Pramana Chandrika Pdf

[Glynis Waughtal]

MadhvaPhilosophy is the conceptual formulation of the reliious attitude of devotion of Bhakti and rests on the idea of an essential distinction between the devotee and the object of worship. The main points of Madhva Philosophy is that "The Lord is the highest reality, The world is real. Difference is real. Individual souls are the servants of the Lord. They are distinguished by superior and inferior excellences. Liberation is the experience of untained innate bliss. Bhakti or devotion together witth the Lord's grace is the means to liberation perception. Inference and Verbal Testimony are the sources of knowledge. In regard to the Lord Vedas are the sole evidence. The Vedas areeternal and impersonal".

The accredited authority on Madhva Logic is Jayatirtha and his celebrated work the Pramanapaddhati is the authoritative logical text of the Madhvas. The Pramanachandrika is a shorter work and follows the Pramanpaddhati closely reproducing the language of Paddhati in many places and acknowledging he Paddhati as its authority at the end of every section. The Chandrika however, has the merit of being a clear presentation both of Madhva and other rival views. The present book gives a clear idea of Madhva logical theory and its points of agreement and disagreement with the theories of other schools. The ;introduction in English gives an outline of Madhva Philosophy.

Pramana (Sanskrit: प्रमण; IAST: Pramāṇa) literally means "proof" and "means of knowledge".[1][2] In Indian philosophies, pramana are the means which can lead to knowledge, and serve as one of the core concepts in Indian epistemology. It has been one of the key, much debated fields of study in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism since ancient times. It is a theory of knowledge, and encompasses one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge.[2] The focus of pramana is how correct knowledge can be acquired, how one knows, how one does not know, and to what extent knowledge pertinent about someone or something can be acquired.[3][4]

While the number of pramanas varies widely from system to system, many ancient and medieval Indian texts identify six[a] pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and to truths: Three central pramanas which are almost universally accepted are perception (Sanskrit: pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and "word", meaning the testimony of past or present reliable experts (Śabda); and more contentious ones, which are comparison and analogy (upamāna), postulation, derivation from circumstances (arthāpatti), and non-perception, negative/cognitive proof (anupalabdhi).[4][5][6] Each of these are further categorized in terms of conditionality, completeness, confidence and possibility of error, by each school of Indian philosophies.

The various schools of Indian philosophies vary on how many of these six pramanas are epistemically reliable and valid means to knowledge.[7] For example, the Carvaka school of the Śramaṇa tradition holds that only one (perception) is a reliable source of knowledge,[8] Buddhism holds two (perception, inference) are valid means,[9][10] Jainism holds three (perception, inference and testimony),[10] while Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism hold that all six pramanas are useful and can be reliable means to knowledge.[11] The various schools of Indian philosophy have debated whether one of the six forms of pramana can be derived from another and the relative uniqueness of each. For example, Buddhism considers Buddha and other "valid persons", "valid scriptures" and "valid minds" as indisputable, but that such testimony is a form of perception and inference pramanas.[12]

Pramāṇa literally means "proof" and is also a concept and field of Indian philosophy. The concept is derived from the Sanskrit roots, pra (प्र), a preposition meaning "outward" or "forth", and mā (म) which means "measurement". Pramā means "correct notion, true knowledge, basis, foundation, understand", with pramāṇa being a further nominalization of the word.[13][14] Thus, the concept Pramāṇa implies that which is a "means of acquiring prama or certain, correct, true knowledge".[1]

Pramāṇa forms one part of a trio of concepts, which describe the ancient Indian view on how knowledge is gained. The other two concepts are knower and knowable, each discussed in how they influence the knowledge, by their own characteristic and the process of knowing. The two are called Pramātŗ (प्रमतृ, the subject, the knower) and Prameya (प्रमेय, the object, the knowable).[15][16]

The term Pramana is commonly found in various schools of Hinduism. In Buddhist literature, Pramana is referred to as Pramāṇavāda.[17] Pramana is also related to the Indian concept of Yukti (युक्त) which means active application of epistemology or what one already knows, innovation, clever expedients or connections, methodological or reasoning trick, joining together, application of contrivance, means, method, novelty or device to more efficiently achieve a purpose.[18][19] Yukti and Pramana are discussed together in some Indian texts, with Yukti described as active process of gaining knowledge in contrast to passive process of gaining knowledge through observation/perception.[20][21] The texts on Pramana, particularly by Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism, include in their meaning and scope "Theories of Errors". These texts explore why human beings make error and reach incorrect knowledge, how can one know if one is wrong, and, if so, how one can discover whether one's epistemic method was flawed or one's conclusion (truth) was flawed, in order to revise oneself and reach correct knowledge.[22][23][24]

In some texts such as by Vedvyasa, ten pramanas are discussed, Krtakoti discusses eight epistemically reliable means to correct knowledge.[27] The most widely discussed pramanas are:[11][28][29]

Pratyakṣa (प्रत्यक्ष) means perception. It is of two types in Hindu texts: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.[8][30] According to Matt Stefan, the distinction is between direct perception (anubhava) and remembered perception (smriti).[31]

Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as pramana and called it internal perception, a proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included pratibha (intuition), samanyalaksanapratyaksa (a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), and jnanalaksanapratyaksa (a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state).[33] Further, some schools of Hinduism considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from Pratyakṣa-pranama, so as to contrast nirnaya (definite judgment, conclusion) from anadhyavasaya (indefinite judgment).[34]

Upamāna (उपमन) means comparison and analogy.[4][5] Some Hindu schools consider it as a proper means of knowledge.[40] Upamana, states Lochtefeld,[41] may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. He or she is told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like cow but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later.[41] The subject of comparison is formally called upameyam, the object of comparison is called upamanam, while the attribute(s) are identified as samanya.[42] Thus, explains Monier Williams, if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" is upameyam, the moon is upamanam, and charmingness is samanya. The 7th-century text Bhaṭṭikāvya in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method is more useful and reliable, and when it is not.[42] In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types of Upamāna and their value in epistemology are debated.

Arthāpatti (अर्थपत्त) means postulation, derivation from circumstances.[4][5] In contemporary logic, this pramana is similar to circumstantial implication.[43] As example, if a person left in a boat on river earlier, and the time is now past the expected time of arrival, then the circumstances support the truth postulate that the person has arrived. Many Indian scholars considered this pramana as invalid or at best weak, because the boat may have gotten delayed or diverted.[44] However, in cases such as deriving the time of a future sunrise or sunset, this method was asserted by the proponents to be reliable. Another common example for arthapatti in ancient Hindu texts is, that if "Devadatta is fat" and "Devadatta does not eat in day", then the following must be true: "Devadatta eats in the night". This form of postulation and deriving from circumstances is, claim the Indian scholars, a means to discovery, proper insight and knowledge.[45] The Hindu schools that accept this means of knowledge state that this method is a valid means to conditional knowledge and truths about a subject and object in original premises or different premises. The schools that do not accept this method, state that postulation, extrapolation and circumstantial implication is either derivable from other pramanas or flawed means to correct knowledge, instead one must rely on direct perception or proper inference.[46]

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