Me262 Night Fighters
guy
superb performance and fire power would have been of more value
against daylight raids. You do not need high speed against night
bombers, more creep up quietly and kill them.
Or was it seen as a Mossie (night bomber and night fighter) killer?
guy
deem...@aol.com
Or the same rationale that created a bomber?
>
> guy
guy
>
> - Show quoted text -
true!
guy
Robert Sveinson
"guy" <guyswe...@googlemail.com> wrote in message
news:1171622916....@a75g2000cwd.googlegroups.com...
A book that might give some answers:
The Other Battle by Peter Hinchliffe
Enjoy!
>
> guy
>
Gordon
That's the specific reason the five nightfighter 262s were built. It
was never intended to hunt Viermots and indeed could never have done
so. The two-seaters only made one attack, and the end result was the
loss of the Me 262 B-1a/U1 - Altner was extremely lucky to bale out
successfully twice in one week! His bordfunker was not so lucky.
v/r Gordon
Eunometic
Luftwaffe nightfighters, initially, weren't that much faster than
ingressing RAF bombers, at least untill the latter Ju 88's using
BMW801 radials and a few DB603 engined Heinkel He 219's started
appearing. (The 801's were needed for Fw 190's) hence it was
sometimes difficult to get an interception in the context of RAF spoof
raids which could split the night fighter force and lead many astray
with nothing to show at the end of a night but burned out engines when
the deception was ascertained. Night fighters need speed almost as
much as a daylight interceptor. Intercepting Mosquitos (both night
fighters and pathfinders) was another factor as was avoiding allied
night fighters.
The Basic Me 262B-1a/U1 was an improvisation, a conversion of the two
seat trainer, as a result it suffered somewhat from stabillity issues
due to the rearrangment of internal fuel tankage to accomodate the
crew member and the radar.
The Me 262B-2a or b however was a full conversion with a fueselage
stretch to properly accomodate the second crew member and extra fuel.
In a report prepared for the US after the war it was declared ready
for its maiden flight.
The Me 262-B2 was only considered an interim aircraft for something
which met demands for a 3rd crew member to cover the increasing amount
of electronic equipment that needed to be carried, short take off
capabillity, speed and the range to intercept allied bombers on their
approach over the sea and then follow them all the way back to their
base. The Arado 234 also was in development as a 2 or 3 seat night
fighter. Aparently the ideal was at one point considered a pusher
proppellor type with wing mounted jets.
The Luftwaffe Secret Project series is full of proposals and
evolutions of proposals to meet the specifications.
Apart from Radar such as the FuG 217 Neptune (which by strength of
frequency flexibillity, agillity and anti-jamming measures) had
avoided jamming there was the FuG 244 microwave radar, the Kiel
cryogenically cooled mechanically scaned imaging infrared system,
Naxos which hommed on H2S and gave warning of allied radar. (It
apparently was up to handling H2X 3cm radar as well with
modification). All these devices were built and used, apart from
Kiel which was only flight tested in a few A/C but regarded as a
breakthrough.
Geoffrey Sinclair
news:1171717698.2...@m58g2000cwm.googlegroups.com...
> On Feb 16, 9:48 pm, "guy" <guyswetten...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>> What was the reasoning behind the Me262 night fighter? surely its
>> superb performance and fire power would have been of more value
>> against daylight raids. You do not need high speed against night
>> bombers, more creep up quietly and kill them.
>>
>> Or was it seen as a Mossie (night bomber and night fighter) killer?
Mosquito bomber killer.
> Luftwaffe nightfighters, initially, weren't that much faster than
> ingressing RAF bombers, at least untill the latter Ju 88's using
> BMW801 radials and a few DB603 engined Heinkel He 219's started
> appearing.
This is interesting given the top and cruising speeds of the Bf110
versus the Whitley, Wellington and Hampden.
In 1941 Bf110s made up around 90% of night fighter production,
in 1942 around 55%, in 1943 around 45%.
The Stirling, Halifax and Lancaster, in basically that order upped
cruising speeds and altitudes. Though in 1944 speeds were slowed
to allow more bombs to be carried.
> (The 801's were needed for Fw 190's) hence it was
> sometimes difficult to get an interception in the context of RAF spoof
> raids which could split the night fighter force and lead many astray
> with nothing to show at the end of a night but burned out engines when
> the deception was ascertained.
So now it seems the above statement really refers to the late 1943
onwards periods. The Bf110 was quite adequate to deal with the
standard RAF heavies, after all the Stirling and then the early
Halifaxes had to be taken off operations to Germany in the late 1943
to early 1944 period. And as of 31 January 1944 Bf110s were 592 out
of 987 operational night fighters, the Ju88C-6 inventory was 323.
The Ju88C-6 did have problems, with Lichtenstein fitted its top
speed was 292 mph at 15,750 feet, a problem once the box system
was abandoned in favour of the wild and tame boar tactics. The
Ju88G started appearing in early 1944, with 3 operational on 31
January, 4 on 31 March and 176 on 31 May.
The Bf110G problem was engine fires, they were actually grounded
for a time in June 1943, the fire problem persisted for about a year
until around April 1944.
>Night fighters need speed almost as
> much as a daylight interceptor. Intercepting Mosquitos (both night
> fighters and pathfinders) was another factor as was avoiding allied
> night fighters.
In essence the standard Luftwaffe night fighter was able to cope with
the heavy bombers but needed better performance to deal with Mosquito
bombers and allied night fighters. With the abandonment of the box
system higher cruise speeds and longer ranges became more important.
> The Basic Me 262B-1a/U1 was an improvisation, a conversion of the two
> seat trainer, as a result it suffered somewhat from stabillity issues
> due to the rearrangment of internal fuel tankage to accomodate the
> crew member and the radar.
The trainer was a 2 seater, the rear fuselage tank being replaced by
an extended cockpit for the instructor. To make up for the loss of
fuel and balance external fuel tanks were carried under the front
fuselage.
By the way we are now talking 1945 and a handful of aircraft, something
like 5 to 7 were made operational. It is sad to think Eunometic believes
the Germans were so bad that the test Me262's have to be used to
represent the German night fighter force, which claimed over 7,000 kills
during the war, around 5,900 in the west and over Germany at night.
> The Me 262B-2a or b however was a full conversion with a fueselage
> stretch to properly accomodate the second crew member and extra fuel.
> In a report prepared for the US after the war it was declared ready
> for its maiden flight.
This is a good clue as to how many actually flew during WWII.
> The Me 262-B2 was only considered an interim aircraft for something
> which met demands for a 3rd crew member to cover the increasing amount
> of electronic equipment that needed to be carried, short take off
> capabillity, speed and the range to intercept allied bombers on their
> approach over the sea and then follow them all the way back to their
> base.
In other words the perfect fighter, not surprising they remained
paper projects.
>The Arado 234 also was in development as a 2 or 3 seat night
> fighter. Aparently the ideal was at one point considered a pusher
> proppellor type with wing mounted jets.
Actually there were a few Ar234 night fighters, serving with Kommando
Bonow formed in late March 1945, with 2 converted Ar234's. It seems none
of the multi seat versions flew in WWII though.
> The Luftwaffe Secret Project series is full of proposals and
> evolutions of proposals to meet the specifications.
Vapourware time again.
> Apart from Radar such as the FuG 217 Neptune (which by strength of
> frequency flexibillity, agillity and anti-jamming measures) had
> avoided jamming
Amazing the small numbers used and their appearance time is ignored.
The allies have to detect it, measure it, then jam it. FUG 217 Neptun J
sets were fitted to around 35 Bf109 and Fw190 in NJGr 10 in early 1944.
Neptun V, FuG 218 was fitted to Ju88G-7b, so we are talking a small
number in 1945. The G-7a was fitted with the older SN-2.
Basically there was FuG 216, 217 and 218 with the code name Neptun.
The 216 and 217 were nominally tail warning devices, and were then
developed into replacements for SN-2.
> there was the FuG 244 microwave radar,
Effectively based on the allied H2S sets, just catching up in performance.
It would seem once again Eunometic thinks the Germans are so bad that
radars around in basically experimental numbers in March 1945 have to be
used, not the types used in numbers during WWII.
> the Kiel
> cryogenically cooled mechanically scaned imaging infrared system,
> Naxos which hommed on H2S and gave warning of allied radar. (It
> apparently was up to handling H2X 3cm radar as well with
> modification). All these devices were built and used, apart from
> Kiel which was only flight tested in a few A/C but regarded as a
> breakthrough.
Naxos was standard equipment in 1944. The rest were confined to
trials or plans of going to be used in numbers, rather than widespread
use. Think of it this way, pre war the British were detecting aircraft
using IR and were able to detect the heat generated from the wings
and fuselage, so they "had" IR right?
By the way to give an idea of the real situation in the German electronics
industries, the night fighter schools did not receive AI sets until March
1943, in August 1943 80% of AI radars delivered had defects and also
about 80% of Luftwaffe night fighters had radar in August 1943.
When it comes to SN-2 300 sets had been built by the end of November
1943, of which 49 had been fitted to fighters of which 12 were serviceable.
In November 1942 at the recommendation of the Chief of Telefunken the
centimetre waves laboratory was disbanded. A few months later the first
H2S set was captured.
The Germans then decided that the H2S wavelength was only good for
air to ground, not air to air work, for a while.
There was a major expansion of the German radar industry in 1944 which
solved the numbers problems, but the allies upped their jamming efforts.
See History of the German Night Fighter Force by Aders.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Gordon
or go near heavy bombers. Not one Kdo Welter or 10./NJG11 Me 262
pilot recorded so much as an encounter of an RAF heavy.
Given equipment limitations and the difficulties that the GCI
controllers were having with the speed disparity, even between
Mosquitos and the Me 262, the chances of running a successful
interception between a heavy bomber and a jet _at night_ was just
plain zero at that point in aviation history. LW jet pilots during
the DAY were having difficulties adjusting to the speed difference
between themselves and their targets, and that was under conditions
where they could actually see the target. Under night/IFR, ground
controlled conditions, the RAF heavies represented more of a collision
risk than a potential victim for the nightfighter jets.
To be clear, orders from above limited the nightfighter Me 262s use to
specifically engage Mosquitos at night, and PR aircraft during day /
IFR conditions (as in the case of K-H Becker's F-5 Abschuss). No
exceptions.
v/r Gordon
guy
wrote:
> "Eunometic" <eunome...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
Thanks for the excellent info Geoffrey
cheers
guy
guy
Blimey, my brain must actually work sometimes! what you state above
fits exactly with my gut feel (well thats where I keep my brain) about
'262s and heavy bombers.
thanks for yet more good stuff,
guy
Rob Arndt
Germany's fighters (Me Bf 109, Fw-190, and Me-262) all had multirole
experimentation. The 262 was tried out as fighter, interceptor, light
strike bomber, brief nightfighter, anti-tank killer, recon machine,
etc...
Interesting to note that a few further projekt 262 craft were to be
dedicated night fighters... much to Gordon's frustration with data!
Rob :)
Dan
Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired
guy
Anti Tank Killer? that sounds very odd, how did they do that?
cheers
guy
Gord Beaman
You find yourself a tank killer and you blast it to smithereens
of course!...gee... :)
--
-Gord.
(use gordon in email)
guy
>
> - Show quoted text -
would not work Gordon, if it is an ANTI tank killer presumably it
hunts down the buggers with bazookas;-)
if it was a Tank killer that is another matter....
guy
Gernot Hassenpflug
Maybe the 30mm cannons could do that job provided the sights worked up
to 4 km away to give at least a second of sighting time :-) Or
dropping little bombies with sticky bottoms and labels stating "attach
to underside of enemy tank". LOL
I think in WW2 the Russians learnt very well that to attack enemy
armour you need powerful, hardy aircraft able to loiter, take a lot of
enemy flak damage, and armed with lots of weaponry. The Me 262
probably doesn't meet the requirements.
--
BOFH excuse #61:
not approved by the FCC
shrub...@excite.com
wrote:
> Gord Beaman <g...@islandtelecom.com> writes:
>
> - Show quoted text -
The Germans used the Ju-87 armed with underwing 20mm cannon in the
Eastern campaign...........and killed a lot of Soviet tanks.
Gordon
> Anti Tank Killer? that sounds very odd, how did they do that?
>
> cheers
Some of the final missions flown by JV 44 were battlefront
interdiction of Soviet armor - Steinhof's "Final Battle" (IIRC) told
of his last few sorties, not against US aircraft, but against an
Soviet armor breakout. They couldn't tell how they were doing, but
they used by R4Ms and their Mk 108 cannons in this futile effort.
v/r
Gordon
Robert Sveinson
<shrub...@excite.com> wrote in message
news:1172109513....@h3g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
IIRC the Ju-87s in Russia were equipped with the 37mm cannon.
Also IIRC Hurricanes had 2x40mm cannon in north Africa
for what it's worth.
>
>
guy
> <shrubkil...@excite.com> wrote in message
>
> - Show quoted text -
Yes, agree with that. Depending on the Hurri there were various
combinations of 40mm A/T. 4x rocket aand 44 gal drop tank, although
firing a single 40 mm was a little inacciurate:-)
guy
Robert Sveinson
Not to mention "stimulating"!
>
> guy
>
guy
> "guy" <guyswetten...@googlemail.com> wrote in message
>
> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Amost as stimulating as the Hurricane testing 4x20mm, the guns on one
side jammed, the other 2 ran away and fired off all the ammo - the
only time a Hurricane has ever flick rolled apparently!
guy
Eunometic
> The Me 262 night fighter pilots were briefed explicitly to NOT engage,
> or go near heavy bombers. Not one Kdo Welter , 10./NJG11 Me 262
> pilot recorded so much as an encounter of an RAF heavy.
These units were specifically set up to hunt and destroy mosquitos
from the very beginning, so this is not surprise that they did not
engage viermotts and were not allowed to engage them.
If the Mosquito was so difficult to intercept, even for a special Me
109 that was slightly faster and equipped with GM-1. It makes sense
to use the rare Me 262 to intercept the unarmed Mosquito with its high
target value (as a pathfinders) because no other Luftwaffe aircraft
could have such a large impact.
In addition mosquito bombers don't shoot back whereas Lancasters do
making Me 262 no less vulnerable than a piston aircraft.
The better equipped versions of the Ju 88G-6 with their speed and
with the Nazos ZR and either FuG 220 SN-2R or FuG 218R tail warning
radar that appeared in December 1944 had a reasonable chance to deal
with a Lancaster because of their enhanced speed and rear warning
capabilities. AFAIKT the Me 262A or me 262B1a/U1 did not have tail
warning radar, which means that slowing them down to deal with a
Lancaster would leave the precious asset vulnerable to a Mosquito or
black widow.
>
> Given equipment limitations and the difficulties that the GCI
> controllers were having with the speed disparity, even between
> Mosquitos and the Me 262, the chances of running a successful
> interception between a heavy bomber and a jet _at night_ was just
> plain zero at that point in aviation history. LW jet pilots during
> the DAY were having difficulties adjusting to the speed difference
> between themselves and their targets, and that was under conditions
> where they could actually see the target. Under night/IFR, ground
> controlled conditions, the RAF heavies represented more of a collision
> risk than a potential victim for the night fighter jets.
I don't accept that jet night fighter operations against RAF four
engined heavies were impracticable or that they were unnecessary, in
fact they were totally necessary primarily to preserve the lives of
the crews who were suffering heavy losses and secondly to be more
effective interceptors of all types of aircraft. Bernhard would have
been (or already was) providing unjamed telemetry to the Bernhardine
receiver with the position and direction of the bomber stream with FuG
218 (and latter Kiel and Berlin) providing interception once in the
stream.
(Note all of the above were in Luftwaffe service)
I do accept your point or argument and evidence that it was
impracticable for the Me 262A and probably also the Me 262B-1a/U1
(which was based on a conversion of the two seat trainer which itself
was also an improvisation) but I don't accept that the Me 262B-2a
(i.e. the stretched aircraft with proper accommodation for the radar,
radar operator, oblique guns, fuel, equipment) was incapable of
intercepting 4 engine heavy bombers.
1 Kurt Welter was involved in the specification of the Me 262B-2a on
8th October. I do not have his opinions on that matter but only a few
minor changes were requested. This aircraft seems to have had a
slight nose extension, a raised canopy that provided room for fuel
under the crew cabin.
2 the improvised Me 262B-1a/U1 was used to provide practicable
information for planed jet night fighters.
3 A RAF heavy with a maximum speed of 285-300 and penetrating at a
cruise speed of 200mph is difficult to intercept by a Luftwaffe night
fighter whose maximum speed is only 10mph faster and which can
probably only sustain 30 minutes at around 280mph on "kampf und steig
leistung". That provides a closing speed of around 80mph and means
unless the raids target is accurately determined that night fighters
more than 40 miles away are going to have trouble participating
because of the difficulty of getting into the bomber stream and the
effort that is put into creating spoof raids to deceive long range
warning radars.
The introduction of the Ju 88G with their powerfull BMW801 or Jumo 213
radials and speeds of over 350mph (when burdened with radar, exhaust
gas dampers, ventral gun packs) made things better but not all that
much better.
4 The provision of the possibility of oblique armament, in the Me
262B-2 is surely for use against heavy bombers.
5 The Me 262B-2a night fighter has a couple of advantages over the
improvised Me 262B-1a/U1 besides oblique guns. Better handling due
to the solution of the centre of gravity issue for approaching a 4
engined heavy from underneath. Better engines; the Jumo 004D which
was entering production as the war ended and whose better control
system allowed better throttle handling for matching bomber speed.
Better equipment and radar for controlling the interception though the
equipment then currently available for piston nigh fighters should
have been adequate.
6 Even the Me 262B-2a itself wasn't seen as the ideal night
fighter. It needed rocket assisted takeoff and needed drop tanks to
properly intercept the Mosquito. Night fighters were to become
specialist designs that were not compromised by their origins as a
bomber or a day fighter. These specification grew from a two seat
night fighter to a three seat night fighter. Apart from a Dornier
proposal and a Focke-Wulf hybrid they were all Jets.
7 Equipment to make night interceptions possible included things such
as longer ranged and more accurate radar eg the FuG 244 10cm and 3cm
microwave radars, even FuG 350 Naxos was getting more accurate. FuG
280 Kiel cryogenic system was available to provide a mechanically
scanned infrared image out to 4-5km. (I've seen photos of the rosette
pattern of a heinkel he 111, its crude but definitely recognisable)
In the "future" there were also blind firing devices like FuG 247
(Pauke SD), Eule, Oberon computers and missiles like the R100 BS that
were under test at the time.
>
> To be clear, orders from above limited the night fighter Me 262s use to
> specifically engage Mosquitos at night, and PR aircraft during day /
> IFR conditions (as in the case of K-H Becker's F-5 Abschuss). No
> exceptions.
As you know most of the 'night fighter' Me 262 kills were conducted
with single seat aircraft flying without radar.
Two seat aircraft with radar surely presented quite different
interception opportunities to exploit.
Did, to your knowledge, the order apply to both types of Me 262 and
did the date of the order preced the introduction of the Me 262B-1a/
U1 with its ausrustung of FuG 218 Neptun?
>
> v/r Gordon
The 'speed' issue has to be taken in context. First of all the same
criticism, i.e. of excessive speed, was levelled at the He 219. It
was too fast. Yet that aircraft turned to be so well liked enough
that it had to be 'secretly' put back into production and then many
were cannibalised to keep in service as long as possible.
The tactical solution was to slow the aircraft down and only use the
speed to get into to the bomber stream and then 'swim' amongst it.
Secondly it would have been madness to use the unwieldy interim Me
262B1a/U1 with its handling difficulties and lack of Schrage Musik
oblique guns when there were only a few Jets and the Pathfinder
mosquitos were a far more important target.
I can't see that tactics and technology couldn't have been developed
to deal with viermot though the cruising speed of a Lancaster was
probably only 80mph above the stalling speed of an Me 262. It just
wasn't worthwhile when there were more lucrative and annoying mosquito
targets to deal with. By this time Ju 88G-6 are appearing with a
much higher speed advantage over the bombers and so it makes sense to
keep the Me 262B1a/U1 strictly focused on Mosquito targets.
Thirdly Chugging around in any kind of piston engine aircraft just
wasn't survivable in the airspace over Germany in 1944/45. A jet was
the only way to go forward even if I meant better radar etc.
The new generation of Luftwaffe night fighters were specified with
evermore sophisticated navigational and guidance, interception
equipment. FuG 350 Naxos was more precise, The new microwave radars
were 'panoramic' so they made interception with greater speed
differentials easier. It's in this context that the development of
higher speed and jet night fighters needs to be considered.
All of the ideal solution night fighters were jets.
A specification was issued by the Technische Luftrüstung (Technical
Air Armaments Board) as early as January 1944 for the definitive night
fighter. Preliminary requirements were to be a top speed of 900 km/h
(559 mph), an endurance of four hours, armament consisting of four
cannon and internally mounted radar (FuG 240 or 244).
The Blohm & Voss BV P.215 chosen for further development on March 20,
1945. All piston aicraft were excluded.
Some of the electronic aids to be carried include:
Equipment Description Weight
"Berlin" FuG 244 Airborne Search Radar
concave mirror antenna
Range: 200 m - 50 km
(656 ft - 31 miles) 150 kg.
Oberon firing computer for guns, missiles (R4M) and R.100 BS missiles.
The R.100 was a solid propellant guided missile with either an electro-
optical proximity fuse or a time delayed fuse set by the oberon
computer which also calculated lead based on range etc. The timed
delayed version fired a forward cone pattern of incendiaries.
Some 25 were built and 10 launched successfully.
FuG 25a Ground-to-air Identification
friend or foe (IFF) 12 kg
"kiel" (26 lbs) FuG 280 Airborne Search Radar
infra-red homing
Range: 4 km (2.49 miles) 15 kg
(33 lbs)
"Naxos" FuG 350 Airborne Search Radar
passive receiver for enemy radar
(H2S, H2X, allied fighter radar)
Range: 50 km (30 miles) 24 kg
Neptune tail warning (53 lbs) FuG 218R 46 kg
(101 lbs)
FuG 24SE Ground/Air Radio
homing device 18 kg
(40 lbs) Fu Bl 3 E Bad Weather Landing Aid
blind landing radio equipment 10 kg
(22 lbs)
FuG 101a Bad Weather Landing Aid
precision altimeter 16 kg
(35 lbs)
Peil G6 Navigation
direction finding equipment 24 kg
(53 lbs)
FuG 29 Ground/Air Radio
Airborne situation report receiver 8 kg
(18 lbs)
Eunometic
wrote:
> "Eunometic" <eunome...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
>
> news:1171717698.2...@m58g2000cwm.googlegroups.com...
>
> > On Feb 16, 9:48 pm, "guy" <guyswetten...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> >> What was the reasoning behind the Me262 night fighter? surely its
> >> superb performance and fire power would have been of more value
> >> against daylight raids. You do not need high speed against night
> >> bombers, more creep up quietly and kill them.
>
> >> Or was it seen as a Mossie (night bomber and night fighter) killer?
>
> Mosquito bomber killer.
>
> > ingressing RAF bombers, at least until the latter Ju 88's using
> > BMW801 radials and a few DB603 engined Heinkel He 219's started
> > appearing.
>
> This is interesting given the top and cruising speeds of the Bf110
> versus the Whitley, Wellington and Hampden.
It takes a posturing dickhead like you to bring up obsolescent types
that were phased out of RAF bomber command as fast as possible so as
to score an asinine rhetorical point that turns out to be incorrect in
anycase.
These types were numerically of little significance to the overall
night bombing campaign nor were they significant in tonnage of bombs
dropped. Perhaps they rate an also mention but more in context of
being kept in service for the sake of propaganda value; the millennium
raid on cologne in 1942.
The Hampton: retired from bomber command entirely in 1942 with
production of only 712 with half lost in combat.
The Whitley: retired from bomber command to transport duties in late
1942. Production 1000.
Wellington, The most produced version was the B.Mk.X which had a
speed of 255mph. Not as fast as a Lancaster or Halifax but almost as
fast as a Stirling. When speed is measured in cruising speed the gap
closed. Offcourse Wellingtons served in coastal command, as
transports, de mining aircraft though they did conduct a substantial
number of night operations this was not comparable to those conducted
by the 4 engined heavies. Perhaps you'd like us to believe that in
1943/1944 there were substantial numbers of Wellington Mk 1c
ingressing Germany with their top speed of 215mph?
The relevant fact however is that Halifaxes and Lancasters had speeds
of over 285mph while an Me 110G-4 with its antenna, exhaust gas flame
dampers, equipment weight could manage 525km/h (326mph) with R-satze
it was 485kmh(301mph). A Ju-88 C-6 could manage only 291mph.
A properly equipped night fighter with flame dampers, gun packs,
radar, weight of equipment lost a lot of speed.
The British 4 engined bombers cruised at between 200mph and 227mph.
The Wellington was hardly any slower.
The German night fighters could only obtain their speed with emergency
power for 10 then 30 minutes.
You do the mathematics of trying to get an intercept when you are 150
miles away from the bomber stream and closing at a net speed of 290mph
- 200mph= 90mph. It would take 100 minutes but your engines would
start to excede their special emergency power limits in 10 minutes and
their combat power limits in 30 minutes.
>
> In 1941 Bf110s made up around 90% of night fighter production,
> in 1942 around 55%, in 1943 around 45%.
Yes Sinclair, I have the month by month production figures, but I
suppose you think that by quoting a fact irrelevant to the point
you've made a point in some argument. You haven't
1943 706 Ju 88, 789 Me 110, 207 Do 217, 11 He 219
1944 2518 Ju 88, 1397 Me 110, 0 Do 217, 195 He 219 with 8 Ta 154.
Of course the 1944 Ju 88 has in general far more powerful engines and
a much higher speed but large numbers of Me 110 are still in
production and in service.
>
> The Stirling, Halifax and Lancaster, in basically that order upped
> cruising speeds and altitudes. Though in 1944 speeds were slowed
> to allow more bombs to be carried.
>
> > (The 801's were needed for Fw 190's) hence it was
> > sometimes difficult to get an interception in the context of RAF spoof
> > raids which could split the night fighter force and lead many astray
> > with nothing to show at the end of a night but burned out engines when
> > the deception was ascertained.
>
> So now it seems the above statement really refers to the late 1943
> onwards periods.
No, it refers to the period the handley page OH.400 was in service.
What do you think?
> The Bf110 was quite adequate to deal with the
> standard RAF heavies, after all the Stirling and then the early
> Halifaxes had to be taken off operations to Germany in the late 1943
> to early 1944 period. And as of 31 January 1944 Bf110s were 592 out
> of 987 operational night fighters, the Ju88C-6 inventory was 323.
>
> The Ju88C-6 did have problems, with Lichtenstein fitted its top
> speed was 292 mph at 15,750 feet, a problem once the box system
> was abandoned in favour of the wild and tame boar tactics. The
> Ju88G started appearing in early 1944, with 3 operational on 31
> January, 4 on 31 March and 176 on 31 May.
This is utter nonsense. What you are arguing is that Luftwaffe night
fighters such as early Jumo 211 Ju 88 ans Me 110s, which took the bulk
of the night fighting during rhe bulk of the war and which were barely
faster than RAF stirlings, Halifaxes and Lancasters can 'adequately'
deal with them when the reality is that they frequently couldn't even
get into the bomber stream in time and had trouble catching bombers
which had dropped their loads. Sure they could theoretically overhaul
them but by that time they had released their loads or were back in
the UK. With more speed more of the fighters from further afield can
participate.
>
> The Bf110G problem was engine fires, they were actually grounded
> for a time in June 1943, the fire problem persisted for about a year
> until around April 1944.
>
> >Night fighters need speed almost as
> > much as a daylight interceptor. Intercepting Mosquitos (both night
> > fighters and pathfinders) was another factor as was avoiding allied
> > night fighters.
>
> In essence the standard Luftwaffe night fighter was able to cope with
> the heavy bombers
It was able to 'cope'? What does 'cope' mean? Presumably cope
means that they could keep up with them long enough to shoot them down
if they happened to be in the right place at the right time which
meant working out the bombers target while several spoof raids and
changes of direction were going on and when sever bomber streams
merged and then re-separated.
As crews became less experienced, as jamming reduced radar range, as
spoof raids drew and split the fighter force the German night fighters
needed speed to get to the bomber stream in time to insinuate a raid.
but needed better performance to deal with Mosquito
> bombers and allied night fighters. With the abandonment of the box
> system higher cruise speeds and longer ranges became more important.
>
> > The Basic Me 262B-1a/U1 was an improvisation, a conversion of the two
> > seat trainer, as a result it suffered somewhat from stability issues
> > due to the rearrangement of internal fuel tankage to accommodate the
> > crew member and the radar.
>
> The trainer was a 2 seater, the rear fuselage tank being replaced by
> an extended cockpit for the instructor. To make up for the loss of
> fuel and balance external fuel tanks were carried under the front
> fuselage.
Indeed
>
> By the way we are now talking 1945 and a handful of aircraft, something
> like 5 to 7 were made operational. It is sad to think Eunometic believes
> the Germans were so bad that the test Me262's have to be used to
> represent the German night fighter force, which claimed over 7,000 kills
> during the war, around 5,900 in the west and over Germany at night.
You are blithering utter nonsense wrapped in an irrelevant
statistic.
Try and stick to a rational argument for once.
Whether they destroyed 5,900 or more is irrelevant to the fact that
they needed better aircraft to avoid destruction and loss of their own
aircraft and crews and that they destroy 3 times as many allied
losses. It needs faster longer ranged aircraft to do that as well as
more and better electonics.
What does the following typical idiotic rhetorical nonsense mean:
Sinclair > "It is sad to think Eunometic believes
Sinclair > the Germans were so bad that the test Me262's have to be
used to
Sinclair > represent the German night fighter force"
I simply stated that the Me 262B-1a/U1 was a conversion based on the
two seat trainer.
The U1 refers to "umrustung" I.E a conversion. Precisely what I
said. It was an improvisation.
>
> > The Me 262B-2a or b however was a full conversion with a fuselage
> > stretch to properly accommodate the second crew member and extra fuel.
> > In a report prepared for the US after the war it was declared ready
> > for its maiden flight.
>
> This is a good clue as to how many actually flew during WWII.
Are you too dopey to read and comprehend or do you deliberately
misrepresent what I so clearly wrote. It seems you are both dishonest
and rashly stupid.
1 Me 262B-1/U1 an improvised conversion based on a two seat trainer.
2 Me 262B-2a proper stretched a/c to accommodate the radar equipment,
second crew member and fuel without the centre of gravity issues in
the Me 262B-1/U1a. The Me 262b-1a/U1 was supposed to ditch its fuel
tanks before engaging in combat.
>
> > The Me 262-B2 was only considered an interim aircraft for something
> > which met demands for a 3rd crew member to cover the increasing amount
> > of electronic equipment that needed to be carried, short take off
> > capability, speed and the range to intercept allied bombers on their
> > approach over the sea and then follow them all the way back to their
> > base.
>
> In other words the perfect fighter, not surprising they remained
> paper projects.
The ideal fighter spec was written in jan 1944 and it was a jet. It
would have been Germany's first special purpose night fighter.
>
> >The Arado 234 also was in development as a 2 or 3 seat night
> > fighter. Apparently the ideal was at one point considered a pusher
> > propeller type with wing mounted jets.
>
> Actually there were a few Ar234 night fighters, serving with Kommando
> Bonow formed in late March 1945, with 2 converted Ar234's. It seems none
> of the multi seat versions flew in WWII though.
The Ar 234 with a two seater cabin was under development for both the
bomber version and a similar b but different two seater cabin for the
night fighter version. A third crew member could, in some versions,
be carried in the back, separated from the other crew where the recon
camera was in the reconnaissance version. The 'trial' Ar 234B bomber
based night fighters carried a second crew member in this position.
The glazed nose was unsuitable for night operations due to
disorientating reflects and the danger of the plexi-glass shattering
from the debris of damaged enemy bombers. It was an experiment as
much as anything.
In general the Me 262 was preferred because of takeoff, landing and
wing loading issues in the kind of runways German fighters had to
operate from.
>
> > The Luftwaffe Secret Project series is full of proposals and
> > evolutions of proposals to meet the specifications.
>
> Vapourware time again.
Actually the point was to indicate the way the Luftwaffe and RLM were
thinking based on their practicable experience. Speed was considered
important but so was ease of handling and takeoff, loitering
endurance. Hence the tendency to a heavier aircraft. The Ar 234
and Me 262 were inadequate.
>
> > Apart from Radar such as the FuG 217 Neptune (which by strength of
> > frequency flexibility, agility and anti-jamming measures) had
> > avoided jamming
>
> Amazing the small numbers used and their appearance time is ignored.
> The allies have to detect it, measure it, then jam it. FUG 217 Neptun J
> sets were fitted to around 35 Bf109 and Fw190 in NJGr 10 in early 1944.
>
> Neptun V, FuG 218 was fitted to Ju88G-7b, so we are talking a small
> number in 1945. The G-7a was fitted with the older SN-2.
I must admit to making a typo mistake here. The FuG 218 Neptun radar
was carried by Ju 88G's and by the Me 262 and was based upon the
earlier FuG 216 and FuG 217. Several of my prior posts in
rec.aviation.military refer to the FuG 218 correctly. All were called
"Neptun"
The point however is this. The FuG 218 Neptun had a number of
features built in to make it resistant to jamming. Indeed it was not
jammed. It was seen as an solution till the second generation of
Berlin microwave sets could be produced. In the meantime Neptuns anti-
jamming measures would be improved through the introduction of greater
transmission power (30kW to 100kW) and other anti-jamming techniques
of for eg pulse modulation or compression etc. Concurrently FuG
240N1a microwave radar would also be in service providing experience
and time to develop a more sophisticated generation of microwave
radars already in ground test: the FuG 244. By the time jamming
started on Neptun or FuG 244 Berlin new quite different radars would
be already entering service. That was the strategy being persued.
Both these radars were stop gaps but the series that followed were
also to be subject to rapid technical evolution.
>
> Basically there was FuG 216, 217 and 218 with the code name Neptun.
> The 216 and 217 were nominally tail warning devices, and were then
> developed into replacements for SN-2.
I believe you'll find that FuG 217 was also used for single seat nigh
fighters: unsuccessfully as their night vision was lost when peering
into a scope.
>
> > there was the FuG 244 microwave radar,
>
> Effectively based on the allied H2S sets, just catching up in performance.
FuG 240 was based in allied technology but not a copy. FuG 244 was
quite quite new.
The first generation of 9cm sets were based on allied H2S radars but
differed in many subtle ways. The magnetrons were based on
electromagnets instead of permanent magnets, and apart from the
magnetron the other parts were mainly standard German components.
Once the principal of the 9cm H2S magnetron had been obtained the
General Martini set up the AGR (Arbeits Gemienschaft Rotterdam) set
about developing a whole range of magnetrons and devices in the 3 and
1.5 cm wavelength without seeing allied units but obviously
anticipating them in the "feindlichen hintegrund" (in the feindly
hinterlands). The strategy was to to leap frog the allies. FuG 350
Naxos, FuG 351 Korfu were rapidly produced and within the 11 months
the first low production rate microwave radars were undergoing test in
a He 177. The Bevollmächtigter für Hochfrequenz-Forschung
(Plenipotentiary for high frequency research) was also active.
>
> It would seem once again Eunometic thinks the Germans are so bad that
> radars around in basically experimental numbers in March 1945 have to be
> used, not the types used in numbers during WWII.
Take note of your above writing: you are being a posturing rhetorical
twit, again.
The FuG 240N1a Berlin radars delivered to a squadron of Ju 88G-6 were
simply very low production rate radars designed to gain experience for
development of more advanced versions of that radar. FuG 218 Neptun
was to fill the gap.
>
> > the Kiel
> > cryogenically cooled mechanically scaned imaging infrared system,
> > Naxos which hommed on H2S and gave warning of allied radar. (It
> > apparently was up to handling H2X 3cm radar as well with
> > modification). All these devices were built and used, apart from
> > Kiel which was only flight tested in a few A/C but regarded as a
> > breakthrough.
>
> Naxos was standard equipment in 1944.
Naxos was Introduced in 1943, about 1500 in service. It was
continiously upgraded and improved for greater range, accuracy,
frequency capacity and enhanced rear warning capacity.
> The rest were confined to
> trials or plans of going to be used in numbers, rather than widespread
> use. Think of it this way, pre war the British were detecting aircraft
> using IR and were able to detect the heat generated from the wings
> and fuselage, so they "had" IR right?
As usual you're taking half arsed facts and stretching them into self
serving lies to suit your prejudices and biases.
The British did not have long wavelength passive "Heat" IR equipment
for the detection of aircraft.
The infrared wavelengths they used for sending Morse were invisible to
the eyes but the detectors were also insensitive to the long
wavelengths emitted by aircraft engines or the contrast produced by
skin friction etc.
Kiel I,II,III,IV (the difference was in the optics) also came from a
long line of developments by Dr Kuscher of ELAC (ELectro AkoustiC)
dating from before 1940 in fact starting from research in 1930 and
also Zeis Ikon.
A 1.5m diameter ground based infrared searcher called WPG
"warmlampengaraet" which was teamed with a stereoscopic range finder
called NMG (Nachmessgaraet) was produced. There was potstam L which
scaned an image onto a foil (effectively a line scan system) for
reconnaissance and bombing and there was EVA that formed a quality
thermal image, though over a 5-8 seconds.
Kiel could see a Lancaster sized target at 4-5 km. In conjunction
with a radar that would be even more usefull. 30 kiel III devices
were received by a squadron of night fighters based at Goslar. CIOS
report file xxx-108, item nos 19, also cios report xxx-3, item 1.
>
> By the way to give an idea of the real situation in the German electronics
> industries, the night fighter schools did not receive AI sets until March
> 1943, in August 1943 80% of AI radars delivered had defects and also
> about 80% of Luftwaffe night fighters had radar in August 1943.
>
> When it comes to SN-2 300 sets had been built by the end of November
> 1943, of which 49 had been fitted to fighters of which 12 were serviceable.
And your point is what? That there were quality control and resource
issues? Everyone knows that German industry was pressed for finding
enough skilled workers; most were at the front.
Of course my original point was that the Luftwaffe night fighters
needed faster aircraft. Now you wandering into a diatrabe on quality
control issues. Tell me, was American industry incompetent or in a
poor state because B-29's coming of assembly lines were not flight
worthy and needed rework in the field? Hmmm? I don't suppose you've
heard of fast tracking.
In July 1944 isolated jamming of FuG 220 SN-2 begins while in
December 1944 the first Ju 88s with jam resistant FuG 218 Neptun is
delivered complete with FuG 350 naxos ZR tail warning radar. Gebhard
Aders makes the point that the He 219 suffered for lack of the more
advanced radars, such as Naxos ZR (rear warning facility) that the Ju
88s were getting starting in December 1944. (I think he has it wrong
as I have a picture of a He 219 with tail radar).
In effect the Luftwaffe had SN-2 in service and free from jamming
from September 1943 to July 1944 with first light and then heavy
jamming starting somewhat latter. Within 5 months a new type of radar
enters service which is backed up by a series of anti-jam improvements
and a planed near simultaneous introduction of a phased series of
microwave radars. (FuG 240N3a)
>
> In November 1942 at the recommendation of the Chief of Telefunken the
> centimetre waves laboratory was disbanded. A few months later the first
> H2S set was captured.
This is a distortion of the what actually happened but exactly the
kind of nonsense you gratuitously perpetuate to indulge your
prejudices.
In 1940 the development of microwave radar was curtailed on the basis
that a set could not be operationally ready within 6 months and that
standard sets were more than adequate. At the time the Germans had
some good magnetrons and it can't be said that they were behind the
British at the time of cancellation as no one actually had a
magnetron, apart from the Japanese who had one over a year ahead of
everyone. In Britain, still reeling under the battle of Britain a
similar order went out to cancel microwave radar development. The
British administrators simply didn't disband their teams but hid them
under other programs. Randall and Boot were not officially working
on radar but direction finding equipment.
A high frequency wave, such as what the Germans were using (50cm to
200cm), when it impinges on a target radiate out evenly in all
directions. A microwave will glance of at an angle like a light wave
of a metallic surface with only a small amount radiating out evenly
and back to the receiver. As a result microwaves need far more power
though this is partially compensated for by the ease of focusing the
beam and the capacity of magnetrons to generate high power. This is
the reason that US Appache helicopters were used to destroy Iraqi long
range radars during Gulf War one. Stealth doesn't work so well if at
all for these frequencies. Using 50cm hohtenweil radar on a Ju 290 a
submarine perisocope could be detected at 6 nautical miles.
Magnetrons also can't use the Doppler principle to resolve moving
targets or elaborate signal processing techniques such as chirping ( a
german ww2 patent 'first' and a german device for avoiding jamming and
that would have defeated broad band noise jamming such as Carpet).
In late 1942 an attempt was made to reopen microwave research but the
attempt was rejected in February.
About two weeks latter H2S was discovered. This must have been
embarrassing to some.
Within a month, two at most, the significance was understood fully.
Over a thousand technicians and engineers previously disbanded were
recalled, the present devices capable of microwave operation were
identified and an comprehensive development program of passive and
active microwave devices was planed. This includes both ground
mapping radars, airborne radars, gun laying radars. The term Berlin
derives from the German copy of the Rotterdam H2S being rebuilt and
turned upside down in the zoo at Berlin.
>
> The Germans then decided that the H2S wavelength was only good for
> air to ground, not air to air work, for a while.
Malarchy. There were certain individuals that held that view for a
fortnight but within 1 month of the discovery of the Rotterdam Garaete
over 1000 technicians and engineers were recalled.
>
> There was a major expansion of the German radar industry in 1944 which
> solved the numbers problems, but the allies upped their jamming efforts.
>
> See History of the German Night Fighter Force by Aders.
Amazingly you have the shameless audacity to quote a source such as
Aders who contradicts you in most of your points.
Gordon
> The better equipped versions of the Ju 88G-6 with their speed and
> with the Nazos ZR and either FuG 220 SN-2R or FuG 218R tail warning
> radar that appeared in December 1944 had a reasonable chance to deal
> with a Lancaster because of their enhanced speed and rear warning
> capabilities. AFAIKT the Me 262A or me 262B1a/U1 did not have tail
> warning radar, which means that slowing them down to deal with a
> Lancaster would leave the precious asset vulnerable to a Mosquito or
> black widow.
FE610 appears to be made of the 'right Stufe' - it had the bracket for
a RWR, even though the actual device does not appear to have been
fitted. Stufe I and Stufe II were, I believe, different flavors of
the same Interim Nightfighter, built by different factories (DLH being
one, can't think of the other offhand). Of the five completed and
delivered B-1a/U1s, three were clearly different from the other two.
Interception was not seen as an issue, although at least once a
Mosquito overflew Kdo Welter aircraft at Burg after landing.
> > Given equipment limitations and the difficulties that the GCI
> > controllers were having with the speed disparity, even between
> > Mosquitos and the Me 262, the chances of running a successful
> > interception between a heavy bomber and a jet _at night_ was just
> > plain zero at that point in aviation history. LW jet pilots during
> > the DAY were having difficulties adjusting to the speed difference
> > between themselves and their targets, and that was under conditions
> > where they could actually see the target. Under night/IFR, ground
> > controlled conditions, the RAF heavies represented more of a collision
> > risk than a potential victim for the night fighter jets.
>
> I don't accept that jet night fighter operations against RAF four
> engined heavies were impracticable or that they were unnecessary, in
> fact they were totally necessary primarily to preserve the lives of
> the crews who were suffering heavy losses and secondly to be more
> effective interceptors of all types of aircraft. Bernhard would have
> been (or already was) providing unjamed telemetry to the Bernhardine
> receiver with the position and direction of the bomber stream with FuG
> 218 (and latter Kiel and Berlin) providing interception once in the
> stream.
It wasn't my opinion, it was Welters. He tried a couple and almost
crashed straight into the heavies. He was adamant, and the OKL
agreed, that the 262s were marginal as nightfighters and should be
used as 'golden bullets', limited to only Mossie duties. I agree that
in Luft 46 circumstances, jets were a logical progression - I just
dont believe that the 262 was the jet anyone would think of as a
viermot-killer.
> I do accept your point or argument and evidence that it was
> impracticable for the Me 262A and probably also the Me 262B-1a/U1
> (which was based on a conversion of the two seat trainer which itself
> was also an improvisation) but I don't accept that the Me 262B-2a
> (i.e. the stretched aircraft with proper accommodation for the radar,
> radar operator, oblique guns, fuel, equipment) was incapable of
> intercepting 4 engine heavy bombers.
Perhaps so. The B-2a was not ordered as a Mosquito hunter, but as a
general nightfighter.
> 1 Kurt Welter was involved in the specification of the Me 262B-2a on
> 8th October. I do not have his opinions on that matter but only a few
> minor changes were requested.
Isn't that interesting? Its clear he was at the meeting and in the
meeting minutes, there are unattributed statements that are clearly
coming from him, but his participation seems muted which doesn't match
his other contributions to the nightfighter debate.
> This aircraft seems to have had a
> slight nose extension, a raised canopy that provided room for fuel
> under the crew cabin.
This of course was before the engineers tweaked the proposal. The
raised canopy shows up on early drawings but not on Messerschmitt art
from the period when it was actually under construction.
> 2 the improvised Me 262B-1a/U1 was used to provide practicable
> information for planed jet night fighters.
Absolutely so.
> 3 A RAF heavy with a maximum speed of 285-300 and penetrating at a
> cruise speed of 200mph is difficult to intercept by a Luftwaffe night
> fighter whose maximum speed is only 10mph faster and which can
> probably only sustain 30 minutes at around 280mph on "kampf und steig
> leistung". That provides a closing speed of around 80mph and means
> unless the raids target is accurately determined that night fighters
> more than 40 miles away are going to have trouble participating
> because of the difficulty of getting into the bomber stream and the
> effort that is put into creating spoof raids to deceive long range
> warning radars.
The GCI environment was quickly evolving and it could have been
elevated to the point that the LW was able to fight 4-mots with jets.
By March 1945, they still hadn't reached that point but equipment and
procedures were advancing quite rapidly.
> The introduction of the Ju 88G with their powerfull BMW801 or Jumo 213
> radials and speeds of over 350mph (when burdened with radar, exhaust
> gas dampers, ventral gun packs) made things better but not all that
> much better.
And as you point out, the Jagerstab deleted all piston fighters, day
and night, from production plans by March 45.
> 4 The provision of the possibility of oblique armament, in the Me
> 262B-2 is surely for use against heavy bombers.
SM was listed in many of the equipment lists, but in the last few
documents concerning the nearly completed airframe, SM was not
included. I really wonder about firing such weapons inside the
cockpit! Deafening for one, incapaciting for vision for the other.
> 5 The Me 262B-2a night fighter has a couple of advantages over the
> improvised Me 262B-1a/U1 besides oblique guns. Better handling due
> to the solution of the centre of gravity issue for approaching a 4
> engined heavy from underneath. Better engines; the Jumo 004D which
> was entering production as the war ended and whose better control
> system allowed better throttle handling for matching bomber speed.
> Better equipment and radar for controlling the interception though the
> equipment then currently available for piston nigh fighters should
> have been adequate.
I see the B-1a/U1 as nothing more than a proof-of-concept and
definitely NOT a front line combat aircraft. The German practice of
"testing" new equipment by actually employing it against enemy
aircraft was well established and I look at the limited B-1a/U1
flights as nothing more than operational tests. The B-2a was a
"grown up" nightfighter and could easily be inserted into general
service, replacing several different types of traditional
nightfighters.
> 6 Even the Me 262B-2a itself wasn't seen as the ideal night
> fighter. It needed rocket assisted takeoff and needed drop tanks to
> properly intercept the Mosquito.
That version, with a rocket under the tail, was only a paper idea.
The one that was built definitely did not have it.
> > To be clear, orders from above limited the night fighter Me 262s use to
> > specifically engage Mosquitos at night, and PR aircraft during day /
> > IFR conditions (as in the case of K-H Becker's F-5 Abschuss). No
> > exceptions.
>
> As you know most of the 'night fighter' Me 262 kills were conducted
> with single seat aircraft flying without radar.
>
> Two seat aircraft with radar surely presented quite different
> interception opportunities to exploit.
>
> Did, to your knowledge, the order apply to both types of Me 262 and
> did the date of the order preced the introduction of the Me 262B-1a/
> U1 with its ausrustung of FuG 218 Neptun?
The order applied to both parts of Kdo Welter - his little group of
"day fighter" nightfighters and the NJG 5-supported two seaters.
Altner has said that they were only sent up in response to Mosquito
raids.
> The 'speed' issue has to be taken in context. First of all the same
> criticism, i.e. of excessive speed, was levelled at the He 219. It
> was too fast. Yet that aircraft turned to be so well liked enough
> that it had to be 'secretly' put back into production and then many
> were cannibalised to keep in service as long as possible.
For the Allied aircrews, its a wonderful thing that Ernst Heinkel was
out of favor for much of the war. I think the He 219 was every bit as
good a nightfighter as the Mosquito.
> The tactical solution was to slow the aircraft down and only use the
> speed to get into to the bomber stream and then 'swim' amongst it.
Yep - and the 3-engine hybrid 219 would have had excellent response
time, using the jet to rapidly close on the bomber stream, then the
pistons to loiter and attack.
> Secondly it would have been madness to use the unwieldy interim Me
> 262B1a/U1 with its handling difficulties and lack of Schrage Musik
> oblique guns when there were only a few Jets and the Pathfinder
> mosquitos were a far more important target.
Agreed by me, and the RLM :) (We so rarely agreed!)
> I can't see that tactics and technology couldn't have been developed
> to deal with viermot though the cruising speed of a Lancaster was
> probably only 80mph above the stalling speed of an Me 262. It just
> wasn't worthwhile when there were more lucrative and annoying mosquito
> targets to deal with. By this time Ju 88G-6 are appearing with a
> much higher speed advantage over the bombers and so it makes sense to
> keep the Me 262B1a/U1 strictly focused on Mosquito targets.
nod.
> Thirdly Chugging around in any kind of piston engine aircraft just
> wasn't survivable in the airspace over Germany in 1944/45. A jet was
> the only way to go forward even if I meant better radar etc.
nod.
> The new generation of Luftwaffe night fighters were specified with
> evermore sophisticated navigational and guidance, interception
> equipment. FuG 350 Naxos was more precise, The new microwave radars
> were 'panoramic' so they made interception with greater speed
> differentials easier. It's in this context that the development of
> higher speed and jet night fighters needs to be considered.
Its interesting to me that the NAXOS was slowly being retired from
future plans by 3-45. Although the early B-2a drawings had it in the
nose, it was replaced in later drawings. Allied use of H2S was
evolving, since NAXOS was clearly being used in interceptions - so as
the Allies limited its use, NAXOS became just a rarely usable weight
penalty.
> All of the ideal solution night fighters were jets.
I think the Mosquito's use as all-weather fighters, just as
schlechtwetterjaeger variants of the 109 and 190s were all leading
toward the postwar model of all-weather jets. The 262 had a SWJ
variant planned, and it fit in the general evolutionary flow of
fighters in general - such evolution continues today.
<snip list of equipment>
> FuG 101a Bad Weather Landing Aid
> precision altimeter 16 kg
> (35 lbs)
One thing you left from your list was the K 22 3-axis autopilot, that
would also be used for blind landing. I think it, along with some of
these other aids, represented the future of jet fighters, capable of
taking off, fighting, and recovering at base all in IFR conditions.
v/r Gordon
Eunometic
> On Feb 25, 5:16 am, "Eunometic" <eunome...@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
> > The better equipped versions of the Ju 88G-6 with their speed and
> > with the Nazos ZR and either FuG 220 SN-2R or FuG 218R tail warning
> > radar that appeared in December 1944 had a reasonable chance to deal
> > with a Lancaster because of their enhanced speed and rear warning
> > capabilities. AFAIKT the Me 262A or me 262B1a/U1 did not have tail
> > warning radar, which means that slowing them down to deal with a
> > Lancaster would leave the precious asset vulnerable to a Mosquito or
> > black widow.
>
> FE610 appears to be made of the 'right Stufe' - it had the bracket for
> a RWR, even though the actual device does not appear to have been
> fitted. Stufe I and Stufe II were, I believe, different flavors of
> the same Interim Nightfighter, built by different factories (DLH being
> one, can't think of the other offhand). Of the five completed and
> delivered B-1a/U1s, three were clearly different from the other two.
> Interception was not seen as an issue, although at least once a
> Mosquito overflew Kdo Welter aircraft at Burg after landing.
As per the day fighters landing was made risky. I suppose some sort
of tail RWR really was needed in the Me 262 even in the absence of
allied night fighter jets such as the vampire.
What was missing? Airbrakes would have been usefull on the
dayfighters and presumably the nightfighters as well. Presumably
there wasn't an appreciation of just how slippery the new jets would
be and the kind of speed differentials they would be coping with.
>
> > I do accept your point or argument and evidence that it was
> > impracticable for the Me 262A and probably also the Me 262B-1a/U1
> > (which was based on a conversion of the two seat trainer which itself
> > was also an improvisation) but I don't accept that the Me 262B-2a
> > (i.e. the stretched aircraft with proper accommodation for the radar,
> > radar operator, oblique guns, fuel, equipment) was incapable of
> > intercepting 4 engine heavy bombers.
>
> Perhaps so. The B-2a was not ordered as a Mosquito hunter, but as a
> general nightfighter.
>
> > 1 Kurt Welter was involved in the specification of the Me 262B-2a on
> > 8th October. I do not have his opinions on that matter but only a few
> > minor changes were requested.
>
> Isn't that interesting? Its clear he was at the meeting and in the
> meeting minutes, there are unattributed statements that are clearly
> coming from him, but his participation seems muted which doesn't match
> his other contributions to the nightfighter debate.
I've been to meetings like that, you turn up as a sort of rubber
stamp.
>
> > This aircraft seems to have had a
> > slight nose extension, a raised canopy that provided room for fuel
> > under the crew cabin.
>
> This of course was before the engineers tweaked the proposal. The
> raised canopy shows up on early drawings but not on Messerschmitt art
> from the period when it was actually under construction.
Are there any photos of the unit that was actually under
construction? It is one of those mystery aircraft.
>
> > 2 the improvised Me 262B-1a/U1 was used to provide practicable
> > information for planed jet night fighters.
>
> Absolutely so.
>
> > 3 A RAF heavy with a maximum speed of 285-300 and penetrating at a
> > cruise speed of 200mph is difficult to intercept by a Luftwaffe night
> > fighter whose maximum speed is only 10mph faster and which can
> > probably only sustain 30 minutes at around 280mph on "kampf und steig
> > leistung". That provides a closing speed of around 80mph and means
> > unless the raids target is accurately determined that night fighters
> > more than 40 miles away are going to have trouble participating
> > because of the difficulty of getting into the bomber stream and the
> > effort that is put into creating spoof raids to deceive long range
> > warning radars.
>
> The GCI environment was quickly evolving and it could have been
> elevated to the point that the LW was able to fight 4-mots with jets.
> By March 1945, they still hadn't reached that point but equipment and
> procedures were advancing quite rapidly.
I don't think there was an appreciation of just how much effort would
be required to secure the airspace or to produce enough innovations.
It's customary to blame Georing for this though i don't think he was
quite as bad as made out though he said some totall silly things that
seemed witty at the time. He gets blamed for not being ready for
window but clearly wurzlaus was ready within a few weeks of its first
use.
>
> > The introduction of the Ju 88G with their powerfull BMW801 or Jumo 213
> > radials and speeds of over 350mph (when burdened with radar, exhaust
> > gas dampers, ventral gun packs) made things better but not all that
> > much better.
>
> And as you point out, the Jagerstab deleted all piston fighters, day
> and night, from production plans by March 45.
Wasn't much not deleted, though you will find a large number of those
deleted programms still progressing after that date out of a sort of
refusable to accept reality. Eg the Ba 346 Natter.
>
> > 4 The provision of the possibility of oblique armament, in the Me
> > 262B-2 is surely for use against heavy bombers.
>
> SM was listed in many of the equipment lists, but in the last few
> documents concerning the nearly completed airframe, SM was not
> included. I really wonder about firing such weapons inside the
> cockpit! Deafening for one, incapaciting for vision for the other.
Yes, this shows that the me 262 was too limited in size.
>
> > 5 The Me 262B-2a night fighter has a couple of advantages over the
> > improvised Me 262B-1a/U1 besides oblique guns. Better handling due
> > to the solution of the centre of gravity issue for approaching a 4
> > engined heavy from underneath. Better engines; the Jumo 004D which
> > was entering production as the war ended and whose better control
> > system allowed better throttle handling for matching bomber speed.
> > Better equipment and radar for controlling the interception though the
> > equipment then currently available for piston nigh fighters should
> > have been adequate.
>
> I see the B-1a/U1 as nothing more than a proof-of-concept and
> definitely NOT a front line combat aircraft. The German practice of
> "testing" new equipment by actually employing it against enemy
> aircraft was well established and I look at the limited B-1a/U1
> flights as nothing more than operational tests. The B-2a was a
> "grown up" nightfighter and could easily be inserted into general
> service, replacing several different types of traditional
> nightfighters.
>
> > 6 Even the Me 262B-2a itself wasn't seen as the ideal night
> > fighter. It needed rocket assisted takeoff and needed drop tanks to
> > properly intercept the Mosquito.
>
> That version, with a rocket under the tail, was only a paper idea.
> The one that was built definitely did not have it.
I'm under the impression that the Me 262B2a nightfighter needed RATO
to opperate from realistic airfields with the kind of equipment and
fuel loads it needed.
>
> > > To be clear, orders from above limited the night fighter Me 262s use to
> > > specifically engage Mosquitos at night, and PR aircraft during day /
> > > IFR conditions (as in the case of K-H Becker's F-5 Abschuss). No
> > > exceptions.
>
> > As you know most of the 'night fighter' Me 262 kills were conducted
> > with single seat aircraft flying without radar.
>
> > Two seat aircraft with radar surely presented quite different
> > interception opportunities to exploit.
>
> > Did, to your knowledge, the order apply to both types of Me 262 and
> > did the date of the order preced the introduction of the Me 262B-1a/
> > U1 with its ausrustung of FuG 218 Neptun?
>
> The order applied to both parts of Kdo Welter - his little group of
> "day fighter" nightfighters and the NJG 5-supported two seaters.
> Altner has said that they were only sent up in response to Mosquito
> raids.
Thanks
>
> > The 'speed' issue has to be taken in context. First of all the same
> > criticism, i.e. of excessive speed, was levelled at the He 219. It
> > was too fast. Yet that aircraft turned to be so well liked enough
> > that it had to be 'secretly' put back into production and then many
> > were cannibalised to keep in service as long as possible.
>
> For the Allied aircrews, its a wonderful thing that Ernst Heinkel was
> out of favor for much of the war. I think the He 219 was every bit as
> good a nightfighter as the Mosquito.
Very odd politics, mired with personalities, politics, policy, heinkel
propganda and perhaps just some practicable considerations. The
Germans shot themselves in the foot with the excellent He 219 and the
solution to the He 177 (4 engine He 277). I suspect that if one
unravels this one will see a pattern emerge. Realistically the allies
also made some bad procurement decisions but these are extremely
puzzling.
>
> > The tactical solution was to slow the aircraft down and only use the
> > speed to get into to the bomber stream and then 'swim' amongst it.
>
> Yep - and the 3-engine hybrid 219 would have had excellent response
> time, using the jet to rapidly close on the bomber stream, then the
> pistons to loiter and attack.
A BMW003 was tested under the He 219 for purpose of understanding the
exhaust gas flow attachment. I wonder if the success of this inspired
this.
It's a little odd but it overcomes the reliabillity issues of the jet.
It became of use again as the allies started using their radars again
in late 44/early 1945. In effect Naxos had the effect of forcing the
allies to shutdown their H2S and perhaps H2X (for fear) and thereby
probably reducing their navigational accuracy.
>
> > All of the ideal solution night fighters were jets.
>
> I think the Mosquito's use as all-weather fighters, just as
> schlechtwetterjaeger variants of the 109 and 190s were all leading
> toward the postwar model of all-weather jets. The 262 had a SWJ
> variant planned, and it fit in the general evolutionary flow of
> fighters in general - such evolution continues today.
>
> <snip list of equipment>
>
> > FuG 101a Bad Weather Landing Aid
> > precision altimeter 16 kg
> > (35 lbs)
>
> One thing you left from your list was the K 22 3-axis autopilot, that
> would also be used for blind landing. I think it, along with some of
> these other aids, represented the future of jet fighters, capable of
> taking off, fighting, and recovering at base all in IFR conditions.
A very interesting device, this electronic area is the area i am
really quite interested in.
Gordon
> > It wasn't my opinion, it was Welters. He tried a couple and almost
> > crashed straight into the heavies. He was adamant, and the OKL
> > agreed, that the 262s were marginal as nightfighters and should be
> > used as 'golden bullets', limited to only Mossie duties. I agree that
> > in Luft 46 circumstances, jets were a logical progression - I just
> > dont believe that the 262 was the jet anyone would think of as a
> > viermot-killer.
>
> What was missing? Airbrakes would have been usefull on the
> dayfighters and presumably the nightfighters as well. Presumably
> there wasn't an appreciation of just how slippery the new jets would
> be and the kind of speed differentials they would be coping with.
In Altner's case (and Welter's for that matter), the missing
ingredient was simple throttle management! Welter pranged / destroyed
the first "Red 4" by slamming the throttles forward; Altner overshot a
Mosquito in his B-1a/U1 and reacted as he was trained in piston-
engined fighters, i.e., he chopped the throttles, causing an immediate
flameout. In the resulting confusion, his bordfunker struck the tail
and died and for the second time in two nights, Altner had to take to
his parachute. Both of these nightfighting Me 262s were lost for no
other reason than the pilots disobeying the basic instruction from
Headmaster Bar - "Adjust the throttles and then DON'T TOUCH THEM.
Keep your mitts off!" The Jumos were simply too touchy for an
adrenaline-pumping 'throttle jockeys', used to jamming the throttle
back and forth to tighten turns and adjust closure speed.
> > This of course was before the engineers tweaked the proposal. The
> > raised canopy shows up on early drawings but not on Messerschmitt art
> > from the period when it was actually under construction.
>
> Are there any photos of the unit that was actually under
> construction? It is one of those mystery aircraft.
All that remains is a Messerschmitt factory drawing from 15 March,
showing the completed arrangement. I search heaven and earth for a
photo of the B-2a...
> > And as you point out, the Jagerstab deleted all piston fighters, day
> > and night, from production plans by March 45.
>
> Wasn't much not deleted, though you will find a large number of those
> deleted programms still progressing after that date out of a sort of
> refusable to accept reality. Eg the Ba 346 Natter.
And even 109s! They were ordered out of production to save resources,
yet Messerschmitt continued to slowly turn them out right up to when
the factories were overrun. I think this was out of habit more than
anything.
> > > 4 The provision of the possibility of oblique armament, in the Me
> > > 262B-2 is surely for use against heavy bombers.
>
> > SM was listed in many of the equipment lists, but in the last few
> > documents concerning the nearly completed airframe, SM was not
> > included. I really wonder about firing such weapons inside the
> > cockpit! Deafening for one, incapaciting for vision for the other.
>
> Yes, this shows that the me 262 was too limited in size.
agreed. it was showing its lineage as being a much-abused, overweight
day fighter design. Can you imagine a two seat nightfighter Bf 109?
Eeeck.
> > That version, with a rocket under the tail, was only a paper idea.
> > The one that was built definitely did not have it.
>
> I'm under the impression that the Me 262B2a nightfighter needed RATO
> to opperate from realistic airfields with the kind of equipment and
> fuel loads it needed.
They were limited to "Silber" airfields, just as the day fighters
were. That means long concrete runways - RATO notwithstanding. The
idea for the RATO B-2a was a fuel saving measure - they intended to
keep the 262 in 5-minute readiness on the runway as the Mosquitos
approached, then launch at the last minute. Brighter heads prevailed
and they decided it made more sense to send them up in advance of the
approaching Mossie raid. I think the RATO unit was cancelled off the
project after Heinz B. nearly burned up that RATO-equipped Me 262
Heimatschutzer.
> > One thing you left from your list was the K 22 3-axis autopilot, that
> > would also be used for blind landing. I think it, along with some of
> > these other aids, represented the future of jet fighters, capable of
> > taking off, fighting, and recovering at base all in IFR conditions.
>
> A very interesting device, this electronic area is the area i am
> really quite interested in.
Me too. I have the manual for the K 22, but it doesn't say anything
about how to operate it, or how to slave it to the pielgerat/
pielschreiber. Bernard + K 22 + datalink and FuG 16 Z (or is it ZG?)
combined with a centimetric radar would have made the B-2a quite a
formidable threat. Of course, its all conjecture, but it shows the
seeds from which the later all-weather interceptors sprang.
v/r Gordon
Geoffrey Sinclair
> On On Feb 19, 2:38 pm, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@froggy.com.au>
> wrote:
>> "Eunometic" <eunome...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
>>
>> news:1171717698.2...@m58g2000cwm.googlegroups.com...
>>
>> > On Feb 16, 9:48 pm, "guy" <guyswetten...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>> >> What was the reasoning behind the Me262 night fighter? surely its
>> >> superb performance and fire power would have been of more value
>> >> against daylight raids. You do not need high speed against night
>> >> bombers, more creep up quietly and kill them.
>>
>> >> Or was it seen as a Mossie (night bomber and night fighter) killer?
>>
>> Mosquito bomber killer.
>>
>> > Luftwaffe night fighters, initially, weren't that much faster than
>> > ingressing RAF bombers, at least until the latter Ju 88's using
>> > BMW801 radials and a few DB603 engined Heinkel He 219's started
>> > appearing.
>>
>> This is interesting given the top and cruising speeds of the Bf110
>> versus the Whitley, Wellington and Hampden.
>
> It takes a posturing dickhead like you to bring up obsolescent types
> that were phased out of RAF bomber command as fast as possible so as
> to score an asinine rhetorical point that turns out to be incorrect in
> anycase.
I like this, the more the insults the more obvious it is Eunometic is wrong.
It is not for Eunometic to correct a statement to indicate a preference
for mid/late 1943 onwards, rather abuse people for assuming Eunometic
meant what was written.
By the way I like the idea the Wellington is declared obsolescent in the
1939 to 1942 period.
> These types were numerically of little significance to the overall
> night bombing campaign nor were they significant in tonnage of bombs
> dropped.
You see here folks Eunometic needs to find a way to remove these RAF
types from consideration.
So go for their bomb tonnage, after all they carried less bombs than
the 4 engined types and this really drops their relative contribution.
Do not mention they were in service, time wise, for around half the
campaign, with the Whitley and Hampden being retired in 1942 and
the Wellington in 1943.
So the Lancaster comes first at 156,172 sorties, the Halifax second at
82,773 sorties, the Wellington third at 47,409 sorties, the Mosquito
fourth at 39,795 the Stirling fifth at 18,440 sorties, the Hampden fifth
at 16,541 sorties, the Blenheim sixth at 12,214 sorties and the Whitley
seventh at 9,858 sorties.
Of course the Whitley was the original night bomber, doing leaflet
raids over Germany in 1939 and so has an important pioneer role.
>Perhaps they rate an also mention but more in context of
> being kept in service for the sake of propaganda value; the millennium
> raid on cologne in 1942.
When in doubt Eunometic seems to make up facts. The RAF wanted
an all 4 engined bomber force, this took time and so the 2 engined force
had to carry on. Eunometic also ignores how end loaded the allied
bombing campaign was.
The last Bomber Command Hampden combat loss was on 28 August
1942. Or just after, time wise, the half way point of the RAF campaign.
The final operation they flew was on 14 September 1942. The last
Whitley operations by an operational squadron was on 29 April 1942.
The last Wellington bomb raid was on 8 October 1943.
> The Hampton: retired from bomber command entirely in 1942 with
> production of only 712 with half lost in combat.
By the way the Hampden production run was 1,451 and Bomber
Command lost some 613 on operations to all causes, including crashes.
> The Whitley: retired from bomber command to transport duties in late
> 1942. Production 1000.
Total Whitley production 1,811, bomber command lost 437 on operations
to all causes.
Amazingly the Whitley's in Coastal Command are ignored.
> Wellington, The most produced version was the B.Mk.X which had a
> speed of 255mph. Not as fast as a Lancaster or Halifax but almost as
> fast as a Stirling. When speed is measured in cruising speed the gap
> closed.
Eunometic is trying to find way to up the average speed of the allied
night bombers attacking Germany. Hence the way the top speed of
the other types are not quoted but the desired result is declared. For
what it is worth the mark III Stirling top speed was 270 mph, the
Lancaster 287 mph.
By the way the first Wellington X lost on operations by Bomber Command
was in January 1943. The mark X had around the same top speed as the
earlier mark III.
> Offcourse Wellingtons served in coastal command, as
> transports, de mining aircraft though they did conduct a substantial
> number of night operations this was not comparable to those conducted
> by the 4 engined heavies.
See the sortie totals above to show why Eunometic prefers to announce
conclusions rather than look up the facts.
> Perhaps you'd like us to believe that in
> 1943/1944 there were substantial numbers of Wellington Mk 1c
> ingressing Germany with their top speed of 215mph?
Eunometic is stuck with making a wrong statement, hence the above
statement.
By the way the mark IC top speed was 235 mph.
> The relevant fact however is that Halifaxes and Lancasters had speeds
> of over 285mph while an Me 110G-4 with its antenna, exhaust gas flame
> dampers, equipment weight could manage 525km/h (326mph) with R-satze
> it was 485kmh(301mph). A Ju-88 C-6 could manage only 291mph.
You notice here by the way how suddenly the top speeds are being
used for the RAF bombers. And note again they are not given,
the Lancaster 287 mph, but more importantly the Halifax II with its
top speed of 265 mph, yes folks, so much faster than the Wellington X.
The Halifax III raised top speed to 280 mph.
> A properly equipped night fighter with flame dampers, gun packs,
> radar, weight of equipment lost a lot of speed.
Which largely did not matter when the box system was in use given
the way it worked. The problems came when the tame boar tactics
came into use and the night fighters had to fly longer distances and
then home in on a bomber, basically from post Hamburg.
> The British 4 engined bombers cruised at between 200mph and 227mph.
> The Wellington was hardly any slower.
So at the moment the Bf110, which was the standard night fighter, has a
top speed advantage of 100 mph.
> The German night fighters could only obtain their speed with emergency
> power for 10 then 30 minutes.
Note by the way the cruise speed of the German fighters is not given. Only
the flat out power.
> You do the mathematics of trying to get an intercept when you are 150
> miles away from the bomber stream and closing at a net speed of 290mph
> - 200mph= 90mph. It would take 100 minutes but your engines would
> start to excede their special emergency power limits in 10 minutes and
> their combat power limits in 30 minutes.
Note how Eunometic is now in the Tame Boar situation, post Hamburg,
that is from August 1943 onwards. Note how the German controllers are
supposed to be so stupid as to put the night fighters onto tail chases,
not interception courses. Of course the later in the war, like September
1944 onwards the worse the warning times became for the Germans.
So yet again Eunometic time shifts, rather than sticking to reality.
>> In 1941 Bf110s made up around 90% of night fighter production,
>> in 1942 around 55%, in 1943 around 45%.
>
> Yes Sinclair, I have the month by month production figures, but I
> suppose you think that by quoting a fact irrelevant to the point
> you've made a point in some argument. You haven't
Eunometic hates figures. Apparently showing the mix of night fighters
the Germans built is irrelevant to the capability of the force.
> 1943 706 Ju 88, 789 Me 110, 207 Do 217, 11 He 219
> 1944 2518 Ju 88, 1397 Me 110, 0 Do 217, 195 He 219 with 8 Ta 154.
>
> Of course the 1944 Ju 88 has in general far more powerful engines and
> a much higher speed but large numbers of Me 110 are still in
> production and in service.
Which of course is why the Bf110 needs to be considered the standard
German night fighter until 1944, since it was the majority of the force.
>> The Stirling, Halifax and Lancaster, in basically that order upped
>> cruising speeds and altitudes. Though in 1944 speeds were slowed
>> to allow more bombs to be carried.
No response here.
>> > (The 801's were needed for Fw 190's) hence it was
>> > sometimes difficult to get an interception in the context of RAF spoof
>> > raids which could split the night fighter force and lead many astray
>> > with nothing to show at the end of a night but burned out engines when
>> > the deception was ascertained.
>>
>> So now it seems the above statement really refers to the late 1943
>> onwards periods.
>
> No, it refers to the period the handley page OH.400 was in service.
> What do you think?
Amazingly Eunometic is going to decide people are supposed to
guess meanings and complains when they don't.
>> The Bf110 was quite adequate to deal with the
>> standard RAF heavies, after all the Stirling and then the early
>> Halifaxes had to be taken off operations to Germany in the late 1943
>> to early 1944 period. And as of 31 January 1944 Bf110s were 592 out
>> of 987 operational night fighters, the Ju88C-6 inventory was 323.
>>
>> The Ju88C-6 did have problems, with Lichtenstein fitted its top
>> speed was 292 mph at 15,750 feet, a problem once the box system
>> was abandoned in favour of the wild and tame boar tactics. The
>> Ju88G started appearing in early 1944, with 3 operational on 31
>> January, 4 on 31 March and 176 on 31 May.
>
> This is utter nonsense.
Note to make this conclusion Eunometic is relying on the above
speed and production claims.
>What you are arguing is that Luftwaffe night
> fighters such as early Jumo 211 Ju 88 ans Me 110s, which took the bulk
> of the night fighting during rhe bulk of the war and which were barely
> faster than RAF stirlings, Halifaxes and Lancasters can 'adequately'
> deal with them when the reality is that they frequently couldn't even
> get into the bomber stream in time and had trouble catching bombers
> which had dropped their loads. Sure they could theoretically overhaul
> them but by that time they had released their loads or were back in
> the UK. With more speed more of the fighters from further afield can
> participate.
Note the top speed of the Halifax and Stirling. Note how Eunometic
is trying to push the line the RAF heavies flew at top speed.
Note the way the Stirling (in November 1943) and then the Halifax II
and V had to be removed from operations over Germany as of 20
February 1944.
>> The Bf110G problem was engine fires, they were actually grounded
>> for a time in June 1943, the fire problem persisted for about a year
>> until around April 1944.
>>
>> >Night fighters need speed almost as
>> > much as a daylight interceptor. Intercepting Mosquitos (both night
>> > fighters and pathfinders) was another factor as was avoiding allied
>> > night fighters.
>>
>> In essence the standard Luftwaffe night fighter was able to cope with
>> the heavy bombers
>
> It was able to 'cope'? What does 'cope' mean?
See Stirling and Halifax withdrawals above.
See the RAF casualty list from the Battle of Berlin, a fight the RAF lost.
>Presumably cope
> means that they could keep up with them long enough to shoot them down
> if they happened to be in the right place at the right time which
> meant working out the bombers target while several spoof raids and
> changes of direction were going on and when sever bomber streams
> merged and then re-separated.
Of course the idea the Germans would put up night fighters to orbit
radio beacons thought to be in the path of the RAF raid is going to
be ignored. As apparently are the RAF losses until around mid 1944.
So when did several night bomber streams merge then separate?
> As crews became less experienced, as jamming reduced radar range, as
> spoof raids drew and split the fighter force the German night fighters
> needed speed to get to the bomber stream in time to insinuate a raid.
So now we are in September 1944, and with the interesting situation
where the fuel situation meant priority was given to the more
experienced crews. Yes folks average experience went up for a while.
> but needed better performance to deal with Mosquito
>> bombers and allied night fighters. With the abandonment of the box
>> system higher cruise speeds and longer ranges became more important.
No reply here.
>> > The Basic Me 262B-1a/U1 was an improvisation, a conversion of the two
>> > seat trainer, as a result it suffered somewhat from stability issues
>> > due to the rearrangement of internal fuel tankage to accommodate the
>> > crew member and the radar.
>>
>> The trainer was a 2 seater, the rear fuselage tank being replaced by
>> an extended cockpit for the instructor. To make up for the loss of
>> fuel and balance external fuel tanks were carried under the front
>> fuselage.
>
> Indeed
Oh good, agreement.
>> By the way we are now talking 1945 and a handful of aircraft, something
>> like 5 to 7 were made operational. It is sad to think Eunometic believes
>> the Germans were so bad that the test Me262's have to be used to
>> represent the German night fighter force, which claimed over 7,000 kills
>> during the war, around 5,900 in the west and over Germany at night.
>
> You are blithering utter nonsense wrapped in an irrelevant statistic.
> Try and stick to a rational argument for once.
The truth about the number and effectiveness of the Me262 as a
night fighter seems to hurt.
> Whether they destroyed 5,900 or more is irrelevant to the fact that
> they needed better aircraft to avoid destruction and loss of their own
> aircraft and crews and that they destroy 3 times as many allied
> losses. It needs faster longer ranged aircraft to do that as well as
> more and better electonics.
So in other words the fact the Germans did not upgrade the night
fighter force until mid/late 1944 with the arrival of the Ju88G means
what?
The Germans could not do it? The Germans accepted they were
using inadequate aircraft?
Or alternatively as the Battle of Berlin showed until around mid
1944 the night fighter force was capable of doing its job, including
inflicting a big defeat on the RAF.
> What does the following typical idiotic rhetorical nonsense mean:
>
> Sinclair > "It is sad to think Eunometic believes
> Sinclair > the Germans were so bad that the test Me262's have to be
> used to
> Sinclair > represent the German night fighter force"
>
> I simply stated that the Me 262B-1a/U1 was a conversion based on the
> two seat trainer.
Yes folks, Eunometic keeps telling us about vapourware and
what the Germans were going to do, rather than what they did.
> The U1 refers to "umrustung" I.E a conversion. Precisely what I
> said. It was an improvisation.
A very minor part of the air war to put it mildly.
>> > The Me 262B-2a or b however was a full conversion with a fuselage
>> > stretch to properly accommodate the second crew member and extra fuel.
>> > In a report prepared for the US after the war it was declared ready
>> > for its maiden flight.
>>
>> This is a good clue as to how many actually flew during WWII.
>
> Are you too dopey to read and comprehend or do you deliberately
> misrepresent what I so clearly wrote. It seems you are both dishonest
> and rashly stupid.
This is a good clue as to how many actually flew during WWII. Note
the insults rather than numbers and flight dates.
> 1 Me 262B-1/U1 an improvised conversion based on a two seat trainer.
> 2 Me 262B-2a proper stretched a/c to accommodate the radar equipment,
> second crew member and fuel without the centre of gravity issues in
> the Me 262B-1/U1a. The Me 262b-1a/U1 was supposed to ditch its fuel
> tanks before engaging in combat.
Note the "was supposed" part, so how many flew in WWII?
>> > The Me 262-B2 was only considered an interim aircraft for something
>> > which met demands for a 3rd crew member to cover the increasing amount
>> > of electronic equipment that needed to be carried, short take off
>> > capability, speed and the range to intercept allied bombers on their
>> > approach over the sea and then follow them all the way back to their
>> > base.
>>
>> In other words the perfect fighter, not surprising they remained
>> paper projects.
>
> The ideal fighter spec was written in jan 1944 and it was a jet. It
> would have been Germany's first special purpose night fighter.
In other words the perfect fighter, not surprising they remained
paper projects. Vapourware time again.
>> >The Arado 234 also was in development as a 2 or 3 seat night
>> > fighter. Apparently the ideal was at one point considered a pusher
>> > propeller type with wing mounted jets.
>>
>> Actually there were a few Ar234 night fighters, serving with Kommando
>> Bonow formed in late March 1945, with 2 converted Ar234's. It seems none
>> of the multi seat versions flew in WWII though.
>
> The Ar 234 with a two seater cabin was under development for both the
> bomber version and a similar b but different two seater cabin for the
> night fighter version.
In other words
"It seems none of the multi seat versions flew in WWII though."
> A third crew member could, in some versions,
> be carried in the back, separated from the other crew where the recon
> camera was in the reconnaissance version.
So tell us all the version designations and flight dates.
> The 'trial' Ar 234B bomber
> based night fighters carried a second crew member in this position.
Ah so the claim is the couple of conversions included space for a
second crew member. So which reference is being used?
> The glazed nose was unsuitable for night operations due to
> disorientating reflects and the danger of the plexi-glass shattering
> from the debris of damaged enemy bombers. It was an experiment as
> much as anything.
It sort of shows how desperate the Germans were at the time.
> In general the Me 262 was preferred because of takeoff, landing and
> wing loading issues in the kind of runways German fighters had to
> operate from.
Not to mention the fact it was a fighter and so needed less work to
turn it into a night fighter.
>> > The Luftwaffe Secret Project series is full of proposals and
>> > evolutions of proposals to meet the specifications.
>>
>> Vapourware time again.
>
> Actually the point was to indicate the way the Luftwaffe and RLM were
> thinking based on their practicable experience. Speed was considered
> important but so was ease of handling and takeoff, loitering
> endurance. Hence the tendency to a heavier aircraft. The Ar 234
> and Me 262 were inadequate.
Of course none of these projects actually flew and of course there is
no comparison to similar allied ideas.
>> > Apart from Radar such as the FuG 217 Neptune (which by strength of
>> > frequency flexibility, agility and anti-jamming measures) had
>> > avoided jamming
>>
>> Amazing the small numbers used and their appearance time is ignored.
>> The allies have to detect it, measure it, then jam it. FUG 217 Neptun J
>> sets were fitted to around 35 Bf109 and Fw190 in NJGr 10 in early 1944.
>>
>> Neptun V, FuG 218 was fitted to Ju88G-7b, so we are talking a small
>> number in 1945. The G-7a was fitted with the older SN-2.
>
> I must admit to making a typo mistake here. The FuG 218 Neptun radar
> was carried by Ju 88G's and by the Me 262 and was based upon the
> earlier FuG 216 and FuG 217. Several of my prior posts in
> rec.aviation.military refer to the FuG 218 correctly. All were called
> "Neptun"
The reality is confusion is easily possible given the reuse of the
code name.
> The point however is this. The FuG 218 Neptun had a number of
> features built in to make it resistant to jamming. Indeed it was not
> jammed.
You see here is where Eunometic simply ignores the numbers deployed,
instead trying to imply the counter jamming systems were the reason
it was not jammed.
Tell us all, when did the allies try and jam Neptun? Try zero.
> It was seen as an solution till the second generation of
> Berlin microwave sets could be produced.
Once again we are in the experimental area.
> In the meantime Neptuns anti-
> jamming measures would be improved through the introduction of greater
> transmission power (30kW to 100kW) and other anti-jamming techniques
> of for eg pulse modulation or compression etc.
Now we head to vapourware.
>Concurrently FuG
> 240N1a microwave radar would also be in service providing experience
> and time to develop a more sophisticated generation of microwave
> radars already in ground test: the FuG 244. By the time jamming
> started on Neptun or FuG 244 Berlin new quite different radars would
> be already entering service. That was the strategy being persued.
Now we arrive in the 1946 to 1947 time frame.
> Both these radars were stop gaps but the series that followed were
> also to be subject to rapid technical evolution.
As usual what the Germans might have done is counted, not what
actually happened. Not to mention the Germans have an easy time
during development.
>> Basically there was FuG 216, 217 and 218 with the code name Neptun.
>> The 216 and 217 were nominally tail warning devices, and were then
>> developed into replacements for SN-2.
>
> I believe you'll find that FuG 217 was also used for single seat nigh
> fighters: unsuccessfully as their night vision was lost when peering
> into a scope.
So in effect a trial that had to be abandoned. Not sure that counts
as a "use".
>> > there was the FuG 244 microwave radar,
>>
>> Effectively based on the allied H2S sets, just catching up in
>> performance.
>
> FuG 240 was based in allied technology but not a copy. FuG 244 was
> quite quite new.
Apparently not when it comes to wavelengths.
> The first generation of 9cm sets were based on allied H2S radars but
> differed in many subtle ways. The magnetrons were based on
> electromagnets instead of permanent magnets, and apart from the
> magnetron the other parts were mainly standard German components.
In other words basically a copy, the "many subtle ways" are an attempt
to remove the idea of it being a copy.
http://www.skylighters.org/radar/index.html
> Once the principal of the 9cm H2S magnetron had been obtained the
> General Martini set up the AGR (Arbeits Gemienschaft Rotterdam) set
> about developing a whole range of magnetrons and devices in the 3 and
> 1.5 cm wavelength without seeing allied units but obviously
> anticipating them in the "feindlichen hintegrund" (in the feindly
> hinterlands).
So what were the results then?
>The strategy was to to leap frog the allies. FuG 350
> Naxos, FuG 351 Korfu were rapidly produced and within the 11 months
> the first low production rate microwave radars were undergoing test in
> a He 177.
Firstly note how "within 11 months" does not have its start date. The
first H2S set captured by the Germans was on 3 February 1943.
Secondly note Korfu was supposed to be a long range Naxos, the H2S
homer, with only a few built. Naxos came into use in early 1944 and
saw extensive use.
> The Bevollmächtigter für Hochfrequenz-Forschung
> (Plenipotentiary for high frequency research) was also active.
And they did exactly what?
>> It would seem once again Eunometic thinks the Germans are so bad that
>> radars around in basically experimental numbers in March 1945 have to be
>> used, not the types used in numbers during WWII.
>
> Take note of your above writing: you are being a posturing rhetorical
> twit, again.
Actually I am accurately reporting the effect of Eunometic's fiction.
There are 2 ways to denigrate, one is obviously to deny anything
good, the other is to over praise, to invent favourable facts, to over
state the case. So in the end no one believes the legitimate claims.
> The FuG 240N1a Berlin radars delivered to a squadron of Ju 88G-6 were
> simply very low production rate radars designed to gain experience for
> development of more advanced versions of that radar. FuG 218 Neptun
> was to fill the gap.
yes folks,
It would seem once again Eunometic thinks the Germans are so bad that
radars around in basically experimental numbers in March 1945 have to be
used, not the types used in numbers during WWII.
>> > the Kiel
>> > cryogenically cooled mechanically scaned imaging infrared system,
>> > Naxos which hommed on H2S and gave warning of allied radar. (It
>> > apparently was up to handling H2X 3cm radar as well with
>> > modification). All these devices were built and used, apart from
>> > Kiel which was only flight tested in a few A/C but regarded as a
>> > breakthrough.
>>
>> Naxos was standard equipment in 1944.
>
> Naxos was Introduced in 1943, about 1500 in service.
Developed during 1943, in production in 1944.
> It was
> continiously upgraded and improved for greater range, accuracy,
> frequency capacity and enhanced rear warning capacity.
The trade off being production being slowed by the modifications.
>> The rest were confined to
>> trials or plans of going to be used in numbers, rather than widespread
>> use. Think of it this way, pre war the British were detecting aircraft
>> using IR and were able to detect the heat generated from the wings
>> and fuselage, so they "had" IR right?
>
> As usual you're taking half arsed facts and stretching them into self
> serving lies to suit your prejudices and biases.
Eunometic hates it when others use the Eunometic logic system
against the preferred good guys.
> The British did not have long wavelength passive "Heat" IR equipment
> for the detection of aircraft.
Obviously not bothered to check the pre war experiments have you?
I mean if German experiments count so do others.
Then follows the "they could have if required" part.
> The infrared wavelengths they used for sending Morse were invisible to
> the eyes but the detectors were also insensitive to the long
> wavelengths emitted by aircraft engines or the contrast produced by
> skin friction etc.
Not bothered to go into the allied experimental sections I see.
> Kiel I,II,III,IV (the difference was in the optics) also came from a
> long line of developments by Dr Kuscher of ELAC (ELectro AkoustiC)
> dating from before 1940 in fact starting from research in 1930 and
> also Zeis Ikon.
So in other words similar to the British experiments pre war, which
were largely dropped to concentrate on radar.
> A 1.5m diameter ground based infrared searcher called WPG
> "warmlampengaraet" which was teamed with a stereoscopic range finder
> called NMG (Nachmessgaraet) was produced. There was potstam L which
> scaned an image onto a foil (effectively a line scan system) for
> reconnaissance and bombing and there was EVA that formed a quality
> thermal image, though over a 5-8 seconds.
>
> Kiel could see a Lancaster sized target at 4-5 km. In conjunction
> with a radar that would be even more usefull. 30 kiel III devices
> were received by a squadron of night fighters based at Goslar. CIOS
> report file xxx-108, item nos 19, also cios report xxx-3, item 1.
I suggest seeking a reference for this material over and above the
Eunometic claim. It is supposed to be a German wonder weapon,
Eunometic tends to add wonder and weapons capability.
>> By the way to give an idea of the real situation in the German
>> electronics
>> industries, the night fighter schools did not receive AI sets until March
>> 1943, in August 1943 80% of AI radars delivered had defects and also
>> about 80% of Luftwaffe night fighters had radar in August 1943.
>>
>> When it comes to SN-2 300 sets had been built by the end of November
>> 1943, of which 49 had been fitted to fighters of which 12 were
>> serviceable.
>
> And your point is what? That there were quality control and resource
> issues? Everyone knows that German industry was pressed for finding
> enough skilled workers; most were at the front.
Simple enough really Eunometic tells us how wonderful German radar
was going to be, in late 1945 or 1946 or 1947. I report reality.
I could add the skilled workers killed or simply removed because
of Nazi racial theory.
> Of course my original point was that the Luftwaffe night fighters
> needed faster aircraft.
I note Eunometic has not bothered to mention the Eunometic
radar report, all those 1945 radars, or planned radars.
> Now you wandering into a diatrabe on quality
> control issues.
Reality does hurt at times.
>Tell me, was American industry incompetent or in a
> poor state because B-29's coming of assembly lines were not flight
> worthy and needed rework in the field?
Actually given the regularly reported teething troubles of new
aircraft the US was tracking about right. The B-29 was right
on the edge of what was possible in WWII, hence the real
problems with it.
Similar to radar sets for aircraft.
>Hmmm? I don't suppose you've heard of fast tracking.
Eunometic needs to run to what the Germans could have done
in 1945, if everything works better than usual.
> In July 1944 isolated jamming of FuG 220 SN-2 begins while in
> December 1944 the first Ju 88s with jam resistant FuG 218 Neptun is
> delivered complete with FuG 350 naxos ZR tail warning radar. Gebhard
> Aders makes the point that the He 219 suffered for lack of the more
> advanced radars, such as Naxos ZR (rear warning facility) that the Ju
> 88s were getting starting in December 1944. (I think he has it wrong
> as I have a picture of a He 219 with tail radar).
>
> In effect the Luftwaffe had SN-2 in service and free from jamming
> from September 1943 to July 1944 with first light and then heavy
> jamming starting somewhat latter.
Note by the way the allied jamming started just after obtaining a set
from a captured night fighter.
> Within 5 months a new type of radar
> enters service which is backed up by a series of anti-jam improvements
> and a planed near simultaneous introduction of a phased series of
> microwave radars. (FuG 240N3a)
Yes folks, the German's figured out the need for continual improvement
in fighter radar performance and they were going to do it. Just not as
fast or as well as Eunometic hopes.
>> In November 1942 at the recommendation of the Chief of Telefunken the
>> centimetre waves laboratory was disbanded. A few months later the first
>> H2S set was captured.
>
> This is a distortion of the what actually happened but exactly the
> kind of nonsense you gratuitously perpetuate to indulge your
> prejudices.
Actually it is what Aders reports but why bother with that.
> In 1940 the development of microwave radar was curtailed on the basis
> that a set could not be operationally ready within 6 months and that
> standard sets were more than adequate.
You see Eunometic really wants to believe the Germans in effect
defeated themselves instead of a more complex picture about
resources and what people thought could be done.
> At the time the Germans had
> some good magnetrons and it can't be said that they were behind the
> British at the time of cancellation as no one actually had a
> magnetron, apart from the Japanese who had one over a year ahead of
> everyone.
Eunometic still tries to ignore the difference between a magnetron and
a cavity magnetron, the former were around in the 1920's.
See other posts for the Soviet cavity magnetron of 1939/40 and the
debunking of the Eunometic radar time line.
>In Britain, still reeling under the battle of Britain a
> similar order went out to cancel microwave radar development. The
> British administrators simply didn't disband their teams but hid them
> under other programs. Randall and Boot were not officially working
> on radar but direction finding equipment.
So tell us all what reference states this? The British were working hard
on better radars.
> A high frequency wave, such as what the Germans were using (50cm to
> 200cm), when it impinges on a target radiate out evenly in all
> directions.
This is good, so tell us what is the magic cut over wave length
between even radiation and directional reflection?
Is it possible things are a little more complicated that this, depending
on size, shape and orientation of the target?
> A microwave will glance of at an angle like a light wave
> of a metallic surface with only a small amount radiating out evenly
> and back to the receiver.
It seems the idea is aircraft a some sort of flat surface.
>As a result microwaves need far more power
> though this is partially compensated for by the ease of focusing the
> beam and the capacity of magnetrons to generate high power.
Partially or more than partially given the movements involved and
given how small a fraction of the radiated energy would make it back
to the receiver if indeed it was reflected equally in all directions.
>This is
> the reason that US Appache helicopters were used to destroy Iraqi long
> range radars during Gulf War one. Stealth doesn't work so well if at
> all for these frequencies. Using 50cm hohtenweil radar on a Ju 290 a
> submarine perisocope could be detected at 6 nautical miles.
Simply put different wavelengths give different results. Eunometic
gives different results again.
> Magnetrons also can't use the Doppler principle to resolve moving
> targets or elaborate signal processing techniques such as chirping ( a
> german ww2 patent 'first' and a german device for avoiding jamming and
> that would have defeated broad band noise jamming such as Carpet).
Note once again the Germans were first and were going to do it. Note
Doppler shift requires a stable frequency, which cavity magnetrons
were not as good at compared with other valves.
Note somehow Eunometic fails to see a good reason why the Germans
might not research microwave radars.
> In late 1942 an attempt was made to reopen microwave research but the
> attempt was rejected in February.
So tell us all which reference is being used.
> About two weeks latter H2S was discovered. This must have been
> embarrassing to some.
>
> Within a month, two at most, the significance was understood fully.
> Over a thousand technicians and engineers previously disbanded were
> recalled, the present devices capable of microwave operation were
> identified and an comprehensive development program of passive and
> active microwave devices was planed. This includes both ground
> mapping radars, airborne radars, gun laying radars. The term Berlin
> derives from the German copy of the Rotterdam H2S being rebuilt and
> turned upside down in the zoo at Berlin.
Of course Eunometic simply over states the results of the program and
the speed in which it was set up. The Germans took time to salvage the
set and return it to Berlin for example.
>> The Germans then decided that the H2S wavelength was only good for
>> air to ground, not air to air work, for a while.
>
> Malarchy. There were certain individuals that held that view for a
> fortnight but within 1 month of the discovery of the Rotterdam Garaete
> over 1000 technicians and engineers were recalled.
Note above it was a month or "two at most", now it is a month, try and
keep the story straight please.
Is this start date based on the first set captured, the one destroyed a
month later or the second set captured on the night the first was
destroyed? The raid on Berlin on the night of 1/2 March 1943.
>> There was a major expansion of the German radar industry in 1944 which
>> solved the numbers problems, but the allies upped their jamming efforts.
>>
>> See History of the German Night Fighter Force by Aders.
>
> Amazingly you have the shameless audacity to quote a source such as
> Aders who contradicts you in most of your points.
Simply put I suggest people read Aders.
John Halliwell
Eunometic <euno...@yahoo.com.au> writes
>As per the day fighters landing was made risky. I suppose some sort
>of tail RWR really was needed in the Me 262 even in the absence of
>allied night fighter jets such as the vampire.
How visible would the jetpipe be from behind at night?
I'm envisioning the 262 getting involved with a stream of heavies with
all the gunners (and the odd Mossie) presented with an obvious, easily
identified target.
--
John
Gordon
> In article <1172544445.604708.127...@8g2000cwh.googlegroups.com>,
> Eunometic <eunome...@yahoo.com.au> writes
>
> >As per the day fighters landing was made risky. I suppose some sort
> >of tail RWR really was needed in the Me 262 even in the absence of
> >allied night fighter jets such as the vampire.
>
> How visible would the jetpipe be from behind at night?
>
> I'm envisioning the 262 getting involved with a stream of heavies with
> all the gunners (and the odd Mossie) presented with an obvious, easily
> identified target.
Gunners would have only a momentary flash as it egressed - no
opportunity to spot the glowing rings of the exhaust (remember, these
aren't motoring around at full throttle so its not exactly belching
flame) until the jet is leaving the gunner's field of fire. Stern
views are all you'd get of the exhaust, which doesn't really help your
fire solution. As for Mossies, they were always a problem and would
likely have attrited the jet nightfighter force if the war had
continued.
v/r Gordon