Ron Caron's Trading Record (Part 2 of 3)
joshua.h.rosenbluth
general manager of the St. Louis Blues. I will post the details behind
any or all of his trades by request. And, if you can bare with me for a
few more paragraphs, I have a little housekeeping to do to explain my methods.
I score each trade or player-exchanging transaction (e.g., free-agent signing
with compensation) by assigning a numerical value to each subsequent season
through last year, for all involved players. I do not evaluate transactions,
such as waiver-wire acquisitions, that do not involve player exchanges.
The numerical value is based on a "Value Approximation Method (VAM)",
similar to the one developed by Bill James for baseball. The next article
details the VAM. In short, the VAM is a quick way to evaluate a player-season,
roughly on a 20-point scale, which is accurate when considering a large number
of player-seasons. However, it is limited to the regular season. It will
take further work to factor in playoff performance.
The value that a player brings to his team is his performance above that
achieved by a replacement-level player. A hypothetical replacement-level
player would have a VAM of about 5 (For example, a forward who played in 50
games with 10 goals, 15 assists, less than 70 penalty minutes, and a plus-minus
less than -10). Thus, I adjust the raw VAM values by subtracting 5. This
adjustment also accurately reflects the impact of a "2-for-1" trade involving
2 OK players for a star. Assume the OK players each have a VAM of 8, and the
star has a VAM of 16. Is this an even trade? Of course not! The team that
acquired the star will add a replacement-level player, along with the star, to
take the place of the 2 OK players. After the adjustment, the team that
acquired the star wins the trade 11-6.
I complete the evaluation of a trade by adding up the adjusted values to
"score" the trade. For example on July 13, 1990, the Blues acquired
Geoff Courtnall from Washington in exchange for Peter Zezel and Mike Lalor.
Courtnall gets an adjusted value of 6 for his 1991 season, a 4 for 1992, and
a 9 for 1993. Zezel gets a 1, 1 and 2 for 1991, 1992 and 1993 respectively.
Lalor gets a 4 for 1992, and zeros the other two years (Even though Lalor
played over 60 games, his VAM was not higher than 5). The total score for this
trade is 19-8 in favor of Caron. But you say, how can Caron get credit for
Courtnall's 1992 and 1993 seasons when he was playing for Vancouver? In his
worst-ever trade, Caron sent Courtnall to Vancouver near the end of the 1991
season. I count Courtnall's 1992 and 1993 values as negatives for that trade.
However, the overall score given to Caron for these two years must be zero
(it's as if the Blues never had Courtnall). Therefore, I continue to count
these years as positives in the original trade. On the other hand, because
I only evaluate player-exchanging transactions, if a player is released or lost
in the waiver or expansion draft, I give no credit for the subsequent years.
If a draft pick is involved in a trade, I record the value of the player
eventually drafted. The other option would be to use an average value based
on the position in the draft. Unfortunately, I do not have those values
(although that would make another interesting study). By using the drafted
player, larger swings occur. In 1984, Caron acquired Rick Wamsley from
Montreal, but had to surrender his top two picks. They turned out to be
Shayne Corson and Stephane Richer (Ooops!). Undaunted, the following year
Caron acquired Mark Hunter, again from Montreal, again giving up his first
two picks. They turned out to be Jose Charbonneau and Todd Richard (Ooops
on Montreal!). Draft picks did not heavily influence any other Caron trades,
and these two cancel each other.
Sometimes, you can "win" a trade even though you lose by the above scoring
method. What typically happens is a team has a short-term need, and
trades away a young player to fill that need. The Calgary Flames argue that
Rob Ramage played an important role in their Stanley Cup championship, and
was worth losing Brett Hull (I don't buy the argument in this case).
Fortunately, that complication doesn't hamper Caron's evaluation. The only
trade that remotely resembles a "today-for-tomorrow" swap is the previously
mentioned Courtnall disaster. Garth Butcher was supposed to fill a specific
need. Yet, the Blues haven't won any division titles, let alone the Cup,
since the trade.
If a player is traded in mid-season, his old and new teams split his value
for that year. However, the VAM does not quite work when you try to assign
values to partial seasons (it isn't linear). To keep things simple, I
followed this rule: if a player is traded before the end of a calendar year,
his new team receives his VAM. Otherwise, his old team receives it.
And finally, the envelope please. From 1983 to the end of calendar year
1992, Caron made 42 player-exchanging transactions with a score other than 0-0.
One of these transactions, the Scott Stevens signing, is still in the making,
so I have not evaluated it. Of the other 41, Caron won 25 and lost 16, with
a total score of 507-427, for a difference of +80. If we only count the 20
trades with a difference of at least 10 points, Caron's record is 12-8 with
a difference of +65.
His greatest successes are 1) Mark Hunter-for-draft-pick-flops (difference
of +33), 2) Oates-for-Federko (+31), 3) Paul Cavallini-for-a-2nd-round-flop
(+25), Momesso and Riendeau-for-Jocelyn Lemieux (+23) and 5) Hull-for-Ramage
and Wamsley (+21). The Hull deal surprises me. I expected it to be Caron's
greatest moment, and with future value from Hull it may yet prove to be.
However, both Ramage and Wamsley did contribute to their teams.
His greatest failures are 1) Butcher-for-Courtnall, Ronning, Momesso and
Dirk (-37), 2) Bullard-for-Gilmour (-37), and 3) Mullen-for-Gino Cavallini,
et al. (-21). He made the latter two deals under duress (the Gilmour sex
scandal, and Blues' owner Harry Ornest's unwillingness to pay Mullen).
It is hard to blame Caron for the Gilmour or Mullen deals, and therefore
his record is pretty impressive. Other minor gems include Dave Barr for
Larey Patey, Rick Meagher for Perry Anderson, Gordie Roberts for nothing,
and Jeff Brown for Greg Millen and Tony Hrkac. So is it time to crown him
a genius? I think not!
From 1983-1988 Caron made 25 deals, winning 15 of them by a difference of +84,
in spite of the Mullen and Gilmour fiascoes. I can say with enthusiasm,
his trading record was great during that time. But since then, he has made
16 trades, with a net difference of -4. The best example may be Gordie
Roberts, whom Caron picked up in early 1988, but let go to win a Stanley Cup
in late 1990. And it could get a lot worse. Unlike the earlier trades,
the final chapter has yet to be written on recent ones. The Ron Sutter-for-
Rod Brind'Amour trade will look a lot worse in five years. And Cliff Ronning
is in his prime. On the other hand, Brendan Shanahan should outlast Scott
Stevens (but the Devils can consider themselves winners in any event), and
who knows what will happen with Craig Janney compared to Adam Oates. But,
the fact remains the Professor's record since 1989 is ordinary.
Yet, to those who feel that Caron is a bumbling idiot, the record most
certainly does not support that assertion.
Josh Rosenbluth (attmail!jrosenbluth)