Dropping the bomb where you want seems to be the kind of skill that would take
a long time to get really good at?
How much training to real A-10 pilots spend learning to drop dumb bombs? Is any
of that time spent in simulators, this seems to be a place where simulators
might be an aid in getting proficient at dropping bombs?
Any simple suggestions on getting the bombs on the target such as dive straight
down towards the target and release or is it practice practice practice?
As always thanks for any thoughts!
>My A-10 flight sim has a demo mode where you get to drop 4 2000 lb. bombs. Part
>of the simulator is a device that aids you in dropping the bombs on a selected
>target, the CCIP mode (continuously calculated impact point) the target is
>selected and then you just keep flying and the bombs are released at the right
>time. But as is fitting there seems to be a bug in the software and the CCIP
>mode does not work and so one must manually drop the bombs at the right time.
>As the bombs are rather large one does not want to be too low when the bombs
>are released. They recommend keeping 1000 ft. above ground.
CCIP modes are relatively new as computer-controlled bombing is
concerned. Prior to its use, the pilot would center the sight
pipper on the target, then squeeze and hold the pickle button until
the computer recognized the "right spot" in the bombing equation for
the bombs to hit that desired target. If the crew didn't get
impatient - and held the craft relatively stable, it worked VERY well.
However, pilots complained that it didn't give them the freedom to
make snap decisions - and they were right.
CCIP, on the other hand, is just that: the bombing pipper is moved
about by the computer, showing the pilot exactly where his bombs would
hit if he punched them off, RIGHT NOW.
Thus, the driver must point the nose in such a way that the pipper
passes over the target; when it does, he pickles, and the bombs come
off.
The last I time I sat in one, the A-10 had no "computer" bombing modes
at all. One of its best qualities is that everything is basic -
including the avionics/weapons control. No radar, no INS, no bombing
computer; just a DG, a radio, and a depressible gunsight..
I have no idea if this computer game parallels the real thing in any
way...
- John T.
>Dropping the bomb where you want seems to be the kind of skill that would take
>a long time to get really good at?
>
>Any simple suggestions on getting the bombs on the target such as dive straight
>down towards the target and release or is it practice practice practice?
Bombing 101 is an apt title for this. Manual dive bomb is a complex
subject and "practice, practice, practice" is the way to get
good--plus a lot of study.
An airplane moves in an airmass, hence that is a major player. A bomb
moves with the vectors of the airplane until release and then it
becomes purely ballistic.
At the point of bomb release the bomb will fall predictably if (and I
must repeat IF) the pilot has met the preplanned parameters of
altitude above the ground, release airspeed, dive angle and g-load
(including both pitch and yaw). If, at that point, the airplane were
to continue in a straight line, without recovery, the airplane would
impact LONG, beyond the target (for that reason, the pipper is
depressed a pre-calculated amount).
Aircraft drift during the bomb run and at the point of release also
effects the bomb. Typically bomb drift for wind from release to impact
is on the order of 5-10 feet/knot, so a correction in pipper placement
at release for a 10 kt wind would be 50-100 feet upwind.
Pipper tracking during the bomb pass generally must account for
acceleration of the aircraft during the bomb run (that means AOA is
decreasing and the pipper moves backwards) as well as aircraft
movement over the ground (that means the pipper moves forwards) and
aircraft drift (depending on the wind that can mean the pipper moves
sideways).
Ideally the pilot preplans (or knows from experience) an "initial
pipper placement" and then adds a wind correction offset of about 3
times the final wind correction at release. In a perfect pass the
aircraft will accelerate smoothly and the pipper will drift to the
preplanned release point at release altitude.
Miss any parameter and the bomb has an error. Some errors can cancel
each other out, so you continually calculate your progress toward
ideal release conditions and adjust to minimize errors. "Tiger" errors
are smaller than "pussy" errors. That means being steep five degrees
is a smaller error than being shallow. Being fast five knots is
smaller than being slow five knots. Dropping below planned release
altitude is less error than releasing high.
There's more, but that's the 101 course. There is a graduate school
too!
Ed Rasimus *** Peak Computing Magazine
Fighter Pilot (ret) *** (http://peak-computing.com)
*** Ziff-Davis Interactive
*** (http://www.zdnet.com)
It takes a study of the theory, an understanding of your airplane's
performance and the bomb's ballistics, a feel for how to make real-time
adjustments in your release point, and lots of practice.
BTW, PC-based flight sims are probably pretty useless for learning manual
bombing -- it takes a good "seat of the pants" feel, as well.
---------------------
John R. Weiss
Seattle, WA
Remove *NOSPAM* from address for e-mail reply
Ale2NOSPAM wrote in message <19990203024553...@ng108.aol.com>...
>My A-10 flight sim has a demo mode where you get to drop 4 2000 lb. bombs.
Part
>of the simulator is a device that aids you in dropping the bombs on a
selected
>target, the CCIP mode (continuously calculated impact point) the target is
>selected and then you just keep flying and the bombs are released at the
right
>time. But as is fitting there seems to be a bug in the software and the
CCIP
>mode does not work and so one must manually drop the bombs at the right
time.
>As the bombs are rather large one does not want to be too low when the
bombs
>are released. They recommend keeping 1000 ft. above ground.
>
>Dropping the bomb where you want seems to be the kind of skill that would
take
>a long time to get really good at?
>
>How much training to real A-10 pilots spend learning to drop dumb bombs? Is
any
>of that time spent in simulators, this seems to be a place where simulators
>might be an aid in getting proficient at dropping bombs?
>
>Any simple suggestions on getting the bombs on the target such as dive
straight
>down towards the target and release or is it practice practice practice?
>
Tallyho!
AK
Ed Rasimus wrote:
>
> ale2n...@aol.com (Ale2NOSPAM) wrote:
>
> >Dropping the bomb where you want seems to be the kind of skill that would take
> >a long time to get really good at?
> >
> >Any simple suggestions on getting the bombs on the target such as dive straight
> >down towards the target and release or is it practice practice practice?
>
>Great stuff, Ed. And then there's high altitude, straight-&-level, precision
>radar bombing, which is a whole `nother category.
A pathetic way for a tactical aviator to be required to deliver
ordinance. And, "precision" in that sequence of adjectives above
renders the whole phrase an oxymoron.
The complexities of tactical delivery in the graduate course are
curvilinear approaches, popups and, of course, the ever-present
necessity of figuring bomb trail and safe separation lest one's tail
feathers be ruffled.
Ed Rasimus wrote in message <36bc0686...@news.rmi.net>...
> My A-10 flight sim has a demo mode where you get to drop 4 2000 lb. bombs. Part
> of the simulator is a device that aids you in dropping the bombs on a selected
> target, the CCIP mode (continuously calculated impact point) the target is
> selected and then you just keep flying and the bombs are released at the right
> time. But as is fitting there seems to be a bug in the software and the CCIP
> mode does not work and so one must manually drop the bombs at the right time.
> As the bombs are rather large one does not want to be too low when the bombs
> are released. They recommend keeping 1000 ft. above ground.
>
> Dropping the bomb where you want seems to be the kind of skill that would take
> a long time to get really good at?
>
> How much training to real A-10 pilots spend learning to drop dumb bombs? Is any
> of that time spent in simulators, this seems to be a place where simulators
> might be an aid in getting proficient at dropping bombs?
>
> Any simple suggestions on getting the bombs on the target such as dive straight
> down towards the target and release or is it practice practice practice?
>
> As always thanks for any thoughts!
Hey Ale,
I'm not one of the Lords of the Sky here but I play computer sims a bit so here's
my thoughts-
1. The only time I ever heard of A-10's carrying such massive ordinance fits (it
would /really/ 'pig up' your performance) was when they were trying to
light/collapse/close some of the fire canals surrounding the fortifications in
Kuwaiti DS.
2. If you are playing a pre-'92 airframe then the chances are good that you
haven't got the LASTE (Low Altitude Safety and Targeting Enhancement I /think/)
which means that you will be fixing the reticle (circular thingy on the HUD with an
anticlockwise rotary dial ranger and a center fine-pipper on the fuselage index).
Basically you roll in push the nose down to whatever the ballistics books say is
the optimum angle for your preprogrammed release height and target type/munitions
fuzing and hold the wings horizon-level and with pipper centered and the airspeed
on knot with a 'consented' trigger squeeze until the analogue stores computer
autosequences the weapons.
Alternately, if the stores management system is primitive enough, you yourself may
have to squeeze-to-drop as the pipper passes over the target (which adds the human
reflex problem to 1,000th second release variable).
LASTE changed all this, in that the F-16's HUDWAC was installed and this 'samples'
the INS and air data system input to get relative airspeed, sensed windage and
airframe index (pitch-yaw-roll) and thus 'Continuously Compute the Impact Point';
i.e. however you point the airplane at whatever speed or altitude it will
automatically 'run the maths' to give a best guestimate of impact point.
What the system still -cannot- do is measure range to the target. You need radar
(which the A-10 lacks) or an outside (laser to the Pave Penny say) feed to do that
and even here, if the surface winds are funky or the terrain is 'terraced' in
slopeage relative to the airframe flight path, the bombs will have an along or
across track error index.
My Conclusions- The A-10 is actually a pretty good high altitude bomber,
aerodynamically: it's stable and it has those decellerons to keep it from ramping
down too fast to generate a good aiming solution.
It sucks for thrust though and has a very low limiter speed which basically
/ensures/ a Very Long period of target defensive exposure the avionics are /lousy/
for over-10K, high slant, work.
Your list _bottomout_ value of 1K feet is also at /least/ 2.5K short of 'safe' with
the Mk.84. 4-5K is better and a BSU-50 level-pararetarder is recommended if the
terrain and defense density provides -any- options on a lo-masked approach.
If forced high by AAA/SHORADS type threats, /stay there/, below 8K is courting
certain death, especially on repeat pass buzzard attacks. Below 10K you will want
to have a large expendables pop at the weapon pickle and any repeat pass or post
impact second element attack had better come from a different compass point,
blowing chaff all the way down and flaring at the pulloff.
The Hog is a great deal 'better' (more accurate) from low levels and the last Gun
Smoke which the A-10's won in errrr, 1992, included at least two 'down the tank
tube' BDU tosses from close range (under 2K feet).
If you would give more details on the weapons available to you and the target
conditions (hardness, defenses, terrain, ceiling, visibility, TOD) I could
recommend some different profiles and weapons which might work better for you.
As is Some Basics-
1. Read the Mission Brief. If it lists target winds and expected TOT's USE THEM
to set your run compass index. Put the sun behind you and the winds following or
from a near-neutral (along track) compass heading, when possible (i.e. rearrange
waypoints but don't extend the approach overlong).
2. If possible, slew the view so that you have the target always in sight as you
roll the airplane for the pitch down. This usually means at least a 30-40` offset,
flightpath from target.
Learn to 'fly from the corners' of the canopy bow, wingtips, tails or whatever
peripheral visual cues you are given (in terms of getting the wings right side up
and level or putting a wingtip on the target and using it as a half orbit 'tieline'
to eventual nose placement). Delays reacquiring the target due to HUD fixation is
one of the great ways to 'get behind' on a divebombing attack.
But if you are using a 'padlock' or 'virtual cockpit' view to achieve this, _Do
Not_ bomb from it. The viewing perspective is usually alterred and the symbology
representation cheapened so it doesn't line up the same way or mean the same
thing. Use HUD-forward viewing perspectives only.
3. Set the dive angle quickly and deep, you can always pull-shallow and use the
decelerons to control your rampspeed but the pipper will need time to stabilize and
as Ed Said, Tiger is better than Timid (push-pull-set-bomb takes longer than
pull-set-bomb).
4. Use whatever bank angle indicator you have to ensure the wings are horizon
LEVEL. Target Long/Short is sometimes unpredictable, Lateral Dispersions are
always embarassing. If there are friendlies in contact, ALWAYS bias a high dive
aimpoint away from them. Let #2 correct from your impacts.
5. Bearing the conditions of #4 in mind, with multiple big-boom weapons, an
indeterminate sequencer/fuzing delay, and a manual rather than consentual pickle,
it's better to trigger short than long.
6. Have a 'mental movie' (minds eye) of what you will do where and particularly
the 'dexterity' (finger positioning) needed to get there. USE THIS as a sequential
progression indicator so you know if you're 'ahead of the game' or behind it. Try
not to Press a Bad Play. The exposure and poor weapons employment aren't worth a
repeat performance compared to an early pullup and repositioning.
7. Regardless of how 'late' you are, _Never_ violate the preset (in your own head)
bottomout height and -always- blow expendables on the pullup if you are below 10K.
70% of MANPADS hits in the A/G role come from the below the airframe sill line
(blindside), in the pipe or when your eyes are pointed up and the engines aren't,
on the recovery.
The A-10 doesn't have the burner energy to waste jinking on the pullout (so don't
pig-wallow around doing this) but it sure as heck has the largest decoy loadout of
any twin A-jet on the planet. Waste Some, the Government owes you.
8. If you're mission is CAS, rather than interdiction (loitering support vs. hit
and run away), run in do some damage and take a breather for a few minutes before
coming back, /as a team/, from a new compass heading and if possible altitude
band. Never get 'tired' over the FEBA and never string your wingmen so far behind
your action path or so deep in the threat envelope (for so long) that they eat fire
intended for you.
If you're 'getting behind' (taking shortcuts to make the weapon release happen from
less than optimum/safe 'shack' positioning) -You Are Tired-. If there are enemy
fighters in the area, CAS becomes Interdiction, _instantly_.
9. Never 'Rescue' wingmen under fire if it means exposure to a higher/other threat
system yourself. AI wingies are stupid, fact of life, plan around that when
possible but don't die together, repeating their idiocy. This is /especially/ true
in the low energy A-10.
10. Expendables and ECM effectiveness 'remaining' come before everthing else, fuel
altitude, airspeed, and even weapons inclusive, as a "Time for a Cold One"
back-to-base indicator.
In the Hog /especially/. This should be preplanned, to include no less than 20
releases per attack pass in a medium threat environs and no less than 40 in a high
lethality one.
KP
(big snip, thanks!)
<<
As is Some Basics-
1. Read the Mission Brief. If it lists target winds and expected TOT's USE
THEM
to set your run compass index. Put the sun behind you and the winds following
or
from a near-neutral (along track) compass heading, when possible (i.e.
rearrange
waypoints but don't extend the approach overlong).
>>
The sun behind your back so its in the enemies face? And the wind at your back
so any scatter is long or short?
<<
2. If possible, slew the view so that you have the target always in sight as
you
roll the airplane for the pitch down. This usually means at least a 30-40`
offset,
flightpath from target.
>>
Keep the target in view at all times, check.
<<
Learn to 'fly from the corners' of the canopy bow, wingtips, tails or whatever
peripheral visual cues you are given (in terms of getting the wings right side
up
and level or putting a wingtip on the target and using it as a half orbit
'tieline'
to eventual nose placement). Delays reacquiring the target due to HUD fixation
is
one of the great ways to 'get behind' on a divebombing attack.
>>
Don't keep your eyes looking through the HUD, know and see where your target is
at all times?
<<
But if you are using a 'padlock' or 'virtual cockpit' view to achieve this, _Do
Not_ bomb from it. The viewing perspective is usually alterred and the
symbology
representation cheapened so it doesn't line up the same way or mean the same
thing. Use HUD-forward viewing perspectives only.
>>
Check.
<<
3. Set the dive angle quickly and deep, you can always pull-shallow and use
the
decelerons to control your rampspeed but the pipper will need time to stabilize
and
as Ed Said, Tiger is better than Timid (push-pull-set-bomb takes longer than
pull-set-bomb).
>>
We want steep so? 1. Bomb falling to earth near vertical will take a
"straighter" path to target then a bomb with a more horizontal initial
velocity? 2. Diving at a steep angle gives you speed and therefore gives your
bomb more speed (speed like a German 88 high velocity projectile, means the
bomb goes where you point it with less concern for error due to wind and
elevation corrections). 3. Steep and fast so you are within the enemies
defenses for the shortest time possible?
<<
4. Use whatever bank angle indicator you have to ensure the wings are horizon
LEVEL. Target Long/Short is sometimes unpredictable, Lateral Dispersions are
always embarassing.
>>
If the wings are not level when the bomb is released --> lateral dispersions,
check.
<<
If there are friendlies in contact, ALWAYS bias a high dive
aimpoint away from them. Let #2 correct from your impacts.
>>
The scatter from our bombing will be in the shape of a long and narrow ellipse
so we want the friendlies basically at right angles to our flight path, we
should set up our dive so that the friendlies are left or right of the target
and not long or short of the target?
<<
5. Bearing the conditions of #4 in mind, with multiple big-boom weapons, an
indeterminate sequencer/fuzing delay, and a manual rather than consentual
pickle,
it's better to trigger short than long.
>>
I'm lost with number 5, 8^(
<<
6. Have a 'mental movie' (minds eye) of what you will do where and
particularly
the 'dexterity' (finger positioning) needed to get there. USE THIS as a
sequential
progression indicator so you know if you're 'ahead of the game' or behind it.
Try
not to Press a Bad Play. The exposure and poor weapons employment aren't worth
a
repeat performance compared to an early pullup and repositioning.
>>
So if you know the shot is no good keep the bombs, pull up and try again?
<<
7. Regardless of how 'late' you are, _Never_ violate the preset (in your own
head)
bottomout height and -always- blow expendables on the pullup if you are below
10K.
>>
How can you hit anything above 10K? 8^)
<<
70% of MANPADS hits in the A/G role come from the below the airframe sill line
(blindside), in the pipe or when your eyes are pointed up and the engines
aren't,
on the recovery.
The A-10 doesn't have the burner energy to waste jinking on the pullout (so
don't
pig-wallow around doing this) but it sure as heck has the largest decoy loadout
of
any twin A-jet on the planet. Waste Some, the Government owes you.
8. If you're mission is CAS, rather than interdiction (loitering support vs.
hit
and run away), run in do some damage and take a breather for a few minutes
before
coming back, /as a team/, from a new compass heading and if possible altitude
band. Never get 'tired' over the FEBA and never string your wingmen so far
behind
your action path or so deep in the threat envelope (for so long) that they eat
fire
intended for you.
>>
Safety in numbers or they can't shoot at both of you at the same time (well
they can if you are too near each other) ?
<<
If you're 'getting behind' (taking shortcuts to make the weapon release happen
from
less than optimum/safe 'shack' positioning) -You Are Tired-. If there are
enemy
fighters in the area, CAS becomes Interdiction, _instantly_.
9. Never 'Rescue' wingmen under fire if it means exposure to a higher/other
threat
system yourself. AI wingies are stupid, fact of life, plan around that when
possible but don't die together, repeating their idiocy. This is /especially/
true
in the low energy A-10.
10. Expendables and ECM effectiveness 'remaining' come before everything else,
fuel
altitude, airspeed, and even weapons inclusive, as a "Time for a Cold One"
back-to-base indicator.
In the Hog /especially/. This should be preplanned, to include no less than 20
releases per attack pass in a medium threat environs and no less than 40 in a
high
lethality one.
>>
Use it or lose it (your life) ?
Thanks again for your time from a pilot wanabe!
>As is Some Basics-
>
>1. Read the Mission Brief. If it lists target winds and expected TOT's USE
>THEM
>to set your run compass index. Put the sun behind you and the winds
>following
>or
>from a near-neutral (along trac
But whatt happens if the wind direction and velocities change from breifing to
attack? This is often more the case than not. Depending on that data, quite
old by the time of the attack sounds a bit dicey? (s)
Arthur Kramer
344th Bomb Group 9th Air Force
England France Belgium Holland Germany
The dynamics of manual bombing make it impossible to get good at it from
reading a book or "mission brief" in a game package. When the winds change
half-way down the pipe, you have to "just know" how to adjust the pipper --
there's no time to _start" thinking and analyzing. That takes familiarity
with the theory, knowledge of your delivery parameter sensitivities, feel
for your airplane, and enough practice to make the corrections instinctive.
---------------------
John R. Weiss
Seattle, WA
Remove *NOSPAM* from address for e-mail reply
ArtKramr wrote in message <19990215104847...@ng12.aol.com>...
>>
>>1. Read the Mission Brief. If it lists target winds and expected TOT's
USE
>>THEM to set your run compass index. Put the sun behind you and the winds
>>following or from a near-neutral (along trac
High-altitude manual bombing cannot be precise enough to consistently place
a single unguided weapon in one "hole" -- the physics just don't allow it.
The nominal ballistic accuracy of a current-technology low-drag weapon is 4
milliradians or so. With a flight path length of 30,000' or more from a
20,000'+ AGL level release, even a "perfect" release will result in a 120'+
error half the time.
---------------------
John R. Weiss
Seattle, WA
Remove *NOSPAM* from address for e-mail reply
Carlo Kopp wrote in message <36C84966...@aus.net>...
>
>Art, my turn to ask a dumb question. If you were going in to bomb from a
>fairly low altitude I can see how you could have used the wind drift
>from navigating legs close to the target to estimate the wind velocity
>and direction.
>
>However if you are a little higher up you might see a quite large
>variation in wind direction and strength with altitude. How did you
>account for this, if you did ? Drop one bomb inbound and check the
>position drift off the aimpoint ?
>Art, my turn to ask a dumb question. If you were going in to bomb from a
>fairly low altitude I can see how you could have used the wind drift
>from navigating legs close to the target to estimate the wind velocity
>and direction.
>
>However if you are a little higher up you might see a quite large
>variation in wind direction and strength with altitude. How did you
>account for this, if you did ? Drop one bomb inbound and check the
>position drift off the aimpoint ?
>
>Thanks,
>
>Carlo
The Norden bombsight automatically corrected for wind direction and velocity as
you went down the bomb run and corrected the mirror drives to stop the
corsshair drift.
>High-altitude manual bombing cannot be precise enough to consistently place
>a single unguided weapon in one "hole" -- the physics just don't allow it.
There are many factors that effect high alttitude bombing, but physics isn't
one of them.
It is the wind acting on teh airplane at time of release that
adds the vector to the bomb's velocity. Wind on the bomb in
flight isn't normally that big a factor. For example a 60 knot
wind at right angles to the aircraft path at release (not uncommon
in winter at 8000 MSl - typical release altitude in 45 dive at 500K)
goves a 1nm/min sideways vector; that's 2000 yards in 60 seconds or
100 feet in one second. If bomb time-to-fall is 10 seconds (to make
it simple) then the bomb will impact 1000 feet down wind from the no-wind
impact point. I can remember having to aim 600 feet or so upwind at Avon
Park range in Florida so this is really a world-wide problem.
So it's wind velocity times bomb time to fall for the offset aim point.
The bomb tables give the offset value in feet per knot of wind. The simplest
way to apply this value is to offset the aimpoint in the direction the wind
is coming from.
Values of feet-per-knot depend upon the weapon and the bomb fall time. For
a toss of a drogued weapon they get up over 65 feet per knot!
Everything depends on being on speed, on dive angle, in coordinated and
unaccelerated flight at release point at the correct height above the target.
It ain't a simple maneuver! But after a (long) while it starts to become
a TLAR operation - That Looks About Right!
Walt BJ ftr plt ret
Art, my turn to ask a dumb question. If you were going in to bomb from a
Walt,
Under ideal conditions I can deliver a shack every time. Unfortunately, ideal
conditions aren't always there. But when one says, "the physics doesn't allow
it" that suggests that it is a physical impossibility under all and any
conditions, which it totally untrue. My circle of error for 100 bombs dropped
in training was 27 feet ( I graduated second in my class), which meant the
vast majority of runs were shacks. A few off weight wild bombs are what caused
the error to accrue, But combat conditions, weather, rough air, winds on the
way down, Bombardier nerves, pilot nerves, enemy action, poor visibility etc.
all added to kill accuracy,. But to say the physics doesn't allow it is a
statement that could only be made by someone who doesn't understand the
physics, and certainly has no experience with a Norden.
>artk...@aol.com (ArtKramr) wrote:
>>>Subject: Re: Bombing 101 or how to hit the target?>>From: "John Weiss" <jrweiss@seanet*NOSPAM*.com>
>>
>>>High-altitude manual bombing cannot be precise enough to consistently place
>>>a single unguided weapon in one "hole" -- the physics just don't allow it.
>>
>>There are many factors that effect high alttitude bombing, but physics isn't
>>one of them.
>>>Arthur Kramer
>>
>Well, physics governs what happens; the unavoidable tolerances in the factors
>affecting the path of the projectile determine where it is going to hit. Sometimes
>the errors add u and you miss a mile or more; sometimes they cancel and you get a
>shack. That's the extremes. We like to forget the misses and remember the hits.
>FWIW a Mk 82 has about a 5 mil CEP all its own; I got that out of an old -34 weapons
>data manual I unfortunately no longer have. (5 mils translates close enough to 5 feet
>per 1000 feet of travel - one half of the bombs dropped will be inside that cone)
Glad to know that, Walt - it jibes really well with the "less than
50-footers or the plane's grounded" maintenance philosophy for a 3-4
mile Dive Toss lob. ( Korat standard 1969-72 )
- John T.
Granted, nobody here defined the parameters for "high altitude," "shack,"
"consistently," or "one hole," nor did we specify "ideal" or realistic
training or combat conditions. Still, I stand by my original statement that
"High-altitude manual bombing cannot be precise enough to consistently
place a single unguided weapon in one "hole" -- the physics just don't allow
it."
and take issue with your claim that
"[There are many factors that effect high altitude bombing, but] physics
isn't one of them."
Also, your statement that
'But when one says, "the physics doesn't allow it" that suggests that it
is a physical impossibility under all and any conditions, which it totally
untrue.'
appears to disregard the main point of the statement from which you pulled
the quotation:
'High-altitude manual bombing cannot be precise enough to consistently
place a single unguided weapon in one "hole"'
Physics includes the [study of] forces imposed upon, and resulting
accelerations of, bodies in flight, such as airplanes and bombs. Physics,
as manifested in aerodynamics, ballistics, and meteorology, certainly ARE
important factors in bombing!
One of those factors is the sum of forces/accelerations imposed on a bomb in
free flight, even after a "perfect" release. The reality of the situation
is that bombs cannot be made ballistically "perfect," so they will not all
follow an ideal ballistic path even on a calm day. This reality is
expressed in the "ballistic dispersion" value given for a particular
type/model of bomb. A typical value for a modern, low-drag, freefall bomb
such as the Mk 80 series is 4 to 5 milliradians (mils). This translates to
an expected circular error probable (CEP, or expectation that 50% of the
bombs will fall within a circle of a stated radius) under otherwise ideal
conditions, of 4 to 5 feet for each 1000' of travel through the atmosphere.
From a 20,000' level delivery, we expect 50% of the weapons (over a large
number of deliveries) to hit more than 100' from the target.
While a 27' CEP is laudable under any circumstances, it does not meet my
(admittedly after-the-fact) definition of 'consistently putting a bomb in
one hole.' You didn't say what the delivery parameters for your training
drops were (in my original message I believe I gave example parameters of
level deliveries from 20,000' AGL or more). Even so, a "circle of error" of
27' suggests half of your bombs were dropped outside a 27' radius from your
target (using the widely-accepted definition of CEP).
At the training ranges where I dropped practice bombs, a "shack" or "bull"
was a hit within 20 or 25' from target center. If "in one hole" is defined
as a "shack" on a training range, your best effort in training was unable to
get a weapon in that "hole" even half the time. Under combat conditions, I
doubt even the Norden gunsight gave an overall CEP near that figure for
high-altitude (>=20,000') level deliveries.
---------------------
John R. Weiss
Seattle, WA
Remove *NOSPAM* from address for e-mail reply
ArtKramr wrote in message <19990216004425...@ng-fp1.aol.com>...
>
>>artk...@aol.com (ArtKramr) wrote:
>>>>Subject: Re: Bombing 101 or how to hit the target?>>From: "John Weiss"
>>>
>>>>High-altitude manual bombing cannot be precise enough to consistently
place
>>>>a single unguided weapon in one "hole" -- the physics just don't allow
it.
>>>
>>>There are many factors that effect high alttitude bombing, but physics
>>>isn't one of them.
>>>Arthur Kramer
>>>
>>Well, physics governs what happens; the unavoidable tolerances in the
factors
>>affecting the path of the projectile determine where it is going to hit.
<snip>
>> Walt BJ ftr plt ret
>>
>Walt,
>
>Under ideal conditions I can deliver a shack every time. Unfortunately,
ideal
>conditions aren't always there. But when one says, "the physics doesn't
allow
>it" that suggests that it is a physical impossibility under all and any
>conditions, which it totally untrue. My circle of error for 100 bombs
dropped
>in training was 27 feet ( I graduated second in my class), which meant the
>vast majority of runs were shacks. A few off weight wild bombs are what
caused
>the error to accrue, But combat conditions, weather, rough air, winds on
the
>way down, Bombardier nerves, pilot nerves, enemy action, poor visibility
etc.
>all added to kill accuracy,. But to say the physics doesn't allow it is a
>statement that could only be made by someone who doesn't understand the
>physics, and certainly has no experience with a Norden.
>
>Arthur Kramer
>What was the release altitude? And where did the other half of the bombs
>land?
> Walt BJ ftr plt ret
The altitude was 10,000 feet. And I don't understand what you mean by the other
half of the bombs.
>Art, my original comment stemmed from an apparent discussion of a PC
>simulator game and its [non]relation to the real world...
>
>Granted, nobody here defined the parameters for "high altitude," "shack,"
>"consistently," or "one hole," nor did we specify "ideal" or realistic
>training or combat conditions. Still, I stand by my original statement that
>
> "High-altitude manual bombing cannot be precise enough to consistently
>place a single unguided weapon in one "hole" -- the physics just don't allow
>it."
I tak eissue tiwh the one statement you made which was, "the physics won't
allow it". There are things thta make it difficult, but physics isn't a
tissue. It is the other things I mentioned.
At any rate, I have given you my experience in training and in combat and my
point of view. I guess there is no point beating this dead horse any more. BTW,
if you noticed, we sure knocked the hell out of Germany and left it a smoking
ruin, so we must have hit something.
I think a better word there would be "chance".........it is physics but
also many other factors like the -very- human pilot and thermo related
issues (many of which are physics based though)
>>>>>Subject: Re: Bombing 101 or how to hit the target?>>From: "John Weiss"
>>>>
>>>>>High-altitude manual bombing cannot be precise enough to consistently
>place
>>>>>a single unguided weapon in one "hole" -- the physics just don't allow
>it.
>>>>
>>>>There are many factors that effect high alttitude bombing, but physics
>>>>isn't one of them.
>>>>Arthur Kramer
>>>>
>>>Well, physics governs what happens; the unavoidable tolerances in the
>factors
>>>affecting the path of the projectile determine where it is going to hit.
> <snip>
>>> Walt BJ ftr plt ret
>>>
>>Walt,
>>
>>Under ideal conditions I can deliver a shack every time. Unfortunately,
>ideal
>>conditions aren't always there. But when one says, "the physics doesn't
>allow
>>it" that suggests that it is a physical impossibility under all and any
>>conditions, which it totally untrue. My circle of error for 100 bombs
>dropped
>>in training was 27 feet ( I graduated second in my class), which meant the
>>vast majority of runs were shacks. A few off weight wild bombs are what
>caused
>>the error to accrue, But combat conditions, weather, rough air, winds on
>the
>>way down, Bombardier nerves, pilot nerves, enemy action, poor visibility
>etc.
>>all added to kill accuracy,. But to say the physics doesn't allow it is a
>>statement that could only be made by someone who doesn't understand the
>>physics, and certainly has no experience with a Norden.
>>
>>Arthur Kramer
>>344th Bomb Group 9th Air Force
>>England France Belgium Holland Germany
>>
>
>
>
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Keith Dombrowski
We are spirits in the material world.
One Life
Well, sure Art, but CEP of an 8th AF combat box was on the order
of 1000' from 20k. Fortunately, most any factory was that big.
(This was with visual bombing rules. Radar bombing was worse.)
FWIW, I've found the release of the _Impact_ series distributed
by the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence.
It was republished in an 8 volume set by the Air Force Historical
Foundation in 1980.
It has nice sets of strike photos showing before, during, and
after shots of various places on the worldwide AF hit parade.
--
David Benjamin
ArtKramr wrote:
> conditions, which it totally untrue. My circle of error for 100 bombs dropped
> in training was 27 feet ( I graduated second in my class), which meant the
Was there a pass/fail boundary for this error during training which you
had to meet to qualify as a bombardier? If you recall any scores for
other classmates I'd appreciate seeing them.
Rick
Damn near bombed it back to the Stone Age.
I believe my statement was that the effect of lower-altitude winds was
likely to be within the multiple-bomb pattern -- not "irrelevant."
I would add that in DS there were "standard" delivery parameters dictated by
ROE and emergent tactics that were not widely practiced by many crews prior
to arrival in the Sandbox. I expect that the inaccuracy was as much a
result of targeting and delivery errors as it was of low-level wind shifts
below release altitude (e.g., failure to account for wind shifts between
roll-in and pickle altitude, resulting in misplaced pipper at release).
Also, there were attempts to deliver weapons with larger ballistic
dispersions and more complex ballistics (e.g., Rockeye) from high altitudes,
even further complicating the equation.
And, yes, pipper size is a major physical limitation (optics is a branch of
physics, FWIW)...
---------------------
John R. Weiss
Seattle, WA
Remove *NOSPAM* from address for e-mail reply
g_al...@hotmail.com wrote in message <7ad9nd$uf8$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>...
>
>I would take slight issue with John Weiss' (or maybe it was Walt's or Ed's)
>comment that wind speed on the way down is largely irrelevant. Such did not
>seem to be true in DS, where the high pickle altitudes and high and
variable
>winds played hell with dumb bomb accuracy. Early on, tactical crews were
>apparently under orders to pickle at 15k, to avoid defenses. As the ground
>war got closer, they were allowed to go lower and lower, and bombing got
more
>accurate. If nothing else, just the pipper size is a limiting factor in
>accuracy at large slant ranges.
>artk...@aol.com (ArtKramr) wrote:
>>
>>Under ideal conditions I can deliver a shack every time. Unfortunately, ideal
>>conditions aren't always there. But when one says, "the physics doesn't allow
>>it" that suggests that it is a physical impossibility under all and any
>>conditions, which it totally untrue. My circle of error for 100 bombs dropped
>>in training was 27 feet ( I graduated second in my class), which meant the
>>vast majority of runs were shacks. . . . . . But to say the physics doesn't allow it is a
>>statement that could only be made by someone who doesn't understand the
>>physics, and certainly has no experience with a Norden.
>>>Arthur Kramer
>>
>What was the release altitude? And where did the other half of the bombs land?
I know my expertise has improved considerably during the years I've
spent retired. When I actually dropped bombs I was "qualified" and
occasionally, darn good. But as the years have gone by, I've gotten
better and better...at least in my recollection.
I've seen guys get strings of twenty or so "shacks" in low-angle or
skip-bomb but I've never seen manual bombing at high angle or high
altitude release that was better than the CEP inherent in the bomb
itself--in other words, you can't beat the odds with skill.
We had two kinds of guys in most peacetime squadrons that I flew in:
the "eat what ya throw" realists that know they are training for
combat, and the "bomb-comp lawyers" who alibi and finagle to get their
CEPs into the winners circle of the semi-annual squadron ranking. The
lawyers take credit for skill when the bombs are "in" and they
generate the most outlandish write-ups for the AGS maintainers to get
their bad bombs thrown out.
I'm not suggesting that you did that, Art, but I'm going with Walt in
the opinion that physics is a huge component of the bomb trajectory.
Rick, I don't remember the pass/fail scores, but most guys that washed out did
so because they couldn't send and recieve 8 words per minute of Morse code.
I've seen average CEPs of 3,300 ft. quoted for visual high altitude level
bombing by U.S. heavies in WWII. Radar bomb CEPs under the same conditions
were in the region of 10,000 feet. Mediums, bombing from lower altitudes
(because they generally faced lighter flak they could afford to do so), would
do better than the heavies. FWIW, I've seen 4,300 and 4,800 ft. CEPs quoted
for the A-6 and F-111 on night radar bombing in Vietnam. Of course, the
target might well be a 'suspected truck park' in the middle of the jungle,
bombing off an indistinct offset point. and of course, that includes all the
malfunctions and other factors that cause misses, rather than just the pure
'system' CEP.
I would take slight issue with John Weiss' (or maybe it was Walt's or Ed's)
comment that wind speed on the way down is largely irrelevant. Such did not
seem to be true in DS, where the high pickle altitudes and high and variable
winds played hell with dumb bomb accuracy. Early on, tactical crews were
apparently under orders to pickle at 15k, to avoid defenses. As the ground
war got closer, they were allowed to go lower and lower, and bombing got more
accurate. If nothing else, just the pipper size is a limiting factor in
accuracy at large slant ranges.
Guy
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
> Even so, a "circle of error" of
>>27' suggests half of your bombs were dropped outside a 27' radius from your
>>target (using the widely-accepted definition of CEP).
It doesn't mean anyhting like that. Obviously you really don't understand the
term CE at all. And I am getting fed up with these incessant stupid claims
that the USAAC couldn';t hit a damn thing or bomb accurately. How the hell do
you think Germany became a crushed smoking ruin? All your picky little carping
is a lot of crap. And I have lost interest in this discussion.
>FWIW, I've found the release of the _Impact_ series distributed
>by the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence.
>It was republished in an 8 volume set by the Air Force Historical
>Foundation in 1980.
>
>It has nice sets of strike photos showing before, during, and
>after shots of various places on the worldwide AF hit parade.
>
>
>--
>David Benjamin
>
Well, we knocked the crap out of the place. What more do you want?
>I'm not suggesting that you did that, Art, but I'm going with Walt in
>the opinion that physics is a huge component of the bomb trajectory.
>
>
>
> Ed Rasimus **
Go with whatever pleases you. But don't you ever wonder how we even hit the
ground with all that crap that was against us? And since I never did any
peacetime bombing, I can't respond to your statements.
>We had two kinds of guys in most peacetime squadrons that I flew in:
>the "eat what ya throw" realists that know they are training for
>combat, and the "bomb-comp lawyers" who alibi and finagle to get their
>CEPs into the winners circle of the semi-annual squadron ranking. The
>lawyers take credit for skill when the bombs are "in" and they
>generate the most outlandish write-ups for the AGS maintainers to get
>their bad bombs thrown out.
I can vouch for that last statement; fortunately, the proportion of
"lawyers" declined as they increased in rank/skill/real experience.
- John T.
>GMT, thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
>>We had two kinds of guys in most peacetime squadrons that I flew in:
>>the "eat what ya throw" realists that know they are training for
>>combat, and the "bomb-comp lawyers" who alibi and finagle to get their
>>CEPs into the winners circle of the semi-annual squadron ranking. The
>>lawyers take credit for skill when the bombs are "in" and they
>>generate the most outlandish write-ups for the AGS maintainers to get
>>their bad bombs thrown out.
>
We had no such thing in WW II. There was no appeal to bomb CE scores. The
hits were observed and rated and you never knew what they were until the scores
were in after the fact. And you lived with the way your hits landed. We had
no "lawyers". There were more important things to do at the time, with no time
to waste on that sort of nonsense. I don't think I would have been happy in the
peacetime Air Force. Sounds like the Army Air Corps was a more down to
business outfit.
> >Subject: Re: Bombing 101 or how to hit the target?
> >From: ale2n...@aol.com (Ale2NOSPAM)
> >Date: 2/15/99 1:51 AM PST
> >Message-id: <19990215045103...@ng128.aol.com>
> >
> >From: Kurt Plummer <ch1...@earthlink.net>
> >
>
> >As is Some Basics-
> >
> >1. Read the Mission Brief. If it lists target winds and expected TOT's USE
> >THEM
> >to set your run compass index. Put the sun behind you and the winds
> >following
> >or
> >from a near-neutral (along trac
>
> But whatt happens if the wind direction and velocities change from breifing to
> attack? This is often more the case than not. Depending on that data, quite
> old by the time of the attack sounds a bit dicey? (s)
>
> Arthur Kramer
> 344th Bomb Group 9th Air Force
> England France Belgium Holland Germany
Hey Art,
Yeah Mr. you just prick that bubble with a blowtorch why don'tcha!;)
To be seriously humble the A-10 /is/ probably at or near the same level-envelope
'high' rating of the late B-series mediums but of course excepting Murphy's long
SCUD-hunts over Iraq, I don't think it was -ever- intended to do more than
30-45minute CAS profiles out of Euro-FOL.
And those were all closer to the P-47/Typhoon profile than what you're talking,
about target-slant separation wise.
As for the rest, I /think/ I remember, here or from one of the WINGS episodes,
that there were 'Target Weather Recce' platforms about a halfhour ahead of the
bomber streams and presumeably fast-low survivable enough to get a good range of
crosswind readings off to the higher headquarters which in turn relayed back to
the main stream.
I had never heard that the Nordens could compensate for drift like you mention
later on down the thread, that's kewl. Were you say 'tracking' the smoke
generator pot drifts of surface effect or only the local (pitot feed?) flow around
the airframe...??
Thanks- Kurt Plummer
No problem, just remember that ten words from one of the 'I am retired /now/'
signatories probably match a thousand or more of my 'verbal pictures'.
That said, here's a repeat on the few that you didn't 'get' better than I said-
> <<
> 3. Set the dive angle quickly and deep, you can always pull-shallow and use
> the
> decelerons to control your rampspeed but the pipper will need time to stabilize
> and
> as Ed Said, Tiger is better than Timid (push-pull-set-bomb takes longer than
> pull-set-bomb).
> >>
>
> We want steep so? 1. Bomb falling to earth near vertical will take a
> "straighter" path to target then a bomb with a more horizontal initial
> velocity? 2. Diving at a steep angle gives you speed and therefore gives your
> bomb more speed (speed like a German 88 high velocity projectile, means the
> bomb goes where you point it with less concern for error due to wind and
> elevation corrections). 3. Steep and fast so you are within the enemies
> defenses for the shortest time possible?
The A-10 will never hit never exceed except in a high angle run. In any case it's
how fast you come /down/ (into the threat band) that counts. Even lo-lo A-10
pilots get more combined +/- than a lot of 'speed wing' birds because they put
maximum emphasis on -staying away- from the target terminal defenses.
> <<
> If there are friendlies in contact, ALWAYS bias a high dive
> aimpoint away from them. Let #2 correct from your impacts.
> >>
>
> The scatter from our bombing will be in the shape of a long and narrow ellipse
> so we want the friendlies basically at right angles to our flight path, we
> should set up our dive so that the friendlies are left or right of the target
> and not long or short of the target?
Actual axis is not always important (if you're that high you won't see any marker
flags, may not see smoke and /really/ won't see the laser, though you'd better at
least know which side it's coming from). It's just a "10' for my conscience, 20'
for their kids" kind of choice when the conditions (defensive or met) don't meet
your acknowledged skill level/luck for putting the iron where it should be...
> <<
> 5. Bearing the conditions of #4 in mind, with multiple big-boom weapons, an
> indeterminate sequencer/fuzing delay, and a manual rather than consentual
> pickle,
> it's better to trigger short than long.
> >>
Many games only partly emulate the various methods of DT/CCIP manual/auto. I
honestly don't know myself if the LASTE mod includes 'all options'. Basically you
can set the bombcomp to trigger a release impulse to the racks based on when IT
thinks the physics are most accurate or you can 'CCIP' in the truest sense and
drop-on-reticle-advance (when the big circle covers the target and the pipper is
'close enough' for government work).
Given that the A-10 really struggles to come above 15K I doubt if the accumulated
error is big either way but it can be important when your rollin heights start
above 20 and you're pulling out by no later than 12 (F-16 vunder bomber...;).
But if you ARE on a 'manual pickle' (trigger equals release rather than consent to
a timedown) triggering short with multiple weapons will 'walk the target',
short-to-shack-to-long. IF the weapons have sequencing (delay release interval in
the armament control panel) equivalent to coverage of the CEP ring overlay.
I'm sure Walt or Ed could put it better...
> <<
> 6. Have a 'mental movie' (minds eye) of what you will do where and
> particularly
> the 'dexterity' (finger positioning) needed to get there. USE THIS as a
> sequential
> progression indicator so you know if you're 'ahead of the game' or behind it.
> Try
> not to Press a Bad Play. The exposure and poor weapons employment aren't worth
> a
> repeat performance compared to an early pullup and repositioning.
> >>
>
> So if you know the shot is no good keep the bombs, pull up and try again?
If the threat is high, no. You will not only have to reposition but if your part
of a coordinated effort, relag your impact (dust, other weapons effects etc.)
timing 'back to the end of the line'. Successful coordination is all about maximum
throughput saturation of the target.
If you're doing 'deep BAI' with just a section and four Mk.82's apiece, 'it
depends'. Most Hog drivers wanted the heavy crap OFF THE JET, ASAP. So they could
do precision work with the Maverick and occasionally guns, and 'a little bit of
performance to spare'. OTOH, clusters deserve to be well placed and if you do it
sharp enough (within 2K of the start and _always_ above the bottomout height) then
yes, if it's low threat.
> 7. Regardless of how 'late' you are, _Never_ violate the preset (in your own
> head)
> bottomout height and -always- blow expendables on the pullup if you are below
> 10K.
> >>
>
> How can you hit anything above 10K? 8^)
It's all about the software and the jet. I'm sure you've heard the tale of D/S
F-16A's pulling their wings off trying to be 'accurate' from above 12K with quad
Mk.84. A little skill, a lot of 'horseshoe'...
OTOH, there have been MAJOR mods to the weapon aiming computer systems of all
aircraft since the 'recognition' (duuuuh, it worked in Vietnam too?:) of the medium
attack profile and even independent plane-to-plane paper trail improvements based
on the 'good bombers' within a single-type squadron.
At least on the Blk.50 birds it's not unusual to see separate sets of codes in the
machines on the flightline and yet further 'tuning' for jets on their way to
bombcomps (That's supposedly how the A-10's won that last Gunsmoke, now the rules
have changed and not using the same codes is considered 'cheating'). The interview
I read had a Blk.50 Falcon pilot stating that his squadron could now get 3-4m bombs
from above 12K...
> 8. If you're mission is CAS, rather than interdiction (loitering support vs.
> hit
> and run away), run in do some damage and take a breather for a few minutes
> before
> coming back, /as a team/, from a new compass heading and if possible altitude
> band. Never get 'tired' over the FEBA and never string your wingmen so far
> behind
> your action path or so deep in the threat envelope (for so long) that they eat
> fire
> intended for you.
> >>
>
> Safety in numbers or they can't shoot at both of you at the same time (well
> they can if you are too near each other) ?
A bit of both, last I heard, the CAS community employs a set of 'BatCodes' like
Split, Trail, Wedge etc. which are a specialized attack-positioning subset of the
USAF '3-1' (shorter, is better) concise communications protocols. These are used
to set the attack lanes, weapons and breakaway/rejoin points.
In some instances, you want to be within the same 40-60` spread of horizon, simply
because it keeps everybody on the 'same side of the fence' for both initial and
postattack (rejoins) formating. It's also a helluva lot simple for the TACP or FAC
if you hit a single IP and sequence along a direct linear track from there.
In others though (terrain effects and FSCL 'sharing' esp.) you be will forced
around/over specific landmark 'high points'. In this case, having somebody
standing by 500' up and a mile or two back with Maverick as you make your gunpass
or whatever can really be a nice suppression/warning aid, but if he's /too far/ off
your bearing he won't see what's Big Bad and After You before you do, terminally.
At night, over Iraq, the A-10s would drop 'Logs' (LUU-2 I /think/) of long burning
ground marker flares and then switch from airframe:airframe separation 'tuning' to
a 'point lock' reference or even pure INS (when the TACAN was out of LOS) with all
aircraft firmly on 'one side side or the other of the campfire'.
This to restrict the collision danger and lost-airplane risk during afterhours
'close work' to the target sets (the farther you go outbound, the more likely you
are to lose your return-heading reference, there were no Hog NVG's etc. to
period-facilitate out-the-canopy stalking).
This is an exception however, and generally you want your team to stay on the same
side of the FEBA (within 5-10nm of the friendly one) and with close (visual)
coordination in any area of even -potential- threat-air activity.
> Thanks again for your time from a pilot wanabe!
No Problem, if you ever get into this seriously as a historian or technogeekazoid
like me you might want to consider at least a Library Trip to peruse William
Smallwood's _Warthog, Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War_ and his _Strike Eagle,
Flying the F-15E_ titles.
Good, fast, reads that also have a lot of "Wull shucks, I never wooda guessed
/that/..." lessons on the pragmatics of employment of modern airpower (how
/exactly/ accurate they are I can't comment with authority on...;).
KP
>ArtKramr wrote:
>
>> >Subject: Re: Bombing 101 or how to hit the target?
>> >From: ale2n...@aol.com (Ale2NOSPAM)
>> >Date: 2/15/99 1:51 AM PST
>> >Message-id: <19990215045103...@ng128.aol.com>
>> >
>> >From: Kurt Plummer <ch1...@earthlink.net>
>> >
>>
>> >As is Some Basics-
>> >
>> >1. Read the Mission Brief. If it lists target winds and expected TOT's
>USE
>> >THEM
>> >to set your run compass index. Put the sun behind you and the winds
>> >following
>> >or
>> >from a near-neutral (along trac
>>
>> But whatt happens if the wind direction and velocities change from breifing
>to
>> attack? This is often more the case than not. Depending on that data,
>quite
>> old by the time of the attack sounds a bit dicey? (s)
>>
>> Arthur Kramer
>I had never heard that the Nordens could compensate for drift like you
>mention
>later on down the thread, that's kewl. Were you say 'tracking' the smoke
>generator pot drifts of surface effect or only the local (pitot feed?) flow
>around
>the airframe...??
>
>
>Thanks- Kurt Plummer
>
The Norden solved both drift and dropping angle problems. You had to correct
the wind drift by stopping the veritcal crosshair from drifting. Thsi was done
as you stopped its movement the autopilot (or pilot) would get corrections on
the PDI. If you failed to kill drift before the indexes crossed, the vertical
crosshair wouldn't stay on the target and you would get a wild release. It is
hard to describe all this without drawing diagrams, but the Norden was a
miracle of precision for its time and its accuracy,under ideal conditions was
remarakable.This becomes apparant if you drove through Germany in 1945 and saw
the ruin.
Art, at least you can talk bombing in this NG.
The Brits took a basting too, and you don't hear them whining about it.
I wonder how the Norden compared to the RAF Mark 14.
I guess at night just finding the city was pretty good. The Germans would
play tricks with decoy fires.
Ever regret not staying in? My sister is a lifer in the air force and it's
been great.
They even have a day care centre. Mike.
Currently, the mainstream measure of bombing accuracy is CEP or "Circular
Error Probable" (less widely referred to as CEP50). The layman's definition
is that it is a circle drawn with the target at the center, with a radius
such that 50% of the bombs under consideration fall inside that circle.
When considering the inherent ballistic dispersion of a freefall bomb, the
CEP is more often calculated in milliradians (mils) of arc around the target
point, along the axis of the ballistic path. Since this is an ellipse
rather than a circle (unless the impact angle is 90 degrees), a CEP in feet
can only be estimated (though along-path probable error and cross-path
probable error can be calculated in feet).
When scoring hits on a range, the calculation of CEP is straightforward: it
is the median distance from target center, without regard to direction, of
all hits scored. For your example drop of 100 bombs, you list the hit
distances from closest to, to farthest from, the target. The CEP is the
median distance (distance of the middle hit), which in this case is the
average of the 50th and 51st hits.
The bottom line is that 50% of the bombs fall on or inside the CEP distance,
and 50% fall outside it. Unless the USAAC definition of "circle of error"
or "CE" was significantly different, a CE of 27' means 50% of your hits were
outside 27'.
---------------------
John R. Weiss
Seattle, WA
Remove *NOSPAM* from address for e-mail reply
ArtKramr wrote in message <19990216213522...@ng-fz1.aol.com>...
>>Subject: Re: Bombing 101 or how to hit the target?
>>From: ke...@Lehigh.EDU
>
>> Even so, a "circle of error" of
>>>27' suggests half of your bombs were dropped outside a 27' radius from
your
>>>target (using the widely-accepted definition of CEP).
>
>It doesn't mean anyhting like that. Obviously you really don't understand
the
>term CE at all. And I am getting fed up with these incessant stupid claims
>that the USAAC couldn';t hit a damn thing or bomb accurately. How the hell
do
>you think Germany became a crushed smoking ruin? All your picky little
carping
>is a lot of crap. And I have lost interest in this discussion.
>
ArtKramr wrote:
<snipped>
> The Norden solved both drift and dropping angle problems. You had to correct
> the wind drift by stopping the veritcal crosshair from drifting. Thsi was done
> as you stopped its movement the autopilot (or pilot) would get corrections on
> the PDI. If you failed to kill drift before the indexes crossed, the vertical
> crosshair wouldn't stay on the target and you would get a wild release. It is
> hard to describe all this without drawing diagrams, but the Norden was a
> miracle of precision for its time and its accuracy,under ideal conditions was
> remarakable.This becomes apparant if you drove through Germany in 1945 and saw
> the ruin.
Art, I can't and I won't argue with you about techological quality of
the Norden bombsight.
I think the problem with the use of the Norden was assuming that the set
of conditions necessary for the Norden to achieve its potential accuracy
could be duplicated in European weather facing intense fighter and flax
resistance.
David
>Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>>ArtKramr wrote:>>
>>>
>Wind: In the new birds the inertial gives you the wind.
>In old birds the nav has to figure it out using a drift
>meter and 'double drift' methods.
>
>It is the wind acting on teh airplane at time of release that
>adds the vector to the bomb's velocity. Wind on the bomb in
>flight isn't normally that big a factor. For example a 60 knot
>wind at right angles to the aircraft path at release (not uncommon
>in winter at 8000 MSl - typical release altitude in 45 dive at 500K)
>goves a 1nm/min sideways vector; that's 2000 yards in 60 seconds or
>100 feet in one second. If bomb time-to-fall is 10 seconds (to make
>it simple) then the bomb will impact 1000 feet down wind from the no-wind
>impact point. I can remember having to aim 600 feet or so upwind at Avon
>Park range in Florida so this is really a world-wide problem.
> So it's wind velocity times bomb time to fall for the offset aim point.
>The bomb tables give the offset value in feet per knot of wind. The simplest
>way to apply this value is to offset the aimpoint in the direction the wind
>is coming from.
> Values of feet-per-knot depend upon the weapon and the bomb fall time. For
>a toss of a drogued weapon they get up over 65 feet per knot!
> Everything depends on being on speed, on dive angle, in coordinated and
>unaccelerated flight at release point at the correct height above the target.
> It ain't a simple maneuver! But after a (long) while it starts to become
>a TLAR operation - That Looks About Right!
> Walt BJ ftr plt ret
But this does assume that the wind is the same from the moment the
bomb is released untill impact.
I can imagine that over a flat desert this might be the case, but I
know that where I live wind at higher altititude usually is directed
different from halfway down. Then it starts getting more difficult to
compensate for that.
But of course it all depends on what CEP you find acceptable with dumb
bombs
Marc
The Norden could do the job. But it took a bombardier and pilot team to
withstand flack, fighters and weather to operate the Norden to its utmost. Very
often this was the case. Sometimes it was not. But you can't blame the Norden
for that. If I missed a target, it wasn't the Nordens fault it was my fault in
the same sense that if I fired a rifle at a target and missed, you can't blame
the rifle. But usinghte Norden even under the tough conditions, we still
reduced Germany to a smoking ruin.
>Art, at least you can talk bombing in this NG.
>The Brits took a basting too, and you don't hear them whining about it.
>I wonder how the Norden compared to the RAF Mark 14.
> I guess at night just finding the city was pretty good. The Germans would
>play tricks with decoy fires.
>Ever regret not staying in? My sister is a lifer in the air force and it's
>been great.
>They even have a day care centre. Mike.
Never wanted to stay in. I guess that the magic was gone once the war ended and
I justr wanted ot go home and not worry every day if I was going to be alive
tommorrow. (s)
>Maybe you better tell us what you mean by "circle of error" or CE, then...
>
>Currently, the mainstream measure of bombing accuracy is CEP or "Circular
>Error Probable" (less widely referred to as CEP50). The
The CE or circle of error was actual error, not probability. If I dropped one
bomb in the shack area, and another bomb 100 feet away, then the CE for the two
bombs was 50 feet. The phrase "circular error probable" sounds like an
oxymoron. If you actually dropped the bomb and its point of impact could be
measured, how was there anything probable about this? It seems 100% actual. I
guess there is something that I don't understand about the CEP concept.
Your mother was probably more relieved than you were.
I'm a paramedic, but I always enjoyed my peacetime reserve time.
Couldn't let yourself worry too much, or you wouldn't be able to focus on
the job.
Was the GI Bill pretty generous?
When my dad got home to Canada he was able to get a job right away.
He was in the navy and had a good time.
Here's a good article on the Norden, if anyone interested. Fascinating
instruement.
Is there anywhere on the web with a blow-up type diagram. I've heard Art
try to explain it a number of times, but to tell you the truth, without
pictures etc, I , as a non-flyer, find it difficult to even understand
the basics.
http://www.airspacemag.com/ASM/Mag/Index/1995/FM/swpn.html
It is possible to get a very tight cluster of hits, and hence a small CEP, where
the entire cluster has missed the target. Measuring hits in relation to the target
center does not generate a CEP, although it sure is certainly more critical in
winning an engagement. Aligning each weapon's boresight puts that tight cluster
(small CEP) of rounds on the target.
Illigitimus Non Carnborundum!
William D. Allen Sr.
end
>But this does assume that the wind is the same from the moment the
>bomb is released untill impact.
I think you're missing something. The effect is the force on the
plane affecting the initial drop vector. The wind on the way down
doesn't affect the bomb as much as that initial direction. The drop
platform is a lot more sensitive to the wind than the projectile.
Not that the lower level winds don't have an effect, but they are
much smaller terms in the equation.
(If I've got that right. This realization was one of the
enlightenments for me in the early part of the thread.)
-dB
>t is possible to get a very tight cluster of hits, and hence a small CEP,
>where
>the entire cluster has missed the target. Measuring hits in relation to the
>target
>center does not generate a CEP, although it sure is certainly more critical
>in
>winning an engagement. Aligning each weapon's boresight puts that tight
>cluster
>(small CEP) of rounds on the target.
>
>illiam D. Allen Sr.
I may not understand CEP at all, but it sounds like a way to make a lousy load
of hits look good without relating it to damage to the target. Sort of what we
might call politically correct bombing. (ssheeesh)
Sounds like 'grouping', as in rifle shooting...you're way ahead of the
game if your group is 'tight' or small, no matter where it is on the
target, that's just a matter of adjusting the sights to center the
group on the bull...if your group is 'loose', even if it _is_
centered, then you're screwed.,
--
Gord Beaman
PEI, Canada
Hitting the ground is easy. Hitting the target is harder. And I'm sure you must
have dropped lots of 'blue boys' back in teh States before you went over, right?
Walt BJ
>Hitting the ground is easy. Hitting the target is harder. And I'm sure you
>must
>have dropped lots of 'blue boys' back in teh States before you went over,
>right?
> Walt BJ
Exactly 100 M-38A2 Blues.
>Sounds like 'grouping', as in rifle shooting...you're way ahead of the
>game if your group is 'tight' or small, no matter where it is on the
>target, that's just a matter of adjusting the sights to center the
>group on the bull...if your group is 'loose', even if it _is_
>centered, then you're screwed.,
>--
>Gord Beaman
>PEI, Canada
>
In WW II the "group" was predetermined by the intervelometer settings assuming
your wings were straight and level and there was no skid component involved at
the moment of release. A lousy pilot can mess up even the best bombardier.
I'll drink to that. (grin)
I have never seen CEP defined that way with
regard to bombing accuracy. It is always defined
with reference to the aimpoint (target), as John
Weiss (I think) described. It sounds to me as if
you're describing what John would call
dispersion, i.e. how much ballistic ordnance will
deviate from the predicted hitpoint of the nominal
weapon. The latter is a measure of the inherent
ballistic accuracy and repeatability of the
weapon; the former shows how close you're likely
to hit to the target, taking the whole system into
account.
As an example of dispersion, the internal M61
Vulcan in an F-4 has a 5 mil dispersion
(assuming you're using the tightest dispersion
collar), while a pod-mounted M61has an 8 mil
dispersion (presumably due to vibration of the
pod). However, the CEP of either will probably
be greater than that, due to errors or
inaccuracies in the system (whether human,
mechanical, electrical or natural). It is CEP that
determines how many sorties it is likely to take
for a particular target to be destroyed.
For example, I've been reading John Terraine's
book "A Time for Courage," a history of the RAF in
WW2 in Europe and the Middle East. He describes
the impact of the Butt Report, which was an
analysis of RAF night bombing accuracy up to
1942 (more accurately, it was an analysis of
night navigation accuracy). The report stated
that, of the aircraft which reported attacking
their target, only 1/2 (I think that was the
fraction; it may have been 1/3rd, but let's
assume 1/2) were within 5 miles of their target
(city centers), or a CEP of 5 miles. The report's
author pointed out that a five mile CEP meant that
for any German city other than Berlin, most of
the bombs would be hitting in open country. Few
cities are that big, and certainly not
symmetrically. Thus, unless Bomber Command
could radically improve their navigation, most of
their effort would continue to be wasted on open
country, and they'd never be able to inflict
serious damage on German cities with a practical
number of aircraft.
Now, we can compare that with day radar bombing
accuracy a couple of years later (late '43-45) by
the USAAF heavies - 10,000 ft. CEPs, or about 2
miles. Not exactly precision, is it, but adequate
for area bombing of many larger cities.
Using the Norden from a heavy at altitude, CEP is
down to 3,300 feet (over 1/2 mile), which
means that a single a/c has some miniscule
chance of putting a few bombs inside the grounds
of a particular factory, if it's a very large one.
So, to be sure of hitting it with enough bombs to
do adequate damage, you send several hundred B-
17s/24s in formation, most of whose bombs will,
on average, miss the target.
And so on down to ordnance with 5-10 foot CEPs
that can target individual air shafts with a
reasonable chance of hitting them:-)
BTW, Art, that German cities were largely
destroyed has little or nothing to do with the
Norden bombsight's accuracy, and more to do with
the quantity and type of bombs dropped. In WW2,
for RAF Bomber Command almost always, and 8th
and Fifteenth Air Force whenever the weather
wouldn't allow anything else (or deliberately, in
the case of Dresden), the cities as a whole were
the targets. A Norden isn't required for that,
although it helps if you want to destroy a
particular part of a city.
Guy
P.S. Art, I've also seen CEP sometimes defined as
'circle of equal probability,' at least in some
English sources. I don't know if that helps you get
a handle on the concept, but the idea is the same -
50% of the bombs hit inside the circle, 50%
outside.
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
>Using the Norden from a heavy at altitude, CEP is
>down to 3,300 feet (over 1/2 mile), which
>means that a single a/c has some miniscule
>chance of putting a few bombs inside the grounds
>of a particular factory, if it's a very large one.
>So, to be sure of hitting it with enough bombs to
>do adequate damage, you send several hundred B-
>17s/24s in formation, most of whose bombs will,
>on average, miss the target.
>
>And so on down to ordnance wi
My experience tells me your conclcusions ar eincorrect. The 3300 feet is a
syatistical number which is th eresul tfrom doem missions hitting the target
dead on and destrroying it whil eother were gross errors. It is unreasonable to
look at that number and say every bomber in the ETO using a Norden had an error
of 3300 feet. I flew 50 missions and had "good" results in 40 of the missions
which meant the majority of my bombs landed in the target area. I had a few
"Poor" which meant only a few of the bombs landed in the target area and only
one mission which was rated as "gross" where none of the bombs landed in the
target area. That number of 3300 feet included weather and enemy action which
had nothing to do with the accuracy of the Norden, as any bombardier
knows.>BTW, Art, that German cities were largely
>destroyed has little or nothing to do with the
>Norden bombsight's accuracy, and more to do with
>the quantity and type of bombs dropped. In WW2,
>for RAF Bomber Command almost always, and 8th
Nonsense. If that were true we would have only blown up empty fields and
Germany would have escaped with nary a blemish. But Germany was wrecked,
burned to the ground with all capabilites destroyed by our bombing. We must
have hit something dead on. You would understand better had you walked through
Germany in 1945 and seen what little was left.. Or ask a German whoi was there
at the time.
>I figured out the Warthog ain't Kosher: It parteth not the hoof, having
>one wheel on each strut, and it cheweth the scud. Per Leviticus, they
>ain't fer eatin'.
LOL. I often wondered why the Israelis never bought any A-10s...now I
know why !
- John T.
: I may not understand CEP at all, but it sounds like a way to make a lousy load
: of hits look good without relating it to damage to the target. Sort of what we
: might call politically correct bombing. (ssheeesh)
It is like grades in school. Using practice bombs, damage to the target
is minimal. However, a string of 8 pop-up attacks/drops on the range can
be 'graded', and CEP [which I always heard as Circular Error of
Probability] is the 'grade' they use. On most ranges, the strikes are
triangulated, so the actual distance from the target is known [50' at 6,
shack, 25' at 12, shack, 75' at 9 [oops, watch out for the troops], etc.]
for the CEP calculation. A 50' CEP, achieved often, is a pretty good
indicator that a pilot is safe to send out on CAS missions. A 300 or 500
yard CEP would suggest a transfer to helos [or the Air Force and nuke
bombers as we used to joke.] The grunts tend to get a bit hostile when
500#ers are dropped on them. You were there, Art. How popular was the
USAAF after they dropped on *our* troops in Normandy? I suspect it took
a little while for the bitter taste in the grunts mouths to be overcome.
OJ III
[Actually, my father never forgave the USAAF for that, even to the day he
died.]
> You were there, Art. How popular was the
>USAAF after they dropped on *our* troops in Normandy? I suspect it took
>a little while for the bitter taste in the grunts mouths to be overcome.
>
>OJ III
>[Actually, my father never forgave the USAAF for that, even to the day he
>died.]
Deaths bt friendly fire were common every day of the war and on every side. In
those terms, the artillery did their share as well. And how many bombers were
shot down by our own flak batteries with nervous triggers? It waspart of the
war. Tragic but common.
Misses relative to the target are obviously important but they do not represent CEP. CEP
is a mathematical probability concept. It is not a military term. And the correct
terminology is Circular Error Probable, the radius of the smallest circle which encloses
half the shots, regardless of what they were shot at.
So why is this important? During weapon system development it is critical to be able to
identify and separate out each of the various system error factors for analysis and
reduction to maximize weapon system effectiveness.
Yours truly,
William D. Allen Sr.
end
g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
> I have never seen CEP defined that way with
> regard to bombing accuracy. It is always defined
> with reference to the aimpoint (target), as John
> Weiss (I think) described...
Absolutely: CEP is a statistical measure. The 3,300 feet even includes the
effect of rancid candy bars:-) CEP is system effectiveness under a defined
set of circumstances, and the 3,300 feet is an average effectiveness
including all factors. Change one factor, and the CEP changes. For
instance, specify that cloud cover is 2/10ths or less and the CEP will
improve considerably. You can specify CEP including or leaving out any
factors you wish. In your case, you were usually bombing at 10-12,000 feet,
weren't you? That change by itself would improve your CEP compared to the
heavies, which were normally at twice the height using the same system.
Taking the Butt Report again (got Terraine's book with me), here's the
conclusions (this was up to late 1941 for RAF Bomber Command at night):
"1. Of those a/c recorded as attacking their target, only one in three got
within five miles.
2. Over the French ports, the proportion was two in three; over Germany as a
whole, the proportion was one in four; over the Ruhr, it was only one in ten.
3. In the full moon, the proportion was two in five; in the new moon it was
only one in fifteen.
4. In the absence of haze, the proportion is over one half, whereas over
thick haze it is only one in fifteen.
5. An increase in the intensity of AA fire reduces the number of a/c getting
within five miles of their target in the ratio of three to two.
6. All these figures relate only to a/c recorded as _attacking_ the target;
the proportion of total sorties which reached within five miles is less by
one third."
So, if you want to know what the likely CEP is of an attack on the Ruhr with
a full moon, heavy haze (all that coal burning), and heavy AA, you've got the
info that will let you know how many a/c you will have to send to achieve a
result, on average (and allowing for the inevitable aborts).
>BTW, Art, that German cities were largely
> >destroyed has little or nothing to do with the
> >Norden bombsight's accuracy, and more to do with
> >the quantity and type of bombs dropped. In WW2,
> >for RAF Bomber Command almost always, and 8th
>
> Nonsense. If that were true we would have only blown up empty fields and
> Germany would have escaped with nary a blemish. But Germany was wrecked,
> burned to the ground with all capabilites destroyed by our bombing. We must
> have hit something dead on. You would understand better had you walked through
> Germany in 1945 and seen what little was left.. Or ask a German whoi was there
> at the time.
Art, RAF Bomber Command was responsible for, IIRC, over half the bomb tonnage
dropped on Germany. Lubeck, Rostock, Cologne, Hamburg, and lots of other
cities were almost completely wrecked by them, without any use of the Norden
bombsight. They did it with high explosive and lots of incendiaries. And I
have seen pictures of the destruction, and my father saw parts of France,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and Czechoslovakia with the 99th Division in
1944-1945. In addition to damage caused by bombing, artillery also
contributed a significant amount of destruction.
Now, if you want to discuss how many military or industrial facilities were
destroyed with/without use of the Norden, or the amount of collateral damage
caused, that's a different matter.
Take care,
Guy
As you describe it it had no relevance to the way we bombed information in WW
II. The clustering of the bombs was a function of the tightness of hte
formation verified by aerial strike phots.
>Taking the Butt Report again (got Terraine's book with me), here's the
>conclusions (this was up to late 1941 for RAF Bomber Command at night):
>
Taking stats to 1941 is invalid in terms of any conclusions since it was a low
point. And projecting those stats to 1945 doesn't cut it. Seems to me that your
are choosing stats to prove the RAF bombing was bad, even though it wrecked
Germany and was a major contributor to our winning the war. Besides, the RAF
did the best they could under tough circumstamces. Instead of crapping all over
them how about giving them credit for what they did acheive and what it cost
them in lives to achieve it.
In the practical sense Art is correct. But generally in a formation teh elad bombardier dropped the
bombs and everyone else pickled as his bombs came out. Now we look at the intervalometer settings
which governs spacing between bombs in the train, how wide and how long teh formation was, and that
determines the spacing between each bomb of the possibly hundreds that dropped. The idea was to get
the 'center bomb' of the entire pattern on the center of the target.
There are literally hundreds of feet of film showing bombs as they drop toward the target. They vary
from the He-111 dropping them tail-first to flip around as the hit teh airstream to teh ones out of B17s,
24s, 25s, 26s, 29s, just falling cleanly to the RAF tapered bombs with ring tails wobbling as they go
down.Then there's the B29 incendiary clusters opening as they fall away to scatter the individual fire
bombs widely.
What I'm trying to get across is that 'lab' results do not begin to compare with 'field' results.
A practice target consisting of a white painted pyramid in teh center of a big circle of tires painted
white on a flat hunk of desert is a lot easier to hit (spec when no one is shooting) than an enemy
target he's been doing his best to hide plus he's shooting at you. Oh yeah, you got to hit it the first
time too; making a second pass usually isn;t a real good idea.
There are lots and lots of film showing bombs walking across innocuous terrain of zero military value
left over from every war where bombing has been used. But drop enoug of the buggers and you're bound to
hit something . . . . and Germany actually isn't all that big; hell, it's onl;y about 600 miles from
London to Berlin! While over here in the USA it's 450 from Denver to KC!
>The idea was to get
>the 'center bomb' of the entire pattern on the center of the targe
Not so. There was no "center" bomb. The bomb dropped by the lead plane would
strike at the near edge of the target area. The intervelometer would then
release the bombs based on groundspeed so that the entire area is covered by
the entire formation. The bomb pattern on the ground would be a football shaped
pattern. If a plane was out of formation or released late, it would show up in
the strike photos as a bulge or hole in the football. So we can tell the
performance of every plane in the formation. Your comment about seeing films
where bombs fell on empty fields proves that we didn't hit every target every
time. No one ever said that we did. So I don't know why you are pointing this
out, inless you think that if it was you on that Norden you could have done
better than the bombardiers in WW II did.
The 8th Air Force and Bomber Command wanted nothing to do with tactical
support.
It was the Allied armies that requested them. That work was bettered suited
for medium bombers. RCAF Lancasters bombed Canadians too. And many trigger
happy ground gunners pounded up flak at the heavies.
Lancasters and B-17s were designed for strategic bombing.
Easier to burn a city down than blow it up.
Bombing photos can be misleading.
A hard target, like a rail yard, calls for HE. That's what gives it the
moon crater effect. interesting to see a photo taken up to six days later
as more and more delayed action timers started going off. This would allow
workers time to vacate the area and discourage repair crews.
Cities were fire bombed. Japanese cities were "seeded" differently because
they used a lot of wood compared to London or Berlin. HE would, hopefully,
break roads and water mains. They "cookies" or blockbusters would blast out
windows. The incendiaries could be put out with sand. But, there were
thousands of them.
So, even if a factory didn't look as bad as a rail yard, consider the
water damage from fire fighting and rain if the roof was gone. All the heat
and smoke and water and dirt to the machines. As well, bombing would have
a negative effect on employee morale. Many of whom were slaves to begin
with.
Success was measured by acres destroyed per acres attacked.
On the night of 9/10 Mar 1945, the USAAF burned out 16 sq. miles of Tokyo.
I think the problem with using the heavy bombers for tactical missions
had much more to do with the antipathy of the 8th AF and BC leaders to
such missions than on any limitations of Lanc and B-17 designs. I can't
think of a reason why B-17s would have been less successful at tactical
raids than B-26s, for example, and given their greater bomb load, they
likely would have been more effective. The bottom line is that the
"bomber barons" were passionately--almost fanatically--convinced that
the way to win the war was by bombing German cities and/or industry.
They viewed any deviation from that purpose as an unneeded and harmful
distraction. Since they had no desire to make tactical bombing work,
they never tried. Given that, the mixed results obtained are not really
surprising.
The interesting question is, what might have happened if someone as
innovative and adaptable as Quesada had been in charge of some or all of
the heavy bombers? With good planning, close coordination between the
ground and airforces, and a commitment to success, heavies might have
been developed into an enormously effective tactical weapon.
Jim Erickson
Bombing through the industrial haze of the Ruhr or cooking fires of Japan
are different conditions then encountered on the prairies of Texas or
Alberta.
Bombing Japan equalled the flying time of London to NYC. They weren't going
to salvo into the sea. The RAF figured it was better to bomb anything in
Germany than nothing at all. Blind bombing relied on H2S. The US used H2X.
Well, Ike said if Harris didn't support him he was going home.
From 14 April 1944, the 8th AF and Bomber Command worked for SHAEF.
"No historian could possibly be aware of the depth of my obligation to you."
President Eisenhower to Bomber Harris
5 June,
1964.
Jim, read Massacre Over the Marne. The RAF had to make 3 trips to Revigny
rail yard in France in July 1944. At night. Each trip was double the
flying time to the Ruhr. Three trips were needed because orders were not to
risk French civilians. They had to bring bombs back to base. Estimates
were that such raids would kill 40,000 French civilians. Those 3 trips
equalled 6 visits to the Ruhr. And, bombing the Ruhr each and every trip.
Revigny, a place few have ever heard of, cost 41 Lancasters.
The Luftwaffe simply moved night fighter stations to eastern France when
they figured out the change in strategy.
Therefore, using Lancasters to bomb in Normandy was safe ( relatively ) for
the Lanc's but dangerous to soldiers. Sending Lanc's on deep penetration
raids into France was dangerous to civilians and airmen. I think Lancasters
got the most bang for the buck hitting Germany. What they lacked in
precision, they made up in quantity.
And quantity has a quality all it's own.
Lancaster crews were not familiar with formation flying. Calling off or
changing a heavy bomber strike, once it got started was very difficult.
Much more so than calling in artillery co-ordinates.
Gen. Hansell tried precision bombing Japan in preparation for invasion and
was getting nowhere. Hap Arnold fired him and told LeMay to get results or
get the sack.
The philosophy was, as Gen. LeMay put it when referring to Vietnam, "Why
swat flies. Go after the manure pile." A rather blunt way of putting it,
but it got the point across.
Under the same ideal conditions we could do the same in Europe, and did time
after time. What gets me is how everyone who never operated a Norden or flew
a mission critisize our accuracy as though if they were in our place they could
do better than we did. Not likely. And the overlook the fact that we
destroyed Germany's ability to wage war. That's a lot more than out critics
ever did.
I am still trying to find even a diagram of a Norden. I wouldn't know one
if I tripped over it. The bottom line is you, and other Allies, got the
job done. Most of your learning would have been on the job, as you went
along.
Paramedics are trained in classrooms, or "labs". Doing it on the street
at 4 AM is another situation entirely.
I think anyone anylising results of bombing a defended target in poor
visibiltity would take that into consideration.
Excuse me, Art, but how am I crapping all over them? Those were the results
at the time, and it was because of their ineffectiveness _at the time_ that
they put so much emphasis on developing radio navaids (Gee, Oboe, G-H),
bombing radar (H2S and the American offshoot H2X), the Pathfinders, Master
bombers and the like, which led to their ability to devastate virtually every
German city with a population of 100,000 or more in the 1944-45 period.
Where did I ever not give them credit for what they accomplished? Seems to
me that was the point of my last message, that they managed to do all that
without the Norden bombsight.
I can certainly take issue with Harris' decision (and the passive acquiescence
of Portal and others) to continue trying to destroy Germany city by city, when
they had achieved the capability to be more accurate and target military
objectives specifically, but that's certainly not the fault of the crews.
>Well, Ike said if Harris didn't support him he was going home.
>From 14 April 1944, the 8th AF and Bomber Command worked for SHAEF.
>"No historian could possibly be aware of the depth of my obligation to you."
> President Eisenhower to Bomber Harris
> 5 June,1964.
>Jim, read Massacre Over the Marne.
<deleted>
No dispute that BC and the 8th AF bombed tactical targets around D-Day.
But there is a huge difference between following orders and exercising a
commitment to a strategy. Harris and Spaatz protested vehemently
against a policy they thought was a waste, one that was a drain on the
"real" way to beat Germany. It's not too far off to say they were
dragged kicking and screaming into the tactical battle in France. Given
their reluctance, it's fair to say that the heavy bomber was not given
the chance to prove itself as a tactical weapon.
Put it this way. If you want to see if something's possible, are you
more likely to succeed with people who have already been convinced that
it's a lost cause and a waste of time, or with someone who is open to
the possibilities, willing to experiment and learn, and has a commitment
to making it work? The first situation is what happened. I can't help
but think if someone innovative like Quesada had been given the chance,
the results might have been far different.
Jim Erickson
Art, just who has criticised your accuracy? I'm not aware that anyone has
done so - I certainly haven't. I have stated the overall achieved accuracy,
no more and no less. No one here is indulging in armchair quarterbacking,
that I'm aware of. Am I criticising Ed's and his confrere's accuracy, or
implying that I think I could have done better, when I state that Combat CEP
of F-105s doing dive-bombing in Route Pack 6 (heavy defenses) using direct
mode (manually- depressed reticle, trying to hit the exact airspeed,
altitude, and dive angle) was 425-450 feet in 1967-68? No, just stating the
information that the people who planned the missions had and used.
If I say that Dive-toss CEP in the F-4D in the same period was actually
slightly worse (due to malfunctions, difficulty of use etc.), and that the
F-4E using the same mode achieved about 150 Ft. CEPs in 1972 (mainly due to
more emphasis on maintenance and more reliable systems, especially among the
388th at Korat, for which people like John Tomany are responsible; he puts
"Korat Dive-Toss" in his sig line for a reason), am I implying that the
pilots in 1972 were more skilled or braver than the ones who flew in 1967?
If I say that Combat CEPs for LGBs used by the 8th TFW at Ubon in the '69-'72
period were 15-30 feet, am I saying that the pilots at Ubon were bigger studs
than those at Takhli, Korat, Da Nang or other bases who only had dumb bombs,
and that I think I would have done better, given the chance? I can't find
any such imputation in my posts, Art.
As to destroying Germany's ability to wage war, sure you did. And so did the
Navy and the Army. We won.
Mike,
Thanks for the (misplaced) vote of confidence. I can't offer any help,
because I learned nearly everything I know about bombsights,
bombardiers, and the arming and dropping of bombs, from reading Art's
stuff here and elsewhere.
Jim Erickson
> Under the same ideal conditions we could do the same in Europe, and
> did time after time. What gets me is how everyone who never operated
> a Norden or flew a mission critisize our accuracy as though if they
> were in our place they could do better than we did.
Who criticized your accuracy, Art? I'd really like to see such a
posting. I haven't seen a single posting that said anything critical,
although I have seen postings that said that high-altitude bombing is
not the way to deliver bombs on small targets with pin-point
accuracy. That's just how it is; it's about a critical as saying that
airplanes have wings.
I've read postings saying that, for reasons inherent in the delivery
technique and the design of the bombs themselves, it was then (and
probably still is) essentially impossible to drop only one bomb and
have it land on a relatively small target, but that's not criticism,
just an acknowledgement of physics (aerodynamics is physics, by the
way).
I've read other postings saying that dispersion is fairly large when
dropping bombs from high altitudes. Again, that's not criticism, just
an acknowledgement of physics.
According to my uncle, the one shot down over Ploesti, typical targets
in German were factories, railyards, and other large facilities. He
says that the goal was to get enough bombs on or near the target to
destroy it. He also says that doing so meant putting a lot of bombs
on the surrounding area, because the bombing was not pin-point
accurate. Actually he said that highly accurate bombing from altitude
was regarded as having at least half the bombs land on or near the
target, inaccurate bombing was having none land on or near it, and
most bombing was somewhere inbetween. He also said that the bombing
was sometimes so inaccurate that they'd have to go back and rebomb the
same target again, sometimes more than once. (Either Deig
I don't understand why mentioning that increasing altitude increases
dispersion, or that precision bombing, in the LGB sense, wasn't
possible in WW II, or that not every bomb hit the target is
criticism. I thought it was just being realistic about how things
work.
I don't believe you're claiming that no Allied bomb ever missed its
target, or that bombing from altitude produces a nice, tight cluster,
or that you could drop a dumb bomb down a ventilation shaft from
20,000 ft, so I must be missing some part of this thread where people
were critical. Did someone write that the bomber crews dropped bombs
improperly or intentionally missed targets or tried to hit places that
weren't targets?
> Not likely. And the overlook the fact that we destroyed Germany's
> ability to wage war. That's a lot more than out critics ever did.
Which critics? After all, every bomb dropped over Germany hit
_something_ there, which no doubt affected the ability to wage war,
but that doesn't mean every bomb was delivered accurately. I'm just
finding it hard to believe that you're saying that every bomb hit the
target, no bombs ever missed, and nothing anyone else did affected
Germany's ability to wage war (which, by the way means that the Dam
Busters were useless, as they didn't bomb from altitude in massed
raids). That doesn't jibe with what my uncle has said or what other
participants have written. Nor does it jibe with the bomb damage
assessments written during the war, while the bombing was in progress
and repeat strikes being scheduled.
--
Mary Shafer NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA
SR-71 Flying Qualities Lead Engineer Of course I don't speak for NASA
sha...@reseng.dfrc.nasa.gov DoD #362 KotFR
URL http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/People/Shafer/mary.html
For personal messages, please use sha...@ursa-major.spdcc.com
The mix of incendiary/HE also changed due to other factors. By 1945, Bomber
Command had cut way down on the use of incendiaries; everything that could be
burned in German cities already had. With the B-29 bombing of Japan, they
would periodically switch to HE when they ran out of incendiaries.
> So, even if a factory didn't look as bad as a rail yard, consider the
> water damage from fire fighting and rain if the roof was gone. All the heat
> and smoke and water and dirt to the machines. As well, bombing would have
> a negative effect on employee morale. Many of whom were slaves to begin
> with.
One of the most startling findings to come out of the Strategic Bombing
survey was just how difficult it was to destroy machine tools. The factory
buildings might well be completely wrecked, but the machine tools were often
usable (or able to be made so in a fairly short period of time. The rapid
recovery of most bombed German factories, which appeared from recon photos to
be completely destroyed, was quite unexpected during the war. They might not
have roofs or walls, but they'd still be producing.
Even nukes have a tough time unlless they're close; "The Effects of Nuclear
Weapons" by Glasstone and Dolan discusses this. Of course, if you've killed
everyone who would operate the tools, it's a moot point.
> In article <19990218000127...@ng-fa1.aol.com>,
> artk...@aol.com (ArtKramr) wrote:
> > >Subject: Re: Bombing 101 or how to hit the target?
> Taking the Butt Report again (got Terraine's book with me), here's the
> conclusions (this was up to late 1941 for RAF Bomber Command at night):
>
> Now, if you want to discuss how many military or industrial facilities were
> destroyed with/without use of the Norden, or the amount of collateral damage
> caused, that's a different matter.
>
> Take care,
>
> Guy
>
> -----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
> http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
Hey Guy,
I read somewhere that the RAF average after the pathfinders and OBOE or whatever it
was called was only about 400' and that this actually /beat/ the daylight average by
quite a margin, IF the marker flares didn't fall wrong, IF they weren't spoofed by
German flak illuminators modified to the same color and pattern and IF the followon
formations were one of the elite squadrons.
Kind surprising, I thought the RAF standard was 'burnem out and crush a few
bombshelters' with semirandom patterns of 2-4Klbers amidst a HUGE load of almost
window-like incendiaries laid down almost haphazardly over these great big burning
vistas.
I'm also surprised, since the Y-service(?) was so good at comms tracking and the
Luftwaffe had their own extensive X/Y/Z Gerat's, that they didn't 'pick up on' the
bombing aid improvements in accuracy by pseudo-TACAN 'crosshairs' and simply wipe
them out the way they did Gee, almost the second the bombers were 'coast in' with the
low countries in sight.
Got any deeper explanations for me?
Thank You- Kurt Plummer
>Hey Guy,
>
>I read somewhere that the RAF average after the pathfinders and OBOE or
>whatever it
>was called was only about 400' and that this actually /beat/ the daylight
>average by
>quite a margin, IF the marker flares didn't fall wrong, IF they weren't
Yeah, where exactly did you read that?
Thanks, Jim.
Time to phone "Unsolved Mysteries".
I have a local vet who explained the Mark 14 to me, but likewise, he can
not compare it to the Norden.
Thanks for the thoughtful reply, Jim.
I am inclined to agree. To a point. <s>.
Gen. Spaatz was really on to something with the Oil Plan. I don't think the
Allies knew how effective it was. Harris, as is known, was obsessed with
area bombing. He seemed to have a real fixation on Berlin. But, that may
have been to please Stalin.
I must confess, I have never heard of "Quesada".
I shall have to look him, or her, up.
>Excuse me, Art, but how am I crapping all over them? Those were the results
>at the time, and it was because of their ineffectiveness _at the time_ that
Inefectiveness? Germany was being crushed. That is not inefective. The bombing
campaign all during the war was chockeing Germany to death and was extremely
successful. The bottom line is that in spite of all difficulties, which were
incredible, the job got done. Because the job was hard and many missions didn't
succeed does not prove that it was not effective. I guess you just don't
understand what is involved since you never had to do the job yourself. But
your bad mouthing a valiant effort is beneath contempt.
I wasn't in the war and I'm not a flyer, so I'm not speaking from
experience. I read and ask questions. These are just my opinions, so take
'em for what that's worth. <g>.
>Got any deeper explanations for me?
RAF Pathfinders took great care with night time precision marking over
*French* targets. Or, when HE was used for a "hard" target like a
specific factory.
Not all Bomber Command raids were incendiary.
Less caution was used over Germany.
But, having said that, I said to an RCAF bomber vet, "So I guess over
Germany, even if you had a problem identifying primary or secondary targets
in Germany, U would just salvo anywhere." He said, no. At briefing they
were told, in that situation, whether to dump them in a special "safe"
place in the N. Sea, or actually land with them at base ( I am informed
that bringing bombs home was contrary to US policy ).
Mike,
I don't know if you saw Art's post asking if there were any RAF bomb
aimers out there, so they could compare notes, so to speak; but you
might ask the vet you spoke with if he'd be interested in corresponding
with Art. If he is, put him in touch and we will all learn something.
Jim Erickson
>I have seen postings that said that high-altitude bombing is
>not the way to deliver bombs on small targets with pin-point
>accuracy. That's just how it is; it's about a critical as saying that
>airplanes have wings.
>
Nonxsense. I have dropped many ssngle bombs from altitude and hit small
targets. And pleasedon't lecture me on the physics of the bomb problem and
ballistic coefficients. I have been there and done that. The pointis that every
miossion won't be 100% succefful. That is a fact. And it is also shedding light
on the obvious. I resent those who want to make the entire bonmbing effort
seem ineffective, which is the essence of many of the messages on this
subject.>I have seen postings that said that high-altitude bombing is
>not the way to deliver bombs on small targets with pin-point
>accuracy. That's just how it is; it's about a critical as saying that
>airplanes have wings.
>
It was theonly way we had. We practised the art of the possible, and 20-20
hindsight is insulting and mindless.
>As to destroying Germany's ability to wage war, sure you did. And so did the
>Navy and the Army. We won.
>
>Guy
>
What do you mean "WE" ?
ArtKramr wrote:
<snipped>
> Inefectiveness? Germany was being crushed. That is not inefective. The bombing
> campaign all during the war was chockeing Germany to death and was extremely
> successful. The bottom line is that in spite of all difficulties, which were
> incredible, the job got done. Because the job was hard and many missions didn't
> succeed does not prove that it was not effective. I guess you just don't
> understand what is involved since you never had to do the job yourself. But
> your bad mouthing a valiant effort is beneath contempt.
The strategic bombing campaign against Nazi Germany was of the most hard fought,
and valient campaigns of modern warfare. The airmen that flew into the German
defense were heroic beyond measure and truely worthy of our lasting gratitude and
respect.
The effects of the bombing campaign has been studied and much debated. However
there is a problem with measuring the effectiveness of the air campaign. The
effective of the bombing campaign is not how much German war capacity was degraded.
Rather the effectiveness of the campagn is how much German war capacity was reduced
from what it would been without the air offensive. What if all those damned
eigthty-eights were on the Eastern front shooting Soviet tanks instead in Germany
shooting at Fort's. What would German war production have been had it not been
forced to disperse. How might the Battle of Bulge proceeded if Hitler's tank
divisions were not low on fuel.
You can't simply count the nunber of bomb craters, measure the rate fighter
production, etc and say this was the effectiveness of the air campaign How much
damage was done to the German ego when Herman Goering could look up and see
Mustangs over Berlin. A lot of this stuff is immeasurable. I say one measure of
the effectiveness of the campaign was how hard the Nazi's were trying to oppose it
and to counter act its effects.
Another measure of the effectiveness of airpower in World War Two, on all front,
was the establishment of the Air Force as seperate service. I for one moment
don't believe that I would served twenty years in the US Air Foree, rather than US
Army Air Corp had it not been for the effectiveness, of USAAC during the World War.
David
See what I can do.
There are two problems.
Explaining technical things to laypersons ( like me ) with a keyboard is
not easy.
Because of the high losses suffered by the US and RAF bomber crews ( many
of whom don't even have a grave ), questions or criticisms directed to
vets in open forum should be tactful.
I know one vet local to me ( Toronto ) did in fact lurk the WW2 NG, at my
request, and was discouraged by the tone of some of the posts that the
moderators let through.
Ironically, our freedom of speech is one of the things they fought for.
It was a pity. He was a brave man with a good record in the RCAF.
Any target is easier to hit from lower altitudes.
And, it's also easier for a flak gunner to hit a low flying bomber.
I agree. It was a success. And, absolutely necessary for the invasion.
Which, no matter what, had to be given every support.
But, I can't help wonder if the B-17s had been allowed to prosecute the
Oil Plan as vigorously as they wanted and if Harris been allowed to plaster
German industry ( and morale ) as he loved to do, maybe the war machine
would have cracked.
I'm not a tactician. But, what if they had focused more on bridges than
railyards?
Aren't they easier to destroy? And the Resistance could be very effective
against them.
Here I am playing armchair General lol. Hindsight is 20/20. But, that's
what amateurs do.
I have a nice quote from a captured German general who said the
Transportation Plan cost Germany the war. And, the customer is always
right, they say.
OTH, An American Air Force evaluation in 1945 concluded the pre D-Day
attacks on
French rail centres were not necessary and the 70,000 tons involved should
have gone to other targets.
"The real importance of the air war
consisted in the fact that it opened a second front long before the
invasion
of Europe. That front was the skies over Germany. The unpredictability of
air attacks made the front gigantic. Defence against air attacks
required............holding in readiness hundreds of thousands of
soldiers.
........this was the greatest lost battle on the German side.
If all of
Germanys defeats in Russia, North Africa, Italy and France were added
together they would not equal the defeat Germany sufferred by not being
able
to keep Allied aircraft out of Germanys skies."
Albert Speer.
>The strategic bombing campaign against Nazi Germany was of the most hard
>fought,
>and valient campaigns of modern warfare. The airmen that flew into the
>German
>defense were heroic beyond measure and truely worthy of our lasting gratitude
>and
>respect.
>
Thank you. I was wondering if anyone noticed.
The effectiveness of the campaign was that Germany was destoryed, rendered
incapable of fueling their tanks and planes and therefore unable to continue
the war. That is the effectiveness. Those who say after all this that they now
want to measure the effectiveness, are fools. The effectiveness has been
measured by the destruction done to Germany. There is no more. It is not me
that is measurirng crater holes. It is a bunch of civilians trying to unprove
something that we have already proven. And the present concentration on air
power is the direct result of what we accomplished. And that does not indicate
failure, it indicates smashing success.
>Germanys defeats in Russia, North Africa, Italy and France were added
>together they would not equal the defeat Germany sufferred by not being
>able
>to keep Allied aircraft out of Germanys skies."
> Albert Speer.
>
>
Dr. Speer knows wereof he speaks.