"JeffreyHamilton" <
bbere...@cogeco.ca> wrote in
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CEN11FA383
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On June 13, 2011, about 0947 central daylight time, a Boeing B-17G
"Flying Fortress" airplane, N390TH, experienced an in-flight fire and
emergency landing near Oswego, Illinois. One passenger sustained a minor
injury. The remaining 3 flight crew members and 3 passengers were not
injured. The airplane was substantially damaged as a result of the
postimpact fire. The airplane was registered to and operated by The
Liberty Foundation under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations
Part 91 as a repositioning flight. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed for the flight, which was not operated on a flight plan. The
flight originated from the Aurora Municipal Airport (ARR), Sugar Grove,
Illinois at 0938, with an intended destination of the Indianapolis
Regional Airport (MQJ).
The airplane had been at ARR for the weekend before the accident flight
as a planned stop for education/demonstration flights; however, a fuel
leak had interrupted the scheduled flights. A mechanic associated with
the Foundation evaluated and repaired the fuel leak the day prior to the
accident flight. According to the mechanic, a final inspection of the
repair the morning of the accident flight did not reveal any evidence of
a continued fuel leak at that time and the airplane was subsequently
returned to service.
The flight crew reported that they noticed a faint odor during initial
climb after takeoff. While attempting to locate the source of the odor,
the pilot noticed a small amount of smoke near the radio room. The flight
crew immediately initiated a turn with the intention of returning to ARR.
About that time, they received a call from the pilot of the accompanying
airplane advising that there was a fire visible on the left wing. The
third crew member onboard the B-17 subsequently confirmed a fire behind
the no. 2 engine. The pilot took control of the airplane from the co-
pilot and setup for an emergency landing to a field off the left side of
the airplane. The co-pilot then shut down the no. 2 engine and discharged
the fire bottles. The pilot executed an emergency landing to a corn field
about 8 miles southeast of ARR. The co-pilot noted that the airplane
touched down smoothly on speed about one-third of the way down the field.
The ground was firm and the airplane came to a smooth stop.
Emergency crews were hampered by the muddy field conditions, and the fire
ultimately consumed portions of the fuselage and the inboard portions of
both wings.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with single and
multi-engine land airplane ratings. His certificate included type ratings
for B-17, B-737, B-757, and B-767 airplanes. He was issued a first class
airman medical certificate without limitations on May 17, 2011. He
reported a total flight time of 14,178 hours, with 438 hours in B-17
airplanes. His most recent regulatory checkride was completed on April
17, 2011.
The co-pilot held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with single and
multi-engine land airplane ratings. His certificate included type ratings
for DC-9, B-757, B-767, and A320 airplanes. He was issued a first class
airman medical certificate with a limitation for corrective lenses on
March 4, 2011. He reported a total flight time of 15,000 hours, with 6
hours in B-17 airplanes. His most recent regulatory checkride was
completed on August 26, 2010.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident airplane was a Boeing B-17G "Flying Fortress," serial number
44-85734. It was mid-wing monoplane design, configured with a
retractable, tail wheel landing gear. The cockpit and cabin were
accessible through a door located on the right side of the fuselage just
forward of the horizontal stabilizer, or through a hatch located in the
bottom of the fuselage below the cockpit. The airplane was powered by
four 1,200 horsepower Wright model R-1820-97 nine-cylinder, radial
engines.
Available information indicated that the accident airplane was delivered
to the United States Army Air Force in 1945. In 1947, the airplane was
included in a lot of aircraft sold for scrap. However, the accident
airplane was not scrapped and was subsequently sold to the United
Aircraft Corporation/Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division for use as an
engine development test bed. In 1967, the airplane was donated to the
Connecticut Aviation Historical Association. Unfortunately, in 1979, the
airplane was severely damaged in a tornado. In 1999, a private individual
purchased the airplane with the intention of restoring it. During the
restoration process, the airplane was sold to the Liberty Foundation. The
restoration was completed in 2004 and the airplane was returned to an
airworthy condition. The FAA issued a limited special airworthiness
certificate in May 2005. At the time of the accident, the airplane was
being operated as a historical demonstration/exhibition aircraft by the
Liberty Foundation.
The airplane was maintained under a progressive inspection program. The
program was comprised of four incremental inspection procedures
designated "A", "B", "C", and "D", which were to be conducted at 25-hour
intervals, and periodic/non-routine inspection procedures as applicable.
The most recent incremental inspections were completed on: March 25,
2011, at 2,501.9 hours total time airframe (TTAF); April 21, 2011, at
2,529.6 hours TTAF; May 14, 2011, at 2,552.7 hours TTAF; and June 10,
2011, at 2,579.0 hours TTAF.
Documentation on file with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
revealed that a modification of the fuel system was completed during
restoration of the airplane. This modification involved removal of the
outboard fuel cells, also known as "Tokyo" tanks, and related fuel lines.
In addition, the fuel tank-to-fuel tank transfer system was replaced with
a fuel tank-to-engine cross-feed system. A corresponding FAA form 337,
Major Repair and Alteration, dated April 26, 2005, was on file with the
airplane records.
An airplane maintenance logbook entry, dated February 24, 2011, at
2,474.7 hours TTAF, noted that the aluminum fuel tanks had been removed
from the airplane, and that the rubber fuel bladder liners were removed
from the tanks. The aluminum tanks were subsequently welded to close the
bladder liner mounting relief holes and re-installed into the airplane.
An operational check of the fuel tank modification did not reveal any
anomalies and the airplane was returned to service. There was no
corresponding Major Repair and Alteration (FAA form 337) on file with the
airplane records. The mechanic that conducted the work noted that the
fuel bladders were degrading and occasionally clogging the fuel sumps.
The final maintenance logbook entry was dated June 13, 2011, the day of
the accident. The entry noted a repair to the inboard end of the no. 1
main fuel tank. A subsequent leak check did not reveal any anomalies and
the airplane was returned to service.
The mechanic who accomplished the fuel tank repair reported that he had
examined the no. 1 fuel tank the day before the accident because of a
fuel leak. He determined that the leak was due a 3-inch crack that was
located in the weld bead at the bottom edge of the tank near the sump
drain valve. The fuel leak was repaired by installing 5 bolts through the
fuel tank flange. An aluminum C-channel was then installed with sealant
over the fuel tank flange.
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
At 0952, the ARR Automated Surface Observing System recorded weather
conditions as: Wind from 060 degrees at 10 knots; 10 miles visibility;
clear skies; temperature 18 degrees Celsius; dew point 9 degrees Celsius;
altimeter 30.16 inches of mercury.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane came to rest on its landing gear in an agricultural field
located about 8 miles southeast of ARR. Ground tracks indicated that the
emergency landing was performed toward the east; approximate course 090
degrees. There did not appear to have been any damage to the airplane as
a direct result of off-airport landing. However, the in-flight and ground
fire substantially damaged the airplane.
In-flight photographs of the accident airplane showed the presence of
fire on the aft lower portion of the left wing between the no. 1
(outboard) and no. 2 (inboard) engines. Also located in the same area of
the fire were fuel tanks feeding the left-side engines.
In photographs taken shortly after the accident aircraft landed, heavy
fire conditions were present on the left side of the aircraft with the
fire spreading to the fuselage. By the time the fire was extinguished,
the inboard portion of both the left and right wings had been destroyed
by fire as well as most of the fuselage. The engines, empennage, fuselage
nose, and the outboard portions of both wings remained intact.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
A postaccident examination of the no. 1 main fuel tank was conducted
under the direct supervision of the NTSB investigator-in-charge. The
upper, inboard end of the fuel tank was deformed and ruptured consistent
with damage sustained after the landing. However, the area repair area
itself located at the center portion of the lower, inboard seam of the
tank appeared to exhibit minimal deformation. The aft portion of the
repair C-channel was partially separated from the tank seam. The
remainder of the C-channel appeared to be securely bonded to the tank.
The bolts installed at the time of the repair were intact and appeared to
be secure. The tank was filled with a small amount of water, which was
subsequently observed to leak from the aft section of the repair area in
the vicinity of the partially separated C-channel.
Further examination of the fuel tank was conducted by the NTSB materials
laboratory. A longitudinal crack, about 7.2 inches in length, was located
along the center of the weld seam. The fracture surface features were
consistent with fatigue, consistent with a progressive failure at the
weld seam. The sealant in the vicinity of the aft two repair bolts was
thin and the cured sealant did not conform to the inside shape of the C-
channel. The sealant along the remainder of the repair had adhered to the
fuel tank and provided full coverage over the weld seam. Additionally,
the cured sealant along this portion of the repair conformed to the
inside shape of the C-channel.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
FAA regulations (14 CFR Part 1) define a major alteration as one that is
not listed in the aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller specifications:
(1) that might appreciably affect weight, balance, structural strength,
performance, powerplant operation, flight characteristics, or other
qualities affecting airworthiness; or (2) that is not done according to
accepted practices or cannot be done by elementary operations. The
regulations (14 CFR Part 43) related to a major alteration specifically
include "changes to the basic design of the fuel, oil, cooling, heating,
cabin pressurization, electrical, hydraulic, de-icing, or exhaust
systems" as airframe alterations.
The FAA Major Repair and Alteration Data Approval Job Aid provides
guidance to Aviation Safety Inspectors in evaluating requests for field
approvals. The document notes that a change to, or addition of, permanent
fuel tanks or fuel system components, may be eligible for approval by
means other than a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), but require FAA
approved data. This data may be obtained from a Designated Engineering
Representative (DER), Organization Designation Authorization (ODA)
approved engineering data or through ACO coordinated field approval.
The airplane records on file with the FAA included approvals for
modification of the fuel crossfeed system and removal of outboard fuel
tanks, radio room seating, and a tail wheel modification, as well as
lighting and avionics upgrades. However, the file did not include any
application for, or approval of, the most recent modification to the fuel
tanks, which included removal of the fuel bladders.
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20110613X14032&key=1
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief2.aspx?ev_id=20110613X14032
&ntsbno=CEN11FA383&akey=1