Friendly Fire Notebook
Otis Willie
An effort has begun to collect and preserve the details of every
friendly fire incident that took or changed the lives of American
soldiers.
Since the Revolutionary War thousands upon thousands of military
personnel have been injured or killed due to mistaken or intentional,
American friendly fire.
All are invited to participate in this project. For more information
please access URL:
http://members.aol.com/amerwar/ff/ff.htm
---------------------------
Otis Willie
Associate Librarian
The American War Library
http://www.americanwarlibrary.com
Ed Rasimus
<americanw...@pacbell.net> wrote:
>Friendly Fire Notebook
>
>An effort has begun to collect and preserve the details of every
>friendly fire incident that took or changed the lives of American
>soldiers.
>
>Since the Revolutionary War thousands upon thousands of military
>personnel have been injured or killed due to mistaken or intentional,
>American friendly fire.
>
>All are invited to participate in this project. For more information
>please access URL:
>
GMAFB! Do we have "friendly fire" incidents reported from the
Revolutionary War? Really?
"Thousands upon thousands...." Really? Do we have bit of hyperbole
here? Is the result of this "project" predetermined? How many
first-hand accounts do we expect to glean of blue-on-blue incidents
from the Revolution, War of 1812, Civil War, Spanish-American War,
World War I.....?
Is this rigorous study going to be subject to academic peer review?
Oh,.....never mind.
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8
D. Strang
YGTBSM!
This makes as much sense as a Purple Heart Registry (Ho, man!)
Ed Rasimus
<dstrang...@cox.net> wrote:
>
>YGTBSM!
Since this is a newsgroup dedicated to factual precision--measuring
with a micrometer, marking with a greasepencil and cutting with a
chainsaw, let me provide a minor correction to your expletive---
The proper phrasing is YGBSM, since "Gotta" is a contraction and only
one word. It was first uttered by Jack Donovan, original F-100F Weasel
Bear upon getting the first briefing of what their mission was going
to be.
He'd come a long way from the bowels of a B-52 to the R/C/P of a Hun.
B2431
>Date: 4/1/2004 5:26 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <uy1bc.4013$zc1.778@okepread03>
It seems to me opening friendly fire incidents will only rub salt in the wounds
of the people involved.
Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired
Pete
"Ed Rasimus" <rasimu...@adelphia.net> wrote
> On Thu, 1 Apr 2004 17:26:15 -0600, "D. Strang"
> <dstrang...@cox.net> wrote:
>
> >
> >YGTBSM!
>
> Since this is a newsgroup dedicated to factual precision--measuring
> with a micrometer, marking with a greasepencil and cutting with a
> chainsaw, let me provide a minor correction to your expletive---
>
> The proper phrasing is YGBSM, since "Gotta" is a contraction and only
> one word. It was first uttered by Jack Donovan, original F-100F Weasel
> Bear upon getting the first briefing of what their mission was going
> to be.
One of the ACC Generals of the mid 90's had a customization of his email
program to allow, among other things, a one button reply of "YGBSM"
Pete
Kevin Brooks
"Ed Rasimus" <rasimu...@adelphia.net> wrote in message
news:o78p60pi2gnmccq0g...@4ax.com...
While I have to agree with your assessment of the usefullness of this
"study" (not to mention suspecting the very nature of the "AWL" invovement,
since ol' Otis' group has a rather fishy background), and I truly the am
disgusted by the likes of the Henry Cobb's of this world who sit back and
point accusing fingers at incidents like the more recent A-10/USMC incident,
the number of "thousands upon thousands" is probably quite accurate. George
Washington commented on an early fratricide incident that caused significant
casualties even before this period, during the French and Indian War. During
the first significant land battle of the Civil War, at Big Bethel in
Virginia, the Federal's accounted for most of their own casualties (which
totaled some 80 personnel) when two of their elements started firing at each
other due to mistaken identity. That is just two examples from our early
history; come forward to WWII and Operation COBRA, where we bombed the poor
30th Infantry Division not once, but twice, causing hundreds (IIRC the total
came to around 600) of friendly casualties. One unit during one operation
during one war therefore gets you over halfway to your first thousand. How
many US Army paratroopers were killed during the ill-fated airborne
operation at the start of the invasion of Sicily, when the USN opened up on
the C-47's? How many "short" artillery volleys were fired during both World
War's, and what was their toll? In the end, I doubt very seriously the
aggregate total would not be quite a few thousands of casualties due to
fratricide over the course of our military history.
Brooks
Ed Rasimus
>One of the ACC Generals of the mid 90's had a customization of his email
>program to allow, among other things, a one button reply of "YGBSM"
>
>Pete
>
I had a boss in ATC Hq when I was exiled there for about 18 months who
peppered the daily TWX read-file with obscure acronyms which were
always fun to decipher.
I learned the meaning of WGAS, WTFO, BTSOM, GMAFB, and the truly
elusive but often appropriate, ROMFYOYO.
No telling where this convolution of the thread might lead.
BUFDRVR
>
Technically speaking, he didn't come from the "bowels" per se, but from the
"back corner". The term "bowels" is reserved for the BUFF offense team.
BUFDRVR
"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"
BUFDRVR
>elusive but often appropriate, ROMFYOYO.
I spent an entire morning hearing the oft repeated acronym OBE. At lunch I had
to ask what the hell it meant. Out of 6 guys, only 1 knew.
BUFDRVR
>the first significant land battle of the Civil War, at Big Bethel in
>Virginia, the Federal's accounted for most of their own casualties (which
>totaled some 80 personnel) when two of their elements started firing at each
>other due to mistaken identity.
Was this before or after Bull Run? At Bull Run, the Union forces were so overly
concerned with fratricide that a Wisconsin Brigade allowed the Union's main
artilliary position to be over run by a Confederate Virginia Brigade because
they thought it was reinforcements arriving to help hold the hill.
Ed Rasimus
>>I learned the meaning of WGAS, WTFO, BTSOM, GMAFB, and the truly
>>elusive but often appropriate, ROMFYOYO.
>
>I spent an entire morning hearing the oft repeated acronym OBE. At lunch I had
>to ask what the hell it meant. Out of 6 guys, only 1 knew.
>
>
>BUFDRVR
It used to be a very popular acronym in headquarters that are
constipated and don't get actions completed until the issue is
Overcome By Events. It's a good way to insure you don't take the wrong
action.
But, I've always been on top of things...yeah, don't I wish.
Robey Price
confessed the following:
Okay Alex, I like obscure acronynms for $2000...
>I learned the meaning of WGAS, WTFO, BTSOM, GMAFB, and the truly
>elusive but often appropriate, ROMFYOYO.
WGAS...who gives a shit
WTFO...what the fuck, over
BTSOM...beats the shit out of me
GMAFB...give me a fuckin' break
ROMFYOYO...rock on muther fucker, you're on your own
Yeff
What about FIGMO? <g>
-Jeff B. (BTDT)
yeff at erols dot com
Howard Berkowitz
<rasimu...@adelphia.net> wrote:
> On 02 Apr 2004 22:34:03 GMT, buf...@aol.com (BUFDRVR) wrote:
>
> >>I learned the meaning of WGAS, WTFO, BTSOM, GMAFB, and the truly
> >>elusive but often appropriate, ROMFYOYO.
> >
> >I spent an entire morning hearing the oft repeated acronym OBE. At lunch
> >I had
> >to ask what the hell it meant. Out of 6 guys, only 1 knew.
> >
> >
> >BUFDRVR
>
> It used to be a very popular acronym in headquarters that are
> constipated and don't get actions completed until the issue is
> Overcome By Events. It's a good way to insure you don't take the wrong
> action.
>
Leading to the interesting concept of a British civil servant delaying a
truly bad proposal until it was OBE, and then being recognized for
wisdom by being invested in the OBE.
Kevin Brooks
"BUFDRVR" <buf...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20040402173815...@mb-m26.aol.com...
> >During
> >the first significant land battle of the Civil War, at Big Bethel in
> >Virginia, the Federal's accounted for most of their own casualties (which
> >totaled some 80 personnel) when two of their elements started firing at
each
> >other due to mistaken identity.
>
> Was this before or after Bull Run? At Bull Run, the Union forces were so
overly
> concerned with fratricide that a Wisconsin Brigade allowed the Union's
main
> artilliary position to be over run by a Confederate Virginia Brigade
because
> they thought it was reinforcements arriving to help hold the hill.
It happened about a month earlier. The 7th NY engaged the 3rd NY, which was
wearing gray uniforms; these were the two lead regiments in the Federal
attack, and this fratricide incident led to the failure of the Union attack.
It was not a large battle; the Feds had about 2500 men engaged (out of a
force of around 4000, IIRC), and the Confederates were defending with around
1200. After the engagement I believe the Feds retreated back towards Fort
Monroe. Actually, there is a link of sorts to being topical in this NG; the
site of the battle is now largely covered by a reservoir that serves Langley
AFB, and (at least when I lived in the area pre-1980) fishing in it was
limited to armed forces personnel.
Brooks
Pete
"Yeff" <zoo...@fastmail.fm> wrote
>
> What about FIGMO? <g>
The ROAD Sgt gets to say that and mean it...;)
Pete
Ed Rasimus
And he's usually a REMF as well.
Alan Minyard
redc1c4
>
> On Sat, 03 Apr 2004 03:55:38 GMT, "Pete" <p...@usaf.com> wrote:
>
> >
> >"Yeff" <zoo...@fastmail.fm> wrote
> >>
> >> What about FIGMO? <g>
> >
> >The ROAD Sgt gets to say that and mean it...;)
> >
> >Pete
> >
> And he's usually a REMF as well.
well, all you can do then is say "FIDO, Charlie Mike".
either that or "DILLIGAF". %-)
redc1c4,
LWASTA
--
"Enlisted men are stupid, but extremely cunning and sly, and bear
considerable watching."
Army Officer's Guide
Ed Rasimus
<red...@drunkenbastards.org.ies> wrote:
>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, 03 Apr 2004 03:55:38 GMT, "Pete" <p...@usaf.com> wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Yeff" <zoo...@fastmail.fm> wrote
>> >>
>> >> What about FIGMO? <g>
>> >
>> >The ROAD Sgt gets to say that and mean it...;)
>> >
>> >Pete
>> >
>> And he's usually a REMF as well.
>
>well, all you can do then is say "FIDO, Charlie Mike".
>
>either that or "DILLIGAF". %-)
>
>redc1c4,
>LWASTA
Can it be time for a posting of the Falcon Codes?
Here ya go:
FALCON CODES
101 You've Got To Be Shitting Me
102 Get Off My Fucking Back
103 Beats The Shit Out Of Me
104 What The Fuck, Over?
105 It's So Fucking Bad, I Can't Believe It
106 I Hate This Fucking Place
107 This Place Sucks
108 Fuck You Very Much
109 Beautiful, Just Fucking Beautiful
110 That Goddamn "O" Club
111 Here Comes Another 2nd Lt., Or Fucking Lt Col
112 Let Me Talk To That S.O.B
113 Big Fucking Deal
114 Get Your Shit Straight
115 You Bet Your Sweet Ass
116 S-H-O-R-T, Fuck It
117 If You Think I'm Shitting You, You Try It
118 What Are You Trying To Do? Kill Somebody?
119 You Piece Of Shit
120 You Piss Me Off
121 If You Say "No Hab" One More Time, I'm Going To Ram One Of
Those Fucking Sugar Cubes Up Your Ass
122 Fucking Blackout In Tanker Ops
123 Same To You, Fella!
124 Take That Runway, And That, And That..
125 I Think I'm Going To Puke
131 Go Stuff A Buff Up Your Ass With The Training Wheels
Hanging
169 Fuck It, Just Fuck It!
269 Pardon Me, Sir, But I Believe You Have Me Mistaken For
Someone Who Gives A Shit!
270 If You Think I Give A Shit, Treat Me For Shock!
271 Ban The Buff
272 One Good Deal After Another
273 If We Have One More Bag Drag, I'm Going To Shit In Your Lunch
Box
274 I'd Rather Have A Sister In A Whore House Than A Brother In A
B-52!
275 Time Sure Flies When You're Having Fun
Paul J. Adam
<rasimu...@adelphia.net> writes
>GMAFB! Do we have "friendly fire" incidents reported from the
>Revolutionary War? Really?
Certainly multiple reports from Waterloo, cited in Keegan's "The Face of
Battle": the Colonel of the 23rd Light Dragoons was reported as saying
"it's always the case, we always lose more men by our own people than we
do by the enemy" (this after his horse was shot dead under him by troops
of the 52nd Infantry), and there were several nasty fratricides as the
Prussian troops arrived.
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill
Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk
BUFDRVR
>had
>>to ask what the hell it meant. Out of 6 guys, only 1 knew.
>Overcome By Events.
>
>Al Minyard
Yep, the 1 out of 6 of us clued the rest in. To this day I haven't felt the
need to use that acronym.
BUFDRVR
>Hanging
>271 Ban The Buff
>274 I'd Rather Have A Sister In A Whore House Than A Brother In A
>B-52!
Why such animosity to the BUFF? Ordnance load envy ;) ?
Ed Rasimus
>>131 Go Stuff A Buff Up Your Ass With The Training Wheels
>>Hanging
>
>>271 Ban The Buff
>
>>274 I'd Rather Have A Sister In A Whore House Than A Brother In A
>>B-52!
>
>Why such animosity to the BUFF? Ordnance load envy ;) ?
>
>
>BUFDRVR
I only posted the Falcon code--didn't write it and didn't go to the
trade school. Have only the greatest respect for BUFF drivers since 18
December 1972. (Before then there were some credibility issues.)
Always glad I didn't have to walk a mile in their mukluks--they
couldn't wear shoes at those Northern tier bases for ten months of the
year.
BUFDRVR
>trade school.
I was just bustin' your chops anyway Ed, us BUFF guys have pretty thick skin.
>Have only the greatest respect for BUFF drivers since 18
>December 1972. (Before then there were some credibility issues.)
Which I was unaware of until I read Michels "11 Days of Christmas", although it
seems unfair to target the aircrew for these "credibility issues"; the orders
came directly from SAC.
Ed Rasimus
>>Have only the greatest respect for BUFF drivers since 18
>>December 1972. (Before then there were some credibility issues.)
>
>Which I was unaware of until I read Michels "11 Days of Christmas", although it
>seems unfair to target the aircrew for these "credibility issues"; the orders
>came directly from SAC.
>
You are probably too young to have heard the stories of the Anderson
O'Club bar with the bell announcing to "clear the bar for the combat
crews" and the itinerant Thud driver who promptly punched out the Buff
driver returning from his FL 390 monkey-killing bomb puke over S.
Vietnam who suggested the single-seater didn't belong.
The credibility was regarding the tactical forces doing the deep
strike strategic mission (and suffering 40% or higher losses for
months on end) while the strategic force was doing no-threat tactical
bomb drops in tactical support roles. In those days, they were like
Rodney Dangerfield--they didn't get no respect (and they hadn't earned
any.)
"Peace is Our Profession" was fine for them, but for the rest of us,
War was our occupation. Everyone around BUFFs should be familiar with
the heritage that was forged during those eleven days.
John Keeney
> >I only posted the Falcon code--didn't write it and didn't go to the
> >trade school.
>
> I was just bustin' your chops anyway Ed, us BUFF guys have pretty thick
skin.
BTW, I specifically asked my friend his crew position and he said "Radar
Nav".
When I recounted to him that I had been told he would take offense at "BN"
he
looked some what quizzical, shrugged and said "No." "That's what I was, a
Radar
Navigator Bombardier."
One other note of interest to old threads: he told me his experience with
Hound
Dogs was aboard E models.
BUFDRVR
>strike strategic mission (and suffering 40% or higher losses for
>months on end) while the strategic force was doing no-threat tactical
>bomb drops in tactical support roles.
I fail to see how this is a credibility issue, the BUFF crews simply did as
they were told. During OAF the B-1s weren't "allowed" to hit targets in
downtown Belgrade while us BUFF guys went there daily (mostly at night, but not
always). From our perspective it wasn't a credibility issue, the B-1 guys were
as frustrated as we were proud.
>Everyone around BUFFs should be familiar with
>the heritage that was forged during those eleven days.
The problem is Ed, the heritage tought by USAF PME is inaccurate and in some
cases blatently untrue. "The 11 Days of Christmas" is a book circulating
through the BUFF community, hopefully most crewmembers will get a chance to
read it.
BUFDRVR
>he
>looked some what quizzical, shrugged and said "No." "That's what I was, a
>Radar
>Navigator Bombardier."
He's much more laid back then other Radar vets I've met. The term "BN" is short
for Bombardier Navigator, which depending on airframe could imply the job
description of operating the bombing radar, but not always. Seems the guys I've
met try to seperate themselves from non-Radar bombing types. Current RN's don't
really seem to care either way, at least most don't.
Ed Rasimus
>>The credibility was regarding the tactical forces doing the deep
>>strike strategic mission (and suffering 40% or higher losses for
>>months on end) while the strategic force was doing no-threat tactical
>>bomb drops in tactical support roles.
>
>I fail to see how this is a credibility issue, the BUFF crews simply did as
>they were told. During OAF the B-1s weren't "allowed" to hit targets in
>downtown Belgrade while us BUFF guys went there daily (mostly at night, but not
>always). From our perspective it wasn't a credibility issue, the B-1 guys were
>as frustrated as we were proud.
We all do what we are told (please don't confuse me with Kramer this
AM.)
>
>>Everyone around BUFFs should be familiar with
>>the heritage that was forged during those eleven days.
>
>The problem is Ed, the heritage tought by USAF PME is inaccurate and in some
>cases blatently untrue. "The 11 Days of Christmas" is a book circulating
>through the BUFF community, hopefully most crewmembers will get a chance to
>read it.
That's a good thing. I remember a while back when you were quoting
Clodfelter to me as a demonstration of the total failure of Linebacker
II. All it did was end the war, bring the recalcitrant NVN/VC back to
the bargaining table and get the release of the POWs in six weeks.
Henry J Cobb
> He's much more laid back then other Radar vets I've met. The term "BN" is short
> for Bombardier Navigator, which depending on airframe could imply the job
> description of operating the bombing radar, but not always. Seems the guys I've
> met try to seperate themselves from non-Radar bombing types. Current RN's don't
> really seem to care either way, at least most don't.
As long as they're not called GPS Bombardiers?
-HJC
Bob's Your Uncle
"BUFDRVR" wrote in message
> >When I recounted to him that I had been told he would take offense at
"BN"
> >he
> >looked some what quizzical, shrugged and said "No." "That's what I was, a
> >Radar
> >Navigator Bombardier."
>
> He's much more laid back then other Radar vets I've met. The term "BN" is
short
> for Bombardier Navigator, which depending on airframe could imply the job
> description of operating the bombing radar, but not always. Seems the guys
I've
> met try to seperate themselves from non-Radar bombing types. Current RN's
don't
> really seem to care either way, at least most don't.
>
>
> BUFDRVR
There were in WWII - Pilots, Navigators and Bombardiers.
Once the Jets came in they were sent to
Aerial Observer School at Mather as I remember and were issued anew set of
Wings and MOS (1037), never saw a pair of Navigator or Bombardier Wings
after early 1950's?
The B-47 Pilot AC's were sent to Ellington for Navigation School, then
Mather for Radar and Bombardier Schools, thus authorizing them to be rated
in 4 Specialties and wear 4 different sets of Wings. They were known as
4 -Headed Monsters!
BUFDRVR
>AM.)
Well, then why the credibility issue with the BUFF crews? Its not like it was
there choice to fly "coconut knocking" sorties vise meaningful sorties up
north.
>I remember a while back when you were quoting
>Clodfelter to me as a demonstration of the total failure of Linebacker
>II.
Ahh, you're miss quoting me, I never said LB II was a "total failure". What I
did say was that the NVN didn't agree to any additional stipulations in Jan
1973 that they hadn't already agreed to in Oct 1972.
>All it did was end the war, bring the recalcitrant NVN/VC back to
>the bargaining table and get the release of the POWs in six weeks.
>
Which was going to happen in Nov-Dec 1972 but for the South Vietnamese
governments "refusal" to agree with the Paris Peace Accord. Kissenger played
hardball with Thieu in Jan 73 telling him to go along with Paris or risk being
left completely alone (which, of course, he was anyway). Had Henry played
hardball in Nov 72, there would have been no reason for LB II. LB II showed the
NVN that congress wasn't prepared (yet) to cut off funding for the war, they
agreed to return to sign the already agreed upon truce, all that was left was
for SVN to give the U.S. a thumbs up, which they begrudingly did. The Freedom
Porch operations and Linebacker I did more to the end the war as far as NVN
material destruction then LB II did.
BUFDRVR
I believe its unique to the United States Navy....
>The B-47 Pilot AC's were sent to Ellington for Navigation School, then
>Mather for Radar and Bombardier Schools, thus authorizing them to be rated
>in 4 Specialties and wear 4 different sets of Wings. They were known as
>4 -Headed Monsters!
Interesting. Good thing they don't do that now, I've flown nearly an entire
sortie as the Navigator and I'm here to tell you I'm the worst navigator since
Marco Polo.
Tex Houston
"Bob's Your Uncle" <B...@rsv.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:CVzfc.34095$i74.7...@bgtnsc04-news.ops.worldnet.att.net...
> Never heard of a Bombardier-Navigator.
> There were in WWII - Pilots, Navigators and Bombardiers.
> Once the Jets came in they were sent to
> Aerial Observer School at Mather as I remember and were issued anew set of
> Wings and MOS (1037), never saw a pair of Navigator or Bombardier Wings
> after early 1950's?
> The B-47 Pilot AC's were sent to Ellington for Navigation School, then
> Mather for Radar and Bombardier Schools, thus authorizing them to be rated
> in 4 Specialties and wear 4 different sets of Wings. They were known as
> 4 -Headed Monsters!
>
http://www.b26.com/html/people/albert_hill.htm
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer/Dontlookdown.htm
http://www.nebna.org/editorials.htm
http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.com/~nortonheritage/WayneDupreWWII.html
http://home.att.net/~jbaugher4/a26_4.html
Triple Headed Monsters
http://www.b-47.com/Navigator.htm
Regards,
Tex
ArtKramr
>From: buf...@aol.com (BUFDRVR)
>Date: 4/15/04 11:39 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: <20040415143934...@mb-m07.aol.com>
>
>>Never heard of a Bombardier-Navigator.
>
>I believe its unique to the United States Navy....
>
>>The B-47 Pilot AC's were sent to Ellington for Navigation School, then
>>Mather for Radar and Bombardier Schools, thus authorizing them to be rated
>>in 4 Specialties and wear 4 different sets of Wings. They were known as
>>4 -Headed Monsters!
>
>Interesting. Good thing they don't do that now, I've flown nearly an entire
>sortie as the Navigator and I'm here to tell you I'm the worst navigator
>since
>Marco Polo.
>
>
>BUFDRVR
US Army Air Corp Bombardier Navigator(DR) MOS 1035. It was my MOS all during
WW II.
Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
Bob's Your Uncle
"Tex Houston" <wrote in message
> > Mather for Radar and Bombardier Schools, thus authorizing them to be
rated
> > in 4 Specialties and wear 4 different sets of Wings. They were known as
> > 4 -Headed Monsters!
> >
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Tex
In
In this reference, as is typical, the AOB who wrote the story got it wrong.
the Pilots were known as 4, count 'em 4 -headed Monsters, 1.Pilot, 2.
Navigator, 3. Bombardier, 4. Radar Observer. They were RATED in all 4
Specialties and entitled to wear all 4 sets of Wings.
This quote:"General LeMay originally had decided to fill all three crew
seats with rated pilots called "Triple Headed Monsters". This was a costly
ill-conceived idea, which was abandoned as it soon became evident that
pilots made poor radar navigators. "
is completely false.
Never was this the plan, the reason for the 4-headed Monster AC and CP was
the workload was too great for the AOB in the nose and skilled and
knowledgeable Pilots could assist the overburdened AOB.
Over 3,000 Pilots were sent through the B-47 program becoming 4-headed
Monsters!
Tex Houston
> In
> In this reference, as is typical, the AOB who wrote the story got it
wrong.
> the Pilots were known as 4, count 'em 4 -headed Monsters, 1.Pilot, 2.
> Navigator, 3. Bombardier, 4. Radar Observer. They were RATED in all 4
> Specialties and entitled to wear all 4 sets of Wings.
>
> This quote:"General LeMay originally had decided to fill all three crew
> seats with rated pilots called "Triple Headed Monsters". This was a
costly
> ill-conceived idea, which was abandoned as it soon became evident that
> pilots made poor radar navigators. "
> is completely false.
> Never was this the plan, the reason for the 4-headed Monster AC and CP was
> the workload was too great for the AOB in the nose and skilled and
> knowledgeable Pilots could assist the overburdened AOB.
> Over 3,000 Pilots were sent through the B-47 program becoming 4-headed
> Monsters!
>
I know of two references to multi-headed monsters in B-47 units, one, the
original program (Mather AFB?) in which the bombardier/navigator/RADAR
observer graduates were called that and two, the follow-on where some of
these people went to flight school and became pilot/bombardier/navigators
also called triple headed monsters. In no case do I ever remember
four-headed term being used. Realize this though...back then I was mostly
an air defense type and was not that familiar with B-47 units. Too bad this
subject had not come up before as I had breakfast in Phoenix last month with
a B-47 pilot.
Google had nothing on your program nor do I have a decent B-47 history.
Regards,
Tex Houston
Dweezil Dwarftosser
Hey - now that's an idea: the QB-52 UCAV. Beats hell out
of predators; plenty of loiter time and *bunches* more
munitions...
<Ducking...>
Ed Rasimus
>>We all do what we are told (please don't confuse me with Kramer this
>>AM.)
>
>Well, then why the credibility issue with the BUFF crews? Its not like it was
>there choice to fly "coconut knocking" sorties vise meaningful sorties up
>north.
I avoid these "he said-she said" knockups, but you asked. There was a
conscious pomposity about the BUFF community--one that was ill-founded
as (in those days) it was the absolute bottom of every graduating
class out of UPT that went to SAC. There was an incredible amount of
cross-training going on and a desire to be on the point of the spear
could have been met. (I had several B-47 and B-52 re-quals going
downtown with me in both F-105s and F-4Es.)
It is inevitable that individuals who through no fault of their own
are doing what they are told are going to be looked down upon because
of higher level policy decisions. The various interpretations were
that SAC was "too valuable" or SAC equipment would be compromised or
whatever. SAC remained a specified command and not chopped to PACAF or
7th AF for employment. This very issue is the core of Michel's book,
"Eleven Days of Christmas."
Had SAC been a component of the force waging the war and been employed
in 1966 as they were in Decembe of '72, how many lives could have been
spared?
>
> >I remember a while back when you were quoting
>>Clodfelter to me as a demonstration of the total failure of Linebacker
>>II.
>
>Ahh, you're miss quoting me, I never said LB II was a "total failure". What I
>did say was that the NVN didn't agree to any additional stipulations in Jan
>1973 that they hadn't already agreed to in Oct 1972.
Excuse me? If the prisoner release had been agreed to in October (when
Kissinger announced "peace was at hand", why were will still bombing
NVN below 20 degrees N. throughout November? The NVN/VC walked out in
Paris in November when we suspended bombing and refused to sign an
agreement.
>
>>All it did was end the war, bring the recalcitrant NVN/VC back to
>>the bargaining table and get the release of the POWs in six weeks.
>>
>
>Which was going to happen in Nov-Dec 1972 but for the South Vietnamese
>governments "refusal" to agree with the Paris Peace Accord. Kissenger played
>hardball with Thieu in Jan 73 telling him to go along with Paris or risk being
>left completely alone (which, of course, he was anyway). Had Henry played
>hardball in Nov 72, there would have been no reason for LB II. LB II showed the
>NVN that congress wasn't prepared (yet) to cut off funding for the war, they
>agreed to return to sign the already agreed upon truce, all that was left was
>for SVN to give the U.S. a thumbs up, which they begrudingly did. The Freedom
>Porch operations and Linebacker I did more to the end the war as far as NVN
>material destruction then LB II did.
Linebacker I was significantly more effective than Rolling Thunder. We
had better equipment, more experience and more permissive ROE. But,
the damage inflicted by LB II was the decisive factor. Academic
interpretation of the events will not prevail as long as there are a
bunch of us participants still around to speak the truth.
Bob's Your Uncle
"Tex Houston" wrote in message > "Bob's Your Uncle" <B...@rsv.demon.co.uk>
wrote in message
> > In
> > In this reference, as is typical, the AOB who wrote the story got it
> wrong.
> > the Pilots were known as 4, count 'em 4 -headed Monsters, 1.Pilot, 2.
> > Navigator, 3. Bombardier, 4. Radar Observer. They were RATED in all 4
> > Specialties and entitled to wear all 4 sets of Wings.
> >
> original program (Mather AFB?) in which the bombardier/navigator/RADAR
> observer graduates were called that and two, the follow-on where some of
> these people went to flight school and became pilot/bombardier/navigators
> also called triple headed monsters.
The 1st reference is to Navigators and Bombardiers of the WWII era who went
to Mather, NEVER were those AOB Graduate referrred to as 3-Headed monsters,
in SAC.
The Pilots, however, 1st went USAF Navigator School in Ellington AFB, TX,
then to Mather, to the same school and training,the Navigators and
Bombardiers went to for upgrading their WWII ratings.
>In no case do I ever remember
> four-headed term being used. Realize this though...back then I was mostly
> an air defense type and was not that familiar with B-47 units.
If you were in SAC Tex, you would have known.
>Too bad this
> subject had not come up before as I had breakfast in Phoenix last month
with
> a B-47 pilot.
Trust me.
> Regards,
>
> Tex Houston
>
>
Bob's Your Uncle
"Tex Houston" <> wrote in message ...
>
> Tex
What I meant to say was never heard of a Navigator-Bombardier in WWII.
The B-26/A-26 self-described Bombardier-Navigators were just that. None of
them were dual rated and were classified as Bombardiers. They were given
rudimentary Dead Reckoning, map reading and E-6B training.
Then the aircraft manufacturers designated the chap in the nose, a
Bombardier-Navigator.
The USAAC, the USAAF and the USAF never had a Military Occupational
Specialty Code or Air Force Specialty Code for a Navigator-Bombardier or a
Bombardier-Navigator, nor was there a set of Wings that identified such a
person or Aeronautical Rating.
Tex Houston
>
> If you were in SAC Tex, you would have known.
44SMW 63-66, Headquarters 15th Air Force 66-68, 92BW, 69-72. Sounds like
SAC to me.
Tex
BUFDRVR
>are doing what they are told are going to be looked down upon because
>of higher level policy decisions.
Understand.
> SAC remained a specified command and not chopped to PACAF or
>7th AF for employment. This very issue is the core of Michel's book,
>"Eleven Days of Christmas."
Yeah, Michel pretty much blames SAC for everything that went wrong in the world
after 1966, but that doesn't change the fact he was correct about their
involvement in what went wrong during LB II.
>Excuse me? If the prisoner release had been agreed to in October (when
>Kissinger announced "peace was at hand", why were will still bombing
>NVN below 20 degrees N. throughout November?
Because Nixon didn't want to give the NVN the impression that by simply
agreeing to the Paris Peace Accord in principle, they were going to get relief
before they signed it. Secondly, and even more important, Nixon knew he was
leaving Theiu in a bad position. There were tens of thousands of NVA across the
border in South Vietnam and the Paris Peace Accord required the removal of
*none* of them. Nixon knew Thieu would take issue with it (and he did, this was
the main reason he wouldn't agree with the Paris Peace Accord. Of course, SVN
was not a signatory to it, so it only mattered to Nixon and Kissenger that
Thieu agreed) and he was determined to make the situation south of 20-North as
positive as possible for Thieu and SVN.
>The NVN/VC walked out in
>Paris in November when we suspended bombing and refused to sign an
>agreement.
We suspended bombing north of the 20th on 18 October, as a good will gesture,
since Nixon believed the NVN were finally bargaining in "good faith". The NVN
walked out of the peace talks on 13 Dec, they didn't just walk out for the hell
of it. They walked out for two reasons; 1. We returned with new demands that
included the removal of all NVA troops and Viet Cong insurgeants. Le Duc Tho
had never even admitted that any NVA troops had crossed into SVN and he was
sure as hell not going to sign an agreement removing troops he had always
denied were there. The second reason goes hand-in-hand with the first. As the
delay grew for the final signing of the Paris Peace Accord, several democratic
congressman publically called for a House and Senate vote on suspending funding
for the war in SE Asia. Suddenly NVN could see themselves getting everything
they wanted without having to give up anything. As soon as we returned with new
demands, Le Duc Tho took a gamble and walked out. All LB II did was show Tho
that Nixon could still pull off strong military action without an uproar (or
even a vote on funding) from congress. Once Tho realized he wasn't going to get
the whole enchillada, he returned to sign *the original* peace accord.
>Linebacker I was significantly more effective than Rolling Thunder.
Agree.
>But,
>the damage inflicted by LB II was the decisive factor.
I'll have to disagree with you there Ed. I did a lot of research for a 40 page
masters thesis and nearly every target struck during LB II had either already
been struck during LB I or was struck repeatedly during LB II basically turning
over rubble. Ed, B-52s alone dropped over 4,000 M-117 on the Kinh No
railyard...which had already been 60% disabled in November. BUFFs dropped over
3,000 M-117 on the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant....also struck repeatedly in
November. I mean, come on Ed, they sent 36 B-52 sorties after the damn Hanoi
Radio site, dropped over 3,000 bombs, lost 4 B-52s and never even took the damn
thing out. On day #9 a pair of F-4Es hit it with a few LGBs and knocked it off
the air for months. No Ed, I'm going to have to disagree, we were mainly
turning over rubble and making a political statement during those days and
nights.
>Academic
>interpretation of the events will not prevail as long as there are a
>bunch of us participants still around to speak the truth.
I'm sorry Ed, but I've researched every target hit by B-52s during LB II and
even the ones struck for the first time (and there were only 3 or 4) were hit
again and again. I used an accuracy of 1000 feet and plugged the numbers into
todays targeteering software and the .pd inflicted on nearly every BUFF target
was .8 or better after being struck the second time. Problem is most targets
were hit 3, 4 or even 5 times. I know you've seen me say this to Kramer before
Ed, but just because you were a participant doesn't mean you've got an accurate
view of events.
On a similar subject, I'll be attending Army General Command & Staff College
next year at Ft. Leavenworth and I just received my "book report" reading list
for the Air Force prep course preceeding the Army course (basic Air Force 101 I
guess ??). #21 on a list of 26 was "When Thunder Rolled". I guess I'll have to
pick it up Ed. Looking forward to reading it.
ArtKramr
>From: Ed Rasimus rasimu...@adelphia.net
>Date: 4/15/04 3:00 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>It is inevitable that individuals who through no fault of their own
>are doing what they are told are going to be looked down upon because
>of higher level policy decisions. The various interpretations were
>that SAC was "too valuable
Guys who died in bombers were just as dead as guys who died in fighters.
Bob's Your Uncle
"Tex Houston" wrote in message .com...
>
> 44SMW 63-66, Headquarters 15th Air Force 66-68, 92BW, 69-72. Sounds like
> SAC to me.
Little late in the argument as you yourself just said- :-)
> "In no case do I ever remember
>four-headed term being used. Realize this though...back >then I was mostly
>an air defense type and was not that familiar with B-47 >units.
> Tex
>
>
>
buf3
I went to AOB(Air Observer, Bombardier) School at James Connally AFB,
TX in 1957 on my way from pilot training to a co-pilot position in
RB-47s at Little Rock AFB. It was a six month school with training in
dead reckoning, celestial navigation, radar navigation and radar
bombing. We picked up an additional rating, another set of wings and
were called "Triple-Headed-Monsters".
Gene Myers
John Keeney
> >When I recounted to him that I had been told he would take offense at
"BN"
> >he
> >looked some what quizzical, shrugged and said "No." "That's what I was, a
> >Radar
> >Navigator Bombardier."
>
> He's much more laid back then other Radar vets I've met. The term "BN" is
short
> for Bombardier Navigator, which depending on airframe could imply the job
> description of operating the bombing radar, but not always. Seems the guys
I've
> met try to seperate themselves from non-Radar bombing types. Current RN's
don't
> really seem to care either way, at least most don't.
Well, he comes from a bit before your time. I'm not sure but I think
a bit before Ed's time as well. I know he flew missions over 'Nam
but I don't think I've ever heard him mentioning Hanoi.
Says the last time he went to an air show and looked up in the bomb
bay he recognized some of the mods they worked on while he was
at Boeing
John Keeney
"buf3" <tam...@msn.com> wrote in message
news:99619b10.04041...@posting.google.com...
> I went to AOB(Air Observer, Bombardier) School at James Connally AFB,
> TX in 1957 on my way from pilot training to a co-pilot position in
> RB-47s at Little Rock AFB. It was a six month school with training in
> dead reckoning, celestial navigation, radar navigation and radar
> bombing. We picked up an additional rating, another set of wings and
> were called "Triple-Headed-Monsters".
>
> Gene Myers
What does an "Air Observer" do?
Ed Rasimus
>> SAC remained a specified command and not chopped to PACAF or
>>7th AF for employment. This very issue is the core of Michel's book,
>>"Eleven Days of Christmas."
>
>Yeah, Michel pretty much blames SAC for everything that went wrong in the world
>after 1966, but that doesn't change the fact he was correct about their
>involvement in what went wrong during LB II.
I think that is painting with too broad a brush. What Marshal says is
that the isolation of SAC dating back to the LeMay involvement at the
beginning led to an unresponsive command structure. SAC was certainly
pivotal in maintaining deterrence throughout the Cold War, but they
weren't a contributor to air power in an effective way for lesser
wars.
And, Marsh points out, the unresponsiveness of the SAC leadership to
the requests of the local commanders cost a lot of B-52 crews their
lives or freedom on day 1 through 6 of LB II.
>
>>Linebacker I was significantly more effective than Rolling Thunder.
>
>Agree.
>
>>But,
>>the damage inflicted by LB II was the decisive factor.
>
>I'll have to disagree with you there Ed. I did a lot of research for a 40 page
>masters thesis and nearly every target struck during LB II had either already
>been struck during LB I or was struck repeatedly during LB II basically turning
>over rubble. Ed, B-52s alone dropped over 4,000 M-117 on the Kinh No
>railyard...which had already been 60% disabled in November. BUFFs dropped over
>3,000 M-117 on the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant....also struck repeatedly in
>November. I mean, come on Ed, they sent 36 B-52 sorties after the damn Hanoi
>Radio site, dropped over 3,000 bombs, lost 4 B-52s and never even took the damn
>thing out. On day #9 a pair of F-4Es hit it with a few LGBs and knocked it off
>the air for months. No Ed, I'm going to have to disagree, we were mainly
>turning over rubble and making a political statement during those days and
>nights.
We had been bombing NVN on and off for eight years. There are only a
limited number of targets in an area the size of RP VI. It is almost
inevitable that you will be re-striking previously struck targets.
But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and
in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the
area. Additionally we added targets such as all of the MiG bases and
(as you note) radio Hanoi. We took out all of the major RR bridges in
town, got confirmed kills on 43 SAM sites, restruck Thai Nguyen steel
and the power plant, hit Viet Tri and Phu Tho's power plants, etc.
etc.
They had previously been able to take strikes and bring their
significant manpower to bear in restoring operations in days or even
hours. With LB II, the round-the-clock intensity meant that couldn't
be done.
>
> >Academic
>>interpretation of the events will not prevail as long as there are a
>>bunch of us participants still around to speak the truth.
>
>I'm sorry Ed, but I've researched every target hit by B-52s during LB II and
>even the ones struck for the first time (and there were only 3 or 4) were hit
>again and again. I used an accuracy of 1000 feet and plugged the numbers into
>todays targeteering software and the .pd inflicted on nearly every BUFF target
>was .8 or better after being struck the second time. Problem is most targets
>were hit 3, 4 or even 5 times. I know you've seen me say this to Kramer before
>Ed, but just because you were a participant doesn't mean you've got an accurate
>view of events.
I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee
understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that
can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s
and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty.
>
>On a similar subject, I'll be attending Army General Command & Staff College
>next year at Ft. Leavenworth and I just received my "book report" reading list
>for the Air Force prep course preceeding the Army course (basic Air Force 101 I
>guess ??). #21 on a list of 26 was "When Thunder Rolled". I guess I'll have to
>pick it up Ed. Looking forward to reading it.
You mean you haven't read it yet? You might want to continue waiting
until Sept 28th when it will be released in paperback by Random
House/Presidio Press for $6.99. The new book, tentatively titled
"Phantom Flights/Bangkok Nights" will be out from Smithsonian this
fall as well. It contains a few stories about Linebacker I and II seen
out the front window rather than from the back of the library.
Bob's Your Uncle
"buf3" < wrote in message
(BUFDRVR) wrote in message
>
> I went to AOB(Air Observer, Bombardier) School at James Connally AFB,
> TX in 1957 on my way from pilot training to a co-pilot position in
> RB-47s at Little Rock AFB. It was a six month school with training in
> dead reckoning, celestial navigation, radar navigation and radar
> bombing. We picked up an additional rating, another set of wings and
> were called "Triple-Headed-Monsters".
>
> Gene Myers
That was late in the game, in 1950 through 1954, they were sent to
Ellington, graduating as a Navigator w/ a set of Navigator Wings, then
Mather for Bombardier, graduating as a Bombardier w/ a set of Bombardier
Wings, then stayed at Mather for Aerial Observer School(Radar) ,graduating
with a set of AOB wings, these 3 in addition to Senior Pilot or Command
Pilot wings in their possession, since all AC candidates in the beginning
were the high time men on each Base they came from.
Thus 4 sets of wings = 4-headed Monsters!
Bob's Your Uncle
"buf3" wrote in message
We picked up an additional rating, another set of wings and
> were called "Triple-Headed-Monsters".
>
> Gene Myers
If you only picked up an additional set of wings to complement your Pilot
wings, one woudl think you would be called 2 - headed Monsters? Your
predecessors in the program had 4 sets of wings.
Alan Minyard
And the "ground pounders", sailors, etc were just
as dead as either one of them
Al Minyard
BUFDRVR
Yes, it was, but Michel's anti-SAC bias shines throughout the book and is the
only negative aspect to his writing. I felt he could drop the anti-SAC attitude
and still make his point.
>And, Marsh points out, the unresponsiveness of the SAC leadership to
>the requests of the local commanders cost a lot of B-52 crews their
>lives or freedom on day 1 through 6 of LB II.
Absolutely agree.
>They had previously been able to take strikes and bring their
>significant manpower to bear in restoring operations in days or even
>hours. With LB II, the round-the-clock intensity meant that couldn't
>be done.
Ed, the railyard at Kihn No was still out of action from strikes in November,
same holds true for the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant. I don't disagree that
some significant damage was inflicted, but it was not significant enough to
impact the political leadership in NVN. They returned to Paris because congress
never went into session (most likely because they had recessed for Christmas)
and voted to suspend military funding. The NVN looked out the window, heard the
air raid sirons and said; "we're not getting anything for this". They didn't
look out the window and say; "my God, the damage is so horrible if it continues
we'll be destroyed, we must stop it."
>But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and
>in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the
>area.
and struck them again and again and again....
>I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee
>understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that
>can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s
>and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty.
How about most of the sources Michel used (I even included his work)? Michel
did the same thing I did (plus conduct interviews). Are you saying his work is
suspect or does he get a pass "because he was there"?
>It contains a few stories about Linebacker I and II seen
>out the front window rather than from the back of the library.
>
I'm sorry Ed, but I'm still going to have to disagree that "being there" is any
more important to accurate fact collecting. In fact, in my case, and I've said
this before, if someone writes a book on Iraqi Freedom, I'll be the first one
to buy it, because I was so damn busy in my own little world that the big
picture swept completely buy me.
Guy Alcala
<snip>
> >They had previously been able to take strikes and bring their
> >significant manpower to bear in restoring operations in days or even
> >hours. With LB II, the round-the-clock intensity meant that couldn't
> >be done.
>
> Ed, the railyard at Kihn No was still out of action from strikes in November,
> same holds true for the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant. I don't disagree that
> some significant damage was inflicted, but it was not significant enough to
> impact the political leadership in NVN. They returned to Paris because congress
> never went into session (most likely because they had recessed for Christmas)
Correct. Nixon thought they would vote to deny funds as soon as they came back.
> and voted to suspend military funding. The NVN looked out the window, heard the
> air raid sirons and said; "we're not getting anything for this". They didn't
> look out the window and say; "my God, the damage is so horrible if it continues
> we'll be destroyed, we must stop it."
Right.
> >But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and
> >in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the
> >area.
>
> and struck them again and again and again....
>
> >I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee
> >understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that
> >can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s
> >and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty.
>
> How about most of the sources Michel used (I even included his work)? Michel
> did the same thing I did (plus conduct interviews). Are you saying his work is
> suspect or does he get a pass "because he was there"?
Ed seems to have a bit of a blind spot about this, even though you and I have given
him numerous contemporary sources involving the direct participants in the
negotiations, which he can check. Once again, I recommend a perusal of Nixon's
"No More Vietnams," as well as
The palace file / Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold L. Schecter. New York : Harper &
Row, c1986.
The former has Nixon's account of the negotiations and what he was trying to
accomplish (and what he felt he could), the latter contains the photostats of the
actual telegrams/letters Nixon was sending to Thieu throughout this period, as well
as Thieu's handwritten comments on them. Nixon just barely manages to maintain his
patience with Thieu as the latter keeps asking for changes (many for good reason),
but finally just loses his temper and almost in so many words, tells Thieu to sign
it or else. Thieu's delaying behavior continues up until well into January, and
IIRR even into June or so of 1973 (when the final accord was signed).
The deal was done in October 1972, Thieu's insisting on substantive changes
(especially withdrawal of PAVN troops from the south) which the U.S. (in this
context, Nixon and Kissinger) knew the DRVN would never accept, blew the deal,
especially as the latter thought they had a shot at getting it all by just sitting
back and waiting for congress to act, so they pulled out. Nixon started LB II
mainly to convince Thieu that the U.S. would back the RVN with bombing and other
support if the DRVN violated the accords (which Nixon fully expected would happen),
the DRVN agreed to essentially the same terms (with a few cosmetic changes in
wording) as they had agreed to in October, Nixon in effect then told Thieu he'd
better sign if he wanted US support, as we were going to sign regardless of whether
or not he did. Thieu signed, under protest, and did everything he could to hold up
the process, because he felt (rightly, as it turned out) that the RVN was
essentially being sold out.
There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that
LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly better
terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that. Both men
have denied that the final terms were substantially different from October's:
"On November 20th . . . Kissinger presented Thieu's proposed changes, as well as
some of our own . . . After several tough negotiating sessions , I concluded that
if we were to reach an agreement, we would have to abandon most of Thieu's major
demands. I instructed Kissinger to seek a settlement along the lines of the
October agreement."
Nixon, "No More Vietnams," pg. 156.
Both men are clear about the limited goals they had for LB II, and getting a
substantial improvement in the October terms wasn't one of them.. While neither of
them are exactly known for their veracity when discussing their own actions, the
paper record as well as the accounts of others (US, RVN and DRVN) who participated
in the negotiating process backs up their account. "The Palace File" telexes show
the various minor changes made in the terms throughout the negotiations, as Nixon
(or sometimes Kissinger or Haig) inform Thieu of them. The DRVN refused to give in
on the major changes that Thieu wanted, and as shown in the quote from Nixon above,
the US accepted that they would not agree to them, and negotiated accordingly.
Guy
Dweezil Dwarftosser
>
> There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that
> LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly better
> terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that.
Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -
convinced the N. Vietnamese that the gloves were coming
off, for the very first time. They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.
For the very first time, the N. Vietnamese approached the
talks with something other than deceit and delay in mind:
their continued survival.
Academics can revise history as much as they want, as can
bureaucrats and politicians write books glorifying their
own involvement and marginalizing the contributions of
others (best recent example: Richard Clarke's shameless
book-marketing 09/11 committee) - but they cannot change
the actual events that occurred. Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.
In fact, I was so impressed with the change in direction at
that time, I returned to active duty back then... and became
a "lifer".
BUFDRVR
>fact that LB II won the VN war
That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
disproven countless times.
>They had a choice: return
>to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
>or return completely to the stone age at home.
You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
already operating at less than 25%?
>For the very first time, the N. Vietnamese approached the
>talks with something other than deceit and delay in mind:
>their continued survival.
Wrong. They had already agreed to the same document in October '72 that they
did in January '73. Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions proved to the
NVN that ARVN ground forces and U.S. Air power could, quite effectively,
prevent their conquest of SVN. The solution; sign a Peace Accord removing the
U.S. from the picture, which they agreed to in October '72 and had it not been
for SVN President Nguyen Van Thieu's refusal to publicly "ok" the deal (I don't
believe he had to sign anything as SVN was not a participant in Paris), LB II
would never have been required. NVN was not fighting for their survival *ever*
during that conflict. Their industrial base was barely existant in 1964, they
counted on imports from China and the Soviet Union for everything except rice
and since we never took real measures to cut off their imports (mining of
Haiphong harbor in 1972 was like closing the barn door after the horses got
out), their existance was never threatened...even during LB II.
>Academics can revise history as much as they want
There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
if it did not stop.
>Far too many direct
>participants (and individuals extremely interested in
>then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
>"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.
While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals
extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the
USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning
the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all....
Ed Rasimus
>>I think that is painting with too broad a brush.
>
>Yes, it was, but Michel's anti-SAC bias shines throughout the book and is the
>only negative aspect to his writing. I felt he could drop the anti-SAC attitude
>and still make his point.
Sounds like your wearing your heart on your sleeve. Marsh simply and
clearly states the relationship between SAC and the unified command.
He points out the parochialism driven by the bomber-generals and the
failure of leadership that cost a lot of airplanes during LB II.
Statement of the events and pointing out the relationships isn't
"anti-SAC bais."
>
>>But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and
>>in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the
>>area.
>
>and struck them again and again and again....
Then your research probably disclosed the original prep order that
directed the wings to conduct a full scale, maximum effort for THREE
DAYS. The option to extend beyond the original three day effort was
because we still had targets to hit and we were still inflicting heavy
damage.
>
>>I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee
>>understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that
>>can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s
>>and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty.
>
>How about most of the sources Michel used (I even included his work)? Michel
>did the same thing I did (plus conduct interviews). Are you saying his work is
>suspect or does he get a pass "because he was there"?
I'm not saying either. He doesn't get a pass because of attendance and
his work is excellent. I have written a formal review of his book and
the two faults that I found (which don't outweigh the excellent
detail, the probing analysis and the extremely valuable enemy
perspective), were the short-shrift given to the daytime ops and the
emphasis on the NVN view of the battle as "the Dien Bien Phu of the
air war." If that was a "victory" for them it was most assuredly
Phyrric.
Ed Rasimus
>>Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
>>fact that LB II won the VN war
>
>That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
>Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
>disproven countless times.
There is history and there is history. A lot of history is
interpretive and some is even revisionist. You might say the 8th
didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
won the war.
>
>>They had a choice: return
>>to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
>>or return completely to the stone age at home.
>
>You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
>Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
>already operating at less than 25%?
For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire. Or maybe the transportation
that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
operations in the south.
>
>>Academics can revise history as much as they want
>
>There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
>your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
>was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
>if it did not stop.
I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
home is all the proof required.
>
>>Far too many direct
>>participants (and individuals extremely interested in
>>then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
>>"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.
>
>While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals
>extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the
>USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning
>the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all....
Absolutely true, Santayna. The lesson of LB II taken in the context of
an eight year war against NVN is that the Powell/Bush doctrine is
correct---don't enter a war without a clear objective. Once committed,
win quickly with overwhelming force. When victory is achieved have a
defined exit strategy.
If you think the lesson of LB II is something different, you're in the
wrong business.
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala wrote:
> >
> > There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that
> > LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly better
> > terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that.
>
> Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
> fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -
> convinced the N. Vietnamese that the gloves were coming
> off, for the very first time.
Bull, John. LB I, the mining of the harbors, the stopping of their invasion with heavy
casualties did that. What on the LB II target list, other than Hanoi Radio, hadn't we
struck before?
> They had a choice: return
> to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
> or return completely to the stone age at home.
They had already agreed to the same terms in October, but pulled out in November when the
US tried to reopen the talks and negotiate for new conditions which were asked for by
President Thieu, which they refused (as we expected they would). They then agreed in
January to essentially the same terms as in October, when we abandoned our attempts to
try and get the major changes Thieu wanted. What exactly were we going to bomb that we
hadn't already? How were we going to do so, since Nixon knew perfectly well that he
couldn't continue the bombing once Congress came back? See below.
> For the very first time, the N. Vietnamese approached the
> talks with something other than deceit and delay in mind:
> their continued survival.
You're sort of right, you've just got the timing wrong. Their attitude shifted after the
failure of the Spring offensive (due to LB I as well as ARVN resistance), not after LB
II. Here's the letter from Nixon to Thieu dated October 16, 1972 (from "The Palace
File"), describing the change in attitude:
The White House
Washington
"Dear President Thieu:
I have asked Dr. Henry Kissinger to convey to you this personal letter regarding our
current negotiations with North Vietnam which now appear to be reaching a final stage.
"As you know, throughout the four years of my Administration the United states has stood
firmly behind your Government and its people in our support for their valiant struggle to
resist aggression and preserve their right to determine their own political future.
"The military measures we have taken and the Vietnamization program, the dramatic steps
that we took in 1970 against the cambodian sanctuaries, the operations in Laos in 1971
and the measures against North Vietnam just this past May have fully attested to the
steadfastness of our support. I need no emphasize that many of these measures were as
unpopular in the U.S. as they were necessary.
"At the negotiating table we have always held firm to the principle that we would never
negotiate with North Vietnam a solution which predetermined the political outcome to the
conflict. We have consistently adhered to positions that would preserve the elected
government and assure the free people of Vietnam the opportunity to determine their
future.
"Until very recently the North Vietnamese negotiatiors have held firmly to their
long-establishedposition that anysettlementofthewarwouldhaveto include your resignation
and the dismantlement of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and its institutions.
"It now seems, however, that the combination of the perserverance and heroism of your
Government and its fighting forces, the measures taken by the United States on the 8th of
May, 1972, and our firmness at the conference table have caused a fundamental shift in
Hanoi. In the course of Dr. Kissinger's recent meetings with the North Vietnamese
negotiators in paris, it has become progressively more evident that Hanoi's leadership is
prepared to agree to a ceasefire prior to a resolution of the political problem in South
Vietnam. This is indeed an important reverse in doctrine and must represent a decision
by them which cannot have been taken lightly. They know the weakness of their own
political forces in the South and therefore the risks involved in reaching an agreement
that does not meet their poltical objectives must indeed for them be great.
"The consequence of this change in strategy has resulted in a situation wherein we and
Hanoi's negotiators have reached essential agreement on a text which provides for a
cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of remaining allied forces, the exchange of
prisoners of war, and the continued existence of your Government and its institutions
after the ceasefire takes effect. In addition to the document itself a number of private
assurances have been obtained designed to meet the security concerns of your country and
whose implementation we consider an essential part of this agreement.
"Dr. Kissinger will explain to you in the fullest detail the provisions of the proposed
agreement which he carries with him and I will therefore not provide further elaboration
in this message. I do, however, want you to know that I believe we have no reasonable
alternative but to accept this agreement. It represents major movement by the other
side, and it is my firm conviction that its implementation will leave you and your people
with the ability to defend yourselves and decide the political destiny of South Vietnam.
"As far as I am concerned, the most important provision of this agreement, aside from its
military features, is that your Government, its armed forces and political institutions,
will remain intact after the ceasefire has been observed. In the periodfollowing the
cessation of hostilities you can be completely assured that we will continue to provide
your Government with the fullest support, including continued economic aid and whatever
military assistance is consistent with the ceasefire provisions of this government.
"I recognise that after all these years of war a settlement will present an enormous
challenge to your leadership and your people. We all recognize that theconflict will now
move into a different form, a form of political struggle as opposed to open military
confrontation; but I am of the firm conviction that with wisdom and perserverance your
Government and the people of South Vietnam will meet this new challenge. You will have
my absolute support in this endeavor and I want you to know it is myfirm belief that in
this new phase your continued leadership of the destiny of South Vietnam is
indispensable.
"Finally, I must say that, just as we have taken risks in war, I believe we must take
risks for peace. Our intention is to abide faithfully by the terms of the agreements and
understandings reached with Hanoi, and I know this will be the attitude of your
government as well. We expect reciprocity and have made this unmistakably clearbothto
them and their major allies. I can assure you that we will view any breach of faith on
their part with the utmost gravity; and it would have the most serious consequences.
"Allow me to take this occasion to renew my sentiments of highest personal regard and
admiration for you and your comrades in arms.
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon [Nixon then added the hand-written note below on the bottom of the letter]
"Dr. Kissinger, General Haig and I have discussed this proposal at great length. I am
personally convinced it is the best we will be able to get and that it meets my
_absolute_ [emphasis in original] condition that the GVN must survive as a free country.
Dr. Kissinger's comments have my total backing. RN"
Thieu then demanded major changes, but as Nixon clearly writes above he didn't think the
DRVN would agree to them, and they didn't. The letters Nixon sent to Thieu in October
and November describing this process, and reflecting Nixon's growing frustration with
Thieu's intransigence are also available, but you can read the book for yourself to fill
in the blanks.
> Academics can revise history as much as they want, as can
> bureaucrats and politicians write books glorifying their
> own involvement and marginalizing the contributions of
> others (best recent example: Richard Clarke's shameless
> book-marketing 09/11 committee) - but they cannot change
> the actual events that occurred.
> Far too many direct
> participants (and individuals extremely interested in
> then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
> "inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.
And what does the most powerful direct participant have to say? Nixon again, here's the
verbatim text (again, from "The Palace File") of his ultimatum to Thieu, telling him to
sign the Ceasefire Agreement (without the major changes Thieu demanded in October), or be
prepared for the U.S. to abandon the RVN completely:
The White House
Washington
January 20, 1973
"Dear President Thieu:
"Thank you for your January 20th letter, which I have carefully read.
"No point is served in reviewing the record of our exchanges, regarding the Agreement and
the protocols. While it may be true that the latest texts of the protocols did not reach
Saigon until January 11, it is also true that your representatives in Paris were
continually without instructions during the various negotiating sessions in November and
December. We were thus forced to proceed according to our own best judgement. During
this process we kept your representatives fully informed, while continually asking in
vain for your goverment's suggestions.
"In any event, all these considerations are now beside the point. The essential fact is
that the situation in the United States makes it imperative to put our relationship on a
new basis. It is obvious that we face a situation of most extreme gravity when long-time
friends of South Vietnam such as Senators Goldwater and Stennis, on whom we have relied
for four years to carry our programs of assistance through Congress, make public
declarations that a refusal by your Government of reasonable peace terms would make it
impossible to continue aid. It is in this situation which now threatens everything for
which our two countries have suffered so much.
"Let me now address the specific proposals you have made in your letter. We have made
innumerable attempts to achieve the very provisions you have proposed with respect to
North Vietnamese forces [Thieu's continiuing demand that they be specifically required to
withdraw from the RVN, which had caused the talks to fall apart in October, and which the
US had abandoned trying to get], both in the text of the Agreement and in formal
understandings. We have concluded that the course we have chosen is the best
obtainable. While there is no specific provision in the text, there are so many
collateral clauses with an impact on this question that the continued presence of North
Vietnamese troops could only be based on illegal acts and the introduction of new forces
could only be done in violation of the Agreement. It seems to me that the following
clauses in the Agreement achieve this objective:
-- The affirmation of the independence and sovereignty of South Vietnam in Articles 14,
18(e), and 20.
-- The provision for reunification only by peaceful means, through agreement and without
coercion or annexation, which establishes the illegitimacy of any use or threat of force
in the name of reunification (Article 15).
-- The U.S. and DRV, on an equal basis, pledging themselves to against any outside
interference in the exercise of the South Vietnamese pople's right to self-determination
(Article 9).
-- The legal prohibition of the introduction of of troops, advisers, and war material
into South Vietnam from outside South Vietnam (Article 7).
-- The principle of respect for the demilitarized zone and the provisional military
demarcation line (Article 15).
-- The prohibition of the use of Laotian and Cambodian territory to encroach upon the
sovereignty and security of South Vietnam (Article 20).
-- The fact that all Communist forces in south Vietnam are subject to the obligation
that their reduction and demobilization are to be negotiated as soon as possible (Article
13).
"In addition, we are prepared to give you a unilateral U.S. note which sums up our
understanding on this issue. Ambassador Bunker will show you a draft of a note which we
will deliver in Saigon on the day of signature of January 27.
"With respect to your concern about the protocols, it seems to us that Article 6 in the
ceasefire/joint commission protocol would permit your police forces to continue carrying
carbines and rifles since the continuedpresence of North vietnamese forces obviously
constitutes 'unusual circumstances'. Nevertheless, I shall instruct Dr. Kissinger to
seek a change in this Article in an attempt to remove its ambiguity. I cannot, however,
promise success.
"The key issue is different, however. We have now reached a decisive point. I can no
longer hold up my decision pending the outcome of further exchanges. When Dr. Kissinger
leaves Washington Monday morning, our basic course must be set. As I have told you, we
will initial the Agreement on January 23. I must know now whether you are prepared to
join us on this course, and I must have your answer by 1200 Washington time, January 21,
1973.
"I must meet with key Congressional leaders Sunday evening, January 21, to inform them in
general terms of our course. If you cannot give me a positive answer by then, I shall
inform Dr. Kissinger to initial the Agreement even without the concurrence of your
government. In that case, even if you should decide to join us later, the possibility of
continued Congressional assistance will be severely reduced. In that case I will not be
able to put into my January 23 speech the assurances I have indicated to you, because
they will not then seem to have been a voluntary act on my part. Needless to say, I
would be most reluctant to take this fateful step.
"Let me therefore sum up my position as follows: First, I welcome your decision to send
Foreign Minister Lam to Paris, and I will instruct Dr. Kissinger to to have the fullest
and frankest discussion with him. Dr. Kissinger will see him both before and after his
meeting with the North Vietnamese to make clear your Government's full particpation in in
our actions. Secondly, I have instructed Dr. Kissinger to seek the change in the
protocol regarding police forces. Thirdly, with respect to North Vietnamese forces, I
can go no further than the draft note that I am asking Ambassador Bunker to transmit to
you and which we will hand over to you officially on January 27, the day of signing.
Fourthly, if you join us we shall announce the Vice President's visit to Saigon before
the date of signing though he could not leave Washington until January 28.
"Finally, and most importantly, I must have your assurance now, on the most personal
basis, that when we initial the agreement on Tuesday we will be doing so in the knowledge
that you will proceed to sign the Agreement jointly with us.
"This agreement, I assure you again, will represent the beginning of a new period of
close collaboration and strong mutual support between the Republic of Vietnam and the
United States. You and I will work together in peacetime to protect the independence and
freedom of your country as we have done in war. If we close ranks now and proceed
together, we will prevail."
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon
Guy Alcala
> On 17 Apr 2004 13:42:06 GMT, buf...@aol.com (BUFDRVR) wrote:
>
> >>Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
> >>fact that LB II won the VN war
> >
> >That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
> >Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
> >disproven countless times.
>
> There is history and there is history. A lot of history is
> interpretive and some is even revisionist. You might say the 8th
> didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
> that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
> lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
> won the war.
You could say that. You could also say that the loss of their petroleum source
(Ploesti) to the Soviets on August 31st,1944, as well as the loss of the coke
supplies of France (Western allies, August-September; can't make steel without coke)
had more than a little to do with it. Oh, and the several million German military
casualties suffered on the Eastern Front might be due a little credit too, don't you
think? ;-)
> >>They had a choice: return
> >>to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
> >>or return completely to the stone age at home.
> >
> >You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
> >Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
> >already operating at less than 25%?
>
> For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
> of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
> would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
> integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire.
Precisely how much of this did they make themselves, so that we could target the
production facilities? Zero.
> Or maybe the transportation
> that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
> operations in the south.
They did build bicycles themselves, I'll give you that. All other road/rail
vehicles came in from outside the country.
> >>Academics can revise history as much as they want
> >
> >There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
> >your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
> >was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
> >if it did not stop.
>
> I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
> Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
> six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
> home is all the proof required.
Ed, the only problem is that you ignore all that had gone before and was still going
on throughout, none of which you were aware of at the time. See my other post.
>
> >
> >>Far too many direct
> >>participants (and individuals extremely interested in
> >>then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
> >>"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.
> >
> >While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals
> >extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the
> >USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning
> >the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all....
>
> Absolutely true, Santayna. The lesson of LB II taken in the context of
> an eight year war against NVN is that the Powell/Bush doctrine is
> correct---don't enter a war without a clear objective.
> Once committed,
> win quickly with overwhelming force. When victory is achieved have a
> defined exit strategy.
And hope like hell that the other side's definition of losing is the opposite of
your definition of winning, and that they will accept and conform to your exit
strategy. Neither may be the case, especially in limited wars.
> If you think the lesson of LB II is something different, you're in the
> wrong business.
Actually, LB II did have a clear strategy, but it wasn't the one you state. It was
more "By bombing NVN before Congress comes back into session and cuts off all funds,
I can convince Thieu that we will continue to back him should the DRVN violate the
accords, while also convincing the DRVN that it's not worth it for them to hold out
for the whole loaf but accept the same offer they'd previously agreed to before
Thieu queered the deal, so we can get our PoWs back and get the hell out of there
with as much dignity as we can muster."
Nixon was successful on the first three counts, and the fourth was arguable.
"Winning the war" was never his goal with LB II; he knew that the war could only be
won in South Vietnam, unless we were prepared to obliterate North Vietnam and risk a
direct confrontation with the PRC and/or the USSR. Politically (and morally), that
wasn't an option, unless you feel that Nixon was willing and able to order the
AF/Navy to destroy the Chinese and Soviet factories that were producing virtually
all the north's war needs, along with the Eastern Bloc cargo ships that brought much
of it there, and the north's own food supplies? Or how about just nuking Hanoi,
Haiphong, and the Red River Delta in general?
Guy
Dweezil Dwarftosser
>
> Dweezil Dwarftosser wrote:
>
> > Guy Alcala wrote:
> > >
> > > There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief > > > that LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly
> > > better terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that.
> >
> > Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
> > fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -
> > convinced the N. Vietnamese that the gloves were coming
> > off, for the very first time.
>
> Bull, John. LB I, the mining of the harbors, the stopping of their invasion with
> heavy casualties did that. What on the LB II target list, other than Hanoi Radio,
> hadn't we struck before?
Wrong question. (And my time near there was long over by then...)
The appropriate question is : "Did they think that LB I was an
anomaly (like the old Rolling Thunder program) that wouldn't be
resumed for years? If so, LB II convinced them we were serious
and would keep up - and increase - the pressure. Nixon was NOT
LBJ - though his motivation was likely just as political: do what
is necessary to END this thing ASAP, without it going down in the
history books as another Dien Bien Phu. If it meant the destruction
of all of NVN's capability to wage war, so be it. (Not a bad
objective during any war, eh?)
> > They had a choice: return
> > to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
> > or return completely to the stone age at home.
>
> They had already agreed to the same terms in October, but pulled
> out in November when the US tried to reopen the talks and negotiate
> for new conditions [...]
I don't particularly care WHY they pulled out. LB II convinced
them to *change their ways* - which you conveniently would like
to ignore.
The fact that Nixon also had to "up the ante" with the SVN
government as well (Take the deal or we're outta here right
now...) does not diminish in any way the "motivation" which
was provided to the the N. Vietnamese to "coax" them back to
the bargaining table: LB II (and in general, the entire series).
Please refrain from confusing political goals and wartime
objectives - or attempting to dismiss military successes
as merely inconsequential "tools" of diplomacy. There is no
doubt they are tools - but unrivalled as a *enabler* of
diplomacy; without the will to use this tool effectively
(which Nixon possessed and LBJ did not) you get the Third
World Debating Society actions of the UN.
ArtKramr
>Date: 4/18/04 2:19 AM Pacific
> Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
>> > fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -
We won the VN war??? Really?
Ed Rasimus
<g_al...@junkpostoffice.pacbell.net> wrote:
>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
>> On 17 Apr 2004 13:42:06 GMT, buf...@aol.com (BUFDRVR) wrote:
>> >That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
>> >Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
>> >disproven countless times.
>>
>> There is history and there is history. A lot of history is
>> interpretive and some is even revisionist. You might say the 8th
>> didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
>> that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
>> lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
>> won the war.
>
>You could say that. You could also say that the loss of their petroleum source
>(Ploesti) to the Soviets on August 31st,1944, as well as the loss of the coke
>supplies of France (Western allies, August-September; can't make steel without coke)
>had more than a little to do with it. Oh, and the several million German military
>casualties suffered on the Eastern Front might be due a little credit too, don't you
>think? ;-)
Which, I think, makes my point. The victory comes from a complex
intermix of events. To discount the impact of the 8th AF on Germany's
capability to continue is to grossly over-simplify.
It may be a return to the cliches of AF vs Army dialog in which the
regular repitition of "boots on the ground" or "a tank on the front
lawn of their O'club" is refuted by anecdotes of the rapid termination
of hostilities after Aug 6 & 9, 1945, or Dec 29, 1972, or or Desert
Storm's 100 day air/100 hour ground war.
>
>> >>They had a choice: return
>> >>to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
>> >>or return completely to the stone age at home.
>> >
>> >You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
>> >Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
>> >already operating at less than 25%?
>>
>> For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
>> of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
>> would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
>> integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire.
>
>Precisely how much of this did they make themselves, so that we could target the
>production facilities? Zero.
>
>> Or maybe the transportation
>> that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
>> operations in the south.
>
>They did build bicycles themselves, I'll give you that. All other road/rail
>vehicles came in from outside the country.
So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?
>
>
>> >>Academics can revise history as much as they want
>> >
>> >There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
>> >your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
>> >was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
>> >if it did not stop.
>>
>> I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
>> Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
>> six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
>> home is all the proof required.
>
>Ed, the only problem is that you ignore all that had gone before and was still going
>on throughout, none of which you were aware of at the time. See my other post.
Ahh, what a cruel accusation after all these years. Do you really
consider that I ignore all the history or that my perspective is so
narrow?
You've said a mouthful, but unfortunately even those of us with the
largest orifice sometimes can't get the whole thing in. You might also
put it into the context of presidential politics. The Nixon policy of
Vietnamization that started in '68 had already been nearly completely
implemented. It was acknowledged at all levels that all we wanted was
a "withdrawal with honor" and release of the POWs.
Let's also acknowledge that the Oct termination of LB was just prior
to election and that both the Nixon administration and the NV/VC were
using it to their advantage. Once elected, and prior to inauguration
for his second term, with four years ahead of him, Nixon felt free to
flex our muscle to wrap things up quickly. He did.
The final point you make is a good one. The clear differences in ROE
between Rolling Thunder when we were decidedly tentative without a
clear knowledge that it was possible to keep the nuclear genie in the
bottle and the wider latitude for action in LB and finally LB II is
evidence. After eight years we had developed a much better picture of
the relationship between Vietnam and China, as well as the split
between the Soviets and Chinese. And, we knew that the Viets were
Soviet clients rather than Sino-proxies. Neither of the big players
were going to get confrontational and both benefited from our
political unrest.
> Politically (and morally), that
>wasn't an option, unless you feel that Nixon was willing and able to order the
>AF/Navy to destroy the Chinese and Soviet factories that were producing virtually
>all the north's war needs, along with the Eastern Bloc cargo ships that brought much
>of it there, and the north's own food supplies? Or how about just nuking Hanoi,
>Haiphong, and the Red River Delta in general?
Ahh, now there's a picture to contemplate.
Ed Rasimus
>>Subject: Re: Friendly Fire Notebook
>>From: Dweezil Dwarftosser f4...@yahoo.com
>>Date: 4/18/04 2:19 AM Pacific
>
>> Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
>>> > fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -
>
>We won the VN war??? Really?
>
>
>Arthur Kramer
Well, Art, if you get the chance to visit the Wall, you'll find 58,325
names on the wall. If you check most historian estimates of losses to
the NVN and VC, you'll get numbers of dead ranging from a low of one
million to a high of three million. By numbers, we won.
If you measure the victorious side by who owns the land at the end of
hostilities, the fall of Saigon in 1975 says they won.
But, if you visit Hanoi today, you'll find a real "Hanoi Hilton" that
offers an "American breakfast" included in the room rate. If you visit
Ho Chi Minh City, you'll find a bustling, free-market entrepenurial
economy. And, you'll find tour packages available at any travel agent
in the country touting the scenery, history, and hospitality of a
visit to Vietnam. If you measure the success or failure thirty years
after, it looks more and more each day like capitalism and Western
values beat Communism every way.
ArtKramr
>Date: 4/18/04 10:41 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: <p1f580piduj34v2n8...@4ax.com>
Geez Ed, I guess you are right. We did win the VN war.
((:-))
BUFDRVR
Hardly, my biggest concern today is that STRATCOM re-invents itself as "SAC
reborn", which may be in progress. No, my beef with Michel is in his first
chapter where he bashes SAC about its "ORI mentality" and then makes a mistake
by throwing spears at SAC, LeMay and their contribution in Korea during that
conflict(Michel makes a *completely* false statement about SAC's contribution
to 7th AF during 1951-1952). In my opinion, that entire chapter is of little
value to the rest of the book. I agree completely with Michel about the
horrible job SAC did in nearly every regard during LB II, but when read in the
context of the first chapter, it looks like he's got a gripe with SAC. In fact,
he admits he once had a "gripe" with SAC. In that first chapter Michel claims
(and since I lent my copy to someone I'm going to have to paraphrase) that all
fighter pilots in TAC, PACAF or USAFE *hated* SAC and dreaded an assignment to
any SAC unit. What the book jacket tells us is that Michel was an F-4 pilot,
one that obviously had issues with SAC. Bottom line, I thought the book was
great, but the first chapter was not needed, contained historical innacuracies
and overall detracted from Michel's overall premis.
>The option to extend beyond the original three day effort was
>because we still had targets to hit and we were still inflicting heavy
>damage.
The bombing was always going to be extended until the NVN delegation returned
to Paris, Nixon's memoirs as well as Kissenger's bear this out. Many of the
first B-52 targets struck weren't even recce'd until the 3rd day. Why? Because
damage inflicted was a secondary concern.
>I'm not saying either. He doesn't get a pass because of attendance and
>his work is excellent.
So you can actually research facts from a library and produce a factually
correct writting?
BUFDRVR
>of all of NVN's capability to wage war, so be it. (Not a bad
>objective during any war, eh?)
Except that, outside of the mining of Haiphong harbor, and the required strikes
against SAM sites, LB II attacks weren't designed to destroy their capability
to wage war. Our strikes that continued further south against their mechanized
ground units were designed to destroy as many fielded forces as we could, but
these were not part of LB II.
>I don't particularly care WHY they pulled out. LB II convinced
>them to *change their ways* - which you conveniently would like
>to ignore.
I don't believe either one of us is ignoring the fact that the NVN returned to
Paris, what we're saying (or at least I am) was that had Nixon forced Thieu to
agree to the initial agreement, without the bombing, the end result would have
been the same. Neither one of us is arguing LB II was a waste of men and
equipment, but it's over stating its impact on the war in SE Asia to claim; "it
ended the war". If you mean it was the last large scale operation for US forces
in SE Asia, then yes, it ended the war. If you mean without it the war would
have gone on longer, you're wrong.
>Please refrain from confusing political goals and wartime
>objectives
In this case, they're inseperable. And that should be the lesson learned from
LB II, not that if you bomb a nations capital round the clock for 11 days with
enough aircraft, you'll win any war.
BUFDRVR
>didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
>that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
>lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
>won the war.
Except that the only real shortage they had that you listed was
petroleum....and eventually land as the Army rolled into Germany. The 8th AF
bombing campaign depleted POL stores and forced Germany to use men and
equipment to defend from air strikes that otherwise would have been used with
front line units. Except, at SOS and even ACSC you'll "learn" the 8th AF
bombing campaign "won the war in Europe".
>For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
>of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
>would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
>integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire.
Thanks to the Soviets and Chinese certain parts of their military were in the
20th Century, but most of their military (supplied via Schwinn bicycle) and the
infrastructure and population were not far removed from at least the Bronze
Age.
>Or maybe the transportation
>that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
>operations in the south.
Ed, that transportation network consisted of a hundred or so WW II era French
trucks and a few hundred bicycles. Hardly "hi-tech".
>I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
>Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
>six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
>home is all the proof required.
That's simply wrong. Yes, LB II was a *part* of making the above happen, but to
claim it was the single reason, or even the main reason is wrong. If Nixon and
Kissenger had not stiff armed Thieu into blessing the already agreed upon peace
plan, LB II would have lasted until congress returned from break and voted to
suspend all funding for the war in SE Asia. You're trying to make a simple
cause-effect relationship out of a situation with more than two "moving parts".
However, what you say is also being taught in Air Force PME, which IMHO is
tragic.
>Absolutely true, Santayna. The lesson of LB II taken in the context of
>an eight year war against NVN is that the Powell/Bush doctrine is
>correct---don't enter a war without a clear objective. Once committed,
>win quickly with overwhelming force. When victory is achieved have a
>defined exit strategy.
>
>If you think the lesson of LB II is something different, you're in the
>wrong business.
I'd say your first statement is the lesson learned from the entire conflict.
The lesson learned from LB II is that air power can be as much a political
weapon as a military one and used in conjunction with political forces can
allow the U.S. to achieve limited political objectives. The lesson being
taught, and the wrong one IMHO is; If we had just done LB II in 1965, the war
would have ended in 1966.Or; LB II ended the war because of the tremendous
damage we caused to the North Vietnamese, forcing them to sue for peace
(without admitting they had already agreed to it).
Ed Rasimus
>>Sounds like your wearing your heart on your sleeve.
>
>Hardly, my biggest concern today is that STRATCOM re-invents itself as "SAC
>reborn", which may be in progress.
No one will accuse you of paranoia for that apprehension. Be afraid,
be very afraid.
> No, my beef with Michel is in his first
>chapter where he bashes SAC about its "ORI mentality" and then makes a mistake
>by throwing spears at SAC, LeMay and their contribution in Korea during that
>conflict(Michel makes a *completely* false statement about SAC's contribution
>to 7th AF during 1951-1952). In my opinion, that entire chapter is of little
>value to the rest of the book.
You forced me to pull it off the shelf and do a quick skim. I think
you must be referring to the Prologue rather than the first chapter.
Titled "Peace is Our Profession" it seems to be a fairly accurate
brief history of the period of the '50s. LeMay and other WW II bomber
generals were in control of a large chunk of the AF. The real
questions of doctrine in an emerging Cold War were driving decisions
and strategic nuclear forces were a major player. Even the tactical
inventory was being developed around bomber intercept for defense and
low-level nuke strike for offense.
>I agree completely with Michel about the
>horrible job SAC did in nearly every regard during LB II, but when read in the
>context of the first chapter, it looks like he's got a gripe with SAC. In fact,
>he admits he once had a "gripe" with SAC. In that first chapter Michel claims
>(and since I lent my copy to someone I'm going to have to paraphrase) that all
>fighter pilots in TAC, PACAF or USAFE *hated* SAC and dreaded an assignment to
>any SAC unit.
Well, duh! I don't want to be a shatterer of your illusions, but that
is a fact. All fighter pilots in TAC, PACAF or USAFE most assuredly
hated the thought of possibly being assigned to SAC. (Can you recall
the vinyl square top baseball caps and polyester dickies of SAC
crews?)
When personnel requirements and the bad personnel policy decision of
"no involuntary second tours" drove the cross-training of loads of
SAC, MAC and ATC crews into fighters, the hatred was reinforced. While
a lot of guys did a great job (and some are described in When Thunder
Rolled), there were some who brought SAC attitudes and lack of
flexibility with them. It wasn't a "team-building" exercise.
>What the book jacket tells us is that Michel was an F-4 pilot,
>one that obviously had issues with SAC. Bottom line, I thought the book was
>great, but the first chapter was not needed, contained historical innacuracies
>and overall detracted from Michel's overall premis.
Marshall flew a combat tour in RF-4s, then another in F-4s during
Linebacker and finally wound up as an F-15 driver.
>
>>The option to extend beyond the original three day effort was
>>because we still had targets to hit and we were still inflicting heavy
>>damage.
>
>The bombing was always going to be extended until the NVN delegation returned
>to Paris, Nixon's memoirs as well as Kissenger's bear this out. Many of the
>first B-52 targets struck weren't even recce'd until the 3rd day. Why? Because
>damage inflicted was a secondary concern.
So, you're telling me that the prep order that specified three-day max
effort that I read in the Korat Command Post on the morning of
December 18, 1972 was a fake?
If damage inflicted was a secondary concern, then why didn't we just
resume tactical operations and pick up where Linebacker had ended.
Inflicting maximum damage was the whole raison d'etre for scheduling
150 BUFF sorties on night one. (Have you ever seen 150 BUFFs airborne
in the same month let alone one night?)
>
>>I'm not saying either. He doesn't get a pass because of attendance and
>>his work is excellent.
>
>So you can actually research facts from a library and produce a factually
>correct writting?
I think Pliny the Elder did some of that. (And, after ten years
service on the seven-member Board of Trustees of the Pikes Peak
Library District I've got a soft spot in my heart/head for libraries.)
BUFDRVR
>as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
>II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
>bridges, cranes, etc?
The mining of Haiphong harbor was a great move, and had the plan been to
re-seed the minefield weekly (which is required to keep a minefield useful) and
keep Haiphong shutdown, perhaps in a month or two, frontline units would have
really felt a pinch. In fact, many frontline NVA units were already feeling a
pinch because the supply network, designed to supply VC and NVA regulars in SVN
with 34 tons of supplies/day (7 x 2 1/2 ton trucks worth) was unable to
adequately supply a 3 division force, even if it wasn't being hit from the air.
Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions "ended the war" (if we have to use
that term) by hitting those critical supply nodes. LB II simply hit them
again..and again..and again, but even before they were hit the first time
during LB II, most were already unsuitable for their designed task or able to
perform 25% or less of their designed task.
BUFDRVR
>you must be referring to the Prologue rather than the first chapter.
I'm sorry, I lent my book to someone, but yes the prologue is what I'm
referring to.
>it seems to be a fairly accurate
>brief history of the period of the '50s.
Not where it claims LeMay sent 7th AF its "least combat capable B-29 units"
(paraphrased). SAC sent 2 *radar* equipped B-29 units to Japan. These B-29
units were hardly the least capable in SACs inventory, in fact quite the
opposite.
>Well, duh! I don't want to be a shatterer of your illusions, but that
>is a fact.
Which is fine, but don't expect readers not to question your main premis when
its reflected in the light of; "I always hated SAC anyway..."
>So, you're telling me that the prep order that specified three-day max
>effort that I read in the Korat Command Post on the morning of
>December 18, 1972 was a fake?
No, the three day maximum effort was also followed in the JCS order with the
caveat that operations could be extended. Nixon's memoirs shed even further
light, indicating he was going to bomb them until they returned to Paris....or
congress removed funding. Are you trying to say Nixon wouldn't have been the
ultimate authority on the legth of LB II?
>If damage inflicted was a secondary concern, then why didn't we just
>resume tactical operations and pick up where Linebacker had ended.
>Inflicting maximum damage was the whole raison d'etre for scheduling
>150 BUFF sorties on night one.
Because Nixon himself ordered the use of BUFFs over Hanoi! He was making a
statement!
>Have you ever seen 150 BUFFs airborne
>in the same month let alone one night?
No, but that would be awsome!
IBM
news:20040418180746...@mb-m04.aol.com:
>>So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
>>as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
>>II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
>>bridges, cranes, etc?
[snip]
T'other thing is the idiotic rules of engagement that prevented
attacks on Haiphong if there was "neutral" shipping in the port.
This policy worked very well for the North Vietnamese until the
day somebody screwed up and there were no neutrals. An acquaintance
of mine was on the ensuing raid and has some lovely pictures of the
port in flames.
IBM
_______________________________________________________________________________
Posted Via Uncensored-News.Com - Accounts Starting At $6.95 - http://www.uncensored-news.com
<><><><><><><> The Worlds Uncensored News Source <><><><><><><><>
SteveM8597
You made prior reference to a hundred or so WWII French truck as being the
exxtent of the NVN tranportation system. Doesn't explain the 800+ Russian and
Chinese trucks we struck in Sept 22 out ot Takhli with F-4s out the othe 48th
TFW. Or did I misunderstand?.
Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern. The F-4s went up in
the daytime to hit targets that the bombers missed. Two of which I flew escort
on were Radio Hanoi and the Hanoi thermal power production plant. Given that
we continued to restrike targets that were missed by the bombers at night,
recce'd in the AM and hit by fighters in the afternoon, I'd say that damage was
a concern. My strong recollection was that we were trying to damage the NVN
supply chain and command structure as much as we could while we had the
opportunity as the war was Viernamized. The NVN didn't recover until 1975.
Steve
Korat RTAFB 72-74
F-4E
SteveM8597
>((:-))
Lost the battle but won the war. The Soviet Union is gone and Chine looks more
and more like a bunch of filthy capitalists.
The Coke and IBM signs that you see on final to hanoi International kind of
explain it all don't they!
Dweezil Dwarftosser
>
> Thanks to the Soviets and Chinese certain parts of their military were in the
> 20th Century, but most of their military (supplied via Schwinn bicycle) and the
> infrastructure and population were not far removed from at least the Bronze
> Age.
>
> >Or maybe the transportation
> >that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
> >operations in the south.
>
> Ed, that transportation network consisted of a hundred or so WW II era French
> trucks and a few hundred bicycles. Hardly "hi-tech".
Damn! I had no idea that the hundreds of NVN trucks
we destroyed in Laos during 1970/71 had left them with
so few vehicles at home, just a year or so later.
Ed Rasimus
That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.
While Linebacker was ongoing throughout the summer of '72 we were also
operating round-the-clock against the trail with Spectre and F-4s with
M-36 and with USAF/USN/Marine tacair in those beseiged hot spots.
In March of '73 we were about to muster a full scale roll-back on Khe
Sanh because in addition to the three SA-2 sites we had confirmed
there we also had intel on a pair of SA-3 sites being on the verge of
operational. That's after we "moved the rubble around" and there was
no infrastructure to move such stone age equipment three hundred miles
south.
And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB. It seems to this observer
that the first dedicated airfield strikes were by the F-111s on Dec.
18 PM. And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed. SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.
----Ed: Hunter/Killer specialist and WW #2488.
SteveM8597
>Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB. It seems to this observer
>that the first dedicated airfield strikes were by the F-111s on Dec.
>18 PM. And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
>sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed. SAM sites
>were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
>targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.
>
>Ed Rasimus
Ed,
When I was assigned to one of the "summer help"Takhli F-4D units, namely the
48th out of Holloman, we hit Yen Bai in Aug 72 as our Pack 6 training flight,
and then Phuc Yen in Sept 72. Mixed loads of Mk 82 slicks and daisy cutters,
ffour flights of fours IIRC.
The F-4E Hunter-Killers were far more interesting. Didn't care much for that
1500' line abreast dumb bomber stuff.
Steve
BUFDRVR
Well, not just me but several prominant authors....
>You made prior reference to a hundred or so WWII French truck as being the
>exxtent of the NVN tranportation system. Doesn't explain the 800+ Russian
>and
>Chinese trucks we struck in Sept 22
These were truck being used as supply vehicles on the Ho Chi Mihn trail?
>Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.
It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.
>we continued to restrike targets that were missed by the bombers at night,
>recce'd in the AM and hit by fighters in the afternoon
Of the 7 night #1 B-52 targets, only a "few" were recce'd prior to night #3.
Had they recee'd immediately they would have noticed that the BUFFs bombing in
a strong crosswind (the same crosswind that was moving the chaff corridor) were
having accuracy problems due to those strong crosswinds. Interstingly enough,
18 years later, that same problem would resurface on targets in Iraq and
Kuwait.
>My strong recollection was that we were trying to damage the NVN
>supply chain and command structure as much as we could while we had the
>opportunity as the war was Vietnamized.
Which was done with great success during LB I and Freedom Porch.
>The NVN didn't recover until 1975.
True, but the damage inflicted during LB II had much less to do with that than
LB I.
BUFDRVR
>we destroyed in Laos during 1970/71 had left them with
>so few vehicles at home, just a year or so later.
First, the "hundred or so trucks" I referred to were the ones in use on the Ho
Chi Mihn trail, not delivering goods in downtown Hanoi. Secondly, throughout
the war, post-strike assesments of trucks destroyed was so overly inflated that
by late 1968, we had destroyed more trucks on the trail then North Vietnam had
in the entire country. The CIA doesn't have a very good reputation now, but
during Vietnam they were very accurate and routinely cut in half or even thirds
the reported destroyed vehicle reports. They also were very accurate in their
assesment of the effect we had on NVN POL stores.
BUFDRVR
>but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
>I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
>the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.
Which would show you why first hand accounts aren't always the best pieces of
info. Post war interviews with NVA regulars engaged in the Easter offensive
attest to severe shortages, including the tale of a young NVA 2nd Lt., sent
into battle with an AK-47 and a sidearm with no ammo. For every NVA unit with
"just fine supplies" there were two others with *none*.
>And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
>Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB.
They weren't. I never claimed *every* LBII target was a "repeat", but a great
majority were. And even those new targets (like Phuc Yen and Kep airfields)
were hit repeatedly, beyond what kind of "maintenance" bombing you would do to
keep an airfield shutdown. Come on Ed, B-52s alone dropped nearly 1,000 bombs
on the Kep airfield. Other non-airfield targets got hit with as much as 4 times
that amount. All in 11 days!
>And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
>sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed.
Well, if you have Marshall Michel's phone number, you better give him a ring
because he (and at least three other authors) claim that on night #9 B-52s went
after SA-2 sites including the "infameous" VN-563 site (I think that was the
number?). Karl Eschmann lists 8 SAM sites as B-52 targets and 7 SAM sites as
F-111 targets in his book.
>SAM sites
>were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
>targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.
>
Not according to nearly every reference source I've seen....
SteveM8597
>
>Well, not just me but several prominant authors..
I have read several prominent authors, too, and some of their "facts" were
point blank wrong. The two targets I mentioned were included in the lists of
targets destroyed in the ACSC and Air War College texts. The coal fired
electrical plant we took out with LGBs in the daylight on Day #3 after the
bombers two nights in a row is one that stands out in my mind. The post strike
photos in the textbook clearly shows the damage we left behind. Don't believe
all you read unless the author was there himself.
Hereis an interesting read for you from aother author
http://www.sftt.org/303VINq.pdf
>
>>You made prior reference to a hundred or so WWII French truck as being the
>>exxtent of the NVN tranportation system. Doesn't explain the 800+ Russian
>>and
>>Chinese trucks we struck in Sept 22
>
>These were truck being used as supply vehicles on the Ho Chi Mihn trail?
Yes they were. We also used to escort Specter on the trails at night, in
F-4Ds. We usually carried CBU-58 and MK 82 with daisy cutters. Specter would
"mark" the lead and tail trucks and stop the convoys with 20 mm API then we
would drop in the line between the two truck fires. According to the Specter
guys the convoys were often in the miltiple hundreds of trucks. I seem to
recall that the record number of Specter truck kills in one night was 500+. I
got credit for a total of 400+ over a period of four months according to
Specter BDA for whatever that was worth. I never cared much about BDA numbers
but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from
Specter's night vision and IR gear.
>
>>Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.
>
>It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.
If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go
after targest that the bombers had missed? Must have made sense to somebady
and we all worked for the politicians. Certainly would have been easier for
the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I flew
a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3.
>
>>we continued to restrike targets that were missed by the bombers at night,
>>recce'd in the AM and hit by fighters in the afternoon
>
>Of the 7 night #1 B-52 targets, only a "few" were recce'd prior to night #3.
>Had they recee'd immediately they would have noticed that the BUFFs bombing
>in
>a strong crosswind (the same crosswind that was moving the chaff corridor)
>were
>having accuracy problems due to those strong crosswinds. Interstingly enough,
>18 years later, that same problem would resurface on targets in Iraq and
>Kuwait.
SAC couldn't hit a point target with strings of up to 300 bombs in a crosswind
or wind shear in other words? We managed reasonably well with the LORAN
equipped
A-6s, F-111As, and F-4s. An A-6 with two flights of three waqs accurate enough
to nearly destroy the DaNang POL facility when the BN forgot to switch steering
from his offset aimpoint to his target, similar to that incident where the
B-52 cell hit Neak Long in Cambodia.
>
>>My strong recollection was that we were trying to damage the NVN
>>supply chain and command structure as much as we could while we had the
>>opportunity as the war was Vietnamized.
>
>Which was done with great success during LB I and Freedom Porch.
>
>>The NVN didn't recover until 1975.
>
>True, but the damage inflicted during LB II had much less to do with that
>than
>LB I.
Maybe for the bombers but I would have to disagree for the fighters.
On Day 8 for example, Korat was fragged against a rail LOC, first daytime
strike for the AF A-7Ds. Unfortunately that one was a fiasco as the #2 -105
Weasel punched off his load on the runway on TO roll after an engine problem
and shut the runway down for 45 min. We finally did get off and over the
target but it was 100% unercast, the Pathfinder couldn't get a Loran lock and
so we all went home. It is described in the ACSC thesis that Karl Eschmann
wrote that became the book you refer to. I'd have to get it out to see exactly
what the target was but I am almost certain it was a rail yard. Karl and I are
friends and as I was a contributor and proofreader, he gave me a couple copies
of the manuscript. I loaned my book out and never got it back. The book
leaves out some information in places that is in the manuscript.
The accounts of LBII are a sore subject with me as there seems to have been an
element in the AF that was determined to show SAC in the best light possible.
That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any
contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental. Particularly when I
see BDA attributed to the bombers when I know for a fact that the fighters were
responsible. I am in no way tryng to downplay the bravery of the SAC crews - I
wouldn't have wanted their jobs for twice the pay - but I don't believe the
bombing was all that effective.. What brought the North back to the bargaining
table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more effective.
They were running out of missiles and fuel as their supply lines had been
pretty well cut off as early as Day 3. I guess you could call that political
but I see it as more of a tactical solution. Had the supplie lines stayed open,
the bombong might have gone on a lot longer. I don't think it wold have
happened as it did if NVN had more missiles. I sat in an orbit over downtown
for 15 minutes on Day 3 until a single cloud drifted away from the target the
the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired at
us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing - in fact I still have some
pictures I took with a little camera I carried with me.
Regards.
Steve Mellenthin
Ed Rasimus
>>That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
>>but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
>>I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
>>the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.
>
>Which would show you why first hand accounts aren't always the best pieces of
>info. Post war interviews with NVA regulars engaged in the Easter offensive
>attest to severe shortages, including the tale of a young NVA 2nd Lt., sent
>into battle with an AK-47 and a sidearm with no ammo. For every NVA unit with
>"just fine supplies" there were two others with *none*.
Seems to me that you can't have it both ways. If on scene US observers
aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level,
in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable?
>
>>And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
>>Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB.
>
>They weren't. I never claimed *every* LBII target was a "repeat", but a great
>majority were. And even those new targets (like Phuc Yen and Kep airfields)
>were hit repeatedly, beyond what kind of "maintenance" bombing you would do to
>keep an airfield shutdown. Come on Ed, B-52s alone dropped nearly 1,000 bombs
>on the Kep airfield. Other non-airfield targets got hit with as much as 4 times
>that amount. All in 11 days!
Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield
down? Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm
not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.) Also note
that on 27 Dec. Maj. Carl Jeffcoat and 1/lt Jack Trimble were shot
down in daylight by a Mig-21 flying out of Kep. I engaged a pair of
MiG-21s on Dec 23rd, out of Phuc Yen. And, on Dec. 26th put four
CBU-52 on the N. end of the relatively unblemished runway of Yen Bai
during egress on a H/K mission near Hanoi.
>
>>And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
>>sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed.
>
>Well, if you have Marshall Michel's phone number, you better give him a ring
>because he (and at least three other authors) claim that on night #9 B-52s went
>after SA-2 sites including the "infameous" VN-563 site (I think that was the
>number?). Karl Eschmann lists 8 SAM sites as B-52 targets and 7 SAM sites as
>F-111 targets in his book.
The operative word on those targettings is "probable". Regular
locations for the highly mobile SA-2 units were listed as VN numbers,
but few of them were occupied during LB II. We often carried 8x10 BxW
glossies of known sites taken by recent RF-4 runs as a backup. The
priority was attack sites that fired on us or the strike package,
attack sites that we fired Shrikes at, and finally F-4s in the lead to
visual recce SAM possible sites.
Talking to Marshall in December last, he was in Hanoi researching his
next book. I asked him for a photo of the site on the downtown lake
(peninsula on the E. shore, still has a network of roads on it--now a
park). Marsh reported that there never was a site on that location. I
led the H/K element that killed the site on 12/21 in a scene that was
reminiscent of the SAM City finale of Flight of the Intruder. There
was most definitely a SAM site at that location.
>
> >SAM sites
>>were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
>>targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.
>>
>
>Not according to nearly every reference source I've seen....
Then you need to meet some Weasels. From the earliest days of F-100F
Weasels to the end of the war with third generation F-105Gs, we could
never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up. While
early ('64-65) sites were classic Star-of-David bladed and surveyed
bases, in very short order they disappeared from view and became
heavily camouflaged and a "shell game" of which one is going to have
someone home.
BUFDRVR
>targets destroyed in the ACSC and Air War College texts.
Which include "documented facts" on how 8th Air Force won WW in Europe. See my
earlier posts for my opinion of AF PME.
>Don't believe
>all you read unless the author was there himself.
That's ridiculous. Using that logic there is only one "believeable" book on the
Peloponnesian War. Conversely, according to you I could right a definitive work
on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, which wouldn't be worth the cost of the paper
because I was so deeply buried in B-52 stuff (flying and mission planning),
that the "big picture" blew right by me.
>I never cared much about BDA numbers
>but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from
>Specter's night vision and IR gear.
Except that the over inflated truck count is now a documented fact and one of
the accurate things taught at SOS and ASCS (I'm not sure about Air War
College). Recently there was a program on the Discovery Channel that
highlighted the Ho Chi Mihn Trail vehicle repair facilities and pointed out
that many of the trucks on the trail were "destroyed" several times over.
>>>Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.
>>
>>It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.
>
>If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go
>after targest that the bombers had missed?
Because it made military sense to do that, however it would have made little
difference in the end had the targets not been re-struck.
>Certainly would have been easier for
>the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I
>flew
>a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3.
Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.
>SAC couldn't hit a point target with strings of up to 300 bombs in a
>crosswind
>or wind shear in other words?
Nope. The BUFF OAS calculates a release using the winds at altitude, should
those winds change drastically on the way down, it could have a significant
impact on accuracy. It happened in LB II, then again in DS. It was fixed after
DS.
>We managed reasonably well with the LORAN
>equipped
>A-6s, F-111As, and F-4s.
Not sure about the F-4s, but neither the F-111 or A-6 was dropping from inside
or above the jet stream. If the F-4 has that capability great, its too bad they
didn't give it to the BUFF following Vietnam, we could have used over
Iraq/Kuwait.
>An A-6 with two flights of three waqs accurate enough
>to nearly destroy the DaNang POL facility when the BN forgot to switch
>steering
> from his offset aimpoint to his target
A BUFF could do that from 5,000' AGL too. Its a whole different story at
30,000+' AGL.
>That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any
>contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental.
I've never read anything that infers that, however, I will admit that the
bombers definitely have gotten more publicity.
>but I don't believe the bombing was all that effective..
Depends what effect you were looking for...
>What brought the North back to the bargaining
>table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more
>effective.
What brought them back to the *signing* table was the fact that congress was
going to let the bombing continue; that and we told them (through the Swedish
ambassador I believe) that we were ready to sign the original agreement.
> They were running out of missiles
Marshall L. Michel's book "The 11 Days of Christmas" attributes this to myth.
He supports this claim with interviews from NV SAM operators and commanders.
They were never short of missiles in Hanoi (they did have trouble getting them
out to some of the sites, but were given a reprieve when night strikes in Hanoi
decreased markedly night #5 through #7 when the BUFFs went to targets outside
Hanoi). The missile firings decreased because the bombers began to make the
operators job much more difficult with varied routing.
>and fuel
They had been low on fuel since May due to LB I. LBII had little to no impact
on NV POL stores.
> I don't think it wold have
>happened as it did if NVN had more missiles.
See above, or better yet, pick up Michel's book. Although, be forwarned, it
includes very little about you fighter guys.
>I sat in an orbit over downtown
>for 15 minutes on Day 3 until a single cloud drifted away from the target the
>the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired
>at
>us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing
The NV SAM operators were under strict orders to fire SAMs at only F-111s or
B-52s. The one guy interviewed said he took a shot at an F-4 on night #1 and
was very concerned he would face disciplinary action.
BUFDRVR
>aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level,
>in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable?
Well it depends on who is commenting on what. A U.S. Marine commenting on how
well supplied the enemy was is conjecture, a NV officer discussing personal
experiences about ammo shortages and testimony from high ranking government
officials supporting that experience,makes that a documented fact.
>Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield
>down?
Probably not since IIRC, Kep was one of the "crosswind" missions. However that
airfield received attention during the day on more than one occasion and the
BUFFs returned there on three more occasions. I realize we're not talking
about JDAMs here Ed, but surely you guys couldn't have been that bad?
>Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm
>not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.)
What? You mean everyone in the USAF from the Air Force Academy through Air War
College is wrong? I'm shocked ;) Before I exchanged posts here with you Ed, I
had never even heard those shoot downs were questionable. After discussing it
with you, Dr. Thompson and reading Michel's book I'm convinced both those guys
shot at F-4s...however I can go to Maxwell and read about those shoot downs. By
the way, those accounts were written by guys "who were there" and not in the
back of a library.
>The operative word on those targettings is "probable".
Absolutely.
> we could
>never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up.
Same is true today...for the most part, but you claimed SAM sites were always
response targets, what you should have said was *confirmed* SAM sites were
always response targets, although that might not have been true had an SA-2
been parked under any of those F-111 or B-52 target areas.
SteveM8597
>>I never cared much about BDA numbers
>>but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from
>>Specter's night vision and IR gear.
>
>Except that the over inflated truck count is now a documented fact and one of
>the accurate things taught at SOS and ASCS (I'm not sure about Air War
>College). Recently there was a program on the Discovery Channel that
>highlighted the Ho Chi Mihn Trail vehicle repair facilities and pointed out
>that many of the trucks on the trail were "destroyed" several times over.
I don't disagree with you relative to overstating numbers . My body, truck,
and tonnage of enemy supplies destroyed counts were ridiculous at times. I am
trying point out that you are very much understating, at least with respect to
my own personal observations. I've enough pre/post strike recce photos of
truck parks and convoys to know that there were a lot of trucks, numbering int
he hundreds, certainly more than the hundred you mentioned unless you want to
tell me those photos wre faked.
I wasn't impressed one way or the other by the accounts of LB I and II when I
went through SOS and ACSC. The AWC readings were shown to me by an 0-4 and an
0-5 who were taking AWC by correspondence. I understand they upset a few folks
when they pointed out the errors in the photos to the staff.
>
>>>>Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.
>>>
>>>It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.
>>
>>If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go
>>after targest that the bombers had missed?
>
>Because it made military sense to do that, however it would have made little
>difference in the end had the targets not been re-struck.
Possibly for some but not all the daytime targets that were struck. If it made
little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the first
place? You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered
was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they hit
anything or not, scaring the government back to the table and i don't quite
hold that view. My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ
SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the TAC
guys had learned the hard way, and then the collective actions of both forces
convinced the NVN there was no future in their current strategy once they
started losing assets..
>
>>Certainly would have been easier for
>>the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I
>>flew
>>a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3.
>
>Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.
So was blowing away their infrastructure.
>
>A BUFF could do that from 5,000' AGL too. Its a whole different story at
>30,000+' AGL.
The pathfinders usually operated above 15,000' to stay out of small arms and
lighter AAA.like 23 and 37 mm.
>
>>That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any
>>contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental.
>
>I've never read anything that infers that, however, I will admit that the
>bombers definitely have gotten more publicity.
Certainly did in the ACSC reading I referred to above.
You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity. Same
difference. Several who have challenged that viewpoint have become pariahs,
Dana Drenkowski for one.
>
>>but I don't believe the bombing was all that effective..
>
>Depends what effect you were looking for...
>
As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle
killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory?
>>What brought the North back to the bargaining
>>table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more
>>effective.
>
>What brought them back to the *signing* table was the fact that congress was
>going to let the bombing continue; that and we told them (through the Swedish
>ambassador I believe) that we were ready to sign the original agreement.
>
>> They were running out of missiles
>
>Marshall L. Michel's book "The 11 Days of Christmas" attributes this to myth.
>He supports this claim with interviews from NV SAM operators and commanders.
>They were never short of missiles in Hanoi (they did have trouble getting
>them
>out to some of the sites, but were given a reprieve when night strikes in
>Hanoi
>decreased markedly night #5 through #7 when the BUFFs went to targets outside
>Hanoi). The missile firings decreased because the bombers began to make the
>operators job much more difficult with varied routing.
>
>>and fuel
I read that too but I don't agree. The missile firings dropped off after Day
3.
They were low on everything which also explains why the daytime AAA was so
light. I was over Hanoi and saw the sky go from absolutelyclear to totally
undercast from AAA. I never saw that in the daytime sorties I flew in LBII.
You are making my point about why their follow-on warfighiing capability was
set back by the fighter strikes. Whether the changed B-52 tactics or lack of
operation missiles reduced bomber losses is almost a moot point but you are
making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II
>See above, or better yet, pick up Michel's book. Although, be forwarned, it
>includes very little about you fighter guys.
>
I have the book and have read it a couple of times. I agree with nearly all he
has written. I guess we just see the accounts he describes differently. He
does quote a squadron mate, Rex Rivolo, in several places.but there isn't a
vast amount written about the daytime fighter sorties.
>>the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired
>>at
>>us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing
>
>The NV SAM operators were under strict orders to fire SAMs at only F-111s or
>B-52s. The one guy interviewed said he took a shot at an F-4 on night #1 and
>was very concerned he would face disciplinary action.
There must have been quite a few SAM shooters getting disciplined that night
then. . One crew in our squadron had one fired at them, dodged it, then took
it down again for another. The backseater saw the altimeter unwind to zero as
they bottomed out in the pullup, but the SAM missed. It was the backseater's
first mission in country.
The F-111s operated far too low to be targeted once they were out onto the Red
River delta and in SAM country.
Ed Rasimus
>>Seems to me that you can't have it both ways. If on scene US observers
>>aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level,
>>in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable?
>
>Well it depends on who is commenting on what. A U.S. Marine commenting on how
>well supplied the enemy was is conjecture, a NV officer discussing personal
>experiences about ammo shortages and testimony from high ranking government
>officials supporting that experience,makes that a documented fact.
You're hedging. You indicated that personal observation was a poor
source of historical fact; that on-scene observers were unreliable and
only imperfectly viewed the metaphorical "lower right-hand corner of
the big picture." Then you offered a "young NV Lt, armed with an AK-47
and a pistol" and no ammo.
Today you discount the intense fighting that was going on at Hue, An
Loc, and Khe Sanh during the period in question. Lots of ammo was
being expended by the bad guys---it must have come from somewhere and
I'll be willing to believe US troops on the scene that it was being
fired.
>
>>Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield
>>down?
>
>Probably not since IIRC, Kep was one of the "crosswind" missions. However that
>airfield received attention during the day on more than one occasion and the
>BUFFs returned there on three more occasions. I realize we're not talking
>about JDAMs here Ed, but surely you guys couldn't have been that bad?
There were night strikes by the F-111s on the airfields during LB II.
As you know, an airfield is a very difficult target to disable. And,
no, we weren't that bad. In fact, if you see the pix of Radio Hanoi
after the LGB guys from Ubon showed up, you'll see the level of
accuracy. You also might consider the Doumer Bridge, the Dragon Jaw at
Thanh Hoa, the Bac Giang and Bac Ninh bridges as examples of artistry
with manually delivered dive bombs. And, consider the difference
between unleashing a JDAM from 30 miles away, high in the menopause
and the idea of hurling your chubby pink body at the ground amidst a
hail of 23/37/57/85/100 mm flak, SA-2s and other flying metal.
>
>>Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm
>>not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.)
>
>What? You mean everyone in the USAF from the Air Force Academy through Air War
>College is wrong? I'm shocked ;) Before I exchanged posts here with you Ed, I
>had never even heard those shoot downs were questionable. After discussing it
>with you, Dr. Thompson and reading Michel's book I'm convinced both those guys
>shot at F-4s...however I can go to Maxwell and read about those shoot downs. By
>the way, those accounts were written by guys "who were there" and not in the
>back of a library.
I don't think they shot at F-4s. An F-4 had no reason to get to the
altitudes of the B-52s (in fact in A/A configuration with three bags
it was almost impossible.) I suspect that they were shooting at
shadows--no airplanes at all. But, it was good for morale to award
some kills.
Maybe Guy Alcala knows if Toperczer reported any losses from the NVN
side related to the BUFF gunner claims.
>
>>The operative word on those targettings is "probable".
>
>Absolutely.
>
>> we could
>>never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up.
>
>Same is true today...for the most part, but you claimed SAM sites were always
>response targets, what you should have said was *confirmed* SAM sites were
>always response targets, although that might not have been true had an SA-2
>been parked under any of those F-111 or B-52 target areas.
A SAM site without SAMs or radar in residence isn't really a SAM site
is it?
BUFDRVR
>trying point out that you are very much understating, at least with respect
>to
>my own personal observations.
Well, perhaps my definition of truck is too narrow. My "understatement" comes
from Robert Pape's "Bombing To Win" (I think, I'm moving and can't find my
copy), IIRC Pape states there was "a hundred or so 2 1/2 Ton trucks" (I'm
paraphrasing). Perhaps there were smaller trucks in use that account for your
personal experience?
>If it made
>little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the
>first
>place?
Because Nixon wanted B-52s over Hanoi. B-52 targeting in Hanoi was sometimes
ridiculous. BUFFs were targeted against Radio Hanoi which consisted of a small
building and a couple of antenna. 12 B-52s dropped weapons near Radio Hanoi
without ever knocking it off the air. 4 were lost.
>You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered
>was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they
>hit
>anything or not
As far as Nixon was concerned, that was true, as long as the civilian casulties
were kept to a minimum.
>My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ
>SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the
>TAC
>guys had learned the hard way
True, although I think "failed miserably" is a little too harsh. Night #2 saw
no BUFFs lost and about average bombing accuracy.
>>Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.
>
>So was blowing away their infrastructure.
That had already been accomplished for the most part by LB I.
>You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity.
And you are making half of mine.
>>Depends what effect you were looking for...
>>
>
>As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle
>killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory?
No; as in it doesn't really matter if the Kihn No Vehicle repair yard get hits
tonight or not, as long as bombs land somewhere near it and the NVN government
gets a personal, up close viewing.
>but you are
>making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II
Like I said, you're making half of mine. All you have to do is admit that the
accuracy of the weapons you dropped wasn't nearly as important as dropping them
and you and I will be in agreement.
BUFDRVR
>source of historical fact; that on-scene observers were unreliable and
>only imperfectly viewed the metaphorical "lower right-hand corner of
>the big picture."
Taken by itself, yes, personal observations are not adequate historical
sources. When backed up by other personal sources they get more credibility,
but when backed up by documents, they become factual. The munition, food and
POL shortages experienced by the NVA in the summer of '72 are well documented
by NV government records and by dozens of NV officers and enlisted who were
obsessive diary keepers. Ed, you're arguing against a very solid historic fact.
>There were night strikes by the F-111s on the airfields during LB II.
And BUFFs.
>As you know, an airfield is a very difficult target to disable.
Not with 108 bombs its not! Come on Ed, I split the runways at Batajanica with
a B-52 two-ship with a grand total of 90 weapons. 2 more two-ships followed
until we quartered the runway making it useless for anything except a
Cessna-172. This was all done with unguided Mk-82s. Its not really that
difficult to cut runways, even with unguided weapons.
>And, consider the difference
>between unleashing a JDAM from 30 miles away
30 miles ? I wish it were possible....
>and the idea of hurling your chubby pink body at the ground amidst a
>hail of 23/37/57/85/100 mm flak, SA-2s and other flying metal.
I have seen, up close and personal, SA-2s, SA-3's and SA-6s. Operating in the
"menopause" is not as safe as you seem to think.
>I suspect that they were shooting at
>shadows--no airplanes at all.
However, this whole issue gets at the heart of your argument. Here you have
reports from guys who were actually there and compared to studies done by guys
who weren't actually there (sitting in the back of a library as you put it) we
find the "library guys" more historically accurate. Why? Because the infameous
"fog and friction" tends to distort reality. There's no fog and little friction
from the back of a library. I'm not sure how familiar you are with the study
Checkmate did in the 80s of a supposed F-4 to F-4 blue on blue kill in Vietnam,
but several guys who were not old enough to drive when the incident occured,
accurately figured out that a supposed blue-on-blue kill in 1971 (I think?)
over NVN was, in fact, an enemy MiG-21 that shot down the F-4. As far as I'm
concerned personal eyewitness accounts are good historical sources, but like
all other sources, must be supported by other documentation.
>A SAM site without SAMs or radar in residence isn't really a SAM site
>is it?
LOL...nope, not at all. I was trying to point out that had there been an SA-2
site located in those areas (which there wasn't), they would have certainly
been destroyed, so the fact that no SAMs were attacked by B-52s is a matter of
good NVN luck.
SteveM8597
>Well, perhaps my definition of truck is too narrow. My "understatement" comes
>from Robert Pape's "Bombing To Win" (I think, I'm moving and can't find my
>copy), IIRC Pape states there was "a hundred or so 2 1/2 Ton trucks" (I'm
>paraphrasing). Perhaps there were smaller trucks in use that account for your
>personal experience?
I frankly don't care what he states, he and/or his sources are wrong. I
personally saw hundreds of trucks that our intel said were similar to our own 2
1/2 T to 5 T trucks, parked in a marshalling yard just inside the PRC buffer
zone that we were fragged against in LB I. I am pretty sure tht in most cases
the trucks came south in convoys of less than 100 but not always. Dependedoin
where they were, under the junglecanopy or in the open where the trails were
exposed. Specter could "see" through the jungle foliage and that is why it
became a great truck killer. Evidence that the truck convoys moved a lot of
supplies is the passes through hills west of the DMZ, such as Ban Karai and Mu
Gia, and river fords were heavily attacked and defended throughout the war.
There were tanks and SAMs in the south during the April 72 offensive. 100
"duece and a halfs" certainly couldn't haul them south. My flight got targeted
by a slow FAC (c/s Nail IIRC) against a SAM transporter with two missiles on
the trailer that apparently had gotten stuck in a river crossing near the DMZ.
Apparently was real as there were some impressive secondaries. There were
hulks of tanks in that area as well though I never caught any in the open. An
offensive of this scale needed lots and lots of trucks to haul fuel, ammo, and
parts, not to mention halling the tanks themselves..
>
>>If it made
>>little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the
>>first
>>place?
>
>Because Nixon wanted B-52s over Hanoi. B-52 targeting in Hanoi was sometimes
>ridiculous. BUFFs were targeted against Radio Hanoi which consisted of a
>small
>building and a couple of antenna. 12 B-52s dropped weapons near Radio Hanoi
>without ever knocking it off the air. 4 were lost.
Yeah, the nearest bomb missed by 800'. We got it the next day with four LGBs.
I'grant you this one. I always wondered why the bombers even bothered with
that one.
>
>>You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered
>>was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they
>>hit
>>anything or not
>
>As far as Nixon was concerned, that was true, as long as the civilian
>casulties
>were kept to a minimum.
The order from the President to just scatter bombs at random away from
inhabited areas sure never made it down to the working level! There were a
lot of energy, lives and materiel expended in actually trying to hit critical
targets. I have a little trouble with the insinuation that it didn't matter if
targets wre hit or not. That might have been true for the bombers; I can't
speak for that. Certainly not for the tactical forces. My three daytime
Linebackers against targets that the bombers missed certainly weren't just to
scatter bombs. That may have been the situation in Cambodia near the bombing
halt, but not in LB.
>
>>My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ
>>SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the
>>TAC
>>guys had learned the hard way
>
>True, although I think "failed miserably" is a little too harsh. Night #2 saw
>no BUFFs lost and about average bombing accuracy.
>
>>>Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.
>>
>>So was blowing away their infrastructure.
>
>That had already been accomplished for the most part by LB I.
You are overlooking the difficulty in blowing away infrastructure in a thrid
world country that has been bombed for years. The NVN were able to
reconstitute pretty quickly. You allude to references that say the materiel
was there in LBII but the NVN weren't able to get it where it was needed to
rearm and reload. That infrastructure was somewhat rebuilt after LBI and hit
again in LB II. The bridges had been partially reopened and the intell was
that they had built up in the interim to greater than LB i levels. Damage from
LB had destroyed much of the LOC infrastructure in the Panhandle but not in the
Red River Delta area. It got hit again and you stated that was the reason why
fewer and fewer missiles were fired on later LB II nights. I Personally don't
buy the argument that the NVN really didn't run out of missiles but if in fact
we did destroy their missile assembly and tranportation infrastructure, then
you are arguing against yourself.
>
>>You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity.
>
>And you are making half of mine.
>
>>>Depends what effect you were looking for...
>>>
>>
>>As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle
>>killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory?
>
>No; as in it doesn't really matter if the Kihn No Vehicle repair yard get
>hits
>tonight or not, as long as bombs land somewhere near it and the NVN
>government
>gets a personal, up close viewing.
>
>>but you are
>>making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II
>
>Like I said, you're making half of mine. All you have to do is admit that the
>accuracy of the weapons you dropped wasn't nearly as important as dropping
>them
>and you and I will be in agreement.
You have got to be kidding! Never having been in SAC I can't speak to the
bomber employment philosophy and that might explain why the bombers missed a
lot of targets. However, for the tactical forces that certainly wasn't the
case by a long shot. I find your statement very startling. I can see how you
can say that the bomber raids were purely political if you in fact feel that
way. It certainly doesn't explain away the use of the laser guided bombs
against critical targets. You paint is as more of a case of the bombers being
sent to Hanoi just to keep the people awake while the tactical forces did the
real work.
Ed Rasimus
>>You're hedging. You indicated that personal observation was a poor
>>source of historical fact; that on-scene observers were unreliable and
>>only imperfectly viewed the metaphorical "lower right-hand corner of
>>the big picture."
>
>Taken by itself, yes, personal observations are not adequate historical
>sources. When backed up by other personal sources they get more credibility,
>but when backed up by documents, they become factual. The munition, food and
>POL shortages experienced by the NVA in the summer of '72 are well documented
>by NV government records and by dozens of NV officers and enlisted who were
>obsessive diary keepers. Ed, you're arguing against a very solid historic fact.
My challenge has never been that historical compilation is inaccurate.
I've been contending that as long as we have first person accounts
available, we can integrate the "official" record with the live
on-scene experiences to get a considerably more accurate account. In
many instances, availability of first-person recollections will result
in correction of the historic records.
The real issue here is that on the one hand you are eager to discount
first person US recollections on intensity of the fighting and
simultaneously accept the NVN statements. And, do you really mean to
say that the NVA operating from the tunnels and jungle caves deep into
SVN, short of "munition, food and POL" were devoting their time to
meticulous record keeping? This while the massive US bureaucracy of
MAC-V was simply doodling away on French cuisine and Eurasian whores?
>
>>As you know, an airfield is a very difficult target to disable.
>
>Not with 108 bombs its not! Come on Ed, I split the runways at Batajanica with
>a B-52 two-ship with a grand total of 90 weapons. 2 more two-ships followed
>until we quartered the runway making it useless for anything except a
>Cessna-172. This was all done with unguided Mk-82s. Its not really that
>difficult to cut runways, even with unguided weapons.
Gimme a break. I'll accept your well-earned pride in your system and
capabilities, but if you've really done that in-depth research of the
LB II BUFF strikes, you've seen the same B&W BDA photos I have from
the period. Long bomb trains walking up to and over discrete targets
with one, two or three bombs out of the string possibly hitting the
target---or in some instances ending before the target, starting after
the target or paralleling the target but missing cleanly.
And, I'm sure you've been briefed and maybe even personally observed
"rapid runway repair" teams in action. That technology has been around
for a lot of years. And, you can trust me, the NV were quite good at
it. Maybe Serbs hadn't finished the correspondence course yet.
>
>>I suspect that they were shooting at
>>shadows--no airplanes at all.
>
>However, this whole issue gets at the heart of your argument. Here you have
>reports from guys who were actually there and compared to studies done by guys
>who weren't actually there (sitting in the back of a library as you put it) we
>find the "library guys" more historically accurate. Why? Because the infameous
>"fog and friction" tends to distort reality. There's no fog and little friction
>from the back of a library. I'm not sure how familiar you are with the study
>Checkmate did in the 80s of a supposed F-4 to F-4 blue on blue kill in Vietnam,
>but several guys who were not old enough to drive when the incident occured,
>accurately figured out that a supposed blue-on-blue kill in 1971 (I think?)
>over NVN was, in fact, an enemy MiG-21 that shot down the F-4. As far as I'm
>concerned personal eyewitness accounts are good historical sources, but like
>all other sources, must be supported by other documentation.
Ahhh, Checkmate..."John Warden? I knew John Warden. John Warden was a
friend of mine. And, frankly, Senator, you're no John Warden...."
(Sorry, I digress.)
Read about Chuck Horner's dismissal of John Warden when setting up the
offensive team for Desert Storm in Clancy's collaboration, "Every Man
a Tiger."
"blue-on-blue kill in 1971"? Sounds like some of that great
history---no ops going in in MiG country in '71. LB didn't start until
May of '72, and the various "protective reaction" incursions were down
in the panhandle.
Recently, Howard Plunkett sent me an extract from the Pentagon study
(Red Baron) that gathered all the MiG engagement data of the SEA war.
It covered an encounter that I had with a MiG-17 that is detailed in
When Thunder Rolled in the chapter titled "MiGs and Moustaches". The
positions in the illustrations are wrong. The sequence of events is
wrong. The ranges between aircraft are wrong. Even the location
relative to the target and other flights is wrong. The only interview
conducted to establish the definitive historic account was done eight
months after the event with the flight lead in Wichita KS. No other
participants were interviewed and the flight lead was not in a
position to witness the entire engagement. Yet, that becomes the
historic record.
For several years after LB II, Carl Jeffcoat who I mentioned earlier
as being downed by a MiG 21 near Kep, believed that he was shot down
by a member of the Hunter/Killer flight rather than an enemy aircraft.
Talking to several participants who were airborne that day, we
confirmed that no H/K aircraft were carrying Sidewinders. No H/K
aircraft fired a Sparrow.
If you read the history of LB II, twenty years from now, you'll know
that two BUFF tail gunners killed MiG 21s. Today, while some of the
participants are still around, we'll tell you that while it is
remotely possible it is extremely unlikely.
YMMV.
>
>>A SAM site without SAMs or radar in residence isn't really a SAM site
>>is it?
>
>LOL...nope, not at all. I was trying to point out that had there been an SA-2
>site located in those areas (which there wasn't), they would have certainly
>been destroyed, so the fact that no SAMs were attacked by B-52s is a matter of
>good NVN luck.
>
>
>BUFDRVR
>
>"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
>everyone on Bear Creek"
Ed Rasimus
SteveM8597
>that two BUFF tail gunners killed MiG 21s. Today, while some of the
>participants are still around, we'll tell you that while it is
>remotely possible it is extremely unlikely.
Well put Ed, as usual, far better than I ever could. Had my interview with Ray
Sullivan today at the AF Museum for the LB II documentary. Interesting
session. He told me that his dad was the Gen Sullivan mentioned in the
accounts as the SAC senior officer who signed the SAC LB II impelementing order
and was later "fired" into Air Rescue Service for opposing the LB II initial
tactics as documented by Mitchell. My copy is loaned out and I don't recall
the exact circumstances. He spoke very highly of you and has your bio and
picture in a list of major contributors to the production..
Thus far he has 16 hours of interviews and Discovery Channel and Hstory Channel
are going to pick it up but the date is still not nailed down..
He has talked at length to Karl Eschmann and Mike Mitchell. He will use
Eschmann as a major source and probably as the lead in. Mitchell was involved
from the start and the "11 Days" book was the seed for the documentary but he
and Mitchell went their separate ways over disagreement on content and level of
detail. He is well versed on all the controversy surrounding LB II but wants
to tell the story from the viewpoints of the guys who were directly involved.
This should a great documentary from the sound of it. The story will be told
through filmed intereviews from the production cast and crew of Linebacker II
rather than secondhand through the eyes of an author his own interpretations as
we are debating here. . .
BUFDRVR
>personally saw hundreds of trucks that our intel said were similar to our own
>2
>1/2 T to 5 T trucks, parked in a marshalling yard just inside the PRC buffer
>zone that we were fragged against in LB I.
Trucks parked near the PRC buffer zone were not the trucks in use along the Ho
Chi Mihn trail in SVN, Laos and Cambodia.
>There were tanks and SAMs in the south during the April 72 offensive. 100
>"duece and a halfs" certainly couldn't haul them south.
Now you're mixing apples and oranges. The easter offensive in '72 was a true
conventional offensive and as such, was supplied like one. The "hundred or so
trucks" I referred to were the ones used to haul supplies to VC forces in SVN.
The logistics pipeline for the Easter offensive was what you would expect for
any nation supporting a 3 division offensive, that's what made it such an easy
target and why the Freedom Porch missions were so successful.
>The order from the President to just scatter bombs at random away from
>inhabited areas sure never made it down to the working level!
Obviously the EXORD wasn't for "random bomb scattering", it was for round the
clock maximum effort bombing against any legal target in NVN, including
previously restricted targets in Hanoi. The military did what they were
supposed to and went after what they determined to be critical targets. The
fact the military took the CJCS order and turned it into as sound a military
operation as they could, doesn't change the fact that Nixon didn't really care
what damage was inflicted, his purpose was political, not military.
>There were a
>lot of energy, lives and materiel expended in actually trying to hit
>critical
>targets.
The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left and
by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were
SAMs, radars and dikes and dams and the legality of striking them is
debateable.
>I have a little trouble with the insinuation that it didn't matter if
> targets wre hit or not.
Then tell me, what critical targets were hit and what problems was it causing
for the NVN that forced them to return to Paris (to sign an agreement they were
ready to sign in OCT 72)?
>That might have been true for the bombers; I can't
>speak for that. Certainly not for the tactical forces.
I'm sorry, but testimony from nearly all major players on both sides attest to
the fact that; the NVN were not experiencing any drastic effects (not already
experienced from LB I) of *any* bombing and that Nixon ordered LBII, not to
disrupt any specific NVN infrastructure, but to show resolve and convince the
NVN that the U.S. was capable of unrestricted bombing.
>My three daytime
>Linebackers against targets that the bombers missed certainly weren't just to
>scatter bombs.
Militarily, you're right, but the ultimate objective was political not
military.
>You are overlooking the difficulty in blowing away infrastructure in a thrid
>world country that has been bombed for years.
Yes, keep going with that thought and you'll realize that the damage inflicted
during LB II caused little additional hardships on the NVN government or
people. The B-52 bombings were quite a psychological shock (as POWs and NVN
attest to), but never to such a degree that anyone in Hanoi pressured the
government to go back to Paris.
>The NVN were able to
>reconstitute pretty quickly.
What they were able to reconstitute from LB I made little difference in regards
to the offensive in the south or in the lives of anyone up north.
>You allude to references that say the materiel
>was there in LBII but the NVN weren't able to get it where it was needed to
>rearm and reload. That infrastructure was somewhat rebuilt after LBI and hit
>again in LB II.
It wasn't the infrastructure damage that kept them from resupplying their SAM
batterys, it was you in an F-4 and the fact that resupplying Guideline missiles
is a fairly slow and highly visable process.
>I Personally don't
>buy the argument that the NVN really didn't run out of missiles but if in
>fact
>we did destroy their missile assembly and tranportation infrastructure, then
>you are arguing against yourself.
The only damage to the NVN Air Defense system was on the SAM batterys and
associated radars themselves. Michel wonders out loud in his book, why a
concerted effort wasn't made from the beginning of LBII to find the SAM storage
areas. Obviously someone *thought* they knew where they were, as several B-52
sorties targeted "SAM storage areas", but none of those targets up till night
#11 stored anything related to NVN Air Defense. On night # 11 when a 3-ship of
B-52D models attacked the Trai Ca SAM storage area, we hit pay dirt. According
to NVN reports "hundreds" of surface-to-air missiles, both Guideline and
tactical varients were destroyed. Most people would say; "see, when Trai Ca got
hit that's when the NVN decided to return to Paris". This would be incorrect,
Le Duc Tho had already informed the State department on Day #9 that they were
willing to return to Paris to sign the original agreement. Nixon continued the
bombing for another 2 days and nights to insure Le Duc Tho kept his word.
>You have got to be kidding! Never having been in SAC I can't speak to the
>bomber employment philosophy and that might explain why the bombers missed a
>lot of targets.
First, I would question that B-52s "missed *a lot* of their targets. Prior to
night #3 they missed several due to the already mentioned wind problem, but
besides that their accuracy was within advertised unguided CEP, with the
exception being the guys who were fighting for their lives with Guideline
missiles.
>However, for the tactical forces that certainly wasn't the
>case by a long shot.
I'll have to disagree, the ultimate objective was political, not military and
as such, any damage you did was secondary to the fact you just did damage.
>It certainly doesn't explain away the use of the laser guided bombs
>against critical targets.
Sure it does, the military took purely political objectives (actually not
transmitted to the forces, but they took the vague Presidential guidance)
converted them to military objectives and executed the mission. You can argue
against this all you want, but all you have to do is pick up Nixon's memoirs
and read for yourself.
>You paint is as more of a case of the bombers being
>sent to Hanoi just to keep the people awake while the tactical forces did the
>real work.
The bombers were a bold political statement, used to make the strongest point
Nixon could, the fighters were also a political statement, allowing 24 hour ops
and debilitating the NVN efforts to defend themselves after the sun went down.
BUFDRVR
>I've been contending that as long as we have first person accounts
>available, we can integrate the "official" record with the live
>on-scene experiences to get a considerably more accurate account.
Not in all cases however. If I were to interview the two B-52D tail gunners
credited for the two MiG kills, I would conclude that they actually shot down
the two jets. If I expand my research and interview you and other F-4 MiGCAP
guys, I would get a completely different version. If I then go to the the
Vietnamese themselves, ask them to show me their records and discover that not
only were no MiGs reported lost in the area in question, but that there were no
MiGs airborn in that area during the time in question, I can reasonably
conclude that no MiGs were shot down by B-52s.
>In
>many instances, availability of first-person recollections will result
>in correction of the historic records.
>
As you can see above, as many times as it can set the facts straight, it can
distort them.
>The real issue here is that on the one hand you are eager to discount
>first person US recollections on intensity of the fighting and
>simultaneously accept the NVN statements.
Because the U.S. Marine is not really in a poistion to make an accurate
statement regading NVN supplies, the NVN officer, and the NVN documented record
is. Conversly, I would disregard NVN speculation about U.S. force issues and
rely on the U.S. accounts and records.
>And, do you really mean to
>say that the NVA operating from the tunnels and jungle caves deep into
>SVN, short of "munition, food and POL" were devoting their time to
>meticulous record keeping?
Not only did they keep good and accurate records, but nearly every solider kept
a personal diary. If you've ever read Hal Moore's "We Were Soliders Once and
Young", he can attest to the fact that nearly every enemy body recovered in LZ
X-Ray had a personal diary on it.
>This while the massive US bureaucracy of
>MAC-V was simply doodling away on French cuisine and Eurasian whores?
Maybe if the VC and NVA units had French food and whores their records would
not be as meticulous as they are ;)
>Long bomb trains walking up to and over discrete targets
>with one, two or three bombs out of the string possibly hitting the
>target---or in some instances ending before the target, starting after
>the target or paralleling the target but missing cleanly.
I didn't mean to infer it was as easy in 1972 as it was in 1999, many
improvements had been made to the BUFF release system that allowed us to drop
very tight trains today, but it also wasn't so difficult that an airfield
needed to be attacked by over 25 jets of all types. The runway at Bac Mai was
unuseable after night #4 but BUFFs went back there the next night and the
runway also received attention during the day. Perhaps it was "maintenance"
bombing Ed, but that excuse doesn't hold true for the non-airfield targets.
Khin No Railyard and vehicle repair complex was a total loss after night #2,
but BUFFs went back there at least 4 more times. Khin No received over 4,000
weapons from B-52s alone and IIRC A-7s also visited there...and this was after
LB I when it had also been hit...several times!
>Ahhh, Checkmate..."John Warden? I knew John Warden. John Warden was a
>friend of mine. And, frankly, Senator, you're no John Warden...."
Nothing personal to your friend Ed, but I take that as a compliment.
>Read about Chuck Horner's dismissal of John Warden when setting up the
>offensive team for Desert Storm in Clancy's collaboration, "Every Man
>a Tiger."
I have, great stuff, go Chuck!
>"blue-on-blue kill in 1971"? Sounds like some of that great
>history---no ops going in in MiG country in '71.
Than it must have been '72, I'm reciting this from memory.
>The
>positions in the illustrations are wrong. The sequence of events is
>wrong. The ranges between aircraft are wrong. Even the location
>relative to the target and other flights is wrong.
Now define; "wrong"...is it possible Ed, that you recalled it incorrectly. I'm
not choosing sides in this one, just pointing out, as in the case of our
fameous B-52 tail gunners, sometimes the participant is wrong.
>The only interview
>conducted to establish the definitive historic account was done eight
>months after the event with the flight lead in Wichita KS.
Than I would conclude that unless one of you wrote it down immediately after
the fact and verified it with other potential witnesses, that there is no way
of knowing for sure what happened. You may be right...or he may be right, but
as someone who was 4 years old at the time I can not accept either account as
fact.
>No other
>participants were interviewed and the flight lead was not in a
>position to witness the entire engagement. Yet, that becomes the
>historic record.
I believe much of the Air Force historical record is like that. A few months
after ALLIED FORCE ended I got to read in the "Lessons Learned" about how B-52s
required air refueling in order to provide a 2-hour XINT presence. Interesting
since only one crew ever even saw a tanker during the entire operation, and
that was so he could extend his *3-hour* XINT orbit to 5 hours. Whoever wrote
that section confused B-1s and B-52s, but now that is documented Air Force
history. By the way, the participants at the Lessons Learned conferance were
all OAF participants as well....
>For several years after LB II, Carl Jeffcoat who I mentioned earlier
>as being downed by a MiG 21 near Kep, believed that he was shot down
>by a member of the Hunter/Killer flight rather than an enemy aircraft.
Maybe this was the case Checkmate looked at in the 80s? I know that the
official Air Force history held it as fratricide until Checkmate concluded
their study. Another F-4 driver, "Lucky" Anderreg led the study, but I don't
think he was in LBII.
BUFDRVR
Sounds like a great show, I can't wait. Although I am concerned that Michel
left over a disagreement. Out of him and Eschmann, I find Michel's book much
better documented and supported. Eschmann's book contains both the myth about
the BUFF-MiG shoot downs and the "hybrid" FAN SONG-LOW BLOW radar. Michel gets
the word right from the horses mouth on both those issues.
Ed Rasimus
>>I
>>personally saw hundreds of trucks that our intel said were similar to our own
>>2
>>1/2 T to 5 T trucks, parked in a marshalling yard just inside the PRC buffer
>>zone that we were fragged against in LB I.
>
>Trucks parked near the PRC buffer zone were not the trucks in use along the Ho
>Chi Mihn trail in SVN, Laos and Cambodia.
We're beginning to get really convoluted here. Now, your statement
regarding 100 trucks is caveated with some as yet undisclosed location
within the country criteria. A truck delivering war material in the
PRC buffer isn't a truck? Or it isn't war material? Or they had to
unload it and then put it on a different truck for the rest of the
trip? If so, and there were only a 100 or so going down the trail,
there there should have been massive storage areas and trans-shipment
points.
>
>>There were tanks and SAMs in the south during the April 72 offensive. 100
>>"duece and a halfs" certainly couldn't haul them south.
>
>Now you're mixing apples and oranges. The easter offensive in '72 was a true
>conventional offensive and as such, was supplied like one. The "hundred or so
>trucks" I referred to were the ones used to haul supplies to VC forces in SVN.
>The logistics pipeline for the Easter offensive was what you would expect for
>any nation supporting a 3 division offensive, that's what made it such an easy
>target and why the Freedom Porch missions were so successful.
So, the "hundred or so trucks" hauled supplies to VC, and the three
division offensive had thousands of other trucks? Or, they three
divisions carried their logistic goodies in their rice bags?
And, I just Googled Freedom Porch, since I'd never heard of it. No
hits. I then checked Hobson's "Vietnam Air Losses" where he has a list
of names of operations. No hit. Then I pulled Thompson's "To Hanoi and
Back". No hit. Got Freedom Train, but no Porch.
>
>>The order from the President to just scatter bombs at random away from
>>inhabited areas sure never made it down to the working level!
>
>Obviously the EXORD wasn't for "random bomb scattering", it was for round the
>clock maximum effort bombing against any legal target in NVN, including
>previously restricted targets in Hanoi. The military did what they were
>supposed to and went after what they determined to be critical targets. The
>fact the military took the CJCS order and turned it into as sound a military
>operation as they could, doesn't change the fact that Nixon didn't really care
>what damage was inflicted, his purpose was political, not military.
Throughout the war, targets in Route Pack VI weren't selected in
theater. They were JCS directed. Don't know where you got the idea
that "the military took the order and turned it into as sound a
military operation as they could." Since SAC wasn't chopped to 7th AF,
where below the JCS did this selection of critical targets get done?
>
>>There were a
>>lot of energy, lives and materiel expended in actually trying to hit
>>critical
>>targets.
>
>The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left and
>by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were
>SAMs, radars and dikes and dams and the legality of striking them is
>debateable.
On day #6, I orbited Bullseye for 25 minutes at six thousand feet over
a solid undercast. Not a single defensive reaction was observed.
>
>>My three daytime
>>Linebackers against targets that the bombers missed certainly weren't just to
>>scatter bombs.
>
>Militarily, you're right, but the ultimate objective was political not
>military.
Ahh, at last, grounds for agreement. All military operations have
political strategic objectives. They also have military tactical
objectives.
>
>What they were able to reconstitute from LB I made little difference in regards
>to the offensive in the south or in the lives of anyone up north.
>
>>You allude to references that say the materiel
>>was there in LBII but the NVN weren't able to get it where it was needed to
>>rearm and reload. That infrastructure was somewhat rebuilt after LBI and hit
>>again in LB II.
>
>It wasn't the infrastructure damage that kept them from resupplying their SAM
>batterys, it was you in an F-4 and the fact that resupplying Guideline missiles
>is a fairly slow and highly visable process.
It was accomplished from 1965 through the end of the war with
remarkably little visibility. SAM battalions relocated regularly and
were resupplied consistently. They seemed to be well supplied with
missiles throughout.
If, as Steve and I contend, the NVN ran out of missiles or was
constrained in their reaction by day 6 of LB II, it was because of the
destruction of roads, bridges, railroads, marshalling areas, etc. It
was because any time they emitted, we slapped them down again. It was
because the intensity of the air campaign was so great that the
deliveries couldn't be made safely through the no longer proscribed
port facilities.
>
>>I Personally don't
>>buy the argument that the NVN really didn't run out of missiles but if in
>>fact
>>we did destroy their missile assembly and tranportation infrastructure, then
>>you are arguing against yourself.
>
>The only damage to the NVN Air Defense system was on the SAM batterys and
>associated radars themselves. Michel wonders out loud in his book, why a
>concerted effort wasn't made from the beginning of LBII to find the SAM storage
>areas. Obviously someone *thought* they knew where they were, as several B-52
>sorties targeted "SAM storage areas", but none of those targets up till night
>#11 stored anything related to NVN Air Defense. On night # 11 when a 3-ship of
>B-52D models attacked the Trai Ca SAM storage area, we hit pay dirt. According
>to NVN reports "hundreds" of surface-to-air missiles, both Guideline and
>tactical varients were destroyed. Most people would say; "see, when Trai Ca got
>hit that's when the NVN decided to return to Paris". This would be incorrect,
>Le Duc Tho had already informed the State department on Day #9 that they were
>willing to return to Paris to sign the original agreement. Nixon continued the
>bombing for another 2 days and nights to insure Le Duc Tho kept his word.
Michel's account of the night 11 attack on Trai Ca is different than
you list here. He mentions the target and states that the A/C reported
eight SAMs fired, but doesn't indicate damage. As the mission was
going on, it had already been announced that operations would end at
dawn. If the crew provided Michel a detailed enough recounting that
there were 8 missiles fired at them, how could he have failed to
report the "hundreds" of missiles destroyed? Seems like a crucial and
significant fact.
And, what is the distinction between a "Guideline and tactical
varients (sic)"?
>
>>You have got to be kidding! Never having been in SAC I can't speak to the
>>bomber employment philosophy and that might explain why the bombers missed a
>>lot of targets.
>
>First, I would question that B-52s "missed *a lot* of their targets. Prior to
>night #3 they missed several due to the already mentioned wind problem, but
>besides that their accuracy was within advertised unguided CEP, with the
>exception being the guys who were fighting for their lives with Guideline
>missiles.
>>However, for the tactical forces that certainly wasn't the
>>case by a long shot.
>
>I'll have to disagree, the ultimate objective was political, not military and
>as such, any damage you did was secondary to the fact you just did damage.
Let's keep in mind that the tactical crews (and after the first three
nights with 9 BUFFs lost the SAC crews as well) had several hundred
associates on the ground in captivity. Locations of damage wasn't
random and precise targeting was essential if we weren't going to kill
the POWs as well.
ArtKramr
>From: buf...@aol.com (BUFDRVR)
>Date: 4/21/04 3:39 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: <20040421063902...@mb-m13.aol.com>
>>As you know, an airfield is a very difficult target to disable.
>Not with 108 bombs its not! Come on Ed, I split the runways at Batajanica
>with
>a B-52 two-ship with a grand total of 90 weapons. 2 more two-ships followed
Piece of cake with 56 Marauders dropping a total of 448 500 pounders on it.
Runways unuseable, hanger wrecked, machine shops and ordnance facilites in
flames, barracks gone, bomb dumps all exploded and fuel dumps throwing flames
up to our alltitude.Planes on the ground all burning. It was what we
bombardiers live for. But that was a different war at a different time.
Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
SteveM8597
putting a lot of energy into trying to convince me of something and I am not
sure of exactly what. You made earlier statements that I challenged that NVN
only had 100 old French trucks left over from WW II. You also stated that the
BUFFS were sent north for political reasons. You have contradicted yourself
several times on that 100 truck statement including below. Most of the rest of
what you wrote is telling me about how the BUFFS went after military targets,
not politcal targets, once they figured out how to operate in a tactical
environment. Your logic seems very circular to me and has totally lost me.
Dikes and dams are legit military targets but with political implications.
Hospitals are not, just to differentiate between what is legit and what is not.
We certainly did enough dam busting in WWII and Korea. They were not struck in
NVN because of those political implications..
I am trying not to be emotional here but it seems to me that under your logic,
every flight in VN was ultimately for political reasons starting long before
Rolling Thunder. Jphnson and Kennedy sent planes out with ordnance to impress
on the NVN and VC that they were serious. I just can't separate out the BUFFS
in my own mind as going north for different reasons other than the same ones
we are all going north for as you are implying.
Relative to the "experts" I guess people like Dan Rather, Tom Brokaw and Peter
Jennings are experts with the true facts because they have interviewed people
like Saddam Hussain. You;ve quoted many people who have synthesized first and
second hand information into "facts" that many participants don't agree with.
I am not sure that leaves much of a basis for discussion.
.
>Subject: Re: Friendly Fire Notebook
>From: buf...@aol.com (BUFDRVR)
>Date: 4/21/2004 6:20 PM Eastern Daylight Time
>Message-id: <20040421182034...@mb-m01.aol.com>
SteveM8597
>
>Sounds like a great show, I can't wait. Although I am concerned that Michel
>left over a disagreement. Out of him and Eschmann, I find Michel's book much
>better documented and supported. Eschmann's book contains both the myth about
>the BUFF-MiG shoot downs and the "hybrid" FAN SONG-LOW BLOW radar. Michel
>gets
>the word right from the horses mouth on both those issues.
>
Checkout the web page.
http://www.teleproductiongroup.com/12_72-main.html
Lots of extracts from the interviews. Ed's mug is there and I suppose mine
will there there eventually. Karl is there as well. Ray really bit on some of
my wildass tales, oops, I meant accounts.
The outcome will truly be interesting.
I have known Karl for a long time. .We were stationed at Tinker and Korat
together. I have always known him to be a man of high integrity. I don't know
Michael. I am not in a position to say who is right or wrong here but I know
the accounts of the MiG shootdowns and the hybrid radar were pretty convincing
to me when I heard them at Korat. Michael's book contains other information
that desn't pass the logic test to me so I guess we each have to judge for
ourselves. Karl's original manuscript reads like a medical examiners report and
everything else in the book seems quite precise and acurate almost to a fault.
MIchael apparently was a lot more into nitty gtitty details of LB II than Ray
wanted to go. This isn't meant to be a definitive history just an account from
the eyes and ears of the people who particpated including the maintainers,
rescuers, and POWs.
Steve.