Lost Secret Key 1password

[Mette Florida]

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Referrer: forum-search:Lost my Security key and can not log on to new system with 1password. How do I recover?

Note that we do not know your secret key and it cannot be recovered, it is a secret only you'd know. You cannot regain access to your 1Password account without knowing this secret key and your master password.

I'm sorry to hear that. If you can't find your emergency kit printout and/or no longer have access to the original 1Password app or web browser you signed in with, there isn't anything else that can be done, you'd have to start over as mentioned in the support article. Use the contact us link on the bottom of the starting over guide if you need help.

I was considering creating a 1Password families account because I liked the idea that 1Password never has the information needed to decrypt my passwords; however, when I created an account, I entered my master password on the 1Password website and then the website generated a PDF with my secret key.

If the 1Password website were somehow already compromised when I created an account, couldn't an attacker have the info they need from me now to decrypt my data, or am I missing something? It seems like it'd be better if some of this were done from a client-side app (assuming an attacker hadn't compromised that I suppose).

I'm something of an expert on secrets management, having designed and implemented secrets management systems for large banks. I strongly believe that if an external party has ever, even potentially, had access to a secret then it should be considered to have been disclosed, unsafe, and no longer a secret. Actually, I also believe that if a human ever has, even potentially, access to a secret, then it is also no longer considered to be secret.

Having said all that, the problem of 'initial trust' is difficult to solve. Generating an asymmetric key on your trusted device (say, your phone) and sharing one half of it with 1password to use as an encryption key while your device performs all the cryptography functions would be much safer, but would limit you to using your phone to interact with the service, and would depend on the strength of your phone's security (e.g. Samsung/Knox is the only trusted platform for most banks).

Thank you for contacting us. While anything is possible to do, thiswould completely destroy our business overnight. Because of the sizeof 1Password and our commitment to being as secure as possible, we areaudited regularly. If an attempt was made to add this functionality toour program it would be detected and disclosed. There also is no"switch" we could flip to allow such behavior as well. Welltechnically a patch could be released with this functionality, againthis would be detected quickly.

As a password manager, our whole business model revolves around trustand security. breaking either of these would mean almost certain deathof our company and almost certainly legal consequences. Again, whilethis "is possible" the likelihood of this happening is practicallyzero because of the checks and balances put in place.

But, the fact remains that users inherently do not trust 1Password's servers with their secrets. This is why they use 1Password in the first place. They rely on 1Password's "zero knowledge" solution to encrypt their secrets on the client side, so that these secrets never reach 1Password's servers. Yet, ironically, these users rely on these same servers that they do not trust, to serve them secure crypto code that does the above. It's the 'browser crypto chicken and egg problem' in action.

If you use a malicious/compromised client, then all bets are off. And that would include a malicious web client. Unfortunately it is harder to protect the web client than the native clients. Native clients are codesigned and verified by the operating systems. Secondly, the delivery of a malicious web client can be very finely targeted and transient, thus making detection much harder.

It is a feature that previously already had been available for families or teams. If somebody forgot his / her Master Password or the Secret Key, the family organizer or team owner/administrator was able to recover the account in question or create a recovery code for his/her own account.

But you could not create a code for yourself, if it was no family or team account. Now, you can. If you make sure not to forget the Master Password and the Secret Key, the Recovery Key is not needed. There is no risk of the MPW/Secret Key not working. The Recovery Key is a feature to mitigate the user risk of forgetting his/her MPW/Secret Key. Then again: if you forget the MPW/Secret Key AND your Recovery Key, you are still lost. I have created a Recovery Key, but I am pondering about deleting it again.

The Recovery Key is a feature to mitigate the user risk of forgetting his/her MPW/Secret Key. Then again: if you forget the MPW/Secret Key AND your Recovery Key, you are still lost. I have created a Recovery Key, but I am pondering about deleting it again.

I think I read somewhere that one of the benefits is that the Recovery Key only works if you (already) have access to your email, which makes it a little bit safer to print this key and store it somewhere (compared to your Recovery Kit, which contains all the info to get into your account).

Regardless, another potential use-case for the recovery keys is in the event of your untimely demise. With the recovery keys printed and locked in a secure location, your loved ones could potentially use them to get access to your passwords and then get access to your various digital assets/accounts to cancel and/or close them. Presumably, this copy of the recovery keys would include instructions so they are not left to figure things out on their own. And the instructions would also need to include specifics on how to access your email account as that would be required to use the recovery keys.

One thing I keep meaning to do, now that my wife is finally using 1P, is to store my master password in her vault and vice-versa. I think that protects against either one of us simply forgetting our password. If we then also record the secret key in a shared vault, I think that would be total protection against forgetfulness?

I suspect the ultimate use-case is dependent on the set-up you have. A recovery code would be very handy if you were in a family set-up (multiple users) and someone lost all login details, since a new recovery code can be generated by another user.

Popular password management app 1Password today announced the launch of two new features that are designed to make the app more user friendly. 1Password is improving the sign-in process on new devices and adding the ability to recover an account when a master password and secret key are lost.

With recovery codes, 1Password is providing a failsafe that will let customers back into their accounts in the event that a password is lost. 1Password already provides an Emergency Kit PDF that includes a Secret Key, and users are instructed to keep the Secret Key safe. The Secret Key allows for access to a 1Password account if the master password isn't available, but prior to now, if the Secret Key was also lost, there was no option for account recovery.

1Password users can now log in and generate a recovery code, which can be used to regain access to an account. The company recommends that customers go through the recovery code process immediately, as a recovery code can't be generated after a user is locked out of their 1Password account.

Generating a recovery code can be done by going to the Manage Accounts section, selecting Sign-in and Recovery, and choosing the "Set up recovery code option." 1Password recommends that recovery codes be stored in a safe and accessible place.

1Password is also testing an updated sign-in experience in a beta capacity, with the new method aimed at making it easier to log in on a new device or through a web browser. When logging in somewhere new, users can now choose the Scan QR Code option from the top left account menu in 1Password and scan a QR code on the new device to log in.

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Two-factor authentication is a security feature that requires users to confirm their identity by entering a code sent to another device such as a mobile phone after signing in. This reduces the risk of account compromise, even if a password is stolen or cracked.

Two-factor authentication has been available in GravityZone for some time with many users taking advantage of it. From April 12, 2022, two-factor authentication will become mandatory for all GravityZone Cloud users.

After you enter your password to log into GravityZone Control Center, you need to enter a code from the authentication app configured as a second factor on your device. Bitdefender supports Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or any two-factor TOTP (Time-based one-time password algorithm) compatible authenticator.

Please note that the timestamps on both the device and the GravityZone Control Center must match for the six-digit code to be valid. To avoid any timestamp synchronization issues, we recommend enabling the automatic date and time setting on your device.

No. By default, you need to use two-factor authentication at every login, but starting April 12 you will have the new option Trust this browser, which allows you to skip entering the six-digit code up to 90 days.

GravityZone administrators will be able to activate this option and specify the time period in GravityZone in the company authentication settings. After the interval expires, you will need to use your device once again. Learn more in the GravityZone release notes.

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