P38 in Europe? A success?
Albert
Pat Ryan
In <592aop$j8g$1...@mhafn.production.compuserve.com> Albert
<10251...@CompuServe.COM> writes:
>
> 12/15/1996
> Al Cherer
>
> To P38 fans.
>
> I am trying to gain a clearer picture of the role the P38
>played against Italy and Germany. Some works I have read on the
>P51 infer that the P38 was not up to the standards of fighting
>the Luftwaffe. I am especially interested in unit names and
>histories as well as good secondary sources.
1st Fighter group (94th Fighter Squadron-"Hat in the Ring"-1918-1945)),
14th Fighter Group.
>
Al Sumrall
CDB100620 wrote:
a superb P-38 post.
Al
CDB100620
Thirteen P-38 FGs were deployed in Europe and Med Theaters:
1, 14, 20, 55, 78, 81, 82, 350, 364, 367, 370, 474, 479.
Photo recon versions of the P-38 (F-4 and F-5) served in Europe and the
Med in five PRGs:
3, 5, 10, 67, 68.
The 1FG and 14FG were first to receive P-38 in spring, 1941.
P-38s equipped a total of 27 FG and 10 PRG.
In Europe, the P-38 flew some 130,000 sorties. That compares with about
214,000 for the P-51 and 423,000 for the P-47.
Aside from about 20 F-4/5s given to the Free French air force, only the
USAAF used P-38s during the war (a handful of non-turbo, non-handed
versions went to and were rejected by the RAF). One of these proved the
coffin of Antoine de Saint Exupery, author of "Wind, Sand and Stars" and
other aviation literature standards, who disappeared on a flight over
southern France, 31 July, 1944.
The first German plane shot down by the USAAF in WWII is generally
credited to a P-38 on 14 Aug., 1942, an FW-200C downed by Elza Shaham of
342 Composite FG.
The first allied fighters over Berlin were P-38s of the 55FG on 3 March,
1944.
The 1FG was the only USAAF fighter group during the war to win two
Presidential Unit Citations in less than a week, for actions in the MTO.
On two occasions, once in the Pacific and once in the Med, a lone P-38
escorting a group of bombers succeeded in driving off numbers of enemy
fighters attempting to attack the bombers, in each case shooting down one
e/a that got too close. The Pacific incident involved a P-38 from the
475FG, which shot down a Ki-61 from a gaggle going after B-25s, and the
Med incident invoved a P-38 from the 1FG that shot down an Me-109 from a
gaggle going after B-25s. In each case, the lone P-38 had been late off
the runway, missed the rendevous and proceeded on alone hoping to catch up
to the rest of the squadron, which was, in each case, turned back by bad
weather that the late starter missed.
The leading P-38 aces in the Med were Micheal Brezas who shot down 12
German planes (2 Me-210, 4 Me-109, 6 FW-190) while serving with the 14FG,
and William Sloan, who shot down 12 German and Italian a/c (6 Me-109, 2
Mc-200, 1 Mc-202, 1 Re-2001, 1 Ju-88, 1 Do-217) while serving with the
82FG.
The 55FG began operations out of England on 15 Oct., 1943, one day after
Black Thursday when some 60 B-17s were lost on the second Schweinfurt
raid. First encounter with Luftwaffe on 3 Nov., shot down 3 Me-109 with
no loss to selves. On 5 Nov., down five Me-109s with no loss. On 13
Nov., in a sprawling, large-scale battle, shot down 3 FW-190, 2 Ju-88, 1
Me-109, 1 Me-210 but lost 5 P-38s shot down. Two more were lost due to
engine problems. On 29 Nov. 7 P-38s were shot down for the loss of no
German planes.
Problems that surfaced with the P-38 in northern European theatre included
its poor performance above 30,000 ft compared to the Me-109, caused by its
lack of high activity propellers able to make use of the power the engines
were delivering at that altitude. The F models used also had insufficient
intercooler capacity. Some indication that TEL anti-knock compound was
not being properly mixed into avgas as well (at this time TEL was still
blended by hand into fuel shortly before use rather than being blended
when produced. This was because in those days the compound tended to
precipitate out if left standing too long. This problem later corrected.
Others believed either too much (leading to plug fouling) or not enough
(detonation) TEL was being added, causing engine problems.
Another problem that was revealed by the Nov. actions was that 55FG pilots
were attempting to dogfight e/a. Their airplane may have been up to the
job, but the pilots weren't (many had as little of 20 hours total time on
the P-38, and little or no air to air gunnery training, and were
especially lacking in deflection shooting skills. Many after-action
contact reports tell of repeated bursts of fire at deflection angles with
no results. Most kills were the result of dead-astern shots). An 8th AF
report examining the failures of the 55FG noted one main problem was that
the P-38 as an airplane was simply too complicated and too demanding for a
low-time service pilot to fly skillfully, let alone dogfight in. It noted
that many pilots were afraid of the P-38. 55FG lost 17 P-38s in combat in
Nov., while being credited with 23 e/a destroyed in the air.
Morale in 55FG plummeted, and numerous pilots aborted missions claiming
mechanical problems--giving the a/c type a bad rep for mechanical
unreliability, although u/s reports reveal that in most cases the ground
crew could find nothing wrong with the aircraft. In many instances the
ground crews hinted that the pilots were merely cowards. In one u/s
report, the pilot had aborted the mission because he claimed the piss tube
was too short and he could not use it. The ground crew chief wrote in his
report: "Piss tube to spec. Problem is pilot's dick is too short."
20FG entered N. Euro. combat at the end of Dec, '43. Did not appear to
suffer from the morale and leadership problems of the 55FG. First
contacted Luftwaffe on 29 Jan. '44. Downed 3 FW-190, 3 Me-110, 3 Me-210,
1 Me-109. No P-38s lost. 3 FWs downed by Lindol Graham, who used only
his single 20mm cannon, 12 shots per plane. (Lindol later crashed and was
killed while attempting to kill the fleeing crew of an Me-110 he had just
forced down in a low-level fight. The two men were floundering across a
snow-covered field and it appeared that Lindol attempted to hit them with
his props. His plane seemed to hit the ground, then bounce back up,
soaring into a chandelle, then falling off on its nose and diving straight
into the ground.)
On 8 Feb. James Morris of 20FG downed 3 FW-190s in a single combat,
involving tight turns (in which the P-38's maneuvering flap setting [8
degrees extension] was used) and an Me-109 as returning home, the first
quadruple kill for an 8AF fighter. All kills were made with dead astern
shots. Morris missed all his deflection shots. Interestingly, two of the
FWs were first encountered head-on and Morris was able to reverse and
maneuver onto their tails while they tried with all their might to get on
his--and failed. Three days later he downed an Me-109, making him the
first P-38 ace flying out of England. (He would score a total of 8
victories before being shot down on 7 July, the highest score of any
UK-based P-38 pilot.)
364FG arrived in UK in Feb., '44. Led by Col John Lowell, who had helped
develop the P-38 at Wright-Pat, on its first mission over Berlin on 6
March, he downed 2 Me-109s, and two more on 8 March. On 9 March he downed
an FW-190. He was eventually to tally 11 kills in the P-38, but several
were downgraded to probables after the war.
Col Mark Hubbel took over the 20th on 17 March. He believed P-38
excellent fighter against Luftwaffe and proved it by promptly shooting
down 2 Me-109 and sharing a third with his wingman. He may have downed a
fourth Me-109 which he was seen pursuing as it streamed smoke in a dive.
He was last seen chasing yet another Me-109, this time through the door
of a church. Neither planes nor church survived the encounter.
During the late winter of 1944 ocurred the famous dual between a
Griffon-engined Spitfire XV and a P-38H of the 364FG. Col. Lowell few the
P-38, engaging the Spitfire at 5,000 ft. in a head-on pass. Lowell was
able to get on the Spitfire's tail and stay there no matter what the
Spitfire pilot did. Although the Spitfire could execute a tighter turning
circle than the P-38, Lowell was able to use the P-38's excellent stall
characteristics to repeatedly pull inside the Spit's turn radius and ride
the stall, then back off outside the Spit's turn, pick up speed and cut
back in again in what he called a "cloverleaf" maneuver. After 20 minutes
of this, at 1,000 ft. altitude, the Spit tried a Spit-S (at a 30-degree
angle, not vertically down). Lowell stayed with the Spit through the
maneuver, although his P-38 almost hit the ground. After that the
Spitfire pilot broke off the engagement and flew home. This contest was
witnessed by 75 pilots on the ground.
Ultimately 7 P-38 FG were operational in northern Europe. The 474th was
the only one to retain the P-38 till the end of the war. As pilots grew
used to the plane and developed confidence in it, it successes against the
Luftwaffe grew. On 7 July, '44, P-38s of the 20FG downed 25 out of 77 e/a
destroyed that day, the highest of any group.
The last UK-based P-38 ace was Robin Olds of the 479FG. On 14 Aug., '44,
while flying alone, he encountered two FW-190s and engaged them in a
dogfight, shooting both down.
On 25 Aug, P-38s from 367 encountered FW-190s of JG-6, a top Luftwaffe
unit. Wild, low-level battle ensued in which 8 P-38s and 20 FW-190s were
down. Five of the FWs were shot down by Capt. Lawrence Blumer. 367
received a Presidential Unit Citation as a result of this battle.
On the same day, P-38s from 474 shot down 21 FW-190s for the loss of 11
P-38s. The same day Olds' of 479 downed three Me-109s in a running battle
that saw his canopy shot off.
On 26 Sept., P-38s of the 479 downed 19 e/a near Munster. Shortly after
that most P-38s were gradually replaced by P-51s.
The last long-range bomber escort in northern Europe by P-38s was on 19
Nov. '44 when 367FG escorted bombers to Merzig, Germany. FW-190s
attempted to intercept. P-38s downed six with no losses. No bombers were
lost either. It was a good way to end the P-38s air-superiority role in
northern Europe
Bobmiller2
>One of these proved the
>coffin of Antoine de Saint Exupery, author of "Wind, Sand and Stars" and
>other aviation literature standards, who disappeared on a flight over
>southern France, 31 July, 1944.
He also wrote "The Little Prince" and was a close friend of Lindberghs.
Regarding P-38s, I understand that pilot suffered more from the cold at
high altitudes than other fighter pilots. And they cost nearly twice as
much as the P-51. One P-38 or two P-51s?
CDB100620
The cockpit heating problem was taken care of on the P-38L, the definitive
Lightning, which made up about half the production run. But that didn't
help pilots in the ETO or MTO in 1943 and early 1944. There were many
cases of pilots being forced to abort mission because their hands and feet
were frostbitten.
One problem the P-38 had in dealing with the Me-109, but not the FW-190
(which was more of a low and mid-altitude fighter) was the Me's high
altitude performace superiority. Above 25,000 ft., cooling or
supercharger impeller or turbine speeds became limiting for the Lockheed,
and high speed capability started to fall off. At low altitudes, the
plane could max out at about 330-340 mph. This rose to well above 400 mph
between 25,000 to 30,000. As the plane approached 30,000 ft, speeds over
Mach 0.60 could be sustained in level flight. Thus, manuevering could
quickly give the plane compressibility problems. At Mach 0.65 (290 mph
IAS, 440 mph TAS at 30,000 ft.; 360 mph IAS, 460 mph TAS at 20,000 ft.)
drag began to soar as the plane began to encounter compressibility. At
Mach 0.67 shock waves began forming and buffeting began at Mach 0.675. At
Mach 0.74 tuck under began. Buffeting developed at a lower Mach number in
any maneuver exceeding 1 g.
What this meant to a pilot in combat in say, a P-38H such as that used by
the 55FG or 20FG circa Jan. '44, was that if, at high altitude such as
Me-109s preferred approaching bomber formations, he locked on to the e/a
and it split-S'ed and dove away (typical Luftwaffe evasive maneuver), if
he attempted to follow, his P-38 would start to vibrate, then start
bucking like a rodeo bronco, the control column would begin flail back and
forth so forcefully it would probably be ripped out of his hands and begin
pounding him to crap. Once the plane dropped down to lower altitude where
the speed of sound was higher, the buffeting declined and the trim tab
could be used to haul the airplane out of what seemed to be a death dive.
Recovery with trim tab resulted in 5 g pull-out. Many a low-time service
pilot would be so shaken by this experience that he would never dive the
P-38 again, and might be so afraid of the airplane that his usefullness as
a fighter pilot was over.
The late J and L models solved this problem with the installation of a
dive flap. Extend the flaps at the beginning of a dive and all problems
were eliminated. Again, these models weren't available in the critical
period between fall 1943 and spring 1944 when the most desperate battles
against the Luftwaffe took place, and when the P-38s rep in Europe was
established.
The reason P-38s were as successful as they were in Europe (and it should
be kept in mind they performed their escort role before it was decided to
free the fighters from the bombers to seek out e/a on favorable terms so
they were always forced to engage on unfavorable terms) was at least in
part because they were wonderful aerobatic airplanes with absolutely no
maneuvers restricted except the dive. Loops, Immelmans, slow and snap
rolls, Cuban eights...it could perform them all with perfection. It had a
wonderful ability to perform in the vertical, with an excellent rate of
climb, splendid zoom climb. It could easily change direction while
executing vertical maneuvers. It was also a very stable gun platform,
being stable and very smooth while executing maneuvers.
In contrast, the P-51, had far fewer compressibility problems at speeds
normally encountered in combat, including dives from high altitude. The D
model was placarded at 300 mph IAS (539 mph TAS, Mach 0.81) at 35,000 ft.
In a dive, the P-51 was such an aerodynamically clean design that it could
quickly enter compressibility if the dive was continued (in reality, a
pilot could, as a rule, catch any German plane before compressibility
became a problem). But, say, in an evasive dive to escape, as the P-51's
speed in the dive increased, it started skidding beyond what the pilot
could control (this could be a problem in a dive onto a much lower-flying
plane or ground target--couldn't keep the plane tracking on the target if
speed was too high). As compressibility was entered, it would start
rolling and pitching and the whole plane would begin to vibrate. This
began about Mach 0.72. The pilot could maintain control to above Mach
0.80 (stateside tests said 0.83 (605 mph) was max safe speed--but
structural damage to the aircraft would result).
The P-51's quirk that could catch the uprepared service pilot by surprise
was that as airspeed built up over 450 mph, the plane would start to get
very nose heavy. It needed to be trimmed tail heavy before the dive if
speeds over 400 mph were anticipated. However, in high speed dives, the
plane's skidding changed to unintended snap rolls so violent that the
pilot's head was slammed against the canopy. Depending on how much fuel
was in the fuselage tank, on pull-out stick force reversal could occur, a
real thrill that could totally flummox a low-time service pilot diving
earthward at close to 1,000 ft per second trying to escape a pursuer.
The P-51 was a good dogfighter, positively stable under all flight
routines. A pilot didn't have to work hard to get it to the limits of its
flight envelope (that is, he wasn't sweating heaving and pushing and
pulling and kicking to get it to move its ass.) It was important to burn
down fuel in the fuselage tank to avoid longitudenal instabillity.
Cranking into a tight turn with too much go-juice in the tank would mean
instant stick force reversal and the pilot had to brace himself to oppose
the stick slamming backward into his solar plexus, and shove hard to
prevent the turn from tightening till, if he was lucky, he entered a high
speed stall, or, if unlucky, the wing ripped off.
Turns above 250 mph IAS were the killers, because they resulted in g
forces high enough to black out the pilot so that he couldn't oppose the
stick reversal and the Mustang would, unattended, wind itself up into a
wing-buster.
So, which plane would rather go into combat against the Luftwaffe in?
Steve Hix
In article BAA1...@ladder01.news.aol.com, bobmi...@aol.com (Bobmiller2) writes:
:>One of these proved the
The proposed followon to the Lightning would have been even less of a
bargain. Very little performance improvement, and even more expensive
to produce.