F-104 air to air peformance
MARK ATKINS
a MiG in Vietnam. Just got me to wondering, how was the F-104 in a 1 vs
1 engagement? I understand a lot has to do with pilot ability. But could
it turn well? Did it turn better than a Phantom? Was it a good
dogfighter? Was it easy to fight and fly at the same time? What other
aircraft could you compare its turn rate and fight handling
charecteristics too, like an F-5? How manouverable, was it nimble, or is
like a MiG-25 where the last thing you want to do is slow down and turn.
Thanks to everyone in advance!
Julius Lancer
Look at the size of the wing. The F-104 was signed to go fast in one
direction. It was not a good dogfighter, which is one of the reasons it was
never seriously adopted in the US.
John - N8086N
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Steve Sampson
The title says it all, "The F-104 was designed to be a day fighter..."
Kelly Johnson went to Korea and asked the pilots what they
thought of their aircraft. Too heavy, too complicated was the
response. They wanted "clearly superior speed, ceiling,
climb rate, and maneuverability. "
Nothing was said about radar, infrared, or night flying.
There's the two things that always goes wrong with the military
industrial complex:
1. Designed for the last war
2. Tunnel vision
Rather then get into a fur-ball with the enemy, wouldn't it
be smarter to kill him at beyond visual range? etc. etc.
Albert Cherer
Don't the Taiwanese "AKA Nationalist Chinese" have air to
air experience with the F-104? Maybe Greece versus Turkey and
Pakistan versus India in the A model. I don't believe Jordan's A
models ever fought.
Albert Cherer
--
Albert Cherer
Thomas M. Lockard
The F-104 wasnt called a manned rocket for nothing. While it did have a
high wing load as compared to other fighters its attack profile matched its
design spec's, high energy slashing attacks using its speed and high energy
to weight ratio to its best effect.
As to why the AF didnt appreciate the fighter and procure past the C model
I really couldnt say, although we do have a -104 driver in the group and
from what I gather he loved flying that bird.
myrle
occaisional lurker/poster/ crew chief-ret
Julius Lancer <end...@yahoo.com> wrote in article
<7iv4tb$ip1$2...@fir.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
Dudley Henriques
that you might be a little surprised by the air to air capability of
the 104.
The guy to ask would be wal...@image.com. I believe he was quite
proficient in the zip machine.
Dudley Henriques
IFPF
MCSTEVE34
During the Six Day War in 1967 the American advisors in Jordan flew the F-104's
to Turkey. I don't believe the Jordan Air Force particapated in the Yom Kippur
war in 1973.
Stephen McCullough
"I can only take one s**t at a time"
Churchill's responce to the announcement that
a bore was at the door while he was otherwise occupied.
John Carrier
But could
>it turn well? Did it turn better than a Phantom?
Not even the hard wing
Was it a good
>dogfighter?
Stayed alive by using its speed, acceleration, and the vertical. Zipper
drivers didn't turn but made BIG vertical moves that could not be followed
and hopefully generated lost sight.
Was it easy to fight and fly at the same time? What other
>aircraft could you compare its turn rate and fight handling
>charecteristics too, like an F-5?
The F-5 was quite maneuverable, particularly the E version ... a very good
Mig-21 simulator. Probably the best comparison would be with the Mig-23
(despite its swing wing design, it was a dog but its acceleration was even
better than 104). F-105 also had similar turn characteristics.
How manouverable, was it nimble, or is
>like a MiG-25 where the last thing you want to do is slow down and turn.
>Thanks to everyone in advance!
Zipper's corner speed (max turn rate/G) occurred somewhere around 500 kts
for seven G. Slowing down was not to its advantage. Mig-25 was G and Q
limited, so not a good comparison there.
R/ John
g_al...@hotmail.com
Dudley Henriques <dhe...@bellatlantic.net> wrote:
> This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
> --------------1061808EE6ABEE6830CABCC4
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
>
> Based on EM and ACM work I did way back when, I would like to suggest
> that you might be a little surprised by the air to air capability of
> the 104.
> The guy to ask would be wal...@image.com. I believe he was quite
> proficient in the zip machine.
>
> Dudley Henriques
> IFPF
> MARK ATKINS wrote:
> >
> > Just saw a painting depicting a flight of CAP F-104's that almost
bagged
> > a MiG in Vietnam. Just got me to wondering, how was the F-104 in a 1
vs
could
> > it turn well? Did it turn better than a Phantom? Was it a good
> > dogfighter? Was it easy to fight and fly at the same time? What
other
> > aircraft could you compare its turn rate and fight handling
or is
> > like a MiG-25 where the last thing you want to do is slow down and
turn.
> > Thanks to everyone in advance!
I'm sure Walt will chime in soon, but just in case he's busy, the Air
Force had a series of tests in 1964-65 to develop tactics against the
MiG-17s and MiG-21s flown by the VPAF. Known as Project Featherduster,
these pitted virtually every a/c in the inventory against each other.
F-86Hs flown by Korean-experienced ANG pilots (including, I think, a
ace or two) were used to simulate MiG-17s, while either F-106s or F-8s
were used for MiG-21s (I forget the details).
A/c participating were the F-86H, F-100, F-101(?), F-102, F-104C, F-105,
F-106, F-4, F-5, and F-8. Not surprisingly, F-8s beat the F-100s, the
F-4 beat the F-105, and so on. However, the aircraft rated the best Air
Superiority bird was the F-104C. Some of this was due to the fact that
the F-104s used double attack tactics where all the other AF aircraft
used Fluid four, but the only a/c to give the 104s any trouble were the
F-8s, who were using an early form of Loose Deuce (and only then when
the 104s were ordered to fly high altitude subsonic dogfights, where the
F-8 is in its element and no 104 driver would ever willingly be). The
main reason the 104 was better was it was the only a/c designed as an
air superiority fighter (other than the F-8), its performance was head
and shoulders above the other a/c, they used tactics appropriate to its
performance, and most importantly, the pilots of the 479th, despite what
the Air Force might have thought, considered themselves and trained as
A/A specialists first, last, and always, just like the F-8 pilots did.
The 104's advantages are speed, acceleration, climb rate, roll
acceleration, good, simple to use weapon system, good cockpit visibility
(for the era), small size, good combat endurance (the F-86s regularly
called bingo before the Zips did, and the Zips were making full use
of A/B), good weapons platform, and less smoke than most of the other
a/c (the small J79 was less smoky than the big J79, J57 or J75, plus
there was only one of them instead of two in the F-4). It has better Ps
while turning at high indicated airspeeds than any of the other a/c, so
provided you keep it fast (depending on who you're up against, never
below 400-450 knots CAS, and often 600KCAS/M1+), no one can stay with
you long enough to get a shot (with the weapons then available).
If you happen to go to an airshow and see the Starfighters demo team,
try and talk to Tom Delashaw, one of the pilots. Tom was one of the
Featherduster project pilots, and gave copies of the reports to a friend
of mine. He also flew the bird in combat (he was wing weapons officer),
as well as another tour in F-4s, and his opinions about the a/c are the
same as Walt's: nothing in its era came close for A/A work (the
Lightning was in the same performance league, but had a crummy weapon
system for air superiority work, as well as being a plumber's
nightmare).
The 104A got a bad rep early on, due to an unreliable engine
(J79-GE-3/3A) that often blew up during or shortly after takeoff,
combined with a downward ejection seat that didn't instill confidence in
a pilot's chances on takeoff. Plus the fact that the a/c didn't suffer
fools at all, nor is it an aircraft you can ignore for a while.
Walt has said that flying the 104 was like owning the world's
sharpest knife. When inexperienced German pilots got into the a/c,
combined with inexperienced mechanics, lousy european weather, and many
of the sortie profiles (low altitude nuke/recon), the accident rate was
very high for several years.
Experienced pilots seem to have loved it (In an interview in Air
Enthusiast? a while back, Mick Spick asked Johnny Johnson what his
favorite fighter was, expecting him to name the Spit 9 or 14; Johnson
said it was the F-104), but new pilots were often intimidated by it and
its reputation. Definitely not the best a/c for the average wartime
mass-produced pilot, but like the Camel, P-39, B-26, and other a/c
considered tricky to fly, in the hands of someone who knew how to fly it
it could be awesome.
Guy
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
wal...@oneimage.com
>>snip;
Probably the best comparison would be with the Mig-23
>(despite its swing wing design, it was a dog but its acceleration was even
>better than 104). F-105 also had similar turn characteristics.
>
>>like a MiG-25 where the last thing you want to do is slow down and turn.
>>Thanks to everyone in advance!
>
>for seven G. Slowing down was not to its advantage. Mig-25 was G and Q
>limited, so not a good comparison there.>R/ John
>Comment: I flew the F104A for 3 1/2 years and maanged to ammas about 930 hurs
in the Zipper. One thing most people don't realize is that takeoff flaps could
be used up to 550KIAS/1,8M. Using T/O flaps put the corner velocity down to about
425 IAS on a par with the F4. We used them very flexibly as they acted fast. Out
for turn or pullup, in for accel, etc. Same with AB; off for high G, bakc on for
accel. We used modified 'loose deuce' tactics beginning in '65 since we were deployed
as pairs rather than a flight of four.
I do not know of any contemporay airplane that could stay with our re-engined
104s - same engine that went into the 104S except we were about 3000-3500 pounds lighter
weight. I suppose the F22 or MiG29 could out-accel the little bird but M2.0 from M0.9
in 27 miles/1'45"/1000# fuel was pretty darned good for 1967. Attain and maintain M 1.05
cruise in non-AB, scheduled 1+30 training missions without external tanks, and an
availability rate exceeding 90% speaks well for Lockheed, Kelly Johnson and GE.
Just wish Kelly had been able to build the CL1200 Lancer.
Walt BJ Starfighter pilot (ret) (can't afford one)
>
>
>
>
>
Fchao049
> Don't the Taiwanese "AKA Nationalist Chinese" have air to
>air experience with the F-104?
The score was 2:0
2 China's Mig-19s were both shot down by sidewinders,
one of the Taiwanese's F-104 was lost due to
mechanical faliure when heading home; no more
air conflict happened after this .......
AK
Walt has it right...the 104 had a credible turn capability when using the
maneuver flap position. I flew the jet at TOPGUN in '78 when we wanted to
verify some energy maneuverability data against the F-5E. We all were
surprised when the 'numbers' worked out as well as they did. In addition, I
have also flown the 'hard wing' and slatted versions of the F-4 and am
familiar with the relative performance comparisons between the two a/c.
Andy Bush
alfa...@doitnow.com
John Carrier <j...@netdoor.com> wrote in article
<pLP43.1114$LI5.1...@axe.netdoor.com>...
>
> But could
> >it turn well? Did it turn better than a Phantom?
>
MicahJones
direction. It was not a good dogfighter, which is one of the reasons it was
never seriously adopted in the US.>>
John has come across an interesting point here - the F-104's weakness in one
area (wing size hampering manouverability somewhat) contributed immensely to
another area - speed in the low altitude strike role. The Luftwaffe F-104G is
a prime example of this - the small frontal size and high speed of the basic
F-104 platform making it an effective little machine in the ground pounding
role!
Micah
Ed Rasimus
>John has come across an interesting point here - the F-104's weakness in one
>area (wing size hampering manouverability somewhat) contributed immensely to
>another area - speed in the low altitude strike role. The Luftwaffe F-104G is
>a prime example of this - the small frontal size and high speed of the basic
>F-104 platform making it an effective little machine in the ground pounding
>role!
Not really. The 104G was "an effective little machine" in the nuclear
strike role, which is certainly ground pounding, but it wasn't very
effective in terms of conventional attack.
The 104 simply doesn't have the load carrying capability to make it a
weapon of choice in conventional ground attack. The small, highly
loaded wing restricts recovery altitude for dive bomb at virtually any
angle and the 104G's Thunderstick knock-off fire control system didn't
allow for CCIP or DiveToss style deliveries.
Small frontal size and high speed are certainly nice in a tactical
aircraft, but they don't have much relevance to the effectiveness of a
ground attack platform--think of the A-10!
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
*** Ziff-Davis Interactive
*** (http://www.zdnet.com)
dhe...@bellatlantic.net
once how damn sorry I was to have missed flying the bird. It has always
puzzled me how even those of us involved with ACM[or I should say some
of us at least] failed to fully appreciate just how good the airplane
could be in capable hands. The lead changes and free flow yo yo
positioning inherent to loose duece, and vertical plane maneuvering Ps
advantages were 104 assets to be sure.
Check six
Dudley Henriques
IFPF
In article <7j1lca$8cb$1...@nnrp2.deja.com>,
--
Dudley A. Henriques
Past President 1971-1985
International Fighter Pilots Fellowship
wal...@oneimage.com
>In article <3753295A...@bellatlantic.net>,> Dudley Henriques <dhe...@bellatlantic.net> wrote:
Good summation. I never got to hassle an F4 with the 104 but about the only chance the 4 would have
would be to get some separation and shoot AIM7s at high angles-off. That can be done but requires real
good coordination between the seats.
Later on on a couple "Have ----" projects two of my friends took -19 engined 104s out to the desert
to fly against 'oppo' birds - 17, 19, 21. Really no contest as -19 104 has Em numbers very very high.
Lost my EM charts in one of my many moves but as I remember the aircraft was capable of far exceeding
every red line at every altitude.
I commented that many people didn't know the takeoff or 'maneuver' flaps could be used out to 550/1.8;
The procedure was out of burner, flaps down, G on: then G off, burner on, flaps up. Going out of AB for
the G-pull saved considerable fuel and didn't affect G much at all. Generally after the G we used an
unloaded near zeroG flight path to pick the speed back up. Note that a -19 104 would accelerate from .9 Mach
to 2.0 M in about 1'45" using a mild 'unload' technique. (Unloading reduces/eliminates induced drag depending
on how enthusiastic one is.)
The gunsight-M61gun-radar combination was optimum for visual gunnery. We religiously harmonized our guns and
it showed up in air-air and air to ground gunnery scores. I was always impressed when wet-boresighting by the
very compact patterns the guns made on a ground target. At 1000 feet all 50 rounds of a burst would be contained
in a 3 foot circle (36 inches, not 'about' 3 feet) This was due, in part, to the stabilizing ring bearing in which
the muzzle retaining assembly rotated. What this means is that at 3000 feet slant range all the rounds would fall
inside a 9 foot circle - if you tracked smoothly and accurately you'd smother the target. But if you were a plumber
you'd probably miss . . . so we used lots of gun camera film and assessed it carefully to check how we were doing.
Using the AB was done as outlined above - this technique enabled us to run dissimilar aircraft out of fuel. The
F106 was an example because that 60 degree sweepback delta wing was a real drag-monster under G and they had to plug
their huge J75 into full AB to get their speed back. Pretty soon they were bingo but we had still fuel for another 'go'.
Too bad the USAF brass didn't have a place for an 'air superiority' bird. The mission need was always there but they
couldn't see it.
Walt BJ ftr plt ret
Vladimir Malukh
Steve Sampson wrote:
>
> I was born a few days after the first flight of the F-104...
>
> The title says it all, "The F-104 was designed to be a day fighter..."
>
> Kelly Johnson went to Korea and asked the pilots what they
> thought of their aircraft. Too heavy, too complicated was the
> response. They wanted "clearly superior speed, ceiling,
> climb rate, and maneuverability. "
>
> Nothing was said about radar, infrared, or night flying.
>
This just mean that not only pilots should be asked
what new fighter must be, but also engineers. :)
> There's the two things that always goes wrong with the military
> industrial complex:
>
> 1. Designed for the last war
> 2. Tunnel vision
Quite right. The same was in USSR (may be litlle bit less)
with MiG-21 and especially Su-9, Su-11.
--
Vladimir Malukh
-----------------------------------------
g_al...@hotmail.com
dhe...@bellatlantic.net wrote:
> I enjoyed your excellent post on the 104. I think I mentioned to Walt
> once how damn sorry I was to have missed flying the bird. It has
always
> puzzled me how even those of us involved with ACM[or I should say some
> of us at least] failed to fully appreciate just how good the airplane
> could be in capable hands. The lead changes and free flow yo yo
> positioning inherent to loose duece, and vertical plane maneuvering Ps
> advantages were 104 assets to be sure.
>
> Check six
>
> Dudley Henriques
> IFPF
Glad you enjoyed it.
g_al...@hotmail.com
wal...@oneimage.com wrote:
> g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
> >In article <3753295A...@bellatlantic.net>,> Dudley Henriques
<dhe...@bellatlantic.net> wrote:
> Good summation. I never got to hassle an F4 with the 104 but about
the only chance the 4 would have
> would be to get some separation and shoot AIM7s at high angles-off.
That can be done but requires real
> good coordination between the seats.
Delashaw flew the F-104 in the Navy's "Project Plan" Maneuvering Target
Test program. Basic idea was to develop AIM-7 tactics for dogfighting,
which were eventually used in Operation Bolo among others (interlocks
out, ignore the steering dot and pull lead til the target is tangent to
the radome, etc.) Turns out the navy F-4B guys weren't able to take a
single valid AIM-7 shot (either AIM-7D or E at the time). Max. contact
range was low (I think 18nm was max. achieved by the F-4Bs), and by the
time the navy guys could get lock-on, wait for all the electrons and
hydraulics to do their thing, etc., they were usually inside parameters.
Also, Delashaw usually spotted them visually (20nm+) before they got him
on radar. Even if they did manage to call a shot, he'd be unloading
into ground clutter and the shot would be trashed. He'd extend until
they'd lost visual sight (typically 1.5-2nm end-on), and then start a
climbing turn that they couldn't follow.
They also flew all sorts of crazy stuff, like slow speed (200-250kt.)
rollign scissor fights just to see if they could do it. They could and
did, although neither a/c was happy there (I should mention that
Delashaw was hardly your average 104 jock. He was one of only two 104C
FWS alums, and 479th wing WO).
Anyway, the navy guys were very impressed with the a/c.
> Later on on a couple "Have ----" projects two of my friends took
-19 engined 104s out to the desert
> to fly against 'oppo' birds - 17, 19, 21. Really no contest as -19 104
has Em numbers very very high.
> Lost my EM charts in one of my many moves but as I remember the
aircraft was capable of far exceeding
> every red line at every altitude.
The C wasn't any slouch either (in between the straight 'A' and the
A/-19). Delashaw once had some general up in the back seat of a D model
just to show him the a/c, and they were tooling along at fairly low
altitude when Delashaw sort of casually mentioned that they were likely
exceeding the low altitude speed record. They were indicating 850kts at
the time. Either the 479th must have been full of batchelors, or these
guys just had lots of confidence in the a/c, because they often flew
well beyond the redline limits, ignored the "Slow" light if they felt
the conditions causing it to come on weren't really a problem, etc. The
a/c certainly wasn't thrust limited.
> I commented that many people didn't know the takeoff or 'maneuver'
flaps could be used out to 550/1.8;
> The procedure was out of burner, flaps down, G on: then G off, burner
on, flaps up. Going out of AB for
> the G-pull saved considerable fuel and didn't affect G much at all.
Generally after the G we used an
> unloaded near zeroG flight path to pick the speed back up. Note that a
-19 104 would accelerate from .9 Mach
> to 2.0 M in about 1'45" using a mild 'unload' technique. (Unloading
reduces/eliminates induced drag depending
> on how enthusiastic one is.)
Exactly the techniques they used against the F-86s, if the Sabres were
slower than about M0.7 (if they were faster, they'd just make slashing
attacks). Flaps out, track until speed bled down to 400-450, flaps in
and quarter roll level, unload to about 1.1M in a slight dive, with
rolls/jinks as necessary to prevent tracking until beyond AIM-9B range,
make a climbing spiral turn supersonic (usually at some point in this
climb the F-86s would lose sight), alternate attacks (next a/c rolling
in as first pulls off; first often used to drag the enemy by staying
just out of range). When the fights statted at higher
altitudes (30-35kft), when starting on the defensive the 104s
would dive somewhat steeper (40 deg. or so) getting up to M1.4 before
climbing; from that point on, they were in charge of the show.
Apparently there was only a single AIM-9B kill allowed by an F-86 on a
104 throughout the tests, and even in that one the shot was
questionable. The range was opening rapidly when the Zip pilot pulled
up, and there was a borderline chance the missile might have got there,
but the 104 pilot admitted that he'd boobed and pulled up a bit early,
and would have had to react to the shot.
g_al...@hotmail.com
thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
> micah...@aol.com (MicahJones) wrote:
>
> >John has come across an interesting point here - the F-104's weakness
in one
> >area (wing size hampering manouverability somewhat) contributed
immensely to
> >another area - speed in the low altitude strike role. The Luftwaffe
F-104G is
> >a prime example of this - the small frontal size and high speed of
the basic
> >F-104 platform making it an effective little machine in the ground
pounding
> >role!
>
> Not really. The 104G was "an effective little machine" in the nuclear
> strike role, which is certainly ground pounding, but it wasn't very
> effective in terms of conventional attack.
>
> The 104 simply doesn't have the load carrying capability to make it a
> weapon of choice in conventional ground attack. The small, highly
> loaded wing restricts recovery altitude for dive bomb at virtually any
> angle and the 104G's Thunderstick knock-off fire control system didn't
> allow for CCIP or DiveToss style deliveries.
I'll agree with Ed with one caveat. At typical dive bomb speeds, the
104's takeoff flaps would probably allow comparable pull-out altitudes
on recovery. It's definitely not a CAS bird for working under an
overcast, though. As to loads, although I've been unable to find
pictures of C models in Vietnam carrying anything more than 2 M117s, one
per wing pylon, I've got a photo of a CF-104G carrying a pair of BL-755
CBUs on the wing puylon, on what appears to be a rack similar if not
identical to the VER-2 used on the F-18. I have another account that
says that Greek F-104Gs often carried 4 Mk. 82s, two on the C/L and two
on the Right I/B (probably using standard TERs), with tip tanks and a
tank on the left I/B. How well it flies with all this, I don't know,
but it seems to have about the same warload as an F-5 or even an F-100,
which both normally carried four bombs in SVN. For CAS I'd still rather
have either the F-5 or F-100. Clearly, it's not in the same
payload/range class as the Thud or F-4, but I don't know that it's all
that bad compared to a/c of comparable size and weight. If anyone's got
a -1-1 around that has the drag figures and some representative ranges
with bombloads, now's your chance. I've got an S.A.C. chart for the
F-5E with 4 Mk. 82s, so we can compare.
Guy
MiGMan
http://www.migman.com.au/ref/simhis/FA/FA.htm
Peter Inglis mig...@migman.com.au
Visit the FLIGHT SIM MUSEUM at: http://www.migman.com.au
>> Dudley Henriques <dhe...@bellatlantic.net> wrote:
>> > Based on EM and ACM work I did way back when, I would like to
>suggest>> > that you might be a little surprised by the air to air
capability
>of
>> > the 104.
>> > Dudley Henriques
MARK ATKINS
coming! The USAF would have you think the F-4 was the only fighter of
the 1960's. This has really been eye opening.
The USAF wasn't extremely happy with the F-4's performance in air
to air in Vietnam. Why didn't the USAF give this experienced air to air
Zipper unit more oppurtunities to engage MiG's? It may have boosted up
the kill ratios.
The Navy finally figured out how to fight close range with the
F-4 before wars end, lots of vertical zoom tactics I believe. Sounds
like these F-104 guys knew all along how to fight a fast plane against a
tight turning opponent. From what I have read the USAF
F-4 community didn't figure it out till after the war.
More 104 comments please! Thanks to all of you!
MARK
Ed Rasimus
>These replies on my F-104 posting have been very interesting, keep them
>coming! The USAF would have you think the F-4 was the only fighter of
>the 1960's. This has really been eye opening.
The F-4 might be considered the only USAF fighter of the early '70s,
but there were some significant tactical aircraft in the '60s and they
are fairly well recognized: F-105, F-100, F-8, A-4.
> The USAF wasn't extremely happy with the F-4's performance in air
>to air in Vietnam. Why didn't the USAF give this experienced air to air
>Zipper unit more oppurtunities to engage MiG's? It may have boosted up
>the kill ratios.
Why? How about short range, limited low altitude capability, minimal
radar capability, limited procurement, no BVR (or extended WVR)
weapon, probe only refueling, limited weight lifting capability,
single mission capability (no re-roling flexibility), no ECM or RWR?
I'm continually amazed at the assumption that military leadership
wanders around with their head firmly planted up their posterior
unaware of the "obvious". That might have been true of the political
leadership of the Vietnam war, but not necessarily the military.
> The Navy finally figured out how to fight close range with the
>F-4 before wars end, lots of vertical zoom tactics I believe. Sounds
>like these F-104 guys knew all along how to fight a fast plane against a
>tight turning opponent. From what I have read the USAF
>F-4 community didn't figure it out till after the war.
The 479th TFW and particularly the 435th TFS were leaders in
development of Loose Deuce, Fluid Attack, Split Plane, Free/Engaged
tactics. But, the majority of the AF was (unfortunately) restricted by
a '50s training policy that minimized dissimilar A/A training. That
was corrected when recognized mid-war by the development of Top Gun
for USN and increased Fighter Weapons School A/A dissimilar training.
Couple that with rapid development of improved weapons (AIM-9J,
AIM-7E-2, LCOSS for later F-4s, NCTR, LES wing, enhanced GCI/DISCO)
and you get the scenario of plenty of emphasis on improving A/A
capability.
And, "lots of vertical zoom tactics" reflects a very superficial
interpretation of A/A. There are two things going on with a movement
into the vertical. First is an exploitation of "radial G" or "God's
G"--the enhanced turn rate/radius effect of adding one G effectively
when a turn at a given speed and aircraft G load is made while
inverted, i.e. a 5-G turn made inverted benefits from gravity to
effectively create a 6-G turn rate/radius.
And second, the recognition and application of the principle that
effective offensive manuever is best accomplished outside the plane of
motion of the defender, i.e. if the target is turning at best rate
horizontally, don't tail chase him. Get out of his plane of motion and
use 3D geometry to establish a lead pursuit curve. Reverse that for
defense--if you are about to be shot, your best defense is to put your
lift vector on the bandit and pull--that gives you the best angle
generation to force the attacker into lag and outside your turn.
And, note that none of this requires a Zipper. It works in any
aircraft. Since we had about 1000 Phantoms and about 50 Zips, the
solution becomes obvious.
g_al...@hotmail.com
g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
> Exactly the techniques they used against the F-86s, if the Sabres were
> slower than about M0.7 (if they were faster, they'd just make slashing
> attacks).
Whoops. Make that "if the Sabres were _faster_ than M0.7, then they'd
turn with them. If the F-86s were slower, then they'd make slashing
attacks. Typing too fast.
Guy
g_al...@hotmail.com
thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
> C-2...@webtv.net (MARK ATKINS) wrote:
>
> >These replies on my F-104 posting have been very interesting, keep
them
> >coming! The USAF would have you think the F-4 was the only fighter of
> >the 1960's. This has really been eye opening.
>
> The F-4 might be considered the only USAF fighter of the early '70s,
> but there were some significant tactical aircraft in the '60s and they
> are fairly well recognized: F-105, F-100, F-8, A-4.
>
> > The USAF wasn't extremely happy with the F-4's performance in
air
> >to air in Vietnam. Why didn't the USAF give this experienced air to
air
> >Zipper unit more oppurtunities to engage MiG's? It may have boosted
up
> >the kill ratios.
>
> Why? How about short range,
Ed, Ed, Ed, we've been over these before. Short range? Comparable
range to the F-4 in the A/A role (actually better when combat is thrown
in, because the F-4 needs to use a lot more burner than the zip.
>limited low altitude capability,
Limited low altitude capability? I'm not sure what you're referring to
here; certainly not the a/c's performance. Its performance advantage
was greater compared to anything the VPAF had the lower you were. The
same goes for the F-105 and F-4. They all wanted to fight below 15,000
feet.
>minimal radar capability,
Minimal radar capability? So what? In the Rolling Thunder era, as I've
detailed in the past, the radar just didn't serve much purpose during
the detection phase of combat, because the VPAF was vectoring MiGs
around our MiGCAPs until they were behind them, or the MiGs were in
ground clutter. Certainly the F-8 pilots rarely used theirs except when
rendezvousing heading feet wet, and it didn't seem to affect their kill
rate any. Maybe because they spent more time practicing ACM tactics and
weapons employment than radar work.
As for finding tankers and the like, if you can't get within 20nm (max.
radar range scale in the 104A/C) of a tanker using TACAN/DF'ing or even
dead reckoning/pilotage, would they even let you in the cockpit? Over
NVN, how much time are you willing to spend with your head down in the
cockpit staring at a scope (in a single-seat bird), when the RWR is
buzzing continuously? If a pilot can spot your bird visually because of
your size and smoke before you can get him on radar, how much of an
advantage is the radar giving you for all the extra weight and lower
performance? From all the reading I've done, the answer in the Rolling
Thunder era is, it's not, compared to equal money spent on A/A training.
However, I realize this is less a discussion about practical
capabilities and more one of philosophy, so we ain't going to agree:-)
I also agree that, if you have good GCI/AEW radar coverage, then an
onboard radar (especially a Look-down one) can become far more
important. Even so, the USAF kill ratio was no better in LBI than it
was in RT, despite QRC-248, Combat Tree, dedicated A/A crews, and the
AIM-7E-2 and AIM-9E/J. The Navy's F-4 kill rate was improved, because
they spent the money on A/A training.
>limited procurement,
Sure. Because they couldn't see any need for a dedicated A/A bird.
Guess they changed their minds, as a result of combat experience.
>no BVR (or extended WVR) weapon
And in the entire Rolling Thunder period, there seems to have been
precisely two BVR kills, both navy. After some own goals, visual RoE
were in effect. Even the Bolo kills were all WVR. Nor were many of FQ
kills. Virtually all the kills were from the rear quarter, regardless
of what missile you were firing.
> , probe only refueling,
Of course, Lockheed had offered on numerous occasions to fit receptacles
to the Zips, but since the AF didn't like the AF, they weren't about to
spend any money retrofitting them, nor were they going to buy new a/c.
>limited weight lifting capability,
Certainly. For a dedicated A/A bird, so what?
> single mission capability (no re-roling flexibility),
Well, as far as USAF use is concerned, the F-104C has carried and
dropped/fired far more A/G ordnance in combat than the F-15A/C ever has
(Israel isn't so dumb). Are you suggesting that the F-15's dedicated
A/A mission and its lack of lack of re-roling flexibility (not because
of the a/c, because of the training) makes it unsuitable for the U.S.
Air Force? :-)
> no ECM or RWR?
More myth. As you know, the F-104 began to be fitted with RWRs by July
1966 (Delashaw rotated back to the states then, and has said that he
flew a couple of missions in an RWR-equipped bird before leaving), and
all a/c in theater were fitted by November or thereabouts (Remember I
once mentioned that my friend had interviewed the Lockheed tech rep who
was at Udorn at the time, and had examined and made copies of the
reports he'd sent back? In one dated late in the year, he'd mentioned
that they'd completed the project to fit RWRs sometime before that).
No ECM? Every widely available official USAF source you'll find says
that the F-104C couldn't carry pods. What I don't think i've
mentioned to you before is that the tech rep who was there at the time
said (and had the records to prove it) that they not only fitted QRC-160
pods to the C/L station and flew test missions, but that they'd actually
flown combat missions with pods (January 1967), which worked just fine.
But hey, who am I to argue with General Momyer, who among many others
states that the 104's lack of RWR and ECM was one of the many reasons he
decided not to use them in NVN:-) For that matter, in early 1967 the
F-4s were prevented from going into the target area in RP6 with the
Thuds. Why? Because there weren't enough pods to go around. F-105s
got them first, then the F-4s were fitted as more became available.
(IIRR, they weren't all fitted until June or July, but I'd have to check
the date).
<snip>
>
> > The Navy finally figured out how to fight close range with
the
> >F-4 before wars end, lots of vertical zoom tactics I believe. Sounds
> >like these F-104 guys knew all along how to fight a fast plane
against a
> >tight turning opponent. From what I have read the
USAF
> >F-4 community didn't figure it out till after the war.
>
> The 479th TFW and particularly the 435th TFS were leaders in
> development of Loose Deuce, Fluid Attack, Split Plane, Free/Engaged
> tactics. But, the majority of the AF was (unfortunately) restricted by
> a '50s training policy that minimized dissimilar A/A training. That
> was corrected when recognized mid-war by the development of Top Gun
> for USN and increased Fighter Weapons School A/A dissimilar training.
>
> Couple that with rapid development of improved weapons (AIM-9J,
> AIM-7E-2, LCOSS for later F-4s, NCTR, LES wing, enhanced GCI/DISCO)
> and you get the scenario of plenty of emphasis on improving A/A
> capability.
A/A equipment, yes. A/A training, no. AIM-9J pK, 4/31, 12.6%.
AIM-7E-2 even lower. Thid despite the AIM-9J only being issued to the
432nd TFW, who had the dedicated A/A role. On one mission, a 432nd
section took 8 AIM-9Js to shoot one MiG-21 in a high speed low
altitude 1g chase over NVN. What happened to the others? Well, some
went ballistic or went after the ground, but at least four were fired
out of range. Why? The AF had never tested the missiles at low
altitude, and they didn't know what the max. range was at such altitudes
(this, despite the fact that most MiG engagements had been at low
altitudes throughout the war).
MARK ATKINS
posts and a few personal E-mails I have received, so here is what I make
of it...
The F-104 was designed as a fast daytime, fair weather
interceptor. In the 1950's the M-61 gatling gun and two of the then new
Sidewinder missiles were a good combination for a dogfight.
It used its exceptional speed and climb rate for lots of
vertical manouvering. Now let me clarify what I meant by vertical zoom
tactics. I understand that air to air is 3D. There was a lack
of dissimilar air training in the F-4 communities. Vertical zoom was one
of several of the tactics the F-4s used when the importance of
dissimilar training was put back into the community. From what I've read
the vertical zoom tactics of the F-4 were a key part of their success in
the second half of the war. The F-104 guys (based on what you
all have told me) never got caught up in the missile intercept tactics
of the 1960's. One, they lacked the equipment and two just kept training
the old fashioned way, close quarter manouvering. (Sounds like with some
flaps they could turn okay, suprising and unsuspecting opponent). The
104 canopy provided pretty good visibility at the time.
The F-104 was not an ideal CAP aircraft for the Vietnam war.
What was needed was a plane that could carry a radar, weapons, fuel and
jammer pods and do something once it got into North Vietnam. Plus the
aircraft needed lots of room for growth for the electronic warfare gear
that was becoming more and more important.
The F-4 and F-105 were the right airplanes of the day, they did
all of the above. Plus its sounds like the high speed and low payload of
the 104 made it a not ideal choice for air to mud, which was needed in
Vietnam. F-4's did well in this role and hence the importance of the
F-105!
However before air to air tactics were put back into the F-4
syllabus, back in the days when the 104 was in Vietnam I wonder...
(Granted the 104 was short legged and didn't have much of a radar).
The NVAF figured out fairly quick the weaknesses of the F-4
and exploited them. BUT if we would have put more 104's on CAP
up North at that time, they would have been flying against the NVAF with
a whole different set of tactics than what the NVAF was getting used to.
With the close quarter ability already there, in the 104's, maybe the
engagements would have been more successful (in the early 60's).
Some of you seem to think the USAF didn't want older fighter
aircraft stealing the F-4's thunder. All comments welcomed! Did I learn
anything guys?
Thanks
MARK
Albert Cherer
I might have missed it. But last week on this thread I
asked was there any actual combat data from nations other than
the USA with versions of the F-104. The Nationalist Chinese
almost certainly battled with the Communist forces. Pakistani
F-104's certainly fought against Indian forces. Just real
curious.
AC
--
Albert Cherer
wal...@oneimage.com
>>I'm continually amazed at the assumption that military leadership
>wanders around with their head firmly planted up their posterior
>unaware of the "obvious". That might have been true of the political
>leadership of the Vietnam war, but not necessarily the military.
>
>interpretation of A/A. There are two things going on with a movement
>into the vertical. First is an exploitation of "radial G" or "God's
>G"--the enhanced turn rate/radius effect of adding one G effectively
>when a turn at a given speed and aircraft G load is made while
>inverted, i.e. a 5-G turn made inverted benefits from gravity to
>effectively create a 6-G turn rate/radius.
>
>And second, the recognition and application of the principle that
>effective offensive manuever is best accomplished outside the plane of
>motion of the defender, i.e. if the target is turning at best rate
>horizontally, don't tail chase him. Get out of his plane of motion and
>use 3D geometry to establish a lead pursuit curve. Reverse that for
>defense--if you are about to be shot, your best defense is to put your
>lift vector on the bandit and pull--that gives you the best angle
>generation to force the attacker into lag and outside your turn.
>
>And, note that none of this requires a Zipper. It works in any
>aircraft. Since we had about 1000 Phantoms and about 50 Zips, the
>solution becomes obvious.
>
> Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (ret)
>
Having more than one type of aircraft in the supply chain DOUBLES the
effort - the engines were the same name but not interchangeable, for one.
The F4 could do everything the 104 could and more, much more if you consider
CAS and mud-pounding. We often flew with 18x500# MK82s aboard. more than any
B17 or B24 ever carried.
Ed's right on the money when he hits air to air training. When I went from
ADC/104 to TAC/F4 my TAC colleageues where amazed at how much I went vertical/
out of plane on them - and after awhile they caught on. Too much 'safety',
too many safety rules, (we can't hazard safety!) and it took a few losses in
VietNam to correct that peacetime mind-set.
ATC was even worse - they never ever taught students to fly to the aircraft's
limits/envelope.
ADC was about as bad - because someone pitched up a 101 trying to do a loop
all ADC fighters were prohibited from doing loops, even the F102 and F106. Thank
God I was at that time a 1Lt in a 102 outfit infested by WW2 P47 and P51 combat
vets who insisted us newbies learn the fighter game. ANd taught us that we weren't
really fighter pilots until we could fly our airplane to its limits, not some
artificial parameters set out by some bozo sitting behind a desk far up the chain of
command.
F104 was a lovely airplane and I loved flying it but when the sun went down or it
became IFR the Zipper was barely adequate - an F102 was more capable at night because
of its radar/IR systems. The F4 was a much more flexible aircraft even though it didn't
have the superlative acceleration and zoom of the 104. But it could carry 8 missiles and
had a hell of a good radar system, even better than the F102's (The F4D did, anyway; the
F4E's was about the same as the F102/MG10 in target detection).
Big thing was training, or tha lack of proper training. Thank God USAF now has Red
Flag, etc, and dissimilar ACT. I hope they never have to give that sort of training up
because of 'too many accidents'. There's always going to be some losses; the only way to
prevent accidents is lock the airplanes up in the hangar!
Always remember: you gotta train the way you're gonna fight!
Ed Rasimus
>In article <375925fb...@news.rmi.net>,
> thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
>> Why? How about short range,
>
>Ed, Ed, Ed, we've been over these before. Short range? Comparable
>range to the F-4 in the A/A role (actually better when combat is thrown
>in, because the F-4 needs to use a lot more burner than the zip.
Comparable range to the F-4, possibly--if you are pulling -1
performance data and the scenario is high-mid-high. But in reality the
requirement for A/A profile in Rolling Thunder (which admittedly could
have been tactically wrong!) was low. Caps and escorts were required
to support the entire strike package which usually consisted of 4 or 5
flights of four in trail and a requirement to be across the Red for
20-25 minutes.
>
>>limited low altitude capability,
>
>Limited low altitude capability? I'm not sure what you're referring to
>here; certainly not the a/c's performance. Its performance advantage
>was greater compared to anything the VPAF had the lower you were. The
>same goes for the F-105 and F-4. They all wanted to fight below 15,000
>feet.
The wing loading of the 104 makes it an extremely poor turning
aircraft at low altitude. During the Rolling Thunder period the
predominant opposing aircraft was the MiG-17, a very small aircraft
with exceptional turn rate/radius figures. The choice becomes turning
at "my best" which in a 104 (or 105) meant 500 KIAS/.9M in which case
the MiG is always inside your turning circle and often disappears from
view, or slowing to the "MiG best" which is around 300 KIAS at which
point the little bird has your lunch.
"They all wanted to fight below 15,000 feet" because that was where
the MiG were and they were there because that was where the strike
aircraft were and the strikers were there because that was where they
had the Ps to operate and survive the defenses while acquiring the
targets.
>
>>minimal radar capability,
>
>Minimal radar capability? So what? In the Rolling Thunder era, as I've
>detailed in the past, the radar just didn't serve much purpose during
>the detection phase of combat, because the VPAF was vectoring MiGs
>around our MiGCAPs until they were behind them, or the MiGs were in
>ground clutter. Certainly the F-8 pilots rarely used theirs except when
>rendezvousing heading feet wet, and it didn't seem to affect their kill
>rate any. Maybe because they spent more time practicing ACM tactics and
>weapons employment than radar work.
The F-8 is a non-starter in the debate because although ratios of
exchange are high, number of kills for the F-8 are so small as to be
insignificant.
And, we discussed radar application in the past. Statistics about MiG
kills and radar detection don't address the day-in/day-out use of the
radar for arena awareness, navigation, mutual support and overall SA.
I wouldn't have wanted to be downtown without my radar in either the
105 or F-4.
>
> Over
>NVN, how much time are you willing to spend with your head down in the
>cockpit staring at a scope (in a single-seat bird), when the RWR is
>buzzing continuously?
If you're saying pilot workload in combat is high, I agree. But, if
you're putting forth a "F-100 perspective" ala Robin Olds that we
don't have time for technology because we're busy looking out the
window, I've got to disagree. (You might also acknowledge how much
time is spent "head down in the cockpit" in an F-15.)
Experience RWR audio interpretation made it very easy to distinguish
between noise and actual launch notification.
> If a pilot can spot your bird visually because of
>your size and smoke before you can get him on radar, how much of an
>advantage is the radar giving you for all the extra weight and lower
>performance? From all the reading I've done, the answer in the Rolling
>Thunder era is, it's not, compared to equal money spent on A/A training.
Duh. I certainly wished I had more A/A training, but there wouldn't be
adequate time or money to balance the loss of my radar in either
aircraft I flew combat in.
>
>>limited procurement,
>
>Sure. Because they couldn't see any need for a dedicated A/A bird.
>Guess they changed their minds, as a result of combat experience.
I'm still not sure that the dedicated A/A--dedicated A/G philosophy is
correct. It seemed to work for the USN, but they've now begun to fog
the dividing line between A's and F's. My philosophy was always that
"A/A is something a fighter pilot does on his way to and from the
target."
>
>>no BVR (or extended WVR) weapon
>
>And in the entire Rolling Thunder period, there seems to have been
>precisely two BVR kills, both navy. After some own goals, visual RoE
>were in effect. Even the Bolo kills were all WVR. Nor were many of FQ
>kills. Virtually all the kills were from the rear quarter, regardless
>of what missile you were firing.
You're right about BVR, but extended WVR was the modus operandi of
Ritchie. Fighting aircraft with 20 degree per second turn rates using
Zippers with 8-10 degrees per second at engagement altitudes and with
weaponry requiring a low aspect/short range shot wouldn't be very
effective.
>
>>limited weight lifting capability,
>
>Certainly. For a dedicated A/A bird, so what?
Gas or weapons and no ability to flex roles. That just didn't make
sense.
>
>
>> single mission capability (no re-roling flexibility),
>
>Well, as far as USAF use is concerned, the F-104C has carried and
>dropped/fired far more A/G ordnance in combat than the F-15A/C ever has
>(Israel isn't so dumb). Are you suggesting that the F-15's dedicated
>A/A mission and its lack of lack of re-roling flexibility (not because
>of the a/c, because of the training) makes it unsuitable for the U.S.
>Air Force? :-)
It would have made the F-15 unsuitable in SEA.
>
>> no ECM or RWR?
>
>More myth. As you know, the F-104 began to be fitted with RWRs by July
>1966 (Delashaw rotated back to the states then, and has said that he
>flew a couple of missions in an RWR-equipped bird before leaving), and
>all a/c in theater were fitted by November or thereabouts (Remember I
>once mentioned that my friend had interviewed the Lockheed tech rep who
>was at Udorn at the time, and had examined and made copies of the
>reports he'd sent back? In one dated late in the year, he'd mentioned
>that they'd completed the project to fit RWRs sometime before that).
And, you'll recall my recounting the double loss of 104's on the West
side of Thud Ridge in late summer of '66 that resulted in 7AF decision
to restrict the aircraft from Route Pack VI. And, my experience flying
"Poor man's Weasel" with a flight of 2 F-105s (at least one of which
had APR 25/26) in support of 4 flights of 4 Zippers, each armed with
2x750 pound bombs in Route Pack I and II. After supporting each of
them for their five minute TOT recce period we still had 25 minutes of
our own armed recce time available to expend our loads of 6x500 or
4xLAU-3.
As of November '66 when my tour in 105s ended the Zips were still not
authorized for penetration of SAM country.
>
>No ECM? Every widely available official USAF source you'll find says
>that the F-104C couldn't carry pods. What I don't think i've
>mentioned to you before is that the tech rep who was there at the time
>said (and had the records to prove it) that they not only fitted QRC-160
>pods to the C/L station and flew test missions, but that they'd actually
>flown combat missions with pods (January 1967), which worked just fine.
>But hey, who am I to argue with General Momyer, who among many others
>states that the 104's lack of RWR and ECM was one of the many reasons he
>decided not to use them in NVN:-) For that matter, in early 1967 the
>F-4s were prevented from going into the target area in RP6 with the
>Thuds. Why? Because there weren't enough pods to go around. F-105s
>got them first, then the F-4s were fitted as more became available.
>(IIRR, they weren't all fitted until June or July, but I'd have to check
>the date).
By November of '66 I had completed 110 combat missions (100 North) in
the 105 and NEVER once carried a pod. By the first week of November
only Tahkli had pods available, we didn't even have them at Korat. So
where (and why) would anyone load a precious pod on a Zipper in
January '67? As you correctly state, there weren't enough to go around
and even the F-4s were still awaiting the equipment.
>
>>
>> The 479th TFW and particularly the 435th TFS were leaders in
>> development of Loose Deuce, Fluid Attack, Split Plane, Free/Engaged
>> tactics. But, the majority of the AF was (unfortunately) restricted by
>> a '50s training policy that minimized dissimilar A/A training. That
>> was corrected when recognized mid-war by the development of Top Gun
>> for USN and increased Fighter Weapons School A/A dissimilar training.
>>
>> Couple that with rapid development of improved weapons (AIM-9J,
>> AIM-7E-2, LCOSS for later F-4s, NCTR, LES wing, enhanced GCI/DISCO)
>> and you get the scenario of plenty of emphasis on improving A/A
>> capability.
>
>A/A equipment, yes. A/A training, no. AIM-9J pK, 4/31, 12.6%.
>AIM-7E-2 even lower. Thid despite the AIM-9J only being issued to the
>432nd TFW, who had the dedicated A/A role. On one mission, a 432nd
>section took 8 AIM-9Js to shoot one MiG-21 in a high speed low
>altitude 1g chase over NVN. What happened to the others? Well, some
>went ballistic or went after the ground, but at least four were fired
>out of range. Why? The AF had never tested the missiles at low
>altitude, and they didn't know what the max. range was at such altitudes
>(this, despite the fact that most MiG engagements had been at low
>altitudes throughout the war).
I'm not sure where the info about "AIM-9J only being issued to the
432nd" comes from. I carried J-birds out of Korat in 72-73--it was
easy to identify the J since it was the first one with the "bent"
front wings.
Keep in mind that even in Linebacker the AF was still suffering from
the "interchangeable pilot" syndrome that was pumping retread bomber,
transport and staff pilots into the fighter pipeline. There was a wide
range of capability in all units in theater ranging from brand new UPT
grads through high time fighter guys with multiple tours. It isn't
surprising that an element (we don't call them "sections" in the AF)
would virtually salvo on one of those rare days that the MiGs ventured
forth.
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
wal...@oneimage.com
> All comments welcomed! Did I learn
>anything guys?>Thanks>MARK
Comments:
Pretty good.
You forgot the contributions of Robert McNamara and the
"Gradual Escalation" strategy's effect on the air war
quinnc...@hotmail.com
>... Just got me to wondering, how was the F-104 in a 1 vs 1
engagement? ... could it turn well?
Did some 1 v 1 against the German Naval F-104 variant in training over
the North Sea years ago.
That 104 version turned just like the F-105G that I was flying (i.e.,
not very well). It was great to finally find a fighter that the Thud-G
could keep up with in a maneuvering engagement.
Like the Thud, the 104 was built for speed-- not turns.
wal...@oneimage.com
>g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:>
>>In article <375925fb...@news.rmi.net>,
>> thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
>
>
>>> Why? How about short range,
>>
>>Ed, Ed, Ed, we've been over these before. Short range? Comparable
>>range to the F-4 in the A/A role (actually better when combat is thrown
>>in, because the F-4 needs to use a lot more burner than the zip.
incompatible with F4 'boomed' tankers.
>performance data and the scenario is high-mid-high. But in reality the
>requirement for A/A profile in Rolling Thunder (which admittedly could
>have been tactically wrong!) was low. Caps and escorts were required
>to support the entire strike package which usually consisted of 4 or 5
>flights of four in trail and a requirement to be across the Red for
>20-25 minutes.
mistake LW/Goering made in BoB. Roaming air superioity under GCI control
would have made life tough for MiGs.
>>>limited low altitude capability,
>>BJ again: I don't understand this comment. Sure, radar got a little
cluttered at low altitude but what radar didn't until MTI or pulse-doppler?
>>here; certainly not the a/c's performance. Its performance advantage
>>was greater compared to anything the VPAF had the lower you were. The
>>same goes for the F-105 and F-4. They all wanted to fight below 15,000
>>feet.
>The wing loading of the 104 makes it an extremely poor turning
>aircraft at low altitude. During the Rolling Thunder period the
>predominant opposing aircraft was the MiG-17, a very small aircraft
>with exceptional turn rate/radius figures. The choice becomes turning
>at "my best" which in a 104 (or 105) meant 500 KIAS/.9M in which case
>the MiG is always inside your turning circle and often disappears from
>view, or slowing to the "MiG best" which is around 300 KIAS at which
>point the little bird has your lunch.
Still won't outturn a MiG17 but what will even come close besides an AT37?
Our tactic would have been a climbing spiral with 550 KIAS plus (plus-plus)
and at least enough G to keep ot of guns until the MiG topped off and then
honk(slice) back around onto his tail. Worked fine on 106s.
>"They all wanted to fight below 15,000 feet" because that was where
>the MiG were and they were there because that was where the strike
>aircraft were and the strikers were there because that was where they
>had the Ps to operate and survive the defenses while acquiring the
>targets.
>>
>>>minimal radar capability,
superb - good outfits) the F4D (better than the deuce) and the F4E(not as good
as the Deuce) I consider the F104A's radar, while smple, still a most worthwhile
adjunct and capable in the hands of a trained pilot. It was very simple to read,
to interpret, and to use. The gunsight was better than the F4E by far.
>>Minimal radar capability? So what? In the Rolling Thunder era, as I've
>>detailed in the past, the radar just didn't serve much purpose during
>>the detection phase of combat, because the VPAF was vectoring MiGs
>>around our MiGCAPs until they were behind them, or the MiGs were in
>>ground clutter.
under threat from teh time they taxied . . .
>>rendezvousing heading feet wet, and it didn't seem to affect their kill
>>rate any. Maybe because they spent more time practicing ACM tactics and
>>weapons employment than radar work.
>
>The F-8 is a non-starter in the debate because although ratios of
>exchange are high, number of kills for the F-8 are so small as to be
>insignificant.
Ed's remark below concerning pilots. train, train, train.
>And, we discussed radar application in the past. Statistics about MiG
>kills and radar detection don't address the day-in/day-out use of the
>radar for arena awareness, navigation, mutual support and overall SA.
>I wouldn't have wanted to be downtown without my radar in either the
>105 or F-4.
>> Over NVN, how much time are you willing to spend with your head down in the
>>cockpit staring at a scope (in a single-seat bird), when the RWR is
>>buzzing continuously?
staring is only done when one is trying to get that guy a hundred miles out. The
20-mie contacts show up nicely on a quick 'eyeball' scan.
>If you're saying pilot workload in combat is high, I agree. But, if
>you're putting forth a "F-100 perspective" ala Robin Olds that we
>don't have time for technology because we're busy looking out the
>window, I've got to disagree. (You might also acknowledge how much
>time is spent "head down in the cockpit" in an F-15.)
six-shooters days of the calvary. You gotta use evryhting you have to
best of its (ITS, not yours) ability. If you can;t do that you haven't
trained enough to know and to use your equipment and you're not earning
your paycheck. (One of BJ's maxims)
>
>Experienced RWR audio interpretation made it very easy to distinguish
>between noise and actual launch notification.
after the SA2-E(?) optical mode was added.
>>your size and smoke before you can get him on radar, how much of an
>>advantage is the radar giving you for all the extra weight and lower
>>performance? From all the reading I've done, the answer in the Rolling
>>Thunder era is, it's not, compared to equal money spent on A/A training.
detect the 18 FBW F86Fs on radar before they saw us visually. Then followed
a stern conversion and one .9 Mach deep-six bounce in Ab and an immediate
RTB because we were bingo fuel.
>Duh. I certainly wished I had more A/A training, but there wouldn't be
>adequate time or money to balance the loss of my radar in either
>aircraft I flew combat in.
or night or night weather?
>>>limited procurement,
>>
>>Sure. Because they couldn't see any need for a dedicated A/A bird.
>>Guess they changed their minds, as a result of combat experience.
missiles; all it needs is a) good maintenance all around including the
missiles and b) AA capable crews. Consider that a high-altitude engagement
is going to be a medium to low altitude engagement in but a few turns if
indeed it lasts that long. If the missiles don;t kill and a subsequent gun
pass doesn't kill the best tactic IMHO is to disengage and then decide what
to do as a follow-up. Belive me, aircraft standing on a wingtip are visible
for 20 miles around and draw other fighters like honey draws flies. And you
have no idea which side they'll be one, either.
>I'm still not sure that the dedicated A/A--dedicated A/G philosophy is
>correct. It seemed to work for the USN, but they've now begun to fog
>the dividing line between A's and F's. My philosophy was always that
>"A/A is something a fighter pilot does on his way to and from the
>target."
>>>no BVR (or extended WVR) weapon
>>
>>And in the entire Rolling Thunder period, there seems to have been
>>precisely two BVR kills, both navy. After some own goals, visual RoE
>>were in effect. Even the Bolo kills were all WVR. Nor were many of FQ
>>kills. Virtually all the kills were from the rear quarter, regardless
>>of what missile you were firing.
>
>You're right about BVR, but extended WVR was the modus operandi of
>Ritchie. Fighting aircraft with 20 degree per second turn rates using
>Zippers with 8-10 degrees per second at engagement altitudes and with
>weaponry requiring a low aspect/short range shot wouldn't be very
>effective.
followed by a 3 second burst of 20mm/M61 and RTB.
>
>>>limited weight lifting capability,
>>
>>Certainly. For a dedicated A/A bird, so what?
>
>Gas or weapons and no ability to flex roles. That just didn't make
>sense.
line of supply items when the F4 could do it 'good enough'?
>>
>>> single mission capability (no re-roling flexibility),
>>
>>Well, as far as USAF use is concerned, the F-104C has carried and
>>dropped/fired far more A/G ordnance in combat than the F-15A/C ever has
>>(Israel isn't so dumb). Are you suggesting that the F-15's dedicated
>>A/A mission and its lack of lack of re-roling flexibility (not because
>>of the a/c, because of the training) makes it unsuitable for the U.S.
>>Air Force? :-)
>
>It would have made the F-15 unsuitable in SEA.
>>> no ECM or RWR?
>>
>>More myth. As you know, the F-104 began to be fitted with RWRs by July
>>1966 (Delashaw rotated back to the states then, and has said that he
>>flew a couple of missions in an RWR-equipped bird before leaving), and
>>all a/c in theater were fitted by November or thereabouts (Remember I
>>once mentioned that my friend had interviewed the Lockheed tech rep who
>>was at Udorn at the time, and had examined and made copies of the
>>reports he'd sent back? In one dated late in the year, he'd mentioned
>>that they'd completed the project to fit RWRs sometime before that).
>
>And, you'll recall my recounting the double loss of 104's on the West
>side of Thud Ridge in late summer of '66 that resulted in 7AF decision
>to restrict the aircraft from Route Pack VI. And, my experience flying
>"Poor man's Weasel" with a flight of 2 F-105s (at least one of which
>had APR 25/26) in support of 4 flights of 4 Zippers, each armed with
>2x750 pound bombs in Route Pack I and II. After supporting each of
>them for their five minute TOT recce period we still had 25 minutes of
>our own armed recce time available to expend our loads of 6x500 or
>4xLAU-3.
and lives just for 'sortie count' 16 104s at 2 bombs apiece is 32 bombs;
gee, I remember at least a dozen missions where our 3 F4s carried 18x500
apiece, that's 3 aircraft and 48 Mk82s plus 3 guns . . .
to train us in the 'old-fashioned' stuff. I can well remeber when we were
all advised to get out of fighters and into missiles for career progression.
(It is to barf . .)
>>> Couple that with rapid development of improved weapons (AIM-9J,
>>> AIM-7E-2, LCOSS for later F-4s, NCTR, LES wing, enhanced GCI/DISCO)
>>> and you get the scenario of plenty of emphasis on improving A/A
>>> capability.
>>
>>A/A equipment, yes. A/A training, no. AIM-9J pK, 4/31, 12.6%.
>>AIM-7E-2 even lower. Thid despite the AIM-9J only being issued to the
>>432nd TFW, who had the dedicated A/A role. On one mission, a 432nd
>>section took 8 AIM-9Js to shoot one MiG-21 in a high speed low
>>altitude 1g chase over NVN. What happened to the others? Well, some
>>went ballistic or went after the ground, but at least four were fired
>>out of range. Why? The AF had never tested the missiles at low
>>altitude, and they didn't know what the max. range was at such altitudes
>>(this, despite the fact that most MiG engagements had been at low
>>altitudes throughout the war).
of course, that being our primary weapon. The 319th had a copy of the USN
AIMB envelopes and we weer amazed at its rather stringent limitations against
a truning target and at low altitude and especially low alt/high speed targets
around .9 M
>I'm not sure where the info about "AIM-9J only being issued to the
>432nd" comes from. I carried J-birds out of Korat in 72-73--it was
>easy to identify the J since it was the first one with the "bent"
>front wings.
>
>Keep in mind that even in Linebacker the AF was still suffering from
>the "interchangeable pilot" syndrome that was pumping retread bomber,
>transport and staff pilots into the fighter pipeline. There was a wide
>range of capability in all units in theater ranging from brand new UPT
>grads through high time fighter guys with multiple tours. It isn't
>surprising that an element (we don't call them "sections" in the AF)
>would virtually salvo on one of those rare days that the MiGs ventured
>forth.
>BJ: Yes, and USAF HQ has a lot to answer for. A B52 or 141 or ATC pilot
who has only 140 hours of F4 time and a basic exposition to fighter flying
had no business going into combat. Granted, some of them did a good job
and most did an acceptable job - but in the 366 TFW in early 72 all three
TFSs were critically short of flight leaders - my 390th had 4 including me.
For example, I had more fighter time than the aggregate flying time of all
5 front-seaters in 'C' flight. It is a damn wonder we didn't lose more just
to non-combat accidents alone.
added together.
Two Wheels
I noticed that you skipped the F-101. Any reason?
Steve Evans
Ed Rasimus wrote:
g_al...@hotmail.com
thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
> g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> >In article <375925fb...@news.rmi.net>,
> > thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
>
> >> Why? How about short range,
> >
> >Ed, Ed, Ed, we've been over these before. Short range? Comparable
> >range to the F-4 in the A/A role (actually better when combat is
thrown
> >in, because the F-4 needs to use a lot more burner than the zip.
>
> Comparable range to the F-4, possibly--if you are pulling -1
> performance data and the scenario is high-mid-high. But in reality the
> requirement for A/A profile in Rolling Thunder (which admittedly could
> have been tactically wrong!) was low. Caps and escorts were required
> to support the entire strike package which usually consisted of 4 or 5
> flights of four in trail and a requirement to be across the Red for
> 20-25 minutes.
Ed, Tom Delashaw flew both a/c in combat. He did mission planning for
both. He went into RP6 in the F-104C and probably in the F-4 (I'm not
sure just when his F-4 time was. It might have been during the bombing
halt). He has stated that the ranges were comparable given actual
profiles, with the 104 coming out ahead as soon as any turning and
burning was done (because the 104 was much cleaner and maintained speed
better in a high speed turn than the F-4). When you add the most
effective A/A weapon of the RT era to the F-4, the 104 really
comes out ahead, because the F-4C/D has to give up 600 gallons of
gas and add a lot of drag to carry the gun pod. Without having the
-1-1s before me, I can't give you exact figures, so unless Walt has
-1-1s for both a/c, I submit we'll have to take Tom's word on
this. I do have some profiles for the 104C that a friend who does have
the -1 for the a/c did for me, and as Tom said, the ranges are
comparable.
>
> >>limited low altitude capability,
> >
> >Limited low altitude capability? I'm not sure what you're referring
to
> >here; certainly not the a/c's performance. Its performance advantage
> >was greater compared to anything the VPAF had the lower you were.
The
> >same goes for the F-105 and F-4. They all wanted to fight below
15,000
> >feet.
>
> The wing loading of the 104 makes it an extremely poor turning
> aircraft at low altitude. During the Rolling Thunder period the
> predominant opposing aircraft was the MiG-17, a very small aircraft
> with exceptional turn rate/radius figures. The choice becomes turning
> at "my best" which in a 104 (or 105) meant 500 KIAS/.9M in which case
> the MiG is always inside your turning circle and often disappears from
> view, or slowing to the "MiG best" which is around 300 KIAS at which
> point the little bird has your lunch.
Let's leave aside the question of exactly how many kills air force a/c
scored against MiG-17s by out-turning them (well ok, the answer's
'zero'). Nevertheless, we had an excellent kill/loss ratio against the
MiG-17, because all the AF a/c were so much faster than it was, and it
didn't carry missiles in the RT era.
Let's see what the Featherduster reports had to say about the F-86H's
(MiG-17 simulator) turning advantage over the F-104C at low altitude
(paraphrased from the actual reports in an article a friend wrote):
"Post-test Sabre conclusions:
"The F-86 pilots provided the following comments about their
experiences:
"They found that the superior speed and acceleration of the F-104 made
detected intercepts [of the 104] impossible. A minimal amount of
jinking by the F-104 combined with their quick acceleration resulted in
quick separations. Defending F-86s, in all cases, had to break hard to
get out of the way of a high speed stern attack. To reverse and
attemopt a kill on the passing attackers was all but impossible. It is
also noteworthy that a hard turn WOULD NOT FOIL THE F-104'S TRACKING
[emphasis added]. In almost all cases the separation tactics of the
Starfighters were effective, the exception being when the F-104 pilots
tried climbing out too soon and presented a blue sky background for a
potential missile kill [happened exactly once according to Delashaw].
"The Sabre pilots also felt that the Starfighter showed A DEFINITE
ABILITY TO ENGAGE IN A TURNING FIGHT AT LOW ALTITUDE [emphasis added].
The Sabres were unable to close on the F-104s in their turns, even
though their turn circles were much smaller. Trying to cut across the
circle proved impossible against the Starfighter. Keeping visual sight
of the F-104s was difficult. They did note that often the F-104 pilots
had the same problem and sometimes lost sight of each other, causing a
breakdown in mutual support [note, the 104s were using DA, which the
F-86s weren't used to]. . . .
"Most significantly, they felt the F-104C was the superior aircraft seen
to date in these series of tests (the Sabres had already been pitted
against F-100s, F-105s, F-4s, and F-102s by that time). They said it
was able to engage in a turning fight and come out relatively unscathed,
that it could power out of potentially critical situations, and that its
use of high-G turns at high Mach numbers was a significant factor in all
engagements.
"Post-test Starfighter conclusions: For their part, the F-104 jocks had
a lot to smile about. Against the Sabres, they found they could engage
or disengage virtually at will. They found they could track an F-86 in
a hard turn by utilizing takeoff flaps (15 degrees) and full A/B down to
about 450 kts and at all altitudes from 500' to 10,000'. Their small
profile and zooms to high altitudes made it difficult for Sabres to keep
them in sight and allowed them to achieve many unobserved six o'clock
passes from high above. . . .
"Tom Delashaw's comments: Tom confirms that the Starfighter jocks had
more trouble seeing each other than seeing the Sabres. He explains
that, at 0.9 to 1.0 Mach and below 5,000 feet, an F-104 could sustain
turns of up to 7.33g (its structural limit), but those were seldom used
because above 5g, the Starfighter encountered buffeting which made
tracking very difficult. Take-off flaps were utilized as maneuver flaps
very often. . . He emphasizes the Starfighters only turned with the
Sabres when the F-86s were fast (> 0.7 Mach), and utilized slashing
attacks otherwise. On the defensive they didn't turn much and utilized
small jinks and roll reversals to foil Sabre tracking until they were
out of range. Tom says that the Sabre pilots were suckers for this and
he found that ironic since the Sabre community had used the same
strategy against slower-rolling MiGs over Korea a decade earlier.
"The 479th TFW, of which Tom was the Wing Weapons Officer, was the first
F-104 Wing [actually the only TAC wing] to adopt the 'double attack'
strategy. This tactic was perfect for the F-104, according to Tom, . .
. since a crucial requirement in its execution is the ability to
disengage from a fight -- which the Starfighter could do almost at will
against any opponent in existence at the time."
>
> "They all wanted to fight below 15,000 feet" because that was where
> the MiG were and they were there because that was where the strike
> aircraft were and the strikers were there because that was where they
> had the Ps to operate and survive the defenses while acquiring the
> targets.
And because we had the greatest Ps advantage below 15kft, vis a vis the
MiGs.
> >
> >>minimal radar capability,
> >
> >Minimal radar capability? So what? In the Rolling Thunder era, as
I've
> >detailed in the past, the radar just didn't serve much purpose during
> >the detection phase of combat, because the VPAF was vectoring MiGs
> >around our MiGCAPs until they were behind them, or the MiGs were in
> >ground clutter. Certainly the F-8 pilots rarely used theirs except
when
> >rendezvousing heading feet wet, and it didn't seem to affect their
kill
> >rate any. Maybe because they spent more time practicing ACM tactics
and
> >weapons employment than radar work.
>
> The F-8 is a non-starter in the debate because although ratios of
> exchange are high, number of kills for the F-8 are so small as to be
> insignificant.
But kills per engagement is most definitely not insignificant, as is the
percentage of in the envelope missile firings, and the F-8s are far
above the F-4s of either service, or the F-105s.
> And, we discussed radar application in the past. Statistics about MiG
> kills and radar detection don't address the day-in/day-out use of the
> radar for arena awareness, navigation, mutual support and overall SA.
> I wouldn't have wanted to be downtown without my radar in either the
> 105 or F-4.
And the F-104C had an easy to use radar. If you want a more powerful
one (although many of its features are wasted in SEA) then we could have
used F-104Gs, which had the same weapon system you had in your Thud.
> >
> > Over
> >NVN, how much time are you willing to spend with your head down in
the
> >cockpit staring at a scope (in a single-seat bird), when the RWR is
> >buzzing continuously?
>
> If you're saying pilot workload in combat is high, I agree. But, if
> you're putting forth a "F-100 perspective" ala Robin Olds that we
> don't have time for technology because we're busy looking out the
> window, I've got to disagree. (You might also acknowledge how much
> time is spent "head down in the cockpit" in an F-15.)
Sure, with the benefit of AWACS cueing, and a nice PD radar, neither of
which was vaialbable in the RT era. Would you do that in an environment
where you didn't have those features?
>
> Experience RWR audio interpretation made it very easy to distinguish
> between noise and actual launch notification.
There seems to be a considerable amount of disagreement among pilots as
to how useful the APR-25/26 was in the high threat areas. On one hand
are pilots like Ed who wanted all the info they could get, and didn't
feel overloaded by the continuous noise and near-saturated scope of the
APR-25 in RP6, and the APR-26 squealing away. On the other side are
pilots who felt that, in RP6 at least, the APR-25 was like the dog that
barks all the time and never shuts up. Olds' shut the audio off
completely when entering the high-threat area. Maybe it's just a
question of high-frequency hearing loss in his case leading to loss of
discrimination, but I've also read accounts by pilots who were Ed's age
at the time who felt the same way. Out of RP6, they felt it was useful,
because some discrimination was possible. Inside, it was like an
oversensitive car alarm, it was too distracting, and didn't provide
enough useful info: "I know they're all looking at me and shooting; I
want to keep my head up and out for maximum warning."
>
> > If a pilot can spot your bird visually because of
> >your size and smoke before you can get him on radar, how much of an
> >advantage is the radar giving you for all the extra weight and lower
> >performance? From all the reading I've done, the answer in the
Rolling
> >Thunder era is, it's not, compared to equal money spent on A/A
training.
>
> Duh. I certainly wished I had more A/A training, but there wouldn't be
> adequate time or money to balance the loss of my radar in either
> aircraft I flew combat in.
No one's suggesting you lose your radar completely, Ed. If you don't
consider the ASG-14 in the 104C adequate, then the R-14A from the G is
available.
OK, let's look at some stats from the RT period to see which weapons are
most effective, specifically March-June '67, when the MiGs were up in
force (110 engagements in May alone), two flights of F-4s were being
used as dedicated escorts for each strike package (the 366th had to be
brought in because the 8th couldn't meet all the commitments, and they
introduced the gun pod for A/A), and the F-104s were available in
theater but were being used for CAS carrying two bombs.
Man.* Gun AIM-9 AIM-9/Gun AIM-7
Total U.S. kill claims: 38 1 17 10 1 7
F-105 kill claims: 18 15 2 1 -
F-4C/D kill claims: 20 1 4* 8 - 7
*Maneuvering
*Only 366th carried
gun pods at this time,
starting in May.
Looking at this list, its clear that the gun is the most effective
weapon, followed by the AIM-9, with the AIM-7 bringing up the rear.
None of the AIM-7 shots were BVR, and in fact most were from visual
pickups leading to boresight lock-ons and a return to full-system for
the shot (I know Bob Titus' and Robin Olds' kills were of this variety)
When one considers just how useless the AIM-9B was if the target saw you
coming, the AIM-9B's numbers are even more astonishing. The 105 had a
higher pK than the F-4 with the AIM-9B, presumably because it was
usually hauling ass and took unobserved shots.
pKs during this period varied similarly; the F-105 got about .28
with the gun (large number, although not so many shots as
previously, were being taken without a gunsight compared to previously,
as more F-105s were being used loaded A/A as escorts, or tasked as such
coming off the target); the F-4 with gun pod got a pK of .55, despite
the lack of an LCOSS on the F-4C. One has to assume that the Thuds
would have been just as good if they weren't usually set up for bombing,
as the F-4E also got a .50 pK during 1972.
The AIM-9B was next in effectiveness, with about .15, right on its
average for the RT period. The AIM-7, as usual, brought up the rear
with about half that, .08-.085. It was essentially useless against the
MiG-17s at low altitude because of clutter, but was often used because
of the AIM-9B's non-existent envelope against a maneuvering target, and
the F-4s mostly didn't have guns.
If they'd carried guns instead of AIM-7s, then whatever kills they might
have missed through not having the AIM-7 would have been more than made
up by gun kills. When the 366th asked for permission to carry gun pods
for A/A missions, they stated that "This Wing has lost a minimum of 7
kills in the past ten days because of the lack of a kill capability
below 2000 feet altitude and inside 2,500 feet range [i.e. exactly where
the MiG-17s were usually found]," and that they considered the gun "the
only air to air weapon that can be employed against a very low altitude
target."
Checking this, let's see how the units' kills stack up in this period (I
realize that luck plays a significant part in this):
355th, 15 kills, 13 gun, 2 AIM-9.
366th, 11 kills, 1 maneuvering, 4 gun, 2 AIM-9, 4 AIM-7 (only one of the
AIM-7 kills came after gun pods started to be carried. That was Bob
Titus's kill, and he wasn't carrying a gun pod on the day he got it.)
8th, 9 kills, 6 AIM-9, 3 AIM-7 (not carrying guns in this period).
388th, 3 kills, 2 gun, 1 AIM-9/gun
So, summarizing,
Total Man. Gun AIM-9 AIM-9/Gun AIM-7
F-105 MiG-17 kills 18 - 15 2 1 -
F-4C/D MiG-17 kills 13 1 3 5 - 4
F-4C/D MiG-21 kills 7 - 1 3 - 3
May was the heaviest month of the period, and we suffered 3 A/A losses,
all F-4s to MiG-17s. The point of all this is that the weapon of choice
is the internal gun (because it doesn't add drag and is more accurate)
used with an LCOSS, backed up by the AIM-9. The AIM-7 is normally used
in lieu of a gun, because it has a higher launch g limit than the
AIM-9B. However, its pK is roughly 1/3rd - 1/7th that of a gun, so
where's the justification for carrying it, given the RoE and tactical
sitaution? Oh, and the F-105's turning disadvantage against the MiG-17
doesn't seem to have been a problem, does it? We stayed fast, and
killed them while they were unable to respond.
Ok, as far as the MiG-17 goes, an A/A-dedicated F-105 is clearly the
weapon of choice over the F-4C (in the RT period), because it's got an
internal gun backed up by a simple, quick to fire missile for sneak
shots. The 105's speed helps it make unobserved missile/gun attacks,
and makes return shots problematic at best. These same advantages are
also held by the F-104, with the addition of smaller size (better chance
of surprise) and better turning/climb at combat speeds.
The 105 is not the a/c of choice against the MiG-21, which scored 15-0
against it throughout the war. The 105 is faster flat out, but the
MiG-21 will probably be traveling faster initially due to a GCI setup,
and the 105 just can't turn or climb with the MiG-21; the F-4 can at
least hold its own, especially at high Q and low level (below 15kft).
Well, what goes for the F-4 is even more true of the F-104; it has even
more of an advantage over the MiG-21 than the F-4 does, with better
switchology, smaller visual/radar signature, and better armament.
> >
> >>limited procurement,
> >
> >Sure. Because they couldn't see any need for a dedicated A/A bird.
> >Guess they changed their minds, as a result of combat experience.
>
> I'm still not sure that the dedicated A/A--dedicated A/G philosophy is
> correct. It seemed to work for the USN, but they've now begun to fog
> the dividing line between A's and F's. My philosophy was always that
> "A/A is something a fighter pilot does on his way to and from the
> target."
We won air supremacy over Europe and the Pacific using dedicated A/A
assets. Once that's been done, then certainly you need to be able to
carry some A/G ordnance. The DoD definition of a fighter is an a/c
primarily used for A/A which can also drop bombs.
Now, we may not need many dedicated A/A birds, but if you've got them,
why not use them instead of an a/c that, while a far better multi-role
bird, is performance-degraded because of that compromise. More
importantly, multi-role crews are performance compromised for A/A.
>
> >
> >>no BVR (or extended WVR) weapon
> >
> >And in the entire Rolling Thunder period, there seems to have been
> >precisely two BVR kills, both navy. After some own goals, visual RoE
> >were in effect. Even the Bolo kills were all WVR. Nor were many of
FQ
> >kills. Virtually all the kills were from the rear quarter,
regardless
> >of what missile you were firing.
>
> You're right about BVR, but extended WVR was the modus operandi of
> Ritchie. Fighting aircraft with 20 degree per second turn rates using
> Zippers with 8-10 degrees per second at engagement altitudes and with
> weaponry requiring a low aspect/short range shot wouldn't be very
> effective.
See above for Featherduster and F-105 effectiveness re MiG-17 type
targets. As for Ritchie, he was operating with far better C2 assets and
Combat Tree. And yet, on his double kill (Paula 01) it was Disco that
spotted the MiGs and told him about them, and he then picked them up
visually, despite Combat Tree and having DeBellevue in the back seat.
Both those kills were visual acq., boresight auto-acq., maneuvering
kills. He fired AIM-7E2s because of the AIM-9E's limitations. the
latter had the same launch G limitations of the AIM-9B, with slightly
improved performance. the Air Frorce had stopped the development of the
aIM-9J for about 2 years during the bombing pause, so when it was
hastily thrown into action while still a developmental weapon, it did
very poorly (pK .126 vs. .086 for the AIM-9E, both less than the
AIM-9B's Rolling Thunder .15 pK). The missiles may have gotten better,
but the pilots got worse. Meanwhile, the Navy's AIM-9D (.18 pK during
RT; I suspect if the pK was broken down into F-4/F-8 firings, the latter
would be higher) had been replaced by the AIM-9G, which got better than
.40 (sources differ). The missile was better, but mainly the pilots
took fewer out of envelope shots, and they fired singly rather
than in pairs (as the AF pilots usually did) because the reliability was
better than the Air Force missiles.
> >>limited weight lifting capability,
> >
> >Certainly. For a dedicated A/A bird, so what?
>
> Gas or weapons and no ability to flex roles. That just didn't make
> sense.
More gas (relatively) than an F-4C/D carrying a gun pod, that's for
sure. Let me say, flat out, that the F-4 and F-105 are far better
multi-role platforms than the F-104. Of course they are, they weigh
twice what it does empty. The P-47 and P-38 were better multi-role
platforms than the P-51, too.
> >
> >
> >> single mission capability (no re-roling flexibility),
> >
> >Well, as far as USAF use is concerned, the F-104C has carried and
> >dropped/fired far more A/G ordnance in combat than the F-15A/C ever
has
> >(Israel isn't so dumb). Are you suggesting that the F-15's dedicated
> >A/A mission and its lack of lack of re-roling flexibility (not
because
> >of the a/c, because of the training) makes it unsuitable for the U.S.
> >Air Force? :-)
>
> It would have made the F-15 unsuitable in SEA.
Not for the 555th and 13th during LB, it wouldn't have, nor for a
squadron or so of the 8th during RT. But wait, there was already a
squadron of a dedicated air superiority bird in theater, attached
to the 8th, being used to drop small bomb loads in CAS, when the F-4s
that were far superior in that role were being used for escort missions
(and having trouble generating enough a/c, so a second wing had to be
used). "Let's see, we can use F-104s for the mission they were designed
for, and use F-4s to drop bombs for which they're better suited, or we
can use them both for roles which are ideal for neither of them. Yeah,
let's go with option #2."
> >
> >> no ECM or RWR?
> >
> >More myth. As you know, the F-104 began to be fitted with RWRs by
July
> >1966 (Delashaw rotated back to the states then, and has said that he
> >flew a couple of missions in an RWR-equipped bird before leaving),
and
> >all a/c in theater were fitted by November or thereabouts (Remember I
> >once mentioned that my friend had interviewed the Lockheed tech rep
who
> >was at Udorn at the time, and had examined and made copies of the
> >reports he'd sent back? In one dated late in the year, he'd
mentioned
> >that they'd completed the project to fit RWRs sometime before that).
>
> And, you'll recall my recounting the double loss of 104's on the West
> side of Thud Ridge in late summer of '66 that resulted in 7AF decision
> to restrict the aircraft from Route Pack VI. And, my experience flying
> "Poor man's Weasel" with a flight of 2 F-105s (at least one of which
> had APR 25/26) in support of 4 flights of 4 Zippers, each armed with
> 2x750 pound bombs in Route Pack I and II. After supporting each of
> them for their five minute TOT recce period we still had 25 minutes of
> our own armed recce time available to expend our loads of 6x500 or
> 4xLAU-3.
Sure. It's stupid to use F-104s to carry bombs, when you've got other
a/c available that are better suited to that job. Use them for what
they are best suited, A/A. If you had P-47s and P-51s which would you
give the bombs to? If you have F-111s, would you use them for MiGCAP if
you had F-4s around?
> As of November '66 when my tour in 105s ended the Zips were still not
> authorized for penetration of SAM country.
And any F-4 which lacked an RWR in Dec.1966 (most of them, apparently,)
were also prevented from going into SAM areas until they were so fitted,
per 7th AF, because of growing losses to SAMs (the Thuds were using the
pods so the F-4s stuck out on the radar like sore thumbs, and lack of
RWRs limited their warning of launches).
57 pods available in theater at the time of Bolo, which had to be
borrowed from the Thud Wings (per 8th TFW Bolo report). More arriving
rapidly. By mid-67 there were enough for all strikers and most escorts
(sources differ slightly on dates).
> >A/A equipment, yes. A/A training, no. AIM-9J pK, 4/31, 12.6%.
> >AIM-7E-2 even lower. Thid despite the AIM-9J only being issued to
the
> >432nd TFW, who had the dedicated A/A role. On one mission, a 432nd
> >section took 8 AIM-9Js to shoot one MiG-21 in a high speed low
> >altitude 1g chase over NVN. What happened to the others? Well, some
> >went ballistic or went after the ground, but at least four were fired
> >out of range. Why? The AF had never tested the missiles at low
> >altitude, and they didn't know what the max. range was at such
altitudes
> >(this, despite the fact that most MiG engagements had been at low
> >altitudes throughout the war).
>
> I'm not sure where the info about "AIM-9J only being issued to the
> 432nd" comes from. I carried J-birds out of Korat in 72-73--it was
> easy to identify the J since it was the first one with the "bent"
> front wings.
I was referring specifically to the LB1 period, and thought about
putting a caveat in, but didn't for space. I figured you or someone
else would correct me if necessary:-) The 432nd got them first (47 GCUs
brought in June? 1972), carried them first in August, and scored the
first kill September 9th (John Madden's two kills). When did you first
carry them? I've never seen any pjhoto of an F-4 other than a 432nd
bird carrying them in 1972.
>
> Keep in mind that even in Linebacker the AF was still suffering from
> the "interchangeable pilot" syndrome that was pumping retread bomber,
> transport and staff pilots into the fighter pipeline. There was a wide
> range of capability in all units in theater ranging from brand new UPT
> grads through high time fighter guys with multiple tours. It isn't
> surprising that an element (we don't call them "sections" in the AF)
> would virtually salvo on one of those rare days that the MiGs ventured
> forth.
Uh, Ed, wasn't this a decision of the same Air Force brass that you said
didn't all have their heads up their posterior orifices? The same people
who decided in the '50s that fighters wouldn't need guns, because
dogfighting was over and we'd shoot everyone BVR? (Momyer was on a board
in the late '50s that recommended that the gun be removed from the
F-105, along with an explosion-suppression system for the fuel tanks,
and an RWR, to get the cost down). The same AF brass that dictated in
the late '67-68 period, despite the protests of the Weasel crews, that
all Weasels going into Pack 6 would carry a pod, even though this meant
that they could only carry 1 Shrike and they'd never turn the pod on
anyway (just as you didn't), because of interference? Seems to me like
plenty of evidence of problems in the GI tract;-)
g_al...@hotmail.com
wal...@oneimage.com wrote:
> thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
> >g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:>
> >>In article <375925fb...@news.rmi.net>,
> >> thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
> >
> >
> >>> Why? How about short range,
> >>
> >>Ed, Ed, Ed, we've been over these before. Short range? Comparable
> >>range to the F-4 in the A/A role (actually better when combat is
thrown
> >>in, because the F-4 needs to use a lot more burner than the zip.
> >BJ's comment: 104 had draggy probe for IFR; hampered p[erformance,
also
> incompatible with F4 'boomed' tankers.
The probe added 8 counts of drag, Walt, pretty minimal. It had a book
limit of M1.75, which was only because certain A/G stores hadn't been
tested for compatibility (separation) with it installed. The 479th
crews ignored the limit. And, as I mentioned in another post, Lockheed
had repeatedly offered to put receptacles on the a/c (or a conformal or
internal probe), which was repeatedly turned down by the Air Force
brass. Of course, the brass were willing to retrofit virtually the
entire F-105D fleet (all except the block-31 a/c, which came with it),
with receptacles, and the Air Force ordered a boom for the F-4C instead
of the navy probe. Are we to blame the a/c for this?
> >Comparable range to the F-4, possibly--if you are pulling -1
> >performance data and the scenario is high-mid-high. But in reality
the
> >requirement for A/A profile in Rolling Thunder (which admittedly
could
> >have been tactically wrong!) was low. Caps and escorts were required
> >to support the entire strike package which usually consisted of 4 or
5
> >flights of four in trail and a requirement to be across the Red for
> >20-25 minutes.
> >>BJ again: Sloppy tactics with escort semi-welded to strike force.
Same
> mistake LW/Goering made in BoB. Roaming air superioity under GCI
control
> would have made life tough for MiGs.
Not at this particular period, Walt. They'd found that free-roving
MigCAPs were ignored by the Vietnamese, because they were easy to ID on
radar, so they'd just vector the MiGs around them in clutter (where our
radars cvouldn't see them before QRC-248 and Combat Tree) and hit the
strikes.
<snip>
> >>>minimal radar capability,
> >>BJ: having worked with radra from the 86D (usually weak) the F102
(usually
> superb - good outfits) the F4D (better than the deuce) and the F4E(not
as good
> as the Deuce) I consider the F104A's radar, while smple, still a most
worthwhile
> adjunct and capable in the hands of a trained pilot. It was very
simple to read,
> to interpret, and to use. The gunsight was better than the F4E by far.
While we're on the subject, what kind of ranges could you pick up other
104s or tanker size a/c?
> >>Minimal radar capability? So what? In the Rolling Thunder era, as
I've
> >>detailed in the past, the radar just didn't serve much purpose
during
> >>the detection phase of combat, because the VPAF was vectoring MiGs
> >>around our MiGCAPs until they were behind them, or the MiGs were in
> >>ground clutter.
> Interjection by BJ: Lousy tactics again by USAF. MiGs should have
been
> under threat from teh time they taxied . . .
See my comments above. We didn't have the range and couldn't see them
down low, prior to the Connies getting the QRC-248, which could
read/interrogate their IFF. With that, The connies could pick them up
at 175 vice 100nm, and while at low altitudes which had been impossible
before.
> >> Over NVN, how much time are you willing to spend with your head
down in the
> >>cockpit staring at a scope (in a single-seat bird), when the RWR is
> >>buzzing continuously?
> >BJ: One does not 'stare' at a scope unless one has time to do so.
Anyway, scope
> staring is only done when one is trying to get that guy a hundred
miles out. The
> 20-mie contacts show up nicely on a quick 'eyeball' scan.
If you've got a nice, reliable, easy to read and use radar:-)
> >Experienced RWR audio interpretation made it very easy to distinguish
> >between noise and actual launch notification.
> >BJ's comment: If they launched with teh sytem hot - which was not
always
> after the SA2-E(?) optical mode was added.
SA-2F.
> >> If a pilot can spot your bird visually because of
> >>your size and smoke before you can get him on radar, how much of an
> >>advantage is the radar giving you for all the extra weight and lower
> >>performance? From all the reading I've done, the answer in the
Rolling
> >>Thunder era is, it's not, compared to equal money spent on A/A
training.
> >BJ's comment: Even in the radar-weak F86D we could generally (not
always)
> detect the 18 FBW F86Fs on radar before they saw us visually. Then
followed
> a stern conversion and one .9 Mach deep-six bounce in Ab and an
immediate
> RTB because we were bingo fuel.
Of course, they weren't putting out the smoke trail of a pair of J79s
or the J75 (although the J47 puts out quite a lot of smoke itself) from
a much larger a/c. The 104 appears to quite a small RCS for its day; no
looking down the intakes to the blades.
> >Duh. I certainly wished I had more A/A training, but there wouldn't
be
> >adequate time or money to balance the loss of my radar in either
> >aircraft I flew combat in.
> >>BJ again: Just what would you plan to do without radar in
broken-plus clouds
> or night or night weather?
No argument about how nice radar can be. The type of radar, and the
trade-offs in terms of performance/range you have to make, are what
I'm talking about. ASG-14 not enough for you? Fine, take an F-104G
(lowest performance of all models) or an F-104S (better A/A
performance from radar, better engine, more pylons).
> >>>limited procurement,
> >>
> >>Sure. Because they couldn't see any need for a dedicated A/A bird.
> >>Guess they changed their minds, as a result of combat experience.
> >>>BJ: The F4D/E is pretty close to a dedicated AA bird; good radra,
good
> missiles; all it needs is a) good maintenance all around including the
> missiles and b) AA capable crews. Consider that a high-altitude
engagement
> is going to be a medium to low altitude engagement in but a few turns
if
> indeed it lasts that long. If the missiles don;t kill and a subsequent
gun
> pass doesn't kill the best tactic IMHO is to disengage and then decide
what
> to do as a follow-up. Belive me, aircraft standing on a wingtip are
visible
> for 20 miles around and draw other fighters like honey draws flies.
And you
> have no idea which side they'll be one, either.
In the Project Plan tests, the F-4s were only able to keep site of the
F-104s out to a max. of 8nm (planform), 3-4 max. head/tail-on. Love
that size:-) However, given my druthers, for the 1972 environment over
NVN, I'd probably take an F-4E over an F-104. The F-4's largest
deficiency has been addressed, and provided that the crews are properly
trained (but wait, the a/c costs a lot more to operate and has a lot
more to break, so training is often lacking), I think its somewhat lower
performance is ok, given its other advantages (3 weapons' systems, two
crew, dedicated R/O who can actually spend time operating the radar
while closing and watch your six when engaged). But let's be
clear; I think the quickest way to improve the F-4's kill ratio in
Vietnam, other than improved training, would have been to fix the
engines earlier so they didn't smoke. Visibility out of a MiG-21 is
awful, but if they can follow the smoke to its source, it doesn't need
to be all that good.
<snip>
> >>BVR (or extended WVR) weapon
> >>
> >>And in the entire Rolling Thunder period, there seems to have been
> >>precisely two BVR kills, both navy. After some own goals, visual
RoE
> >>were in effect. Even the Bolo kills were all WVR. Nor were many of
FQ
> >>kills. Virtually all the kills were from the rear quarter,
regardless
> >>of what missile you were firing.
> >
> >You're right about BVR, but extended WVR was the modus operandi of
> >Ritchie. Fighting aircraft with 20 degree per second turn rates using
> >Zippers with 8-10 degrees per second at engagement altitudes and with
> >weaponry requiring a low aspect/short range shot wouldn't be very
> >effective.
> >>BJ: Zipper was an asassin's weapon - 700 KIAS up the tail with
2xAim9
> followed by a 3 second burst of 20mm/M61 and RTB.
And that's exactly how the F-105 got most of its kills, and for that
matter, how the majority of kills have been scored throughout this
century. Kill 'em before they see you.
> >
> >>>limited weight lifting capability,
> >>
> >>Certainly. For a dedicated A/A bird, so what?
> >
> >Gas or weapons and no ability to flex roles. That just didn't make
> >sense.
> >>BJ: Agreed. Previous comment on earlier posting - why have a
separate
> line of supply items when the F4 could do it 'good enough'?
If you consider 2:1 good enough.
> >>
> >>> single mission capability (no re-roling flexibility),
> >>
> >>Well, as far as USAF use is concerned, the F-104C has carried and
> >>dropped/fired far more A/G ordnance in combat than the F-15A/C ever
has
> >>(Israel isn't so dumb). Are you suggesting that the F-15's
dedicated
> >>A/A mission and its lack of lack of re-roling flexibility (not
because
> >>of the a/c, because of the training) makes it unsuitable for the
U.S.
> >>Air Force? :-)
> >
> >It would have made the F-15 unsuitable in SEA.
> >>BJ: F15 too expensive to be shot down by Ak47s doing CAS.
Ah, an a/c to expensive to use. Funny, I don't recall that we stopped
using 4 million dollar F-4s and F-105s for CAS, despite the fact that we
lost rather a lot of them to small arms. they were the F-15s of their
day.
<snip>
> >BJ: 2 bombs were airplane is just plain dumb and a hazarding of
planes
> and lives just for 'sortie count' 16 104s at 2 bombs apiece is 32
bombs;
> gee, I remember at least a dozen missions where our 3 F4s carried
18x500
> apiece, that's 3 aircraft and 48 Mk82s plus 3 guns . . .
Yup, my point exactly.
<snip>
> >>>>BJ: Don;t know why USAF didn;t train in correct use of AIMs. ADC
did,
> of course, that being our primary weapon. The 319th had a copy of the
USN
> AIMB envelopes and we weer amazed at its rather stringent limitations
against
> a truning target and at low altitude and especially low alt/high speed
targets
> around .9 M
Yup, min range 3,000feet @ SL, max. range 4,000 feet, both a/c at 0.8
mach, six o'clock shot, 1 g. Envelope shrinks by half if target
pulling 3g, disappears at 5g. Practically speaking, there appear to
have been no succesful shots taken on a 3g target.
Ed Rasimus
>Ed,
>I noticed that you skipped the F-101. Any reason?
>Steve Evans
>
>> The F-4 might be considered the only USAF fighter of the early '70s,
>> but there were some significant tactical aircraft in the '60s and they
>> are fairly well recognized: F-105, F-100, F-8, A-4.
The "F-101" was really pretty much of a non-starter if the category is
"tactical aircraft". The F-101A and C (the single seat tactical
fighter wannabe) had the tail-blanking pitchup problem which made it
less than viable in multi-role tactical maneuvering. It could carry
the tactical nukes but really couldn't defend itself in a turning
situation nor do the necessary delivery maneuvers--imagine pitching up
at the completion of a 45 degree dive bomb recovery because you got
just a tad too enthusiastic during the pull-up.
The single seat aircraft were mostly converted to RF configuration and
the two-seat B models were ADC interceptors. In later years even the
interceptors got converted to recce.
Ed Rasimus
>In article <375a8559....@news.rmi.net>,
> thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
>>
>> Comparable range to the F-4, possibly--if you are pulling -1
>> performance data and the scenario is high-mid-high. But in reality the
>> requirement for A/A profile in Rolling Thunder (which admittedly could
>> have been tactically wrong!) was low. Caps and escorts were required
>> to support the entire strike package which usually consisted of 4 or 5
>> flights of four in trail and a requirement to be across the Red for
>> 20-25 minutes.
>
>Ed, Tom Delashaw flew both a/c in combat. He did mission planning for
>both. He went into RP6 in the F-104C and probably in the F-4 (I'm not
>sure just when his F-4 time was.
I hate to be snobbish but, the visits by 104s into RP VI were minimal
and disappointing to say the least in terms of results. And, I'll
suggest that I spent more time in Pack VI in the F-4, so the "Joe Blow
flew both a/c in combat" doesn't carry much weight with me. (Am I bit
peckish this AM???)
> He has stated that the ranges were comparable given actual
>profiles, with the 104 coming out ahead as soon as any turning and
>burning was done (because the 104 was much cleaner and maintained speed
>better in a high speed turn than the F-4).
To paraphrase the Sup. Ct. Justice on pornography, "I don't know
nothin' about short range aircraft, but I know it when I see it."
Quote the -1 if you will, but in combat (where I observed it), the 104
was not faster, even if cleaner, than the 105s and didn't have the
endurance, even if Tom said it did, to stay where it needed to be to
do the job that needed to be done.
> When you add the most
>effective A/A weapon of the RT era to the F-4, the 104 really
>comes out ahead, because the F-4C/D has to give up 600 gallons of
>gas and add a lot of drag to carry the gun pod.
Here's where stats get you in trouble. Sure the "most effective A/A
weapon" of Rolling Thunder was the gun, but that's because you factor
in kills by F-8s and 105s which weren't carrying much else.
During RT, the biggest mistake a guy could make was to enter a turning
engagement with a MiG-17. Ask Jim Kasler, Robbie Risner, Steve
Diamond, Fred Flom, Mike Brazelton and others who lost. Or even ask
Ken Blank, Fred Tracey, Karl Richter, or others who won (I know,
that's a rhetorical question since many of them are deceased.)
The point is that the high gun effectiveness was a function of simply
"being there" as opposed to an endorsement as the technically superior
A/A solution.
>> The wing loading of the 104 makes it an extremely poor turning
>> aircraft at low altitude. During the Rolling Thunder period the
>> predominant opposing aircraft was the MiG-17, a very small aircraft
>> with exceptional turn rate/radius figures. The choice becomes turning
>> at "my best" which in a 104 (or 105) meant 500 KIAS/.9M in which case
>> the MiG is always inside your turning circle and often disappears from
>> view, or slowing to the "MiG best" which is around 300 KIAS at which
>> point the little bird has your lunch.
>
>
>Let's leave aside the question of exactly how many kills air force a/c
>scored against MiG-17s by out-turning them (well ok, the answer's
>'zero'). Nevertheless, we had an excellent kill/loss ratio against the
>MiG-17, because all the AF a/c were so much faster than it was, and it
>didn't carry missiles in the RT era.
That's a faulty syllogism. (Remember the one about sun comes up
because rooster crows?) We got kills against MiG-17s because there
were typically 80-100 US aircraft in the small arena and the MiGs had
to come to us. They had to speed up to intercept into an aerodynamic
area where they lost some maneuverability and they would inadvertently
fly in front of someone.
>
>Let's see what the Featherduster reports had to say about the F-86H's
>(MiG-17 simulator) turning advantage over the F-104C at low altitude
>(paraphrased from the actual reports in an article a friend wrote):
God, if I hear Featherduster one more time I'll gag. Sorry, but that
was a peacetime comparison exercise and although it certainly gathered
some relevant information it shouldn't be elevated to the level of
Moses and the tablets. War has a tendency to be different.
>> The F-8 is a non-starter in the debate because although ratios of
>> exchange are high, number of kills for the F-8 are so small as to be
>> insignificant.
>
>But kills per engagement is most definitely not insignificant, as is the
>percentage of in the envelope missile firings, and the F-8s are far
>above the F-4s of either service, or the F-105s.
If you only have one engagement and it results in a kill you're
batting 100%, but that pinch-hitter doesn't get Mark McGuire's
contract next year. F-8s got kills (few though they were) because the
F-8 primary mission in NVN was MiG hunting. F-4s of the USN got more
kills than USAF because their primary mission in NVN was MiG hunting.
105s got kills because MiGs came to us even if we weren't hunting
MiGs.
>
>And the F-104C had an easy to use radar. If you want a more powerful
>one (although many of its features are wasted in SEA) then we could have
>used F-104Gs, which had the same weapon system you had in your Thud.
We (the USAF) didn't own an 104Gs. And, why would we want a 104G with
Thunderstick if we already had 105s with 4 times the load carrying
capability and double the range?? If we were going to fire up a new
aircraft production contract, it should have been for more
105s--although you then get the argument that the developing F-4E had
better capability than either Zips or Nickels.
>
>There seems to be a considerable amount of disagreement among pilots as
>to how useful the APR-25/26 was in the high threat areas. ----
> Out of RP6, they felt it was useful,
>because some discrimination was possible. Inside, it was like an
>oversensitive car alarm, it was too distracting, and didn't provide
>enough useful info: "I know they're all looking at me and shooting; I
>want to keep my head up and out for maximum warning."
Outside of RP VI the RWR was like snapping your fingers to keep the
elephants away..."no elephants around here, must be working." Inside
SAM country it would be foolish to restrict your available info. The
scope was mounted high on the glare shield and the audio volume was
adjustable. You didn't need to watch the scope to use the system. When
the "right" tone occured an experienced operator knew it. The "real
thing" cut right through the noise and garbage like a slap in the
face. Then you could scan all around the horizon, high and low or you
could simply glance at the vector scope to get the right quadrant to
search--a split second action.
>
>Ok, as far as the MiG-17 goes, an A/A-dedicated F-105 is clearly the
>weapon of choice over the F-4C (in the RT period), because it's got an
>internal gun backed up by a simple, quick to fire missile for sneak
>shots. The 105's speed helps it make unobserved missile/gun attacks,
>and makes return shots problematic at best. These same advantages are
>also held by the F-104, with the addition of smaller size (better chance
>of surprise) and better turning/climb at combat speeds.
Once again you work backward from stats to support conclusions. The
105 doesn't equate to weapon of choice over the F-4C/D for A/A ops in
Rolling Thunder because it got more kills. The F-4 had better radar,
better weapons and much better Ps for better acceleration and better
turn rate/radius. The 105 got kills because the MiGs attacked the
attackers. (That, as you are well aware, is the essence of Bolo).
To extrapolate from kill numbers which were the result of mission
rather than A/A superiority is a mistake.
wal...@oneimage.com
>GA: Are we to blame the a/c for this?
>BJ: No, but still, the probe was a 'loser' as far as tanker support was
concerned.
>
>GA: Not at this particular period, Walt. They'd found that free-roving
>MigCAPs were ignored by the Vietnamese, because they were easy to ID on
>radar, so they'd just vector the MiGs around them in clutter (where our
>radars cvouldn't see them before QRC-248 and Combat Tree) and hit the
>strikes.
designate his position.
>
>GA: >While we're on the subject, what kind of ranges could you pick up other
>104s or tanker size a/c?
>have no idea which side they'll be one, either.
>
>In the Project Plan tests, the F-4s were only able to keep site of the
>F-104s out to a max. of 8nm (planform), 3-4 max. head/tail-on. Love
>that size:-)
who could consistently pick 104s on a nose-to-nose engagement at 10
NM - their eyes were around 20-05. Mine were only 20-15!
> Practically speaking, there appear to
>have been no succesful shots taken on a 3g target.
The 'disengaged' fighter had to scurry back around to gte in position
while the engaged fighter kept the bandit turning. Very difficult to do
esp if bandit had any idea what was going on.
Walt Bj ftr plt ret
g_al...@hotmail.com
Peckish? What does being hungry have to do with it? (yeah, yeah, I
know) :-) Since the performance issue has become "he says/you say"
we're not going to solve it here. So, just for info, in your 105 tour,
how many missions out of the counters were into RP6?
> > He has stated that the ranges were comparable given actual
> >profiles, with the 104 coming out ahead as soon as any turning and
> >burning was done (because the 104 was much cleaner and maintained
speed
> >better in a high speed turn than the F-4).
>
> To paraphrase the Sup. Ct. Justice on pornography, "I don't know
> nothin' about short range aircraft, but I know it when I see it."
> Quote the -1 if you will, but in combat (where I observed it), the 104
> was not faster, even if cleaner, than the 105s and didn't have the
> endurance, even if Tom said it did, to stay where it needed to be to
> do the job that needed to be done.
When did I say the 104s were faster than the 105s (for any length of
time)? A 105 would run 104s or F-4s out of fuel (but it bleeds a lot
more speed in a turn than a 104). I said 104s were faster than the F-4s
(higher cruise speed, better accel, lower bleed in turns while fast).
Maybe I misunderstood, but ISTM to me you've stated that you observed
the 104s only while they carried bombs where they proved very
short-ranged compared to an F-105 (or an F-4), and I agree completely;
their performance degrades very rapidly when carrying draggy stores,
compared to a larger a/c with a bigger wing. That's a fact of life, not
restricted to the F-104. But again, ISTM that you're extrapolating the
a/c's performance for one job from its performance while loaded for
another.
Walt has stated previously that the 104, loaded with max. fuel (4 tanks)
and a nuke in a lo-lo-lo profile, will go farther, faster than an F-4
for the same mission (3 tanks, nuke). That's terrific, but I don't
extrapolate performance for a completely different mission from that,
and ISTM that's what you're doing here. If I were to say, "Let's put
six Mk. 82s on both a/c plus the max. fuel they can carry; with that
load, the F-4 will go a lot further than the 104, faster too (I
imagine), ergo the F-4 has superior performance loaded for an A/A
mission," it just would not compute.
>
> > When you add the most
> >effective A/A weapon of the RT era to the F-4, the 104 really
> >comes out ahead, because the F-4C/D has to give up 600 gallons of
> >gas and add a lot of drag to carry the gun pod.
>
> Here's where stats get you in trouble. Sure the "most effective A/A
> weapon" of Rolling Thunder was the gun, but that's because you factor
> in kills by F-8s and 105s which weren't carrying much else.
I don't factor in anything from the F-8s which had an unreliable,
inaccurate gun virtually guaranteed to jam while pulling g, and which
scored only 1 pure gun kill, plus finished off a couple of others. The
F-8s' high exchange ratio comes from its use of the AIM-9D, not the gun.
Nor am I saying that because most 105 kills were guns, that the gun is
inherently superior. I know that the 105s rarely carried AIM-9s. My
comment is based purely on the pK of each weapon, and there is no doubt
whatsoever that the gun has the highest pK, with the AIM-9 second, and
the AIM-7 a poor third (essentially tied with the AIM-4D for the RT era
in pK).
> During RT, the biggest mistake a guy could make was to enter a turning
> engagement with a MiG-17. Ask Jim Kasler, Robbie Risner, Steve
> Diamond, Fred Flom, Mike Brazelton and others who lost. Or even ask
> Ken Blank, Fred Tracey, Karl Richter, or others who won (I know,
> that's a rhetorical question since many of them are deceased.)
Sure. No one's suggesting that you do so. We didn't shoot down all
those MiG-17s with F-4s and F-105s by out-turning them. Neither would
the F-104. None of them need to turn with them, although the 104 can do
so better than the others at combat speeds, and can often do so long
enough to shoot them down. After all, how many Zeros did F-4Us and
P-38s shoot down because they had a better turn rate/radius? As long as
you can keep the guns on target long enough to hit (and with high
closure rates, effective crossing rates are low), they're toast. They
can spin like a top and they still die. Of course, they may be able to
spin around enough to return fire if they see you coming from far enough
away, but with your performance advantage you can just go vertical and
leave them gasping, out of energy.
> The point is that the high gun effectiveness was a function of simply
> "being there" as opposed to an endorsement as the technically superior
> A/A solution.
No, high gun effectiveness was a result of high reliability, lack of
susceptibility to clutter (radar or IR), the ability to be used while
pulling high g against high g targets, short minimum range, and the
ability to be fired quickly. Those are factors of technical
superiority under the prevailing conditions of combat, not 'being
there.' Otherwise, we'd see lots of F-4 AIM-7 kills while acting as
strike a/c in the same period, and we don't.
None of the missiles of the era had all those features. The AIM-9B is
much higher than the AIM-7 or AIM-4 in reliability and the ability to be
fired quickly, and so comes out as the second best weapon, despite its
complete inability to be used in high g situations. Now, if we'd had
AIM-9Ls available back then, the situation would be very different, but
given the technology then available, the gun's (usually) the one.
The F-8's Mk. 12 gun installation lacked both the first and third
advantages, and performed accordingly (poorly) in combat (although
having them gave the pilots the incentive to keep up with their ACM, and
so led indirectly to the F-8's high kill rate and kills per engagement).
The 105's gun pK was lower than the F-4s because the 105 often had to
fire without a gunsight, owing to switchology problems; when the 105 was
set up for A/A, gun pK increased to equal the F-4's.
The anti-clutter feature is more of a factor against the MiG-17s,
because they tended to be operating at lower altitudes. Against
MiG-21s, the missiles could be used more effectively, because clutter
was less of a problem. Even so, the awful reliability of the AIM-7
works against it.
Ed, What are the tactics you use against an a/c that's slower than you,
armed only with a gun? Do you slow down so they can shoot you? No, you
keep your speed up, and the choice of engaging/disengaging lies with
you. In addition, the low top speed of the MiG-17 compared to the
cruise speeds of our fighters means that it closes more slowly, giving
more time to spot it compared to the MiG-21 (which had about a 1:1 ratio
against us, compared to an extremely lopsided ratio in our favor vs. the
MiG-17). Virtually all of our Thud losses to MiG-17s were while
inbound, when the -17s had a chance of catching us.
In contrast, we usually had a high closure rate on them (once clean),
which gave us (especially the 105s) a fair chance of approaching
unobserved and nailing them unawares. The 104's tactics are the same,
but it's harder to see and thus gets more opportunities for unobserved
kills, than the F-4/F-105.
> >Let's see what the Featherduster reports had to say about the F-86H's
> >(MiG-17 simulator) turning advantage over the F-104C at low altitude
> >(paraphrased from the actual reports in an article a friend wrote):
>
> God, if I hear Featherduster one more time I'll gag. Sorry, but that
> was a peacetime comparison exercise and although it certainly gathered
> some relevant information it shouldn't be elevated to the level of
> Moses and the tablets. War has a tendency to be different.
Ed, Featherduster was designed to develop tactics to use against the
MiGs, and the tactics used in Vietnam against the various MiGs were
exactly the ones developed and recommended in Featherduster. Fighting
MiG-17s? Keep your speed up, don't turn with them, make a pass and
unload away. Work the fight down below 15,000 feet; the U.S. Aircrafts'
Q advantage is maximized, and so is Ps. Anti-MiG-21 tactics were
similarly developed and used.
> >> The F-8 is a non-starter in the debate because although ratios of
> >> exchange are high, number of kills for the F-8 are so small as to
be
> >> insignificant.
> >
> >But kills per engagement is most definitely not insignificant, as is
the
> >percentage of in the envelope missile firings, and the F-8s are far
> >above the F-4s of either service, or the F-105s.
>
> If you only have one engagement and it results in a kill you're
> batting 100%, but that pinch-hitter doesn't get Mark McGuire's
> contract next year. F-8s got kills (few though they were) because the
> F-8 primary mission in NVN was MiG hunting. F-4s of the USN got more
> kills than USAF because their primary mission in NVN was MiG hunting.
Yes, Ed, the F-8s primary mission was MiG hunting, but that's not why
they got their kills. The Navy F-4 exchange rate was virtually
identical with the AF F-4 exchange rate during RT, despite the fact that
the navy F-4's primary job was, as you say, MiG hunting (if you include
BarCAPs and the like), and the Air Force F-4s were doing a little bit of
everything. The difference was training, Ed, nothing else. The F-8s
were constantly training for ACM, and the navy F-4s were missile-armed
interceptors who weren't. The F-8 pilots knew how to fly their a/c into
a good firing position, and did so; the F-4 pilots didn't. Once former
F-8 pilots started to teach the F-4 pilots how to do ACM in Top Gun,
then the navy F-4 kill rate jumped up (for LB), while the Air Force one
stayed essentially static. Training. Add in a more reliable, higher
performing AIM-9 than the Air Force's version, and you get a kills per
engagement rate 4 times that of the air force.
> 105s got kills because MiGs came to us even if we weren't hunting
> MiGs.
Sure. but if they'd only been armed with AIM-7s they wouldn't have got
many kills at all, because they wouldn't have had time to get everything
set up before getting inside min. range (cf. the video of the MiG-17
fuel tank gunshot), the radar wouldn't work very well because of ground
clutter, and the missiles were very unreliable.
> >
> >And the F-104C had an easy to use radar. If you want a more powerful
> >one (although many of its features are wasted in SEA) then we could
have
> >used F-104Gs, which had the same weapon system you had in your Thud.
>
> We (the USAF) didn't own an 104Gs. And, why would we want a 104G with
> Thunderstick if we already had 105s with 4 times the load carrying
> capability and double the range?? If we were going to fire up a new
> aircraft production contract, it should have been for more
> 105s--although you then get the argument that the developing F-4E had
> better capability than either Zips or Nickels.
Quite agree, but you were the one saying that we had to have an
equivalent radar for A/A effectiveness. I know the USAF didn't own
F-104Gs; they didn't want to buy any F-104s, nor did they wish to
upgrade the ones they had. The question is was that a wise decision or
not. If the same attitude had prevailed with the F-4, then you'd have
been flying a gunless F-4B in 1972, with a retractable probe instead of
a receptacle, rather than an F-4E with (eventually) the 556 mod. the
F-105 you flew wouldn't have had a receptacle either, or the numerous
mods related to Porject Look-alike and Safety packages I and II.
Certainly one mod for the 104C is obvious; it could have had the LN-3
INS from the F-104G installed, to counter Momyer's worries about lack of
nav. systems leading to more border violations (the only one of his
contentions re the 104 that isn't disprovable or arguable).
> >There seems to be a considerable amount of disagreement among pilots
as
> >to how useful the APR-25/26 was in the high threat areas. ----
>
> > Out of RP6, they felt it was useful,
> >because some discrimination was possible. Inside, it was like an
> >oversensitive car alarm, it was too distracting, and didn't provide
> >enough useful info: "I know they're all looking at me and shooting; I
> >want to keep my head up and out for maximum warning."
>
> Outside of RP VI the RWR was like snapping your fingers to keep the
> elephants away..."no elephants around here, must be working." Inside
> SAM country it would be foolish to restrict your available info. The
> scope was mounted high on the glare shield and the audio volume was
> adjustable. You didn't need to watch the scope to use the system. When
> the "right" tone occured an experienced operator knew it. The "real
> thing" cut right through the noise and garbage like a slap in the
> face. Then you could scan all around the horizon, high and low or you
> could simply glance at the vector scope to get the right quadrant to
> search--a split second action.
As I say, there is a considerable difference of opinion. Some pilots
I've talked too appreciated it in RP5 and around Vinh, where the threats
were spread out. If you got a launch warning around Vinh, you payed
attention:-) There seems to be less ambivalence about the APR-36/-37 of
the F-4E; most pilots seem to have appreciated it.
> >
> >Ok, as far as the MiG-17 goes, an A/A-dedicated F-105 is clearly the
> >weapon of choice over the F-4C (in the RT period), because it's got
an
> >internal gun backed up by a simple, quick to fire missile for sneak
> >shots. The 105's speed helps it make unobserved missile/gun attacks,
> >and makes return shots problematic at best. These same advantages
are
> >also held by the F-104, with the addition of smaller size (better
chance
> >of surprise) and better turning/climb at combat speeds.
>
> Once again you work backward from stats to support conclusions. The
> 105 doesn't equate to weapon of choice over the F-4C/D for A/A ops in
> Rolling Thunder because it got more kills. The F-4 had better radar,
> better weapons and much better Ps for better acceleration and better
> turn rate/radius. The 105 got kills because the MiGs attacked the
> attackers. (That, as you are well aware, is the essence of Bolo).
As I said above, If that were true then we'd expect an equally large
number of kills from strike-loaded F-4s, and they don't exist. At the
time in question, the F-4s were tucked in as escorts with the strike,
one flight behind the first strike flight, the other following the last
strike flight. The number of F-4 kills does go up, but it's escorts not
F-4 strikers who are getting the kills, and they're flying right along
with the 105s, except in the target area itself. Where does the effect
of the better radar and the AIM-7 show up? Virtually all the pickups
are visual, despite the better radar; if the MiGs are outside the radar
arc and/or in ground clutter (as they were, deliberately), the radar
isn't helping you to spot them.
Take care,
Dweezil Dwarftosser
On Wed, 09 Jun 1999 02:41:50 GMT, g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
>In article <375d3310....@news.rmi.net>, thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
>> Here's where stats get you in trouble. Sure the "most effective A/A
>> weapon" of Rolling Thunder was the gun, but that's because you factor
>> in kills by F-8s and 105s which weren't carrying much else.
>
>I don't factor in anything from the F-8s which had an unreliable,
>inaccurate gun virtually guaranteed to jam while pulling g, and which
>scored only 1 pure gun kill, plus finished off a couple of others. The
>F-8s' high exchange ratio comes from its use of the AIM-9D, not the gun.
>Nor am I saying that because most 105 kills were guns, that the gun is
>inherently superior. I know that the 105s rarely carried AIM-9s. My
>comment is based purely on the pK of each weapon, and there is no doubt
>whatsoever that the gun has the highest pK, with the AIM-9 second, and
>the AIM-7 a poor third (essentially tied with the AIM-4D for the RT era
>in pK).
I've been enjoying this thread - and staying out of it - but I now
have two things to say:
1 - Stats definitely don't mean a whole lot here, unless one mixes in
a whole range of "fudge factors" that characterize each specific
engagement by the conditions present when the shot was taken. (Aspect,
G, range, launch conditions in the case of missiles - and sometimes,
the gun - not to mention 1v1, 2v1, or even map coordinates...a virtual
plethora of conditions that make almost all of the shots uniquely
INCOMPARABLE to any other. Throw in some truly insane ROE, and using
stats as a valid measure of weapon capability quickly becomes
ludicrous.
2- Of all the weapons mentioned, only the AIM-4D is worthy of the
"poor" characterization. Knowing what I do about a) the way AIM-7
aircraft systems were maintained back then, and b) the early missiles'
"touchy" nature concerning shock and vibration, and c) the proportion
of launches that were "out of the missile envelope", I can flatly
state that that ANY AIM-7 hit in VN was close to miraculous.
True, all of these things conspired to provide a much lower pK for the
AIM-7 than it really should have had - but the missiles were pretty
good; it was the aircraft that were bad, and ROE limitations.
By the mid-70s ( too late for VN ), we knew what had been wrong, and
had it fixed. Mostly a problem of maintenance ( and the philosophy of
how to do it right at the Wing level ), tactical re-education and
aircrew employment discipline completed the picture.
>> 105s got kills because MiGs came to us even if we weren't hunting
>> MiGs.
>
>Sure. but if they'd only been armed with AIM-7s they wouldn't have got
>many kills at all, because they wouldn't have had time to get everything
>set up before getting inside min. range (cf. the video of the MiG-17
>fuel tank gunshot), the radar wouldn't work very well because of ground
>clutter, and the missiles were very unreliable.
Just a note on this: that film of the F-105 shot on the -17 wing tank
was below minimum gun firing range - never mind missiles !
One more: losing the bad guy in "ground clutter" wasn't as bad as most
let on; I'm sure that the time-dilation of combat probably didn't
allow for radar memory-tracking to reacquire a true lock before the
WSO went for it, manually. ( Memory tracking gave a very visible
cockpit indication - and could reacquire multiple times as the target
faded in and out of the grass...that is, if you trusted it long
enough, and the bad guy didn't pull any 90-degree turns while hidden.)
P.S. - I find it really odd that two guys who were there ( Ed and Walt
- each of whom employed two of the aircraft types in this thread, and
who both are in relative agreement about this-versus-that ) are
"engaged" using authors' recollections as if they were the final,
authoritative word. It's not as if there has never been an "official
report" or autobiography that attempted to exclude all opposing views,
right ?
- John T.
Ed Rasimus
>In article <375d3310....@news.rmi.net>,
> thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
>. So, just for info, in your 105 tour,
>how many missions out of the counters were into RP6?
Out of 100 counters and 110 total combat missions in the 105, roughly
30 were into RP VI. In the F-4E, out of 150 combat missions, 50 were
NVN and of those, about 35 were RP VI.
>I don't factor in anything from the F-8s which had an unreliable,
>inaccurate gun virtually guaranteed to jam while pulling g, and which
>scored only 1 pure gun kill, plus finished off a couple of others. The
>F-8s' high exchange ratio comes from its use of the AIM-9D, not the gun.
>Nor am I saying that because most 105 kills were guns, that the gun is
>inherently superior. I know that the 105s rarely carried AIM-9s. My
>comment is based purely on the pK of each weapon, and there is no doubt
>whatsoever that the gun has the highest pK, with the AIM-9 second, and
>the AIM-7 a poor third (essentially tied with the AIM-4D for the RT era
>in pK).
I'm not sure I understand your definition of pK. Probability of kill
to me would mean that if employed as designed (within parameters) what
is the liklihood of achieving a kill. Your application seems related
to interpolation of after the fact success stats. For example, pK of
the gun would require establishing some parameters like range,
angle-off, rounds fired, hit percentage, etc. To compare one hit by
20mm to one hit by AIM-9 would illustrate the difference.
During A/A engagements in SEA, the gun had the most kills, but that
(as Dweezil just mentioned) needs to be interpreted in terms of a
range of factors such as aircraft type/equippage, mission, range of
employment, circumstances, weather, location, force ratio, and even
aircrew training. To take kill stats alone and draw the conclusion
that the gun is a more effective weapon is erroneous.
>
>
>Sure. No one's suggesting that you do so. We didn't shoot down all
>those MiG-17s with F-4s and F-105s by out-turning them. Neither would
>the F-104. None of them need to turn with them, although the 104 can do
>so better than the others at combat speeds, and can often do so long
>enough to shoot them down. . . . Of course, they may be able to
>spin around enough to return fire if they see you coming from far enough
>away, but with your performance advantage you can just go vertical and
>leave them gasping, out of energy.
No! I've said before, the Featherduster result of 104 competitiveness
against the F-86 was primarily a function of tactics, not turn rate.
At 500 kts neither a 104 nor a 105 will be turning and tracking a
MiG-17. And, your defense alternative of "just go vertical and leave
them gasping" may be attractive at some moments during engagement but
isn't always possible. If you are the attacker, you can manage your
energy to retain that option, but if you are the defender, you may not
be in position to jettison, light up and zoom out.
>
>
>No, high gun effectiveness was a result of high reliability, lack of
>susceptibility to clutter (radar or IR), the ability to be used while
>pulling high g against high g targets, short minimum range, and the
>ability to be fired quickly.
Aren't you the guy who keeps throwing up the stat about "no
maneuvering engagements" occuring against MiG-17s? What this now about
"pulling high g against high g targets"?
>Ed, What are the tactics you use against an a/c that's slower than you,
>armed only with a gun? Do you slow down so they can shoot you? No, you
>keep your speed up, and the choice of engaging/disengaging lies with
>you. In addition, the low top speed of the MiG-17 compared to the
>cruise speeds of our fighters means that it closes more slowly, giving
>more time to spot it compared to the MiG-21 (which had about a 1:1 ratio
>against us, compared to an extremely lopsided ratio in our favor vs. the
>MiG-17). Virtually all of our Thud losses to MiG-17s were while
>inbound, when the -17s had a chance of catching us.
You enter the argument from the assumption that fighting MiGs was the
primary objective. It wasn't. Rolling Thunder and Linebacker were
bombing campaigns. You overlook the fact of intercept geometry--high
operating speed makes intercepts more difficult, but geometry takes
care of closure if done properly and the attacker enters the merge to
a firing solution despite being a negative Vc.
And, the fact that "all of our (105) losses to MiG-17s were while
inbound" should again demonstrate the difference in philosophy of the
NVNAF. They attacked bombers to deter them. They weren't into the
"ace" thing.
>Quite agree, but you were the one saying that we had to have an
>equivalent radar for A/A effectiveness.
No. You were the one suggesting that an effective radar was a handicap
because of weight and cross-section; that fuel and maneuverability
were preferable. My contention was that a quality radar was essential
for combat effectiveness not A/A effectiveness.
>>The 105 got kills because the MiGs attacked the
>> attackers. (That, as you are well aware, is the essence of Bolo).
>
>As I said above, If that were true then we'd expect an equally large
>number of kills from strike-loaded F-4s, and they don't exist.
That's a function of doctrine. The bomb-loaded birds were supposed to
go to the target and with CAP/escort available the light work was
handled by them.
> At the
>time in question, the F-4s were tucked in as escorts with the strike,
>one flight behind the first strike flight, the other following the last
>strike flight. The number of F-4 kills does go up, but it's escorts not
>F-4 strikers who are getting the kills, and they're flying right along
>with the 105s, except in the target area itself.
Your experience appears to be different than mine. In 105s, the F-4s
were bomb-loaded in the string and directed to jettison and engage.
CAP was orbiting and the primary MiG defense. Unfortunately in '66 the
Phantom Phlyers weren't noted for aggressiveness and usually the one
flight of bomb-loaded F-4s in the string of five flights going to the
target would abort for weather or something.
In LB, the "escort" flew as outriggers to the bomber or chaffer
string, not in line. With Disco, and the 555th usually operating on
discrete frequency, the escort was most often used as BARCAP or herder
to move the MiGs to the specialists. Occasional kills resulted when
the MiGs got close to the bomber string before the CAP could engage.
g_al...@hotmail.com
wc...@usa.net (Dweezil Dwarftosser) wrote:
> [ lots of snippage here; please excuse...]
> On Wed, 09 Jun 1999 02:41:50 GMT, g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
Rasimus) wrote:
>
> >> Here's where stats get you in trouble. Sure the "most effective A/A
> >> weapon" of Rolling Thunder was the gun, but that's because you
factor
> >> in kills by F-8s and 105s which weren't carrying much else.
> >
> >I don't factor in anything from the F-8s which had an unreliable,
> >inaccurate gun virtually guaranteed to jam while pulling g, and which
> >scored only 1 pure gun kill, plus finished off a couple of others.
The
> >F-8s' high exchange ratio comes from its use of the AIM-9D, not the
gun.
> >Nor am I saying that because most 105 kills were guns, that the gun
is
> >inherently superior. I know that the 105s rarely carried AIM-9s. My
> >comment is based purely on the pK of each weapon, and there is no
doubt
> >whatsoever that the gun has the highest pK, with the AIM-9 second,
and
> >the AIM-7 a poor third (essentially tied with the AIM-4D for the RT
era
> >in pK).
>
> have two things to say:
>
> 1 - Stats definitely don't mean a whole lot here, unless one mixes in
> a whole range of "fudge factors" that characterize each specific
> engagement by the conditions present when the shot was taken. (Aspect,
> G, range, launch conditions in the case of missiles - and sometimes,
> the gun - not to mention 1v1, 2v1, or even map coordinates...a virtual
> plethora of conditions that make almost all of the shots uniquely
> INCOMPARABLE to any other. Throw in some truly insane ROE, and using
> stats as a valid measure of weapon capability quickly becomes
> ludicrous.
John, I'm including all the fudge factors, because Red Baron (I
have the relevant part) includes a breakdown of ALL the factors you
mention, and a couple of others: altitude (plus whether
look-up/co-altitude/look-down), airspeed, closure, aspect, range,
G-load, firing mode, and some weapon specific factors such as tone,
, cage/uncage, self track/not, interlocks in/out, etc. It gives pKs
broken down for all these factors, from a data base of 612 attempted
AIM-7 shots (97 hits, 56 kills, kills/hit 0.58), 454 AIM-9 (111 hits, 81
kills, K/H 0.73), 61 AIM-4 (7 hits, 5 kills, K/H 0.71), and 361 gun
attempts (103 hits, 47 kills, K/H 0.46), i.e. every A/A ordnance firing
attempt for the whole war.
You'll note that I also included in my previous comments the effects of
RoE, NVN and U.S. tactics, etc. If we had been able to routinely take
BVR shots, and if the MiGs had normally been operating at medium/high
altitudes where ground clutter wasn't a problem, then both the pKs and
the effectiveness of the various weapons, and their relative worth,
would change. Hell, guarantee me a HO missiles-free option on a
non-maneuvering medium/high altitude target every shot with a
disengagement if we don't hit, and forget the gun: load me up with
AIM-7s! Even allowing for its atrocious reliability (60-80% missile
failures. Note, this does not include firings out of the envelope or
misses, just malfunctions), the pK will roughly double and enough will
hit to wittle down the opposition. That's just the scenario that was
envisaged when the F-4 was designed, but that definitely wasn't the
tactical environment over NVN, was it? Even when it was, for Navy
F-4s after the bombing halt in 1968 to the end of Rolling Thunder
(Nov. 1,1968), they fired 26 AIM-7s (many HO BVR) and 16 AIM-9s for two
kills (1 AIM-7, 1 AIM-9), for two losses. Meanwhile, the F-8s,
operating under the same RoE and tactical situation but without a
head-on BVR capability, scored 5-0 using the AIM-9D (with one finished
off with the guns).
As far as the gun goes, I'm not a bigoted devotee of it. I think the
argument can be made far better now than it could in the '50s-'70s that
it's not worth the weight and volume it takes up, given the miniscule
number of A/A gun shots taken in the last 20 years; the missiles have
gotten so good that you get your kill before you close into gun range,
and the missile envelopes overlap with guns far more than they did
before. Even if a gun is retained in case the opponent of the moment
has effective countermeasures for all our missiles (apparently every
AIM-9M6/7 that had flares deployed against it in DS missed), I don't
think the weight and especially volume of a Gatling is justified; I
think a single barrel revolver of 25-30mm makes more sense, and is more
useful (and safer, because of greater slant ranges) for A/G work.
> 2- Of all the weapons mentioned, only the AIM-4D is worthy of the
> "poor" characterization. Knowing what I do about a) the way AIM-7
> aircraft systems were maintained back then, and b) the early missiles'
> "touchy" nature concerning shock and vibration, and c) the proportion
> of launches that were "out of the missile envelope", I can flatly
> state that that ANY AIM-7 hit in VN was close to miraculous.
> True, all of these things conspired to provide a much lower pK for the
> AIM-7 than it really should have had - but the missiles were pretty
> good; it was the aircraft that were bad, and ROE limitations.
John, a weapon that will work perfectly under antiseptic test
conditions, but won't work in the field, just isn't worth much.
Unfortunately, that's exactly how our missiles were tested and rated for
effectiveness then; any missile that failed to work as advertised was
declared a "no-test," because clearly there'd been a malfunction or a
maintenance problem. There aren't any no-tests in combat; it works or
it doesn't.
All of the factors you mention are part of the pK, and can be (and in
Red Baron, are) separated out. For instance, because of its extremely
restricted envelope, the AIM-9B had a far higher proportion of
out-of-envelope firings (28%) than the AIM-7 (11%) or the AIM-9D (13%).
Despite this, it achieved roughly double the pK of the AIM-7, because it
was much more reliable than the AIM-7, and could be fired faster:
roughly 1 second (delay after trigger squeeze) from acquisition vice
5.25-5.5 sec. for a full system launch AIM-7 launch (4 seconds for
speedgate settling, 1.25-1.5 sec. delay [varies depending on the source]
after trigger squeeze).
For that matter, there's a couple of other factors which don't count in
the AIM-7's pK, and yet which are clearly part of its effectiveness as a
weapon system: missiles which detune are automatically cut out of the
firing sequence, yes? Therefore, even though they are unable to be used
and thus have 'failed' for purposes of combat, they don't count as a
firing attempt because they aren't actually 'fired.' This happened on
numerous occasions. Also, you have to have a working radar, and from
reading accounts, its clear that at-target radar reliability was not all
that good; Lose the radar, lose the AIM-7 capability.
Here's another case which _is_ counted in the pK, even though, strictly
speaking, the missile itself isn't at fault; the missile SYSTEM is. On
a fair number of occasions, AIM-7s failed to launch or the motors didn't
fire because the ordies forgot to make the proper connnections/pull the
pins. The AIM-7 seems to have had more connections than the AIM-9, and
thus this happened far more often with the AIM-7 than it did with the
AIM-9. Human tiredness and error are givens, so this is a valid measure
of system effectiveness.
> By the mid-70s ( too late for VN ), we knew what had been wrong, and
> had it fixed. Mostly a problem of maintenance ( and the philosophy of
> how to do it right at the Wing level ), tactical re-education and
> aircrew employment discipline completed the picture.
>
> >> 105s got kills because MiGs came to us even if we weren't hunting
> >> MiGs.
> >
> >Sure. but if they'd only been armed with AIM-7s they wouldn't have
got
> >many kills at all, because they wouldn't have had time to get
everything
> >set up before getting inside min. range (cf. the video of the MiG-17
> >fuel tank gunshot), the radar wouldn't work very well because of
ground
> >clutter, and the missiles were very unreliable.
>
> Just a note on this: that film of the F-105 shot on the -17 wing tank
> was below minimum gun firing range - never mind missiles !
Min. gun range is just before you ram:-) As a practical matter, though,
he was definitely inside FOD range.
> One more: losing the bad guy in "ground clutter" wasn't as bad as most
> let on; I'm sure that the time-dilation of combat probably didn't
> allow for radar memory-tracking to reacquire a true lock before the
> WSO went for it, manually. ( Memory tracking gave a very visible
> cockpit indication - and could reacquire multiple times as the target
> faded in and out of the grass...that is, if you trusted it long
> enough, and the bad guy didn't pull any 90-degree turns while hidden.)
No, John it was a major problem according to combat reports and Red
Baron, below about 8,000 feet and getting progressively worse the lower
you went. Having a look-up shot helped, but the MiG tactics, especially
the MiG-17s, were to get low and turn. The percentage of full-systems
lock-ons was significantly higher against MiG-21s (74%) than it was
against MiG-17s (52%) or MiG-19s (48%), precisely because the MiG-21s
were typically operating at higher altitudes.
> P.S. - I find it really odd that two guys who were there ( Ed and Walt
> - each of whom employed two of the aircraft types in this thread, and
> who both are in relative agreement about this-versus-that ) are
> "engaged" using authors' recollections as if they were the final,
> authoritative word. It's not as if there has never been an "official
> report" or autobiography that attempted to exclude all opposing views,
> right ?
Sure. But in the case of Featherduster, since "official" opinion was
entirely against the 104, you'd have to figure that the facts were
incontrovertible for the results to be released. Of course, not even
the truth is necessarily enough. When I get time, I'll try and include
one of Tom's stories about an attempt to rig the results to favor a
particular a/c. As for Red Baron, this is the most objective attempt
the Air Force made to discover what the problems were in Vietnam, what
worked and what didn't. I don't have time to type in the entire
"recommendations" section of the report here, but will be happy to do so
via private email, if you remind me often enough:-)
I will give an excerpt from the section relating to the AIM-7:
"Conclusions:
". . . The performance of the Sparrow was degraded brecause of
out-of-parameters firings and launches in which target illumination was
lost. . . A further problem was the AIM-7's complexity; it was difficult
to maintain and to launch. A number of missiles are known to have
aborted launching or to have launched with no motor fire due to
maintenance error. The launch procedure (though not as complex as that
of the AIM-4) and the actual operation of the missile were also
contributors to its lack of success. The requirements for launch in
most cases necessitated a two-man crew working in a coordinated manner.
This, plus the highly complicated circuitry within the missile and
aircraft, contributed to the Sparrow's low efficiency.
"This missile achieved its highest success when launched with a
full-system lock-on, in narrow gate, with the interlock conditions met
[i.e., regardless of whether interlocks were "In" or "Out"], from a
look-up attitude, and at mid-range. When these conditions were not met,
the success rate was virtually nil. However, when launched under the
conditions for which it was designed, the Sparrow performed
significantly better.
"Recommendations:
"The largest sub-categories of determinable failures for missiles fired
out of parameters were launches attempted at less than minimum range and
at greater than maximum range. Only limited confidence can be placed in
the computed firing parameters presented to the pilot since they are
approximations of the launch envelope for a non-maneuvering target and
are of minimal use against a maneuvering target. The fire-control
computer should be modified to present the pilot with maneuvering, as
well as non-maneuvering, firing parameters." [Done, right John?]
"Another problem, related to the cockpit, was the lack of an indication
that the missiles had detuned. A circuit, such as that in the F-4E
advanced versions, should be incorporated into all F-4s to indicate that
a missile has detuned."
[snip recommendation about reducing the speedgate settling time]
"The missile radar system should be modified to minimize the possiblity
of the missile locking onto ground clutter after launch. the radar
breaking lock, particularly at low altitudes, resulted in ineffective
firings.
<snip comments about altitude line problems and side lobe reductions>
"The inability to maintain illumination of the target when firing in
boresight mode while maneuvering resulted in several target misses
[Understatement of the year. Of the first 65 boresight launches in RT,
there was one hit. I think this was in Bolo, as I have an account of a
kill in boresight, using manual track]. A provision should be made for
a greater area of radar coverage in this mode." [John has previously
described how a weapons tech had cobbled together a boresight flood horn
(in Germany? Korat?) to solve this problem, and this was incorporated in
the F-15 from the start]
And so on. Hope you guys are enjoying this. My fingers are tired:-)
g_al...@hotmail.com
thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
> g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> >In article <375d3310....@news.rmi.net>,
> > thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
>
> >. So, just for info, in your 105 tour,
> >how many missions out of the counters were into RP6?
>
> Out of 100 counters and 110 total combat missions in the 105, roughly
> 30 were into RP VI. In the F-4E, out of 150 combat missions, 50 were
> NVN and of those, about 35 were RP VI.
Thanks for the info.
> >I don't factor in anything from the F-8s which had an unreliable,
> >inaccurate gun virtually guaranteed to jam while pulling g, and which
> >scored only 1 pure gun kill, plus finished off a couple of others.
The
> >F-8s' high exchange ratio comes from its use of the AIM-9D, not the
gun.
> >Nor am I saying that because most 105 kills were guns, that the gun
is
> >inherently superior. I know that the 105s rarely carried AIM-9s. My
> >comment is based purely on the pK of each weapon, and there is no
doubt
> >whatsoever that the gun has the highest pK, with the AIM-9 second,
and
> >the AIM-7 a poor third (essentially tied with the AIM-4D for the RT
era
> >in pK).
>
> I'm not sure I understand your definition of pK. Probability of kill
> to me would mean that if employed as designed (within parameters) what
> is the liklihood of achieving a kill. Your application seems related
> to interpolation of after the fact success stats.
Combat pK is based on every firing attempt, in parameters or not. You
can also break out the shots that are out of parameters, or lots of
other things. The problem with out of parameter firings is the reason
for them. For instance, did the pilot fire out of parameters
deliberately, as a deterrent/turn signal? Or did he fire out of
parameters because he didn't know he was out of parameters, and if so,
what's the reason for that?
In the latter case, you can change the number of out of parameter shots
by various methods: increasing the missile envelope (done with the
AIM-9D/E/G/J, compared to the -9B); improved knowledge and training (so
the crew can recognise when they are or are not in parameters; this was
the navy approach for Top Gun, with notable success. They had a high pK
because they took very few bad shots); improving the computation of the
parameters by the weapon system (the AIM-7E2 was usually used interlocks
out because the min. range calculated by the computer was greater than
that actually possible in a maneuvering fight); improving the
presentation of envelope info (the method used by modern a/c with HUD
presentations).
For instance, I've mentioned that the gun had a higher pK than missiles,
_when used with a gunsight_. In about 100 or so F-105 firing attempts,
that wasn't the case, due to switchology problems, which radically skews
the data (pK was about .10 just in those cases, which is still greater
than the AIM-7 overall pK). Remove those cases, and the pK jumps up to
.5 or better. Same goes for any other weapon, obviously.
>For example, pK of
> the gun would require establishing some parameters like range,
> angle-off, rounds fired, hit percentage, etc. To compare one hit by
> 20mm to one hit by AIM-9 would illustrate the difference.
And Red Baron gives breakdowns of all those factors.
> During A/A engagements in SEA, the gun had the most kills, but that
> (as Dweezil just mentioned) needs to be interpreted in terms of a
> range of factors such as aircraft type/equippage, mission, range of
> employment, circumstances, weather, location, force ratio, and even
> aircrew training. To take kill stats alone and draw the conclusion
> that the gun is a more effective weapon is erroneous.
See above, and my answer to John.
> >Sure. No one's suggesting that you do so. We didn't shoot down all
> >those MiG-17s with F-4s and F-105s by out-turning them. Neither
would
> >the F-104. None of them need to turn with them, although the 104 can
do
> >so better than the others at combat speeds, and can often do so long
> >enough to shoot them down. . . . Of course, they may be able to
> >spin around enough to return fire if they see you coming from far
enough
> >away, but with your performance advantage you can just go vertical
and
> >leave them gasping, out of energy.
>
> No! I've said before, the Featherduster result of 104 competitiveness
> against the F-86 was primarily a function of tactics, not turn rate.
> At 500 kts neither a 104 nor a 105 will be turning and tracking a
> MiG-17.
The F-86 pilots said that the 104s were able to track them while they
(the F-86s) were making high-g turns, at 450-500 kts. I'm sure that the
MiG-17 turns a bit better than the F-86H, but not that much. This is
the case where the F-86 knows the 104 is gunning for him, but can't get
out of the way. If the MiG is significantly slower (remember, the 104
pilots only turned with the F-86s if the latter were at M0.7 or faster),
then slashing attacks are the name of the game. F-105s used them, F-4s
used them, and F-104s used them.
>And, your defense alternative of "just go vertical and leave
> them gasping" may be attractive at some moments during engagement but
> isn't always possible. If you are the attacker, you can manage your
> energy to retain that option, but if you are the defender, you may not
> be in position to jettison, light up and zoom out.
Nor do you, if you're defending in a 104. If bounced, starting at 420
kts (Initial set-up conditions; unclear if this is CAS or TAS. Normally
the 104s would be cruising faster at combat altitudes) the 104s would
unload (actually neg-G accels to Mach 1 or so), jinking as necessary,
until out of Atoll range, then they'd do a spiral climb. This puts them
in clutter until out of range, and is exactly the same tactic
recommended and used by your own Wing, the 388th, with the 105.
> >No, high gun effectiveness was a result of high reliability, lack of
> >susceptibility to clutter (radar or IR), the ability to be used while
> >pulling high g against high g targets, short minimum range, and the
> >ability to be fired quickly.
>
> Aren't you the guy who keeps throwing up the stat about "no
> maneuvering engagements" occuring against MiG-17s? What this now about
> "pulling high g against high g targets"?
It ain't a maneuvering engagement, its pulling G until you can't pull
lead anymore, then unload and extend (see Scott's account below).
Here's the recommended tactics for the 105, from the 388th's tactics
manual:
"When anticipating an engagement with a MiG, the F-105 should always
keep the action below 16,000 feet, and the speed should never be allowed
to drop below 450KCAS.
"As you position for a firing pass on the MiG, do not attempt to
maneuver on the a/c itself unless you are close to gun range. Instead,
maneuver towards an optimum missile launch position in his blind 5-7
o'clock low position. From this position you can run him down if you
remain undetected, and perhaps maneuver with him slightly if his evasive
tactics are weak. Keep a high airspeed during this phase -- Mach 1.1
-1.3.
"Plan to use the AIM-9 first, and then press into gun range if
necessary. Press the attack until success or the MiG breaks. If he
does, he will appear to "swap ends" and you will definitely overshoot.
Fly your overshoot down and away into a separation maneuver using
maximum power. If the second element is in position to occupy the MiG,
look for a chance to reposition for another attack, but never try to
out-turn or outclimb a MiG."
Pretty much the same tactics as the 104 would use, except that the 104
has more g available and can come in slower if it wishes, and can also
spiral climb away. That isn't a "maneuvering engagement" to me.
> >Ed, What are the tactics you use against an a/c that's slower than
you,
> >armed only with a gun? Do you slow down so they can shoot you? No,
you
> >keep your speed up, and the choice of engaging/disengaging lies with
> >you. In addition, the low top speed of the MiG-17 compared to the
> >cruise speeds of our fighters means that it closes more slowly,
giving
> >more time to spot it compared to the MiG-21 (which had about a 1:1
ratio
> >against us, compared to an extremely lopsided ratio in our favor vs.
the
> >MiG-17). Virtually all of our Thud losses to MiG-17s were while
> >inbound, when the -17s had a chance of catching us.
> You enter the argument from the assumption that fighting MiGs was the
> primary objective. It wasn't. Rolling Thunder and Linebacker were
> bombing campaigns.
I overlook nothing of the sort. Show me an air campaign that _isn't_
primarily a bombing campaign. However, in this period, the MiGs had
become enough of a problem that the 8th stopped carrying bombs, and the
366th had to be taken off their CAS role in SVN and also used for
escort. That's a minimum of 16 F-4s dedicated A/A per strike mission
(typically one package from each Thud Wing). Late in the year, the
ratio's often higher. There are Commando Club missions where a single
strike flight has two flights of weasels and two flights of escorts to
protect it.
> You overlook the fact of intercept geometry--high
> operating speed makes intercepts more difficult, but geometry takes
> care of closure if done properly and the attacker enters the merge to
> a firing solution despite being a negative Vc.
No, I don't. High intercept speeds in the MiG-17 means controls too
stiff to move. Because of the lack of performance advantage of the
MiG-17 over even laden 105s, a slight error in the setup or the
maneuvering means you've blown the intercept. If they intercept
anywhere in the FQ, they get one (bad) shot, and the Thuds may get to
reply. Once the Thuds are past them, what are their chances of catching
them before bingo (and what are the escorts doing while all this is
going on)? The MiG-21 has a lot more leeway, because its speed
capability can compensate for greater setup errors, and it can blow
through the escorts from the rear.
> And, the fact that "all of our (105) losses to MiG-17s were while
> inbound" should again demonstrate the difference in philosophy of the
> NVNAF. They attacked bombers to deter them. They weren't into the
> "ace" thing.
No, it just demonstrates that the Thuds were moving fast unloaded and
the MiGs couldn't catch them. There were plenty of MiGs up post strike.
Most of the 105's MiG kills were on the way out, too. Partly this is
because the main mission was bombs on target first, but also they had a
much greater performance advantage then. When 105s were loaded and
tasked A/A, as they were for a while during this period, there shot
opportunites went up.
Here's Bob Scott's kill (from "And Kill MiGs"):
". . . as we pulled off the target and began our egress, we were pointed
right at the MiG base at Hoa Lac. We could see the MiGs taking off, and
knew we were in for a fight, since we intended to egress right over
their field!
". . . Salmon's element was jumped by a pair of MiG-21s as we approached
Hoa Lac. The 21s fired Atoll missiles, but missed . . . By the time we
got to Hoa Lac, the MiGs were up and ready to fight. All of a sudden, a
MiG-17 popped up in front of me. By this time we were tooling along at
something over 600 knots, so we had no trouble closing on the MiG.
"At that time, we were carrying a jamming pod on one O/B station, and an
[AIM-9] on the other O/B station. Once the MiG knew were behind him and
began maneuvering, I pretty much forgot about shooting the missile. We
were just pulling too many Gs to count on its working. If I were going
to get this MiG, it would have to be with the gun. As we closed on him,
a SAM site fired at us. We were forced to break hard right into the SAM
to force it to overshoot. As we came back right [left?], the MiG was 90
degrees off my nose [Sic. Presumably 90 deg. TCA]. I had just one
shot, and it was a Godawful deflection shot. I squeezed the trigger and
that 20mm Gatling gun ripped off 264 rounds in less than three seconds.
I don't know how many of those rounds got him, but I saw half of one
wing come off, and the MiG go into a violent spin as I flashed over the
top. I didn't see him go in, and we were not about to stick around to
verify that he did go in. [Confirmed by flight led by Chappie James,
which saw the a/c from hit to ground impact]."
This is a fairly typical kill by an F-105, although the deflection was
extreme. There's no way a Rolling Thunder-era missile could have been
used; as he says, the AIM-9B was out of envelope (so was every
Vietnam-era missile), and even if the AIM-7E could have
conceivably been in envelope, there's no way they could have gotten set
up for a shot before closing inside min. range. At no time was the
MiG-17 a threat, nor, barring instantaneous reflexes on the part of the
MiG pilot and a miraculous snapshot, would it have been if he'd missed;
they were going way too fast.
> >Quite agree, but you were the one saying that we had to have an
> >equivalent radar for A/A effectiveness.
>
> No. You were the one suggesting that an effective radar was a handicap
> because of weight and cross-section; that fuel and maneuverability
> were preferable. My contention was that a quality radar was essential
> for combat effectiveness not A/A effectiveness.
Fair enough. The question is, what's the trade-off? How
much fuel/performance are you willing to give up, and what
are your minimum requirements for range/features in with the radar?
> >>The 105 got kills because the MiGs attacked the
> >> attackers. (That, as you are well aware, is the essence of Bolo).
> >
> >As I said above, If that were true then we'd expect an equally large
> >number of kills from strike-loaded F-4s, and they don't exist.
>
> That's a function of doctrine. The bomb-loaded birds were supposed to
> go to the target and with CAP/escort available the light work was
> handled by them.
Sure. But the 105s got kills coming off target, with higher pK than the
missile only F-4s, especially when the 105s had time to set up A/A mode.
Th obvious conclusion is that F-105s set up for A/A would have been the
escorts of choice, compared to F-4s. And the Air Force actually did
this, during this period, with good results. When the MiGs settled down
some, the Thuds went back to bombing, because there was a shortage of
Thuds and they were better suited for that mission than the F-4s were.
So, one answer would have been to re-open the production line, instead
of building so many F-4s.
> > At the
> >time in question, the F-4s were tucked in as escorts with the strike,
> >one flight behind the first strike flight, the other following the
last
> >strike flight. The number of F-4 kills does go up, but it's escorts
not
> >F-4 strikers who are getting the kills, and they're flying right
along
> >with the 105s, except in the target area itself.
>
> Your experience appears to be different than mine. In 105s, the F-4s
> were bomb-loaded in the string and directed to jettison and engage.
> CAP was orbiting and the primary MiG defense. Unfortunately in '66 the
> Phantom Phlyers weren't noted for aggressiveness and usually the one
> flight of bomb-loaded F-4s in the string of five flights going to the
> target would abort for weather or something.
And your experience is typical of 1966, when MiGs were few and far
between. Such wasn't the case in 1967, and the F-4s had to be pulled
from carrying bombs and jettisoning as required and used as straight A/a
birds, because getting cleaned up and accelerating took too long, and
the MiGs (especially the 21s) were blowing through before the F-4s could
get their act together.
> In LB, the "escort" flew as outriggers to the bomber or chaffer
> string, not in line. With Disco, and the 555th usually operating on
> discrete frequency, the escort was most often used as BARCAP or herder
> to move the MiGs to the specialists. Occasional kills resulted when
> the MiGs got close to the bomber string before the CAP could engage.
Yup, and they tended to use F-4Es for escort, because they had guns (and
no Combat Tree until late).
John Carrier
the aircraft's success is right on the money. The gun system could and
would regularly jam under G, but the primary reason it rarely got the kill
was that invariably the A/C was flown through the 'winder envelope on the
way to guns.
Top Gun was not populated by former F-8 drivers. Most of the initial cadre
were IP's from VF-121 (West Coast F-4 RAG) flying VF-126 TA-4's.
R/ John
Dweezil Dwarftosser
[ snip ]
>You'll note that I also included in my previous comments the effects of
>RoE, NVN and U.S. tactics, etc. If we had been able to routinely take
>BVR shots, and if the MiGs had normally been operating at medium/high
>altitudes where ground clutter wasn't a problem, then both the pKs and
>the effectiveness of the various weapons, and their relative worth,
>would change. Hell, guarantee me a HO missiles-free option on a
>non-maneuvering medium/high altitude target every shot with a
>disengagement if we don't hit, and forget the gun: load me up with
>AIM-7s! Even allowing for its atrocious reliability (60-80% missile
>failures. Note, this does not include firings out of the envelope or
>misses, just malfunctions), the pK will roughly double and enough will
>hit to wittle down the opposition. That's just the scenario that was
>envisaged when the F-4 was designed, but that definitely wasn't the
>tactical environment over NVN, was it?
True; it was not - and it seems that the report you cite was quite
comprehensive as well. However, from my perspective, it also seems
that the report was written from an "aircrew" perspective. There's
nothing wrong with that; it is what they observed to be the problem,
after all. However, the use of cockpit observations alone might not
lead to determining the cause - but they are quite descriptive of the
symptom, instead.
[ more snips ]
>> 2- Of all the weapons mentioned, only the AIM-4D is worthy of the
>> "poor" characterization. Knowing what I do about a) the way AIM-7
>> aircraft systems were maintained back then, and b) the early missiles'
>> "touchy" nature concerning shock and vibration, and c) the proportion
>> of launches that were "out of the missile envelope", I can flatly
>> state that that ANY AIM-7 hit in VN was close to miraculous.
>> True, all of these things conspired to provide a much lower pK for the
>> AIM-7 than it really should have had - but the missiles were pretty
>> good; it was the aircraft that were bad, and ROE limitations.
>
>John, a weapon that will work perfectly under antiseptic test
>conditions, but won't work in the field, just isn't worth much.
Gospel truth as far as I'm concerned. At the same time, though, if
you employ a weapon outside of its design criteria more often than
within those parameters, you can't complain *too* much, unless it is
directed toward redefining the criteria for a more appropriate design.
Crews preferred the higher "g" capability of the AIM-7 over the AIM-9
- and that's good...but such capabilities don't mean much if you are
*way* outside of the system's successful guidance parameters.
>Unfortunately, that's exactly how our missiles were tested and rated for
>effectiveness then; any missile that failed to work as advertised was
>declared a "no-test," because clearly there'd been a malfunction or a
>maintenance problem. There aren't any no-tests in combat; it works or
>it doesn't.
One of the things I have often seen in the literature concerns the
pilot's complaints about a long delay in "tuning". While this was
cured forever in the AIM-7F ( via solid-state rather than the old
motor-driven cavity-tuner ) there was a fix available for the old
problem that never was considered: turning on CW at the start of a
POSSIBLE engagement, and using a waveguide switch to divert the energy
from the antenna until ARM time. This would have prevented early RHAW
warning of guidance to the enemy, and it would exclude what could be a
important delay in making the missile ready. ( Leaving the guidance
ON all the time, "just in case", was not a good idea.)
Since there could be considerable differences in "tune time" of one
missile vs. another, the first missile "UP" might not be the first in
the prescribed firing order. This wasn't really a problem; the "dark"
missile would be stepped over in the first firing pass - but could be
available for a second time through. I wonder how they counted these?
>All of the factors you mention are part of the pK, and can be (and in
>Red Baron, are) separated out. For instance, because of its extremely
>restricted envelope, the AIM-9B had a far higher proportion of
>out-of-envelope firings (28%) than the AIM-7 (11%) or the AIM-9D (13%).
>Despite this, it achieved roughly double the pK of the AIM-7, because it
>was much more reliable than the AIM-7, and could be fired faster:
>roughly 1 second (delay after trigger squeeze) from acquisition vice
>5.25-5.5 sec. for a full system launch AIM-7 launch (4 seconds for
>speedgate settling, 1.25-1.5 sec. delay [varies depending on the source]
>after trigger squeeze).
Though it came after LB, the AIM-7F pretuning was virtually instant.
>For that matter, there's a couple of other factors which don't count in
>the AIM-7's pK, and yet which are clearly part of its effectiveness as a
>weapon system: missiles which detune are automatically cut out of the
>firing sequence, yes? Therefore, even though they are unable to be used
>and thus have 'failed' for purposes of combat, they don't count as a
>firing attempt because they aren't actually 'fired.' This happened on
>numerous occasions.
These "detuners" might be available on a subsequent attempt - and yes,
one that blinks out is stepped over. I realize this may be poor
consolation to the guy who REALLY needed it to work, and saw it blink
out just when he pulled the trigger - but the decision to NOT count it
as a firing attempt is actually a sound one, unless a malfunction in
the system is later confirmed on the ground.
[ snip ]
[ Concerning the Red Baron report: ]
>"Recommendations:
>
>"The largest sub-categories of determinable failures for missiles fired
>out of parameters were launches attempted at less than minimum range and
>at greater than maximum range. Only limited confidence can be placed in
>the computed firing parameters presented to the pilot since they are
>approximations of the launch envelope for a non-maneuvering target and
>are of minimal use against a maneuvering target. The fire-control
>computer should be modified to present the pilot with maneuvering, as
>well as non-maneuvering, firing parameters." [Done, right John?]
Actually, the old ANALOG target intercept computer was quite adept at
this, particularly in the "pursuit" phase - which is where almost all
of the VN shots occurred. The problem was the same as that seen in
the LCOSS reticle on a manuevering target: the gunsite is all over the
glass, making it real hard to put that predicted "hit" point on top of
the target by pointing the nose. With the gun, "reticle stiffness"
could be used to eliminate these excursions - but there was no
"smoothing" mode available on missile aim dots, up close.
The considerably "slower" DIGITAL computer ( which again did not
become available until after VN ) introduced a lot of "slop" into the
equation due to the serial ( rather than simultaneous ) nature of a
digital computer. The crews liked these "lazy" dots much better - but
it unlikely if it actually would improve "hit" percentages. Besides:
the new TIC used what can only be described as "CCIP mode for
missiles": SHOOT lites that gave the pilot a psychological edge in
thinking that the man, rather than the machine was doing the shooting.
>"Another problem, related to the cockpit, was the lack of an indication
>that the missiles had detuned. A circuit, such as that in the F-4E
>advanced versions, should be incorporated into all F-4s to indicate that
>a missile has detuned."
That was a simple fix. They moved from a "latching" circuit in the
tuning drive to one that simply "passed through" the speedgate lockup.
>"The missile radar system should be modified to minimize the possiblity
>of the missile locking onto ground clutter after launch. the radar
>breaking lock, particularly at low altitudes, resulted in ineffective
>firings.
I doubt that anyone could tell the difference between the missile
locking to ground clutter ( which I really doubt ever happened ) and
the radar breaking lock/moving to memory track. It would take a
telemetry package on the missile to know for sure.
>"The inability to maintain illumination of the target when firing in
>boresight mode while maneuvering resulted in several target misses
>[Understatement of the year. Of the first 65 boresight launches in RT,
>there was one hit. I think this was in Bolo, as I have an account of a
>kill in boresight, using manual track]. A provision should be made for
>a greater area of radar coverage in this mode." [John has previously
>described how a weapons tech had cobbled together a boresight flood horn
>(in Germany? Korat?) to solve this problem, and this was incorporated in
>the F-15 from the start]
The flood horn was first used at Combat Sage in Clark AB, Phillipines
on an F-4C by the 1st Test Squadron in 1966 or '67. After project
CONSTANT HIT ( which appears to have been inspired by Red Baron, but
looked for maintenance and crew tactics solutions ) the "super search"
mode was installed for the purpose. Basically, it was a three-bar
wide-angle vertical sweep that excluded a significant look-down from
the sweep.
A word about manual track: thoguh it required a skilled WSO and lots
of coordination between cockpits, it was an excellent way to get a
kill...as long as the bad guy wasn't crossing the nose at 90 degrees
and 500 knots. Since the WSO controlled the antenna pointing and Vc,
it gave the nose gunner some very smooth launch parameters - exactly
the type of thing the really wanted. It wasn't necessary to have a
"broke" radar to use manual track.
- John T.
Ed Rasimus
clue, but I'll admit it with regard to the F-4/AIM-7 system. (Of
course, it's just between you and me and if you tell anyone else, I'll
deny I ever said it--especially, don't let Guy Alcala know!)
I went to war in the F-4 after a "Cat IV" checkout which was 45 days
and just under 30 hours flying time in F-4Cs at Luke. I arrived at
Korat to fly E's which had a considerably different weapons
system--and within the first month the wing converted to TCTO-556 with
yet a different cockpit configuration.
I learned about Dive Toss fairly quickly and didn't have much trouble
taking advantage of the better radar, but that can be related to the
fact that I'd done a lot of radar work in the 105. I don't know how
guys whose previous experience had been in the F-100 or 86 were able
to get much out of the scope after a short course checkout.
My understanding of the AIM-7E was pretty much that the WSO would
lockup and I'd shoot when the dot was centered and the circle got big.
In most instances I'd be swatting at the plastic tubing extension we
all put on the weapons select switch (or after -556 flipping the pinky
switch) to go to AIM-9 or guns because we couldn't get a lock, we were
inside parameters or the missiles didn't "tune"--whatever that meant.
I could understand "growl" and Sidewinder boresighting, and guns
tracking was natural but things like English Bias and "interlocks"
were all Greek to me.
Training never improved much during the five years I spent flying
Phantoms. The details of AIM-7E-2 employment were locked in the safes
in the Wing Weapons shop and only doled out grudgingly by the "target
arms." The secrets of intercept geometry were readily available and
with practice even an ol' ground attack puke like me could figure out
how to "hot up" an intercept to keep from tail chasing, but the
details of even the bit checks were never well understood. (What was
the significance of making the dot run around between the two circles
anyway??)
With the establishment of the Aggressors and wide-spread emphasis on
DACT, I got to improve my BFM skills and apply some tactics but the
concentration was on WVR maneuver to guns or a lagging Sidewinder
shot. We still never got regular, detailed, tactically applied
instruction on AIM-7 parameters and employment.
I've got great sympathy now for guys like you, Dweezil, who were
trying to decipher what went wrong when some sloping forehead fighter
pilot complained that the #$%#!*& missile didn't work. I never did
have a clue about what the Sparrow was supposed to do or how it did
it.
Paul J. Adam
writes
> Even if a gun is retained in case the opponent of the moment
>has effective countermeasures for all our missiles (apparently every
>AIM-9M6/7 that had flares deployed against it in DS missed), I don't
>think the weight and especially volume of a Gatling is justified; I
>think a single barrel revolver of 25-30mm makes more sense, and is more
>useful (and safer, because of greater slant ranges) for A/G work.
Oddly enough, the JSF project appear to have opted for the Mauser
BK27 revolver cannon - maybe for the same reasons?
--
There are four kinds of homicide: felonious, excusable, justifiable and
praiseworthy...
Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Dweezil Dwarftosser
>You'll seldom get a tactical aviator to confess that he didn't have a
>clue, but I'll admit it with regard to the F-4/AIM-7 system. (Of
>course, it's just between you and me and if you tell anyone else, I'll
>deny I ever said it--especially, don't let Guy Alcala know!)
Yeah, yeah. That was LAST month's duress code; this month, it is
"green kryptonite". So - is this really you, or is it Guy in
disguise?
>I went to war in the F-4 after a "Cat IV" checkout which was 45 days
>and just under 30 hours flying time in F-4Cs at Luke. I arrived at
>Korat to fly E's which had a considerably different weapons
>system--and within the first month the wing converted to TCTO-556 with
>yet a different cockpit configuration.
>
>I learned about Dive Toss fairly quickly and didn't have much trouble
>taking advantage of the better radar, but that can be related to the
>fact that I'd done a lot of radar work in the 105. I don't know how
>guys whose previous experience had been in the F-100 or 86 were able
>to get much out of the scope after a short course checkout.
The best - and "politically" the most courageous - DCM I ever knew was
an older "Hun" driver named (Col.) Paul Rankin. He was a real
believer in quality aircraft systems ( "the crews flying them deserve
nothing less" ) and backed the statement up - while clinging
religiously to the fighter pilot credo that rear seaters were little
more than unecessary passengers. Though he no longer flew so much as
a cross-country (as a "passenger" himself), he knew that F-4 like no
other, including the radar and RHAW. His successful maintenance
policies bore real fruit at a time when tactical air was beginning to
look at sortie goals ( whether the jet worked or not ) as the ONLY
measurement criteria for a wing. With his unflinching support, it was
proven that you could have both: reliable jets and high sortie numbers
- if the planes weren't "taken away" from the wrench-benders before
completion rather than use a spare.
>My understanding of the AIM-7E was pretty much that the WSO would
>lockup and I'd shoot when the dot was centered and the circle got big.
>In most instances I'd be swatting at the plastic tubing extension we
>all put on the weapons select switch (or after -556 flipping the pinky
>switch) to go to AIM-9 or guns because we couldn't get a lock, we were
>inside parameters or the missiles didn't "tune"--whatever that meant.
So THAT'S where all those tubes on the switches came from ! Next
thing, someone will own up to covering all of the cockpit lamps with
little pieces of OD duct tape for night missions...
Although it may have been tactically inadvisable, just squeezing and
HOLDING the trigger once a larger circle was obtained might have
resulted in more hits on a manuevering target. We'll never know - but
that is how the system was designed to function, even with a "hot dot"
due to the target's jinking.
>I could understand "growl" and Sidewinder boresighting, and guns
>tracking was natural but things like English Bias and "interlocks"
>were all Greek to me.
If your father was an immigrant Irishman, like mine, you grew up to
know what "English Bias" was... ;-) Actually, it was best described
as "anticipated g-loading" required to put the missile inside the RF
beam when launched at an off-boresight or high angular-rate target.
It became a really big player as range to target got smaller.
>Training never improved much during the five years I spent flying
>Phantoms. The details of AIM-7E-2 employment were locked in the safes
>in the Wing Weapons shop and only doled out grudgingly by the "target
>arms." The secrets of intercept geometry were readily available and
>with practice even an ol' ground attack puke like me could figure out
>how to "hot up" an intercept to keep from tail chasing, but the
>details of even the bit checks were never well understood. (What was
>the significance of making the dot run around between the two circles
>anyway??)
Bit 3 Dot Rot(ation) gave a really great indication of angle tracking
lag. It added a constant error to angle track, and the antenna tried
to chase it and reduce the lag to zero. If it ever did, it was bad.
( Dot rot stopped.) If it lagged too much, it would eventually drift
off and break lockon. You couldn't see it from the cockpit ( or with
the radome closed ) - but the antenna would do a little circular dance
about a point.
Contrast that indication against a more modern aircraft's fault
detection: an "error number" shows up in a maintenance panel AFTER
flight. Often, such an error only tests a portion of the circuitry,
rather the entire system's ability to track; it can't find a bad rate
gyro on the antenna, because the antenna never physically moved during
the computerized test. Sometimes, "newer" isn't necessarily better.
About sharing knowledge among the pilot community: I once found it
particularly aggravating, when I read an incident report about an ANG
crew trying to get a visual ID on a bogey off the coast in heavy
weather. They splashed a lost Cessna with four souls on board when
they rammed him with a wing tank. As I read the aircrew statements,
it became clear from his description of the radar indications that
some WCS toad had aligned an antenna resolver 180 degrees out; the aim
dot went in the wrong direction, but seemed to straighten up as they
closed. ( A real "classic" indication.)
On page four or five, there was the investigating board's conclusion:
Pilot error, with not a mention of equipment failure. All attempts to
correct this "mitigating factor" injustice were shot down. The
experts had made their decision.
>With the establishment of the Aggressors and wide-spread emphasis on
>DACT, I got to improve my BFM skills and apply some tactics but the
>concentration was on WVR maneuver to guns or a lagging Sidewinder
>shot. We still never got regular, detailed, tactically applied
>instruction on AIM-7 parameters and employment.
I don't know what to say - except that the AIM-7 envelope was so
dynamic, there were no hard-and-fast rules about employment, other
than max aerodynamic range - and even that is somewhat dependent on
dynamic factors at launch. I'll bet they use the same "works good,
lasts a long time, you don't need to know" philosophy for the AIM-120.
( And not a bit of it has to do with security...)
>I've got great sympathy now for guys like you, Dweezil, who were
>trying to decipher what went wrong when some sloping forehead fighter
>pilot complained that the #$%#!*& missile didn't work. I never did
>have a clue about what the Sparrow was supposed to do or how it did
>it.
Well, thanks for the compliment - but I think the guys today have it a
lot tougher; there is no way for even the really determined to learn
more about it...on either side of the debriefing table. "Newer" ain't
necessarily "better".
- John T.
g_al...@hotmail.com
"John Carrier" <j...@netdoor.com> wrote:
> Comment that the training of the Crusader pilots was the primary
factor in
> the aircraft's success is right on the money. The gun system could
and
> would regularly jam under G, but the primary reason it rarely got the
kill
> was that invariably the A/C was flown through the 'winder envelope on
the
> way to guns.
And just in case Ed still thinks that the F-8's success was due to its
role, let me just throw in the stats for them and the navy F-4s in RT
(Stats from a navy statisical study quoted in "On Yankee Station"):
F-8, 18 kills in 25 engagements, kills per engagement 0.72.
F-4B/J, 12 kills in 39 engagements, kills per engagment 0.30.
Now comes Top Gun during the bombing halt.
F-4B/J, 1972-73, 24 kills in 23 engagements, k/e 1.04.
In contrast, the Air Force F-4 kills/engagement for the whole war is
0.14. Some of this is undoubtedly due to the fact that the AF F-4s
were more likely to be carrying bombs when jumped, but navy F-4s also
carried bombs (Cunningham scored three kills on a mission where he'd
dropped Rockeyes, and was still carrying his C/L tank and TERs).
(Note, a list compiled by Robert Lawson, editor of "The Hook" magazine,
first published there in 1983 and reprinted in Lou Drendel's "And Kill
MiGs," shows a total of 15 kills by Navy F-4s in the 1965-68 period.
One is Chicom, and may not be included in the official total. Two more
are publicly listed as "probables," with a note in Lawson's list,
"confirmed but not released." Even if we assume that these "unofficial"
kills went 1 for 1 and there were no others in this category, then the
navy F-4's kills/engagement in RT would go up to no more than 0.35 or so
(15/42).
> Top Gun was not populated by former F-8 drivers. Most of the initial
cadre
> were IP's from VF-121 (West Coast F-4 RAG) flying VF-126 TA-4's.
>
> R/ John
Certainly there was Phantom initial cadre in Top Gun (guys like John
Smith). However, ISTR that there were also ex-F-8 guys involved, in
its formation if nothing else. But I won't swear to it without checking
my sources. Anyone got Wilcox' "Scream of Eagles" handy?
g_al...@hotmail.com
thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
> You'll seldom get a tactical aviator to confess that he didn't have a
> clue, but I'll admit it with regard to the F-4/AIM-7 system. (Of
> course, it's just between you and me and if you tell anyone else, I'll
> deny I ever said it--especially, don't let Guy Alcala know!)
I saw that, Ed!
>
> I went to war in the F-4 after a "Cat IV" checkout which was 45 days
> and just under 30 hours flying time in F-4Cs at Luke. I arrived at
> Korat to fly E's which had a considerably different weapons
> system--and within the first month the wing converted to TCTO-556 with
> yet a different cockpit configuration.
>
> I learned about Dive Toss fairly quickly and didn't have much trouble
> taking advantage of the better radar, but that can be related to the
> fact that I'd done a lot of radar work in the 105. I don't know how
> guys whose previous experience had been in the F-100 or 86 were able
> to get much out of the scope after a short course checkout.
>
> My understanding of the AIM-7E was pretty much that the WSO would
> lockup and I'd shoot when the dot was centered and the circle got big.
> In most instances I'd be swatting at the plastic tubing extension we
> all put on the weapons select switch (or after -556 flipping the pinky
> switch) to go to AIM-9 or guns because we couldn't get a lock, we were
> inside parameters or the missiles didn't "tune"--whatever that meant.
>
> I could understand "growl" and Sidewinder boresighting, and guns
> tracking was natural but things like English Bias and "interlocks"
> were all Greek to me.
>
> Training never improved much during the five years I spent flying
> Phantoms. The details of AIM-7E-2 employment were locked in the safes
> in the Wing Weapons shop and only doled out grudgingly by the "target
> arms." The secrets of intercept geometry were readily available and
> with practice even an ol' ground attack puke like me could figure out
> how to "hot up" an intercept to keep from tail chasing, but the
> details of even the bit checks were never well understood. (What was
> the significance of making the dot run around between the two circles
> anyway??)
>
> With the establishment of the Aggressors and wide-spread emphasis on
> DACT, I got to improve my BFM skills and apply some tactics but the
> concentration was on WVR maneuver to guns or a lagging Sidewinder
> shot. We still never got regular, detailed, tactically applied
> instruction on AIM-7 parameters and employment.
Assuming that Ed's training (or rather lack thereof) in AIM-7 employment
was typical of his era (it does seem a bit better earlier on, when the
CCTS was still being used), you can see why the MiGCAP role was given to
FWS school people. Even so, the AIM-7's basic unreliability (prior to
the solid state, microcircuit 7F and subsequent) was still a big
problem. Take Steve Ritchie's second kill. Here's a guy with 3,000
hours who did 195 missions on his first tour 95 as a fast FAC, was a
FWS grad and instructor, bwefore going back for his second tour After
Bob Lodge was killed on 10 May he takes over as Wing weapons Officer, so
if anyone's going to know how to employ the AIM-7E2, it's him (and it's
cklear from his comments about his 3rd and 4th kills that he was very
aware of the missile envelope, launch G, etc.). anyway, on his second
kill he ripples fires his first two Sparrows, in good parameters. the
targets start to turn left, but the first missile corkscrews off to the
right; the second missile blows up upon motor burnout. He fires two
more, still in good parameters. The third missile blows up about 500
feet from the target a/c, the fourth hits and kills. He actually did a
bit better than average, because at least all four of his missiles came
off the a/c and the motor fired: there's a farily good chance that, out
of four, at least one wouldn't.
Ritchie undoubtedly knew far more about the AIM-7 than the average jock,
and what was his record? 5/13. His double kill in July was near
miraculous (certainly he didn't expect the second missile to hit). The
interesting thing, though, is that, for at least 4 of his five kills, he
was in excellent AIM-9 parameters. The double kill shots were extremely
tough ones, and since he had AIM-9Es on they might well have been unable
to make the turn. A month later, he would have had AIM-9Js, which
defintely could have. Also, the shots wouldn't have started from
such abad positions if he'd fired AIM-9s, because the target a/c was
out-turning him while he was waiting the four seconds required for
speedgate settling. As he himself says, in the case of his first shot
the target a/c was 5 deg. off his nose at lock-on, but because he as
restricted in the G he could pull, it was 40 deg. off (i.e. he was
firing from a lag) when the missile went. The second shot was even
worse, for the same reason.
g_al...@hotmail.com
wc...@usa.net (Dweezil Dwarftosser) wrote:
> On Thu, 10 Jun 1999 15:36:07 GMT, thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
>
<snip>
> >My understanding of the AIM-7E was pretty much that the WSO would
> >lockup and I'd shoot when the dot was centered and the circle got
big.
> >In most instances I'd be swatting at the plastic tubing extension we
> >all put on the weapons select switch (or after -556 flipping the
pinky
> >switch) to go to AIM-9 or guns because we couldn't get a lock, we
were
> >inside parameters or the missiles didn't "tune"--whatever that meant.
>
> So THAT'S where all those tubes on the switches came from ! Next
> thing, someone will own up to covering all of the cockpit lamps with
> little pieces of OD duct tape for night missions...
ISTR Robin Olds mentioning doing that, or something similar. No wait,
he said they flew visual low-altitude (he claimed 50 feet; I think
we can assume that his perspective was somewhat off, or he was
exaggerating slightly in most cases) night missions with the front
cockpit completely blacked out so the pilot could see the groiund
better. Might as well blame him:-)
> Although it may have been tactically inadvisable, just squeezing and
> HOLDING the trigger once a larger circle was obtained might have
> resulted in more hits on a manuevering target. We'll never know - but
> that is how the system was designed to function, even with a "hot dot"
> due to the target's jinking.
In Robin Olds' combat report for Bolo (included in the 8th TFW's secret
report along with reports by all the other pilots who scored, as well as
some others, and now declassified) he states that he "pressed and
released, pressed and held," on a ripple shot. Unfortunately, the radar
broke lock almost immediately due to closing inside minimum range, and
the missiles went ballistic. So it seems that at least some pilots were
aware of that aspect of the system.
g_al...@hotmail.com
wc...@usa.net (Dweezil Dwarftosser) wrote:
> On Wed, 09 Jun 1999 21:53:41 GMT, g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
Which is why the navy developed the maneuvering technique with
interlocks out, clutter switch in override, and pulling lead until the
target was tangent to the radome. The steering dot was ignored (the
pilots didn't want to take their eyes off the target in any case).
<snip>
My reading of the report is that it was manual range track only that was
used in this instance, with the antenna in boresight. Here, maybe I
misunderstand it, so you can judge for yourself. Detailing all the
shots taken and the results, the Bolo report states [I'll just include
the AIM-7 stats]:
Attempted missile launches: 19
Missiles launched: 18 [It seems likely that the AIM-7s used on
Bolo were checked and/or cherry picked before loading.]
Aircraft fired: 7
Separate firings: 10
Ripple firings: 7
Single firings: 3 [there's a problem with the total. It
adds up to 17, not 18]
Weapons guided: 9
Weapons not guided: 5
Weapons not observed: 4
MiG's destroyed: 4
Of the single launches, it states that one a/c only had three AIM-7s
because one of the launchers was bad, so its second attempt only used
one missile. They were briefed to fire two missile ripples.
"In the other two single weapon launches, one case is unknown since no
maintenance malfunctions could be found and in the other case two
resistors in the launcher firing circuit were found cracked. The
remaining 7 launches were all in ripples of two and produced all the
AIM-7E kills. So, of 19 attempted launches 18 weapons were actually
launched for a 95% probability of launch [higher than normal for the
AIM-7. See my comments above.]
"Of the 18 weapons launched 9 guided for a 50% probability of single
weapon guidance given launch. Of the remaining 9 weapons, 5 were
considered as no guides and the remaining 4 were not observed. One of
the 5 no guides was actually a missile failure. The missile guided
about halfway to the target and then pitched up and disintegrated. Some
of the 4 not observed may have actually guided, but cannot be accounted
for. None of the single weapon launches produced guidance.
"Some of the no-guides and not observed weapons are believed to be a
function of the relatively high "G" conditions at the time of launch.
The majority of the weapons were launched at 3 "G" or higher. This is
especially true of those weapons not observed. In one case the first
weapon in a salvo of two destroyed the target and the second weapon
guided through the debris. All the MiGs destroyed by AIM-7E's were with
ripple firings. On 7 ripple firings 4 MiGs were destroyed. In one
case, the weapons were fired at minimum range and the radar broke lock
just after launch [Olds]. Therefore, only six ripple firings actually
had a chance to destroy. Of these 6 launches 4 MiGs were destroyed for
a 67% pK given a ripple firing of two weapons. All weapons were
launched at 25 to 45 deg. Track crossing angles and with positive
closing rates. The following is a summary of the weapons control system
switchology used for each missile:
"Nine of the weapons were launched using full system, auto tracking,
interlocks out, clutter to override and pulling lead as recommended in
the navy maneuvering target test. Of these nine weapons, 4 guided, 3
were no guides, one was not observed, and 1 MiG was killed.
"Six weapons were launched using full system, auto tracking, interlocks
in, clutter normal and Aim dot centered. Of these six weapons, 3
guided, 2 were no guides, 1 was not observed and 2 MiGs were destroyed.
"Three weapons were launched from one a/c on boresight, manual track,
interlocks out and holding pipper on target. The pipper was held on
target to missile impact. Of these three weapons, 2 guided, one was not
observed, and 1 MiG was destroyed."
"generally, the procedure of engagement was to visually sight the MiG,
identify, lock on in the boresight mode and then switch to full system
and fire two Sparrows in ripple."
Aaaah, typer's cramp! :-)
Cradlets
kept coming to my mind as I read... too bad the military insists on that
archaic, stupid division of enlisted and officer (no fraternization). I saw so
many write-ups over the years I worked on F-4Es, C-130Es and C-141Bs that if
only we enlisted guys would have been able to "hang out" with the jocks after
the day's flying, could have been resolved in such a way as to make everyone's
job easier. So many times I didn't have a clue WHAT the aircrew was trying to
say was wrong with the system. It often seemed they really didn't know HOW to
use the system properly. And so many times I felt like I knew things about
the systems I worked on, that if I had been able to explain it to the jocks,
they'd have been better able to use the equipment. Just think if Ed could have
picked Dweezil's brain back then, the F-4/AIM-7 wouldn't have been a mystery to
him at all. Sometimes sticking to a time-honored tradition can be a detriment.
Scott Wilson
wal...@oneimage.com
>On Thu, 10 Jun 1999 15:36:07 GMT, thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:>
Yeah, the AIM7 knowledge wasn't well presented to the aircrews
even in the full 6 month RTU. We did luck at at HST because the
Wing Wps people were dedicated. I had an advantage in that I had been
an ADC Wpns Instructor - went through Tyndall back in 63 and a lot
of the old info carried over.
The good crews in the 31st TFW could meet the F5 Aggressors head on,
pitch back and 'face' the Aggressor with a pair of AIM7s using lots of
crew coordination - gyro-out lockon, 5 second count and Zap along with
the English bias . . .
556 mod really nicend things up - i can remeber the 'fingesr drill'
trying to use the AIM4 with a tracking seeker to get good lead before
launch in a tight turing hassle. I wonder who thought up that jewel . .
it sure wasn't user-friendly.
I'll never figure out why the wheels went away from the circle-of-
diamonds reticle in the A4 gunsight, either. That 50 mil reticle in the
F4 was strictly for dummies.
As for the missiles - once the flight line tropps stopped treating
them like iron bombs and more like they were their own stereo sets the
reliability improved immensely. I remember the first time I saw an
unsprung bomb trailer laoded with AIM7s bouncing over the old tank track
a DCM laid across the road to shake rocks out of the tires . . . took
a lot of talking to make our guy change his mind.
wal...@oneimage.com
>In article <7jmnp2$1p$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, g_al...@hotmail.com>writes
I think the Gatling gun M61 is one of the best and most lethal
air to air weapons ever istalled on an airplane. it offered a snap-shot
capability that was effective. A single revolver cannon could never do that.
As for weight, yeah, if you want 30mm; you get a huge thing like the GAU8(?)
in the A10. But if weight is a problem, look at the F100 with 4 M39s. That
installation was both bigger and heavier than the M61.
The only reason the present 20mm ammo doesn't reach out as far is lousy
ballistics; it was designed for a max of a 2-second time-of-flight - specs at
that time, and is rather stubby for the bore diameter. But it does the job.
Using a SUU23 pod gun on an F4D I put 100 out of 300 rounds into the target
in a single pass starting firing at about 4500 feet - not too shabby for gov't work.
The M61 at high rate puts out 6000 rpm; that's where the snap-shot efectiveness
comes from. A better ballistic projectile would add to the slant range, yes, but I
noticed no problems using the gun to 'prep' AA sites at the neginning of a dive bomb
pass, using the high-angle strafe tactics I had learned at Nellis in the F86 and sight
settings from the -34. BTW the gun also fired up a T55 in MR1 - a good solid 100 rounds
into the engine gratings in a 30 degree dive pass lit him up just fine.
I suspect the JSF is going to be used more for anti-armor with that bigger bore cannon.
And it can't carry the A10's gun and go fast for long range without being as big or bigger
than an F111. 1100-1200 rpm vs 6000 rpm - or 100 per second - means more misses . . .
Dweezil Dwarftosser
Thanks for the kudos, Scott - but "way back then" none of us knew the
real story - including me. It wasn't until the APM-307 ( that monster
anechoic chamber that went over the nose in radar cal ) before the
wrench-benders figured out most of it.
Since most folks don't know what I'm talking about here...the
AN/APM-307 was a full-fledged "flight simulator" - but it was the
aircraft which was faked into thinking it was flying - not the guys in
the seats. Manually programmable, it could generate a real,
manuevering radar target at any altitude/direction/velocity we
desired. Automatic programs generated a series of "bogeys" - and as
far as the aircraft was concerned, we fired 16 "real" AIM-7s at them
in four passes - while the machine checked that all of the signals
that came out of the missile umbilicals were right...in real time.
Since we were radiating into the chamber, it also checked the RF
characteristics of both the pulse radar and the AIM-7 guidance.
( It also worked really well for checking Dive Toss bombing...)
It was the ultimate test set - and couldn't be easily fudged. It
tested the entire aircraft as a harmonized SYSTEM, rather than just
portions of it - and printed out both the good and bad on paper,
instead of relying on someone saying "It was good when I looked at it,
Sarge !"
- John T.
Dweezil Dwarftosser
>Assuming that Ed's training (or rather lack thereof) in AIM-7 employment
>was typical of his era (it does seem a bit better earlier on, when the
>CCTS was still being used), you can see why the MiGCAP role was given to
>FWS school people. Even so, the AIM-7's basic unreliability (prior to
>the solid state, microcircuit 7F and subsequent) was still a big
>problem.
I just have to clarify this, as emphatically as I can: there were two
reasons why a significant proportion of AIM-7s failed in VN.
The first is that NOBODY knew enough about HOW it worked, including
the maintenance guys. There were plenty of individuals who would
mis-align resolvers on a broke jet so that the BIT checks LOOKED like
it would work. ( was much easier to do than an a good alignment which
required a lot of test equipment hauled out, and an hour or so...)
The RF (test) equipment was such that you never really knew if what
you were looking at was right; you could tweak a bit here and there
so it fulfilled the T.O. specs within a limited range - but was it
good outside of that range ? NO ONE knew.
The second reason is that the aircrews - and that included the FWS
grads - relied on empirical wizardry, rather than fact in formulating
their tactics. If Joe Shmoe got a good shot by tapping out "zippity
do-dah" on the mic button in Morse code, it became part of everyone's
repertoire. I applaud their valiant efforts to make omelets out of
broken eggs ( they KNEW that most of their shots were out-of-limits,
after all...) but I never understood why they tried to apply gun-style
ballistics to something that didn't work that way, or their insistence
upon delaying even the activation of the guidance system until well
below the minimum REALLY EFFECTIVE range of the missiles...then
complaining that it took "too long" for the things to come off.
( Obviously, there were many times in combat when things happened too
fast, and they had to "just do it" with the conditions at hand...but
I'm not talking about those, here.)
The big-winged AIM-7-E-2 could make tighter turns than previous
models, yes. But the really big difference was how close it could
arm; nice feature to have in a pinch...but that doesn't mean that
you HAVE TO paint yourself into that dangerous corner before firing.
I am absolutely convinced that much of it was that "fighter jock
machismo" which demanded an up-close-and-personal duel; undoubtedly,
some men paid for this pride with their lives, unnecessarily.
> Take Steve Ritchie's second kill. Here's a guy with 3,000
>hours who did 195 missions on his first tour 95 as a fast FAC, was a
>FWS grad and instructor, bwefore going back for his second tour After
>Bob Lodge was killed on 10 May he takes over as Wing weapons Officer, so
>if anyone's going to know how to employ the AIM-7E2, it's him (and it's
>cklear from his comments about his 3rd and 4th kills that he was very
>aware of the missile envelope, launch G, etc.).
I really don't want to take anything away from the man - he probably
was the best of the best at the time, and I'm sure he had the rare
ability to "feel" what was the optimum method to attack - but there is
no way to learn it from reading a graph or table in the -34 weapons
manual. ( There were somewhere between 20 and 40 variables, all of
them interactive, that produced THIS missile's "kill" envelope, on
THIS shot, THIS time. ) Ritchie was good to start with - and got
better as he learned through experience. Along the way, he learned to
"feel" how to employ this weapon effectively - IMO, anyway.
However, let me make one point: if a pilot with 20/20 vision could see
the target - even if only as an otherwise-unidentifiable dot against
the background of sky - he already has lost most of the advantage of
the AIM-7, and is using just a fraction of its "reliable" envelope.
It is even worse if he hesitates actuating the guidance/tuning.
( There *was* a delay while they tuned up - and it was highly variable
between one aircraft channel/missile and another - so to hesitate
turning 'em on until you absolutely need to pull the trigger NOW, is
just enhancing the chance of failure, in my book. Once the bad guy
knew you were on him, why wait - when the closer you got, the worse
your chance of hitting him ? )
>kill he ripples fires his first two Sparrows, in good parameters. the
>targets start to turn left, but the first missile corkscrews off to the
>right; the second missile blows up upon motor burnout.
Sounds like an antenna resolver 180 degrees out of phase.
> He fires two
>more, still in good parameters. The third missile blows up about 500
>feet from the target a/c, the fourth hits and kills. He actually did a
>bit better than average, because at least all four of his missiles came
>off the a/c and the motor fired: there's a farily good chance that, out
>of four, at least one wouldn't.
We found out why, and fixed that problem. The launchers had two 1.7
ohm ( I remember them well ) resistors in-line with the EJECT
cartridges ( to boot the missile down out of the well ) and going to
the motor fire connector. They acted like fuses - and would burn, if
shorted...but they rarely became an open circuit. The voltmeters used
by the load toads and WCS would read a few millivolts less than the
28vdc applied - but a burnt one (resistor) wouldn't let through enough
current to actually fire the carts. BTW - it was 1973 before the test
equipment that could identify this particular problem came about...and
none of them ( APM-307 ) ever got closer to S.E.A. than Clark AB.
>
>Ritchie undoubtedly knew far more about the AIM-7 than the average jock,
>and what was his record? 5/13.
And the shameful part is that it could have been better - with better
maintenance and a better understanding of how it really worked.
The only reason I say that last one is because I was there when we
used to drive nails with rocks. It worked lots better when we started
to use hammers - but the nails were identical in both cases.
I just hope we aren't driving nails with computerized rocks in today's
aircraft.
- John T.
g_al...@hotmail.com
wal...@oneimage.com wrote:
> "Paul J. Adam" <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> >In article <7jmnp2$1p$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, g_al...@hotmail.com>writes
> >>snip:
> I think the Gatling gun M61 is one of the best and most lethal
> air to air weapons ever istalled on an airplane. it offered a
snap-shot
> capability that was effective. A single revolver cannon could never do
that.
> As for weight, yeah, if you want 30mm; you get a huge thing like the
GAU8(?)
> in the A10. But if weight is a problem, look at the F100 with 4 M39s.
That
> installation was both bigger and heavier than the M61.
Hey, Walt, for its time I agree that the 20mm M61 was good. As to RoF,
though, what is more likely to matter nowadays for snapshots is
instantaneous rather than max. rate, and that's where a Gat falls down.
In the first half-second, the 2 M39s (1,500 rpm each) in an F-5 put out
more rounds than the M61 does. Given modern aiming sytems and high
downrange velocities with heavier rounds, I just don't see as much need
to fill the air with lead, especially if the gun is to be used mainly
for snapshots. Normally, missiles will handle anything else.
If you check the last 20 years of air combat, you'll see that gun shots
have been a miniscule amount of A/A shots taken: none vs. airplanes in
DS (A-10s nailed a pair of helos with the GAU-8), none as far as we know
in Allied Force, few if any from Lebanon on (the Brits did take some
with the ADEN in the Falklands, and the Argentines did likewise with the
DEFA, but that's because they only carried two missiles each). That's
one reason why the current generation of U.S. fighters have smaller
magazines than the F-105 era. This also allows the gun (esp. the
barrels) to be lightened up some, because they don't have to be able to
handle the heat of a 1,000+ round burst if the trigger jams; the M61A2
is lighter for just this reason.
Personally, judging by its specs I like the GIAT 791 revolver which is
going into Rafale: 30mm high velocity (1,000+m/s) round with a max. RoF
of 2,500 rpm, with a lower RoF for ground attack; weights about the same
as an M61. Assuming it comes anywhere close to the book numbers, I'll
take it. I think the Swedes also made a good choice by picking a single
Mauser BK27 for the JAS 39. Why use the gun as long as you've still got
AIM-9s, Pythons, Asraam, R-73, or the equivalent?
> The only reason the present 20mm ammo doesn't reach out as far is
lousy
> ballistics; it was designed for a max of a 2-second time-of-flight -
specs at
> that time, and is rather stubby for the bore diameter. But it does the
job.
And they now use the PGU-28/B round which has better ballistics for
better downrange accuracy and velocity. It still lacks terminal effects
compared to a larger round. Modern A/C are a lot tougher than they were
in the Vietnam era. Just as we had to move from 50 cal. to 20mm as
armor improved and jets came in, I think it's time for us to move up to
25-30mm now.
> Using a SUU23 pod gun on an F4D I put 100 out of 300 rounds into the
target
> in a single pass starting firing at about 4500 feet - not too shabby
for gov't work.
> The M61 at high rate puts out 6000 rpm; that's where the snap-shot
efectiveness
> comes from. A better ballistic projectile would add to the slant
range, yes, but I
> noticed no problems using the gun to 'prep' AA sites at the neginning
of a dive bomb
> pass, using the high-angle strafe tactics I had learned at Nellis in
the F86 and sight
> settings from the -34. BTW the gun also fired up a T55 in MR1 - a good
solid 100 rounds
> into the engine gratings in a 30 degree dive pass lit him up just
fine.
Quite so. You weren't facing SA-16s, Stingers and the like. The extra
stand-off range that the larger round gives you is far more important
now, because unless you're virtually unopposed (as sometimes happened in
the later stages of DS, when the Marines strafed with their M61s and
GAU-12s, and knocked out armor), MANPADS are ubiquitous. For that
matter, the Marine F-18s and AV-8Bs and the A-10s are the ones who took
the most hits from IR SAMs. The Air Force and Navy apparently opted out
of strafing from the altitudes you describe. The Marines were even
starting their runs from 1,500 feet and bottoming out at 700 or less.
Good thing they were mostly facing SA-7s and -9s,rather than something
better. IIRC, the French Mirage 2000 that was shot down over Bosnia a
few years back by an igla was at 13,000 feet. ASL.
> I suspect the JSF is going to be used more for anti-armor with that
bigger bore cannon.
Probably, and there was considerable controversy about whether an
internal cannon would be fitted, and to which versions. ISTR that the
Marine version was going to carry its cannon in a pod, while the other
two versions would have it internally, but that seems to change every
week or month.
> And it can't carry the A10's gun and go fast for long range without
being as big or bigger
> than an F111. 1100-1200 rpm vs 6000 rpm - or 100 per second - means
more misses . . .
I'm not suggesting that an a/c needs to carry a GAU-8, just that it
needs a heavier round. One of the reasons the A-10 needed that high
rate of fire was because it used a fixed reticle sight and that was
adequate for the slant ranges envisaged when it was designed. That just
isn't a reasonable profile these days, which is one reason why they've
gotten the LASTE sight with a death dot. They can hit from a lot
further away now.
Urban Fredriksson
Paul J. Adam <ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <7jmnp2$1p$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, g_al...@hotmail.com
>writes
>>I
>>think a single barrel revolver of 25-30mm makes more sense, and is more
>>useful (and safer, because of greater slant ranges) for A/G work.
>Oddly enough, the JSF project appear to have opted for the Mauser
>BK27 revolver cannon - maybe for the same reasons?
The reasons are increased range, both air to ground and
air to air, in the lightest feasible package. (I think the
Swedish air force says 80% the performance of an Oerlikon
KCA at 60% the installed mass. The KCA was actually
intended for the cancelled attack version of AIDC AT-3.)
--
Urban Fredriksson gri...@canit.se http://www.canit.se/%7Egriffon/
"In order to make someone a nervous wreck, apologize while they still
haven't used their best arguments." -- Runer Jonsson
g_al...@hotmail.com
Which to me says that, if you have a weapon so complex that no one
is trained well enough to maintain it or use it properly, you're going
to enjoy low reliability and a low success rate. Q.E.D. So, why are
you buying $40,000 spears, when you could instead buy much cheaper
spears that the average guy can maintain and use under real-life
conditions, and which are more reliable?
> ( Obviously, there were many times in combat when things happened too
> fast, and they had to "just do it" with the conditions at hand...but
> I'm not talking about those, here.)
>
> The big-winged AIM-7-E-2 could make tighter turns than previous
> models, yes. But the really big difference was how close it could
> arm; nice feature to have in a pinch...but that doesn't mean that
> you HAVE TO paint yourself into that dangerous corner before firing.
> I am absolutely convinced that much of it was that "fighter jock
> machismo" which demanded an up-close-and-personal duel; undoubtedly,
> some men paid for this pride with their lives, unnecessarily.
From reading accounts, I don't think it was a macho thing, John. See
below.
>
> > Take Steve Ritchie's second kill. Here's a guy with 3,000
> >hours who did 195 missions on his first tour 95 as a fast FAC, was a
> >FWS grad and instructor, bwefore going back for his second tour After
> >Bob Lodge was killed on 10 May he takes over as Wing weapons Officer,
so
> >if anyone's going to know how to employ the AIM-7E2, it's him (and
it's
> >cklear from his comments about his 3rd and 4th kills that he was very
> >aware of the missile envelope, launch G, etc.).
>
> I really don't want to take anything away from the man - he probably
> was the best of the best at the time, and I'm sure he had the rare
> ability to "feel" what was the optimum method to attack - but there is
> no way to learn it from reading a graph or table in the -34 weapons
> manual. ( There were somewhere between 20 and 40 variables, all of
> them interactive, that produced THIS missile's "kill" envelope, on
> THIS shot, THIS time. ) Ritchie was good to start with - and got
> better as he learned through experience. Along the way, he learned to
> "feel" how to employ this weapon effectively - IMO, anyway.
Sure, they used rules of thumb, because there was no way to keep up with
all the variables themselves. The thing is, at least Ritchie and
DeBellevue knew what the rules of thumb were, unlike the average guys.
> However, let me make one point: if a pilot with 20/20 vision could see
> the target - even if only as an otherwise-unidentifiable dot against
> the background of sky - he already has lost most of the advantage of
> the AIM-7, and is using just a fraction of its "reliable" envelope.
The problem, John, was that average spotting range on a MiG head on (the
way they were usually seen, usually coming up from 6 o'clock due to
GCI,) was 1.5-2nm. Even when they were at some other angle, it was
quite common to only spot them at short ranges. You then have to ID
them which often means closing to quite short range (and remember that
most of the USAF pilots had never seen a MiG for real in flight).
Because of this, they routinely overestimated the range, because they
were used to judging range against much bigger F-4s and F-105s. That's
why DACT is so important. In fact, John Nichols, an F-8 MiG killer,
attributed much of the F-8's success to the fact that they were part of
air wings that included A-4s, which were small and smokeless, and thus
gave them lots of practice at spotting MiG-sized targets and properly
judging range.
If the MiGs see you, they break into you, and even with a fast lock-on
you're at min range in a hurry (re-read Ritchie's account of his double
kill). That shorter min range of the AIM-7E2 (roughly the same as the
AIM-9E) and higher launch G capability mattered.
> It is even worse if he hesitates actuating the guidance/tuning.
> ( There *was* a delay while they tuned up - and it was highly variable
> between one aircraft channel/missile and another - so to hesitate
> turning 'em on until you absolutely need to pull the trigger NOW, is
> just enhancing the chance of failure, in my book. Once the bad guy
> knew you were on him, why wait - when the closer you got, the worse
> your chance of hitting him ? )
Since Cradlets mentions it, and one of the Bolo pilots also mentions it,
what is "Gyro-out" all about (if you don't have to shoot me)? The Bolo
guy is talking about boresight lock-ons, but says that gyro-out can also
be used, and that they now practice both.
Dweezil Dwarftosser
>Since Cradlets mentions it, and one of the Bolo pilots also mentions it,
>what is "Gyro-out" all about (if you don't have to shoot me)? The Bolo
>guy is talking about boresight lock-ons, but says that gyro-out can also
>be used, and that they now practice both.
I'm unfamiliar with the term, "gyro out" as it relates to AIM-7s.
If I had to make a SWAG, though, it would be a reference to boresight.
The term had some meaning for gunshots or early AIM-9s, though: a
caged reticle always pointed the same direction as the nose.
I've also read (in your posts) the term "clutter override" - which is
a dated reference, at least. On F-4Cs and Ds, the radar PULSE LENGTH
switch ( Long/Auto/Short ) was given the legend "CLUTTER", instead of
pulse width. The only thing that changed is the legend.
It was my experience that while SHORT pulse improved the radar's
ranging resolution, it also increased the noise ( "clutter" ) making
it easier to loose lockon to a target near the ground.
( Of course, I only saw them from the ground, anyway - so that's IMO.)
- John T.
Paul J. Adam
> I think the Gatling gun M61 is one of the best and most lethal
>air to air weapons ever istalled on an airplane. it offered a snap-shot
>capability that was effective. A single revolver cannon could never do that.
What's performance on a one-second burst? (The problem with
Gatlings is that you have to spin a lot more working parts up to speed
than in a revolver cannon)
>As for weight, yeah, if you want 30mm; you get a huge thing like the GAU8(?)
Spot on, Walt... Gatlings get less and less attractive as you increase
the calibre.
>in the A10. But if weight is a problem, look at the F100 with 4 M39s. That
>installation was both bigger and heavier than the M61.
Absolutely agree... if you want lots of 20mm downrange, a M61 is a
better answer than many M39s or M3s. (Was this the reason why the
A-7 moved from two 20mm revolver cannon to a single Gatling?
Anyone got strong feelings for or against that?)
If you want 25mm, then two revolver cannon can match or beat one
four-barrel Gatling (USMC AV-8B versus RAF GR.7 Harriers).
> The M61 at high rate puts out 6000 rpm; that's where the snap-shot
>efectiveness
>comes from.
How long does it take to reach that rate?
>A better ballistic projectile would add to the slant range, yes,
>but I
>noticed no problems using the gun to 'prep' AA sites at the neginning of a dive
>bomb
>pass, using the high-angle strafe tactics I had learned at Nellis in the F86 and
>sight
>settings from the -34.
>BTW the gun also fired up a T55 in MR1 - a good solid
>100 rounds
>into the engine gratings in a 30 degree dive pass lit him up just fine.
Thirty years before you were doing this, Walt, a battery of multiple
.303 or .50 machineguns was considered perfectly adequate for all
threats - indeed, the lethality of the "eight-gun fighter" was spoken
of in hushed voices... indeed, cannon were often found to be
unreliable and less than entirely effective, while machineguns were
at least reliable.
_How_ long did it take the USAF to move off the .50 Browning and
onto something more lethal? (Wonder whether the 2.75" FFAR
counts... that might be worth a new thread)
I'm not denying your experience - you used what you were given and
used it well - but it's my _job_ to ask smug smartarse questions. (The
hard part is, I have to do it _before_ the fact, not after, but I get to
practice here)
> I suspect the JSF is going to be used more for anti-armor with that bigger
>bore cannon.
My guess is that - like Saab's JAS39 and the Eurofighter - the weight
and volume available for the gun have shrunk as missile lethality has
proved itself increased: and the single BK27 has won out in the
tradeoff studies as offering the most lethality and 'stored kills' for the
least weight, volume and cost.
Whether this is the result of enlightened and informed study, or mere
fashion, remains to be seen.
>And it can't carry the A10's gun and go fast for long range without being as big
>or bigger
>than an F111. 1100-1200 rpm vs 6000 rpm - or 100 per second - means more
>misses . . .
And with 27mm vice 20mm, you need fewer hits and have better
ballistics. Swings and roundabouts... and not my field of expertise,
just an interest.
Take all comments with a large pinch of salt, and value at no more
than $0.02 US.
Paul J. Adam
writes
>Probably, and there was considerable controversy about whether an
>internal cannon would be fitted, and to which versions. ISTR that the
>Marine version was going to carry its cannon in a pod, while the other
>two versions would have it internally, but that seems to change every
>week or month.
It seems fairly stable (from here) that the USMC/RN/(RAF?) STOVL
version will carry podded gun(s), while the CTOL variants will have
internal guns. YMMV.
wal...@oneimage.com
>One real big problem in a longer slant range is seeing the target -
4500 feet is well over 3/4 mile. I suggested to the Wing VC of the
first A10 wing they look into using a scope sight like the Bushnell
1 3/4 x 4 variable power scope. It had a wide angle of view and
should have better than the 2-mil pipper at using the 30mm's range.
He looked at me like I was nuts. That 2 mil pipper covers 2 feet at
a thousand; 8 feet at four thousand. Then consider the wind allowance
at strafing point targets at long slant range; someplace in here a
Maverick or Hellfire is a better choice if SAM/AAA is a real threat.
BTW spool-up time on the mechanically driven Gatling wasn't that much
of a problem for snap shots' generally one saw the shot developing but
couldn't get in a position to effectively track the target, but could
the nose at the right spot and use eyeball lead and hold the trigger
down long enough to put out some flak.
If a real 'Dan'L Boone' existed he'd need only a single shot and could
use the C130's 105mm in a semi-automatic mode. I don't have the weight
figures on the new cannon types - would appreciate seeing them if you, Guy,
or Urban have them handy. I'd also like to hear soem armor figures for new
fighters; the F4 had zilch unless you consider that 1/4 inch aluminum radar
bulhead 'armor plate'. It might have stopped a subsonic seagull or maybe
even a .22 Long Rifle slug . . .;<)
Paul J. Adam
writes
>I don't have the weight
>figures on the new cannon types - would appreciate seeing them if you, Guy,
>or Urban have them handy.
The 30mm DEFA 552A weighs 179lb, fires 1250 rds/min, MV 2674fps.
(British ADEN 30mm very similar)
The 27mm Mauser BK27 weighs 202.5lb, with a ROF of 1700 or 1000
rounds/min. Muzzle velocity's 3363 feet/sec.
ADEN 25 weighs 203lb, fires ~1750 rounds/min, at a muzzle velocity
of 3445fps.
The 25mm GAU-12 weighs 280lb, fires 3600 rounds/min at a muzzle
velocity of 3400fps.
The M39 20mm weighed 178.4lb and fired at 1700 rpm with a MV of
2885fps.
M61A1 weighs 265lb, fires 6000rpm at a muzzle velocity of 3400fps.
wal...@oneimage.com
Walt Bj ftr plt ret
g_al...@hotmail.com
wc...@usa.net (Dweezil Dwarftosser) wrote:
> On Sat, 12 Jun 1999 18:00:23 GMT, g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
it,
> >what is "Gyro-out" all about (if you don't have to shoot me)? The
Bolo
> >guy is talking about boresight lock-ons, but says that gyro-out can
also
> >be used, and that they now practice both.
>
> If I had to make a SWAG, though, it would be a reference to boresight.
> The term had some meaning for gunshots or early AIM-9s, though: a
> caged reticle always pointed the same direction as the nose.
This was on F-4Cs; on Ds the Gyro switch was slightly relabled (I
forget exactly how), but was in the same location (on the AMCS panel
forward and right of the throttles, which also included the Vc "x1 - x3"
toggle switch). The Gyro switch is a three-position toggle labeled "Out
- Normal - Fast" (I think. Working from memory). As for caged
reticles, the F-4C had a fixed-reticle (manually depressable), not an
LCOSS, so the gyro didn't refer to it.
> I've also read (in your posts) the term "clutter override" - which is
> a dated reference, at least. On F-4Cs and Ds, the radar PULSE LENGTH
> switch ( Long/Auto/Short ) was given the legend "CLUTTER", instead of
> pulse width. The only thing that changed is the legend.
Could be. At the time of Bolo, they only had F-4Cs, so it's referring
to them. Here's the justification given in a Bolo combat report for
having the clutter switch in "override" (other settings were "normal"
and one other which I forget. At least one a/c had the switch set in
"normal"):
"Clutter- override (To prevent break lock at power level mode
switching)"
I assume that this refers to going from "Standby" to "OPR", but it also
might refer to changing from "Boresight" to "full system?"
Oh, although I don't think it affects the discussion, FYI they were
using narrow gate with linear polarization.
g_al...@hotmail.com
> writes
> > I think the Gatling gun M61 is one of the best and most lethal
> >air to air weapons ever istalled on an airplane. it offered a
snap-shot
> >capability that was effective. A single revolver cannon could never
do that.
>
> What's performance on a one-second burst? (The problem with
> Gatlings is that you have to spin a lot more working parts up to speed
> than in a revolver cannon)
>
> >As for weight, yeah, if you want 30mm; you get a huge thing like the
GAU8(?)
>
> Spot on, Walt... Gatlings get less and less attractive as you increase
> the calibre.
>
> >in the A10. But if weight is a problem, look at the F100 with 4 M39s.
That
> >installation was both bigger and heavier than the M61.
>
> Absolutely agree... if you want lots of 20mm downrange, a M61 is a
> better answer than many M39s or M3s.
Actually, the M39s put out more rounds than an M61, because they get up
to speed virtually instantly, compared to the M61's 0.3 or so seconds
(per Jane's. Ed feels that the actual time was considerably less, with
very few rounds passed through). OTOH, you got somewhat wider
dispersion with four guns bouncing around individually, to the point
that many thought the F-100 was better for strafing. Offsetting that,
the M61 could be fitted with different muzzle holders
(sort of equivalent to a shotgun choke, which gave different
dispersions). Still, weight and size wise, the Gat wins in that case.
(Was this the reason why the
> A-7 moved from two 20mm revolver cannon to a single Gatling?
> Anyone got strong feelings for or against that?)
Well, one of the reasons was that the A-7A/B used two Mk. 12 pieces of
garbage. Going to a single gun took up less space, increased the ammo
supply (from 680? total to 1,000 or so), and improved the reliability.
>
> If you want 25mm, then two revolver cannon can match or beat one
> four-barrel Gatling (USMC AV-8B versus RAF GR.7 Harriers).
Five barrel, but yeah. The other advantage, although I'm not sure that
the a/c is cleared to do it, is that you could theoretically carry a
single gun and an AIM-120 on the other side, so you could maybe carry 2
AIM-120s (the other on a wing pylon), 2 AIM-9s (dual carriage on the
other wing pylon) and a gun. Don't know if that's possible
aerodynamically.
>
> > The M61 at high rate puts out 6000 rpm; that's where the snap-shot
> >efectiveness
> >comes from.
>
> How long does it take to reach that rate?
See above.
> _How_ long did it take the USAF to move off the .50 Browning and
> onto something more lethal? (Wonder whether the 2.75" FFAR
> counts... that might be worth a new thread)
First dayfighter to have them alone were a few F-86Fs sent to Korea to
test 20mms (both M-2s and M39s), because the 50 cal. was proving to be
ineffective against MiGs. The 20mms proved to have a much higher pK
than the .50s. The F-100 was already in the pipeline, with four M-39s
from the start. Some interceptors already had all 20mm armament,
because it was clear that bombers needed to be knocked down in a hurry.
The Brits and French opted for 30mm to make sure that a couple of hits
would do the job, and traded off MV for lethality. And yes, the FFAR
was considered to be far more lethal than a gun, especially in a
collision-course intercept. It was established that the all-weather
interceptors of the day ('50s) would be unlikely to be able to make more
than one frontal pass on a jet bomber, and would be unable to overhaul
it from the rear (and would be at a disadvantage while doing so, because
the bomber's rearward firing guns would have much higher relative
velocity than the fighter's guns, and thus longer effective range).
PLus, guns just weren't lethal enough, but a 68mm rocket would be almost
certain to destroy a bomber with a single hit. Given that it was
assumed the bombers in question would be carrying nukes, lethality
improvements were mandatory; gradual attrition wasn't an option.
g_al...@hotmail.com
wal...@oneimage.com wrote:
> g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
> >One real big problem in a longer slant range is seeing the target -
> 4500 feet is well over 3/4 mile. I suggested to the Wing VC of the
> first A10 wing they look into using a scope sight like the Bushnell
> 1 3/4 x 4 variable power scope. It had a wide angle of view and
> should have better than the 2-mil pipper at using the 30mm's range.
> He looked at me like I was nuts. That 2 mil pipper covers 2 feet at
> a thousand; 8 feet at four thousand. Then consider the wind allowance
> at strafing point targets at long slant range; someplace in here a
> Maverick or Hellfire is a better choice if SAM/AAA is a real threat.
Sure. I'm not sure just what LASTE includes, but it seems likely that
at some point, you'll use a FLIR/laser pod to acquire the target, and
have the guns auto-fired when the parameters are right. Yeah, wind
dispersion is a problem, and heavier shells are less affected by it. I
also agree that using a PGM is the weapon of choice, but if that's true
and you can afford them, why ever would you strafe? Kill 'em from 15k,
and don't let them take a shot. Demoralizing as all hell.
> BTW spool-up time on the mechanically driven Gatling wasn't that much
> of a problem for snap shots' generally one saw the shot developing but
> couldn't get in a position to effectively track the target, but could
> the nose at the right spot and use eyeball lead and hold the trigger
> down long enough to put out some flak.
And I agree that with the technology of the time, the gun was the only
weapon capable of taking many shots. However, with modern missiles with
massive off-boresight capability, HMS, incredible maneuverability,
and short firing times, while the gun-only a/c is seeing the shot
developing and still pointing the nose, the missile-armed pilot has
already looked, locked, fired, and broken away. I think snap-shots
nowadays are going to be just that; limited by reaction time to the time
it takes to process the info that a target will cross the line of fire,
and then the reaction time to pull the trigger. Anything else allows
the use of a missile.
> If a real 'Dan'L Boone' existed he'd need only a single shot and
could
> use the C130's 105mm in a semi-automatic mode.
And it should be noted that the appearance of the SA-7 in SVN in
1972 drove the slow movers to heights at which they were safe, making
the 20mms in the gunships almost completely ineffective (as you say,
partly it's a ballistic problem of the rounds, which have been
improved).
I don't have the weight
> figures on the new cannon types - would appreciate seeing them if you,
Guy,
> or Urban have them handy. I'd also like to hear soem armor figures for
new
> fighters; the F4 had zilch unless you consider that 1/4 inch aluminum
radar
> bulhead 'armor plate'. It might have stopped a subsonic seagull or
maybe
> even a .22 Long Rifle slug . . .;<)
Depends on the a/c. Much of the improvement is due less to armor and
more to better survivability design, especially in fuel systems (which
caused the majority of losses in Vietnam). In addition, FBW, modern
stability augmentation systems, and redundancy have made it possible for
a/c to fly missing entire control surfaces (or in the most famous case,
virtually an entire wing). There is often Kevlar to protect against
frag damage, as well as the use of "trigger plates" to activate fuses
before they get to something vital (used to protect the A-10's ammo
drum, as armoring it would weigh too much).
Paul
'power level mode switching' was when the radar automatically switched from
long pulse width to short pulse width as the target closed within a given
range. Sometimes radar would drop lock at this point. By taking the switch
out of the 'auto' mode (believe it was normal on C model, but not sure). WSO
could lock the radar into a desired pulse lenght and prevent plms from
occuring. For what it's worth, on the APQ-120 used in the E and G models,
short pulse gave a cleaner scope presentation (less apparent clutter) but a
shorter contact range. Each WSO had his own preference on mode setting.
Ref 'gyro out' mode...might this have been the C model equal of the E/G
'stab in/stab out' switch, which determined it the radar was swept parallel
to the plane of the horizon or the plane of the wing line?...not sure, but
sounds like it. In a close in fight, most crews would switch to 'stab out',
so front seater could call bandit postions in reference to the nose (ie 30
hi, 10 left) instead of the horizon. Required a lot of practise and good
co-ord, but this poor man's version of 'auto-guns/super search' could
actually work it the crews were good. Without practise for stab out, you
were often better off to go for a boresight lock, where WSO placed radar in
boresight mode, pilot would put pipper on target and call for lock, WSO
would squeeze full action on hand controller and run acq symbols up the
scope...once acquired, system would go into full system lock and track in
range/angles out to gimbal limits.
Paul
g_al...@hotmail.com wrote in message <7k3suc$4gm$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
>In article <3762b964...@news.rdu.bellsouth.net>,
> wc...@usa.net (Dweezil Dwarftosser) wrote:
>> On Sat, 12 Jun 1999 18:00:23 GMT, g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
>>
>> >Since Cradlets mentions it, and one of the Bolo pilots also mentions
>it,
>> >what is "Gyro-out" all about (if you don't have to shoot me)? The
>Bolo
>> >guy is talking about boresight lock-ons, but says that gyro-out can
>also
>> >be used, and that they now practice both.
>>
Paul J. Adam
writes
>Sure. I'm not sure just what LASTE includes, but it seems likely that
>at some point, you'll use a FLIR/laser pod to acquire the target, and
>have the guns auto-fired when the parameters are right.
Fairly sure it isn't even that fancy - AIUI LASTE is a laser ranger ("how
far away is the ground in front of the gun?") feeding into a ballistics
computer. Not sure how much met. and other compensation goes in,
but I'm led to believe it provides reasonable CCIP for the gun and
other ordnance. That was apparently a _big_ improvement over the
previous fixed-reticule sight...
Paul J. Adam
writes
>In article <KF8GHJAb...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk>,
> "Paul J. Adam" <ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> Absolutely agree... if you want lots of 20mm downrange, a M61 is a
>> better answer than many M39s or M3s.
>
>Actually, the M39s put out more rounds than an M61,
Two M39s put out less after spinup time (more important for air-to-air
than air-to-ground at a guess), four throw more shells but at a
significant weight penalty (four guns, four feed mechanisms, four
ammo bins...)
>> If you want 25mm, then two revolver cannon can match or beat one
>> four-barrel Gatling (USMC AV-8B versus RAF GR.7 Harriers).
>
>Five barrel, but yeah. The other advantage, although I'm not sure that
>the a/c is cleared to do it, is that you could theoretically carry a
>single gun and an AIM-120 on the other side, so you could maybe carry 2
>AIM-120s (the other on a wing pylon), 2 AIM-9s (dual carriage on the
>other wing pylon) and a gun. Don't know if that's possible
>aerodynamically.
Something similar's being done. RAF Harrier GR.7s can trade one Aden
25 for a TIALD pod - that's how they've been self-designating over
Serbia recently.
>> _How_ long did it take the USAF to move off the .50 Browning and
>> onto something more lethal? (Wonder whether the 2.75" FFAR
>> counts... that might be worth a new thread)
>The Brits and French opted for 30mm to make sure that a couple of hits
>would do the job, and traded off MV for lethality. And yes, the FFAR
>was considered to be far more lethal than a gun, especially in a
>collision-course intercept.
Yes, I seem to recall that the F-86D was the most numerous Sabre
variant...
How effective was the FFAR in practice? Would it have worked
against bombers as hoped? Or was it less successful in service than on
paper?
(It died out as an air-to-air weapon, but was that because it was
ineffective or because the mission changed?)
g_al...@hotmail.com
g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
> In article <3762b964...@news.rdu.bellsouth.net>,
> wc...@usa.net (Dweezil Dwarftosser) wrote:
<snip>
> > I'm unfamiliar with the term, "gyro out" as it relates to AIM-7s.
> > If I had to make a SWAG, though, it would be a reference to
boresight.
> > The term had some meaning for gunshots or early AIM-9s, though: a
> > caged reticle always pointed the same direction as the nose.
>
> This was on F-4Cs; on Ds the Gyro switch was slightly relabled (I
> forget exactly how), but was in the same location (on the AMCS panel
> forward and right of the throttles, which also included the Vc "x1 -
x3"
> toggle switch). The Gyro switch is a three-position toggle labeled
"Out
> - Normal - Fast" (I think. Working from memory).
I've retrieved the books I have with cockpit diagrams for the C, D, and
E. The labels are as I describe it in the F-4C, with "Gyro Out" being
forward, "Nor[mal]" being the center position, and "Fast" being the
aftmost position.
In the F-4D, the switch positions are relabeled "Out," "Stab," "Nor"
respectively. In the F-4E, the panel is moved slightly aft, and the
positions are relabeled "STAB Out," "Nor," "Drift Out."
>
> > I've also read (in your posts) the term "clutter override" - which
is
> > a dated reference, at least. On F-4Cs and Ds, the radar PULSE
LENGTH
> > switch ( Long/Auto/Short ) was given the legend "CLUTTER", instead
of
> > pulse width. The only thing that changed is the legend.
>
> Could be. At the time of Bolo, they only had F-4Cs, so it's referring
> to them. Here's the justification given in a Bolo combat report for
> having the clutter switch in "override" (other settings were "normal"
> and one other which I forget.
Checking, I see that the other setting is "Heavy," which corresponds to
the "Short" position (switch forward) in the F-4E. "Nor" corresponds to
"Auto" (middle position), and "OVRD" corresponds to "Long" (aftmost
position). They are in the same place on the panel.
Dweezil Dwarftosser
>Guy...
>'power level mode switching' was when the radar automatically switched from
>long pulse width to short pulse width as the target closed within a given
>range. Sometimes radar would drop lock at this point. By taking the switch
>out of the 'auto' mode (believe it was normal on C model, but not sure). WSO
>could lock the radar into a desired pulse lenght and prevent plms from
>occuring. For what it's worth, on the APQ-120 used in the E and G models,
>short pulse gave a cleaner scope presentation (less apparent clutter) but a
>shorter contact range. Each WSO had his own preference on mode setting.
Accurate info above - but just as an information point, a radar that
lost lock at PLMS was in most cases badly aligned for short pulse
ranging. This got to be a much worse problem on those aircraft where
ARN-101 had been installed. ( Piss poor programming of the ARNIE,
which the contractor refused to fix. It thought a mile was always
going to be 5,280 feet, even though a "radar mile" is an even 6,000.)
It was common - particularly in TAC units - for the troops to
mal-align short pulse ranging in an effort to please the drivers who
would get bad CCIP bombs using ARNIE. ( A/G mode uses short pulse
only.) In doing so, it screwed up short pulse A/A ranging, but nobody
cared.
The ARNIE's mistakes concerning radar range are a bona-fide scandal
that went unfixed, unpublicized ... and unpunished.
>Ref 'gyro out' mode...might this have been the C model equal of the E/G
>'stab in/stab out' switch, which determined it the radar was swept parallel
>to the plane of the horizon or the plane of the wing line?...not sure, but
>sounds like it. In a close in fight, most crews would switch to 'stab out',
>so front seater could call bandit postions in reference to the nose (ie 30
>hi, 10 left) instead of the horizon. Required a lot of practise and good
>co-ord, but this poor man's version of 'auto-guns/super search' could
>actually work it the crews were good. Without practise for stab out, you
>were often better off to go for a boresight lock, where WSO placed radar in
>boresight mode, pilot would put pipper on target and call for lock, WSO
>would squeeze full action on hand controller and run acq symbols up the
>scope...once acquired, system would go into full system lock and track in
>range/angles out to gimbal limits.
I think you nailed it. I hadn't considered "Stab out" at all as a
possibility. I assume that this was before -556 ( front seat )
AUTO-ACQ or the later "super search" of the digital TIC's "CAGE"
button in the front seat.
- John T.
Dweezil Dwarftosser
[ big snip ]
>In the F-4D, the switch positions are relabeled "Out," "Stab," "Nor"
>respectively. In the F-4E, the panel is moved slightly aft, and the
>positions are relabeled "STAB Out," "Nor," "Drift Out."
FYI - "DRIFT OUT" only applied to PPI mapping modes, which were
normally offset on the radar screen by the amount of yaw.
- John T.
Urban Fredriksson
Paul J. Adam <ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>How effective was the FFAR in practice? Would it have worked
>against bombers as hoped? Or was it less successful in service than on
>paper?
>(It died out as an air-to-air weapon, but was that because it was
>ineffective or because the mission changed?)
It didn't die out in Sweden, and interestingly one of the
upgrades from J 35F to J 35J Draken was to allow the
carrieage of four rocket pods and to use them in the
air-to-air role (F apparently only could use them for
ground attack, but when they were introduced on the B
version it was specifically as an air-to-air weapon).
--
Urban Fredriksson gri...@canit.se http://www.canit.se/%7Egriffon/
Malvolio: ... I say to you, this house is dark.
Clown: Madman, thou errest: I say, there is no darkness but ignorance ...
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
wal...@oneimage.com
>On Mon, 14 Jun 1999 19:44:02 -0400, "Paul" <1...@nospam.com> wrote:>
Same-o - same-o. We taught that mode for max manuevering i.e.
our RTU studs vs Aggressors in the last phase of training. F/S call out
bandit position as stated "10 right 50 high" to get a lock as early as possible
so 'settling time' would be accomplished before reaching a launch position.
R/S would call out "locked on" and count off 5 seconds and then call out
"shoot". IMHO here was a good time for the R/S to state "Ready to launch"
and for F/S to either shoot or say "Shoot" and then the R/S pull the trigger.
I had no qualms about letting the Gib shoot after being humbled by missing
such an opportunity against the Aggressors by being too padlocked into a guns
situation that I passed up a close range AIM7 shot. Live and learn. But at that time
there were too many 'cowboys' to listen to such recommendations.
g_al...@hotmail.com
> writes
> >Sure. I'm not sure just what LASTE includes, but it seems likely
that
> >at some point, you'll use a FLIR/laser pod to acquire the target, and
> >have the guns auto-fired when the parameters are right.
>
> Fairly sure it isn't even that fancy - AIUI LASTE is a laser ranger
("how
> far away is the ground in front of the gun?") feeding into a
ballistics
> computer. Not sure how much met. and other compensation goes in,
> but I'm led to believe it provides reasonable CCIP for the gun and
> other ordnance. That was apparently a _big_ improvement over the
> previous fixed-reticule sight...
Sloppy writing on my part. I didn't mean to imply that LASTE had
this capability now, but meant to imply that _some day_, A/G strafing
will be so done, on some a/c, which may or may not include the A-10.
Sorry for the confusion.
g_al...@hotmail.com
wc...@usa.net (Dweezil Dwarftosser) wrote:
> On Mon, 14 Jun 1999 19:44:02 -0400, "Paul" <1...@nospam.com> wrote:
>
> >'power level mode switching' was when the radar automatically
switched from
> >long pulse width to short pulse width as the target closed within a
given
> >range. Sometimes radar would drop lock at this point. By taking the
switch
> >out of the 'auto' mode (believe it was normal on C model, but not
sure). WSO
> >could lock the radar into a desired pulse lenght and prevent plms
from
> >occuring. For what it's worth, on the APQ-120 used in the E and G
models,
> >short pulse gave a cleaner scope presentation (less apparent clutter)
but a
> >shorter contact range. Each WSO had his own preference on mode
setting.
My thanks to both Paul and John for their replies. Paul's comments
on pulse length vice range make sense; longer pulses generally give
higher average power and make it easier to distinguish a signal from
noise (essentially random).
<snip>
Paul has indeed called it. And as John assumes, this was long before
front seat auto-acq, -556 or the supersearch modes. All radar mode
changes appear to be from the back seat, without the pilot having any
way to activate even the range gate sweep from the front. At least, at
no time is the Front-seater mentioned as doing anything like "Auto-Acq;"
All he does is tell the GIB to "go boresight . . . go full system."
John and I had some extensive correspondence about this some while back,
trying to figure when the F/C/P throttle-mounted auto-acq switch
appeared on the earlier models. John thought that there was always one
in the F/C/P/, but that it was located elsewhere (missile control
panel?), while I could find no sign of one prior to its appearance on
the outside of the left throttle. In early F-4Cs, this pinkie switch
was apparently used to turn on/off the taxi lights, a holdover from the
F-4B I think. Flipping the lights on (or maybe it's off, I forget) was
the night-time equivalent of the pilot saluting the catapult officer,
meaning "I'm ready to take the cat shot."
Thanks again,
g_al...@hotmail.com
> writes
<snip>
> >> If you want 25mm, then two revolver cannon can match or beat one
> >> four-barrel Gatling (USMC AV-8B versus RAF GR.7 Harriers).
> >
> >Five barrel, but yeah. The other advantage, although I'm not sure
that
> >the a/c is cleared to do it, is that you could theoretically carry a
> >single gun and an AIM-120 on the other side, so you could maybe carry
2
> >AIM-120s (the other on a wing pylon), 2 AIM-9s (dual carriage on the
> >other wing pylon) and a gun. Don't know if that's possible
> >aerodynamically.
>
> Something similar's being done. RAF Harrier GR.7s can trade one Aden
> 25 for a TIALD pod - that's how they've been self-designating over
> Serbia recently.
I had read that, and though it made a lot of sense. Of course, I still
think the RN should have insisted on wingtip AIM-9 carriage on the SHAR
FRS.2s (I refuse to be politically correct and call it the F/A 2), but I
expect the pols weren't willing to pay for it.
> >> _How_ long did it take the USAF to move off the .50 Browning and
> >> onto something more lethal? (Wonder whether the 2.75" FFAR
> >> counts... that might be worth a new thread)
>
> >The Brits and French opted for 30mm to make sure that a couple of
hits
> >would do the job, and traded off MV for lethality. And yes, the FFAR
> >was considered to be far more lethal than a gun, especially in a
> >collision-course intercept.
>
> Yes, I seem to recall that the F-86D was the most numerous Sabre
> variant...
>
> How effective was the FFAR in practice? Would it have worked
> against bombers as hoped? Or was it less successful in service than on
> paper?
Well, it worked at least once. IIRR, an F-86D was supposed to shoot
down a B-17 drone, with some observers watching from another B-17. He
locked on (no VID required), was cleared to fire, and boom, no more
B-17. Unfortunately . . .
> (It died out as an air-to-air weapon, but was that because it was
> ineffective or because the mission changed?)
It died out because guided missiles were in prospect, which promised
even higher pKs. I've got figures somewhere, showing the predicted pKs
of a gun salvo vs. an FFAR salvo vs. an AIM-7A, which you can take with
as few or many grains of salt as you like. This was the '50s, when the
miracle missiles were going to replace manned a/c in the near future.
David Lednicer
see the lists Adrian Camp and I have put together. They are on elevon
at: http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/gustin_military/usvictor.html
and:
http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/gustin_military/usloss.html
-------------------------------------------------------------------
David Lednicer | "Applied Computational Fluid Dynamics"
Analytical Methods, Inc. | email: da...@amiwest.com
2133 152nd Ave NE | tel: (206) 643-9090
Redmond, WA 98052 USA | fax: (206) 746-1299
John Keeney
<Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <7k3u88$4va$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, g_al...@hotmail.com
>writes
>>In article <KF8GHJAb...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk>,
>> "Paul J. Adam" <ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>> Absolutely agree... if you want lots of 20mm downrange, a M61 is a
>>> better answer than many M39s or M3s.
>>
>>Actually, the M39s put out more rounds than an M61,
>
>Two M39s put out less after spinup time (more important for air-to-air
>than air-to-ground at a guess), four throw more shells but at a
>significant weight penalty (four guns, four feed mechanisms, four
>ammo bins...)
>
>>> If you want 25mm, then two revolver cannon can match or beat one
>>> four-barrel Gatling (USMC AV-8B versus RAF GR.7 Harriers).
>>
>>Five barrel, but yeah. The other advantage, although I'm not sure that
>>the a/c is cleared to do it, is that you could theoretically carry a
>>single gun and an AIM-120 on the other side, so you could maybe carry 2
>>AIM-120s (the other on a wing pylon), 2 AIM-9s (dual carriage on the
>>other wing pylon) and a gun. Don't know if that's possible
>>aerodynamically.
>
>Something similar's being done. RAF Harrier GR.7s can trade one Aden
>25 for a TIALD pod - that's how they've been self-designating over
>Serbia recently.
>
>>> _How_ long did it take the USAF to move off the .50 Browning and
>>> onto something more lethal? (Wonder whether the 2.75" FFAR
>>> counts... that might be worth a new thread)
>
>>The Brits and French opted for 30mm to make sure that a couple of hits
>>would do the job, and traded off MV for lethality. And yes, the FFAR
>>was considered to be far more lethal than a gun, especially in a
>>collision-course intercept.
>
>Yes, I seem to recall that the F-86D was the most numerous Sabre
>variant...
Close second. The F-86F comes in first at 2540 followed by the dog's 2504.
The F was MG equiped.
>How effective was the FFAR in practice? Would it have worked
>against bombers as hoped? Or was it less successful in service than on
>paper?
>
>(It died out as an air-to-air weapon, but was that because it was
>ineffective or because the mission changed?)
>
Matthew Saroff (Remove .123456 to reply)
>In article <7jmnp2$1p$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, g_al...@hotmail.com
>writes
>> Even if a gun is retained in case the opponent of the moment
>>has effective countermeasures for all our missiles (apparently every
>>AIM-9M6/7 that had flares deployed against it in DS missed), I don't
>>think the weight and especially volume of a Gatling is justified; I
>>think a single barrel revolver of 25-30mm makes more sense, and is more
>>useful (and safer, because of greater slant ranges) for A/G work.
>
>Oddly enough, the JSF project appear to have opted for the Mauser
>BK27 revolver cannon - maybe for the same reasons?
Hi,
It turns out that Soviet Flares light MUCH faster than
ours, which is why it was more difficult to counter.
--
Matthew Saroff | Standard Disclaimer: Not only do I speak for
_____ | No one else, I don't even Speak for me. All my
/ o o \ | personalities and the spirits that I channel
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snip:
>F86D/FFAR effectiveness: If (IF) the aircraft and radar were
prepped it was effective. An avergae squadron beast was pretty iffy.
We fired on the rag - about 5 1/2 x 33 feet when stretched out by
the airstream - and the SabreDog could hit it "almost" every time.
One funny thing - after hundreds of practice non-firing passes the
pilots got to where they could hit the rag by eyeball. So all the
weapons matches were done under the hood to keep things honest.
The real problem with the weapons system was reliability - the 86D
had somehintg like 460 vacuum tubes in its boxes and it was an odds-on
bet that at least was going to burn out each time power was placed on
the bird. Fortunately it had good mechanical backup systems to
get home on. I never flew a bird that gave more troubles to the
poor suffering maintenance troops than the F86D/L series.