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D-Day Question

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Robert Bishop

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Jun 29, 2000, 3:00:00 AM6/29/00
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Aside from U.S. Marines as part of the crew on larger USN ships (cruisers,
battleships, etc.) the only ones I know of who served on land were a
handful of officers who were on loan to the OSS. They worked behind German
lines in France helping train and equip units of the Maquis - the French
Resistance.

I can't recall any names, unfortunately... its been a long time since I
read about the above. Hopefully someone else can remember more.

RB


In article <20000630020124...@ng-cl1.aol.com>, swi...@aol.com
(Swipe79) wrote:

> While reading something pertaining to the D-Day landing the other day, a
> thought crossed my mind. Why weren't the US Marines involved (my apologies if
> they were, and I would like to hear about it) in the landing? Considering
> their purpose, it would seem logical. Furthermore, I've never read or heard
> about the US Marine Corps operating in the European theatre. Were they only
> involved with the Pacific theater of war, or were they present in other
areas?
> Any help with this would be appreciated greatly...
>
> Ben

Swipe79

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Jun 30, 2000, 3:00:00 AM6/30/00
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Robert Bowling

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Jun 30, 2000, 3:00:00 AM6/30/00
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At one point during the landings by the rangers at point Du Hoc a message
was sent out that they needed resupply. the marine detachment aboard one of
the capital US ships was Offered the army to take in the resupply and
reinforce the rangers this was turned down by army brass as they remembered
the press that the Marines received in WWI and did not want to see a head
line that read U.S. MARINES SAVE RANGERS AT POINT DU HOC LANDING. I believe
this is referenced in one of the Steven Ambrose books on the subject but
cant remember exact Quote.
D Day was to be an army affair and besides the marines were to busy
elsewhere. Army brass also turned down use of amphibious tractors as
unnecessary for the landings even thought by this time the Marines always
put initial assault wave in amtracks to save lives. I guess since it wasn't
an army idea they wouldn't learn by another services Idea

SGT R.L. BOWLING USMC RET.

--
Thanks
Bob
www.rlbps.com
See us at Fall in, Cold Wars, Little Wars, Nash Con,and Historicon.
Robert Bishop <robi...@teleport.com> wrote in message
news:robishop-290...@i48-19-09.pdx.du.teleport.com...


> Aside from U.S. Marines as part of the crew on larger USN ships (cruisers,
> battleships, etc.) the only ones I know of who served on land were a
> handful of officers who were on loan to the OSS. They worked behind German
> lines in France helping train and equip units of the Maquis - the French
> Resistance.
>
> I can't recall any names, unfortunately... its been a long time since I
> read about the above. Hopefully someone else can remember more.
>
> RB
>
>
> In article <20000630020124...@ng-cl1.aol.com>, swi...@aol.com
> (Swipe79) wrote:
>

Rich R

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Jun 30, 2000, 3:00:00 AM6/30/00
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That is correct. They were all staged west - San Diego or Australia.
All (4) Marine Divisions were staged to the Japanese fighting where
their methods were better fitted.

Rich R.


Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.

Ian Nicoll

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Jun 30, 2000, 3:00:00 AM6/30/00
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Well written Robert. I think the majority of the fighting was done by the Army
in the Pacific, amphibious landings included. Since Normandy was going to be
one single MASSIVE amphibious landing, and then ground fighting from Normandy to
Berlin, it would be a silly use of logistics to have the Marines sent from the
Pacific to lend a hand, and then send them back.

Just my 2c worth, discounted for 1 week only to 1c.

Ian

Dan Cyr

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Jun 30, 2000, 3:00:00 AM6/30/00
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More likely a realistic view of the roles, training and weapons of the two forces.
Marines are great for raids, amphibious assaults and such, with less heavy weapons
and logistics tail, and the Army is more equipped for slogging it out with heavy
weapons and a big logistics tail. Both have their place.

The Marines were not meant to fight an armor/anti-armor campaign, and the Army was
not trained to fight a massive all out attack on some small island for several
days. You'll note that when island campaigns were extended, Army troops were
brought in to support, and replace Marines. Marines are specialists, and are
trained and equipped as such (much like airborne troops), so it is silly to waste
them doing something that Army infantry and armored units were equipped and trained
to do.

Add to that, the silly (and dangerous) rivories between the Navy and Army, and their
refusals to cooperate unless forced. The South Pacific was both Army and Navy, the
Central Pacific was Navy, the North Pacific was Army and Navy, and the Atlantic was
army.

Dan

Arthur Chenin

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Jun 30, 2000, 3:00:00 AM6/30/00
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The only specific Marine participation in the ETO that I can recall reading about
was a single officer mentioned in Collins and LaPierre's "Is Paris Burning?" Said
officer participated in the liberation of Paris, and more specifically of his
expatriate aunt. Though what his official role in the ETO was, was not mentioned.


jfba...@uswest.net

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Jun 30, 2000, 3:00:00 AM6/30/00
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Ian, Dan and Rich are all correct. The marines were
specialists and were concentrated in the Pacific were their
special skills were needed. Hauling a marine division back
from the Pacific would have been a major waste of resources
(transport and cimbatants). Often initial assaults were
made with marines, and followed up by army units if the
fighting became protracted, heavier equipment was needed to
dig out fortified units, or garrision troops were required.

Another point is that there were 4 marine divisions vs. (I
don't know exactly) a whole bunch of army divisions. This
would force the majority of the fighting onto the army,
while you save your specialists for jobs where you need them
most. That's the majority of, not neccessarily the toughest
fighting.

Inter-service rivalry was also a major player, and it still
exists today...budgetary concerns being the main reason,
closely followed by prestige (recruiting and pride), and
just plain old "my dad's tougher than yours and so am I".
:))

--
john :) 10+ yrs in the navy, retired from ANG in 1998

Jim Webster

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Jun 30, 2000, 3:00:00 AM6/30/00
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jfba...@uswest.net wrote in message <395CF920...@uswest.net>...

>Ian, Dan and Rich are all correct. The marines were
>specialists and were concentrated in the Pacific were their
>special skills were needed. Hauling a marine division back
>from the Pacific would have been a major waste of resources
>(transport and cimbatants). Often initial assaults were
>made with marines, and followed up by army units if the
>fighting became protracted, heavier equipment was needed to
>dig out fortified units, or garrision troops were required.

Note that all the other beaches were stormed by Army troops, British and
Canadian, as neither country had marines in the same numbers as the US. I
suspect that the actual "marine" element of the task was limited by design
when the operation was planned. Troops were trained with the operation in
mind but apart from one day (D Day itself) they weren't intended to have
much to do with the sea. To have landed marines who then had to be withdrawn
on D+2 or similar (when the fighting was expected to be several miles
inland) would merely have been extra men cluttering up the beach. The
obvious thing to do was land units who would continue fighting across the
continent. Marines are not really designed for this.
In the Pacific were many actions were fought on islands you could
virtually spit across, the marines with their integral amphibious capability
and close liasion with the navy were ideal. However what use would amtracs
be in the fighting around Caen and ideally naval liasion would be a rear
echelon supply matter after the first week.

JIm Webster

We worship the inexorable god known as Dangott.
Strangers are automatically heretics, and so are fed to the sacred apes.

Arthur Chenin

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Jun 30, 2000, 3:00:00 AM6/30/00
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Jim Webster wrote:

>
>
> Note that all the other beaches were stormed by Army troops, British and
> Canadian, as neither country had marines in the same numbers as the US.

I wish I actually had Max Hasting's D-Day book in front of me to cite the exact
units, but in the Order of Battle in the appendix there are listed a couple
Royal Marine Commando battalions going ashore on the British beaches D-Day.


Stephan Milam

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Jul 1, 2000, 3:00:00 AM7/1/00
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In article <395D2A35...@unr.edu>, Arthur Chenin <ach...@unr.edu>
writes
Royal Marine Commando's went ashore to secure the edges of the beaches
and to take particular targets, acting like the normal commando units,
they also had tanks with them and navy spotters...... One of the reasons
sited in the histories for the sheer bloodiness of Omaha was that the
naval support was too far out, and that the DD's were released too far
away or not at all so that most of the fighting was infantry versus
strong points. Coupling this with the fact that they were facing the
best defended area of the invasion they did well to take the beach that
day.
--
Stephan Milam

Rich R

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Jul 1, 2000, 3:00:00 AM7/1/00
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In article <395D2A35...@unr.edu>,

Arthur Chenin <ach...@unr.edu> wrote:
>
>
> Jim Webster wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > Note that all the other beaches were stormed by Army troops,
British and
> > Canadian, as neither country had marines in the same numbers as the
US.
>
> I wish I actually had Max Hasting's D-Day book in front of me to cite
the exact
> units, but in the Order of Battle in the appendix there are listed a
couple
> Royal Marine Commando battalions going ashore on the British beaches
D-Day.
>
>

Get a copy of Avalon Hill Fortress Europa or the Larger D-Day (Not the
1964 version). The full order of battle is included - for all
sides!

Note that the highest Divisional numeric I knew of was 116 (Infantry)
and 20 Armor. There were also Numerous independent brigades.

One other thing to add about the marines - They would be classified as
Light Infantry as their TO&E would not include all the bigger weapon
systems (Like 8" artillery, Large Tanks, etc). Their mission was quite
different and their organization (even today) quite different.

Tom Bryant

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Jul 1, 2000, 3:00:00 AM7/1/00
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Swipe79 wrote:
>
> While reading something pertaining to the D-Day landing the other day, a
> thought crossed my mind. Why weren't the US Marines involved (my apologies if
> they were, and I would like to hear about it) in the landing? Considering
> their purpose, it would seem logical. Furthermore, I've never read or heard
> about the US Marine Corps operating in the European theatre. Were they only
> involved with the Pacific theater of war, or were they present in other areas?
> Any help with this would be appreciated greatly...
>
> Ben

The marines were busy in the Pacific at the time. In fact about two
weeks later the Marines mounted a major landing on Saipan (could be
Tinian I'm not sure) this was the beginning of the Marianas invasion
that would finish off the last of the Japanese carrier task forces in
the Battle of the Philippine Sea, or as it is commonly known "The Great
Marianas Turkey Shoot."

Tom Bryant
President HMGS-GL

Jim Webster

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Jul 1, 2000, 3:00:00 AM7/1/00
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Arthur Chenin wrote in message <395D2A35...@unr.edu>...

>
>
>Jim Webster wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Note that all the other beaches were stormed by Army troops, British and
>> Canadian, as neither country had marines in the same numbers as the US.
>
>I wish I actually had Max Hasting's D-Day book in front of me to cite the
exact
>units, but in the Order of Battle in the appendix there are listed a couple
>Royal Marine Commando battalions going ashore on the British beaches D-Day.
>

Exactly, Battalions. I would offer the suggestion that there were more
marines on shipboard giving supporting fire on D Day than they were on the
beach. What we are discussing is the deployment of US Marine Divisions, and
given the huge size of these formations you virtually have to think of Corp
level deployment on D Day

Matthew Bond

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Jul 3, 2000, 3:00:00 AM7/3/00
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"Arthur Chenin" <ach...@unr.edu> wrote in message
news:395D2A35...@unr.edu...

>
>
> Jim Webster wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > Note that all the other beaches were stormed by Army troops, British and
> > Canadian, as neither country had marines in the same numbers as the US.
>
> I wish I actually had Max Hasting's D-Day book in front of me to cite the
exact
> units, but in the Order of Battle in the appendix there are listed a
couple
> Royal Marine Commando battalions going ashore on the British beaches
D-Day.

From Max Hastings 'Overlord':

21st AG
Independent Brigades:
1st Special Service Brigade [3,4 & 6 Commando, & 45 (Royal Marine) Commando]
2nd Special Service Brigade [41, 46, 47 & 48 (Royal Marine) Commando]

Other Formations:
Royal Marine Armoured Support Group: 1st & 2nd Royal Marine Armoured Support
Regiments

Matt

Jim Webster

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Jul 3, 2000, 3:00:00 AM7/3/00
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Matthew Bond wrote in message <8joqvs$qc4$1...@newsg3.svr.pol.co.uk>...

remember what the point being made was. The US Marine corp, even if
available, would have had to be withdrawn because it wasn't a sensible
choice of formation for an attack that was plunging into the heart of a
continent. So the Marines would have had to been withdrawn, a corps sized
formation being pulled out while the replacement troops plus everything else
was going in.
Look at the units you have mentioned. What dates were they
withdrawn. I think you will see that my comment still stands.

TcSqd

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Jul 4, 2000, 3:00:00 AM7/4/00
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The comment somone said earlier about inter-service rivalry had a lot to do
with the initial planning. Remember there were two full campaign's in the
pacific. One navy under Nimitz and one army under MacArthur. I don't recall the
Marine split between the two. But MacArthur had extensive use of Army troops in
the New Guinea campaign.

Whereas Europe was an Army affair, although there was some sharing with the
British. This sharing was akin to the Army-Navy split in the Pacific.

Matthew Bond

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Jul 4, 2000, 3:00:00 AM7/4/00
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"Jim Webster" <j...@websterpagebank.spam.freeserve.co.uk> wrote in message
news:8jpk39$56v$1...@newsg3.svr.pol.co.uk...

Well, I agree that the US Marines were logistically tied to the Pacific
Theatre, but that is irrelevant to what I posted. Arthur Chenin was saying
that he wished he had his copy of Max Hastings D-Day book to hand, so that
he could cite the Royal Marine contingent. Mine was on the shelf next to the
computer, so I posted the information he was after.

Whether the material was directly relevant to the discussion didn't matter
to me, I was just helping out someone looking for information that was an
arms length away from me.

All the best,

Matt

Arthur Chenin

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Jul 5, 2000, 3:00:00 AM7/5/00
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With the exception of the marines at Guadalcanal, the Southwest Pacific Theater
(MacArthur) was pretty much an army show, with strong support from Australia and
New Zealand.

Whereas the ground combat in the Central Pacific Theater (Nimitz) was largely the
purview of the marines, although as was pointed out earlier in the thread when
extended land operations were necessary after the initial assault (ie, Iwo Jima,
Okinawa) the army would take over for the mopping up.

Paul & Voirrey

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Jul 15, 2000, 3:00:00 AM7/15/00
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Robert Bowling <rlb...@earthlink.net> wrote
>Snip>

> Army brass also turned down use of amphibious tractors as
> unnecessary for the landings even thought by this time the Marines always
> put initial assault wave in amtracks to save lives. I guess since it
wasn't
> an army idea they wouldn't learn by another services Idea
>
> SGT R.L. BOWLING USMC RET.
>
It was the "not invented here" syndrome. The US army also turned down the
specialist "Funnies" armoured vehicles used by us British. I'm sure that
with those and Amtracks "Bloody Omaha" would have been a lot less bloody.

Paul


Estarriol

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Jul 15, 2000, 3:00:00 AM7/15/00
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In article <AcXb5.15$1m2....@news.enterprise.net>, Paul & Voirrey
<voi...@enterprise.net> writes
Bradleys reason for turning down the vehicles of the 79th Armoured
Division was practicality, as they were mostly based on the churchill
chassis he was worried about maintenance etc.... He did however ask for
Sherman Fireflies (17pdr versions) and was told that we were not making
enough 17pdrs to meet our own use, never mind passing them on
--
Estarriol

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