"Keith Willshaw" <
keithw...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:r7pfs6$c4j$1...@dont-email.me...
> On 22/04/2020 07:26, Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
>
>> The weights, and Lancastrian data, are part of a what if question I was
>> asked, if the RAF had understood earlier the need for a long range
>> maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and cancelled the Stirling to free
>> capacity, what would a long range Lancaster look like, given things
>> like the RAAF extended the nose of the Lincoln to create its maritime
>> reconnaissance version. Things like what an extra 800 gallons of fuel
>> would cost/benefit.
>
> The RCAF operated the Lancaster MP/MR in the maritime recon mode post war.
> Its covered in the book
>
> Avro Lancaster 1945-1965: In British, Canadian and French Military Service
> from Casemate Publishers
>
> On the web this is a good source
>
http://jproc.ca/rrp/index.html
>
> The Lancaster 10 MR/MP is covered here
>
http://jproc.ca/rrp/rrp3/lanc.html
Thanks for the information.
> Not much help with no internet of course fortunately the ISP's in the UK
> are coping well but my regular contacts in Germany are really struggling,
> their infrastructure cant cope with the load.
ISPs here are noting the increase in traffic, plus the shift in
when the peaks occur, capacity has been boosted, so far
working bandwidth does not seem to be generally any worse
than normal.
Skip to the next > to avoid the modern experience.
Link back, only 17 point something days from failure, only 16 point
something days from initial contact with Hindrance Desk, (header
of all my email messages, no Internet, must call me on this phone
number, basically resulted in emails giving extracts from their help
page, all about customer equipment failures), problems finding a
live connection meant I could only check emails every week or so.
Long waits for phone support of course, zero out of three call back
promises kept (though the final one sent an email instead saying
it really is a network issue and to find this out they needed to start
work early, in order to talk to the network people), initial trouble
ticket unilaterally closed, it seems as I did not respond to their SMS
from a number you cannot reply to within a day or so, no email
from me seemed to trigger "problem solved". The SMS was as
usual the customer equipment is always wrong. Only 11 point
something days after bypassing the Hindrance Desk and only 1
point something days after the confirmation it was a network issue,
but in the cloud, outside of their network.
Resolving the problem would have been fun, given the various
physical network providers tend to an even more extreme version
of my equipment good, I do not need to check, it must be your
equipment.
It is clear the first level technical support are trained to assume it
is customer equipment that is the problem and are given several
fractions of a second to evaluate a help me email, and are not
necessarily told when in fact the ISP has a problem. You call in
business hours you wait for an hour or more given current staffing
levels, you call out of business hours they cannot access the network
support problem tracking system, so no matter how much the person
taking the call wants to help the system says no.
Yes, thanks for that. The RAF used some GR/ASR Lancasters
post war as did the French. As far as I can tell all were standard
Lancasters that carried fuel tanks in the bomb bay if extra range
was required, and largely removed the mid upper turret, for no
doubt weight and room benefits.
Interestingly it seems at least one post war RCAF Lancaster
reconnaissance version conversion had an extended nose.
The Lancastrian indicates you could fit maybe 750 gallons in
non self sealing tanks in the bomb bay plus 4,000 pounds of
bombs/depth charges. Also how little volume there was in the
Lancaster fuselage. One of the reasons the Sunderland was
so large was to give the crew creature comforts, like a galley,
a place to lay down etc. given the length of the missions. The
B-24 also had more internal volume than the Lancaster. Not
so the Catalina.
So removing the mid upper turret and extending the nose (at
around 57 pounds per foot) would appear to be necessary to
give the crew working room. (The RAAF added 6 and a half
feet to the Lincoln nose for the mark 31 GR version.) 800
gallons of saddle tanks leaves the bomb bay free, a new nose
with B-24/Halifax III front glazing gives a good forward and
part side view plus cuts out the front turret weight. Say 4
machine guns in the nose as flak suppressants and so on.
Would need a 65,000 pound take off weight to carry the fuel,
extra crew, radar etc. Nominal range 3,400 to 3,500 miles
with 4,000 pounds of depth charges, maybe 3,600 miles given
the reduction in drag thanks to a more contoured nose and no
mid upper turret. But reduce these ranges when operating at
low level. And remember B-24 operating out of Iceland had to
regularly divert to Newfoundland or Scotland thanks to the
weather when calculating the required fuel reserves.
And so on. At least all the data is there, the design brief was
standard Lancaster airframe except for the nose, so minimal
changes to enable ease of production.
Then comes how early things happen and what changes are
made, Britain built 542 heavy bombers to the end of 1941,
say 10 squadrons of 18 given losses, training needs and
reserves, given lower losses as fewer go to Bomber Command
for a while. As of 1 December 1941 Coastal Command had
41 Catalina, 9 Liberator and 25 Sunderlands as its longer
range force. The training and supply advantages of replacing
these three types with a single home built design are obvious.
On 1 December 1943 Coastal Command had 36 Catalina,
32 B-17, 31 Halifax, 102 Liberator and 82 Sunderlands, by
that stage there were plenty of USAAF B-24 in Britain with
a steady flow of spares but Coastal Command was the only
RAF user of the B-17 and (at home) the Catalina. Some
2,378 production Lancasters had been built, Bomber
Command held 601 of them in operational squadrons, 465
were serviceable, there were 573 crews available, giving 451
aircraft with crew. Stirling figures were 166, 126, 120 and 106.
In any case as much as it is interesting to see what sort of
paper possibilities there are the reality is the allies needed
few long range ASW aircraft from about mid 1941 through
the first half of 1942 given U-boat operations and other
allied ASW measures.
Much better to move 4 Group Whitleys to Coastal Command
before the war started, and add the extra fuel tanks of the
historical mark VII. Just like higher performance day fighters
would make the Battle of Britain easier for the RAF but what
Britain really needed was a sizeable working night fighter force
in mid/late 1940, given most of the damage to Britain was
inflicted by the night raids. And that means a control system,
aircraft plus ground and airborne radars. Meantime teach the
day fighter pilots deflection shooting and the pairs tactics,
plus do the simple upgrades to pilot protection etc.
There are usually plenty of outside constraints that as much
as hindsight can give the people better equipment earlier,
they are often unable to fully use it. Say you get plenty of
allied jets in time for Overlord. They do not have the range
to fight over Germany, would probably make terrible fighter
bombers at the time and the allied supply situation in France
would not allow large numbers of jets meant to escort raids
into Germany to be based there until around January 1945,
once Antwerp is working post Ardennes offensive and the
various rail links have been improved.
There is the capability and the idea. As far as I can tell there
was no obstacle to the second generation of aircraft carriers,
the ones built from the mid/late 1930's onwards, to have mirror
landing systems (there were Fresnel lens lighthouses), angled
flight decks, and deck edge lifts (so can be much bigger, have
more of them and do not sacrifice hangar space or limit flight
deck operations).
All enabling much more efficient aircraft handling, if the ideas
had been thought of. The final piece to the 1950's aircraft
carriers, the steam catapult, required plenty of engineering
work plus a real need, much heavier aircraft with poor initial
acceleration. While the biplanes around in the mid 1930's
had such slow landing speeds misjudgements on landing
tended to be less hazardous compared with the higher speeds
that came with the monoplanes, so the need for more accurate
landing aids was less, the biplanes were also smaller and
lighter, easier to get on and off the flight deck and be pushed
around it. And until people actually used aircraft with higher
landing speeds etc. they could only make assumptions on
what sort of aids were required.
Lockdown with no internet tends to lead to the above
considerations being worked through.
Geoffrey Sinclair