agent in questionought to do \(A\) (or is morally obligated to do \(A\), or is morallyrequired to do \(A)\), that \(OA\) and \(OB\) are both true is notitself inconsistent, even if one adds that it is not possible for theagent to do both \(A\) and \(B\). And even if the situation isappropriately described as \(OA\) and \(O\neg A\), that is not acontradiction; the contradictory of \(OA\) is \(\neg OA\). (See Marcus1980 and McConnell 1978, 273.)

But failing to be uniquely action-guiding is not the only reason thatthe existence of moral dilemmas is thought to be troublesome. Just asimportant, the existence of dilemmas does lead to inconsistencies ifcertain other widely held theses are true. Here we shall consider twodifferent arguments, each of which shows that one cannot consistentlyacknowledge the reality of moral dilemmas while holding selected (andseemingly plausible) principles.

The first argument shows that two standard principles of deontic logicare, when conjoined, incompatible with the existence of moraldilemmas. The first of these is the principle of deonticconsistency

Intuitively this principle just says that the same action cannot beboth obligatory and forbidden. Note that as initially described, theexistence of dilemmas does not conflict with PC. For as described,dilemmas involve a situation in which an agent ought to do \(A\),ought to do \(B\), but cannot do both \(A\) and \(B\). But if we add aprinciple of deontic logic, then we obtain a conflict withPC:

Two other principles accepted in most systems of deontic logic entailPC. So if PD holds, then one of these additional two principles mustbe jettisoned too. The first says that if an action is obligatory, itis also permissible. The second says that an action is permissible ifand only if it is not forbidden. These principles may be statedas:

There is much to say about the moral emotions and situations of moralconflict; the positions are varied and intricate. Without pretendingto resolve all of the issues here, it will be pointed out thatopponents of dilemmas have raised two different objections to theargument from moral residue. The first objection, in effect, suggeststhat the argument is question-begging (McConnell 1978 and Conee 1982);the second objection challenges the assumption that remorse and guiltare appropriate only when the agent has done wrong.

Matters are even more complicated, though, as the second objection tothe argument from moral residue shows. The residues contemplated byproponents of the argument are diverse, ranging from guilt or remorseto a belief that the agent ought to apologize or compensate personswho were negatively impacted by the fact that he did not satisfy oneof the conflicting obligations. The argument assumes that experiencingremorse or guilt or believing that one ought to apologize orcompensate another are appropriate responses only if the agentbelieves that he has done something wrong. But this assumption isdebatable, for multiple reasons.

So both supporters and opponents of moral dilemmas can give an accountof why agents who face moral conflicts appropriately experiencenegative moral emotions. But there is a complex array of issuesconcerning the relationship between ethical conflicts and moralemotions, and only book-length discussions can do them justice. (SeeGreenspan 1995 and Tessman 2015.)

Another issue raised by the topic of moral dilemmas is therelationship among various aspects of morality. Consider thisdistinction. General obligations are moral requirements thatindividuals have simply because they are moral agents. That agents arerequired not to kill, not to steal, and not to assault are examples ofgeneral obligations. Agency alone makes these precepts applicable toindividuals. By contrast, role-related obligations are moralrequirements that agents have in virtue of their role, occupation, orposition in society. That lifeguards are required to save swimmers indistress is a role-related obligation. Another example, mentionedearlier, is the obligation of a defense attorney to hold in confidencethe disclosures made by a client. These categories need not beexclusive. It is likely that anyone who is in a position to do soought to save a drowning person. And if a person has particularlysensitive information about another, she should probably not reveal itto third parties regardless of how the information was obtained. Butlifeguards have obligations to help swimmers in distress when mostothers do not because of their abilities and contractual commitments.And lawyers have special obligations of confidentiality to theirclients because of implicit promises and the need to maintaintrust.

In philosophy, an ethical dilemma, also called an ethical paradox or moral dilemma, is a situation in which two or more conflicting moral imperatives, none of which overrides the other, confront an agent. A closely related definition characterizes an ethical dilemma as a situation in which every available choice is wrong. The term is also used in a wider sense in everyday language to refer to ethical conflicts that may be resolvable, to psychologically difficult choices or to other types of difficult ethical problems.

This article concerns ethical dilemmas in the strict philosophical sense, often referred to as genuine ethical dilemmas. Various examples have been proposed but there is disagreement as to whether these constitute genuine or merely apparent ethical dilemmas. The central debate around ethical dilemmas concerns the question of whether there are any. Defenders often point to apparent examples while their opponents usually aim to show their existence contradicts very fundamental ethical principles. Ethical dilemmas come in various types. An important distinction concerns the difference between epistemic dilemmas, which give a possibly false impression to the agent of an unresolvable conflict, and actual or ontological dilemmas. There is broad agreement that there are epistemic dilemmas but the main interest in ethical dilemmas takes place on the ontological level. Traditionally, philosophers held that it is a requirement for good moral theories to be free from ethical dilemmas. But this assumption has been questioned in contemporary philosophy.

A person is in an ethical dilemma if they stand under several conflicting moral obligations and no obligation overrides the others. Two ethical requirements are conflicting if the agent can do one or the other but not both: the agent has to choose one over the other. Two conflicting ethical requirements do not override each other if they have the same strength or if there is no sufficient ethical reason to choose one over the other.[1][2][3] Only this type of situation constitutes an ethical dilemma in the strict philosophical sense, often referred to as a genuine ethical dilemma.[4][5] Other cases of ethical conflicts are resolvable and are therefore not ethical dilemmas strictly speaking. This applies to many instances of conflict of interest as well.[2] For example, a businessman hurrying along the shore of a lake to a meeting is in an ethical conflict when he spots a drowning child close to the shore. But this conflict is not a genuine ethical dilemma since it has a clear resolution: jumping into the water to save the child significantly outweighs the importance of making it to the meeting on time. Also excluded from this definition are cases in which it is merely psychologically difficult for the agent to make a choice, for example, because of personal attachments or because the knowledge of the consequences of the different alternatives is lacking.[4][1]

Ethical dilemmas are sometimes defined not in terms of conflicting obligations but in terms of not having a right course of action, of all alternatives being wrong.[1] The two definitions are equivalent for many but not all purposes. For example, it is possible to hold that in cases of ethical dilemmas, the agent is free to choose either course of action, that either alternative is right. Such a situation still constitutes an ethical dilemma according to the first definition, since the conflicting requirements are unresolved, but not according to the second definition, since there is a right course of action.[1]

Various examples of ethical dilemmas have been proposed but there is disagreement as to whether these constitute genuine or merely apparent ethical dilemmas. One of the oldest examples is due to Plato, who sketches a situation in which the agent has promised to return a weapon to a friend, who is likely to use it to harm someone since he is not in his right mind.[6] In this example, the duty to keep a promise stands in conflict with the duty to prevent that others are harmed. It is questionable whether this case constitutes a genuine ethical dilemma since the duty to prevent harms seems to clearly outweigh the promise.[4][1] Another well-known example comes from Jean-Paul Sartre, who describes the situation of one of his students during the German occupation of France. This student faced the choice of either fighting to liberate his country from the Germans or staying with and caring for his mother, for whom he was the only consolation left after the death of her other son. The conflict, in this case, is between a personal duty to his mother and the duty to his country.[7][4] The novel Sophie's Choice by William Styron presents one more widely discussed example.[8] In it, a Nazi guard forces Sophie to choose one of her children to be executed, adding that both will be executed if she refuses to choose. This case is different from the other examples in which the conflicting duties are of different types. This type of case has been labeled symmetrical since the two duties have the same type.[4][1]

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