Gun Pods on Navy F-4s: Why not?
Matt Wiser
adopted the SUU-23 gun pod for their F-4s? The AF certainly did for the 366th TFW's
Phantoms, and got gun kills of MiGs as a result. Phantom crews were screaming for a gun
in the USN, but had to wait until the F-14 came along with an internal Vulcan. What was the
story? NAVAIR not approve it or what? It's been said in several books that had VF-96's
Phantoms had guns on 10 May 72, there would've been several more MiG kills that day.
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Rob van Riel
> Has anyone found out why, as the air war over NVN heated up in 1966-67, the USN never
> adopted the SUU-23 gun pod for their F-4s? The AF certainly did for the 366th TFW's
> Phantoms, and got gun kills of MiGs as a result. Phantom crews were screaming for a gun
> in the USN, but had to wait until the F-14 came along with an internal Vulcan. What was the
> story? NAVAIR not approve it or what? It's been said in several books that had VF-96's
> Phantoms had guns on 10 May 72, there would've been several more MiG kills that day.
I believe the SUU-23 was never used by the Navy, which used a different
pod with a different gun. However, even that pod was apparently so
problematic during carrier operations that it was hardly, if ever, used
operationally by Phantoms.
Rob
PHSP Manager
viabrated on the centreline and couldnt hit shit
jammed under gs and was a waste
was heavy and a big loss if dumped
trialled a few and told them to sod off
and stuck to winder and spazzow
john
It was the attitude of Air Force Brass about the role of the F4 in
opposition to a potential hand full of long range Soviet Bombers.
They didn't think they needed guns because the missiles would take out
the enemy at long range before they entered dog fighting range.
They have gone back to the same post Korean War attitude with our new
multi role aircraft. A one size fits all will do our forces in when
confronted with numbers of enemy fighters and other ground and aerial
assets.
They see only very limited air threats like Iraq. If we should ever have
to go into Korea we may be tested again with our limited number of do
all end all aircraft against large numbers of single mission fighters in
concert with other enemy assets and possible effective jamming of mother
by Chinese, Iranian, and Russian, and others furnished technologies.
Our F22s and so forth may have to function alone with only a few shots
at a large number of more flexible fighters in concert with the other
aerial and ground threats.
Everyone seems to be thinking any confrontation with North Korea would
be over in and instant because of our nuclear capabilities. I don't see
as it would greatly harm South Korea and the plumes of nuclear fallout
would hit America, widespread, unless they can reverse the jet stream.
This is just my uninformed opinion.
renab...@aol.com
SNIP
I think you are talking about the Hughes Mark IV HIPEG (HIgh
Performance External Gun) pod
shown here. It was a twin barfrfel weapon working on the Gast principle
http://www.chinalakealumni.org/IMAGES/1963/145063%20YA-4C%20circa63%20CLK%20LHL-179618.jpg
A4, HIPEG & lots of ammo
http://www.chinalakealumni.org/IMAGES/1963/145063%20A-4C%20circa63%20CLK.jpg
THREE gun pods on an A4 !
Strafing a tank target
http://www.chinalakealumni.org/IMAGES/1963/145063%20A-4C%20ddSEP63%20CLK%20NAN.jpg
Rob van Riel
> I think you are talking about the Hughes Mark IV HIPEG (HIgh
> Performance External Gun) pod
> shown here. It was a twin barfrfel weapon working on the Gast principle
Yup, that's the one.
Rob
Paul J. Adam
<MattWi...@yahoo.com> writes
>Has anyone found out why, as the air war over NVN heated up in 1966-67,
>the USN never
>adopted the SUU-23 gun pod for their F-4s? The AF certainly did for the
>366th TFW's
>Phantoms, and got gun kills of MiGs as a result. Phantom crews were
>screaming for a gun
>in the USN, but had to wait until the F-14 came along with an internal
>Vulcan.
There's more to it than that. A *lot* of issues come together in the
Vietnam aircraft armament saga, but one headline statistic is that in
1972 the USAF shot down forty-eight MiGs for the loss of twenty-four
aircraft in air-to-air combat: the US Navy scored twenty-four kills for
four losses.
One of the many factors was that the USAF did not get its missiles right
(technology, training, maintenance and other factors) while the USN did:
the USAF's latest-and-greatest AIM-9J was about 11% effective (95 fired
for 9 kills), while the USN's AIM-9G was 46% effective (fifty fired for
23 kills).
It's also easy to overrate the guns: even with gun pods and then the
F-4E's internal gun, and the "useless" missiles, the USAF's kills broke
down as thirty Sparrow, nine Sidewinder, seven guns and two CFIT.
>What was the
>story? NAVAIR not approve it or what?
Lack of requirement. The USN were doing very well without guns, and the
cost of adding them was greater than the benefit to be had.
>It's been said in several books that had VF-96's
>Phantoms had guns on 10 May 72, there would've been several more MiG
>kills that day.
...except that to get the guns, they'd have had to give up fuel, which
was the other big limit encountered.
I'll confess to a little amiable cynicism about fighter pilots' claim
that "if I'd had X then I'd have shot down lots of Bad Guys" - these men
are selected and trained to be confident and aggressive, not cautious
analysts. No doubt at all that they'd have tried to get those extra
shots, but how many would have translated to kills? (And are there any
extra losses?)
--
Scientific results cannot be used efficiently by soldiers who have no
understanding of them, and scientists cannot produce results useful for
warfare without an understanding of the operations.
- Dr. Theodore Von Karman
Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)co<dot>uk
Ed Rasimus
<ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In message <11610674...@sp6iad.superfeed.net>, Matt Wiser
><MattWi...@yahoo.com> writes
>>Has anyone found out why, as the air war over NVN heated up in 1966-67,
>>the USN never
>>adopted the SUU-23 gun pod for their F-4s? The AF certainly did for the
>>366th TFW's
>>Phantoms, and got gun kills of MiGs as a result. Phantom crews were
>>screaming for a gun
>>in the USN, but had to wait until the F-14 came along with an internal
>>Vulcan.
>
>There's more to it than that. A *lot* of issues come together in the
>Vietnam aircraft armament saga, but one headline statistic is that in
>1972 the USAF shot down forty-eight MiGs for the loss of twenty-four
>aircraft in air-to-air combat: the US Navy scored twenty-four kills for
>four losses.
>
>One of the many factors was that the USAF did not get its missiles right
>(technology, training, maintenance and other factors) while the USN did:
>the USAF's latest-and-greatest AIM-9J was about 11% effective (95 fired
>for 9 kills), while the USN's AIM-9G was 46% effective (fifty fired for
>23 kills).
As you acknowledge at the start--a *lot* of issues! Very clearly there
was a huge difference in training. The USAF offered very little A/A
training for the majority of crews and most were woefully deficient in
knowledge about weapon parameters for employment. Sidewinder was
vastly better than Sparrow in that department, since it was a simple
concept--tone=fire, no-tone=don't fire. But, you still needed range
estimation and you needed awareness of G-limits and angle capability
of seeker head.
Few USAF crews got to actually fire a real missile under anything like
employment conditions before entering combat. Typical "orientation"
for the AIM-9 was a mission with a 5" HVAR--shoot the rocket, then get
a tone from the AIM-9 and shoot it down the tail of the unmaneuvering
rocket. Mechanical, with no real training value!
>
>It's also easy to overrate the guns: even with gun pods and then the
>F-4E's internal gun, and the "useless" missiles, the USAF's kills broke
>down as thirty Sparrow, nine Sidewinder, seven guns and two CFIT.
The F-4E had a very good LCOSS and that's a huge advantage over a
podded gun. Even so, when considering the turn rate/radius advantage
that the MiG-17 had, good gun shots wouldn't be very common. Tactics
for MiG-21s usually involved high-speed, blow-through passes from tail
aspect for them, so there wouldn't be much turn/burn gun opportunity
there either.
Note also the relationship between A/A kills and experience level.
Graduates of Top Gun (USN) and FWS (USAF) got a lot of kills, with
many achieving multiple kills. Other multiple kill pilots were high
experience level--folks like Olds, Titus, Simmons, etc.
>
>I'll confess to a little amiable cynicism about fighter pilots' claim
>that "if I'd had X then I'd have shot down lots of Bad Guys" - these men
>are selected and trained to be confident and aggressive, not cautious
>analysts. No doubt at all that they'd have tried to get those extra
>shots, but how many would have translated to kills? (And are there any
>extra losses?)
Can't shoot down Bad Guys who don't come to the party. There simply
weren't enough MiGs to go around.
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com
Blair Haworth
> On Wed, 18 Oct 2006 16:36:13 -0700, renab...@aol.com wrote:
>
>>I think you are talking about the Hughes Mark IV HIPEG (HIgh
>>Performance External Gun) pod
>
> Yup, that's the one.
Except it wasn't a Gast action: it was a very unusual revolver cannon
with one eight-chamber cylinder serving both barrels, using both gas and
recoil to run the action; both barrels fired at the same time. The
barrels were smoothbore, incidentally, with the rifling in the chambers.
--Blair
renab...@aol.com
Thanks!
I knew it was double barrel and I assumed - with the the usual results
-
it was Gast. Do you have any refernces you can recommend, I'd like to
read more about this design!
Sounds more complex than a Vulcan, so I think I can see why it
developed a reputation for problems.
PS: The Russians also have a dual barreled aircraft gun, do you know
its operating principle?
Diamond Jim
"Ed Rasimus" <rasimus...@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:pcjfj2dg4r2ek3sjo...@4ax.com...
One other important thing, due to the difference in warning times, Navy
encounters were usually by chance. The Air Force because of the distance and
mission profile usually gave the NVAF plenty or time to plan and pick and
chose their encounters, always trying to make sure that they had the
advantage. Also from my understanding the Air Force philosophy it was put
anyone with wings in the cockpit, everyone gets their ticket punched before
anyone gets a second ride. In the NAVY if you were a fighter pilot or an
attack pilot you might as well count on going back and back and back. A lot
of Naval Aviators had more than 100 combat missions. I can't remember the
name (senior moment) but I believe the record was something like 745 by an
attack pilot. I am not saying who were the best pilots but the Navy did a
better job keeping experience in the cockpit.
Blair Haworth
> Blair Haworth wrote:
>>Rob van Riel wrote:
>>>On Wed, 18 Oct 2006 16:36:13 -0700, renab...@aol.com wrote:
>>>>I think you are talking about the Hughes Mark IV HIPEG (HIgh
>>>>Performance External Gun) pod
>>>>shown here. It was a twin barrel weapon working on the Gast principle
>>>Yup, that's the one.
>>Except it wasn't a Gast action: it was a very unusual revolver cannon
>>with one eight-chamber cylinder serving both barrels, using both gas and
>>recoil to run the action; both barrels fired at the same time. The
>>barrels were smoothbore, incidentally, with the rifling in the chambers.
[...]
> Thanks!
>
> I knew it was double barrel and I assumed - with the the usual results
> -
> it was Gast. Do you have any refernces you can recommend, I'd like to
> read more about this design!
I was pulling that from _Jane's Weapons Systems, 1973-74_; the entry is
a bit meatier than the usual. I also recall running across an article
on it in _Ordnance_ (the predecessor journal to _National Defense_) from
~1970, but it was in the course of other research over ten years ago and
I didn't save the citation. Googling shows that stinet.dtic.mil has
some technical reports on both the Mk 11 gun itself and the Mk 4 pod
listed, but it looks like there's not much actually online.
> Sounds more complex than a Vulcan, so I think I can see why it
> developed a reputation for problems.
I'm not sure it was that much more complex than the Vulcan, but it
wasn't the attention of nearly as much development effort. I infer from
limited reading that it was sold as avoiding the Vulcan's time-to-rate
phenomenon.
> PS: The Russians also have a dual barreled aircraft gun, do you know
> its operating principle?
As I recall, the GSh-23 is a Gast action, and Wikipedia agrees with me;
neither of of is sure about the GSh-30-2.
--Blair
Ed Rasimus
wrote:
>One other important thing, due to the difference in warning times, Navy
>encounters were usually by chance. The Air Force because of the distance and
>mission profile usually gave the NVAF plenty or time to plan and pick and
>chose their encounters, always trying to make sure that they had the
>advantage.
That is one of those factors that seldom get pointed out in the debate
over loss ratio differences between the USAF and USN. Much is made of
training and weaponry, but little of the circumstances of engagement.
> Also from my understanding the Air Force philosophy it was put
>anyone with wings in the cockpit, everyone gets their ticket punched before
>anyone gets a second ride.
Not exactly. The "universally trainable pilot" concept meant that
anyone could be routed through the fighter pipeline, but the "Palace
Cobra" program was that everyone rated would get a combat tour before
anyone went back for a second tour INVOLUNTARILY. There were lots and
lots of guys with two or more combat tours.
>In the NAVY if you were a fighter pilot or an
>attack pilot you might as well count on going back and back and back. A lot
>of Naval Aviators had more than 100 combat missions. I can't remember the
>name (senior moment) but I believe the record was something like 745 by an
>attack pilot.
Always keep in mind the necessary distinction for that war between N.
Vietnam combat missions and all others (i.e. Laos, Cambodia and S.
Vietnam.) There was considerable difference in "degree of difficulty".
Also keep in mind the duration per sortie question--refer to your own
paragraph one above.
> I am not saying who were the best pilots but the Navy did a
>better job keeping experience in the cockpit.
Also consider that the Navy had long used specialization among their
rated force. Fighter/attack pilots stayed in that business and were a
relatively small number compared to the total rated complement of the
USAF. Their cruise rotation policy did get them a sigificant amount of
exposure.
Ken S. Tucker
Ed Rasimus wrote:
> On Thu, 19 Oct 2006 23:45:27 GMT, "Diamond Jim" <jba...@ec.rr.com>
> wrote:
>
> >One other important thing, due to the difference in warning times, Navy
> >encounters were usually by chance. The Air Force because of the distance and
> >mission profile usually gave the NVAF plenty or time to plan and pick and
> >chose their encounters, always trying to make sure that they had the
> >advantage.
>
> That is one of those factors that seldom get pointed out in the debate
> over loss ratio differences between the USAF and USN. Much is made of
> training and weaponry, but little of the circumstances of engagement.
About weaponry in Vietnam:
The USAF was unprepared, it's mission was USSR
orientated. TAC should have had an air-superiorty
fighter but didn't, thinking more about bombers and
leaving fighter defense to the ADC. So TAC became
more of a strategic force. In Korea the USAF had the
F-86, dog-fighter, there was no real equivalent in Nam.
The F-100 Super Sabre and F-104 Starfighter might
have evolved to being good air-superiority fighters but
they needed some major political work, for that to
happen and that didn't happen.
The USN (I think) did see itself as a tactical tool, by
using the F-8 Crusader and A-4 Skyhawk and later
the Corsair, not too bad.
The USAF realized that, but by the time the serious
air-superiority fighters like the F-15 and F-16 got out,
well you know.
I think the Nam air-war would have been much different
if the USAF had an F-16 equivalent in the mid 60's.
...snip agreeably...
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com
Regards
Ken S. Tucker
Ed Rasimus
wrote:
>
>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>> On Thu, 19 Oct 2006 23:45:27 GMT, "Diamond Jim" <jba...@ec.rr.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> >One other important thing, due to the difference in warning times, Navy
>> >encounters were usually by chance. The Air Force because of the distance and
>> >mission profile usually gave the NVAF plenty or time to plan and pick and
>> >chose their encounters, always trying to make sure that they had the
>> >advantage.
>>
>> That is one of those factors that seldom get pointed out in the debate
>> over loss ratio differences between the USAF and USN. Much is made of
>> training and weaponry, but little of the circumstances of engagement.
>
>About weaponry in Vietnam:
>The USAF was unprepared, it's mission was USSR
>orientated.
The mission of the USAF was global and that extended a long way beyond
simply USSR. One should note that there were significant forces on
alert in Korea and Okinawa throughout the period prior to and during
the Vietnam war.
> TAC should have had an air-superiorty
>fighter but didn't, thinking more about bombers and
>leaving fighter defense to the ADC.
ADC was very much oriented around bomber defense, not fighter and was
definitely not in the air superiority counter-fighter business.
> So TAC became
>more of a strategic force.
TAC's mission was always to "organize, train and equip" and not to
employ operationally. TAC was a stateside command and when deployed
would transfer or CHOP to the operational commands, USAFE and PACAF.
The tactical fighter force was capable of both nuclear and
conventional A/G as well as air superiority missons.
> In Korea the USAF had the
>F-86, dog-fighter, there was no real equivalent in Nam.
>The F-100 Super Sabre and F-104 Starfighter might
>have evolved to being good air-superiority fighters but
>they needed some major political work, for that to
>happen and that didn't happen.
Neither the F-100 nor the F-104 had a BVR capability. The F-100 didn't
have a radar and the F-104 had a lot less capability in US service
than the later F-104G which the allied countries used.
> The USN (I think) did see itself as a tactical tool, by
>using the F-8 Crusader and A-4 Skyhawk and later
>the Corsair, not too bad.
The F-8 had good day VFR air superiority capability but negligible
ground attack. The A-4 and A-7 had good A/G but weren't much in the
way of air superiority.
>The USAF realized that, but by the time the serious
>air-superiority fighters like the F-15 and F-16 got out,
>well you know.
The F-15 and F-16 would have been dynamite against the Nazi airplanes
as well, but the technology didn't exist then either.
If you consider the threat inventory, the opposition was MiG-17 and
21--one with guns and no missiles, the other with missiles and no gun.
>I think the Nam air-war would have been much different
>if the USAF had an F-16 equivalent in the mid 60's.
It would have been different with JADMs as well.
Ken S. Tucker
Sure TAC had (circa Nam) good A/G but I don't see a good
CAP (suppose CAP is reasonable acronym for air-superiority)
fighter in the USAF inventory then.
> > In Korea the USAF had the
> >F-86, dog-fighter, there was no real equivalent in Nam.
> >The F-100 Super Sabre and F-104 Starfighter might
> >have evolved to being good air-superiority fighters but
> >they needed some major political work, for that to
> >happen and that didn't happen.
>
> Neither the F-100 nor the F-104 had a BVR capability. The F-100 didn't
> have a radar and the F-104 had a lot less capability in US service
> than the later F-104G which the allied countries used.
>
> > The USN (I think) did see itself as a tactical tool, by
> >using the F-8 Crusader and A-4 Skyhawk and later
> >the Corsair, not too bad.
>
> The F-8 had good day VFR air superiority capability but negligible
> ground attack. The A-4 and A-7 had good A/G but weren't much in the
> way of air superiority.
Ok, apparently the US only had the F-8 for CAP,
the F-4 being shoe-horned in later, and IIRC did
become a good air-superiority fighter.
> >The USAF realized that, but by the time the serious
> >air-superiority fighters like the F-15 and F-16 got out,
> >well you know.
>
> The F-15 and F-16 would have been dynamite against the Nazi airplanes
> as well, but the technology didn't exist then either.
I disagree, an F-16 like fighter could have been
designed in the later 50's and operational in the
60's, but Rapier's and such things occupied the
USAF. Jog my old memory, what requirement
was set forth in that period for effective CAP a/c.
> If you consider the threat inventory, the opposition was MiG-17 and
> 21--one with guns and no missiles, the other with missiles and no gun.
>
> >I think the Nam air-war would have been much different
> >if the USAF had an F-16 equivalent in the mid 60's.
>
> It would have been different with JADMs as well.
Today, America is prepared and preparing to have
complete air-superiority in days in any conflict, so
that argues for an F-22 type a/c...from hard lessons.
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com
Regards
Ken S. Tucker
Ed Rasimus
wrote:
CAP (Combat Air Patrol) is one tactic or scenario for air superiority.
There is also Sweep, Escort, Intercept and even "offensive
counter-air" which means busting up the airfields before the aircraft
can take off.
One could debate for days whether we had a "good CAP" or air
superiority aircraft. The question needs to include what the
opposition had, what the weapons were, what the environment would be
(it's a lot tougher to employ over bad guy land than over your own
territory) and what the criteria for "good CAP" are.
The F-100 was a pretty good day/VFR air superiority fighter and a
development over the F-86. It would be a reasonable opponent for a
MiG-17. The F-104 would be a pretty reasonable high altitude fighter,
if flown with the tactics developed by the 435th TFS/479th TFW--fluid
attack/Loose Deuce and vertical maneuvering rather than Fighting Wing.
The F-4 was a very good fighter and competitive against MiG-17/19/21.
>
>> > In Korea the USAF had the
>> >F-86, dog-fighter, there was no real equivalent in Nam.
>> >The F-100 Super Sabre and F-104 Starfighter might
>> >have evolved to being good air-superiority fighters but
>> >they needed some major political work, for that to
>> >happen and that didn't happen.
>>
>> Neither the F-100 nor the F-104 had a BVR capability. The F-100 didn't
>> have a radar and the F-104 had a lot less capability in US service
>> than the later F-104G which the allied countries used.
>>
>> > The USN (I think) did see itself as a tactical tool, by
>> >using the F-8 Crusader and A-4 Skyhawk and later
>> >the Corsair, not too bad.
>>
>> The F-8 had good day VFR air superiority capability but negligible
>> ground attack. The A-4 and A-7 had good A/G but weren't much in the
>> way of air superiority.
>
>Ok, apparently the US only had the F-8 for CAP,
>the F-4 being shoe-horned in later, and IIRC did
>become a good air-superiority fighter.
The F-4 was available from 1965 onward in the Vietnam War, and the
E-model with internal gun was around in large numbers from 1968 until
the end of hostilities in 1973.
>
>> >The USAF realized that, but by the time the serious
>> >air-superiority fighters like the F-15 and F-16 got out,
>> >well you know.
>>
>> The F-15 and F-16 would have been dynamite against the Nazi airplanes
>> as well, but the technology didn't exist then either.
>
>I disagree, an F-16 like fighter could have been
>designed in the later 50's and operational in the
>60's, but Rapier's and such things occupied the
>USAF. Jog my old memory, what requirement
>was set forth in that period for effective CAP a/c.
Sorry to disagree, but we did not have the engine technology to
achieve the T/W ratio enjoyed by the teen fighters. We also didn't
have the engineering manufacturing technology to build the compound
curve, blended wing shapes of the Viper. And, that doesn't begin to
address such simple components as the canopy, the phased array radar,
the solid state circuitry of avionics, etc.
Nor could the A/A weapons of today have been produced in the '50s.
Things like an all-aspect IR missile, look-down/shoot-down radar and
missile systems, self-contained nav (Doppler and INS were just being
incorporated.)
>
>> If you consider the threat inventory, the opposition was MiG-17 and
>> 21--one with guns and no missiles, the other with missiles and no gun.
>>
>> >I think the Nam air-war would have been much different
>> >if the USAF had an F-16 equivalent in the mid 60's.
>>
>> It would have been different with JADMs as well.
>
>Today, America is prepared and preparing to have
>complete air-superiority in days in any conflict, so
>that argues for an F-22 type a/c...from hard lessons.
I don't see any "hard lessons"--the US has not had an enemy aircraft
attack our troops in combat since Korea. That would seem to mean that
we have enjoyed a high degree of air superiority globally since 1950.
renab...@aol.com
Ken S. Tucker wrote:
> About weaponry in Vietnam:
> The USAF was unprepared,
SNIP
In fairness, it had established a limited war/
counter-insurgency capability at Eglin AFB (Project Jungle
Jim) in the early Sixties that certainly was relevent to
Vietnam, as was the re-raising of the Air Commando units
http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123029050
http://www.hurlburt.af.mil/heritage/guide/
Today, those units have evolved into AFSOC
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/afsoc.htm
it's mission was USSR
> orientated. TAC should have had an air-superiorty
> fighter but didn't, thinking more about bombers and
> leaving fighter defense to the ADC. So TAC became
> more of a strategic force.
SNIP
Indeed with all those aircraft sitting strip alert with nukes in
Europe,
for example, the tactical compenent of the USAF had evolved into
a "SAC-Lite" (SAC got the mjority of the USAF's funds fromm the
Forties until around 1970 - amd people aren't dumb aboiut what sells
to the boss. Plus TACAIR was seen as suppoeting surface forces
and the justification for the USAFas a separate service as seen by
Bomber Barons and enshrined in AF myth was the doctrine of
independent, war winning Strategic Airpower (tm)).
I know Thid Drivers will argue, but the F-105 was the perfect example -
optimized as a bomber for the nuclear strike mission
"The massive F-105 was intended primarily for nuclear strike missions"
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/airdef/f-105.htm
It probably should have been designated in the defunct A series as
a light bomber
In Korea the USAF had the
> F-86, dog-fighter, there was no real equivalent in Nam.
> The F-100 Super Sabre
SNIP
Too old a design and where would you put a search radar?
and F-104 Starfighter might
SNIP
Great machine for rapidly getting from here to there, but
its high wing loading affected its ACM ability Also, it was
the last of the WWII era gun dighters - all it
had was a simple ranging radar. As Bill Gunston puts
it in "Early Supersonic Fighters of the West", the F-104
might well have proven capable of scoring air to air kills
as there would have been times it couldn't have avoided
M2 colliosions with enemy aircraft.
The F-104G was effectively a new aircraft and carried
theh NASARR (IIRC) avionics suite, but it and its variants
(exceptingt the last of the line, the Sierra model) were
optimized for nuclear strike down low, where its small
wings was ideal for its low gust response.
> have evolved to being good air-superiority fighters but
> they needed some major political work, for that to
> happen and that didn't happen.
SNIP
A lot more than political - ses above
> The USN (I think) did see itself as a tactical tool, by
> using the F-8 Crusader and A-4 Skyhawk and later
> the Corsair, not too bad.
> The USAF realized that, but by the time the serious
> air-superiority fighters like the F-15 and F-16 got out,
> well you know.
> I think the Nam air-war would have been much different
SNIP
Not really, the US had absolute air suprememcy - its aircraft
could go and do what it wanted whenever it wanted to and
prevent the enemy from doing the same.
The problem wss that abillity was not central to winning the war -
as mathematicians put it, it was "Necessary but not
sufficient"
Shooting down a few more MiG's a bit easier wasn't going to
change that
> if the USAF had an F-16 equivalent in the mid 60's.
SNIP
The problem is what was available
There were only two (possibly three) candidates (there was no way the
USAF was going to buy the very linited Mirage III or equally limited
RAF Lightning - although the thought of the later in ADC service makes
for interesting daydreams..anybody want to whip up a model of F6 with
USAF TO-1-14 camoufalge ?...and if only Blackburern and Grumman had
collaborated on the A-6 Buccaneer with A-6 avionics in a Banana
Bomber!)
1) The F-4 (adopted by the USAF as the F-110) which ended up
susrprising people with its A/A ability
2) The F-8 - which at least one USAF test pilot rated as superior to
their own F-100
3) the F8U-3 - "the best plane we ever cancelled" which lost to the
F4H. It was a great ship -perhaps superior to the F-4 in A/A, but it
was cancelled back in 1958. Ther was just no way that the Air Force was
going to buy a cancelled Navy plane..
"What is less known is that the USN had concurrently sought to deploy
together with the Phantom another fighter, the single engined F8U-3
Crusader III, a derivative of the existing Crusader. USN policy at that
time required that the fleet carried two alternative fighter types, to
ensure that serious problems with either of the two would not leave the
fleet without top cover. The F8U-3 was a single seat, all weather
fighter powered by a 25,000 lb class J75 afterburning turbojet. While
it used a thin two position wing with flap blowing, like its ancestor,
it also employed two large ventral fins which would swing from
horizontal position at low speeds to almost vertical at Mach 2 class
speeds. Typically armed with 3 AIM-7 SARH AAMs, one semirecessed on the
ventral centreline, the remaining two semiconformally mounted on the
lower fuselage sides, the F8U-3 is said to have been faster, more
manoeuvrable, cheaper and longer legged than the larger Phantom. Given
the success of earlier Crusader subtypes in Vietnam, demonstrating a
consistently better kill ratio than the F-4, the F8U-3 would have been
the scourge of the NVAF were it deployed. This was not to be, as in
1958 the politicians ruled that the USN must choose one of the two
fighters, the Phantom was selected largely due to its 2 man crew and
thus better capability in the all weather fleet defence role"
First published Australian Aviation, Jan-April 1995
by Carlo Kopp
© 1995, 2005 Carlo Kopp
http://aeroweb.brooklyn.cuny.edu/database/aircraft/getimage.htm?id=8568
http://www.voughtaircraft.com/heritage/products/html/f8u-3.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f8u-3.htm
I think the hsitorical record shows that the USAF made the right choice
with the F-4 - from the same article
"The foremost of these must be the McDonnell F4H-1 Phantom II, a large
twin engined all weather (ie IFR) interceptor, armed with AAMs and
equipped with a powerful AI radar set. Designed for a 435 NM tactical
radius on internal fuel alone, the Phantom outranged most of its
potential opponents, which it could outclimb, outaccelerate and
outreach with its radar/missile suite. The F-4's superlative payload
range and excellent handling characteristics saw its application in the
strike role, and it became the first true fighter-bomber of the period.
The Phantom's contribution to Western tactical aviation is one with few
parallels"
Ken S. Tucker
Sorry to disagree back :-). I'll cite the SR-71, flying
circa 64, had an airframe as advanced as the F-16,
and much more, but it had political backing because
it was a Strategic asset/weapon, perhaps 10 years
ahead of it's time. My point is that the US could have
built a very advanced air-superiority fighter "like" the
F-16, circa 64, if it had the will and recognized the need.
> Nor could the A/A weapons of today have been produced in the '50s.
> Things like an all-aspect IR missile, look-down/shoot-down radar and
> missile systems, self-contained nav (Doppler and INS were just being
> incorporated.)
> >> If you consider the threat inventory, the opposition was MiG-17 and
> >> 21--one with guns and no missiles, the other with missiles and no gun.
> >>
> >> >I think the Nam air-war would have been much different
> >> >if the USAF had an F-16 equivalent in the mid 60's.
> >>
> >> It would have been different with JADMs as well.
> >
> >Today, America is prepared and preparing to have
> >complete air-superiority in days in any conflict, so
> >that argues for an F-22 type a/c...from hard lessons.
>
> I don't see any "hard lessons"--the US has not had an enemy aircraft
> attack our troops in combat since Korea. That would seem to mean that
> we have enjoyed a high degree of air superiority globally since 1950.
I think the "hard lesson" was the US lost the
air war over NV in terms of $attrition, a Mig
might cost 1/10 of an F-4, meaning to break
even the F-4 should have a kill ratio of 10:1.
IIRC the F-8 managed 19:3 ~ 10:1.5.
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com
Best Regards
Ken S. Tucker
Ed Rasimus
wrote:
>> Sorry to disagree, but we did not have the engine technology to
>> achieve the T/W ratio enjoyed by the teen fighters. We also didn't
>> have the engineering manufacturing technology to build the compound
>> curve, blended wing shapes of the Viper. And, that doesn't begin to
>> address such simple components as the canopy, the phased array radar,
>> the solid state circuitry of avionics, etc.
>
>Sorry to disagree back :-). I'll cite the SR-71, flying
>circa 64, had an airframe as advanced as the F-16,
>and much more, but it had political backing because
>it was a Strategic asset/weapon, perhaps 10 years
>ahead of it's time. My point is that the US could have
>built a very advanced air-superiority fighter "like" the
>F-16, circa 64, if it had the will and recognized the need.
While the SR-71 was certainly impressive, it should be noted that a
lot of things about the aircraft don't relate in the slightest to an
air superiority fighter or tactical aircraft. The sister-ship, A-12,
was a high performance interceptor, but again was not a fighter.
The aircraft engines required a special fuel and were optimized for
steady state, high altitude performance--a totally different
environment than the tactical. The airframe was built, of necessity,
with such huge expansion tolerances that it leaks like the proverbial
sieve on the ground--not quite what you would want parked in the alert
barn for a day or two.
Most critically, the aircraft was stressed for around 3 G.
It didn't have the T/W ratio of the Viper, didn't have the weapons
points or stressing for tactical employment, didn't have any outside
visibility, didn't have much in defensive systems and was a very
special case.
The premise of your position is somehow that the aircraft designs of
the Century Series period were something significantly LESS than
state-of-the-art. To consider what was being done in terms of tactical
weapons systems at that time such as F-100, F-104, F-105, F-8, A-6,
A-7, F-111 as well as LGB, Maverick, Sparrow, Sidewinder, Snakeye,
Bullpup and RHAW, RWR, ALQ, etc. and suggest that somehow they could
have just built a 1980 airplane in 1955 is pretty optimistic.
Ken S. Tucker
Thanks for the post, many good points.
I'd like to add the period 1957 (sputnik) - 63,
seem to have been dominated by USSR
strategic thinking.
- 700 B-52's deploying
- XB-70
- 1000 minuteman's deploying
- Atlas + Titans + Juno's
- SR-71
- B-58 deploying
- Polaris + subs deploying
- Nuclear Aircraft, Project Pluto
- Atomic Bomb R&D + atmospheric testing.
- Nuclear A/C Carriers + Vigilante's
- Projects Mercury, Gemini.
- Saturn V Rocket
Additions welcome.
All the above sucks brain-power. The gov can
print money but it can't print brains/experience,
The F-4 was a minor program.
Read the rest of the post below.
Thanks
Ken S. Tucker
Ken S. Tucker
((The out gassing of the SR-71's fuel is reasonable,
it's not a leak, anymore than the out-gassing of
a liquid propellant missile, it's a consequence of the
cyrogenics))
> Most critically, the aircraft was stressed for around 3 G.
>
> It didn't have the T/W ratio of the Viper, didn't have the weapons
> points or stressing for tactical employment, didn't have any outside
> visibility, didn't have much in defensive systems and was a very
> special case.
Sure, but it was 10x harder to build than an F-16 type,
and it (SR71) enveloped that technology.
> The premise of your position is somehow that the aircraft designs of
> the Century Series period were something significantly LESS than
> state-of-the-art. To consider what was being done in terms of tactical
> weapons systems at that time such as F-100, F-104, F-105, F-8, A-6,
> A-7, F-111 as well as LGB, Maverick, Sparrow, Sidewinder, Snakeye,
> Bullpup and RHAW, RWR, ALQ, etc. and suggest that somehow they could
> have just built a 1980 airplane in 1955 is pretty optimistic.
Excluding F-104, the only A/A A/C of note is the F-8,
((I think we can safely exclude the 104 as an A/A)).
For example, if a similiar effort was applied to build
an air-superiority fighter as was applied to the XB-70,
an A/C with F-16 near capable (aside from electronics)
would have obtained a 50:1 win against Migs!
I think the US coud have had that in the early 60's,
hindsight is 20-20.
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com
Regards
Ken S. Tucker
Ed Rasimus
wrote:
>
>renab...@aol.com wrote:
>> Ken S. Tucker wrote:
>>
>> > About weaponry in Vietnam:
>> > The USAF was unprepared,
>>
>> SNIP
>>
>> In fairness, it had established a limited war/
>> counter-insurgency capability at Eglin AFB (Project Jungle
>> Jim) in the early Sixties that certainly was relevent to
>> Vietnam, as was the re-raising of the Air Commando units
--SNIP--
>>
>> it's mission was USSR
>> > orientated. TAC should have had an air-superiorty
>> > fighter but didn't, thinking more about bombers and
>> > leaving fighter defense to the ADC. So TAC became
>> > more of a strategic force.
>>
>> SNIP
>>
>> Indeed with all those aircraft sitting strip alert with nukes in
>> Europe, for example, the tactical compenent of the USAF had evolved into
>> a "SAC-Lite" (SAC got the mjority of the USAF's funds fromm the
>> Forties until around 1970 - amd people aren't dumb aboiut what sells
>> to the boss. Plus TACAIR was seen as suppoeting surface forces
>> and the justification for the USAFas a separate service as seen by
>> Bomber Barons and enshrined in AF myth was the doctrine of
>> independent, war winning Strategic Airpower (tm)).
That seems a bit revisionist, if you are willing to acknowledge
acquisition of literally thousands of tactical aircraft during the
period as well as conduct of intensive combat operations in SEA
coupled with construction of at least two dozen operational combat
airbases and production of rated aircrew members at the highest rate
since WW II.
The assertion that USAF was bomber-dominated in the fifties and until
the mid-60's is fine, but there was considerable effort expended on
building and maintaining a quality tactical force.
>
>Thanks for the post, many good points.
>I'd like to add the period 1957 (sputnik) - 63,
>seem to have been dominated by USSR
>strategic thinking.
>
>- 700 B-52's deploying
But also note that B-52 acquisition was ongoing for twenty years and
from 1965 onward the BUFF was employed extensively in conventional
operations not related to counter-USSR strategic objectives.
>- XB-70
Bit of exaggeration if we are to consider three experimental aircraft
as a trend.
>- 1000 minuteman's deploying
Max ICBM deployment was 1054 total missiles including Atlas, Titan and
MM.
>- Atlas + Titans + Juno's
Juno was not a weapon system, but a satellite launch vehicle
adaptation of Jupiter.
>- SR-71
Small number program of strategic reconnaissance employed extensively
in other operations than anti-USSR, including SEA service.
>- B-58 deploying
Two wings, limited numbers of aircraft.
>- Polaris + subs deploying
>- Nuclear Aircraft, Project Pluto
None of which flew.
>- Atomic Bomb R&D + atmospheric testing.
Much of which was dedicated to tactical nuclear weapons. The period
saw development of small yield weapons down to the size of artillery
shells and nuclear "suitcase" bombs for manual employment--hardly the
stuff of "Bomber Barons" and strategic warfare.
>- Nuclear A/C Carriers + Vigilante's
A-5 Vigilante was quickly converted in RA-5 and only small numbers
total. Nice aircraft but hardly supportive of your thesis of SAC
pre-eminence. Nuclear CV development is simply logical--lower
dependence on support vehicles, greater range, better flexibility,
higher speeds, better force projection.
>- Projects Mercury, Gemini.
>- Saturn V Rocket
Space programs, not war-fighting at tactical or strategic level.
>
>Additions welcome.
>
>All the above sucks brain-power. The gov can
>print money but it can't print brains/experience,
>The F-4 was a minor program.
5195 jets produced and one of the most successful tactical aircraft
programs of all time. Hardly minor.
>Read the rest of the post below.
>Thanks
>Ken S. Tucker
>
>> I know Thid Drivers will argue, but the F-105 was the perfect example -
>> optimized as a bomber for the nuclear strike mission
>>
>> "The massive F-105 was intended primarily for nuclear strike missions"
>>
>> http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/airdef/f-105.htm
Well, although the airplane was designed around a 1.1MT nuke, it had
considerable capability for conventional delivery. More than 12k
pounds of payload, five major external weapons stations, dual-mode
refueling capability, multi-mode radar, lead-computing gun site,
self-contained nav system (Doppler), integrated auto-pilot for nav,
ILS, altitude, airspeed or attitude hold functions, blind/offset radar
weapons delivery capability and exceptional high and low altitude
high-speed performance.
>>
>> It probably should have been designated in the defunct A series as
>> a light bomber
The "defunct A series" never really existed in the USAF for the period
in question. The A-1 and A-7 were simply AF purchases of existing Navy
designs with an established nomenclature. The A-10 is hardly evidence
of a "series." And, the F-105 had sufficient MiG kills to have some
credibility as a fighter.
>>
>>
>> In Korea the USAF had the
>> > F-86, dog-fighter, there was no real equivalent in Nam.
>> > The F-100 Super Sabre
>>
>> SNIP
>>
>> Too old a design and where would you put a search radar?
>>
>>
>> and F-104 Starfighter might
>>
>> SNIP
>>
>> Great machine for rapidly getting from here to there, but
>> its high wing loading affected its ACM ability Also, it was
>> the last of the WWII era gun dighters - all it
>> had was a simple ranging radar. As Bill Gunston puts
>> it in "Early Supersonic Fighters of the West", the F-104
>> might well have proven capable of scoring air to air kills
>> as there would have been times it couldn't have avoided
>> M2 colliosions with enemy aircraft.
>>
>> The F-104G was effectively a new aircraft and carried
>> theh NASARR (IIRC) avionics suite, but it and its variants
>> (exceptingt the last of the line, the Sierra model) were
>> optimized for nuclear strike down low, where its small
>> wings was ideal for its low gust response.
The F-104G carried the Thunderstick fire control system which was the
F-105 radar/Doppler (later replaced with INS)/air data computer and
Toss Bomb Computer system.
The F-104S was the Italian variant that upgraded the radar to support
the AIM-7.
>> 1) The F-4 (adopted by the USAF as the F-110) which ended up
>> susrprising people with its A/A ability
Who were these surprised people? The F-4C onward had good T/W and good
turn rate/radius along with more than adequate weapons to make it very
credible in A/A.
>>
>> 2) The F-8 - which at least one USAF test pilot rated as superior to
>> their own F-100
The F-8 had no nuclear weapon capability and very little conventional
A/G carriage. It was superior to the F-100 in BFM, but one could
hardly call it superior overall.
>>
>> 3) the F8U-3 - "the best plane we ever cancelled" which lost to the
>> F4H. It was a great ship -perhaps superior to the F-4 in A/A, but it
>> was cancelled back in 1958. Ther was just no way that the Air Force was
>> going to buy a cancelled Navy plane..
The F8U-3 and other developmental aircraft were extreme approaches to
increasing performance. The F-107 and 108 were peers, as was a
proposal for a drastically upgraded F-105G (not the Weasel variant
produced several years later), but they were expensive and incremental
approaches that were better left to new aircraft--reminds one of the
"cancel Raptor and upgrade Eagle" arguments.
Dunno why the AF wouldn't buy a cancelled Navy plane, if it met
needs--can you say F-111A? AF bought A-7 as well and even borrowed a
whole fleet of A-1s. AF took the F-4 and made it arguably a much more
capable aircraft in the F-4E than the Navy ever had with the Phantom.
And, in reverse, the Navy took the AF cancelled YF-17 and developed it
into the F/A-18.
John Carrier
> The F8U-3 and other developmental aircraft were extreme approaches to
> increasing performance. The F-107 and 108 were peers, as was a
> proposal for a drastically upgraded F-105G (not the Weasel variant
> produced several years later), but they were expensive and incremental
> approaches that were better left to new aircraft--reminds one of the
> "cancel Raptor and upgrade Eagle" arguments.
The F-8U3 was designed to the same spec as the F-4. Essentially, it was a
slight expansion of the original F-8 airframe (roughly the same order of
magnitude of the F-18E/F compared to the A-D models) incorporating the J-75
also being used by the F-105, 106 and 107 ... albeit with an improved hot
section and more thrust. It incorporated the same variable camber wing for
maneuvering capability that was superior to any other US fighter of its era.
Speed (overemphasized in the late 50's I'll agree) was in the 2.6 -2.8
range. I wouldn't describe it as extreme and it outperformed the F-4
prototype in every category except initial climb rate and subsonic
acceleration. It's fuel fraction was vastly superior to the norm for the
era. Had the design been worked to incorporate a decent gun system, it
would have been one hell of a Mig killer in Vietnam.
IIRC, the F-107 was built to the same requirement as the Thud. Same engine,
and similar performance. The inlet and cockpit were rather wild looking,
but its basic aero package was a pretty minor rework of the F-100.
The F-108 was a twin J-93 powered, mach 3 interceptor which bore more
resemblance to a scaled down B-70 than anything else. It would have been
roughly comparable to, albeit I suspect not as good as, the F-12 derivative
of the Skunk Works Oxcart design.
R / John
Harry Andreas
Tucker" <dyna...@vianet.on.ca> wrote:
> > The aircraft engines required a special fuel and were optimized for
> > steady state, high altitude performance--a totally different
> > environment than the tactical. The airframe was built, of necessity,
> > with such huge expansion tolerances that it leaks like the proverbial
> > sieve on the ground--not quite what you would want parked in the alert
> > barn for a day or two.
>
> ((The out gassing of the SR-71's fuel is reasonable,
> it's not a leak, anymore than the out-gassing of
> a liquid propellant missile, it's a consequence of the
> cyrogenics))
Sorry, but that's just wrong.
The SR-71s fuel was JP-7 which was designed specifically to NOT outgass.
As a result, (IIRC) it had higher viscosity than JP-4 or JP-5 and was
liquid at room temperature and very high ambients.
The leakage, as Ed said, was a function of thermal expansion joints.
Due to the large movements generated by high delta T, they
could not be sealed with the normal polysulfide tank sealants.
--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur
Paul J. Adam
S. Tucker <dyna...@vianet.on.ca> writes
>Excluding F-104, the only A/A A/C of note is the F-8,
>((I think we can safely exclude the 104 as an A/A)).
Why? The F-104 had a *lot* of A/A capability for its time, provided it
was properly flown. It even turned well, provided it stayed fast (and it
had lots of engine for the airframe, so staying fast wasn't too much of
a problem).
Of course if you slowed down to play angles with a F-86 you were doomed,
but that's no different from a F6F pilot ignoring "never turn with a
Zero!".
>For example, if a similiar effort was applied to build
>an air-superiority fighter as was applied to the XB-70,
>an A/C with F-16 near capable (aside from electronics)
>would have obtained a 50:1 win against Migs!
Even allowing for the fact that the MiGs had full GCI, excellent
intelligence, and could choose when, where and who to engage? Don't
think so. There were many reasons why the USAF didn't get a better
exchange ratio than it did in Vietnam, but the airframes and weapons
were well down on the list.
Also, bear in mind that the F-16 as originally intended lacked any
defensive countermeasures more sophisticated than a Fuzzbuster - not a
good idea when flying into NVN-style air defences. It became properly
effective only when "burdened" and "ruined" with the electronic
boondoggles its champions so despised.
Ken S. Tucker
Going back a bit, the SR-71 fuel was complex,
consisting of hydrocarbon+additives. Anyway
loading a very cold fuel into an A/C one should
expect the fuel to expand and the A/C to shrink.
One complexity at sustained Mach 3 flight is
aerodynamic heating, that I think places upper
limits on speed x range so using the cold fuel
as a coolant - like the XB-70 did - means the
cooled fuel improves speed x range, within the
thermodynamic tolerances.
I suppose one could characterise the SR-71
"leakage" the same way you call sweat.
> Harry Andreas
> Engineering raconteur
Regards
Ken S. Tucker
Ken S. Tucker
Paul J. Adam wrote:
> In message <1161707648.1...@m7g2000cwm.googlegroups.com>, Ken
> S. Tucker <dyna...@vianet.on.ca> writes
> >Excluding F-104, the only A/A A/C of note is the F-8,
> >((I think we can safely exclude the 104 as an A/A)).
>
> Why? The F-104 had a *lot* of A/A capability for its time, provided it
> was properly flown. It even turned well, provided it stayed fast (and it
> had lots of engine for the airframe, so staying fast wasn't too much of
> a problem).
Although a good friend of mine was a CF-104
instructor, (likely in the 2 seater version, but
one never knows when costs are cut), the
actual A/A F-104 ability is ambiguous.
Personally I think the zip bled to much energy
turning and ran out of gas too quick doing that.
> Of course if you slowed down to play angles with a F-86 you were doomed,
> but that's no different from a F6F pilot ignoring "never turn with a
> Zero!".
>
> >For example, if a similiar effort was applied to build
> >an air-superiority fighter as was applied to the XB-70,
> >an A/C with F-16 near capable (aside from electronics)
> >would have obtained a 50:1 win against Migs!
>
> Even allowing for the fact that the MiGs had full GCI, excellent
> intelligence, and could choose when, where and who to engage? Don't
> think so. There were many reasons why the USAF didn't get a better
> exchange ratio than it did in Vietnam, but the airframes and weapons
> were well down on the list.
>
> Also, bear in mind that the F-16 as originally intended lacked any
> defensive countermeasures more sophisticated than a Fuzzbuster - not a
> good idea when flying into NVN-style air defences. It became properly
> effective only when "burdened" and "ruined" with the electronic
> boondoggles its champions so despised.
Well let me ask, F-16 vs F-15 dog fight using guns,
who wins?
> Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)co<dot>uk
Regards
Ken S. Tucker
Ken S. Tucker
Tip of the burg, LeMays strategic dominance.
> >- 1000 minuteman's deploying
>
> Max ICBM deployment was 1054 total missiles including Atlas, Titan and
> MM.
>
> >- Atlas + Titans + Juno's
>
> Juno was not a weapon system, but a satellite launch vehicle
> adaptation of Jupiter.
>
> >- SR-71
>
> Small number program of strategic reconnaissance employed extensively
> in other operations than anti-USSR, including SEA service.
>
> >- B-58 deploying
>
> Two wings, limited numbers of aircraft.
"limited numbers" as opposed to unlimited
numbers? May we ask what is the unlimited
number of A/C you refer too :-) ,
33,000 Me109's is still limited.
> >- Polaris + subs deploying
> >- Nuclear Aircraft, Project Pluto
>
> None of which flew.
NB-36 flew.
> >- Atomic Bomb R&D + atmospheric testing.
>
> Much of which was dedicated to tactical nuclear weapons. The period
> saw development of small yield weapons down to the size of artillery
> shells and nuclear "suitcase" bombs for manual employment--hardly the
> stuff of "Bomber Barons" and strategic warfare.
8-15 Mt H-bomb is more than a suitcase.
> >- Nuclear A/C Carriers + Vigilante's
>
> A-5 Vigilante was quickly converted in RA-5 and only small numbers
> total. Nice aircraft but hardly supportive of your thesis of SAC
> pre-eminence. Nuclear CV development is simply logical--lower
> dependence on support vehicles, greater range, better flexibility,
> higher speeds, better force projection.
I hear ya, the A-5 flunked, it was *intended*
as a strategic weapon the USN wanted to
stay in the Nuke strike game.
> >- Projects Mercury, Gemini.
> >- Saturn V Rocket
>
> Space programs, not war-fighting at tactical or strategic level.
Highly strategic, set the basis for the Strategic Aerospace
Command, it proved our ability to be the best in space.
> >Additions welcome.
> >
> >All the above sucks brain-power. The gov can
> >print money but it can't print brains/experience,
> >The F-4 was a minor program.
>
> 5195 jets produced and one of the most successful tactical aircraft
> programs of all time. Hardly minor.
The McDonnell Demon, conceived in haste,
in the backdrop of the Korean conflict, for the
USN, to get something airborne, to beat the
Mig 15, killed test pilots, too much, that was
a hard time.
McDonnell evolved the under powered Demon
by adding an engine and refining the design to
become the Phantom II, damn fortunate, but
certainly not a high priority at that time, more
ingenuity.
Regards
Ken S. Tucker
I'll leave the remaining part of the post for
continuity...
John Carrier
>>
>> None of which flew.
>
> NB-36 flew.
A reactor in a conventionally powered aircraft to explore aircrew shielding
issues. Hardly a nuclear powered machine.
R / John
Ken S. Tucker
hmmm...if I were to study that, I'd put a B-36
fuselage on the ground, install the reactor and
shielding and then fill the cockpit with guinea
pigs and instrumentation to acquire that data.
But you made a good point.
Ken
renab...@aol.com
SNIP
They were a heartier race of men back then
We shall not see their line again
(something about radioation poisining....)
Here's the story
B-36H serial number 51-5712 was never delivered to SAC. It was reserved
for special tests designed to support research for a nuclear-powered
aircraft. It was modified as a nuclear-reactor testbed as part of the
WS-125A nuclear-powered bomber project.
The idea of a nuclear-powered aircraft (with a duration measured in
days rather than in hours) dates back to the late 1940s. In 1946, the
Air Force gave a contract to the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Company
to explore the possibility of a nuclear-powered aircraft. The study was
known by the name NEPA (which stood for Nuclear Energy for the
Propulsion of Aircraft) and was carried out at Oak Ridge in Tennessee.
In 1948, another study was performed for the Atomic Energy Commission
by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This study concluded that
a nuclear-powered aircraft was actually feasible, but that it would
take at least 15 years to develop.
By early 1951, the Air Force had concluded that the NEPA project had
shown enough promise that work should begin on an actual propulsion
unit. General Electric was the prime propulsion contractor. The system
would work by having air enter a compressor, where it would be heated
by passing through the reactor, and be exhausted through a jet nozzle.
Pratt and Whitney was given a contract for the development of an
indirect cycle engine which would use an intermediate fluid to transfer
the heat to the air rather than by passing the air through the reactor
core itself.
In 1954, the Air Force decided to begin work on an actual aircraft,
given the project name of WS-125A. Pratt & Whitney and General Electric
were to be the primary engine contractors, with Lockheed and Convair
handling the airframe work. The WS-125A would be a high-altitude
subsonic bomber, but would have a supersonic cruise capability.
As part of the project, it was necessary to test the effects of nuclear
reactor radiation on instruments, equipment, and airframe and to study
shielding methods. To support this effort, B-36H ser no 51-5712 was
assigned to the program on May 11, 1953. This particular aircraft had
been severely damaged in a tornado which struck Carswell AFB on
September 1, 1952. Rather than trying to repair the heavily-damaged
nose section, the plane was kept by Convair and reassigned to the ANP
program.
A nuclear reactor (which did not actually power the aircraft) was
mounted in the aft bomb bay. The reactor was a 1000-kilowatt design
weighing 35,000 pounds. The reactor could be removed from the aircraft
by a crane while on the ground. A number of large air intake and
exhaust holes were installed in the sides and bottom of the rear
fuselage to cool the reactor. The crew was housed entirely in a
highly-modified compartment in the fuselage nose section. The
compartment was composed of lead and rubber, and entirely surrounded
the crew. A four-ton lead disc shield was installed in the middle of
the aircraft. Only the pilot and co-pilot could see out through the
foot-thick, leaded-glass windshield. A closed-circuit television system
enabled the crew to watch the reactor. The aircraft was redesignated
XB-36H. It bore the name "Crusader" on the fuselage side.
Its first flight was made on September 17, 1955, with test pilot A. S.
Witchell, Jr. at the controls.. All of the test flights were carried
out over sparsely-populated areas, and the reactor was not turned on
until the plane was at a safe altitude. Flying alongside the XB-36H on
every one of its flights was a C-97 transport carrying a platoon of
armed Marines ready to parachute down and surround the test aircraft in
case it crashed.
In the autumn of 1956, the aircraft was redesignated NB-36H. However,
at about this time, the Air Force decided to cancel the WS-125A nuclear
aircraft program. The NB-36H made its last flight on March 28, 157. Up
to that time, a total of 47 flights had been made. The NB-36H was
decommissioned at Fort Worth in late 1957. It was scrapped several
months later, with the radioactive parts being buried.
A nuclear-powered B-36H, which was temporarily designated X-6, had been
ordered in 1951. However, it never actually materialized.
and here's a first hand account
THE NB-36H
A TEST AIRCRAFT FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH
I joined the Air Force in June of 1949. I completed the B-36 Aircraft
and Engine Specialist school at Sheppard AFB, Instrument School at
Chanute AFB, and the Autopilot School at the Minneapolis Honeywell
factory. I was on flying status as an autopilot technician. I worked
on the XC-99 for two weeks before going to instrument school.
I was discharged from the Air Force in July of 1955 and completed an
electronics school in 1956. I then went to work at Convair (Ft. Worth,
Tx.) in 1956 on the research and development of a nuclear aircraft. We
were testing the airframe for the effects of radiation exposure.
The aircraft was damaged by a tornado that had destroyed several
aircraft and was later reconfigured to be the nuclear test bed. Lead
and raw rubber shielded the flight crew cabin from radiation. The
cabin windows were constructed of glass and water for radiation
protection. At the top of the crew compartment was a huge eyehook that
would be used for the removal of the crew compartment in case of a
crash.
A special recovery vehicle was constructed that had a large blade in
front attached to a hydraulic boom that could be used to capture the
eyehook and drag the crew compartment away from the accident. It had a
radial B-25 aircraft engine for power of the tracks and boom. In the
event of a crash the crew compartment was to be cut away from the
fuselage and then pulled to a safe area. Then the 1-Megawatt reactor
in bomb bay 4 would be extracted from the airframe. A hole in the form
of an "X" would then be dug to put the reactor into below ground level
to restrict radiation deployment to only the upward direction.
The crew was a Pilot, Co-pilot, Reactor Operator, Instrumentation
Operator and a Flight Engineer.
Bomb bay 1 held the heating and air-conditioning system, bomb bay 2
held the instrumentation equipment, bomb bay 3 contained a water
shielded cylinder constructed of boreal impregnated aluminium. This
device provided additional shielding for the crew. Bomb bay 4
contained the 1-Megawatt reactor. The left and right aft scanner
bubbles were removed and closed circuit cameras were installed to
permit monitoring of the engines by the flight engineer. The tail guns
were removed and an adjustable airflow eye was installed. A huge
aluminium radiator was installed in the aft crew compartment for
cooling the reactor moderator water. The instrument capsule in bomb
bay 2 had electronics for 21 neutron detectors spaced throughout the
aircraft for sensing radiation levels, and a 24-track recorder for
recording binary counts from the binary count accumulators.
Ground-based experiments were conducted with a 3-Megawatt pool type
reactor that had a dam mid-way in the pool. The pool container was 100
feet long, 27 feet deep and 50 feet wide. There were 3 escalators to
transport equipment to be radiated by the reactor core that was in a
closet of the dam.
We also irradiated equipment for NASA and the Sandia, NM test sites. A
500 KW pool type reactor was built to irradiate different natural and
man made rock and ceramics used for the re-entry tile used on space
vehicles. We radiated all types of gyros and monitored them for
current draw and operational rigidity. Different types of wire
insulation and all types of necessary hardware required for operation
in space vehicles were irradiated.
James D. Endicott
FWIW, the development team never found anything that precluded the
building of a true nuclear aircraft. the problems were political
acceptablity and that the USAF and AEC
coild never agree on what they wanted - everything from a solitary
prototype to a fleet of bombers - for more than a week or so
The research on the small nuclear reactor led directly to the SNAP
reactor orbited by NASA
"The United States flew only one complete nuclear reactor, aboard the
SNAPSHOT mission. The SNAP-10A reactor flown on that mission produced
650 W of power from 1.3 kg of used uranium-235 fuel (embedded in
uranium zirconium hydride) to run a small ion propulsion system"
The Soviets built a similar derivative ofv the Bear in the Sixties
renab...@aol.com
> > >Thanks for the post, many good points.
> > >I'd like to add the period 1957 (sputnik) - 63,
> > >seem to have been dominated by USSR
> > >strategic thinking.
> > >
> > >- 700 B-52's deploying
> >
> > But also note that B-52 acquisition was ongoing for twenty years and
> > from 1965 onward the BUFF was employed extensively in conventional
> > operations not related to counter-USSR strategic objectives.
> >
SNIP
SAC's bumper sticker at the time was
"The only way they'll take my B-52's is out of my cold, dead hand"
SAC fought tooth and nail to prevent "diversion" of "strategic assets"
like B-52's and KC-135's (SAC owned 'em all) to SEA. What many people
don't realize is that TAC's standard tanker until 1964 was he KB-50
...some even made it so SEA (which is an easy way to win a bar bet -
"Did the USAF employ Superforts in Vietnam"?). ...
"The KB-50s began to be phased out in 1964. Their pumping equipment and
jet pods were transferred to KC-97L tankers serving with the Air
National Guard. A few KB-50s were still around for the early stages of
the Vietnam war, and were pressed into service to refuel jet fighters
that were running low on fuel while still over enemy territory. Some of
these refuelings were carried out at such low altitudes that they came
under fire from the ground. The last KB-50s were retired in 1965."
The retirement was due to airframe corrosion, which left everyone but
SAC dependent on USAR/ARNG KC-97's
DOD & HQ USAF finally put their collective feet down and told SAC it
was going to war in SEA whether it liked it or not. SAC saw the light,
but insisted that it control the B-52's not 7th Air Force.
> > >- XB-70
> >
> > Bit of exaggeration if we are to consider three experimental aircraft
> > as a trend.
>
> Tip of the burg, LeMays strategic dominance.
SNIP
And a ton of money spent...One can argue that it resulted in important
experimental work being accomplished, but I've never heard what exactly
was learned through the development or testing phases...my conclusion
is that it could have been better spent elsewhere..
>
> > >- 1000 minuteman's deploying
> >
> > Max ICBM deployment was 1054 total missiles including Atlas, Titan and
> > MM.
SNIP
Nope,
Zero Atlas
54 Titan II
1000 Minuteman
"A decision regarding the final size of the silo-based Minuteman ICBM
force was not made until December 1964. A new Minuteman system program
directive issued on 11 December 1964 established the final Minuteman
force at 1,000 missiles."
http://www.strategic-air-command.com/missiles/Minuteman/Minuteman_Missile_History.htm
So the original post was dead on
Whether the US needed 1054 ICBM's is an open question
> >
> > >- Atlas + Titans + Juno's
> >
> > Juno was not a weapon system, but a satellite launch vehicle
> > adaptation of Jupiter.
SNIP
I think he meant Jupiter, to which you can add Thor.
The whole Thor vs Jupiter saga is typical. The Army argues that
long-range bombardment by missiles was like firing an artillery shell,
hence, it should be under its control. The Air Force argues that that
a missile was like an airplane and should belong to it.
As soon as ABMA started making real progress with Jupiter, the USAF
went into a snit and in a fit of NIH, ordered Douglas to develop Thor
- demanding the speediest development timetable in guided missile
history in an effort to catch up with Jupiter. This resulted in an
extremely troubled development program
Through crass mismanagement at the DOD level, both programs were
completed and deployed - instead of deciding on one, with the
resulting savings.
They lasted about 3 or 4 years in service - being hurriedly removed
from Britain, Italy and Turkey after their deployment had provoked the
Cuban Missile Crisis (The USSR pointed out, not unreasonably, that the
US had deployed ballistic missiles outside its territorial limits to
threaten it,, why should it not be allowed to reciprocate? The Kennedy
Administration, knowing it was playing a losing hand here, capitulated
and agreed to their being withdrawn as part of the deal settling the
crisis. It should be noted that this supplied some ammunition to
DeGaulle when he led France out of the NATO command structure in '65,
claiming that US guarantees of nuclear protection were doubtful at
best)
http://www.spaceline.org/rocketsum/thor.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/jupiter.htm
> > >- SR-71
> >
> > Small number program of strategic reconnaissance employed extensively
> > in other operations than anti-USSR, including SEA service.
> >
SNIP
And Project OXCART began as a CIA program that was later transferred to
the USAF
> > >- B-58 deploying
> >
> > Two wings, limited numbers of aircraft.
SNIP
The B-58 was enormously expensive for its limited capability
"Throughout the years, money had a great deal to do with the B-58's
retention. By 1954, for example, after an investment of some $200
million, the B-58 project could show no tangible achievements.
Cancellation at this stage, the Air Staff reasoned, would mean an
unacceptable financial loss. Hence, despite production slippages,
soaring costs, and General LeMay's continued opposition, the B-58
survived. Yet, the program that finally emerged was emaciated, in terms
of numbers as well as military capabilities.
The Air Force bought 116 B-58s, less than half of the minimum initially
planned. At long last operational in 1961, the B-58 still harbored
deficiencies of varying importance. Its bombing and navigation system
was unreliable, and the aircraft was unable to carry several kinds of
new weapons. Although expensive, necessary modifications were
accomplished between 1962 and 1964. However, significant problems
remained. In the early 1960s, technological advances had radically
altered the anti-air defenses that the B-58 was expected to challenge.
Defensive nuclear-tipped air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles
appeared to preclude penetration of enemy airspace at high altitude.
Since the B-58 structure incurred significant fatigue damage when
flying at low level, and since the new bomber had no terrain-following
radar, extensive modifications would be needed to permit effective
low-level penetration. Such modifications did not materialize because
of their prohibitive cost, and all B-58s were phased out of the Air
Force inventory by early 1970, less than 8 years after the last ones
rolled off the assembly line.
"Nevertheless, by focusing attention on cost, the enormously expensive
B-58 program did not help the cause of future high-performance manned
bombers."
which meant it had to be rammed down SAC's throat
"Mach 2 speed success of the B-58, cited as one of the reasons for
decreasing the B-52 production rate, did not satisfy General LeMay. He
quickly reasserted his early 1955 position that no B-58s were needed.
New studies, General LeMay explained, showed that the B-52G with its
programmed penetration aids would be superior to the
production-improved B-58 and to any "better" B-58, such as the new
B-58B configuration proposed by Convair. This was particularly true
from the standpoints of cost effectiveness and availability. As for the
B-70, General LeMay added, there was no doubt that it would provide
substantial improvements over the B-52G. Therefore, "the B-58 should be
limited to a test program. Funding for procurement or model improvement
testing should not be provided."
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b-58-reen.htm
Conclusion, the $3 billion (at a time when you could buy a new car for
$1500-$2000) could have been better spent elsewhere
>
> "limited numbers" as opposed to unlimited
> numbers? May we ask what is the unlimited
> number of A/C you refer too :-) ,
> 33,000 Me109's is still limited.
>
> > >- Polaris + subs deploying
> > >- Nuclear Aircraft, Project Pluto
> >
> > None of which flew.
>
> NB-36 flew.
SNIP
Which was NOT the Nuclear Aircraft - it was a testbed for certain
aspects of a nuclear POWERED aircraft. The NB-60's reactor was just
provide radiation to test shielding.
"The initial concept called for a nuclear- propelled bomber that could
fly at least 12,000 miles at 450 miles per hour without refueling. Such
range and speed would enable nuclear weapons to be delivered via
airborne bombers anywhere in the world. The aircraft, however, would
require a compact reactor small enough to fit inside a bomber and
powerful enough to lift the airplane into the air, complete with
lightweight shielding to protect the crew from radiation. "
http://www.megazone.org/ANP/politics.shtml
> > >- Atomic Bomb R&D + atmospheric testing.
> >
> > Much of which was dedicated to tactical nuclear weapons. The period
> > saw development of small yield weapons down to the size of artillery
> > shells and nuclear "suitcase" bombs for manual employment--hardly the
> > stuff of "Bomber Barons" and strategic warfare.
>
> 8-15 Mt H-bomb is more than a suitcase.
snip
And which begs the question, considering what 20 KT can do to a city,
what is a "strategic" or a "tactical" wepaon
I don't think anyoen would argue that sub-KT and 1 or m2 KT shots are
tatctical - but they were not the majority of the weapons tested.
> > >- Nuclear A/C Carriers + Vigilante's
> >
> > A-5 Vigilante was quickly converted in RA-5 and only small numbers
> > total. Nice aircraft but hardly supportive of your thesis of SAC
> > pre-eminence. Nuclear CV development is simply logical--lower
> > dependence on support vehicles, greater range, better flexibility,
> > higher speeds, better force projection.
>
> I hear ya, the A-5 flunked, it was *intended*
> as a strategic weapon the USN wanted to
> stay in the Nuke strike game.
SNIP
You can add the P2V-3C 's, AJ's and A-3's to your list of Navy aircraft
specifically designed for the nuclear role. Like the A-5, the Whale was
modified into something useful - indeed, it outlasted its supposed
successor by many years - but, so far as I know, never dropped a bomb
Speaking of the A-3 brings up the B-66 fiasco. TAC realized that the
A-3 could fly missions normally tasked for B-47's from its forward
bases and sold HQ USAF on the idea as being a cheap, low risk approach.
In the end, despite external similarities, there may not have been a
single part that was common between the two aircraft - and the price
showed it.
"At first, the Air Force thought the conversion would be an easy matter
of removing the carrier-specific features, so no prototypes were
ordered, just five pre-production RB-66A models (the reconnaissance
mission was deemed higher priority). The list of modifications grew,
and before long, the easy conversion became a substantially new
aircraft. Many of the changes were due to the Air Force's requirement
for low-level operations, while the Navy plane was a high-altitude
bomber."
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b-66.htm
.
> > >All the above sucks brain-power. The gov can
> > >print money but it can't print brains/experience,
> > >The F-4 was a minor program.
> >
> > 5195 jets produced and one of the most successful tactical aircraft
> > programs of all time. Hardly minor.
SNIP
He's referring to its beginning, as an unwanted project for an attack
aircraft. By sheer luck, it became a superb fighter,
> The McDonnell Demon, conceived in haste,
> in the backdrop of the Korean conflict,
SNIP
Actually begun in 1949
for the
> USN, to get something airborne, to beat the
> Mig 15, killed test pilots, too much, that was
> a hard time.
It was another fiasco - largely due to the engine, but a fiasco - as
brand new Dash One models, some never flown, were BARGED - they were
not considered airworthy - from St Louis to Navy training centers to
serve as ground instructional airframes. Congress had apoplexy...
"The prototype first flew on 7th August 1951 flown by test pilot Robert
Edholm, and first test flights of the operational design were in
January 1953. The engine was a major disappointment, producing only
half of the expected power. Worse, it was temperamental and unreliable.
Of 35 F3H-1N aircraft flown with the J40 engine, eight were involved in
major accidents. The J40-engined aircraft were grounded and a new
engine was sought. The proposed F3H-1P reconnaissance version was never
built.
The best alternative was the Allison J71 engine which was also used in
the B-66 Destroyer. Subsequent F3Hs with this engine were designated
the F3H-2N. Use of this engine required an enlarged wing and redesigned
fuselage. In service, the J71 proved problematic, providing
insufficient power for an aircraft of the Demon's size. The engine also
suffered from frequent flameouts and compressor stalls. The first Demon
with a J71 flew in October 1954. Another problem was with the ejection
seats: initial versions could fail to operate and had to be replaced
with Martin-Baker models."
> McDonnell evolved the under powered Demon
> by adding an engine and refining the design to
> become the Phantom II, damn fortunate, but
> certainly not a high priority at that time, more
> ingenuity.
SNIP
Correct
"Under its own financing and initiative, McDonnell Aircraft began
developing an all-weather attack fighter in August 1953, shortly after
it lost a competitive bid to build a Navy supersonic air-superiority
fighter. The company focused on developing a single-seat aircraft with
45-degree swept wings to replace the Demon. McDonnell worked on a
design first designated the F3H-G and then the AH-1. Although there was
no established military requirement for the aircraft, the Navy released
details of a desired mission: an aircraft to be deployed from a
carrier, armed with air-to-air missiles instead of guns, that could
cruise out to a radius of 250 nautical miles, stay on combat patrol,
attack an intruder when necessary, and return to the carrier deck
within three hours. McDonnell reconfigured the AH-1, removing the guns,
adding Sparrow missiles, and substituting more powerful engines."
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-4-history.htm
Ken S. Tucker
I read your posted essay several times carefully,
I think it's excellent. (as usual some issues might
be contentious, but my pantys are still straight).
Pardon Top Post, but I have no specific inline
argument.
Best Regards
Ken S. Tucker
WaltBJ
the 319th employed loose deuce, scheduled 9 four-ship AA gunnery
missions a week, and practiced ACT at every opportunity including
during recovery from the scheduled missions. We stressed employing the
Zipper's strong points such as its phenomenal handling at 600 KIAS +.
Very few people seem to be aware that the maneuver flaps were modified
to new limits of 550/1.8M, which let the A model actually outturn the
F4 with its corner velocity of about 425. Its roll rate of 450 deg/sec
was only exceeded by the T38/F5. And its zero-G acceleration
performance had to be experienced to be believed. Fuel burn - we
trained to come out of AB for hard turns, as keeping it on was very
little help in the turn. As for gunnery, the Zipper's M61 had a
dispersion of 3 mils, allowing dart kills out at 2500 feet, and the gun
held a boresight exceedingly well. How do I know this? I personally
boresighted all 26 A-models we owned, leveling each airplane and using
a transit to verify the accuracy of the fuselage mounted boresight pins
to be within 1/2 mil. I was the unit weapons instructor. When we got
the J79-19 engine (J79-17 modified for single-engine installation) the
Zipper gained about 25% excess thrust. I personally know a pilot who
took one out to 2.5M in level flight. The Dash 17 engined bird could
accel from 0.95 to 2.0 in 1':45" and 27 miles while burning only 1000
pounds of fuel. With the old 3B engine the Zipper was no slouch; thrust
crossed drag at 2.36, and even the squadron dog could get to 2.0 faster
than the F4Ds and Es I later FCF'ed at Homestead. The no-turn canard
came from guys who thought the answer was to slow down and select land
flaps - the slow-down-to-turn-tight guys. Loose deuce -double attack
suited the Zipper just fine. Keep the speed up, way up, shoot, call
'off' to the wingman, and zoom to reposition. And the radar while
simple worked well enough with GCI assist. 14-15 mile contact on
another 104 from deep six was average.The radar was extremely reliable,
too. The total weapons system was far superior to any MiG21 regardless
of model, and yes, I have some actual experience with 21 systems to
back that statement. As for other comments in this thread, Ed Ramius
has adequately dealt with them.
Walt BJ
John Carrier
"WaltBJ" <walt...@mindspring.com> wrote in message
news:1161832081.1...@i42g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
The 104 had a sweet gun system and it was VERY quick. Couldn't turn unless
everybody agreed on 500+ minimum airspeed, but its vertical fight made the
Phantom appear grossly underpowered. The Canadian 104's used to make guest
appearances at Top Guns 1 v many shows. The only time I ever saw them, they
were doing 1.2 or better (hard to see 'em after they've zoomed to near
50K').
Daryl Greenameyer had a highly modified 104 (NF nose, G tail, tuned Navy -10
engine ... a loner from COMFITFUDPAC) that did 1006 mph for a new low
altitude speed record. The ultimate goal was the absolute altitude record
and the speed effort was to secure funding for a water injection system for
the inlets (limiting factor for the J-79 was compressor inlet temp when it
got going really fast). His fear was the canopy heating at 2.6 IMN, the
projected speed for the attempt. Sadly, he had to jettison the aircraft
(gear malf IIRC).
R / John
Ken S. Tucker
Thanks Walt, for the benefit of your experience.
I posted on Oct.24th an ambiguity about the F-104,
here's my problem where A/A in the Vietnam War
is concerned. It would seem to me that the 104
would have been an excellent fighter to deploy,
as an escort/air superiority fighter over NV, but
it wasn't used much for that, and was withdrawn from
service in ~1967, which must have been done for
good reason. In addition the only 104 combat reports
available publicly are summarized here,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-104_Starfighter#Service_with_Pakistan_Air_Force
though the revision in tactics you mention using the
104 may not have been well applied, again that's hard
to say. In juxtaposition to the 104, modern A/A tend
to reduce wing loading by using more wing area and
fin area that I would say are good for A/A, such as
the F-15 and F-22.
Ed Rasimus
wrote:
>Thanks Walt, for the benefit of your experience.
>I posted on Oct.24th an ambiguity about the F-104,
>here's my problem where A/A in the Vietnam War
>is concerned. It would seem to me that the 104
>would have been an excellent fighter to deploy,
>as an escort/air superiority fighter over NV, but
>it wasn't used much for that, and was withdrawn from
>service in ~1967, which must have been done for
>good reason. In addition the only 104 combat reports
>available publicly are summarized here,
>
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-104_Starfighter#Service_with_Pakistan_Air_Force
>
>though the revision in tactics you mention using the
>104 may not have been well applied, again that's hard
>to say. In juxtaposition to the 104, modern A/A tend
>to reduce wing loading by using more wing area and
>fin area that I would say are good for A/A, such as
>the F-15 and F-22.
>Best Regards
>Ken S. Tucker
The F-104 was deployed to SEA in 1966 to fulfill exactly the mission
you suggest--escort for Wild Weasel and bombing sorties of F-105s
going into RP VI. They carried AIM-9B and gun.
Problems that quickly surfaced were that they required "Papa"
tankers--probe/drogue rather than boom. This was an additional tasking
requirement and left a few tankers restricted from support of F-4
units which also were involved in the strikes. (F-105s were dual
refueling capable and could use the P tankers, but transfer rates were
considerably slower than boom.)
The F-104, while undeniably fast, had difficulty at low altitude with
the high indicated airspeeds of the 105s, occasionally resulting in
high inlet temp warning lights for them.
They had not yet been fitted with APR-25/26 RHAW gear, so had no
warning of air defense radars. The RHAW systems were just being
installed and priority went to the F-105 force which was spending the
most time in SAM country.
Almost immediately after their introduction, two 104s were lost out of
one flight which was escorting the Wild Weasel, hunter/killer flight
of one Weasel and three F-105Ds.
AFAIK, they never had a MiG engagement.
From that day on they were restricted to bombing sorties in Laos and
RP I (the southern panhandle of NVN). They required F-105 support with
RHAW gear to provide them SAM warning. Typically we flew a two-ship of
D-models armed with 4xLAU-3 rocket pods or 6x750 GP bombs. We would be
tasked with support of three or four flights of four F-104s, each of
which would be armed with a pair of 750 pound bombs and have a
play-time in the target area of an average five minutes. After
supporting those flights, we typically would have 15 or 20 minutes
on-station time remaining to perform armed recce to expend our own
ordnance.
Several things to point out. Over NVN, MiGs were not a major problem
usually. Experience with SA-2 was demonstrating the importance of
radar warning receivers and ECM gear. Range, endurance and payload
were detrimental to F-104 success.
Ricardo
Avro Arrow?
Ricardo
--
"Quick to judge, quick to anger, slow to understand
Ignorance and prejudice, and fear, walk hand in hand ..."
Andrew Robert Breen
Ricardo <NS...@blueyonder.co.uk> wrote:
>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>>
>> While the SR-71 was certainly impressive, it should be noted that a
>> lot of things about the aircraft don't relate in the slightest to an
>> air superiority fighter or tactical aircraft. The sister-ship, A-12,
>> was a high performance interceptor, but again was not a fighter.
>Avro Arrow?
High performance interceptor, but not a fighter. The Fairey Delta III
(designed, authorised, cancelled before build) was another of the same
breed. Big, fast, but essentially a big fast platform for a biiiiig
radar and some big missiles - and certainly never intended to get
close to anyone else's fighter.
--
Andy Breen ~ Not speaking on behalf of the University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Feng Shui: an ancient oriental art for extracting
money from the gullible (Martin Sinclair)