Patton on the Maginot line
ArtKramr
"Permanent fortifications such as the Maginot line are a tribute to man's
stupidity.".
Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
Dave Eadsforth
<artk...@aol.com> writes
plan:
Part 1 - it was intended, in the event of war with Germany, to divert
the main German advance around the northern end, thus bringing Belgium
(and its allies) into the war, and allow the German army to be engaged
on a narrower front.
Part 2 - this part of the plan - holding the German advance, was not
carried out in a completely satisfactory manner...
Cheers,
Dave
--
Dave Eadsforth
Candice Sheppard
> When Patton was asked what he thought of the Maginot line, he said,
> "Permanent fortifications such as the Maginot line are a tribute to man's
> stupidity.".
But then Patton had no use for anything besides air and armor. His view
of the Army was purely attack. He would have been interesting to watch
operate in places like Somalia, or even Vietnam, where attacking the enemy
was the last thing desired, as there was no front, and the people in the
Pentagon didn't want a front, but instead a limited war (say only 60k dead
maximum).
Thus, the U.S. Army developed thousands of its own Maginot lines.
Tributes I suppose...
Nono Le Rouje/RBC
news:noemail-B7E1DF...@cnews.newsguy.com:
>
> Are you sure? I had always read that the reason the Maginot line
> stopped at the Belgian border was because the French were convinced
> the German would respect Belgian neutrality.
I heard this hypothesis too, but I couldn't decide between the 2 opinions.
--
Nono Le Rouje/RBC
`All those moments will be lost in time like tears in rain. Time to die.'
Dave Eadsforth
<noe...@noemail.com> writes
>In article <eliEkjAG...@magnum.demon.co.uk>,
>at the Belgian border was because the French were convinced the German
>would respect Belgian neutrality.
France might well have wanted to avoid the political repercussions of
fortifying the Belgian frontier, but without such fortifications the
Maginot Line put them is a better position either way. If the Germans
respected Belgian neutrality then they would have to beat themselves
senseless against an almost invulnerable fortification (with any local
breakthroughs being dealt with by strong mobile reserves.) And if the
Germans did not respect Belgian neutrality then the alternative, war
with Belgium and her allies, and a narrow main front for France, would
apply.
Keith Willshaw
"Hobo" <noe...@noemail.com> wrote in message
news:noemail-B7E1DF...@cnews.newsguy.com...
> In article <eliEkjAG...@magnum.demon.co.uk>,
> Dave Eadsforth <da...@magnum.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> >
>
> Are you sure? I had always read that the reason the Maginot line stopped
> at the Belgian border was because the French were convinced the German
> would respect Belgian neutrality.
Given that they hadnt in 1914 why would they do so ?
In fact there was a less well developed line of fortifications
along the Belgian border but it was thinner and didnt cover
the Ardennes sector at all.
In reality the line was a strategic disaster since what
happened is it tied down a large percentage of the French
Army and artillery allowing the Germans to achieve local
superiority and outflank it.
Keith
Steve Hix
Hobo <noe...@noemail.com> wrote:
> Are you sure? I had always read that the reason the Maginot line stopped
> at the Belgian border was because the French were convinced the German
> would respect Belgian neutrality.
After all, it had worked so well in WW1...
Tuollaf43
> When Patton was asked what he thought of the Maginot line, he said,
> "Permanent fortifications such as the Maginot line are a tribute to man's
> stupidity.".
OK. So?
Walt BJ
sure that no modern army could come through the Ardennes. So 'Plan D'
had the French and the British advance to the river Dyle to meet the
Germans coming through Belgium, only to have the 'sickle stroke' from
the Ardennes swing around behind them. Poser - what would have
happened had the French, instead of putting their money into digging
and cement, had built more tanks, equipped them with radios, and
trained a mobile armored force, a la DeGaulle's writings? And built
sopme more good fighters quicker while they were at it. BTW, RTFBs!
Walt BJ
Nono Le Rouje/RBC
news:497f097b.03020...@posting.google.com:
Our aeronautical industry was, unfortunately, less more advenced in its
reorganisation that it should have been to build those heavily needed
fighters.
At this time, our "industry" looked like more craft than industry as it was
in the USA ot in Germany.
St Exupery had a sentence which summarize this very well: "how 40 millions
of farmers could have resisted to 60 millions of workers?" (In 'pilote de
Guerre', if I remember correctly)
Keith Willshaw
"Nono Le Rouje/RBC" <NonoL...@NOSPAMnetcourrier.com> wrote in message
news:Xns931DE98AAA51BNo...@193.252.19.141...
> wal...@mindspring.com (Walt BJ) a écrit dans
> news:497f097b.03020...@posting.google.com:
>
> > Read history! The third part of this 'puzzle' was that the French were
> > sure that no modern army could come through the Ardennes. So 'Plan D'
> > had the French and the British advance to the river Dyle to meet the
> > Germans coming through Belgium, only to have the 'sickle stroke' from
> > the Ardennes swing around behind them. Poser - what would have
> > happened had the French, instead of putting their money into digging
> > and cement, had built more tanks, equipped them with radios, and
> > trained a mobile armored force, a la DeGaulle's writings? And built
> > sopme more good fighters quicker while they were at it.
>
> Our aeronautical industry was, unfortunately, less more advenced in its
> reorganisation that it should have been to build those heavily needed
> fighters.
France had plenty of aircraft and more tanks than the
Germans and they were for the most part better.
The problem was one of doctrine. Had the French and British
counter attacked the German flanks they could have turned
round the war. Instead the French Generals held back their
tanks and only de Gaulle's 4th Armored Division made the
a counterattack on the Meuse bridgehead.
Keith
Nono Le Rouje/RBC
news:b26llb$27i$1$8300...@news.demon.co.uk:
> France had plenty of aircraft and more tanks than the
> Germans and they were for the most part better.
MS 406 were not better, and the D 520 was in too fex number. Besides, these
were very badly equiped (no radio, for example, no heating, ...), and when
they came from factories, they had a lot of malfunctions, and many things
lacked.
Besides bis, they had problems with guns (lack of reliability)
> The problem was one of doctrine. Had the French and British
> counter attacked the German flanks they could have turned
> round the war. Instead the French Generals held back their
> tanks and only de Gaulle's 4th Armored Division made the
> a counterattack on the Meuse bridgehead.
>
That must be taken into account, yes.
Peter Stickney
While the Ardennes isn't exactly the Maine woods or the Oregon rain
forest, If you're doing motorized movement, you'll still be hanging
pretty close to thw roads. I have often wondered what the effect on
the German advance through there in 1940 would have been if the French
had used their Engineer troops a bit more effectively. Mined
roadblocks, with artillery registered on them, multiple layers of
blocks, the sort of thing that makes traffic jams miles long when
you're trying to move an Armored Division. If nothing else, it could
have given the Northern flank units up in Belgium time to get
re-oriented.
--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster
Keith Willshaw
"Peter Stickney" <p-sti...@adelphia.net> wrote in message
news:run62b...@Mineshaft.att.net...
This is of course pretty much what happened in 1944
where a relatively small number of US engineers and
infantry effectively bottled up the Panzers long enough for
Patton and Montgomery to swing their forces around.
Keith
Yama
"Walt BJ" <wal...@mindspring.com> kirjoitti
viestissä:497f097b.03020...@posting.google.com...
> the Ardennes swing around behind them. Poser - what would have
> happened had the French, instead of putting their money into digging
> and cement, had built more tanks, equipped them with radios, and
> trained a mobile armored force, a la DeGaulle's writings? And built
> sopme more good fighters quicker while they were at it. BTW, RTFBs!
A common myth, really. Maginot line was built mostly in '20s and early
'30s - aircraft and tanks built at that timeframe would have been obsolete
and useless by WW2.
Maginot line was a very good idea, considering that it gave long-time
benefit from one-time investment. Fortifications are not made obsolete as
quickly as tanks or aircraft.
James Wilkins
> While the Ardennes isn't exactly the Maine woods or the Oregon rain
> forest, If you're doing motorized movement, you'll still be hanging
> pretty close to thw roads. I have often wondered what the effect on
> the German advance through there in 1940 would have been if the French
> had used their Engineer troops a bit more effectively. Mined
> roadblocks, with artillery registered on them, multiple layers of
> blocks, the sort of thing that makes traffic jams miles long when
> you're trying to move an Armored Division. If nothing else, it could
> have given the Northern flank units up in Belgium time to get
> re-oriented.
No one -- on either side -- realized how fast Rommel and Guderian
would be moving. The rest of the German army was slow enough to have
given the French time to man prepared positions.
Rommel wrote with amusement (The Rommel Papers) how French and British
vehicles kept joining his column, thinking it was friendly because the
Germans just couldn't be that far forward yet. Later during his rush
to the Seine he avoided roadblocks by driving cross-country.
US engineer troops couldn't stop the Panzer advance through the
Ardennes in 1944, either. "The Bitter Woods" contains some good
stories of how hard they tried.
jw
ArtKramr
>From: "Yama" tjama...@paju.oulu.fi
>Date: 2/10/03 3:34 AM Pacific
>Maginot line was a very good idea, considering that it gave long-time
>benefit from one-time investment. Fortifications are not made obsolete as
>quickly as tanks or aircraft.
>
>
Well we have your point of view and we have Patton's. I'll take Pattons.
ArtKramr
>Date: 2/10/03 5:17 AM Pacific Standard Time
>US engineer troops couldn't stop the Panzer advance through the
>Ardennes in 1944, either. "The Bitter Woods" contains some good
>stories of how hard they tried.
>
>jw
But in the end we beat their asses driving them into the dirt never to
recover..That is more than the French could ever say.
Keith Willshaw
"James Wilkins" <james_...@ti.com> wrote in message
news:ec12ea06.03021...@posting.google.com...
> p-sti...@adelphia.net (Peter Stickney) wrote in message
> >
> > While the Ardennes isn't exactly the Maine woods or the Oregon rain
> > forest, If you're doing motorized movement, you'll still be hanging
> > pretty close to thw roads. I have often wondered what the effect on
> > the German advance through there in 1940 would have been if the French
> > had used their Engineer troops a bit more effectively. Mined
> > roadblocks, with artillery registered on them, multiple layers of
> > blocks, the sort of thing that makes traffic jams miles long when
> > you're trying to move an Armored Division. If nothing else, it could
> > have given the Northern flank units up in Belgium time to get
> > re-oriented.
>
> No one -- on either side -- realized how fast Rommel and Guderian
> would be moving. The rest of the German army was slow enough to have
> given the French time to man prepared positions.
>
Sure but the French could have attacked the rear
and flanks of the panzer columns and threatened
their supply lines. This is what the German high
command feared and why the ordered Guderian and
Rommel to halt.
> Rommel wrote with amusement (The Rommel Papers) how French and British
> vehicles kept joining his column, thinking it was friendly because the
> Germans just couldn't be that far forward yet. Later during his rush
> to the Seine he avoided roadblocks by driving cross-country.
>
> US engineer troops couldn't stop the Panzer advance through the
> Ardennes in 1944, either. "The Bitter Woods" contains some good
> stories of how hard they tried.
>
But they DID slow it down and change its direction by blowing bridges
Keith
Yama
"ArtKramr" <artk...@aol.com> kirjoitti
viestissä:20030210081851...@mb-ms.aol.com...
> >Maginot line was a very good idea, considering that it gave long-time
> >benefit from one-time investment. Fortifications are not made obsolete
as
> >quickly as tanks or aircraft.
>
> Well we have your point of view and we have Patton's. I'll take Pattons.
Or we could take those men's point of view who designed the Maginot line,
they were highly trained officers who were throughly familiar with French
strategic problems, whilst Patton was completely ignorant about them. I
know who I pick...
ArtKramr
>Date: 2/10/03 6:48 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Maginot line was a very good idea, considering that it gave long-time
>> >benefit from one-time investment. Fortifications are not made obsolete
>as
>> >quickly as tanks or aircraft.
>>
>> Well we have your point of view and we have Patton's. I'll take Pattons.
>
>Or we could take those men's point of view who designed the Maginot line,
>they were highly trained officers who were throughly familiar with French
>strategic problems, whilst Patton was completely ignorant about them. I
>know who I pick...
>
Yup. You choose to go with the losers. How French.
Keith Willshaw
"Yama" <tjama...@paju.oulu.fi> wrote in message
news:b28dto$ctp$1...@ousrvr3.oulu.fi...
The trouble is history proved Patton right.
The Maginot line had the intrinsic problems of
all such fortifications. It forces you to spread your
army along a long line while the enemy can concentrate
and defeat you in detail.
In a sense you can argue that given its intent was
to deter attack it worked. The trouble is the French
seemed to forget that their left flank along the
Belgian frontier, and especially the Ardennes region
was undefended.
Napoleon must have been spinning in his grave
as his ghost saw such a blunder being made.
We shouldnt castigate them too much as the Germans
headed by Rommel did exactly the same thing on the
Atlantic wall. They spent the equivalent of billions
of dollars and tied huge resources up building a
system of coastal defences that held the allies
up only a few hours.
Keith
Yama
"Keith Willshaw" <keith_w...@compuserve.com> kirjoitti
viestissä:b28hbg$3ea$1...@selma.aspentech.com...
line,
> > they were highly trained officers who were throughly familiar with
French
> > strategic problems, whilst Patton was completely ignorant about them. I
> > know who I pick...
> >
>
> The trouble is history proved Patton right.
Completely opposite. Maginot line did it's part - it deterred Germans from
their obvious route. It isn't the line's fault that rest of the military
failed.
> The Maginot line had the intrinsic problems of
> all such fortifications. It forces you to spread your
> army along a long line while the enemy can concentrate
> and defeat you in detail.
Completely opposite. It allowed a strong front line with relatively weak
manning, while rest of the forces were freed to be in tactical or strategic
reserve.
> In a sense you can argue that given its intent was
> to deter attack it worked. The trouble is the French
> seemed to forget that their left flank along the
> Belgian frontier,
They did not forget it - completely opposite. Best French and British
forces were headed to Belgium to repel German invasion. Attack through
Ardennes was relatively late German masterpiece, before it German invasion
plan called an attack exactly as French and British had envisioned and were
prepared to meet.
> We shouldnt castigate them too much as the Germans
> headed by Rommel did exactly the same thing on the
> Atlantic wall. They spent the equivalent of billions
> of dollars and tied huge resources up building a
> system of coastal defences that held the allies
> up only a few hours.
What else Germans could have done? It was better than nothing.
Lawrence Nyveen
"Keith Willshaw" <keith_w...@compuserve.com> wrote:
> The trouble is history proved Patton right.
>
> The Maginot line had the intrinsic problems of
> all such fortifications. It forces you to spread your
> army along a long line while the enemy can concentrate
> and defeat you in detail.
>
> In a sense you can argue that given its intent was
> to deter attack it worked. The trouble is the French
> seemed to forget that their left flank along the
> Belgian frontier, and especially the Ardennes region
> was undefended.
The French plan was to advance through Belgium and hold the
Belgian-German border.
But the Belgians said no, and France and England refused to invade
Belgium without its permission.
--
Laurie Nyveen nyv...@videotron.canada
_______________________________________________________________________
Editor, Netsurfer Digest http://www.netsurf.com/nsd
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"All we are, basically, are monkeys with car keys."
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(Remove nada from Canada to e-mail me. Sorry)
Barry Offord
Yama wrote:
>
> "Walt BJ" <wal...@mindspring.com> kirjoitti
> viestissä:497f097b.03020...@posting.google.com...
> > the Ardennes swing around behind them. Poser - what would have
> > happened had the French, instead of putting their money into digging
> > and cement, had built more tanks, equipped them with radios, and
> > trained a mobile armored force, a la DeGaulle's writings? And built
> > sopme more good fighters quicker while they were at it. BTW, RTFBs!
>
> A common myth, really. Maginot line was built mostly in '20s and early
> '30s - aircraft and tanks built at that timeframe would have been obsolete
> and useless by WW2.
But money spent in the 1920s-30s would have led to developing better
tanks and aircraft... so that by 1940 the quality of the tanks and
aircraft would be better than they were, and because you are not
committing resources to your fixed defences they would (maybe) have
developed the doctrine to properly use the equipment.
>
> Maginot line was a very good idea, considering that it gave long-time
> benefit from one-time investment. Fortifications are not made obsolete as
> quickly as tanks or aircraft.
Rather than a one time investment you are probably committing your
capital purchases budget for years ahead to make the purchase....
Then you have a massive annual maintenance cost... fortifications like
the Maginot line would burn up a considerable portion of the defence
budget just to maintain them, then there is the impact of
deferred/reduced rate purchase of other equipment for your mobile forces
(transport, tanks, artillery etc) because of the size of the capital
commitment to the fortifications.
Keith Willshaw
>
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith_w...@compuserve.com> kirjoitti
> viestissä:b28hbg$3ea$1...@selma.aspentech.com...
> > "Yama" <tjama...@paju.oulu.fi> wrote in message
> > news:b28dto$ctp$1...@ousrvr3.oulu.fi...
> > > Or we could take those men's point of view who designed the Maginot
> line,
> > > they were highly trained officers who were throughly familiar with
> French
> > > strategic problems, whilst Patton was completely ignorant about them.
I
> > > know who I pick...
> > >
> >
> > The trouble is history proved Patton right.
>
> Completely opposite. Maginot line did it's part - it deterred Germans from
> their obvious route. It isn't the line's fault that rest of the military
> failed.
>
Their obvious route was the way they had come before,
through Belgium.
> > The Maginot line had the intrinsic problems of
> > all such fortifications. It forces you to spread your
> > army along a long line while the enemy can concentrate
> > and defeat you in detail.
>
> Completely opposite. It allowed a strong front line with relatively weak
> manning, while rest of the forces were freed to be in tactical or
strategic
> reserve.
>
Except that there was no such reserve. When the Germans
broke through there were no mobile reserves available
for a counter attack and the garrisons of the forts were marched
into captivity, most never having fired a shot.
> > In a sense you can argue that given its intent was
> > to deter attack it worked. The trouble is the French
> > seemed to forget that their left flank along the
> > Belgian frontier,
>
> They did not forget it - completely opposite. Best French and British
> forces were headed to Belgium to repel German invasion. Attack through
> Ardennes was relatively late German masterpiece, before it German invasion
> plan called an attack exactly as French and British had envisioned and
were
> prepared to meet.
>
In other words the French and British expected a replay
of WW1 and the Germans didnt cooperate
> > We shouldnt castigate them too much as the Germans
> > headed by Rommel did exactly the same thing on the
> > Atlantic wall. They spent the equivalent of billions
> > of dollars and tied huge resources up building a
> > system of coastal defences that held the allies
> > up only a few hours.
>
> What else Germans could have done? It was better than nothing.
>
Was it ?
Those billions of dollars and millions of tons of steel and
concrete covering hundreds of miles of coastline that were
never attacked couldnt have been put to better use ?
Keith Willshaw
"Lawrence Nyveen" <nyv...@videotron.canada> wrote in message
news:nyveen-F9A5B1....@news.videotron.net...
> In article <b28hbg$3ea$1...@selma.aspentech.com>,
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith_w...@compuserve.com> wrote:
>
> > The trouble is history proved Patton right.
> >
> > The Maginot line had the intrinsic problems of
> > all such fortifications. It forces you to spread your
> > army along a long line while the enemy can concentrate
> > and defeat you in detail.
> >
> > In a sense you can argue that given its intent was
> > to deter attack it worked. The trouble is the French
> > seemed to forget that their left flank along the
> > Belgian frontier, and especially the Ardennes region
> > was undefended.
>
> The French plan was to advance through Belgium and hold the
> Belgian-German border.
>
> But the Belgians said no, and France and England refused to invade
> Belgium without its permission.
>
Not really. While the Belgians had declared neutrality in 1936 they had
fortified their Eastern frontier and the Anglo/French plan called
for the forces to advance to the Dyle river while the Belgians
conducted a holding action. There they would dig in and conduct
a holding action.
When the Germans attacked this plan was put into action. Trouble
is the main thrust came through the Ardennes splitting the British
from the main French force. A counter attack on the flanks of
the German spearhead was ordered but the French couldnt mount
it in time and instead of the planned 8 divisions only 1 French and
1 British armoured Brigade made the attack.
Keith
Yama
"Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> kirjoitti
viestissä:b299l0$3bq$1$8302...@news.demon.co.uk...
from
> > their obvious route. It isn't the line's fault that rest of the
military
> > failed.
>
> Their obvious route was the way they had come before,
> through Belgium.
Absolutely. Which the French and British expected, which was because of
Maginot line.
France did not have same sort of strategic depth than Soviets. Northern
France contained most of their industry and natural resources. Keeping that
area was crucial.
> > Completely opposite. It allowed a strong front line with relatively
weak
> > manning, while rest of the forces were freed to be in tactical or
> strategic
> > reserve.
> >
>
> Except that there was no such reserve. When the Germans
> broke through there were no mobile reserves available
> for a counter attack
...because those reserves had been committed at Northern Belgium, where
everyone thought Germans were going to invade. They were NOT committed at
Maginot Line.
A conventional frontline, with only field fortifications, would have been
much weaker despite requiring more troops.
>and the garrisons of the forts were marched
> into captivity, most never having fired a shot.
And those who did, did good job. One place where Germans attempted to break
through, they lost about a regiment worth of troops without making any
meaningful advances.
> > They did not forget it - completely opposite. Best French and British
> > forces were headed to Belgium to repel German invasion. Attack through
> > Ardennes was relatively late German masterpiece, before it German
invasion
> > plan called an attack exactly as French and British had envisioned and
> were
> > prepared to meet.
> >
>
> In other words the French and British expected a replay
> of WW1 and the Germans didnt cooperate
Indeed. Which does zero to prove Maginot lines futility...
> > > We shouldnt castigate them too much as the Germans
> > > headed by Rommel did exactly the same thing on the
> > > Atlantic wall. They spent the equivalent of billions
> > > of dollars and tied huge resources up building a
> > > system of coastal defences that held the allies
> > > up only a few hours.
> >
> > What else Germans could have done? It was better than nothing.
> >
>
> Was it ?
>
> Those billions of dollars and millions of tons of steel and
> concrete covering hundreds of miles of coastline that were
> never attacked couldnt have been put to better use ?
Where? It's a matter of putting all resources to use. You can't, for
example, make tank out of concrete. It's not like choice was building more
Messerschmitt's or building Atlantic Wall - it was more like building
Atlantic Wall or building nothing.
Yama
"Barry Offord" <barr...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz> kirjoitti
viestissä:3E482A33...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz...
> Yama wrote:
> > A common myth, really. Maginot line was built mostly in '20s and early
> > '30s - aircraft and tanks built at that timeframe would have been
obsolete
> > and useless by WW2.
>
> But money spent in the 1920s-30s would have led to developing better
> tanks and aircraft...
Not really. Technology did not allow it. And decisionmakers at late '20s
did not know that war was about to break loose within 10 years, they only
knew that there might be a war some day.
> > Maginot line was a very good idea, considering that it gave long-time
> > benefit from one-time investment. Fortifications are not made obsolete
as
> > quickly as tanks or aircraft.
>
> Rather than a one time investment you are probably committing your
> capital purchases budget for years ahead to make the purchase....
>
> Then you have a massive annual maintenance cost... fortifications like
> the Maginot line would burn up a considerable portion of the defence
> budget just to maintain them,
However, costs of maintaining a larger tank and aircraft force and industry
would be MUCH greater. Basically, you wouldn't be able to develope your
forces and industry much because you would have to maintain the existing
force you've built.
> deferred/reduced rate purchase of other equipment for your mobile forces
> (transport, tanks, artillery etc) because of the size of the capital
> commitment to the fortifications.
However, the argument is (and I agree) that in that situation, you get more
bang for a buck from building fixed fortifications. Their lifetime costs
are very small compared to tanks or aircraft, and they can be even
seriously negleted and still brought up to operational use if necessary,
which certainly can't be said from tanks or a/c.
Geoff May
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> kirjoitti
> viestissä:b299l0$3bq$1$8302...@news.demon.co.uk...
>>Those billions of dollars and millions of tons of steel and
>>concrete covering hundreds of miles of coastline that were
>>never attacked couldnt have been put to better use ?
>
> Where? It's a matter of putting all resources to use. You can't, for
> example, make tank out of concrete. It's not like choice was building more
> Messerschmitt's or building Atlantic Wall - it was more like building
> Atlantic Wall or building nothing.
In the strictest sense, you are correct but you have overlooked that
there are a limited number of *people* available. If you get everyone
mixing cement then those people cannot produce aircraft or what ever
other weapon system you wish to build.
Added to that, that concrete might have been better used in other
projects. Off hand, I cannot think of anything excepting U-Boat pens but
I'm fairly sure someone will provide a better example.
MfG
Geoff.
--
An offline Formula One[tm](r)(c) database is available at
http://beateundgeoff.bei.t-online.de/geoff.htm
(Last uploaded on 8th Jan. 2003)
For an alternate F1 news group news://news.f1ngers.com/F1NGers
Barry Offord
Yama wrote:
>
> "Barry Offord" <barr...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz> kirjoitti
> viestissä:3E482A33...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz...
> > Yama wrote:
> > > A common myth, really. Maginot line was built mostly in '20s and early
> > > '30s - aircraft and tanks built at that timeframe would have been
> obsolete
> > > and useless by WW2.
> >
> > But money spent in the 1920s-30s would have led to developing better
> > tanks and aircraft...
>
> Not really. Technology did not allow it. And decisionmakers at late '20s
> did not know that war was about to break loose within 10 years, they only
> knew that there might be a war some day.
But they could have had more tanks in the 20'3 and 30's meaning a change
in doctrine. So that by the 1940's they may still have the same tanks
(Char B etc) but maybe by then they would have found that a one man
turret is contra indicated on a "MBT")... Just having the tanks they did
have in concentration would have been beneficial.....
Without Maginot line the French would have had to develop a more mobile
defence plan.....
>
> > > Maginot line was a very good idea, considering that it gave long-time
> > > benefit from one-time investment. Fortifications are not made obsolete
> as
> > > quickly as tanks or aircraft.
> >
> > Rather than a one time investment you are probably committing your
> > capital purchases budget for years ahead to make the purchase....
> >
> > Then you have a massive annual maintenance cost... fortifications like
> > the Maginot line would burn up a considerable portion of the defence
> > budget just to maintain them,
>
> However, costs of maintaining a larger tank and aircraft force and industry
> would be MUCH greater. Basically, you wouldn't be able to develope your
> forces and industry much because you would have to maintain the existing
> force you've built.
One thing, at least you can export your tank and aircraft designs...
can't do that with a defence structure.
Also, you can easily upgrade you tanks and aircraft (not cheaply but
relatively easily).. but introducing new technology to a fixed defence
system...... difficult.
>
> > deferred/reduced rate purchase of other equipment for your mobile forces
> > (transport, tanks, artillery etc) because of the size of the capital
> > commitment to the fortifications.
>
> However, the argument is (and I agree) that in that situation, you get more
> bang for a buck from building fixed fortifications. Their lifetime costs
> are very small compared to tanks or aircraft, and they can be even
> seriously negleted and still brought up to operational use if necessary,
> which certainly can't be said from tanks or a/c.
But (IIRC) the need to divert resources to the Maginot line prevented
the timely introduction of new design military hardware (aircraft and
tanks).
Lifetime costs for a defence structure may be less than the same capital
investment in tanks and aircraft (but a mobile force needs less
equipment and man power than a manned defence line)... but to be
effective the defence line has to cover the whole boarder (any holes can
be exploited)... and must be constantly updated as new technology is
introduced.
Obsolete tanks and aircraft can at least be uses as trainers, you can't
do much else with a defence structure.
Keith Willshaw
>
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> kirjoitti
> viestissä:b299l0$3bq$1$8302...@news.demon.co.uk...
> > "Yama" <tjama...@paju.oulu.fi> wrote in message
> > news:b28po9$jlr$1...@ousrvr3.oulu.fi...
> > > Completely opposite. Maginot line did it's part - it deterred Germans
> from
> > > their obvious route. It isn't the line's fault that rest of the
> military
> > > failed.
> >
> > Their obvious route was the way they had come before,
> > through Belgium.
>
> Absolutely. Which the French and British expected, which was because of
> Maginot line.
>
No there was no Maginot line in 1914 and the Germans
still came that way
> France did not have same sort of strategic depth than Soviets. Northern
> France contained most of their industry and natural resources. Keeping
that
> area was crucial.
>
Sure and that could have been better achieved with a mobile
force. The sad part is that France DID have the basic requirements
for a rapid response mobile force. They had more tanks than the
Germans and they were as good or better than the PZ II & III
the trouble was they tied them to the infantry instead of using
them as a mobile counterforce.
> > > Completely opposite. It allowed a strong front line with relatively
> weak
> > > manning, while rest of the forces were freed to be in tactical or
> > strategic
> > > reserve.
> > >
> >
> > Except that there was no such reserve. When the Germans
> > broke through there were no mobile reserves available
> > for a counter attack
>
> ...because those reserves had been committed at Northern Belgium, where
> everyone thought Germans were going to invade. They were NOT committed at
> Maginot Line.
>
> A conventional frontline, with only field fortifications, would have been
> much weaker despite requiring more troops.
>
But nobody bothers garrisoning field fortifications if the threat
is elsewhere.
> >and the garrisons of the forts were marched
> > into captivity, most never having fired a shot.
>
> And those who did, did good job. One place where Germans attempted to
break
> through, they lost about a regiment worth of troops without making any
> meaningful advances.
>
Sure but then they didnt have to.
> > > They did not forget it - completely opposite. Best French and British
> > > forces were headed to Belgium to repel German invasion. Attack through
> > > Ardennes was relatively late German masterpiece, before it German
> invasion
> > > plan called an attack exactly as French and British had envisioned and
> > were
> > > prepared to meet.
> > >
> >
> > In other words the French and British expected a replay
> > of WW1 and the Germans didnt cooperate
>
> Indeed. Which does zero to prove Maginot lines futility...
>
Actually it does such there was no Maginot line in 1914
and the Germans still didnt attack through that sector.
> > > > We shouldnt castigate them too much as the Germans
> > > > headed by Rommel did exactly the same thing on the
> > > > Atlantic wall. They spent the equivalent of billions
> > > > of dollars and tied huge resources up building a
> > > > system of coastal defences that held the allies
> > > > up only a few hours.
> > >
> > > What else Germans could have done? It was better than nothing.
> > >
> >
> > Was it ?
> >
> > Those billions of dollars and millions of tons of steel and
> > concrete covering hundreds of miles of coastline that were
> > never attacked couldnt have been put to better use ?
>
> Where? It's a matter of putting all resources to use. You can't, for
> example, make tank out of concrete. It's not like choice was building more
> Messerschmitt's or building Atlantic Wall - it was more like building
> Atlantic Wall or building nothing.
>
>
Or building proper defense positions in depth instead of
along a single line where once pentrated the whole edifice
is useless.
Keith
Yama
"Barry Offord" <barr...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz> kirjoitti
viestissä:3E4839E7...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz...
> Yama wrote:
> > Not really. Technology did not allow it. And decisionmakers at late
'20s
> > did not know that war was about to break loose within 10 years, they
only
> > knew that there might be a war some day.
>
> But they could have had more tanks in the 20'3 and 30's meaning a change
> in doctrine. So that by the 1940's they may still have the same tanks
> (Char B etc) but maybe by then they would have found that a one man
> turret is contra indicated on a "MBT")... Just having the tanks they did
> have in concentration would have been beneficial.....
>
> Without Maginot line the French would have had to develop a more mobile
> defence plan.....
Maybe, but it's not clear more mobile defence plan is actually useful in
such confined front.
> > However, costs of maintaining a larger tank and aircraft force and
industry
> > would be MUCH greater. Basically, you wouldn't be able to develope your
> > forces and industry much because you would have to maintain the
existing
> > force you've built.
>
> One thing, at least you can export your tank and aircraft designs...
> can't do that with a defence structure.
>
> Also, you can easily upgrade you tanks and aircraft (not cheaply but
> relatively easily).. but introducing new technology to a fixed defence
> system...... difficult.
Actually, it's the opposite. It's easier to put a new anti-tank gun to
bunker, much difficult to tank. Upgrading existing aircraft ij any
meaningful way was pretty much impossible in the '30s.
> > However, the argument is (and I agree) that in that situation, you get
more
> > bang for a buck from building fixed fortifications. Their lifetime
costs
> > are very small compared to tanks or aircraft, and they can be even
> > seriously negleted and still brought up to operational use if
necessary,
> > which certainly can't be said from tanks or a/c.
>
> But (IIRC) the need to divert resources to the Maginot line prevented
> the timely introduction of new design military hardware (aircraft and
> tanks).
I don't see how. Maginot line was built mostly in late '20s and early '30s.
There was plenty of time to develope military hardware.
> Lifetime costs for a defence structure may be less than the same capital
> investment in tanks and aircraft (but a mobile force needs less
> equipment and man power than a manned defence line)
Having a mobile defence force does not remove a need for manning the front
line. If anything, fixed fortifications free up manpower.
>... but to be
> effective the defence line has to cover the whole boarder (any holes can
> be exploited)
Actually, no. Maginot line had "traps", seemingly weakly defended areas
where it was hoped Germans would try to exploit.
Yama
"Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> kirjoitti
viestissä:b29fm7$mrk$1$830f...@news.demon.co.uk...
> > Maginot line.
> >
>
> No there was no Maginot line in 1914 and the Germans
> still came that way
There was no Maginot line, but there still was heavy fortifications, some
of which was later included to Maginot line. Not to mention French main
forces being on that sector.
> > France did not have same sort of strategic depth than Soviets. Northern
> > France contained most of their industry and natural resources. Keeping
> that
> > area was crucial.
>
> Sure and that could have been better achieved with a mobile
> force.
I'm not convinced. You still need a frontline, and troops to man that.
The sad part is that France DID have the basic requirements
> for a rapid response mobile force. They had more tanks than the
> Germans and they were as good or better than the PZ II & III
> the trouble was they tied them to the infantry instead of using
> them as a mobile counterforce.
However, this doctrinal failure has nothing to do with Maginot line.
Germans were busy building Siegfried line whilst training Blitzkrieg.
> > ...because those reserves had been committed at Northern Belgium, where
> > everyone thought Germans were going to invade. They were NOT committed
at
> > Maginot Line.
> >
> > A conventional frontline, with only field fortifications, would have
been
> > much weaker despite requiring more troops.
>
> But nobody bothers garrisoning field fortifications if the threat
> is elsewhere.
I don't quite see your point here.
> > > In other words the French and British expected a replay
> > > of WW1 and the Germans didnt cooperate
> >
> > Indeed. Which does zero to prove Maginot lines futility...
> >
>
> Actually it does such there was no Maginot line in 1914
> and the Germans still didnt attack through that sector.
Not at all. Germans attacked through Belgium in WW1 due to exact same
reason they did in WW2 - there were too strong French forces in the border.
> > Where? It's a matter of putting all resources to use. You can't, for
> > example, make tank out of concrete. It's not like choice was building
more
> > Messerschmitt's or building Atlantic Wall - it was more like building
> > Atlantic Wall or building nothing.
>
> Or building proper defense positions in depth instead of
> along a single line where once pentrated the whole edifice
> is useless.
Which would have taken MORE resources...
At any rate, Germans - including Rommel, Hitler and Runstedt et al - did
not agree. They all thought that invasion must be stopped on it's track, in
the beaches. If it gets any ground, defence has failed.
Walt BJ
that do not hold water.
1) The Maginot line was built in the 20s and 30s therefore if mobile
forces were instead built they would have been obsolete by 1939. That
statement, of course, presupposes no improvements would have been made
when aircraft, tank and communications and mobile tactics development
was proceeding apace.
2) One reason the Maginot line wasn't extended to the west is that the
further west one goes the less suitable the ground is for deep
fortifications - the water table is too close to the surface.
3) Money spent on the fortifications would have reenergised the
armament industries if spent there. The MS420 and D520 would have come
along smoother and faster. But money was spent on the navy and the
Dunquerque, Strasbourg, and Richelieu were excellent and well-balanced
ships.
4) Those who have doubts about the US engineers' performance in the
Battle of the Bulge would be well advised to read about them - see
what Joseph Pieper had to say.
5) One problem the French had was a plethora of aging WW1 generals who
never learned a thing after 1915. Consequently they were unable to
cope with a swift-moving enemy who sought the line of least
resistance.
Walt BJ
B2431
>never learned a thing after 1915. Consequently they were unable to
>cope with a swift-moving enemy who sought the line of least
>resistance.
>Walt BJ
>
Ardennes marched their forces into Holland expecting to meet the Germans there,
had no modern communications and hadn't read Rommel, De Gaulle...etc.
The Maginot line performed as designed: the bad guys went around the end of it.
The old fossils had a plan and stuck to it. Pity was the Germans didn't play
along.
I think the French could have made a dent in the Germans had they had proper
leadership.
Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired
Peter Stickney
james_...@ti.com (James Wilkins) writes:
> p-sti...@adelphia.net (Peter Stickney) wrote in message
>>
>> While the Ardennes isn't exactly the Maine woods or the Oregon rain
>> forest, If you're doing motorized movement, you'll still be hanging
>> pretty close to thw roads. I have often wondered what the effect on
>> the German advance through there in 1940 would have been if the French
>> had used their Engineer troops a bit more effectively. Mined
>> roadblocks, with artillery registered on them, multiple layers of
>> blocks, the sort of thing that makes traffic jams miles long when
>> you're trying to move an Armored Division. If nothing else, it could
>> have given the Northern flank units up in Belgium time to get
>> re-oriented.
>
> No one -- on either side -- realized how fast Rommel and Guderian
> would be moving. The rest of the German army was slow enough to have
> given the French time to man prepared positions.
The issue isn't how fast that the Panzers were going to move, but
rather that unimpeded _anything_ when you've got a shared border that
has been used as an invasion route twice before in the previous
century is a bad idea.
>
> Rommel wrote with amusement (The Rommel Papers) how French and British
> vehicles kept joining his column, thinking it was friendly because the
> Germans just couldn't be that far forward yet. Later during his rush
> to the Seine he avoided roadblocks by driving cross-country.
Cross country in the rather open farmland around the Seine is one
thing. Even though the Ardenne have always reminded more of a tree
farm than the Forest Primeval, you aren't gpoing to push an armored
formation (and keep it as a formation) through it unless you stick to
the roads. That's even more true of the logistical support.
> US engineer troops couldn't stop the Panzer advance through the
> Ardennes in 1944, either. "The Bitter Woods" contains some good
> stories of how hard they tried.
The idea isn't to stop them cold - that's never going to happen. But
a cascading series of defended positions will delay things for quite a
while, as you point out. This gives the defenders time to move
troops, just as happened in 1944, and bottled up road-bound convoys
are very tempting targets. A single PanZer Division is a circus
parade something like 10 miles long, using their road convoy rules.
The French, and the British, had adequate weapons, and adequate
numbers. What they didn't have, was adequate planning, and time.
They had eight months to make sure that the doors into France were
locked. Thay missed a spot. That's poor planning. But enough time
can get you through that, if you're flexible enough to believe the
combat reports when they start coming in. But, again...
Bill Shatzer
On Tue, 11 Feb 2003, Peter Stickney wrote:
-snips-
> The French, and the British, had adequate weapons, and adequate
> numbers. What they didn't have, was adequate planning, and time.
> They had eight months to make sure that the doors into France were
> locked. Thay missed a spot. That's poor planning. But enough time
> can get you through that, if you're flexible enough to believe the
> combat reports when they start coming in. But, again...
The problem, of course, is that combat reports are -always-
coming in. Some are accurate of course, but many incorrect or
overblown or wildly exagerated. Or just plain mistaken.
Sorting out the wheat from the chaff takes time. Given the
speed of the German advance and the rather awkward French
command and control system, "time" is exactly what the French
didn't get. They were rather consistently a day or more behind
the curve in attempting to respond.
OTOH, if they responded to -every- report of German advances,
attacks, and penetrations without first doing the "wheat/chaff"
analysis, they would have been like the proverbial Irishman who
leapt on his horse and rode off in all directions. As much a
recipe for disaster as being a day behind the curve.
I'm not sure any contemporary army would have performed better
in a similar situation than did the French army. No one, not
even the Germans, really fully understood the implications of
the 'blitzkreig' concept in the spring of 1940.
Cheers and all,
Kevin Brooks
> Yama wrote:
> >
> > "Barry Offord" <barr...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz> kirjoitti
> > viestissä:3E482A33...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz...
> > > Yama wrote:
> > > > A common myth, really. Maginot line was built mostly in '20s and early
> > > > '30s - aircraft and tanks built at that timeframe would have been
> obsolete
> > > > and useless by WW2.
> > >
> > > But money spent in the 1920s-30s would have led to developing better
> > > tanks and aircraft...
> >
> > Not really. Technology did not allow it. And decisionmakers at late '20s
> > did not know that war was about to break loose within 10 years, they only
> > knew that there might be a war some day.
>
> But they could have had more tanks in the 20'3 and 30's meaning a change
> in doctrine. So that by the 1940's they may still have the same tanks
> (Char B etc) but maybe by then they would have found that a one man
> turret is contra indicated on a "MBT")... Just having the tanks they did
> have in concentration would have been beneficial.....
>
> Without Maginot line the French would have had to develop a more mobile
> defence plan.....
Actually, you could make the argument that the fortifications also
required the development of a mobile striking force; any decent
strongpoint defense should include a mobile reserve to serve as both a
reaction force (planning for 100% effectiveness of fortifications
being unwise to the extreme) and as a CATK force.
>
> >
> > > > Maginot line was a very good idea, considering that it gave long-time
> > > > benefit from one-time investment. Fortifications are not made obsolete
> as
> > > > quickly as tanks or aircraft.
> > >
> > > Rather than a one time investment you are probably committing your
> > > capital purchases budget for years ahead to make the purchase....
> > >
> > > Then you have a massive annual maintenance cost... fortifications like
> > > the Maginot line would burn up a considerable portion of the defence
> > > budget just to maintain them,
> >
> > However, costs of maintaining a larger tank and aircraft force and industry
> > would be MUCH greater. Basically, you wouldn't be able to develope your
> > forces and industry much because you would have to maintain the existing
> > force you've built.
>
> One thing, at least you can export your tank and aircraft designs...
> can't do that with a defence structure.
Tell that to the folks in Europe who built all those HAS's for Iraq
back in the 80's; seemed to work for them.
>
> Also, you can easily upgrade you tanks and aircraft (not cheaply but
> relatively easily).. but introducing new technology to a fixed defence
> system...... difficult.
>
> >
> > > deferred/reduced rate purchase of other equipment for your mobile forces
> > > (transport, tanks, artillery etc) because of the size of the capital
> > > commitment to the fortifications.
> >
> > However, the argument is (and I agree) that in that situation, you get more
> > bang for a buck from building fixed fortifications. Their lifetime costs
> > are very small compared to tanks or aircraft, and they can be even
> > seriously negleted and still brought up to operational use if necessary,
> > which certainly can't be said from tanks or a/c.
>
> But (IIRC) the need to divert resources to the Maginot line prevented
> the timely introduction of new design military hardware (aircraft and
> tanks).
Yet the French still had better (in general terms), and more, tanks
than their German counterparts when the war began. In the aircraft
arena they were lagging, but then again so were the Brits and the US
(though IIRC the French did find that their Hawks purchased from the
US were able to somewhat maintain their own versus the early version
M-109's, especially at low altitudes).
>
> Lifetime costs for a defence structure may be less than the same capital
> investment in tanks and aircraft (but a mobile force needs less
> equipment and man power than a manned defence line)...
I'd disagree there. The whole idea behind fortification is really a
form of "economy of force"--by increasing their survivability, you
decrease the number of troops required.
but to be
> effective the defence line has to cover the whole boarder (any holes can
> be exploited)... and must be constantly updated as new technology is
> introduced.
True, but I have not seen where the French missed any major
technological leaps as they applied to fortifications and their
armament.
>
> Obsolete tanks and aircraft can at least be uses as trainers, you can't
> do much else with a defence structure.
I believe that where the French made their mistake was in placing too
much reliance on the fortifications; had they treated them as economy
of force tools, concentrated them only on certain avenues of approach,
and backed them with decent mobile reserves under capable leadership,
they could have proved to be of greater value. In other words, cut the
fortification budget by 30-40% and apply the savings to *training*
and, to a lesser extent, better equipping, their motorized/armored
forces and aviation, and the results might have been quite different.
I added the emphasis to training because I see this thread as
espousing a solely "equipment based" theory, be it forts or
tanks/aircraft--but the real combat multiplier would have been a
better trained force (and that, along with better leadership, is what
doomed the French in the end--the equipment comparisons, both in
numbers and quality, would not have indicated the Germans as having
such a tremendous advantage, as it ended up playing out). All of the
better equipment in the world would not have made a difference on the
Meuse at Sedan--having a well trained force that could have actually
emplaced all of the anti-tank mines they had on-hand, though, might
have doomed Guderian's troops at that point, especially if they had
had a competent, small armored reserve waiting 8 or 10 klicks back.
Brooks
Barry Offord
Yama wrote:
>
> "Barry Offord" <barr...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz> kirjoitti
> viestissä:3E4839E7...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz...
> > Yama wrote:
<SNIP>
> > Without Maginot line the French would have had to develop a more mobile
> > defence plan.....
>
> Maybe, but it's not clear more mobile defence plan is actually useful in
> such confined front.
Without the Maginot line the potential front becomes the whole french
eastern boarder....
>
> > > However, costs of maintaining a larger tank and aircraft force and
> industry
> > > would be MUCH greater. Basically, you wouldn't be able to develope your
> > > forces and industry much because you would have to maintain the
> existing
> > > force you've built.
> >
> > One thing, at least you can export your tank and aircraft designs...
> > can't do that with a defence structure.
> >
> > Also, you can easily upgrade you tanks and aircraft (not cheaply but
> > relatively easily).. but introducing new technology to a fixed defence
> > system...... difficult.
>
> Actually, it's the opposite. It's easier to put a new anti-tank gun to
> bunker, much difficult to tank. Upgrading existing aircraft ij any
> meaningful way was pretty much impossible in the '30s.
But the anti tank gun in a fort is already being countered by large guns
(42cm "mortars" etc).
As a tank becomes obsolete it can be replaced (the tank force is
upgraded, not individual tanks)... ditto for aircraft... meanwhile the
old version can be used for training.
The greatest problem with massive fortifications is that they can be
identified, mapped, and got around (either you plan special strategies
etc or go where the defences are weakest)... meanwhile a good sized
balanced mobile force can move to where they are needed (note that there
would be some fortifications... mainly at choke points The idea being to
delay for the mobile force to react rather than for the fortifications
to stop the enemy on it's own.)
<SNIP>
> > But (IIRC) the need to divert resources to the Maginot line prevented
> > the timely introduction of new design military hardware (aircraft and
> > tanks).
>
> I don't see how. Maginot line was built mostly in late '20s and early '30s.
> There was plenty of time to develope military hardware.
But there was little money left in the defence budget... the capital
cost of the Maginot line took up the capital purchase budget for many
years... it was really (IIRC) in the later pre WW2 years that France was
able to afford new aircraft etc (but in limited volume due to money
shortages)
>
> > Lifetime costs for a defence structure may be less than the same capital
> > investment in tanks and aircraft (but a mobile force needs less
> > equipment and man power than a manned defence line)
>
> Having a mobile defence force does not remove a need for manning the front
> line. If anything, fixed fortifications free up manpower.
Yes, some fortification would still be needed (we can't all have a full
moat like UK)... but rather than have fortifications that are supposed
to stop the enemy getting through you have fortifications that DELAY the
enemy.
>
> >... but to be
> > effective the defence line has to cover the whole boarder (any holes can
> > be exploited)
>
> Actually, no. Maginot line had "traps", seemingly weakly defended areas
> where it was hoped Germans would try to exploit.
Yes, special "killing grounds"... but the line must extend from
impassible terrain (swiss alps) to impassible terrain (the sea)... to
stop people just going around the side.
Barry Offord
Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> Barry Offord <barr...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz> wrote in message news:<3E4839E7...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz>...
> > Yama wrote:
<SNIP>
> > Without Maginot line the French would have had to develop a more mobile
> > defence plan.....
>
> Actually, you could make the argument that the fortifications also
> required the development of a mobile striking force; any decent
> strongpoint defense should include a mobile reserve to serve as both a
> reaction force (planning for 100% effectiveness of fortifications
> being unwise to the extreme) and as a CATK force.
But it would have been nice if they had some money left over from the
fixed defences to equip those mobile reserves.....
Also, having the Maginot line had considerable impact on the development
of doctrine (dispersing tanks piece meal rather than collecting them
together in tank formations.....)
<SNIP>
> > One thing, at least you can export your tank and aircraft designs...
> > can't do that with a defence structure.
>
> Tell that to the folks in Europe who built all those HAS's for Iraq
> back in the 80's; seemed to work for them.
Ah, sale of design technology..... but how many other countries were
interested in a Maginot Line type defence establishment?
<SNIP>
> > But (IIRC) the need to divert resources to the Maginot line prevented
> > the timely introduction of new design military hardware (aircraft and
> > tanks).
>
> Yet the French still had better (in general terms), and more, tanks
> than their German counterparts when the war began. In the aircraft
> arena they were lagging, but then again so were the Brits and the US
> (though IIRC the French did find that their Hawks purchased from the
> US were able to somewhat maintain their own versus the early version
> M-109's, especially at low altitudes).
But imagine if they had had even more armour and aviation, and of the
best and latest model... I mean, in 1940 the French still had some 1600
FT-17s - which were taken over by the Germans (see Hogg & Weeks, "The
Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Military Vehicles" page 74).
<SNIP>
> > Obsolete tanks and aircraft can at least be uses as trainers, you can't
> > do much else with a defence structure.
>
> I believe that where the French made their mistake was in placing too
> much reliance on the fortifications; had they treated them as economy
> of force tools, concentrated them only on certain avenues of approach,
> and backed them with decent mobile reserves under capable leadership,
> they could have proved to be of greater value. In other words, cut the
> fortification budget by 30-40% and apply the savings to *training*
> and, to a lesser extent, better equipping, their motorized/armored
> forces and aviation, and the results might have been quite different.
> I added the emphasis to training because I see this thread as
> espousing a solely "equipment based" theory, be it forts or
> tanks/aircraft--but the real combat multiplier would have been a
> better trained force (and that, along with better leadership, is what
> doomed the French in the end--the equipment comparisons, both in
> numbers and quality, would not have indicated the Germans as having
> such a tremendous advantage, as it ended up playing out). All of the
> better equipment in the world would not have made a difference on the
> Meuse at Sedan--having a well trained force that could have actually
> emplaced all of the anti-tank mines they had on-hand, though, might
> have doomed Guderian's troops at that point, especially if they had
> had a competent, small armored reserve waiting 8 or 10 klicks back.
You missed out development of doctrine for proper use of available
equipment (something that increased training could develop).... And if
they had properly identified just how much of a hindrance those one man
turrets on tanks were (the 47 mm on Char B). With commanders having to
command, load and fire the gun...
>
> Brooks
James Wilkins
> rather that unimpeded _anything_ when you've got a shared border that
> has been used as an invasion route twice before in the previous
> century is a bad idea.
The Meuse was fairly well defended and Rommel forced a crossing by
trying multiple areas and rapidly reinforcing success when one group
made it across. He then had to fight through many kilometers of
roadblocks before breaking out of the defended area. I haven't read
the Allied side yet, but from Rommel's notes it looks like the British
and French put up a desperate but fatally unorganized resistance to an
unexpected method of attack - fast-moving tanks unsupported and
unhindered by marching infantry. Rommel was right at the front of the
column, maneuvering it and calling in air and artillery based on his
own direct observation. This meant that he couldn't have controlled a
wider front but it was perfect for a narrow Panzer thrust.
This sort of dangerous trick can work extremely well for a skilled and
clever general the first time when it isn't expected. Or it can fail,
like the German airborne attack on The Hague.
The situation was completely different in Normandy. The Allies had
matched Germany in mobility and completely controlled the air, so
Rommel advocated distributing the Panzer forces along the beach since
he knew he could no longer maneuver them. By then they could still
defend very well (Caen) but had lost the ability to attack
(Avranches).
>
> The idea isn't to stop them cold - that's never going to happen. But
> a cascading series of defended positions will delay things for quite a
> while, as you point out. This gives the defenders time to move
> troops, just as happened in 1944, and bottled up road-bound convoys
> are very tempting targets. A single PanZer Division is a circus
> parade something like 10 miles long, using their road convoy rules.
>
> The French, and the British, had adequate weapons, and adequate
> numbers. What they didn't have, was adequate planning, and time.
"The Rommel Papers" was assembled and commented by Sir Basil
Lidell-Hart, the early British advocate of rapid armored tactics whose
work Rommel and Guderian studied. He was obviously annoyed that his
own country hadn't listened to him more carefully and formed more
armored divisions instead of distributing the tanks as infantry
support.
jw
Kevin Brooks
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
> >
> > Barry Offord <barr...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz> wrote in message news:<3E4839E7...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz>...
> > > Yama wrote:
> <SNIP>
> > > Without Maginot line the French would have had to develop a more mobile
> > > defence plan.....
> >
> > Actually, you could make the argument that the fortifications also
> > required the development of a mobile striking force; any decent
> > strongpoint defense should include a mobile reserve to serve as both a
> > reaction force (planning for 100% effectiveness of fortifications
> > being unwise to the extreme) and as a CATK force.
>
> But it would have been nice if they had some money left over from the
> fixed defences to equip those mobile reserves.....
I'd think they had plenty of equipment, if you look at the comparisons
between the French forces and the german forces in 1940. The problem
was not the quantity, or really even the quality, of equipment, but
the way they (mis)used it. Again, training (and the related doctrinal
issues, which you noted) was more of a deficiency than the equipment
they possessed, and that was *with* having spent all of those funds on
the fortification system.
>
> Also, having the Maginot line had considerable impact on the development
> of doctrine (dispersing tanks piece meal rather than collecting them
> together in tank formations.....)
Why do you say that the Maginot Line was responsible for the poor
organizational plan for armor? What is it about the concept of
fortification that says you can't/shouldn't also better consolidate
armor formations? I would agree that the French took the wrong tack in
this regard, and I'd be willing to agree that their reliance upon the
fortification system was a contributing cause to that, but that does
not mean the idea of fortification was responsible--just that the
French took the wrong lessons away from the experience. They had all
of the assets necessary to form armored formations every bit the equal
of most Wehrmacht panzer units of the day, and decidedly *better* than
the Germans' "Light Divisions" (which they quickly found were not
viable); the fact that they did not do so was not the fault of
fortification, but again was a function of their improper application
of the values of fortification.
> <SNIP>
> > > One thing, at least you can export your tank and aircraft designs...
> > > can't do that with a defence structure.
> >
> > Tell that to the folks in Europe who built all those HAS's for Iraq
> > back in the 80's; seemed to work for them.
>
> Ah, sale of design technology..... but how many other countries were
> interested in a Maginot Line type defence establishment?
ISTR it was more than the sale of design technology--I believe a few
construction firms were involved. As to the maginot line interest, the
Czechs seemed to be interested in developing a fortification
system--they just started a bit late.
> <SNIP>
> > > But (IIRC) the need to divert resources to the Maginot line prevented
> > > the timely introduction of new design military hardware (aircraft and
> > > tanks).
> >
> > Yet the French still had better (in general terms), and more, tanks
> > than their German counterparts when the war began. In the aircraft
> > arena they were lagging, but then again so were the Brits and the US
> > (though IIRC the French did find that their Hawks purchased from the
> > US were able to somewhat maintain their own versus the early version
> > M-109's, especially at low altitudes).
>
> But imagine if they had had even more armour and aviation, and of the
> best and latest model... I mean, in 1940 the French still had some 1600
> FT-17s - which were taken over by the Germans (see Hogg & Weeks, "The
> Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Military Vehicles" page 74).
It would not have mattered, given their inability to *use* them
properly--again, a training (and organizational) issue, not an
equipment issue.
I'd agree with that. Though the Char B's were still more than a match
for the Panzer II's that the Wehrmacht still had in service in
substantial numbers.
Brooks
> >
> > Brooks
Harry Andreas
(ArtKramr) wrote:
> When Patton was asked what he thought of the Maginot line, he said,
> "Permanent fortifications such as the Maginot line are a tribute to man's
> stupidity.".
One thing missing from all this discussion is manpower.
The French lost something like 1.5 million men in WWI.
That's 1.5 million fathers, a whole generation lost.
This would have an extreme impact on manning levels in the French Army
and some forward thinking planners in the 20's saw this for what
it was, an the result was the Maginot line.
Yes, fixed fortifications are immobile in a time of increasingly fluid
warfare, but remember in the timeframe that the ML was
conceived and built, the concept of highly mechanized warfare
was still being developed and was very immature. No one really
knew if that was the future.
In any case, the French Army would not have had nearly enough
bodies to man a mobile force large enough to be effective
against the German Army.
The ML was constructed to save manning levels, free up men for the
infantry and tank forces, and to force any
German attack through Belgium, bringing them into the war.
This would in itself add to the French manpower.
IMO it was a sound theory that was executed poorly in the stress
of war.
The ML did work well in the south against the Italians.
--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur
Harry Andreas
(ArtKramr) wrote:
> >Subject: Re: Patton on the Maginot line
> >From: "Yama" tjama...@paju.oulu.fi
> >Date: 2/10/03 3:34 AM Pacific
>
> >Maginot line was a very good idea, considering that it gave long-time
> >benefit from one-time investment. Fortifications are not made obsolete as
> >quickly as tanks or aircraft.
> >
> >
>
> Well we have your point of view and we have Patton's. I'll take Pattons.
I'll have to disagree with you on this one Art.
Patton was smart, but he was speaking from 20/20 hindsight.
I think the (Sherman?) tanks of his day needed a crew of 5.
What would he have said if he was only allocated a crew of 3
solely because there weren't enough bodies to go around?
I think this was the situation of the French Army in the 30's
due to their losses 20 years earlier.
Yama
"Geoff May" <BeateU...@t-online.de> kirjoitti
viestissä:b29c7b$rsm$04$1...@news.t-online.com...
>>>>In the strictest sense, you are correct but you have overlooked that
there are a limited number of *people* available. If you get everyone
mixing cement then those people cannot produce aircraft or what ever
other weapon system you wish to build.
<<<<
True, but much of the fortifications were built by local workers/unskilled
slave labour or garrison troops which (from German point of view) had
nothing better to do anyway.
Yama
"Barry Offord" <barr...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz> kirjoitti
viestissä:3E48AB2A...@spamtrap.paradise.net.nz...
> Yama wrote:
> > Maybe, but it's not clear more mobile defence plan is actually useful
in
> > such confined front.
>
> Without the Maginot line the potential front becomes the whole french
> eastern boarder....
..with direct access to French industrial heartlands. Not good, nope.
> > Actually, it's the opposite. It's easier to put a new anti-tank gun to
> > bunker, much difficult to tank. Upgrading existing aircraft in any
> > meaningful way was pretty much impossible in the '30s.
>
> But the anti tank gun in a fort is already being countered by large guns
> (42cm "mortars" etc).
Not really. Big Berthas and other heavy guns were around in WW1 and they
didn't make fortresses obsolete - in fact, even some pre-WW1 fortresses
could resist their fire.
> As a tank becomes obsolete it can be replaced (the tank force is
> upgraded, not individual tanks)... ditto for aircraft... meanwhile the
> old version can be used for training.
And replacing the tank costs money, while the fortress only requires
relatively small maintenance and upgrade costs.
> > I don't see how. Maginot line was built mostly in late '20s and early
'30s.
> > There was plenty of time to develope military hardware.
>
> But there was little money left in the defence budget... the capital
> cost of the Maginot line took up the capital purchase budget for many
> years...
Many years _in late '20s/early '30s_. Not all that much later.
> it was really (IIRC) in the later pre WW2 years that France was
> able to afford new aircraft etc (but in limited volume due to money
> shortages)
Which had nothing to do with Maginot line which by then was pretty much
paid for.
> > >... but to be
> > > effective the defence line has to cover the whole boarder (any holes
can
> > > be exploited)
> >
> > Actually, no. Maginot line had "traps", seemingly weakly defended areas
> > where it was hoped Germans would try to exploit.
>
> Yes, special "killing grounds"... but the line must extend from
> impassible terrain (swiss alps) to impassible terrain (the sea)... to
> stop people just going around the side.
However, even that limits enemy options. Allied *knew* Germans would try to
go around it.
Raymond
>
> One thing, at least you can export your tank and aircraft designs...
> can't do that with a defence structure.
>
What about Czesh fortification ?
R.
Peter Stickney
Bill Shatzer <bsha...@OregonVOS.net> writes:
> On Tue, 11 Feb 2003, Peter Stickney wrote:
>
> -snips-
>
>> The French, and the British, had adequate weapons, and adequate
>> numbers. What they didn't have, was adequate planning, and time.
>> They had eight months to make sure that the doors into France were
>> locked. Thay missed a spot. That's poor planning. But enough time
>> can get you through that, if you're flexible enough to believe the
>> combat reports when they start coming in. But, again...
>
> The problem, of course, is that combat reports are -always-
> coming in. Some are accurate of course, but many incorrect or
> overblown or wildly exagerated. Or just plain mistaken.
Yep, and everybody's problem is what's right in front of them.
>
> Sorting out the wheat from the chaff takes time. Given the
> speed of the German advance and the rather awkward French
> command and control system, "time" is exactly what the French
> didn't get. They were rather consistently a day or more behind
> the curve in attempting to respond.
Oh, yeah. Without being able to hit the references to verify it, I
recall that one of the French Army COmmanders had his HQ about 100 km
to the rear of the front of the area he was responsible for. No Radio
Communications, no, or very few phone lines. Most of his work has
done on the basis of twice-a-day deliveries by motorcycle courier. Of
course, about an hour after things started on May 10, 1940, the phones
wre out or clogged, and the roads were jammed.
Not that that's particularly a French thing. The original commander
of the U.S> II Corps in Tunisia, Fredenhall, had his HQ in a cave 80
miles behind the action. When the Afrika Korps hit the Kasserine
Pass, he lost all clue about what was what. (He was replaced by
Patton immediately after)
> OTOH, if they responded to -every- report of German advances,
> attacks, and penetrations without first doing the "wheat/chaff"
> analysis, they would have been like the proverbial Irishman who
> leapt on his horse and rode off in all directions. As much a
> recipe for disaster as being a day behind the curve.
Absolutely. And filtering that information quickly takes, along with
a cool head and experience, a command structure that's willing to
listen, and pay attention. I don't know about the BEF, in this
regard, but the French did overlook definite signs that something was
going to happen in the Ardennes. French Recon crews over the area at
night reported kilometers-long streams of vehicles forming up on the
road. (The had their headlighs on - a calculated risk between forming
up faster, or more stealthily). A French Engineer Battalion
commander, trynig to keep his troops busy during the Sitzkreig,
blocked the roads in his area of responsibility. The higher ups made
him take them out - not in the plan, after all.
> I'm not sure any contemporary army would have performed better
> in a similar situation than did the French army. No one, not
> even the Germans, really fully understood the implications of
> the 'blitzkreig' concept in the spring of 1940.
That's true, but even granting that, there apears to have been an
extreme lack of flexibility.
Peter Stickney
james_...@ti.com (James Wilkins) writes:
> p-sti...@adelphia.net (Peter Stickney) wrote in message
>>
>> The issue isn't how fast that the Panzers were going to move, but
>> rather that unimpeded _anything_ when you've got a shared border that
>> has been used as an invasion route twice before in the previous
>> century is a bad idea.
>
> The Meuse was fairly well defended and Rommel forced a crossing by
> trying multiple areas and rapidly reinforcing success when one group
> made it across. He then had to fight through many kilometers of
> roadblocks before breaking out of the defended area. I haven't read
> the Allied side yet, but from Rommel's notes it looks like the British
> and French put up a desperate but fatally unorganized resistance to an
> unexpected method of attack - fast-moving tanks unsupported and
> unhindered by marching infantry. Rommel was right at the front of the
> column, maneuvering it and calling in air and artillery based on his
> own direct observation. This meant that he couldn't have controlled a
> wider front but it was perfect for a narrow Panzer thrust.
Well, Rommel's tanks weren;t entirely unsupported. As I remember it,
the crossing was forced by the Recon Battalion, which, in t German
Army, was a pretty hefty COmbined Arms unit, with its own Armor,
Infantry, and Artillery. And, yes, the crossings were defended, and
th eroads blocked. But, as you say, the roadblocks were hasty, ad hoc
affairs. What would have happened with previously prepared blocks,
under fire and under observation, with pre-registered artillery
available?
> "The Rommel Papers" was assembled and commented by Sir Basil
> Lidell-Hart, the early British advocate of rapid armored tactics whose
> work Rommel and Guderian studied. He was obviously annoyed that his
> own country hadn't listened to him more carefully and formed more
> armored divisions instead of distributing the tanks as infantry
> support.
The "Rommel Papers" is a good read, but you have to be a little
careful with Liddle-Hart. Being human, he tends to focus on aspects
of thigs that coincide with his own ideas. As with any other
research, cast your net as wide as you can, and strike your own
balance.
Peter Stickney
wal...@mindspring.com (Walt BJ) writes:
> Gentlemen: There's a lot of presumptions made during thsi discussion
> that do not hold water.
> 1) The Maginot line was built in the 20s and 30s therefore if mobile
> forces were instead built they would have been obsolete by 1939. That
> statement, of course, presupposes no improvements would have been made
> when aircraft, tank and communications and mobile tactics development
> was proceeding apace.
I've often wondered if the relatvely poor showing made by the Italian
Armor and Aircraft during WW 2 was due to the fact that the Italians
were early adopters of a lot of the newer technologies (Especially the
ones that looked good in teh newsreels, rolling past Il Duce)
They built a lot of tanks that were pretty much up to world standards
in the early adn mid '30s, and for their date of introduction, the
CR.42 and G.50 fighters compared very favorably with everybody elses,
such as, say, a Bf 109B, or I-153 or I-16.
But Italy didn't have all that advanced an economy, and by the time
they gor involved in teh Big War in 1940, the equipment they'd bought
was obsolete, and they couldn't crank out anything newer, to any great
degree. If they'd waited a coupel of years before rearming, they
might have been better off.
> 2) One reason the Maginot line wasn't extended to the west is that the
> further west one goes the less suitable the ground is for deep
> fortifications - the water table is too close to the surface.
Yeah - If you're up near Flanders, you can pretty much find
groundwater by kicking a hole with your boot heel.
> 3) Money spent on the fortifications would have reenergised the
> armament industries if spent there. The MS420 and D520 would have come
> along smoother and faster. But money was spent on the navy and the
> Dunquerque, Strasbourg, and Richelieu were excellent and well-balanced
> ships.
Given that there was a fiarly large and, on paper, impressive Italian
Navy in the Med, France was going to have to keep her Navy up tp
snuff, or have real preblems if war broke out.
The problems of the French Aviation Industry in the late '30s were
"people troubles" as much as anything else. Production was not well
organized, efficent, or anywhere consistant on quality. Alexandr
deSeversky toured the French Aero Industry just before the war, and ws
apalled at the work being done - Assemblers ignoring drawings,
unauthorized changes, no parts expediting, just not well organized or
directed across the board. IIRC, there were also some serious cases
of work disruption and sabotage by the members of the Communist Party,
under Comintern diection, since they had to support Stalin's new
friends in Germany.
> 4) Those who have doubts about the US engineers' performance in the
> Battle of the Bulge would be well advised to read about them - see
> what Joseph Pieper had to say.
I've yet to see a COmbat Engineer who didn't smile upon being called a
"Verdammt Pioneer"
> 5) One problem the French had was a plethora of aging WW1 generals who
> never learned a thing after 1915. Consequently they were unable to
> cope with a swift-moving enemy who sought the line of least
> resistance.
I concur. They were attuned to a methodical, slow moving war, with
weeks or months to plan the next move. Which is probably a reaction
to the slaughters of 1914, when "Toujours a l'Audace!" was the
watchword, and agressive maneuver was king. Unfortunately, Elan isn't
bulletproof.
James Wilkins
> The problems of the French Aviation Industry in the late '30s were
> "people troubles" as much as anything else. Production was not well
> organized, efficent, or anywhere consistant on quality. Alexandr
> deSeversky toured the French Aero Industry just before the war, and ws
> apalled at the work being done - Assemblers ignoring drawings,
> unauthorized changes, no parts expediting, just not well organized or
> directed across the board. IIRC, there were also some serious cases
> of work disruption and sabotage by the members of the Communist Party,
> under Comintern diection, since they had to support Stalin's new
> friends in Germany.
Lindbergh quoted his similar report in "Wartime Journals". He made use
of his hero status to visit the air forces and factories of almost all
major powers, not just Germany. After his report to Army Intelligence
was leaked he was much less of a hero in France and Russia.
> > 4) Those who have doubts about the US engineers' performance in the
> > Battle of the Bulge would be well advised to read about them - see
> > what Joseph Pieper had to say.
Google didn't find a useful "Jochen Pieper book". Where did you read
it? Toland?
I brought them up as another example of competent engineers unable to
stop an unexpected Panzer attack through the Ardennes after it was
suggested that the French engineers should have done better.
Roadblocks and blown bridges don't completely stop tanks, they just
make them better targets for anti-tank weapons which the engineers
didn't have.
This well-written book describes the confusion during the initial
attack;
<http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?isbn=1580800386>
jw
ArtKramr
>Date: 2/13/03 4:37 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id:
>I brought them up as another example of competent engineers unable to
>stop an unexpected Panzer attack through the Ardennes after it was
>suggested that the French engineers should have done bett
Engineers are not expected to stop attacks. They are not well armed and that is
not their jopb. Critisizing engineers for not stopping Panzers is nonsense.
>Roadblocks and blown bridges don't completely stop tanks, they just
>make them better targets for anti-tank weapons which the
Blowing bridges and setting up roadblocks are just one of many devices used in
battle, They alone can't achieve evreything. We blow bridges all the time. It
is battle 101.
>This well-written book describes the confusion during the initial
>attack;
The confusion was well known and doccucmmented by all who were there.. I sat
just west of the Meuse on that memorable morning of December 16, 1944. And the
performance of the American forces ended in total victory and the smashing of
the very last hopes of the Nazis.No thanks to the French
> French engineers should have done bette
They had long surrendered.
Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
Peter Stickney
james_...@ti.com (James Wilkins) writes:
>> > 4) Those who have doubts about the US engineers' performance in the
>> > Battle of the Bulge would be well advised to read about them - see
>> > what Joseph Pieper had to say.
>
> Google didn't find a useful "Jochen Pieper book". Where did you read
> it? Toland?
No. I don't use Toland very much, to tell you the truth. The story,
possibly apochrypical, but fairly common in COmbat Engineering
circles, is that for most of his drive to the Meuse, picking his way
through the roadblocks, finding the bridges in front of him blown, and
having to change routes, only to find more bridges blown spent a lot
of time cursing "Those Damned Engineers". Whether that's stricly true
or not is kinda hard to say, since most of the people around him
became casualties.
(As an aside, I always liked working with Combat Engineers, in my
weaponsmongering days. Anybody who'll truck the 5kw Generators into
teh field to run the Coffee Pot is fine by me.)
> I brought them up as another example of competent engineers unable to
> stop an unexpected Panzer attack through the Ardennes after it was
> suggested that the French engineers should have done better.
> Roadblocks and blown bridges don't completely stop tanks, they just
> make them better targets for anti-tank weapons which the engineers
> didn't have.
I, certainly, didn't say that roadblocks would have _stopped_ the
Germans advancing through the Ardennes in 1940. What is would have
done is significantly _delayed_ the advance, giving the French High
Command the opportunity to shift their mobile reserves, and to attack
the bunched-up road columns from the air.
We'll never know if it absolutely would have worked, because they
didn't try it.
ArtKramr
>Date: 2/13/03 4:05 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id:
>No. I don't use Toland very much, to tell you the truth. The story,
>possibly apochrypical, but fairly common in COmbat Engineering
>circles, is that for most of his drive to the Meuse, picking his way
>through the roadblocks, finding the bridges in front of him blown, and
>having to change routes, only to find more bridges blown spent a lot
>of time cursing "Those Damned Engineers". Whether that's stricly true
>or not is kinda hard to say, since most of the people around him
>became casualties.
>(As an aside, I always liked working with Combat Engineers, in my
>weaponsmongering days. Anybody who'll truck the 5kw Generators into
>teh field to run the Coffee Pot is fine by me.)
>
>> I brought them up as another example of competent engineers unable to
>> stop an unexpected Panzer attack through the Ardennes after it was
>> suggested that the French engineers should have done better.
>> Roadblocks and blown bridges don't completely stop tanks, they just
>> make them better targets for anti-tank weapons which the engineers
>> didn't have.
>
>I, certainly, didn't say that roadblocks would have _stopped_ the
>Germans advancing through the Ardennes in 1940. What is would have
>done is significantly _delayed_ the advance, giving the French High
>Command the opportunity to shift their mobile reserves, and to attack
>the bunched-up road columns from the air.
>We'll never know if it absolutely would have worked, because they
>didn't try it.
>
For good work on Meuse Bridges go to my website and click on, "The 344th Was
Here" and "Death of a Bridge". It is some of my best work (grin)
Nono Le Rouje/RBC
news:20030213101949...@mb-fh.aol.com:
> Engineers are not expected to stop attacks. They are not well armed
> and that is not their jopb. Critisizing engineers for not stopping
> Panzers is nonsense.
Engineers can destroy bridges, build bridges, block roads, mine them, ....
alone, it can't stop Panzers, but if well done it can be
>> French engineers should have done bette
>
> They had long surrendered.
>
Facts ?
"Parfois détruire, souvent construire, toujours servir"
"A me suivre tu passes"
--
Nono Le Rouje/RBC
`All those moments will be lost in time like tears in rain. Time to die.'
Kevin Brooks
> p-sti...@adelphia.net (Peter Stickney) wrote in message
> ...
> > The problems of the French Aviation Industry in the late '30s were
> > "people troubles" as much as anything else. Production was not well
> > organized, efficent, or anywhere consistant on quality. Alexandr
> > deSeversky toured the French Aero Industry just before the war, and ws
> > apalled at the work being done - Assemblers ignoring drawings,
> > unauthorized changes, no parts expediting, just not well organized or
> > directed across the board. IIRC, there were also some serious cases
> > of work disruption and sabotage by the members of the Communist Party,
> > under Comintern diection, since they had to support Stalin's new
> > friends in Germany.
>
> Lindbergh quoted his similar report in "Wartime Journals". He made use
> of his hero status to visit the air forces and factories of almost all
> major powers, not just Germany. After his report to Army Intelligence
> was leaked he was much less of a hero in France and Russia.
>
> > > 4) Those who have doubts about the US engineers' performance in the
> > > Battle of the Bulge would be well advised to read about them - see
> > > what Joseph Pieper had to say.
>
> Google didn't find a useful "Jochen Pieper book". Where did you read
> it? Toland?
Try any of many official historical sources from the US Army Corps of
Engineers. What Art was refering to was Pieper's frustration at being
repeatedly stymied by blown bridges and point minefield/roadblocks
erected by engineers defending against his Stavelot/Trois Points
thrust--see Janice Holt Giles "The Damned Engineers" (out of print
since 1970, but reprinted by the USACE/Office of the Chief Engineer
historical division in 1985). I'd also recommend "Builders and
Fighters: US Army Engineers in World War II", published by the OCE as
well.
>
> I brought them up as another example of competent engineers unable to
> stop an unexpected Panzer attack through the Ardennes after it was
> suggested that the French engineers should have done better.
Gee, you must be reading alternate histories. The 51st and 291st
Engineer Battalions have been largely credited with stopping Peiper's
main effort attack; the 51st, along with troops from its sister
battalion, held Trois Points until the arrival of the 82nd ABN DIV.
Likewise, the stand of the 44th Engineer Battalion at the town of
Wiltz and their subsequent destruction of the bridge over the river of
the same name is credited by the US Army as having been instrumental
in allowing another, now more famous, unit to reach...Bastogne. Had it
not been for their efforts, then McAuliffe's famous "Nuts" reply may
never have been uttered. Then there were the 35th and 158th Engineer
Battalions that were already sitting at Bastogne and stopped the first
Nazi thrust towards the town, allowing the 101st ABN DIV to get into
the town later that evening. The 158th then held a vital bridge open
against enemy attacks, allowing the last vital supply convoys to move
into the soon beseiged town. The 81st Engineer Battalion received a
DUC for its defense of St Vith early in the defense; most of it was
subsequently captured after holding until they were cut off and trying
to escape by breaking up and infiltrating back to the rear on their BN
Cdr's orders.
As to the French efforts, they were *not* noteworthy. See Guderian's
and Rommel's crossing of the Meuse at Sedan, where IIRC the defending
French had not bothered to place the majority of the AT mines they had
in forward stockage. Likewise, ISTR Guderian noted the general lack of
resistance during the movement through the Ardennes in 1940 as well.
In 1944 we saw what engineers *could* accomplish in the same terrain;
1940 showed us what happens when they *don't* perform adequately.
> Roadblocks and blown bridges don't completely stop tanks, they just
> make them better targets for anti-tank weapons which the engineers
> didn't have.
Normally you are exactly right. But the germans made a key mistake
(Pieper admitted as much later under allied interrogation, when he
bemoaned his own lack of engineers forward); they did not plan
sufficient engineer support of their own, and it was too far back.
Thus Peiper did indeed end up being "stopped" by the engineers. And
the engineers had the same antitank weapons the infantry had, the
2.57" bazooka. They also commandeered AT guns (for what little they
were worth) during a few instances during the defense. I don't think
you understand the way engineers fought during WWII; as the father of
a friend of mine, who had served in (IIRC) the 5th Engineer Battalion,
later stated, "From the time I got off the boat in France until the
time the war ended, I worked on one Bailey Bridge--the rest of the
time we fought with, or in front of, the infantry." As the old FM
5-100 used to say (way back when I was a cadet waiting to pin on my
castles), "In your mind be an engineer; in your heart, be an
infantryman."
Brooks
Guy Alcala
> In article <ec12ea06.03021...@posting.google.com>,
> james_...@ti.com (James Wilkins) writes:
>
> >> > 4) Those who have doubts about the US engineers' performance in the
> >> > Battle of the Bulge would be well advised to read about them - see
> >> > what Joseph Pieper had to say.
> >
> > Google didn't find a useful "Jochen Pieper book". Where did you read
> > it? Toland?
>
> No. I don't use Toland very much, to tell you the truth. The story,
> possibly apochrypical, but fairly common in COmbat Engineering
> circles, is that for most of his drive to the Meuse, picking his way
> through the roadblocks, finding the bridges in front of him blown, and
> having to change routes, only to find more bridges blown spent a lot
> of time cursing "Those Damned Engineers". Whether that's stricly true
> or not is kinda hard to say, since most of the people around him
> became casualties.
> (As an aside, I always liked working with Combat Engineers, in my
> weaponsmongering days. Anybody who'll truck the 5kw Generators into
> teh field to run the Coffee Pot is fine by me.)
And not all that oddly, there's a book titled "The Damned Engineers," by
Janice Giles, published in 1970 or so, which details the exploits of the
291st Combat Engineer Battalion in the Bulge. There's also a book by the
former battalion CO, David E. Pergrin, titled "First Across the Rhine."
ISTM that I've read both; I'm sure I've read Pergrin's.
Guy
Kevin Brooks
Pergrin has a second book out about the 291st, following them
throughout the war. Unfortunately it is not as well written or edited
as his first work, and is rather confusing in some spots. I guess age
may be catching up with him. You'd have to wonder what his reaction to
Art would be--ISTR that he nearly got waxed by the B-26 raid that
mistakenly struck Malmedy. <g>
Brooks
ArtKramr
>Date: 2/17/03 3:27 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: <1e6ea40d.03021...@posting.google.com>
There is a larger question. How many of those bridges were blown by B-26's, and
not engiineers? See the photos, "Death of a Bridge" and "The 344th was here"
on my website.
blackfire
> bodies to man a mobile force large enough to be effective
> against the German Army.
> The ML was constructed to save manning levels, free up men for the
> infantry and tank forces, and to force any
> German attack through Belgium, bringing them into the war.
> This would in itself add to the French manpower.
As there were more Germans then Frenchmen.
>
> IMO it was a sound theory that was executed poorly in the stress
> of war.
> The ML did work well in the south against the Italians.
It worked well against the Germans too. It forced them to go around.
Its not the designers of the ML fault, that the Northern region was so
badly and incompendently defended.
Guy Alcala
Actually, troops of von Leeb's Army Group C went through the Maginot line,
after the breakout through the Ardennes had blown the whole allied plan.
Guy
Kevin Brooks
Answer: None. The key bridges that actually stopped Pieper were all
taken down by engineers (from the 291st and 51st EN BN's). Having been
on the receiving end of "friendly air support" a couple of times
already, I doubt they would have opted for laying on a mission
*behind* their front positions, right? IIRC one of the two strikes
that hit Malmedy was actually supposed to strike another target some
25 miles or so away.
Brooks
Peter Stickney
broo...@yahoo.com (Kevin Brooks) writes:
> artk...@aol.com (ArtKramr) wrote in message news:<20030217190512...@mb-cc.aol.com>...
>> not engiineers? See the photos, "Death of a Bridge" and "The 344th was here"
>> on my website.
>
> Answer: None. The key bridges that actually stopped Pieper were all
> taken down by engineers (from the 291st and 51st EN BN's). Having been
> on the receiving end of "friendly air support" a couple of times
> already, I doubt they would have opted for laying on a mission
> *behind* their front positions, right? IIRC one of the two strikes
> that hit Malmedy was actually supposed to strike another target some
> 25 miles or so away.
Don't forget that the Germans deliberately chose mid December for the
short periods of useful daylight, and waited for more than usually bad
weather so that they could launch their attack with as few Allied
aircraft in the air as possible. They were counting on nature to do
what the Luftwaffe couldn't - keep Allied tactical airpower away from
their ground forces.
ArtKramr
>From: p-sti...@adelphia.net (Peter Stickney)
>Date: 2/19/03 3:15 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id:
>Don't forget that the Germans deliberately chose mid December for the
>short periods of useful daylight, and waited for more than usually bad
>weather so that they could launch their attack with as few Allied
>aircraft in the air as possible. They were counting on nature to do
>what the Luftwaffe couldn't - keep Allied tactical airpower away from
>their ground forces.
>
>--
>Pete Stickney
On December 16th all of western europe was socked in. Noihtign could fly, It
was snowing and the ceiling was on the ground. And I was never so cold in my
life. We wore our heavy winter fleece lined flying suits 24 hours a day and we
were still cold. When the Germans started west, nothing was in the air.
Nothing.
Drazen Kramaric
<keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>France had plenty of aircraft
Not the first line aircraft. Most of the modern types lacked necessary
equipment to be deployed. Also, French air force had practically no
bombers.
>and more tanks than the Germans and they were for the most part better.
Some of them were better, some weren't.
>The problem was one of doctrine. Had the French and British
>counter attacked the German flanks they could have turned
>round the war. Instead the French Generals held back their
>tanks and only de Gaulle's 4th Armored Division made the
>a counterattack on the Meuse bridgehead.
De Gaulle's 4th DCR was never used against bridgeheads at Meuse. It
was used on several occasions against so called "panzer corridor" when
Guderian's XIX corps already broke out of bridgehead at Sedan.
It should also be mentioned that French "Armoured divisions" (DCRs)
were actually strong armoured brigades with single motorised infantry
batallion included. They were not trained to fight in the absence of
infantry divisions. On May 10th, France had only three such divisions.
France also possesed three "Light Mechanised Divisions" (DLM) which
were more similar to German panzer divisions. Two of them comprised
Cavalry Corps that held Hoepner's XV panzerkorps at standstill at
Gembloux.
Drax
remove NOSPAM for reply
Drazen Kramaric
Stickney) wrote:
> I have often wondered what the effect on the German advance through
> there in 1940 would have been if the French had used their Engineer troops
> a bit more effectively.
French could not use their engineers because Germans were advancing
through Belgium. It was expected, however, that Belgian "Chasseurs
d'Ardenneis" (sp?) would have performed better delaying German
advance...
Drazen Kramaric
<keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>Their obvious route was the way they had come before,
>through Belgium.
And where entire Army Group of Germans were advancing again in 1940.
>Except that there was no such reserve.
There was such reserve. It was Giraud's 7th Army. It was only in the
"Breda Variant" of Dyle Plan where this motorised force was detached
from the strategic reserve and ordered to drive all the way to
Netherlands.
How about Flavigny's XXI corps comprised of 3rd motorised division
(DIM) and 3rd Armoured division (DCR) that was ordered to attack
Guderian's bridgehead? Instead of attacking, Flavigny delayed and then
deployed his corps in defense.
It is truth that French had forces on their disposal but mishandled
them once Germans broke through.
What French did not expect was for Germans to cross the Meuse without
artillery support. They knew Germans were closing to Meuse but
expected for Germans to perform opposed river crossing in traditional
way, with artillery support. They even calculated when German
artillery will reach Meuse. These calculations matched Runstedt's
calculations.
Unfortunately for French, Guderian did not plan to wait for artillery.
He deployed his support tanks (PzIVD) and mobile artillery and called
for massive Stuka support to supplement the artillery.
It worked. Up north, Reinhardt's XLI panzerkorps was beating its head
against the defenses of French colonial fortress division from
Indochina. It was only after collapse of Sedan sector when brave
Vietnamese pulled back and with no transport available were destroyed.
>When the Germans broke through there were no mobile reserves available
>for a counter attack and the garrisons of the forts were marched
>into captivity, most never having fired a shot.
You mixed whole march to the sea, battle at Seine and subsequent
breakout into single sentence. A lots of things happened between
Guderian's breakout and surrender of forts in the Maginot line.
Drazen Kramaric
<keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>Actually it does such there was no Maginot line in 1914
>and the Germans still didnt attack through that sector.
There was no Maginot line in 1914 but there were plenty of forts on
the German-French border in 1914. One of them was Verdun.
Keith Willshaw
"Drazen Kramaric" <dkra...@fina.hr> wrote in message
news:3e5b7044...@news.fina.hr...
> On Sun, 9 Feb 2003 22:45:04 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
> <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>
> >France had plenty of aircraft
>
> Not the first line aircraft. Most of the modern types lacked necessary
> equipment to be deployed. Also, French air force had practically no
> bombers.
>
Sort of, in 1940 the French Air Force had a strength of 67
fighter squadrons and 66 bomber squadrons.
Modern French day bombers included the 307mph Lioré et Olivier LeO 451 (18
squadrons, 392 sorties, 98 losses), the 298-mph Amiot 354 (4 squadrons
partially equipped, 48 losses), and the 304-mph Breguet 693 (10 squadrons,
484 sorties, 47 losses). The French machines were supplemented by shipments
from America of the 288-mph Martin 167F (first of 8 squadrons into action 22
May, 385 sorties, 15 losses) and the 305-mph Douglas DB-7F (first of 6
squadrons into action 31 May, 69 sorties, 9 losses).
The real problem though was that starting on June 17 the
French Air staff ordered the more modern units OUT
of the combat zone and for the most part flew them to
North Africa. It seems to have been more concerned with
ensuring the survival of its
All of the squadrons equipped with the Curtiss 75A (10),
Dewoitine 520 (10), Amiot 354 (8), Bloch 174 (18), F
arman 222 (4), Douglas DB-7 (8), and Martin 167 (10),
plus most of those with the Lioré et Olivier 451 (12 of 18)
were evacuated in this way leaving no viable air force
to fight the Germans.
At the same time the French Government was begging Churchill
to send more RAF fighters to France !
Keith
Walt BJ
-
1) Economy cost - no one has teh resources to cover every base - you
make your choices and if you guess wrong - too bad. you now get to see
how flexible you are.
2) You can not tell, in peacetime, who your good reliable warfighters
are. Every war proves this again and again. So your politicals/supreme
command have to be ruthless at pruning the dead wood before they do
more harm to you. There's an excellent book out now on 'Torch', the
invasion of North Africa in '42. (Can't think of the title right now.)
More ruthlessness (well, a lot more!) would have materially helped the
US Forces there.
Walt BJ
Kevin Brooks
I believe the book is "An Army at Dawn", by Rick Atkinson. Good read.
Supposed to be the first of a trilogy, with the remaining two about
the war in Italy, and the war in France/Germany from D-Day forward,
IIRC.
I ran over an interesting quote today from a former French officer who
served in the defense of 1940; he said (essentially) that the fault
lay in the French way of war, and their military education at the
time, which he said focused more on learning various required
information as opposed to dealing with how to address
problems/changing situations. The French were dedicated to the orderly
battle, while the Germans were dedicated to success.
Brooks
flhscl...@gmail.com
> When Patton was asked what he thought of the Maginot line, he said,
> "Permanent fortifications such as the Maginot line are a tribute to man's
> stupidity.".
Yes Dave, the fortification worked as designed by the French.
The German army just went around the fortification, conquered all of France, walked into Paris, the German paratroopers dropped on top of the Maginot Line, and conquered the fortifications.
Patton was kind in his description of a "tribute to man's stupidity". It is why the French military had not won a war at the time since Napoleon.