Attack on the Paul Doumer and Thanh Hoa Bridge
Yeff
When the USAF dropped the Paul Doumer bridge
during the Viet Nam conflict it was a stunning
debut for LGBs into modern combat. That has
never been disputed.
What is in question is how many aircraft were
lost attacking this, and the Thanh Hoa bridge,
prior to laser-guided munitions arriving in SEA?
I've seen the figure of "hundreds of Air Force,
Navy and Marine Corps aircraft lost" to 11
aircraft lost over 871 sorties.
Does anyone have an authoritative source for the
losses incurred, including the number of sorties
flown against these two bridges?
Thanks.
-Jeff B.
yeff at erols dot com
Ed Rasimus
>
>When the USAF dropped the Paul Doumer bridge
>during the Viet Nam conflict it was a stunning
>debut for LGBs into modern combat. That has
>never been disputed.
You're talking here about the "One Day in A Long War" attack on May of
'72, I presume. You might want to check out the famous Keith Ferris
painting, "Doumer Bridge" showing it being cut with dumb iron by
F-105's in early '67 during Rolling Thunder. The Doumer was cut
several times during the war.
I'm not sure, but I'll bet Guy Alcala knows, whether the Doumer was
the first application of LGB's. I would assume that the first "zot"
sorties were flown for coordination of tactics in a lower threat
environment.
>
>What is in question is how many aircraft were
>lost attacking this, and the Thanh Hoa bridge,
>prior to laser-guided munitions arriving in SEA?
>
>I've seen the figure of "hundreds of Air Force,
>Navy and Marine Corps aircraft lost" to 11
>aircraft lost over 871 sorties.
I'd doubt that the numbers would add up to "hundreds" on these two
targets alone. We regularly check out the numbers of NVN losses here
and I'm pretty comfortable with the total of around 1000 for USAF and
USN combined. (625 USAF and 481 USN/USMC).
I do know that I was fortunate enough never to have been fragged on
either of those targets. I went to the bridges at Bac Giang and Bac
Ninh often enough to make up for that shortcoming, however.
>Does anyone have an authoritative source for the
>losses incurred, including the number of sorties
>flown against these two bridges?
You might try seeking a database at Air University Library to see if
they could sort numbers for that sort of thing.
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***Computer Edge Magazine
***http://www.computeredge.com
BUFDRVR
>losses incurred, including the number of sorties
>flown against these two bridges?
>
"History Of The US Air Force"; David A. Anderton, The Military Press; New York
ISBN: 0-517-66575-1
page 186." Paul Doumers big bridge had been attacked by 177 bombers that had
dropped 380 tons of bombs. By the time of the last strike of the 1967 air
campaign, the defenses were known to include more than 300 anti-aircraft
batteries of varying calibers, 84 missile sites with four to six launchers
each, and 24 MiG-17 and MiG-21 interceptors. Countless rounds of anti-aircraft
artillery had been fired at the attackers, and 109 missiles were launched,
according to strike force reports. Two planes were lost to flak-neither during
the first strike in August and 15 were damaged.
But the bridge was to endure, almost until the end of hostilities, and it
was to absorb more punishment future strikes"
page 206: "The durable Paul Doumer Bridge was targeted again. The first mission
against the structure since 1967 was flown on May 10, 1972, by a force made up
of 16 F-4's from the 8th TFW, loaded with 2,000 lb general purpose bombs.
Twelve of the planes had laser-guided bombs and the other four had
electro-optically guided weapons. Eight more F-4's from the 8th TFW were loaded
with chaff and were to lay down a corridor for the strike force to follow. The
388th TFW sent 15 F-105G Wild Weasel aircraft and four EB-66's for jamming and
other electronic warfare. More Phantom's flew MiGCAP.
At 8:00 AM the chaff layers roared off the runway, followed 20 minutes later
by the strike force. They flew into defending MiG's, heavy flak and missile
fire at the bridge. Pilots reported an estimated 160 missiles fired from the
SAM sites along the route, and 41 intercepting MiG's. In spite of that fierce
defense, the bombers released from 14,000 feet, dropping 22 LGB's and seven
EOGB's. The results were first class; they got 12 direct hits on the bridge and
4 probables; 13 other bomb strikes were unobserved due to the heavy defenses
and smoke in the target area. But the bridge was out of action, with one span
completely destroyed and several badly damaged. No USAF planes were lost.
In a follow up raid the next day, four Phantoms were dispatched with a
covering force to hit the bridge again. One was carrying two M-118 3,000 lb
bombs with laser guidance. The chaff corridor was laid too early and the
support aircraft left the scene early, but the strike force continued. The
defenders fired missiles, but no MiG's came up to intercept. The F-4's rolled
in, dropped, and left. They had launched two M-118 bombs and six standard Mk-84
2,000-lb iron bombs. They had dropped three spans of the bridge into the Red
River.
And that finally, was the end of Paul Doumer's durable bridge."
So by my count, 197 strike sorties (which doesn't include all the support
sorties) and 2 aircraft lost, both in 1967. The Paul Doumer bridge also wasn't
the first use of LGB's, just the most fameous. I believe the Paul Doumer Bridge
is such a fameous target because of what you just read. In 1967 177 aircraft
struck the target over a 3 month period and never closed it for more then 7-8
days. In 1972, 20 aircraft armed with precision munitions shut it down for
good.
BUFDRVR
"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"
Jack
NVN, but Laos. And for Ed Rasimus, is your number of losses... 1106, for
USAF/USN/USMC accurate? Have been looking for that number. The NVN Army
Museum in Hanoi claims 4000+ American fighters/bombers destroyed by 1972, by
the way??? Cheers & chek6... wgfp (Ret.)
"Yeff" <ye...@spamcop.net> wrote in message
news:9d4fie$irl$1...@bob.news.rcn.net...
Fred Stern
"Paul Saccani" <sac...@omen.net.au> wrote
> (BUFDRVR) wrote:
>
> >So by my count, 197 strike sorties (which doesn't include all the support
> >sorties) and 2 aircraft lost, both in 1967. The Paul Doumer bridge also wasn't
> >the first use of LGB's, just the most fameous. I believe the Paul Doumer Bridge
> >is such a fameous target because of what you just read. In 1967 177 aircraft
> >struck the target over a 3 month period and never closed it for more then 7-8
> >days. In 1972, 20 aircraft armed with precision munitions shut it down for
> >good.
>
> An inordinate expenditure for a target that could have been destroyed
> by one of the rather excellent US battleships that were in theatre for
> fire support.
Guy Alcala
> Yeff <ye...@spamcop.net> wrote:
>
> >
> >When the USAF dropped the Paul Doumer bridge
> >during the Viet Nam conflict it was a stunning
> >debut for LGBs into modern combat. That has
> >never been disputed.
>
> You're talking here about the "One Day in A Long War" attack on May of
> '72, I presume. You might want to check out the famous Keith Ferris
> painting, "Doumer Bridge" showing it being cut with dumb iron by
> F-105's in early '67 during Rolling Thunder. The Doumer was cut
> several times during the war.
>
> I'm not sure, but I'll bet Guy Alcala knows, whether the Doumer was
> the first application of LGB's. I would assume that the first "zot"
> sorties were flown for coordination of tactics in a lower threat
> environment.
Without checking in detail, it was possibly the first attack using
LGBs/EOGBs in RP VI, but most definitely not the first use of LGBs, which
had been in use since 1968 at least, with designation being done by
AC-130s, OV-10s, and Zot-equipped F-4Ds. Owing to a shortage of Pave
Knife pods Zot missions continued to be flown in lower-threat areas of RP
VI in 1972.
The Dragon's Jaw (RP IV) had been attacked by (apparently eight) 8th TFW
F-4s carrying LGBs and EOGBs, on 27 April 1972, as part of Operation
Freedom Dawn. Owing to smoke and clouds, only EOGBs (5) were dropped,
damaging the bridge but not dropping it.
> >What is in question is how many aircraft were
> >lost attacking this, and the Thanh Hoa bridge,
> >prior to laser-guided munitions arriving in SEA?
> >
> >I've seen the figure of "hundreds of Air Force,
> >Navy and Marine Corps aircraft lost" to 11
> >aircraft lost over 871 sorties.
>
> I'd doubt that the numbers would add up to "hundreds" on these two
> targets alone. We regularly check out the numbers of NVN losses here
> and I'm pretty comfortable with the total of around 1000 for USAF and
> USN combined. (625 USAF and 481 USN/USMC).
The 11 out of 871 looks much more reasonable. I've also seen numbers
quoted (although I can't seem to lay my hands on a source that does right
now), and that would be in the ballpark.
Guy
Guy Alcala
> >Does anyone have an authoritative source for the
> >losses incurred, including the number of sorties
> >flown against these two bridges?
> >
<snip>
> So by my count, 197 strike sorties (which doesn't include all the support
> sorties) and 2 aircraft lost, both in 1967. The Paul Doumer bridge also wasn't
> the first use of LGB's, just the most fameous. I believe the Paul Doumer Bridge
> is such a fameous target because of what you just read. In 1967 177 aircraft
> struck the target over a 3 month period and never closed it for more then 7-8
> days.
More like a month or two. First strike 11 August 1967. Recon on 10 August showed
estimated repair completion in three weeks. Road/Rail traffic restored by 3
October. Restruck (delayed by weather) on 25 October, with more spans dropped.
Operational again 20 November. Restruck 14 and 18 December, doing major damage.
Recon 2 Janaury 1968 showed 4 of 19 spans still down, three damaged beyond use, 12
restored, two permanent and one temporary pier destroyed. Time to repair estimated
at 2.5 to 3 months. Bad weather between then and 31 March bombing halt precluded
reattacks. Rail traffic stopped until 14 April 1968, when pontoon rail bridge
opened 4.5nm SE of Paul Doumer (rail traffic ferried across in the meantime).
> In 1972, 20 aircraft armed with precision munitions shut it down for
> good.
By 1972, neither the Doumer nor the Dragon's Jaw was all that significant, except
in U.S. minds. Both had numerous bypasses built around them. Their destruction
was an inconvenience to the DRVN, but not critical. It was more the cumulative
reduced throughput of our dropping bridges the length of the rail lines from the
Chinese border south, plus the mining, that made it impossible for the DRVN troops
to sustain their assault in SVN. As was true in WW2, Korea, DS and Allied Force,
interdiction was effective only in preventing the continuation of a large-scale
offensive, not in depriving troops of the necessary supplies to sit immobile on the
defensive (or conduct small-scale/guerilla warfare).
Guy
Paul J. Adam
<sac...@omen.net.au> writes
>On 06 May 2001 23:54:58 GMT, buf...@aol.com (BUFDRVR) wrote:
>I believe the Paul Doumer Bridge
>>is such a fameous target because of what you just read. In 1967 177 aircraft
>>struck the target over a 3 month period and never closed it for more then 7-8
>>days. In 1972, 20 aircraft armed with precision munitions shut it down for
>>good.
>
>by one of the rather excellent US battleships that were in theatre for
>fire support.
How often did battleships ever manage to destroy bridges?
You may find that they're rather less effective in the bombardment role
than their (extremely vocal) advocates claim, when you actually look at
the data.
Note that only the NEW JERSEY deployed off Vietnam, for a single tour in
1969.
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill
Paul J. Adam ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Ed Rasimus
>An inordinate expenditure for a target that could have been destroyed
>by one of the rather excellent US battleships that were in theatre for
>fire support.
There would be a couple of options to accomplish that feat--Move the
Doumer bridge to the shore or put wheels on the New Jersey.
Ed Rasimus
>I believe the first Paveway was dropped in 1968, possibly early '69? Not in
>NVN, but Laos. And for Ed Rasimus, is your number of losses... 1106, for
>USAF/USN/USMC accurate? Have been looking for that number. The NVN Army
>Museum in Hanoi claims 4000+ American fighters/bombers destroyed by 1972, by
>the way??? Cheers & chek6... wgfp (Ret.)
>
The numbers I've been using here are from the Red River Valley Fighter
Pilot Ass'n book that was distributed at the 30th reunion in 1997
(50th Anniversary of the USAF.) It offers a breakout by type for both
services. Also includes a list of every aviator lost with their
shoot-down date, every MiG kill with date and crew credited and every
returnee from Operation Homecoming.
Somehow I've always given more credibility to these people that I've
flown and fought with than to the NVN Army. It's just one of those
Yankee Air Pirate running dog of capitalism things.
w2ndgfp (I guess).
Ralph Savelsberg
> On 06 May 2001 23:54:58 GMT, buf...@aol.com (BUFDRVR) wrote:
>
> >So by my count, 197 strike sorties (which doesn't include all the support
> >sorties) and 2 aircraft lost, both in 1967. The Paul Doumer bridge also wasn't
> >the first use of LGB's, just the most fameous. I believe the Paul Doumer Bridge
> >is such a fameous target because of what you just read. In 1967 177 aircraft
> >struck the target over a 3 month period and never closed it for more then 7-8
> >days. In 1972, 20 aircraft armed with precision munitions shut it down for
> >good.
>
> An inordinate expenditure for a target that could have been destroyed
> by one of the rather excellent US battleships that were in theatre for
> fire support.
>
> --
> Cheers
> Paul Saccani
> Perth, Western Australia.
Even if it were in range of a battleship, I doubt it would have been able to hit it
with pin-point precision, but anyway, the whole thing was an exercise in futility.
By the time the bridge was eventually dropped with first generation Paveways, the
north Vietnamese already had plenty of other river crossings. A damned waste of
lives on both sides.
By the way, the navy was first to try guided weapons against the bridge. The type
of weapon used was the AGM-12 Bullpup which was a command guidance weapon primarily
used by USN A-4s. Unfortunatley, the weapons weren't heavy enough to do serious
damage to a bridge like the Paul Doumer.
Regards,
Ralph Savelsberg
Drewe Manton
Did you ever use the 3,000lb demolition bomb personally? I'm planning
a model of a Rolling Thunder Thud shortly and want to know if I should look
out for anything? Did you use it with the big centreline tank? What about
outboard pylons? Did you carry them, and if so, did you carry anything on
them ?(unlikely with those big bombs but you never know with the Thud!)
TIA for any help. . .
--
regards
Drewe
"Better the pride that resides
In a citizen of the world
Than the pride that divides
When a colourful rag is unfurled"
Drewe's Modelling Page:- www.manton300.freeserve.co.uk/index.html
Ed Rasimus
>Hey Ed,
> Did you ever use the 3,000lb demolition bomb personally? I'm planning
>a model of a Rolling Thunder Thud shortly and want to know if I should look
>out for anything? Did you use it with the big centreline tank? What about
>outboard pylons? Did you carry them, and if so, did you carry anything on
>them ?(unlikely with those big bombs but you never know with the Thud!)
> TIA for any help. . .
My first combat mission in the 105 was with two M-118s. The 3000
pounder was almost all I saw for the first month in combat--remember,
those were the days when there was no bomb shortage, so we carried all
sorts of unusual stuff that had been buried in the back of munitions
storage areas for years, including BLU-27B finned napalm, LAU-3 rocket
pods, MLU-10/B land mines and AGM-12C big Bullpups.
The M-118 was carried on the inboard pylons and accompanied by the 650
gallon C/L tank. On one sortie I carried LAU-3s on the outboards with
the 3000 pounders--an unusual configuration that was actually above
max gross takeoff weight at engine start, and only after deducting the
fuel for start, taxi and runup did you reduce to allowable weight.
If not carrying a store, the outboard pylons were not usually
installed during the time I was flying the aircraft. Later, when the
QRC-160 pod arrived, the pylons were usually left on. Other
configurations that used the outboard pylons were 5x1000 Mk-83s (3 on
the C/L MER and one on each outboard. Also 8x750 M-117 or 8x500
Mk-82s. Rarely a Sidewinder was carried on an outboard (AIM-9B).
Drewe Manton
--
regards
Drewe
"Better the pride that resides
In a citizen of the world
Than the pride that divides
When a colourful rag is unfurled"
Drewe's Modelling Page:- www.manton300.freeserve.co.uk/index.html
in article 3af6c2fc...@news.earthlink.net, Ed Rasimus at
thund...@earthlink.net wrote on 7/5/01 4:44 pm:
Ralph Savelsberg
> On Mon, 07 May 2001 15:37:04 +0200, Ralph Savelsberg
> <r.save...@tue.nl> wrote:
>
> >> An inordinate expenditure for a target that could have been destroyed
> >> by one of the rather excellent US battleships that were in theatre for
> >> fire support.
> >
> >Even if it were in range of a battleship, I doubt it would have been able to hit it
> >with pin-point precision, but anyway, the whole thing was an exercise in futility.
>
> It wasn't, I was thinking of another target. CEP of 250 yards
> typically at 41 miles. CEP of 40 yards at 25 miles from New Jersey.
> Throw more cheap shells instead of expensive aircraft at the target.
>
> >By the time the bridge was eventually dropped with first generation Paveways, the
> >north Vietnamese already had plenty of other river crossings. A damned waste of
> >lives on both sides.
> >By the way, the navy was first to try guided weapons against the bridge. The type
> >of weapon used was the AGM-12 Bullpup which was a command guidance weapon primarily
> >used by USN A-4s. Unfortunatley, the weapons weren't heavy enough to do serious
> >damage to a bridge like the Paul Doumer.
>
> I recall that. Sorry about my faulty recollection of which bridge
> could be reached.
> --
Hey, that happens to all of us on occassion.
>
> Cheers
> Paul Saccani
> Perth, Western Australia.
Regards,
Ralph Savelsberg
Ed Rasimus
>On Mon, 7 May 2001 13:15:42 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
><ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>You may find that they're rather less effective in the bombardment role
>>than their (extremely vocal) advocates claim, when you actually look at
>>the data.
>
>How's that? The CEP and range data indicate that it could have done
>the job. Certainly, the projectile would have been satisfactory.
>Even if they needed 150 rounds to do the job, this would seem better
>than putting many very valuable aircrew and aircraft into an area with
>good air defences. Just a matter of striking the enemy where he is
>weakest, his naval power to act against such a battleship.
Start with the basics. The range of the 16 inch guns was roughly 20
miles. That's a long way to toss a 2000 pound warhead admittedly. Now,
recognize that the BB must stay in relatively deep water to maintain
some level of defensive maneuverability. Let's say three miles off
shore. Now, start drawing a line down the coast of NVN 17 miles
inland.
When you've finished, look for targets. Find Kep, Phuc Yen, Thai
Nugyen, Doumer, Bac Giang, Phu Thu, Viet Tri, etc. etc.
"Striking the enemy where he is weakest..." is a good strategy, but it
only works if the high value targets can be reached simultaneously.
Paul J. Adam
<sac...@omen.net.au> writes
>It wasn't, I was thinking of another target. CEP of 250 yards
>typically at 41 miles.
??? The 16"/50 gun had a maximum range of about 41,000 yards.
> CEP of 40 yards at 25 miles from New Jersey.
Whiskey Tango Foxtrot, interrogative, over?
CEP at 34,000 yards, in test-range conditions, was ~150m.
Paul J. Adam
<sac...@omen.net.au> writes
>>than their (extremely vocal) advocates claim, when you actually look at
>>the data.
>
>the job.
Elsewhere you give extraordinarily optimistic data. The reality is
rather less impressive. Using 16" ammunition, CEP at ~17 miles was
around 150 metres when everything went right.
Or, to quote FM 6-30, "Characteristics. The 16-inch gun produces a
significantly larger dispersion pattern than does the 5-inch. The
pattern is about 150 meters (or greater) wide and 500 meters (or
greater) long. The pattern depends on the terrain, target range, and
number of guns in effect. The observer should expect 2 to 5 minutes
between transmitting a correction and shot of the next salvo."
>Certainly, the projectile would have been satisfactory.
Again, why so? It's a very inefficient projectile for most purposes, and
while battleship advocates like to enthuse about the mass of the shell,
very little of it is actually useful payload.
The 16" HC shell weighs 1,900lb but carries only 150lb of Explosive D
(compare this with the 945lb of much more potent Tritonal - equivalent
to nearly 1,500lb of Explosive D - in a Mark 84 bomb weighing about the
same). The 16" AP shell weighs 2,700lb... but delivers only 40lb of
explosive. Even a Mark 82 500lb bomb is more destructive.
>Even if they needed 150 rounds to do the job,
I have an awful suspicion that a battleship could shoot her magazines
dry without dropping the bridge: not accurate enough to hit, not
destructive enough to do damage if they did.
>this would seem better
>than putting many very valuable aircrew and aircraft into an area with
>good air defences. Just a matter of striking the enemy where he is
>weakest, his naval power to act against such a battleship.
You might do better using naval gunfire to fire ICM or airburst HE
against the air defences instead.
David Lesher
>How often did battleships ever manage to destroy bridges?
Almost every time they ran into one......
--
A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
Guy Alcala
> In article <1t8fft423er54v6dg...@4ax.com>, Paul Saccani
> <sac...@omen.net.au> writes
<snip>
> >Even if they needed 150 rounds to do the job,
>
> I have an awful suspicion that a battleship could shoot her magazines
> dry without dropping the bridge: not accurate enough to hit, not
> destructive enough to do damage if they did.
The Doumer (assuming you could move it bodily towards the coast) was 5,532
ft. long by 38 feet wide. The Dragon's Jaw at Thanh Hoa was 540 ft. long by
56 feet wide, but that width included the 22-foot wide roadways cantilevered
on either side of the12-foot wide center railroad section. The concrete pier
at mid span was 16 feet in diameter and 50 feet high, and the concrete
abutments at each end were also massively overbuilt. Not an easy target to
hit, especially since you'd need a spotter a/c overhead (Oh, what fun!
Volunteers?).
> >this would seem better
> >than putting many very valuable aircrew and aircraft into an area with
> >good air defences. Just a matter of striking the enemy where he is
> >weakest, his naval power to act against such a battleship.
>
> You might do better using naval gunfire to fire ICM or airburst HE
> against the air defences instead.
And then there's the mine, PT, and ASSM threat to worry about. Not that we
didn't shell the shoreline of the DRVN on occasion, but we took our lumps too
(like the Higbee).
Guy
Paul J. Adam
<sac...@omen.net.au> writes
>On Tue, 08 May 2001 14:00:36 GMT, thund...@earthlink.net (Ed
>Rasimus) wrote:
>>Start with the basics. The range of the 16 inch guns was roughly 20
>>miles.
>
23 miles.
> The secondary armament actually had a longer range
>with the RAP.
Nope. The Mark 57 rocket-assisted shell, fired from the 5"/38 guns,
reached 23,700 yards (half the range of the 16" guns). It also suffered
from dispersion problems, and the rocket motor reduced the shell's
explosive payload to 3.5lb (compared to 7.9lb for a standard 5" shell)
Paul J. Adam
<sac...@omen.net.au> writes
>On Tue, 8 May 2001 18:17:36 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
><ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>??? The 16"/50 gun had a maximum range of about 41,000 yards.
>
>support in SVN with a range of 41 miles.
I've not found any source for that. A RAP 5" shell was used with a
24,000-yard range, but the 8"/55 on the DES MOINES class was only
credited with 30,500 yards. (Hellacious rate of fire, though: nine guns
firing ten rounds a minute each...)
>Anyway, the crux of my position is just that naval gunnery could have
>been used much more in NVN than it was.
You might be surprised how many shells were fired by the USN. They had a
lot of ships on various gun lines.
Paul J. Adam
<sac...@omen.net.au> writes
>On Tue, 8 May 2001 18:30:35 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
><ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> "Characteristics. The 16-inch gun produces a
>>significantly larger dispersion pattern than does the 5-inch. The
>>pattern is about 150 meters (or greater) wide and 500 meters (or
>>greater) long. The pattern depends on the terrain, target range, and
>>number of guns in effect. The observer should expect 2 to 5 minutes
>>between transmitting a correction and shot of the next salvo."
>
>each shot is far less than the risks valuable aircrew and aircraft
>must take to attack the target. You can afford to fire many more
>shells into the target.
Which is why the USN had a lot of ships (destroyers and cruisers, as
well as the NEW JERSEY) on the gun line during Vietnam. Destroyers would
fire their magazines empty (typically 600 rounds per gun, often three 5"
guns per ship) in the course of a day, reload and come back to repeat.
>>The 16" HC shell weighs 1,900lb but carries only 150lb of Explosive D
>>(compare this with the 945lb of much more potent Tritonal - equivalent
>>to nearly 1,500lb of Explosive D - in a Mark 84 bomb weighing about the
>>same). The 16" AP shell weighs 2,700lb... but delivers only 40lb of
>>explosive. Even a Mark 82 500lb bomb is more destructive.
>
>The kinetic energy does something too.
Not really, no. The kinetic energy of the shell is only equivalent to
about twenty pounds of explosive; and the bomb arrives just as fast and
weighs just as much, but brings a lot more payload to the party.
>The thing is, it doesn't cost anywhere
>near as much to deliver to the shell, so you can deliver more of them
>at less risk.
Not really... in a later war (Desert Storm), it took three weeks and two
ships badly damaged, to clear a path through Iraqi mines to get the
battleships into range of the shore. Once there, they found themselves
under air and missile attack (the air attacks were stopped by CAP, the
missile was shot down by HMS Gloucester).
Interestingly, when USS WISCONSIN was attacked by a Silkworm missile,
she retreated and had airpower work over the launch site instead of
shelling it into oblivion with her mighty guns.
Curious, no?
Guy Alcala
> In article <9nihftgdc05hk1oa6...@4ax.com>, Paul Saccani
> <sac...@omen.net.au> writes
<snip>
> >The thing is, it doesn't cost anywhere
> >near as much to deliver to the shell, so you can deliver more of them
> >at less risk.
>
> Not really... in a later war (Desert Storm), it took three weeks and two
> ships badly damaged, to clear a path through Iraqi mines to get the
> battleships into range of the shore. Once there, they found themselves
> under air and missile attack (the air attacks were stopped by CAP, the
> missile was shot down by HMS Gloucester).
>
> Interestingly, when USS WISCONSIN was attacked by a Silkworm missile,
> she retreated and had airpower work over the launch site instead of
> shelling it into oblivion with her mighty guns.
>
> Curious, no?
And SHE had UAVs for spotting, and GPS for her own position. Paul Saccani
might wish to get his hands on a copy of a couple of books published by the
Naval Institute Press. One's a reprint of the official USN Korean War
history, titled "The Sea War in Korea," by Cagle and Manson. The other book
is a collection of essays first published in the Naval Review, titled
"Vietnam: The Naval War," ed. by Frank Uhlig. IIRR, both discuss NGS (the
Korean book definitely does), and the Korean War book also goes into detail
on how much time and energy had to be spent on mine-sweeping, both for
amphibious ops and to provide fire lanes for gunfire support ships close
enough to shore.
Guy
Summerfield1920
>> Paul Saccani
>>might wish to get his hands on a copy of a couple of books published by the
>>Naval Institute Press.
>
>Indeed he might. Thank you for that.
The US Strategic Bombing Survey also examines the results of naval bombardment
of Japan in great detail. Apparently the accuracy waspretty bad. Example:
802 shells fired from 10.5 miles distance at Kamaishi Iron Works, target size
182 acres. Spotter aircraft were used to correct aim. Average error in the
mean point of impact was still over 3,000 feet.
The factory eventually had to be taken out by aerial bombing.
Jussi Saari
>
> On Wed, 9 May 2001 21:02:50 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
> <ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> >Not really... in a later war (Desert Storm), it took three weeks and two
> >ships badly damaged, to clear a path through Iraqi mines to get the
> >battleships into range of the shore. Once there, they found themselves
> >under air and missile attack (the air attacks were stopped by CAP, the
> >missile was shot down by HMS Gloucester).
>
Well, they hit and damage the destroyer Higbee with a 250kg bomb from a
MiG-17, and probably could/would have imported more effective coastal
defence weapons (Silkworms, Styxes, mines) had the naval bombardment
become too much of a problem.
Paul Holloway
wrote:
>On Mon, 07 May 2001 15:37:04 +0200, Ralph Savelsberg
><r.save...@tue.nl> wrote:
>
>>> An inordinate expenditure for a target that could have been destroyed
>>> by one of the rather excellent US battleships that were in theatre for
>>> fire support.
>>
>>Even if it were in range of a battleship, I doubt it would have been able to hit it
>>with pin-point precision, but anyway, the whole thing was an exercise in futility.
>
>It wasn't, I was thinking of another target. CEP of 250 yards
>typically at 41 miles. CEP of 40 yards at 25 miles from New Jersey.
>Throw more cheap shells instead of expensive aircraft at the target.
>
Not a snowballs chance in hell you get a CEP of 40 yards from NJ at
20+ miles (she's not going to reach 25).
I don't know where you get the 41 mile figure..........the 16/50 was
good for about 23.5 miles max.
"May you always have fair winds and following seas..."
Paul Holloway
Paul Holloway
wrote:
>On Mon, 07 May 2001 13:18:30 GMT, thund...@earthlink.net (Ed
>Rasimus) wrote:
>
>>Paul Saccani <sac...@omen.net.au> wrote:
>>
>>>An inordinate expenditure for a target that could have been destroyed
>>>by one of the rather excellent US battleships that were in theatre for
>>>fire support.
>>
>>There would be a couple of options to accomplish that feat--Move the
>>Doumer bridge to the shore or put wheels on the New Jersey.
>
>He he...
>
>Eloquently put, Ed.
>
>I think I was confused with the Thanh Ho bridge. My apologies.
>
>But the 35 mile range of the New Jersey primary armament and the 41
>mile range of other battleships (I use the term loosely) used for fire
>support in the theatre could surely have been used for many of the
>targets in NVN, instead of risking airmen and aircraft, where a safe
>and effective alternative existed.
>
>
>
>
>--
>Cheers
>Paul Saccani
>Perth, Western Australia.
I have no idea where you get your range data from , but your
resource(s) need to be trashed.
New Jersey could reach out to 23 miles max under optimal conditions.
There were no other *battleships* in theatre during the Vietnam war.
Several heavy/light cruisers with 8" and 6" guns, respective ranges of
which I don't recall offhand, but somewhere between the range of 15-18
miles.
Naval gunfire support quality has always been overexaggerated, and the
best NGS was provided by light cruisers and destroyers, able to put
more rounds on target more accurately than the big boys, yet having a
much shorter range.
Paul J. Adam
<sac...@omen.net.au> writes
>On Wed, 9 May 2001 21:02:50 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
><ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>Not really... in a later war (Desert Storm), it took three weeks and two
>>ships badly damaged, to clear a path through Iraqi mines to get the
>>battleships into range of the shore. Once there, they found themselves
>>under air and missile attack (the air attacks were stopped by CAP, the
>>missile was shot down by HMS Gloucester).
>
Even there, a USN destroyer had her aft gun mount blown up by a raiding
MiG-17 in 1972.
Assuming that the enemy will not use simple, inexpensive countermeasures
is not a good idea: Iraq laid only 1,000 or so mines, most of them
cheap, crude contact-fuzed weapons. The total cost of the weapons was
maybe five million dollars and they were laid from trawlers and small
boats - hardly expensive or scarce platforms.
That was sufficient to completely inhibit any amphibious operations (the
threat was still successful), to delay NGFS operations for three weeks,
and to take two USN warships out of the fight.
>>Interestingly, when USS WISCONSIN was attacked by a Silkworm missile,
>>she retreated and had airpower work over the launch site instead of
>>shelling it into oblivion with her mighty guns.
>>
>>Curious, no?
>
>Logical. An anti shipping missiles is going to be designed for that
>job.
Not particularly, and using air power means exposing aircraft to
whatever air defences protect the SSMs.
"The Silkworm activity then was reported to an E-2C, which assumed
responsibility for coordinating an attack on the missile site. Using
several intelligence assets, including an EP-3, the site was located and
strike aircraft were directed to the target. An A-6E, evading heavy SAM
and antiaircraft artillery activity near its target, dropped 12 Rockeye
cluster bombs."
From "Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War".
Why expose that aircraft to loss when the battleship could supposedly
pound the Silkworm site to pieces with impunity? If twelve Rockeyes were
sufficient, surely a few salvoes of one-ton shells would be more than
adequate?
>Just as it would be logical to hit a SAM site with shells
>instead of aircraft.
Again, it seems the WISCONSIN didn't even pause to suppress any air
defences that might have protected the Silkworm site.
Paul Holloway
wrote:
>On Thu, 10 May 2001 20:17:42 GMT, pau...@exis.net (Paul Holloway)
>wrote:
>
>>I don't know where you get the 41 mile figure..........the 16/50 was
>>good for about 23.5 miles max.
>
>41 mile figure is for 8" bombardment in SVN, and was the range
>achieved there. I'll dig up the exact details for you. This
>projectile was not particularly accurate at that range.
>
>--
>Cheers
>Paul Saccani
>Perth, Western Australia.
I'd really like to see the source for your info, as I don't know of
any ER munitions used by any of the CAs during Vietnam.
Walter Bjorneby
that was the arc radius we had to stay out of when they were
hot.
Walt BJ
Peter Stickney
According to the Army's specs, the 175 can push one out 32,700m.
Not too bad, but accuracy was not good. Barrel wear was also a
problem.
There was one factor, though that made them not too popular with the
troops. According to a former colleague, who had been a Field
Artillery type in Viet Nam, there was a tendency for the projectile to
not properly ram home. This required unloading the propellant charge,
and elevating the gun to shake out the shell. When this didn't work,
the protocol was to assemble the cleaning rod, insert it into teh
muzzle end, and whack the shell out that way. Of course, this
required pounding on the fuze in the pointy part of the bullet.
Very few people thought that this was a _good_ idea.
"You have to hit these blockbuster bombs just right, or they don't go off."
--
Pete Stickney Klein bottle for rent -- inquire within.
Guy Alcala
> On Fri, 11 May 2001 20:01:16 GMT, pau...@exis.net (Paul Holloway)
> wrote:
>
> >I'd really like to see the source for your info, as I don't know of
> >any ER munitions used by any of the CAs during Vietnam.
>
> It was the Mk63 8" projectile. I don't know which vessel was firing
> it. It was around 52 kg versus the standard 8" projectile of Ca. 118
> kg. Not exactly big stuff, but it made a bigger hole than one would
> think for it's size.
USS St. Paul, according to Friedman ("U.S. Naval Weapons"). He says it
was "tested in Vietnam. A range of 40nm was reported." Presumably, like
the other RAPs the explosive charge was considerably reduced, as was the
overall weight (as you mention above).
Guy
Peter Stickney
There was also a series of experiments with 8" guns firing saboted 5"
projectiles. This might fit the bill, too. Of course, accuracy was
abysmal, and the terminal effects would be, well, disappointing. (If
I'm going to fling something 80,000 yards, I wand _something_ to
happen, dammit!)
Interesting thought... A point has been made that the
relatively low accuracy of the 16" gun against point targets doesn't
matter, because you can just fling more. This would make it tough on
the surrounding area, what? Since there were efforts (Not always or
often successful) in Vietnam to limit collateral damage, why would a
Battleship be used? If you're going to dunp 100 200# projectiles on
a grid square, you've already got the B-52s.
David Lentz
Peter Stickney wrote:
<snip>
>
> > USS St. Paul, according to Friedman ("U.S. Naval Weapons"). He says it
> > was "tested in Vietnam. A range of 40nm was reported." Presumably, like
> > the other RAPs the explosive charge was considerably reduced, as was the
> > overall weight (as you mention above).
>
> There was also a series of experiments with 8" guns firing saboted 5"
> projectiles. This might fit the bill, too. Of course, accuracy was
> abysmal, and the terminal effects would be, well, disappointing. (If
> I'm going to fling something 80,000 yards, I wand _something_ to
> happen, dammit!)
> Interesting thought... A point has been made that the
> relatively low accuracy of the 16" gun against point targets doesn't
> matter, because you can just fling more. This would make it tough on
> the surrounding area, what? Since there were efforts (Not always or
> often successful) in Vietnam to limit collateral damage, why would a
> Battleship be used? If you're going to dunp 100 200# projectiles on
> a grid square, you've already got the B-52s.
>
> --
> Pete Stickney Klein bottle for rent -- inquire within.
It seems to me, that if you are going to use a bear rifle, damn
big gun, you out to go after bear, a damn big target. In the
case of a Iowa class battleship in Vietnam, the bear would seem
to Hiaphong Harbor. Sit off shore and level the place. Then, we
really weren't into hitting the North in any place where it might
actually hurt them.
David
--
qyra...@ebpurfgre.ee.pbz
Chas Hurst
not the fuse, of the projectile. Loose rams were the result of dirty or
damaged rounds and sloppy or hurried work by the crew. In my own experience
of a year by the gun, we never had a loose ram.
Using artillery to take out these bridges would require an observer to be on
station to adjust fire, and heavy artillery has a slow rate of fire. The
observer would be in danger in short time.
Regards
Chas Hurst
C/7/15th Arty
Peter Stickney <p-sti...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:6mukd9...@Mineshaft.local.net...
Peter Stickney
David Lentz <Ro...@signfile.net> writes:
> It seems to me, that if you are going to use a bear rifle, damn
> big gun, you out to go after bear, a damn big target. In the
> case of a Iowa class battleship in Vietnam, the bear would seem
> to Hiaphong Harbor. Sit off shore and level the place. Then, we
> really weren't into hitting the North in any place where it might
> actually hurt them.
And how much permanent damage do you do to the Harbor? Nothing that
doesn't get fixed real quick. The Vietnamese were lightering stuff
off, for the most part, so whacking the docks and cranes & stuff is an
inconvenience, not a disaster. Look at teh example of Tangier, in
1943. What was the ratio of damage to the harbor compared to the
damage to he city? (Including the ricochets into the town from the
shells bouncing off of Jean Bart) The real answer was not letting hte
ships into the harbor. And that was best (and eventually in '72) was
done with mines. Imagine the propaganda coup that "Evil
U.S. Battleship indiscriminately shells civilians" would have provided
to the Eastern Bloc.
Tarver Engineering
> In article <3AFEBBAE...@signfile.net>,
> David Lentz <Ro...@signfile.net> writes:
> > It seems to me, that if you are going to use a bear rifle, damn
> > big gun, you out to go after bear, a damn big target. In the
> > case of a Iowa class battleship in Vietnam, the bear would seem
> > to Hiaphong Harbor. Sit off shore and level the place. Then, we
> > really weren't into hitting the North in any place where it might
> > actually hurt them.
>
> And how much permanent damage do you do to the Harbor? Nothing that
> doesn't get fixed real quick. The Vietnamese were lightering stuff
> off, for the most part, so whacking the docks and cranes & stuff is an
> inconvenience, not a disaster.
Shell's oil tankers would be the target of choice if hitting Haiphong.
John
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David Brower
Another question becomes, if the US does try to station a BB close enough
to do bombardment, how long does it take NV to put enough bombs on enough
MiGs to scare the bejezus (if not worse) the BB?
177 sorties against a bridge exposed somewhere between 177 and 354 aircrew
to danger; what was the complement on the BB?
Methinks this idea is a non-starter, even ignoring the aiming
problems.
-dB
Guy Alcala
> On Mon, 14 May 2001 17:36:54 -0700, David Brower
> <dbr...@us.oracle.com> wrote:
>
> >Another question becomes, if the US does try to station a BB close enough
> >to do bombardment, how long does it take NV to put enough bombs on enough
> >MiGs to scare the bejezus (if not worse) the BB?
>
> A reaction is only to be expected. At the least, they would attempt
> to use torpedoes from their small craft. But this action would occur
> where US air power could be used with fewer risks too.
Either Sterett or Biddle claimed that they shot down a land-based Styx, the
first claimed SAM kill of an SSM, IIRR the same day as the attack on the
Higbee. Whether the DRVN actually had Styx at the time, I don't know.
Guy