Keith Willshaw wrote:
> On 29/01/2014 22:35, David E. Powell wrote:
>> With the B-29 and B-50 forces contending with MiGs over Korea,
>> why not deploy B-36 or B-47 bombers? The B-47s would be much
>> faster, and the B-36 at altitude would be harder to catch than
>> a B-29. Plus one B-36 could drop a massive load of iron bombs.
The Heavies in Korea were B-29s and RB-29s. The only B-50s that
appeared at all were RB-50s that were performing perimeter recon
of the Soviet territory from Vladivostock on up.
That said, after the initial phase of the confilict, before the
Chinese intervened, there weren't any strategic targets left in
the DPRK. The B-29's trade was interdiction, with a special
concentration against the bridges across the Yalu River from
China. Although the B-29s could be vulnerable to MiG-15s in
daylight, they switched operations to night work, and losses were
held to an acceptable level.
That said, there weren't a lot of B-47s or B-36s available. Yhe
'47 was brand new - it just started entering service in 1951, and
there was a steep learning curve in bringing in the new jets.
(The '47s were also quickly strung as Nuke Carriers - when the
Quemoy and Matsu crisis heated up in the later '50s, some thought
was given to deploying B-47s to possibly take out Red Chinese
coastal installations and airfields - until it was realized that
the short bomb bay '47s (Which they all were at that point)could
only carry 6,000# of conventional bombs, and the job could be
done better with fighter-bombers.
The B-36s in service when the Korean War broke out were mostly
RB-36s, tasked with high altitude peripheral reconnaisance of the
Soviet Union. (At 50Kft the horizon is a long way away, and they
carried some amazing long-lens cameras. Since the Soviets
weren't as obliging as we were about revealing the locations of
objects within their borders, we had to do a lot of looking.
So - there wasn't much need, and the airplanes were needed for
other things.
> The answer is very simple
>
> The B-36 and later B-47 essentially were the strategic
> deterrent. No
> other bombers had the range or carrying capacity to hit the
> USSR from US bases and there were no ICBM's or SLBM's
>
> The Korean war showed that the B-36 was vulnerable and it was
> rapidly phased out in favour of the B-52. Trouble is that by
> 1952 there were
> only a handful of B-47's available and no B-52's. Bottom line
> is that SAC were not going to let these assets be used as
> tactical bombers nor did it make sense to do so.
The B-36s at height - 40 Kft+ - weren't very vulnerable to any
sunsonic/transonic fighter armed with guns. A MiG-15 or -17 (Or,
for that matter, an F-86 or Hunter) had very little G available,
and was operating very close to stalling out. Their only viable
attacks were Pursuit Curve gun runs, and the B-36 could defeat
them with a modest turn into the attack - the fighter can't pull
teh extra G needed to pull lead, and doesn't have the excess
power to maintain height - it either overshoots the turn, and has
to crawl back to the perch to try again (And, if you're a MiG,
maybe run out of gas), or it stalls and drops 3 or 4 miles before
it recovers.
That was a major reason for the USAF adopting FFAR volleys fired
from collision course attacks. The interceptor wasn't
maneuvering with the bomber, nor was it limited to an engagement
from the rear. The collision course attackes also didn't require
as much of a performance advantage, making the aircraft effectve
against B-47 performance (Or Canberra, Valiant, such) aircraft.
TheU.S. Navy tried to claim that the '36s were vulnerable - they
were, after all, fighting the budget battles againt tne new
upstart Air Force, but I haven't seen any good gun camera shots
from a Banshee of a B-36.
(The F2H could make it to 50,000'. It just couldn't maneuver up
there.)
--
Pete Stickney
From the foothills of the Florida Alps