Canberra vs F-4 performance, F-4 vs F-111 $$$
jacko
<wom...@netspeed.com.au> while discussing TSR-2 vs F111 for the RAAF
wrote:
>Only trouble with that argument, Dolbs, is that the UK had to amend OR 343
>for their Canberra replacement to OR 343A to suit the F-111 ( then known as
>the TFX - which had not even flown at the time). The F-111 still didn't
>meet the amended Operational Requirement, and we ended up with the same
>aircraft as the poms got at about the same time - .........................................
Wombat - this bit puzzles me...............
>offer us the F-4E as a stop-gap even though it was by no means anything like
>a Canberra replacement.
>
I would have thought the F-4 way superior in all capabilities - speed,
loadout, range, handling, electronics etc. Can you expand a bit
please?
A second question for you or anybody else. Has anyone done a
cost/benefit analysis comparing what we've paid for the F-111 program
against what it would have cost to stick with the F-4s.? They still
seem to be doing the job for quite a number of countries.
As a taxpayer I'd like a reasoned explanation as to
1. Why RAAF personnel across the ranks are better trained
2. Why Australia is more secure today against immediate threats
with a handful of F-111s rather than several squadrons of Phantoms.
And finally what is the marginal cost of that additional security.
All hindsight I know, but it may be useful when we have similar
choices to make in the future.
jacko
Carlo Kopp
No comparison whatsoever, F-111 wins. Go to the F-111 Aardvark webpage
and do a bit of reading and you'll see why.
Cheers,
Carlo
Rock
>
>A second question for you or anybody else. Has anyone done a
>cost/benefit analysis comparing what we've paid for the F-111 program
>against what it would have cost to stick with the F-4s.? They still
>seem to be doing the job for quite a number of countries.
>
The F-4's were only leased to Australia as a stop gap pending the arrival of
the F-111s once their cracking problems were fixed hence we couldn't keep
them as we has already signed for the TFX.
>As a taxpayer I'd like a reasoned explanation as to
>1. Why RAAF personnel across the ranks are better trained
Better trained when compared to whom? Australia is regarded as one of the
most professionally trained outfits, certainly within our sphere of
influence (ie Asia). What would you rather see defending your (as in all
Australians) interests, a professional outfit or a bunch of incompetent
corrupt lay abouts? Just go to some Asian countries and you see how coorupt
the military can really become.
>2. Why Australia is more secure today against immediate threats
> with a handful of F-111s rather than several squadrons of Phantoms.
>
Last time I looked we still operated two Sqns of F-111s, which considering
the Pigs capabilities is a fair swap for the stop gap F-4's. F-4's are a
good fighter no doubt but the F-111 will always crap all over it when it
comes to Payload range and precision strike using Pavetack and the TFR.
>And finally what is the marginal cost of that additional security.
Defence is never cheap but give me a Sqn of aircraft over an additional
submarine any day. $500m for a sub, $30m for an F/A-18. 10 Hornets plus
spares for a similar price.
>
>All hindsight I know, but it may be useful when we have similar
>choices to make in the future.
>
>jacko
>
Rock
Graeme Hogan
jacko wrote in message <36d10d5a...@news.optusnet.com.au>...
>I would have thought the F-4 way superior in all capabilities - speed,
>loadout, range, handling, electronics etc. Can you expand a bit
>please?
>
Apparently the F4-E had a very small combat radius, something like 190 n.m.
Melb. to Albury.
It was said that with enough power, even a brick will fly.
Gooney Bird
level bombing but is expsoed....
The F4 is a perfect multi role platform where the Canberra wasnt.
Also nearly two generations separeted the Canberra and F4 anyway so in
some ways you cant compare them.
The F4 would of been good as a strike aircraft in RAAF but the Pig has a
better adapatabilty to modern upgrades i belive as shown by the AUP
program of late.
The F4 was always been upgraded..Pave Pacer, Pave Strike, Pave etc..
even the addition of the ARN-101 system bought it a degree of digital
bombing/navigational help, but it is slowly becoming obseletle sadly i
have to admit.:(
Tho anyday i agree ...a Sqn of new a/c over submarine.
Anyone for a reopen of the Pig Line at Forth Worth?.. Long live
Pigs...that Fly :P
Phil
David Lentz
jacko wrote:
<snipped>
> As a taxpayer I'd like a reasoned explanation as to
> 1. Why RAAF personnel across the ranks are better trained
> 2. Why Australia is more secure today against immediate threats
> with a handful of F-111s rather than several squadrons of Phantoms.
>
> And finally what is the marginal cost of that additional security.
>
> All hindsight I know, but it may be useful when we have similar
> choices to make in the future.
As s rule of thumb, I don't tend to say that one aircraft is better than another. The F=111 and
the F-4 are very different aircraft. The F-4 is a multirole fighter, that does everything.
The F-111 is medium bomber that does long range interdiction and precision attack better than
maybe any aircraft in ever made. If you want to fly close air support, CAP, SEAD and myriad of
other tasks with only one type, the F-4 for the bird for you. On the other pylon you want and
aircraft that can fly a long way, carry heavy amount of ordinance and drop them with great
precision, the F-111 is what you want. While certainly the F-4 handles many more missions that
the F-11, for what the F-111 does, nobody does it better.
As for what Australia's defense's needs are, why beyond my realm.
David
James Matthew Weber
I would find that hard to believe. F4 is a naval fighter, and Naval
fighters always have always had long legs. At Maximum weight (about
61,000 pounds), it is reported to have a combat radius of about 300
nmiles (and that is carriyng 8 tons of ordinance)... 190nm is pretty
worthless in a carrier based aircraft. I obviously can go a lot
further with a little ordinance strapped on.
On the other hand, F111 have very short legs. When the USA attacked
Libya from bases in the UK, it required FIVE in flight refuelings to
get them F111's there and back!
F111 has had a checquered career. It turns out when the contract was
awarded to General Dynamics, it was done on the basis of influence.
the Boeing design was actually preferred by the services, and had a
lower price tag!!!
Ed Rasimus
>The bulk of the heavy precision deliveries in 1991 were done by the 48th
>TFW flying the F-111F. You can hardly call that a chequered career.
>Rubbished by ignoramuses in the media, yes, but mostly an outstanding
>performer in combat. No F-111s were lost in bombing missions in 1991.
>One EF-111 was lost ostensibly in an accident.
Seldom do we disagree, but on this one you are letting the
generalities get in the way of the specifics. A career involves more
than one model of a production type and it certainly shouldn't
restrict itself to only one war.
The "bulk of the heavy precision deliveries in 1991" could hardly be
attributed to the 111F at the expense of over-looking the performance
of the -117 and the -15E. If we want to go into the war of statistics,
then we would need to define, "bulk", "heavy", "precision" and maybe
even "delivery". Are we talking weight of iron, targets serviced,
combat CEP or success/Pk ??
Over it's life span, starting with the A models in 67 and going
through successive (mutually incompatible) models, the F-111 was
always a disaster in terms of maintainability, in-commission rates
and, yes, even combat effectiveness.
The "D" was the worst of the lot, with its vacuum tube avionics
virtually inoperative most of the time. During 1980 I helped to plan a
deployment of the Cannon units to Boscombe Downs for an "in theater"
operational evaluation of the system--NOT an ORI, but a "keep or
retire" analysis of whether the airplane was worth the cost. The
results were not impressive.
Typically the USAFE units sat long Victor alert lines (acknowledging
the range capability of the aircaft, but also tacitly admitting that
it was better sitting with a bomb than flying with one.) When deployed
for exercises, which should display wartime ops tempo, the 'Varks
would generate at the rate of 0.5 sorties/aircraft/day. This is in
comparison of A/G F-4s going to 2.5 and A/A F-15s rolling out 3.0 or
higher.
The USAF combat experience in SEA was abysmal with two major
deployments of the aircraft terminated early for excessive,
unexplained losses. One could argue that even the Libya raid wasn't
redeeming considering effectiveness and losses.
By the time of Desert Storm, the only -111s really "operational" were
the F models, and there they performed with distinction, but I'd still
say the career was on the darker side of "checkered."
Ed Rasimus *** Peak Computing Magazine
Fighter Pilot (ret) *** (http://peak-computing.com)
*** Ziff-Davis Interactive
*** (http://www.zdnet.com)
Paul Holloway
Ed Rasimus wrote in message <36d191e8....@news.rmi.net>...
>Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>
<major snip of good points>
>The USAF combat experience in SEA was abysmal with two major
>deployments of the aircraft terminated early for excessive,
>unexplained losses. One could argue that even the Libya raid wasn't
>redeeming considering effectiveness and losses.
>
>By the time of Desert Storm, the only -111s really "operational" were
>the F models, and there they performed with distinction, but I'd still
>say the career was on the darker side of "checkered."
>
>
I don't think you should consider the deployments to SEA in your argument.
Their deployments there were marred by bad tactics, unproven, and untested
combat systems. Plus, the nature of their use, precision strikes against
highly defended areas, made them more susceptible to loss.
The performance of the Varks in DS is more representative of what the a/c
was/is capable of, but it is kinda sad it took 25years to finally develop
the a/c into what it should have been capable of when if first entered
service.
Paul Holloway
"Ask not for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee.........."
José Herculano
> On the other hand, F111 have very short legs. When the USA attacked
>Libya from bases in the UK, it required FIVE in flight refuelings to
>get them F111's there and back!
Blast the Vark on anything but range. True the Libya business took a lot of
refuelings, but just take a look at the route: from England to Libya without
ever crossing another country's airspace. Take a look at the map, it was an
horrendous detour.
José Herculano
José Herculano
Behave...
José Herculano
Brian Elliott
James Matthew Weber wrote in message <36d1692f...@news.goodnet.com>...
>>snip>>
> On the other hand, F111 have very short legs. When the USA attacked
>Libya from bases in the UK, it required FIVE in flight refuelings to
>get them F111's there and back!
>
>>snip>>
Due to the prevailing political situation the strike force had to be routed
out into the Atlantic around the edge of European airspace so it simply
wasn't a direct Lakenheath-Tripoli routing.
Brian
James Matthew Weber
>> >
>> >
>> >Apparently the F4-E had a very small combat radius, something like 190 n.m.
>> >Melb. to Albury.
>> >It was said that with enough power, even a brick will fly.
>> >
>> I would find that hard to believe. F4 is a naval fighter, and Naval
>> fighters always have always had long legs. At Maximum weight (about
>> 61,000 pounds), it is reported to have a combat radius of about 300
>> nmiles (and that is carriyng 8 tons of ordinance)... 190nm is pretty
>> worthless in a carrier based aircraft. I obviously can go a lot
>> further with a little ordinance strapped on.
>>
>> Libya from bases in the UK, it required FIVE in flight refuelings to
>> get them F111's there and back!
>
>Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi typically does 800-1000 NMI radius, depending on model,
>loadout etc.
Most airplanes can go a long way as long as you don't have to carry
much. I suggest you work out the numbers for the Libyan raid. IT
didn't fly across Europe,which made the distance travelled about
2300nm each way. To do that with a 'real war load required the
aircraft to be refueled 3 times on the way in. That puts the combat
radius at no more than about 500nm. I am sorry, but that is long long
way from the 800-1000nmi you have quoted.
You might be able to get a 1000nm combat radius with external tanks,
and internal weaspons only. I suppose if you are planning on using
nuclear weapons that is possiblity. There is a reason the aircraft can
carry up to 25000 pounds of external stores. No place inside to carry
them. Forward Bomb bay was filled up with the targeting pod. ...
If you have any doubts, I suggest you work out how much fuel you can
carry even with external fuel and weapons stores, and then look at
the Specific Fuel Consumption figures for the TF30-P-100/111. There
are few engines out there that get worse fuel economy.
>
>It has the longest legs of any "tactical" aircraft in service since the
>sixties. The Su-27 gets close.
Only if you don't carry any bombsexternally. .....
>>
>> F111 has had a checquered career. It turns out when the contract was
>> awarded to General Dynamics, it was done on the basis of influence.
>> the Boeing design was actually preferred by the services, and had a
>> lower price tag!!!
>
>The bulk of the heavy precision deliveries in 1991 were done by the 48th
>TFW flying the F-111F. You can hardly call that a chequered career.
>Rubbished by ignoramuses in the media, yes, but mostly an outstanding
>performer in combat. No F-111s were lost in bombing missions in 1991.
>One EF-111 was lost ostensibly in an accident.
Three points. Soviet anti aircraft point defense systems have a long
and impressive record of ineffectiveness against western Aircraft.
The Egyptians learned it twice, in 1967 and 1973. The Syrians found it
eually worthless in 1967 and 1973, and totally worthess over the Beka
Valley in Lebanon in the early 1980's.. The Israelis racked up an 80
to 1 Kill ratio, OVER Syrian controlled territory.
Saddam was merely the latest to make this unpleasant discovery. I
suspect the only client to approach happiness with Soviet Anti
Aircraft equipment were the North Vietnamese. The actual rate of
aircraft losses over Iraq was more typical of training missions than
warfare. I'd hardly claim that as a tribute to the F111.
I'd hope that in 25 years since the first one rolled out that they
would get most of the bugs out. The US taxpayer certainly spent enough
money doing so. As for it performance, I suggest you look at the early
service record in South east Asia. I believe half the first squardron
was lost during the first few weeks of deployment in SE Asia, and it
isn't even clear that it was due to anti-aircraft fire...
Lastly, how were the F111's protected on the Libyan raid (and to a
lesser extent in the Gulf).. .F4 Wild Weasels........
jacko
<Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>No comparison whatsoever, F-111 wins. Go to the F-111 Aardvark webpage
>and do a bit of reading and you'll see why.
>
Wins????
With respect Carlo, you seem to have misunderstood my questions.
jacko
jacko
wrote:
>>A second question for you or anybody else. Has anyone done a
>>cost/benefit analysis comparing what we've paid for the F-111 program
>>against what it would have cost to stick with the F-4s.? They still
>>seem to be doing the job for quite a number of countries.
>>
>The F-4's were only leased to Australia as a stop gap pending the arrival of
>the F-111s once their cracking problems were fixed hence we couldn't keep
>them as we has already signed for the TFX.
In the words of Sybil Fawlty "I know, ooh I do know!".
But how does this relate to the question above?
>
>>As a taxpayer I'd like a reasoned explanation as to
>>1. Why RAAF personnel across the ranks are better trained
>
> Better trained when compared to whom? Australia is regarded as one of the
>most professionally trained outfits, certainly within our sphere of
>influence (ie Asia). What would you rather see defending your (as in all
>Australians) interests, a professional outfit or a bunch of incompetent
>corrupt lay abouts? Just go to some Asian countries and you see how coorupt
>the military can really become.
Huh?
>
>>2. Why Australia is more secure today against immediate threats
>> with a handful of F-111s rather than several squadrons of Phantoms.
>>
>Last time I looked we still operated two Sqns of F-111s, which considering
>the Pigs capabilities is a fair swap for the stop gap F-4's. F-4's are a
>good fighter no doubt but the F-111 will always crap all over it when it
>comes to Payload range and precision strike using Pavetack and the TFR.
You're gonna hit boatloads of Kamarians with Pave Tack?
>
>>And finally what is the marginal cost of that additional security.
>
>Defence is never cheap but give me a Sqn of aircraft over an additional
>submarine any day. $500m for a sub, $30m for an F/A-18. 10 Hornets plus
>spares for a similar price.
Then we almost agree.
$2.5m for an F-4E was the unit price of the largest volume of
Phantoms.
Give me 200 Phantoms over a sub any day!
Cheers
jacko
Carlo Kopp
>
> On Mon, 22 Feb 1999 21:51:56 +1100, "Graeme Hogan"
> <gho...@netspace.net.au> wrote:
>
> >
> >jacko wrote in message <36d10d5a...@news.optusnet.com.au>...
> >>I would have thought the F-4 way superior in all capabilities - speed,
> >>loadout, range, handling, electronics etc. Can you expand a bit
> >>please?
> >>
> >
> >
> >Melb. to Albury.
> >It was said that with enough power, even a brick will fly.
> >
> I would find that hard to believe. F4 is a naval fighter, and Naval
> fighters always have always had long legs. At Maximum weight (about
> 61,000 pounds), it is reported to have a combat radius of about 300
> nmiles (and that is carriyng 8 tons of ordinance)... 190nm is pretty
> worthless in a carrier based aircraft. I obviously can go a lot
> further with a little ordinance strapped on.
>
> On the other hand, F111 have very short legs. When the USA attacked
> Libya from bases in the UK, it required FIVE in flight refuelings to
> get them F111's there and back!
You might like to check the distances and payloads. The F-111 on a
Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi typically does 800-1000 NMI radius, depending on model,
loadout etc.
It has the longest legs of any "tactical" aircraft in service since the
sixties. The Su-27 gets close.
>
> F111 has had a checquered career. It turns out when the contract was
> awarded to General Dynamics, it was done on the basis of influence.
> the Boeing design was actually preferred by the services, and had a
> lower price tag!!!
The bulk of the heavy precision deliveries in 1991 were done by the 48th
TFW flying the F-111F. You can hardly call that a chequered career.
Rubbished by ignoramuses in the media, yes, but mostly an outstanding
performer in combat. No F-111s were lost in bombing missions in 1991.
One EF-111 was lost ostensibly in an accident.
Cheers,
Carlo
Dweezil Dwarftosser
wrote:
>The Canberra as ive been discussing in a seperate item was ideal for
>level bombing but is expsoed....
>
>The F4 is a perfect multi role platform where the Canberra wasnt.
>Also nearly two generations separeted the Canberra and F4 anyway so in
>some ways you cant compare them.
>
>The F4 would of been good as a strike aircraft in RAAF but the Pig has a
>better adapatabilty to modern upgrades i belive as shown by the AUP
>program of late.
>
>The F4 was always been upgraded..Pave Pacer, Pave Strike, Pave etc..
>even the addition of the ARN-101 system bought it a degree of digital
>bombing/navigational help, but it is slowly becoming obseletle sadly i
>have to admit.:(
I don't know where this bit of urban legend started - but the ARN-101
was an outright dog when it came to dropping a bomb. It never came
anywhere near the accuracy of the system it replaced. ( The reason
was widely known by everyone associated with Arnie - a critically
stupid programming error which was never, to my knowledge, fixed.
Bombing errors were almost guaranteed to be 18% long, with a properly
aligned radar. )
However, the Arnie jets were pretty good at navigating. Once at the
target, they just couldn't hit anything unless the pilot made some
real good guesses about how far off it would be.
BTW - The only "Pave" programs used on F-4s were Pave Spike and Pave
Tack. Pave Spike was usually considered the more accurate of the two.
- John T.
John Bartels
jacko wrote in message <36d1e445...@news.optusnet.com.au>...
>>
>>Defence is never cheap but give me a Sqn of aircraft over an additional
>>submarine any day. $500m for a sub, $30m for an F/A-18. 10 Hornets plus
>>spares for a similar price.
>
>Then we almost agree.
>
>$2.5m for an F-4E was the unit price of the largest volume of
>Phantoms.
>
>Give me 200 Phantoms over a sub any day!
Sounds like a rather unbalanced force.
Submarines are not a replacement for aircraft, nor does it work the other
way around. They do totally different jobs...
As for 200 F4s, or even another 10 Hornets...as we can't crew the 70 or so
F18s that we have, where would the crews come from for these.
John Bartels
John Bartels
>
> On Mon, 22 Feb 1999 21:51:56 +1100, "Graeme Hogan"
> <gho...@netspace.net.au> wrote:
>
> >
> >jacko wrote in message <36d10d5a...@news.optusnet.com.au>...
> >>I would have thought the F-4 way superior in all capabilities - speed,
> >>loadout, range, handling, electronics etc. Can you expand a bit
> >>please?
> >>
> >
> >
> >Apparently the F4-E had a very small combat radius, something like 190
n.m.
> >Melb. to Albury.
> >It was said that with enough power, even a brick will fly.
190 nm sounds about right. Loads and range will vary enormously, but without
tanking they will be short..
> >
> I would find that hard to believe. F4 is a naval fighter, and Naval
> fighters always have always had long legs.
Rubbish. The F4s got airborne off a carrier and immediately (or so it
seemed) looked for a tanker. And what's this about naval aircraft and long
legs. Quite the contrary. When your runway is only 150 feet long (or 90 in
the case of the Melbourne), you plan on doing any fuelling (not just
refuelling) airborne.
>At Maximum weight (about
> 61,000 pounds), it is reported to have a combat radius of about 300
> nmiles (and that is carriyng 8 tons of ordinance)... 190nm is pretty
> worthless in a carrier based aircraft.
It's worthless in any case, but it is all that you would get in many
situations.
300 miles. Hi - lo - hi. Not inconsistent with the 190 figure.
Let's change aircraft to one I know better. The A4G.
Ferry - 3 2000 lb drop tanks (but not dropping them when empty) roughly 2000
miles.
Hi, lo, hi. 5 * 500 lb Mk82, and 2 * 2000 lb tanks, roughly 600 miles radius
Lo Same load. 350 miles radius
Lo 9 * Mk82. 170 radius
Those figures are a bit rough (it's a long time ago now...), but they are in
the ballpark.
John Bartels
r.pa...@worldnet.att.net
>Over it's life span, starting with the A models in 67 and going
>through successive (mutually incompatible) models, the F-111 was
>always a disaster in terms of maintainability, in-commission rates
>and, yes, even combat effectiveness.
I saw the F-111 at Eglin when they were testing it. Joke was it was up
for an hour and down for seven days. They spent a lot of time on the
flightline fixing things so they had a cart with a long extension cord
and large coffee maker so they could roll it out to the airplane. When
I left there was a 111 sitting on the taxiway with one of the landing
gears folded up. Looked like a wounded duck sitting there. Didn't seem
like it had much of a future then...
Rock
>Sounds like a rather unbalanced force.
>
>Submarines are not a replacement for aircraft, nor does it work the other
>way around. They do totally different jobs...
>
>As for 200 F4s, or even another 10 Hornets...as we can't crew the 70 or so
>F18s that we have, where would the crews come from for these.
>
>John Bartels
>
Sorry John if you may have misunderstood my reference to the submarine.
There was talk a year ago about fitting the RAN fleet of Collins subs with
Tomohawk missiles and getting two more subs so that they could take on the
role of land strike. My argument was based on the cost for a single new
submarine with limited land strike options compared to what a Sqn of multi
role aircraft offer for the same price. Subs always have their place in
protecting a countries sea lanes as well as aircraft.
Rock
Rock
James Matthew Weber wrote in message <36d4d50c...@news.goodnet.com>...
>Most airplanes can go a long way as long as you don't have to carry
>much. I suggest you work out the numbers for the Libyan raid. IT
>didn't fly across Europe,which made the distance travelled about
>2300nm each way. To do that with a 'real war load required the
>aircraft to be refueled 3 times on the way in. That puts the combat
>radius at no more than about 500nm. I am sorry, but that is long long
>way from the 800-1000nmi you have quoted.
>
??????????????????????
2300nm x 2 = 4600nm
divide by 5 = 900 nm
Just using your numbers and the others quoted for the numbers of refuelling.
Then we have to figure in the range needed to get to the nearest "friendly"
airfield in case of a missed refuel. I admit they were free of ordnance on
the way back but isnt that nearly always the case after a bombing attack.
All I know is that the Pig can fly from Australia to Jakarta with a load of
bombs and back (free of bombs) without refuelling. Thats why Australia
bought them in the first place during the Confrontation years.
Rock
Carlo Kopp
>
> Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>
> >The bulk of the heavy precision deliveries in 1991 were done by the 48th
> >TFW flying the F-111F. You can hardly call that a chequered career.
> >Rubbished by ignoramuses in the media, yes, but mostly an outstanding
> >performer in combat. No F-111s were lost in bombing missions in 1991.
> >One EF-111 was lost ostensibly in an accident.
>
> generalities get in the way of the specifics. A career involves more
> than one model of a production type and it certainly shouldn't
> restrict itself to only one war.
Indeed Ed, we are in disagreement, a rare event ! Perhaps we should
celebrate the occasion with a decent debate !
My first comment is that the argument itself is contextually
problematic, since the question itself is a little lame.
How can we meaningfully compare an IFR interceptor turned into a
multirole fighter bomber, against a low level TFR nuclear strike
aircraft turned conventional, which is essentially equivalent to a
shorter ranging twin engined B-1 in mission terms ? Just to push this
point, the B-1A used the F-111 ARS and TFR :-)
>
> The "bulk of the heavy precision deliveries in 1991" could hardly be
> attributed to the 111F at the expense of over-looking the performance
> of the -117 and the -15E. If we want to go into the war of statistics,
> then we would need to define, "bulk", "heavy", "precision" and maybe
> even "delivery". Are we talking weight of iron, targets serviced,
> combat CEP or success/Pk ??
Strategic target precision munition tonnage. Per sortie the F-111 could
deliver twice the tonnage of GBUs than the F-117A. Since the F-15Es were
diverted into Scud hunting fairly early in the game, they only
contributed marginally to the deep precision strike work, which was
F-111, Tornado and F-117A.
Alfred Price did a nice summary of the 48th's work in 1991 and it is
impressive.
>
> Over it's life span, starting with the A models in 67 and going
> through successive (mutually incompatible) models, the F-111 was
> always a disaster in terms of maintainability, in-commission rates
> and, yes, even combat effectiveness.
Other than Linebacker II, where the immature F-111 was thrown into the
thick of it, everything else until 1991 was a statistical blip. BTW I
seem to recall LB II F-111A loss rates cca 0.2% for low level precision
autobombs at night under TFR 200 AGL into the Hanoi IADS.
I won't argue with maintainability being a problem since it was, no
doubt about it. But also to put it into context, it was a much more
complex aircraft in terms of systems than the F-4 or other contemporary
tactical jets. Apples vs oranges, as they say :-)
TFR, fully automated radar bomb-nav, internal integrated RHAWS and ECM,
swing wing, etc etc. Complexity at a given level of technology /
component reliability will directly impact reliability.
>
> The "D" was the worst of the lot, with its vacuum tube avionics
> virtually inoperative most of the time. During 1980 I helped to plan a
> deployment of the Cannon units to Boscombe Downs for an "in theater"
> operational evaluation of the system--NOT an ORI, but a "keep or
> retire" analysis of whether the airplane was worth the cost. The
> results were not impressive.
The problem with the D model was that they tried to do more than the
technology of the day could support properly. The intent was at some
stage to convert them to an -F style avionic package but that never
happened. It was BTW the first fully digital integrated bomb/nav package
ever built. Pretty much the template for the F-15 systems.
>
> Typically the USAFE units sat long Victor alert lines (acknowledging
> the range capability of the aircaft, but also tacitly admitting that
> it was better sitting with a bomb than flying with one.) When deployed
> for exercises, which should display wartime ops tempo, the 'Varks
> would generate at the rate of 0.5 sorties/aircraft/day. This is in
> comparison of A/G F-4s going to 2.5 and A/A F-15s rolling out 3.0 or
> higher.
Accounting for the fact, Ed, that the sorties would be much longer than
the typical F-4 or F-15 sortie. What the F-111's job was, was to go deep
to hit the second echelon targets. Could you do that with an F-4,
without a hefty supporting package and tankers in trail ? I doubt it.
Unescorted IF deep strike under TFR at 200 AGL 500KTAS+ using internal
ECM only - that is not an easy profile and it will reflect in systems
complexity.
>
> The USAF combat experience in SEA was abysmal with two major
> deployments of the aircraft terminated early for excessive,
> unexplained losses. One could argue that even the Libya raid wasn't
> redeeming considering effectiveness and losses.
In all fairness Ed the aircraft they sent into SEA were not ready
technologically, and if my reading and research is correct, many of the
crews were not ready either in terms of on-type proficiency. The F-111
is an extremely high workload aircraft and you have to get everything
right not to get into trouble with it. Have flown the sim 3 times now
and it keeps me busy enough just watching the aircraft let alone the
tactics.
>
> By the time of Desert Storm, the only -111s really "operational" were
> the F models, and there they performed with distinction, but I'd still
> say the career was on the darker side of "checkered."
>
Well, Ed, since Desert Storm was the only major campaign the _mature_
aircraft / crews flew in, it is the campaign upon which I base my
assessment of the aircraft's worth. The SEA deployments involved early,
buggy A-model aircraft with the LN-14 electomechanical nav-attack
(AJQ-20A) and a training system and doctrine where the details had yet
to be fully worked out.
In between the aircraft were barely used. EDC in 1986 was hastily
planned after the F-117A strike was aborted for reasons of security. In
any event a single raid means none of your crews have prior combat
experience. And the RoE were tight as well. Statistically not very
useful.
To put it in perspective:
F-111A - early sixties gen analogue nav attack
F-111E - A-model with different engines and new inlets
F-111D - an attempt at a 1980s glass cockpit integrated digital system
using sixties technology
F-111F - second gen digital system with analogue displays
FB-111A - similar to F-model with longer wings and different
engines/tailpipes
F-111C - Aussie A-model with FB-111 wings and gear
My argument Ed is that comparisons against the F-4 or similar much less
complex aircraft on the availability and maintainability front are
misleading insofar as the aircraft is substantially more complex.
Basically the same profile as a B-1A to a shorter radius. The only
meaningful comparison is against the never built TSR.2, Tornado GR.1 or
with adjustments for later technology, the Bone.
I take your points but argue context !
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >Apparently the F4-E had a very small combat radius, something like 190 n.m.
> >> >Melb. to Albury.
> >> >It was said that with enough power, even a brick will fly.
> >> >
> >> 61,000 pounds), it is reported to have a combat radius of about 300
> >> nmiles (and that is carriyng 8 tons of ordinance)... 190nm is pretty
> >> further with a little ordinance strapped on.
> >>
> >> On the other hand, F111 have very short legs. When the USA attacked
> >> Libya from bases in the UK, it required FIVE in flight refuelings to
> >> get them F111's there and back!
> >
> >You might like to check the distances and payloads. The F-111 on a
> >Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi typically does 800-1000 NMI radius, depending on model,
> >loadout etc.
> much. I suggest you work out the numbers for the Libyan raid. IT
> didn't fly across Europe,which made the distance travelled about
> 2300nm each way. To do that with a 'real war load required the
> aircraft to be refueled 3 times on the way in. That puts the combat
> radius at no more than about 500nm. I am sorry, but that is long long
> way from the 800-1000nmi you have quoted.
>
> and internal weaspons only. I suppose if you are planning on using
> nuclear weapons that is possiblity. There is a reason the aircraft can
> carry up to 25000 pounds of external stores. No place inside to carry
> them. Forward Bomb bay was filled up with the targeting pod. ...
>
> If you have any doubts, I suggest you work out how much fuel you can
> carry even with external fuel and weapons stores, and then look at
> the Specific Fuel Consumption figures for the TF30-P-100/111. There
> are few engines out there that get worse fuel economy.
Perhaps you could explain this to the guys who fly them :-) A
Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi profile on both published USAF figures and my sources, with
2-4 external GBU-10s, full internal gas, and no AAR, works out better
than 800 NMI.
I don't know where you are getting your numbers from, but they don't
look right. The Libyan raid was 13-14 hrs in the cockpit, some very long
legs at low level in the Med not to tip of any other Arab countries, at
420 KTAS averaging out AAR vs Mil time, that is about 5460 NMI ballpark.
If you divide that by three AARs you get 1365 NMI per leg. Divide that
by two and you get 682.5 NMI, which is about right given the highly
non-optimal profile outbound.
Funny that, eh ?
> >
> >It has the longest legs of any "tactical" aircraft in service since the
> >sixties. The Su-27 gets close.
> Only if you don't carry any bombsexternally. .....
> >>
> >> F111 has had a checquered career. It turns out when the contract was
> >> awarded to General Dynamics, it was done on the basis of influence.
> >> the Boeing design was actually preferred by the services, and had a
> >> lower price tag!!!
> >
> >The bulk of the heavy precision deliveries in 1991 were done by the 48th
> >TFW flying the F-111F. You can hardly call that a chequered career.
> >Rubbished by ignoramuses in the media, yes, but mostly an outstanding
> >performer in combat. No F-111s were lost in bombing missions in 1991.
> >One EF-111 was lost ostensibly in an accident.
> Three points. Soviet anti aircraft point defense systems have a long
> and impressive record of ineffectiveness against western Aircraft.
>
> The Egyptians learned it twice, in 1967 and 1973. The Syrians found it
> eually worthless in 1967 and 1973, and totally worthess over the Beka
> Valley in Lebanon in the early 1980's.. The Israelis racked up an 80
> to 1 Kill ratio, OVER Syrian controlled territory.
>
> Saddam was merely the latest to make this unpleasant discovery. I
> suspect the only client to approach happiness with Soviet Anti
> Aircraft equipment were the North Vietnamese. The actual rate of
> aircraft losses over Iraq was more typical of training missions than
> warfare. I'd hardly claim that as a tribute to the F111.
>
> I'd hope that in 25 years since the first one rolled out that they
> would get most of the bugs out. The US taxpayer certainly spent enough
> money doing so. As for it performance, I suggest you look at the early
> service record in South east Asia. I believe half the first squardron
> was lost during the first few weeks of deployment in SE Asia, and it
> isn't even clear that it was due to anti-aircraft fire...
>
> Lastly, how were the F111's protected on the Libyan raid (and to a
> lesser extent in the Gulf).. .F4 Wild Weasels........
Really ? Launching from where ? CVNs in the Med ?
Pleeze.
Cheers,
Carlo
Yama
James Matthew Weber wrote:
> Three points. Soviet anti aircraft point defense systems have a long
> and impressive record of ineffectiveness against western Aircraft.
*laugh*
jacko
<john_b...@NOSPAM.hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>As for 200 F4s, or even another 10 Hornets...as we can't crew the 70 or so
>F18s that we have, where would the crews come from for these.
>
The central point of my original post was intended to be -
Given that Australia has a very small bucket of defence dollars -
1. Has and is a disproportionate share of that bucket been expended
in upgrading up keeping the last few F111s in the world flying in
their highly specialized role?
2. What would those same $$ have bought us in say, three times the
number of multi-role F-4 aircraft and still have had a heap of change
left over to attract, train and retain a much larger pool of both
aircrew and maintenance personnel?
Cheers
jacko
jacko
wrote:
>BTW - The only "Pave" programs used on F-4s were Pave Spike and Pave
>Tack. Pave Spike was usually considered the more accurate of the two.
>
No Dweezil- the two you mention were not the only Pave pgms, for
example -
Pave Light - used by 8th TFW Wolfpack out of Ubon to deliver over
14,000 LGBs with a high degree of accuracy. Also used by R.O.K. and
maybe Israel.
Pave Knife - used to knock out railway bridges linking Hanoi to China,
and to destroy the Lang Chi Hydro electric plant. Over 100 bridges
knocked out in one 6 week period.
Pave Sword - 497th TFS Night Owls aginst N.V ground offensive.
jacko
Tarver Engineering
Yama wrote in message <36D29DDA...@paju.oulu.fi>...
Mr. Weber, go back to Karl's group. The technical requirements here at RAM
are such that your postings are not likely to do well, there are too many
people here that have been there and done that.
John
John H. Banister Jr.
>> Lastly, how were the F111's protected on the Libyan raid (and to a
>> lesser extent in the Gulf).. .F4 Wild Weasels........
>
>Really ? Launching from where ? CVNs in the Med ?
There were no F4 Wild Weasels envolved in the Lybian Raid.
-John
James Matthew Weber
wrote:
>
>James Matthew Weber wrote in message <36d4d50c...@news.goodnet.com>...
>
>>Most airplanes can go a long way as long as you don't have to carry
>>much. I suggest you work out the numbers for the Libyan raid. IT
>>didn't fly across Europe,which made the distance travelled about
>>2300nm each way. To do that with a 'real war load required the
>>aircraft to be refueled 3 times on the way in. That puts the combat
>>radius at no more than about 500nm. I am sorry, but that is long long
>>way from the 800-1000nmi you have quoted.
>>
>
>
>??????????????????????
>2300nm x 2 = 4600nm
>
>divide by 5 = 900 nm
Except that the airplanes leaving Tripoli weighed a whole lot less
than the airplanes going to Tripoli. Getting rid of the internal
payload and the external stores does wonders for fuel economy. Of
course a bomber with no bombs isn't good for much . That is why they
only had be refueled twice on the way back, and the trip back will be
almost entirely at altitude. Also you said Combat Radius. That means
there and back, so 900nm straight ahead is 450nm combat radius.
What sort of combat radius do you think you get with the internal bomb
bays full, and 25000 pounds of ordinance under the wings? The leaves
only about 20,000 pounds for fuel. SFC on the TF30's is almost 7 times
that of a CFM56 on a 737-400.
>Just using your numbers and the others quoted for the numbers of refuelling.
>Then we have to figure in the range needed to get to the nearest "friendly"
>airfield in case of a missed refuel. I admit they were free of ordnance on
>the way back but isnt that nearly always the case after a bombing attack.
>
>All I know is that the Pig can fly from Australia to Jakarta with a load of
>bombs and back (free of bombs) without refuelling. Thats why Australia
>bought them in the first place during the Confrontation years.
Obviously not carrying much in the way of bombs or any other weapons
either. The run from Broome to Jakarta is about 2200nm. If the
Americans needed 5 in flight refuelings to go 4600nm with a realistic
war load, please let me know how the RAAF plans to go 2200nm without
any refueling and an equally realistic war load?
It's like Boeing quoting a 9000nm range for a 747-400. It can be done,
in fact QANTAS has done it, but the payload restrictions are so severe
as to render it total impractical in real life.
John H. Banister Jr.
>Over it's life span, starting with the A models in 67 and going
>through successive (mutually incompatible) models, the F-111 was
>always a disaster in terms of maintainability, in-commission rates
>and, yes, even combat effectiveness.
Ed, I flew F-4's (RF's) in the 70's and F-111's (A & F) in the 80's
and didn't notice any particular difference in in-commission rates,
when supported properly. Once we started to get the spare parts
funding by the mid 80's, we were able to keep in commission rates as
high as one would expect from 15-20 year-old aircraft. I did miss the
F-111 groundings of the 60-70's, but did go through two groundings in
the F-4 in the 70's.
>Typically the USAFE units sat long Victor alert lines (acknowledging
>the range capability of the aircaft, but also tacitly admitting that
>it was better sitting with a bomb than flying with one.)
Well, then you'd have to say the same thing about every thing that sat
Victor, from the Hun to the F-104, including the F-4 and F-105.
Victor was the main mission, and everything else gave way. The fact
that a particular type of aircraft sat Victor says nothing about its
other capabilities, just about what USAFE's first priority was.
>When deployed
>for exercises, which should display wartime ops tempo, the 'Varks
>would generate at the rate of 0.5 sorties/aircraft/day. This is in
>comparison of A/G F-4s going to 2.5 and A/A F-15s rolling out 3.0 or
>higher.
I'm not sure what exercises you are referring to, but both Lakenheath
and Heyford maintained 2.0 sortie rates during ORI's and Tac Evals,
and this compares quite well with the other aircraft mentioned when
you realized that our sorties were 2.5 to 4.0 hours in length. When
you fly that long, you are not going to turn as many times as aircraft
flying .9-1.2 hour sorties. Too much of the mx day (and night <G>) is
used up in flying. Also, many exercies were held under national rules
which either prohibitied night sorites or teminated them at a certain
hour, such as midnight. If you take away half the night, your night
fighters will fly less.
>The USAF combat experience in SEA was abysmal with two major
>deployments of the aircraft terminated early for excessive,
>unexplained losses. One could argue that even the Libya raid wasn't
>redeeming considering effectiveness and losses.
The first SEA deployment was terminated for losses. I have never
heard that the Linebacker folks were sent home for this reason. I
don't have the data at hand, but remember that the A Models stayed
until they were no longer needed. I have a good friend who went, so I
can ask him, if needed.
>By the time of Desert Storm, the only -111s really "operational" were
>the F models, and there they performed with distinction, but I'd still
>say the career was on the darker side of "checkered."
Heyford and Cannon were both alerted for DS deployment and were ready
to go. Cannon was never sent, although they had improved their in
commission rate quite a bit by that time and were doing quite well in
the bombing business. Heyford did deploy, to Turkey as I remember. I
don't remember what they did, however. Mt. Home deployed the EF's for
the duration, but the straight A's were trainers and stayed home.
-John
John Kunkel
> > If you have any doubts, I suggest you work out how much fuel you can
> > carry even with external fuel and weapons stores, and then look at
> > the Specific Fuel Consumption figures for the TF30-P-100/111. There
> > are few engines out there that get worse fuel economy.
Carlo Kopp wrote:
>
>>
> I don't know where you are getting your numbers from, but they don't
> look right. The Libyan raid was 13-14 hrs in the cockpit, some very long
> legs at low level in the Med not to tip of any other Arab countries, at
> 420 KTAS averaging out AAR vs Mil time, that is about 5460 NMI ballpark.
> If you divide that by three AARs you get 1365 NMI per leg. Divide that
> by two and you get 682.5 NMI, which is about right given the highly
> non-optimal profile outbound.
Another thing to consider in the range debate is that the Varks weren't
necessarily anywhere near empty at the time of AAR. Since max range is
always under optimal conditions, I imagine the planners of the Tripoli
strike were inclined to err on the side of caution and plan for tanking
at preset intervals regardless of actual fuel consumed.
John
Carlo Kopp
>
> On Tue, 23 Feb 1999 13:08:17 +1100, "John Bartels"
> <john_b...@NOSPAM.hotmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >As for 200 F4s, or even another 10 Hornets...as we can't crew the 70 or so
> >F18s that we have, where would the crews come from for these.
> >
> G'day John,
>
> The central point of my original post was intended to be -
>
> Given that Australia has a very small bucket of defence dollars -
>
> 1. Has and is a disproportionate share of that bucket been expended
> in upgrading up keeping the last few F111s in the world flying in
> their highly specialized role?
Jacko, does that mean that anti-shipping strike, strategic strike,
counter-air strike, deep interdiction, battlefield heavy interdiction,
precision close air support all amount to one highly specialised role ?
>
> 2. What would those same $$ have bought us in say, three times the
> number of multi-role F-4 aircraft and still have had a heap of change
> left over to attract, train and retain a much larger pool of both
> aircrew and maintenance personnel?
>
We have enough trouble feeding the currently insufficient numbers of
aircrew and ground crew we already have Jacko. Imagine trying to support
three times as many, for an aircraft with about 1/3 the punch in the
primary A/G roles.
For long range bombing work it is the best aircraft we could have at
this time, given what was and is available. Especially with the digital
avionics.
The F-4 is a great aircraft, and I am a big fan of it. But for long
range strike work with minimal or no supporting assets the F-111 is much
more suitable.
If you want to find a domestic issue to argue about, how about us having
bought F/A-18s instead of F-15s :-)
Think about the implications of that one. BTW there have been in total
more F-15s exported than F/A-18s, which nullifies the then primary
argument against the F-15 :-) Buy an F-15 today and you pay about the
same as for an F-18 :-)
If you want another domestic argument, then think about all of the $$$$
we have been sinking into certain assets which are most likely to be
sunk if shooting starts on day one or day two. You can buy a lot of
aircraft, spare parts and stick time for the cost of one of these tubs.
Cheers,
Carlo
Ed Rasimus
>>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>>
>> Over it's life span, starting with the A models in 67 and going
>> through successive (mutually incompatible) models, the F-111 was
>> always a disaster in terms of maintainability, in-commission rates
>> and, yes, even combat effectiveness.
>
>Other than Linebacker II, where the immature F-111 was thrown into the
>thick of it, everything else until 1991 was a statistical blip. BTW I
>seem to recall LB II F-111A loss rates cca 0.2% for low level precision
>autobombs at night under TFR 200 AGL into the Hanoi IADS.
That must have been a different LB II than the one I was flying in.
"Thrown into the thick of it" might apply to the B-52 force, which
arguably wasn't designed for that threat level, but the 111
mini-deployment didn't make any significant contibution in comparison
to the 300 or so tac-air sorties during daylight and the 150/90/90/90
sorties per night by the BUFFs.
The majority of the 111 frag was flown into "Hanoi IADS" but not
within 25 miles of Bulls-eye. Most of the 111 tasking was in the Pack
V--Pack VI border area, places like Yen Bai, Viet Tri and Phu Tho with
some excursions up toward Thai Nguyen. They weren't going downtown
because of possible interference with the BUFF strikes.
Hard to draw meaningful loss rate statistics from a statistically
insignificant sortie generation rate. Six sorties a night for 11
nights of LB II doesn't give very good numbers.
>
>I won't argue with maintainability being a problem since it was, no
>doubt about it. But also to put it into context, it was a much more
>complex aircraft in terms of systems than the F-4 or other contemporary
>tactical jets. Apples vs oranges, as they say :-)
Apples and oranges are both fruit, so let's go with tactical nuclear
strike systems and point out that the 105D was carrying
terrain-avoidance radar, blind-offset radar capability, multi-mode
autopilot and integrated stand-alone nav system at similar speeds and
similar ranges with similar weapons loads for ten operational years
before the "A" model 111 came online.
Complexity of the system was an excuse, but not a good one.
>
>> Typically the USAFE units sat long Victor alert lines (acknowledging
>> the range capability of the aircaft, but also tacitly admitting that
>> it was better sitting with a bomb than flying with one.) When deployed
>> for exercises, which should display wartime ops tempo, the 'Varks
>> would generate at the rate of 0.5 sorties/aircraft/day. This is in
>> comparison of A/G F-4s going to 2.5 and A/A F-15s rolling out 3.0 or
>> higher.
>
>Accounting for the fact, Ed, that the sorties would be much longer than
>the typical F-4 or F-15 sortie. What the F-111's job was, was to go deep
>to hit the second echelon targets. Could you do that with an F-4,
>without a hefty supporting package and tankers in trail ? I doubt it.
Second echelon under Soviet doctrine was very reachable with F-4s.
More importantly the sortie generation capability, turn rate and
maintenance manhours/flight hour gave the F-4 enough of an advantage
that (unfortunately for you folks in OZ) only one other nation ever
invested defense dollars in the 111. The Phantom, OTOH, was
appreciated by many countries.
>
>Unescorted IF deep strike under TFR at 200 AGL 500KTAS+ using internal
>ECM only - that is not an easy profile and it will reflect in systems
>complexity.
And if you change TFR to TA (meaning you don't have full auto-pilot
coupling, but you do have autopilot low level/high speed terrain
avoidance capability), then you've once again got the capability of
the F-105 which matured ten years before the 111A.
>>
>> The USAF combat experience in SEA was abysmal with two major
>> deployments of the aircraft terminated early for excessive,
>> unexplained losses. One could argue that even the Libya raid wasn't
>> redeeming considering effectiveness and losses.
>
>In all fairness Ed the aircraft they sent into SEA were not ready
>technologically, and if my reading and research is correct, many of the
>crews were not ready either in terms of on-type proficiency.
The crews were, in large part, experienced F-105 crews. If they
weren't ready coming from the Weapons Wing at Nellis, it wasn't for
lack of good weather, great ranges and beaucoup experience.
>The F-111
>is an extremely high workload aircraft and you have to get everything
>right not to get into trouble with it. Have flown the sim 3 times now
>and it keeps me busy enough just watching the aircraft let alone the
>tactics.
If this "technologically advanced" aircraft with it's remarkable
systems and two man crew is "an extremely high workload aircraft" let
me suggest that it is a really terrible design! Technology is supposed
to reduce workload, improve flying characteristics and increase
weapons efficiency. And, the "tactics" of an airplane that employs
basically single-ship are "elementary, my dear Watson."
>>
>> By the time of Desert Storm, the only -111s really "operational" were
>> the F models, and there they performed with distinction, but I'd still
>> say the career was on the darker side of "checkered."
>>
>Well, Ed, since Desert Storm was the only major campaign the _mature_
>aircraft / crews flew in, it is the campaign upon which I base my
>assessment of the aircraft's worth.
Ya gotta wonder about an airplane that was around for 25 years before
they found a war for it to fight in. Can't say that about the
F-4/14/15/16/18/117....The mere fact that it wasn't (couldn't?) employ
may tell you a lot about the relative value and reputation of the
system.
>The SEA deployments involved early,
>buggy A-model aircraft with the LN-14 electomechanical nav-attack
>(AJQ-20A) and a training system and doctrine where the details had yet
>to be fully worked out.
>
>In between the aircraft were barely used. EDC in 1986 was hastily
>planned after the F-117A strike was aborted for reasons of security. In
>any event a single raid means none of your crews have prior combat
>experience. And the RoE were tight as well. Statistically not very
>useful.
Once again, you suggest "the aircraft were barely used"--reasons like
poor in-commission rate, low sortie generation capability, and
stratospheric expense meant planners were reluctant to employ the
'Vark. That and a prevalent "can't do" attitude among the crews and
leadership.
>
>
>My argument Ed is that comparisons against the F-4 or similar much less
>complex aircraft on the availability and maintainability front are
>misleading insofar as the aircraft is substantially more complex.
>Basically the same profile as a B-1A to a shorter radius. The only
>meaningful comparison is against the never built TSR.2, Tornado GR.1 or
>with adjustments for later technology, the Bone.
The FB-111 might fit that argument and particularly if managed by the
SAC mentality of the cold war, but the F-111A/D/E/F aircraft were
"tactical" which means that they must carry their weight in the BAI
and interdiction role. They couldn't and didn't.
Ed Rasimus *** Peak Computing Magazine
Fighter Pilot (ret) *** (http://peak-computing.com)
*** Ziff-Davis Interactive
*** (http://www.zdnet.com)
Carlo Kopp
Your standard F-111 payload for the Tripoli mission would have been 2-4
GBU-10s which is 4,000-8,000 lb. Internal bay has about 2000 lb of Pave
Tack cradle and pod.
The ingress route was low level over a good chunk of the run inside the
Med. I need not elaborate to you on what that does for SFC.
BTW why are you making comparsions between a HBTF and a LBTF with
burners ? Entirely different engines.
> >Just using your numbers and the others quoted for the numbers of refuelling.
> >Then we have to figure in the range needed to get to the nearest "friendly"
> >airfield in case of a missed refuel. I admit they were free of ordnance on
> >the way back but isnt that nearly always the case after a bombing attack.
> >
> >All I know is that the Pig can fly from Australia to Jakarta with a load of
> >bombs and back (free of bombs) without refuelling. Thats why Australia
> >bought them in the first place during the Confrontation years.
> Obviously not carrying much in the way of bombs or any other weapons
> either. The run from Broome to Jakarta is about 2200nm. If the
> Americans needed 5 in flight refuelings to go 4600nm with a realistic
> war load, please let me know how the RAAF plans to go 2200nm without
> any refueling and an equally realistic war load?
>
> It's like Boeing quoting a 9000nm range for a 747-400. It can be done,
> in fact QANTAS has done it, but the payload restrictions are so severe
> as to render it total impractical in real life.
Sorry but our guys regularly fly profiles cca 800-900 NMI radius. The
difference is that on a local run down here you can sit at a decent
altitude most of the way out. That was not possible on the Tripoli run
since they did not want any tipoffs by civilian ATC querying "unknown
formation at XXX N and XXX W, pls identify".
Your argument James is simply wrong. Ask any guy who has flown the Vark.
I know many of them.
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
Yup, if you make an allowance for a safe divert, especially once down in
the Med, it sorts of puts a different slant on the numbers.
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
When why did you raise LB II as an issue in judging the aircraft's worth
?
> >
> >I won't argue with maintainability being a problem since it was, no
> >doubt about it. But also to put it into context, it was a much more
> >complex aircraft in terms of systems than the F-4 or other contemporary
> >tactical jets. Apples vs oranges, as they say :-)
>
> Apples and oranges are both fruit, so let's go with tactical nuclear
> strike systems and point out that the 105D was carrying
> terrain-avoidance radar, blind-offset radar capability, multi-mode
> autopilot and integrated stand-alone nav system at similar speeds and
> similar ranges with similar weapons loads for ten operational years
> before the "A" model 111 came online.
Could you penetrate a real Soviet IADS in 1980 at 200 AGL in very hilly
or mountainous terrain, and not get tapped, Ed ?
If I recall properly SOR-183 was the F-105 _replacement_ :-)
>
> Complexity of the system was an excuse, but not a good one.
Complexity of the Vark was a fact of life, since it had a nav attack
system and defensive aids that usually go into a strategic bomber. We
use them mostly as such.
> >
> >> Typically the USAFE units sat long Victor alert lines (acknowledging
> >> the range capability of the aircaft, but also tacitly admitting that
> >> it was better sitting with a bomb than flying with one.) When deployed
> >> for exercises, which should display wartime ops tempo, the 'Varks
> >> would generate at the rate of 0.5 sorties/aircraft/day. This is in
> >> comparison of A/G F-4s going to 2.5 and A/A F-15s rolling out 3.0 or
> >> higher.
> >
> >Accounting for the fact, Ed, that the sorties would be much longer than
> >the typical F-4 or F-15 sortie. What the F-111's job was, was to go deep
> >to hit the second echelon targets. Could you do that with an F-4,
> >without a hefty supporting package and tankers in trail ? I doubt it.
>
> Second echelon under Soviet doctrine was very reachable with F-4s.
Depends on what you call second echelon and when in the battle it
happens. Are you saying that you would be flying F-4s into the Western
Ukraine and Eastern Poland ? Permit me to express my doubts here :-)
> More importantly the sortie generation capability, turn rate and
> maintenance manhours/flight hour gave the F-4 enough of an advantage
> that (unfortunately for you folks in OZ) only one other nation ever
> invested defense dollars in the 111. The Phantom, OTOH, was
> appreciated by many countries.
Different requirements, different expectations, Ed.
> >
> >Unescorted IF deep strike under TFR at 200 AGL 500KTAS+ using internal
> >ECM only - that is not an easy profile and it will reflect in systems
> >complexity.
>
> And if you change TFR to TA (meaning you don't have full auto-pilot
> coupling, but you do have autopilot low level/high speed terrain
> avoidance capability), then you've once again got the capability of
> the F-105 which matured ten years before the 111A.
An F-111 driver I know had a CO who flew 105s, and I am old that the CO
was very pro-F-111 against the 105. Could that be an accident ?
> >>
> >> The USAF combat experience in SEA was abysmal with two major
> >> deployments of the aircraft terminated early for excessive,
> >> unexplained losses. One could argue that even the Libya raid wasn't
> >> redeeming considering effectiveness and losses.
> >
> >In all fairness Ed the aircraft they sent into SEA were not ready
> >technologically, and if my reading and research is correct, many of the
> >crews were not ready either in terms of on-type proficiency.
>
> The crews were, in large part, experienced F-105 crews. If they
> weren't ready coming from the Weapons Wing at Nellis, it wasn't for
> lack of good weather, great ranges and beaucoup experience.
The penetration tactics for the 111 and 105 are not entirely the same,
Ed. Auto TFR at 200 AGL is a little, ehm, different from TA at 500 AGL.
>
> >The F-111
> >is an extremely high workload aircraft and you have to get everything
> >right not to get into trouble with it. Have flown the sim 3 times now
> >and it keeps me busy enough just watching the aircraft let alone the
> >tactics.
>
> If this "technologically advanced" aircraft with it's remarkable
> systems and two man crew is "an extremely high workload aircraft" let
> me suggest that it is a really terrible design! Technology is supposed
> to reduce workload, improve flying characteristics and increase
> weapons efficiency. And, the "tactics" of an airplane that employs
> basically single-ship are "elementary, my dear Watson."
Ed, the F-111 systems were at the time comparable to what went into
strategic bombers, eg the fully internal ECM package, auto TFR etc. They
took a strategic bomber weapon system and crammed it into a 2 seat
aircraft. Expect the workload to go up.
> >>
> >> By the time of Desert Storm, the only -111s really "operational" were
> >> the F models, and there they performed with distinction, but I'd still
> >> say the career was on the darker side of "checkered."
> >>
> >Well, Ed, since Desert Storm was the only major campaign the _mature_
> >aircraft / crews flew in, it is the campaign upon which I base my
> >assessment of the aircraft's worth.
>
> Ya gotta wonder about an airplane that was around for 25 years before
> they found a war for it to fight in. Can't say that about the
> F-4/14/15/16/18/117....The mere fact that it wasn't (couldn't?) employ
> may tell you a lot about the relative value and reputation of the
> system.
Are you going to use your big stick in every little scrap ? Especially
if you are using it to keep the Sovs at bay in the Eurotheatre ?
BTW how many major or even minor air wars with major USAF involvement
were there between SEA and DS ?
>
> >The SEA deployments involved early,
> >buggy A-model aircraft with the LN-14 electomechanical nav-attack
> >(AJQ-20A) and a training system and doctrine where the details had yet
> >to be fully worked out.
> >
> >In between the aircraft were barely used. EDC in 1986 was hastily
> >planned after the F-117A strike was aborted for reasons of security. In
> >any event a single raid means none of your crews have prior combat
> >experience. And the RoE were tight as well. Statistically not very
> >useful.
>
> Once again, you suggest "the aircraft were barely used"--reasons like
> poor in-commission rate, low sortie generation capability, and
> stratospheric expense meant planners were reluctant to employ the
> 'Vark. That and a prevalent "can't do" attitude among the crews and
> leadership.
I suspect Ed that you will be spending the next week defending against
some very disagreeable Vark drivers :-)
> >
> >
> >My argument Ed is that comparisons against the F-4 or similar much less
> >complex aircraft on the availability and maintainability front are
> >misleading insofar as the aircraft is substantially more complex.
> >Basically the same profile as a B-1A to a shorter radius. The only
> >meaningful comparison is against the never built TSR.2, Tornado GR.1 or
> >with adjustments for later technology, the Bone.
>
> The FB-111 might fit that argument and particularly if managed by the
> SAC mentality of the cold war, but the F-111A/D/E/F aircraft were
> "tactical" which means that they must carry their weight in the BAI
> and interdiction role. They couldn't and didn't.
>
Ed, the Vark's role in TAC was in large part similar to that in SAC.
Nuclear theatre deep strike. What the TAC birds had in addition was the
precision conventional deep strike role, and all/any weather day/night
CAS/BAI.
IDR ran an interesting interview with Vogt in the late seventies. He
said that the Vark was his most important asset in USAFE. Only genuine
all weather strike asset.
I must respectfully disagree with much of your position on the Vark.
Cheers,
Carlo
Yama
> If you want to find a domestic issue to argue about, how about us having
> bought F/A-18s instead of F-15s :-)
>
> Think about the implications of that one. BTW there have been in total
> more F-15s exported than F/A-18s, which nullifies the then primary
> argument against the F-15 :-) Buy an F-15 today and you pay about the
> same as for an F-18 :-)
LOL!
Since when you've got F-15's for less than $30M fly-away cost?
Kurt Plummer
Hey Carlo,
Neat closing statement, but you had to know I wouldn't let you 'get away clean'.;) I'm honestly not sure which side to come down on though...
1. Uhmmm the USAF 'contribution' also flew BSU-49 missions (the PTack films where you saw the Il-76's go up) because I remember the USN bitching that 'they got all the new toys'.
At the same time, my book says X12 not 24 so '25K' worth of stores is ridiculous, even including the big-BRU racks. I can't find specifics on how many GBU-10's were tossed on the Sidi Bilal/Al Azziziyah area but I would guess at two rather than four as well, simply because the collaterals risks were already pretty high (we really do seem to have it in for them poor Frenchies, I just got through 'bombing a trade mission' in Hanoi last night...;)
2. As for the rest of Libya, it's not how far you go but how hard you fight when you get there. The massive infusion of USN SEAD'ing support was a vital element, in this case about a dozen AGM-45's from Corsair and at least 36 AGM-88 HARM. Even assuming a later modlevel with onboard HARM optioning, that's more red carpet than the F-111's could have newspapered onto Khadaffi's door step. Especially since this doesn't include the A-6's which did the close coastal work at Benina and Al Jumahiriya.
3. Fuel. My worry is/was less the 'minimum ceiling' risked one than the maximum profile extension equivalent. Put simply, I doubt beyond words that the F-111 community would have been east of the Oder, let alone the Dnepr. Not without jamming or mushroom growth much farther west. Maybe from Sweden or Turkey you could do 'transportation plan' (which is really what I consider the optimal 'strategic second echelon' target matrix) on BMD type rail bridge and terminals but even then I doubt if it would be /important/.
Yet especially coming from England, fuel would be critical and unless you pushed the Tankers forward (risky in the extreme) a 111 is simply too vulnerable to intercept by a MiG-23 (run it down) or MiG-29 (shoot down on /it/) or Su-27 (both).
If I remember right the 111 was the first to have it's ceiling measured in mountain crossings and it was definitely in the Pikes Peak range (14,100lbs) when fully fueled and weaponed. It may be that the 111C and the FB have better performance here but it would still be marginal with an internals on a boom for IFR which to me means you takeoff light, refuel 'late and down' and then separate over the Kattegut or similar right in plain sight of 'All God and Russia'.
Even today, with standoff's in the 1-2Klb class, I'm not sure the 111 would be able to clear 20K feet 'reliably' in a good cruise setting with some 31K of go far (particularly with the 18.5K C engine and probably even the FB's 20.3, dunno about the P-100 much) and the guy is right, if with poor examples, the TF-30 is a bit of a fuel pig 'down under'. This as much as anything else is why 'fighter wings' (AR) are becoming so popular for A/G conversion, IMO.
4. Vietnam.
Well shucks, let's go 'back to the beginning' when Fred Voorhies,
an otherwise decent TP for General D got on the back of the drag curve
at an armed forces day airshow at Holloman and planted it hard in the dirt,
short of the runway, only to come out kicking (literally, his helmet like
a football) and screaming "Dumbhead Dumbhead /Dumbhead/!!" in front of
the evening news photographers as he banged his head on the dusty birds
fuselage.
After that every failure starts to seem commonplace and every deployment to prove otherwise looks rushed to cover up the last failure. Yet here too there are highpoints, from the beginning of 1968-
a. INS laydown accuracies '8 times that of TAC's next-best'.
b. Takeoffs (light) in under 2K feet (another source puts
'combat' MTOW's at 4K
feet which still makes Ed's poor 105 look
like a Mac truck).
c. 'On the nose', unassisted (ZERO, no VOR, no Omega) INS
route accuracies of
3,000nm from Hickam to Anderson Field,
unrefueled with no tanks (though a
KC-135 safety net was along 'for the ride').
And then again on to Takhli, March
17, 1968.
This from an aircraft that first flew in 1964 and then had spent half it's FSD life as a 'Navy Reject'.
Then we hit some more 'rough weather'. I would put it that a 105 would be hard pressed to fly the night intruder mission with the initial letdown in the Laotion/Vietnamese mountains in pitch dark and 'rainy' (submarine) conditions, effectively, at Mach .84. The 111 did just that and battabing March 28, 30, April 27. 3 of six don't come back. Well /hell/!! But one of the crews survived and their testimony plus that of their airframe (and another, back at Nellis on May 8) proved that the tail plane welds had failed, commanding a rather nasty pitchup and backflip 'settling' that proceeded to shred the airframe (loaded with up to X24 Mk.82, gee do ya figgur?).
Well that got fixed and then they started going down in hordes when the WCTB had failures. Finally had to build three independent test facilities to reclear each and every wing on that one. But still, 6 losses in 5K hours is pretty good when 3 come from a combat zone, where the 3 'survivors' of Combat Lancer go on to put up 58 more missions. Nobody noticed that.
Constant Guard V is the return of pigs to SEA after the 'debut' of the E and the Easter invasion. The work went to the 474th but NOT to the the previously toured 428th TFS, rather to it's newbie sisters, the 429th/430th. ZERO CLancer experience. Which they did, with their first combat mission (prerested crews) being 4 hours after the 111's descended en-6-ship 'masse' (again) with about 4hrs for maintenance before the first (night) sorties. 3 ramp deaths, one in-air ECM abort, one no-can-go on primary and one dead eye hit.
Now the 'weather' is still typically SEAsonal with clouds up to 28K and a radar that wants on occasion to 'bloom'n'zoom' you upwards of 10K feet from .2 because it thinks the /rain/ is 'solid dirt'. One Capt. Crouch comments on being in cloud for the last 11 minutes of his run in opaque-canopied with only his Sk-e-scope reader for 'company' at 250' and the speed of very wet heat.
Of course they were flying allll alone on much of these and when four aircraft with callsigns ending in 3 went down battaboom it became a sparring contest with Washington D.C. as to who would file (fragmentary) flightplans and who would call at every turnpoint. With such EXCEPTIONAL 'mission security' in Thailand at that time the 111 crews typical response was "We're Busy" (and they knew the consequences thereof and accepted the risks).
And as for 'downtown'... Dec 18, 1972, one Lt. Glass recalled going for the money targets with another 28-.2 clag alert and coming over the final ring of hills so fast, so far ahead of the raid stream (attacking individual SAM sites) that the 'Ooops! Somebody left the the lights on...' (truck streams as well as city) . And they were still going /out/ as the bombs came off.
Despite being cherry, the 429/30th flew 4,000 missions, all but 20 at TFR no-see-me heighting and suffered /only/ six losses. They were the ONLY ones allowed to tackle one specific target (my book doesn't say but I think it was the radio station) in DT and in so far as is known, not a single bomb passed outside it's registered too-hit CEP max's on that target.
Now having said all that, do /I/ think it's an 'impressive platform'? Well, frankly, no, but it once was. When the 111's came home the F-15 and then 16 were the 'big deals' and they got the money while 'Varks sat on the ramp underfunded 'in the prime of their life' (including the Aussie ships which sat, what, 5 /years/ in storeage at Carswell?). And yet because you measure your national stature by the size of your ACM **ck and the teeners may very well have prevented a war that no airplane could have won, I have to say it was a 'wise investment'.
By 1982, things were on the 'challenged' downslide because MANPADS were everywhere and LDSD was available, if not in numbers. With a few chokepoint channelizer exceptions, I've never been real hot on the 'deep battle' in the face of overwhelming numbers.
You fight the numbers you /face/ by massed, repetive, 'salvo sortie fires' and when we phucked over Pave Mover and Assault Breaker for the later-greater-never-there JSTARS and MLRS/ATACMS 'upgrades' we effectively lost the right to own even the night. As was, the 111 was a slow-turn (around) machine with questionable standoff capability against massed WARPAC armor '1st echelon'; which is exactly where the worst of the frontal SHORADS (MANPADS plus a sensor to see with) is going to be.
By the 90's the 111 was a 'permissive system' which could not IMO, operate outside a secure airspace CAP environs but when used simply as a bombcabinet could/can still -exceed- the 'fighter mission' delivery capabilities as represented by the 15E and 16C.40 class.
That's the way it always is with specialist movers, A-10, Dauntless, Stuka, F-111, B-57, Mitchell/Marauder etc. When they work -within- an initial design spec they're Tony Tigers, when they fail to accomodate later threat changes, they instantly become a 'function of' somebody elses' mission.
At least as far as Australia is concerned the aircraft are somewhere
between 'challenged' and 'permissive'. You've got an overwater problem
without carrier air to back up your ASEAN interests and ONLY the 111 (or
surplus BUFF?;) to solve for 'life preserver' legs. The 'enemy' has
the same problem though with as yet few proliferated (beyond SOGM counterment)
forward bases or CAP-out aircraft able to threaten far and fast enough
to hurt (though they can push you off a single-axis delivery /approach/,
complicated by tanking requirements, IMO). S-300 class SAM's are
horizonable with Popeye but the RAAF can certainly no longer 'afford' (attrition
replacement if nothing else) overflight saturation attacks and when the
Su-27 et al. come online the odds will swing to 'threat deficited' and
the Hornet will never go the distance to bring them home.
KP
P.S. Before you cuss or acclaim, I must credit almost all of this to Bill Gunston's _F-111_; with bits and pieces from _Modern Attack Aircraft_ by Mike Spick and Tim Ripley, _Modern Air Combat_ by Gunston and Spick and lastly _Fighter Missions_ by Gunston and Peacock.
I /am/ willing to be 'corrected' by someone waving a tee-shirt of course (provided I get a 'guest civvie speaker' edition for my own collection, am willing to trade 'WarPac Central Heating' ashtrays...;).
Carlo Kopp
Sorry Tommi, that is what the makers told me quite some time ago.
Current build airframes of both types.
BTW you'll pay cca USD 50M for any half decent twin engined fighter
these days. If you can get them cheaper, good luck to you !
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
accomplishment, just to add some fat to the fire :-)
1.Re 1991, a Pentagon press release:
"F-111 Was `Stellar' " (this was the document title)
The F-111 "proved itself to be a workhorse...a stellar performer" not
only in its standard bombing missions but in more tactical ground-attack
mission. During 4,000 sorties F-111Fs destroyed more than 1,500 enemy
armored vehicles in "tank plinking" missions, as well as bridges, C3I
sites, aircraft shelters and strategic weapons facilities, the AF said.
Its mission capability (MC) rate was 85%, or 8% higher than in
peacetime, and it proved a "versatile, precise, survivable platform."
The EF-111A Raven jamming planes ... were so successful that Iraqi air
defense operators feared to turn on their radars other than for "brief,
limited and ineffective use."
The EF-111s flew 900 sorties with a MC rate of 87.5% ...
The article goes on to state that the F-15Es flew 2,200 sorties and lost
two airplanes. There were no F-111 or EF-111 combat losses.
2.Some comments on the EF-111A deployment:
Aviation Week & Space Technology published an article about the EF-111
(after D.S.) and its crucial role. They mentioned that LTC Dennis
Hardziej (the EF-111 squadron commander) flew the very FIRST combat
mission and led the very FIRST combat package into Iraq. Denny is an
old friend of mine, and one of my previous students. I spoke with him
on the telephone after he returned from Saudi Arabia. He couldn't
praise the maintenance folks enough. He stated that the F-111s and the
EF-111s were in high demand during D.S. In fact, the EF-111 was in the
highest demand of any weapon system, including the F-117. Apparently,
some wings refused to fly without Raven escort. Denny said that he
never thought that the -111s could be flown as hard and as frequently as
they were. Simply notstop, punishing flying. Yet they held up
superbly. A testament to the plane and to the maintenance folks.
I must add that my source here has impeccable professional and service
credentials and spent most of his USAF career on various models of the
F-111.
Ad 1. the F-15E made a much smaller contribution, in part due to the
shortage of Lantirn equipment and also due to the diversion into Scud
hunting.
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
>
<snipped>
Kurt,
You trying to inundate me here ? A megapost dare I say it !
>
> Hey Carlo,
>
> Neat closing statement, but you had to know I wouldn't let you 'get
> away clean'.;) I'm honestly not sure which side to come down on
> though...
No sense of of loyalty either way, eh ?
>
> 1. Uhmmm the USAF 'contribution' also flew BSU-49 missions (the PTack
> films where you saw the Il-76's go up) because I remember the USN
> bitching that 'they got all the new toys'.
>
> At the same time, my book says X12 not 24 so '25K' worth of stores is
> ridiculous, even including the big-BRU racks. I can't find specifics
> on how many GBU-10's were tossed on the Sidi Bilal/Al Azziziyah area
> but I would guess at two rather than four as well, simply because the
> collaterals risks were already pretty high (we really do seem to have
> it in for them poor Frenchies, I just got through 'bombing a trade
> mission' in Hanoi last night...;)
If one were really serious all of the stats have been published. Some of
the loadouts were Mk.82 snakes, ie the classic clip of the snakes coming
down on the Ilyushins tails deployed etc. Very draggy store with a MER.
>
> 2. As for the rest of Libya, it's not how far you go but how hard you
> fight when you get there. The massive infusion of USN SEAD'ing
> support was a vital element, in this case about a dozen AGM-45's from
> Corsair and at least 36 AGM-88 HARM. Even assuming a later modlevel
> with onboard HARM optioning, that's more red carpet than the F-111's
> could have newspapered onto Khadaffi's door step. Especially since
> this doesn't include the A-6's which did the close coastal work at
> Benina and Al Jumahiriya.
Would have to do some digging AFAIK the 48th went feet dry up the coast
and swung in from inland to confuse the bad guys. They had Spark Varks
along so there was some serious soft kill work happening.
The Vark is actually not bad for gas burn since it is a very low drag
airframe, and the TF30s while not spectacular are not that abysmal
either, ie a decent bypass ratio for what they are intended to do. The
Vark does carry about 34 klb of internal gas.
For the big one in Europe consider a loadout of 4 x external 600 USG and
two pointy finned cans of sunshine in the internal bay, plus full
internal gas. Go to TF at the FEBA and low ingress. Gas up over Holland.
You'll get well into Eastern Poland.
Going purely conventional about halfway into Poland or Czechoslovakia.
Of course if you sortie from an FRG base with full gas that pushes the
limits much further East.
I would have to do some work on the profiles.
Also it depends on whether the IADS is still up or shot to bits. If it
is the latter you can spent more time at 20k inbound and outbound.
On the deck the Vark is a renowned bitch to tap, I have been told.
The aircraft was generally considered unstoppable until the teenskis
deployed, and the SA-10 deployed. The latter was/is always the big worry
since it is optimised as an ALCM killer and has apparently good Doppler
performance very low. The Clam Shell FMCW acquisition radar also makes a
big difference.
>
> By 1982, things were on the 'challenged' downslide because MANPADS
> were everywhere and LDSD was available, if not in numbers. With a few
> chokepoint channelizer exceptions, I've never been real hot on the
> 'deep battle' in the face of overwhelming numbers.
MANPADS have tended to have difficulty with the Vark since the
acquisition time is much too short at 200 AGL and 550 KTAS. The SA-10
was the problem.
>
> You fight the numbers you /face/ by massed, repetive, 'salvo sortie
> fires' and when we phucked over Pave Mover and Assault Breaker for the
> later-greater-never-there JSTARS and MLRS/ATACMS 'upgrades' we
> effectively lost the right to own even the night. As was, the 111 was
> a slow-turn (around) machine with questionable standoff capability
> against massed WARPAC armor '1st echelon'; which is exactly where the
> worst of the frontal SHORADS (MANPADS plus a sensor to see with) is
> going to be.
>
> By the 90's the 111 was a 'permissive system' which could not IMO,
> operate outside a secure airspace CAP environs but when used simply as
> a bombcabinet could/can still -exceed- the 'fighter mission' delivery
> capabilities as represented by the 15E and 16C.40 class.
Yup. The Vark went from solo to packages in the late eighties.
>
> That's the way it always is with specialist movers, A-10, Dauntless,
> Stuka, F-111, B-57, Mitchell/Marauder etc. When they work -within- an
> initial design spec they're Tony Tigers, when they fail to accomodate
> later threat changes, they instantly become a 'function of' somebody
> elses' mission.
The Vark was effective in its original mission from 65 to about 85,
beyond which the teenski/SA-10 threat became too hard to beat. Twenty
years is not bad going for a penetrator.
Expert opinion from Vark drivers is that in the absence of AEW, LDSD
fighters, and SA-10 class SAMs, the Vark is still very effective. Pick
your scenario as to whether you package or not.
>
> At least as far as Australia is concerned the aircraft are somewhere
> between 'challenged' and 'permissive'. You've got an overwater
> problem without carrier air to back up your ASEAN interests and ONLY
> the 111 (or surplus BUFF?;) to solve for 'life preserver' legs. The
> 'enemy' has the same problem though with as yet few proliferated
> (beyond SOGM counterment) forward bases or CAP-out aircraft able to
> threaten far and fast enough to hurt (though they can push you off a
> single-axis delivery /approach/, complicated by tanking requirements,
> IMO). S-300 class SAM's are horizonable with Popeye but the RAAF can
> certainly no longer 'afford' (attrition replacement if nothing else)
> overflight saturation attacks and when the Su-27 et al. come online
> the odds will swing to 'threat deficited' and the Hornet will never go
> the distance to bring them home.
>
The 142 is good stuff for dealing with an SA-10/12 environment, shooting
from low level you are out of envelope for the SA-10/12.
The problem is AEW + Su-27, which requires a decent escort. The F/A-18
does not cut it, in fact I hear that the Bugs even have trouble keeping
up once the Varks push the levers forward.
>
> P.S. Before you cuss or acclaim, I must credit almost all of this to
> Bill Gunston's _F-111_; with bits and pieces from _Modern Attack
> Aircraft_ by Mike Spick and Tim Ripley, _Modern Air Combat_ by Gunston
> and Spick and lastly _Fighter Missions_ by Gunston and Peacock.
>
> I /am/ willing to be 'corrected' by someone waving a tee-shirt of
> course (provided I get a 'guest civvie speaker' edition for my own
> collection, am willing to trade 'WarPac Central Heating'
> ashtrays...;).
Must get one of those T-shirts, Kurt. Wear it next time I visit Amberley
:-)
Cheers,
Carlo
Paul Saccani
>
>LOL!
>Since when you've got F-15's for less than $30M fly-away cost?
Hmm... If you are really nice to them, the yanks will give them
gratis.
Ed Rasimus
>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>>
>> Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>>
>> Hard to draw meaningful loss rate statistics from a statistically
>> insignificant sortie generation rate. Six sorties a night for 11
>> nights of LB II doesn't give very good numbers.
>
>When why did you raise LB II as an issue in judging the aircraft's worth
I raise the entire operational experience of the aircraft as evidence
rather than selecting only Desert Storm to reach the conclusion that
the aircraft is the greatest thing to happen in tactical aviation
history. I raise the statistical issue to counter your assertion that
"low loss rate" in LB II was indicative of capability. The aircraft
was expensive to deploy, difficult to maintain, ineffective in
employment and more political than practical.
>?
>> Apples and oranges are both fruit, so let's go with tactical nuclear
>> strike systems and point out that the 105D was carrying
>> terrain-avoidance radar, blind-offset radar capability, multi-mode
>> autopilot and integrated stand-alone nav system at similar speeds and
>> similar ranges with similar weapons loads for ten operational years
>> before the "A" model 111 came online.
>
>Could you penetrate a real Soviet IADS in 1980 at 200 AGL in very hilly
>or mountainous terrain, and not get tapped, Ed ?
Everything must be taken in its historical context. In 1958-1968 when
the 105 was on alert in Europe it would certainly have penetrated in
visual conditions at 200 AGL and in night/IFR using the TA at 500 AGL,
and survived. Ten to fifteen years later one would expect the systems
to have matured (on both sides of the FEBA).
>
>Complexity of the Vark was a fact of life, since it had a nav attack
>system and defensive aids that usually go into a strategic bomber. We
>use them mostly as such.
My point was that the nav/attack system and defensive aids should be
automated and ergonomically designed to minimize crew workload, not
take pride in expanding it.
>> >
>>
>> Second echelon under Soviet doctrine was very reachable with F-4s.
>
>Depends on what you call second echelon and when in the battle it
>happens. Are you saying that you would be flying F-4s into the Western
>Ukraine and Eastern Poland ? Permit me to express my doubts here :-)
It all depends upon where you started from. I sat nuclear lines into
Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Poland, East Germany and Yugoslavia in the
venerable F-4C. As we worked our way into higher stages of alert and
hence into new target lists, we began to reach out a bit further.
Start drawing 800 NM circles from places like eastern Turkey, northern
Greece and NE Italy...
>
>
>An F-111 driver I know had a CO who flew 105s, and I am old that the CO
>was very pro-F-111 against the 105. Could that be an accident ?
No accident, merely a reflection of the "totally interchangable pilot"
in the USAF. By 1967 the USAF was cross-training B-47/52, C-124/141,
T-37/38 and assorted staff weinies into the 105 for the purpose of
implementing a policy of "no involuntary second combat tours". The
result is a lot of folks flew 105s for a short period of time who
weren't very competent and didn't really ever learn to use the full
weapon system. The result is a bomber pilot mentality that would just
"eat up" the concept of this bloated deep-strike platform that you
couldn't turn inverted (policy not aerodynamic decision!).
>> >>
>Ed, the F-111 systems were at the time comparable to what went into
>strategic bombers, eg the fully internal ECM package, auto TFR etc. They
>took a strategic bomber weapon system and crammed it into a 2 seat
>aircraft. Expect the workload to go up.
No. Examine again what you wrote. "Auto" TFR means turn it on and
watch, not increased aircrew workload. Integrated ECM means it gets
programmed on the ground and then responds without further aircrew
involvement. Take a look at the way the F-117 handles the
situation--walk out to the aircraft and plug in the equivalent of an
8-track cassette. Then take off and monitor the operation.
In a modern, well-designed airplane the workload should go down!
>> >>
>> Ya gotta wonder about an airplane that was around for 25 years before
>> they found a war for it to fight in. Can't say that about the
>> F-4/14/15/16/18/117....The mere fact that it wasn't (couldn't?) employ
>> may tell you a lot about the relative value and reputation of the
>> system.
>
>Are you going to use your big stick in every little scrap ? Especially
>if you are using it to keep the Sovs at bay in the Eurotheatre ?
Keeping the Soviets at bay was a NATO function and when it came to
nuclear alert, during most of the period you had Brits, French,
Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Germans, Belgians, Italians, Greeks, Turks
all sitting alert plus lots of USAF other than the 'Varks.
The Upper Heyford and Lakenheath guys sat with the bomb at home,
primarily because the system wasn't very forward deployable. When you
add the extra distance from the UK to the targets you conclude they
didn't reach much deeper than the Zippers and Phantoms on the
continent.
>
>>
>> Once again, you suggest "the aircraft were barely used"--reasons like
>> poor in-commission rate, low sortie generation capability, and
>> stratospheric expense meant planners were reluctant to employ the
>> 'Vark. That and a prevalent "can't do" attitude among the crews and
>> leadership.
>
>I suspect Ed that you will be spending the next week defending against
>some very disagreeable Vark drivers :-)
Things change over time. The -111 was in our inventory for a long
time. Each year Sen. John Tower of Texas stuffed more of the damn
things in the USAF budget to keep the GD plant busy (at least until
the Viper came online.)
When I worked in Europe and particularly when I was doing exercise
planning in USAFE Hq, I dealt with 111 tasking continually. The
aircraft was difficult to deploy and ridiculously expensive to
exercise. When offered exercise opportunities I was usually met with a
list of reasons why the unit couldn't meet the obligation. Other
exercise players hated to have 111's introduced because the whole
exercise slowed down due to the ridiculously low sortie rates.
One example of the inefficiency of the aircraft that hasn't been
mentioned (until now) is the equippage of the typical 111 wing, such
as Mt. Home AFB. Most AF squadrons were equipped with 18 a/c per
squadron for a 3 sqdn wing total of 54 aircraft. Mt. Home's three
squadrons totalled 84 aircraft but tasking was always limited to the
18 a/c per squadron level. A waste of resources trying to make the
unit "look good in the shower."
>> >
>
>IDR ran an interesting interview with Vogt in the late seventies. He
>said that the Vark was his most important asset in USAFE. Only genuine
>all weather strike asset.
Remember that unified command CINCs must often make statements that
are more political than tactical. For Vogt to deprecate the 111 by
acknowledging its shortcomings he would have demoralized two major
wings in his command, countered the "wisdom" of Congress and raised
questions from the other members of the alliance. It wouldn't have
been prudent.
Tarver Engineering
Carlo Kopp wrote in message <36D3ED8C...@aus.net>...
>Yama wrote:
>>
>> Carlo Kopp wrote:
>> > If you want to find a domestic issue to argue about, how about us
having
>> > bought F/A-18s instead of F-15s :-)
>> >
>> > Think about the implications of that one. BTW there have been in total
>> > more F-15s exported than F/A-18s, which nullifies the then primary
>> > argument against the F-15 :-) Buy an F-15 today and you pay about the
>> > same as for an F-18 :-)
>>
>> Since when you've got F-15's for less than $30M fly-away cost?
>
>Current build airframes of both types.
A new F-18 D is about US$60 million.
>
>BTW you'll pay cca USD 50M for any half decent twin engined fighter
>these days. If you can get them cheaper, good luck to you !
Mybe for a BAe product, of a French one. :)
John
Dweezil Dwarftosser
Yes, comparing the F-4 and F-111 isn't very meaningful when the two
were used for such disparate missions. There's no way an F-4 could
match the range of a -111, especially with a heavy bomb load - and
yes, the Aardvark eventually "learned" to do some very accurate
high-speed, low-level "laydown"-style radar-map bombing.
However, I have significant disagreement with one statement of yours
- and will confine my comments to that point:
On Tue, 23 Feb 1999 21:59:22 +1100, Carlo Kopp
<Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>I won't argue with maintainability being a problem since it was, no
>doubt about it. But also to put it into context, it was a much more
>complex aircraft in terms of systems than the F-4 or other contemporary
>tactical jets. Apples vs oranges, as they say :-)
The systems on the F-111 were no more nor less complex than those
of similar "generation" F-4s. ( by generation, I mean the constant
modification/upgrade of systems )
Only the *methods* used to maintain the F-111 were more complex...
and they were that way by design. Early on, the USAF made the mistake
of signing on to the contractor's "smart machine/dumb technician"
proposals. They would produce high-dollar computer-automated test
stations (instead of mockup test benches ), and the AF could "make do"
with lesser-trained technicians. Presumably, savings would come in
training costs, and in multiple-VRB reenlistment bonuses no longer
paid to keep highly-skilled folks on board.
I am reminded of a report written in USAFE around 1978/9: It compared
the repair cycle of a "simple fix" for both the F-4 and F-111.
When the component was brought to the F-4 mockup, the young airman
fixed it by substituting pc boards, one at a time, from the mockup
unit. This basic "troubleshooting" phase took about ten minutes,
total - and could have been done right on the flightline.
A similar part brought into the F-111 shop forced the running of an
eight-hour program on the test station; there were no provisions for
simple parts substitution or adjustment; everything required automated
"harmonization" via the test station's program. The part was
repaired, alright - but it took *forever*.
Unfortunately, this mistake was repeated for subsequent aircraft -
they get around the problem today by using inordinate amounts of
spares...and in some cases, shipping the entire units back to the
contractor, since field repairs aren't authorized or in many cases,
possible: no one knows how the specifics of how the guts work anymore!
- John T.
g_al...@hotmail.com
Had some time to look up some info. 2 Squadrons deployed September 27th(?),
1972, returned late February, 1973 (last mission Feb. 22nd?). In that
period, they flew 4,030 sorties (probably just combat sortie total) in a bit
under 5 months, 3,980 of which involved low altitude TF flight. Losses were
six a/c. So, a loss rate of about 0.15%. Assuming about 145 days in this
period, then average sorties per day would amount to about 28. Two squadrons
were deployed, although I forget if they went simultaneously or one replaced
the other. I'll have to check that and the UE, either 18 or 24 per squadron.
> > >I won't argue with maintainability being a problem since it was, no
> > >doubt about it. But also to put it into context, it was a much more
> > >complex aircraft in terms of systems than the F-4 or other contemporary
> > >tactical jets. Apples vs oranges, as they say :-)
> >
> > Apples and oranges are both fruit, so let's go with tactical nuclear
> > strike systems and point out that the 105D was carrying
> > terrain-avoidance radar, blind-offset radar capability, multi-mode
> > autopilot and integrated stand-alone nav system at similar speeds and
> > similar ranges with similar weapons loads for ten operational years
> > before the "A" model 111 came online
>
> Could you penetrate a real Soviet IADS in 1980 at 200 AGL in very hilly
> or mountainous terrain, and not get tapped, Ed ?
>
> If I recall properly SOR-183 was the F-105 _replacement_ :-)
Yup.
<snip>
> > Second echelon under Soviet doctrine was very reachable with F-4s.
>
> Depends on what you call second echelon and when in the battle it
> happens. Are you saying that you would be flying F-4s into the Western
> Ukraine and Eastern Poland ? Permit me to express my doubts here :-)
SOR 183 called for an 800nm Lo-Lo-Hi radius carrying internal nukes, the last
200 nm of which outbound were to be at Mach 1.2. The actual radius in that
mission fell well short of that, due to excessive base drag (I've seen 120 to
200 nm less quoted in various places).
It's still the longest-ranged tactical a/c in its period, and probably today
too, depending on the profile. According to the map in "And Kill MiGs,"
Takhli is 520 miles straight line distance from Hanoi (not stated whether
it's statute or nautical), and they didn't fly straight line. The Varks did
that without external tanks or refueling, flying low level most of the way,
with lots of draggy bombs carried externally.
<snip>
> Different requirements, different expectations, Ed.
> > >
> > >Unescorted IF deep strike under TFR at 200 AGL 500KTAS+ using internal
> > >ECM only - that is not an easy profile and it will reflect in systems
> > >complexity.
> >
> > And if you change TFR to TA (meaning you don't have full auto-pilot
> > coupling, but you do have autopilot low level/high speed terrain
> > avoidance capability), then you've once again got the capability of
> > the F-105 which matured ten years before the 111A.
>
> An F-111 driver I know had a CO who flew 105s, and I am old that the CO
> was very pro-F-111 against the 105. Could that be an accident ?
Many of the F-111 pilots had come out of the F-105, and I've yet to read an
account by one who said he'd prefer to fly the same mission in a 105, or for
that matter, that he could. I've got one account by an ex-105 jock,
describing a mission where they were in cloud for the last 11 minutes (at 200
feet AGL auto-TFR, mind you) of the run-in, with the RWR lit up like a
Christmas tree the whole way. They never saw the target visually, but the BDA
was apparently good. To use a phrase of the period, if he were voting with
his feet, he'd be walking to the F-111:-)
Another described coming into the Hanoi Basin just under the cloud deck,
again at 200 ft. AGL (at the start of LBII, I think). He said the whole city
was lit up, as they apparently weren't expecting any a/c under the cloud
deck. Only as he was on the final stages of the bomb run (can't remember
what he was hitting; probably airfield, C2, or SAM site to give the Buffs an
easier time; something in or near the city, anyway)), did someone start to
pull the master breakers, as they saw whole sections of the city go dark at
once.
Got to go with Carlo here. It was definitely a bear to maintain (especially
the 'D', which really was beyond the limits of the technologically mature)
and suffered from more than its share of teething troubles, but it was the
only tactical a/c we had that could do that mission. Only TSR.2 might have
been comparable, although if they'd been able to put the TSR.2's avionics in
the Bucc it might have been close. I was about to write 'and if pigs could
fly,' but realized my error just in time:-)
Guy (who rather likes the way the 'Vark looks, too)
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
Donald Harstad
Love this stuff.
Don H.
David Lentz
Carlo Kopp wrote:
<snipped>
> You are IMHO arguing the strike package vs penetrator argument. That is
> one worth a thread within itself. The issue boils down to how much
> hardware and how many bodies do you need to achieve a given P[k] against
> a heavily defended aimpoint
<snipped>
> I am still intrigued that TAC called it the F-111, it should have gotten
> a B series number, or at least an FB prefix for all models. B for bomb
> truck.
I suspect the penetrator versus strike package is cultural perspective. You
can expect, ACC nee TAC, to be able to mount a strike package. With the
number of assets the USAF had, it should not have been a problem. On the other
nacellle, I am not sure how many assets the Austrialian Air Force has, but I
suspect that mounting a strike package along with the necessary tanker support
would be somewhere between hard to do to overly burdensome.
As to way McNamara's Dodo Bird was called the F-111, instead of the FB-111, or
the B-111 or the A-111, the answer was turf. Fighters were owned by TAC and
bombers by SAC. If the lads at Langley called the bird an FB the ogres in
Omaha would have claimed ownership of it.
David
Kurt Plummer
> If one were really serious all of the stats have been published. Some of
> the loadouts were Mk.82 snakes, ie the classic clip of the snakes coming
> down on the Ilyushins tails deployed etc. Very draggy store with a MER.
Looking at the pic in _Fighter Missions_ as we speak, conical 'afterbodies'
with 'double bubble' tops. BSU-49's.
> Would have to do some digging AFAIK the 48th went feet dry up the coast
> and swung in from inland to confuse the bad guys. They had Spark Varks
> along so there was some serious soft kill work happening.
No doubt, _FM_ mentions this but IMO jamming is transient based on time and
closure and at least 'by the book' above, the 111's were feet dry at 0001
and exitted /over/ the USN cleared strike lanes between 0011 and 0013Zulu
with the missing man notification by 0015.
> > If I remember right the 111 was the first to have it's ceiling
> > measured in mountain crossings and it was definitely in the Pikes Peak
> > range (14,100lbs) when fully fueled and weaponed. It may be that the
> > 111C and the FB have better performance here but it would still be
> > marginal with an internals on a boom for IFR which to me means you
> > takeoff light, refuel 'late and down' and then separate over the
> > Kattegut or similar right in plain sight of 'All God and Russia'.
Errr, sorry, that should be '14,110ft'. Gunston's _F-111_ says: "With the
theoretical maximum load, the ceiling is so poor that the aircraft could not
clear the summit of Pike's Peak, Colorado, which is at 14,110ft (4,301m).
The FB was castigated back in the 1960s on this account but it is of no
importance to an aircraft whose operational life is centerred on altitudes
below 1,000ft (300m) and often below 300ft (90m)."
Which is exactly where you DON'T want to be, today...
> The Vark is actually not bad for gas burn since it is a very low drag
> airframe, and the TF30s while not spectacular are not that abysmal
> either, ie a decent bypass ratio for what they are intended to do. The
> Vark does carry about 34 klb of internal gas.
> For the big one in Europe consider a loadout of 4 x external 600 USG and
> two pointy finned cans of sunshine in the internal bay, plus full
> internal gas. Go to TF at the FEBA and low ingress. Gas up over Holland.
> You'll get well into Eastern Poland.
>
> Going purely conventional about halfway into Poland or Czechoslovakia.
> Of course if you sortie from an FRG base with full gas that pushes the
> limits much further East.
My _F-111_ spec page shows internals at 4,191 gallons for every letter up to
the E and 4,184 gallons for the F and 4,673 gallons for the FB. Around
28,079lbs at 6.7 per for the middle figure. Another book (_Modern Attack
Aircraft_) says 32,715lbs for the A-E, 32,660lbs for the F, 36,477lbs for
the FB.
The problem with the tanks is the carriage and performance envelope. They
will /have to/ come off before you go lolo and highspeed and one guy at an
airshow (yeah, yeah...) said that they couldn't load the inners because the
fins 'impinged', either directly or by airflow, on the stabs and fuselage
both.
Most of the FB shots I've seen show the B-61 or SRAM inboard and the tanks
outwards, with one set on the fixed pylons. I don't /think/ the F-111F
force had the outboard pylons but I could be wrong. Keep in mind that
16,080lbs/2400 gallons will likely not be completely consumed, even without
an IFR, before you cross into at least the 'threatened' airspace -unless-
the transit ceiling goes down (cruise efficiencies) as you bring the payload
up to the 25K 'max'...
> Also it depends on whether the IADS is still up or shot to bits. If it
> is the latter you can spent more time at 20k inbound and outbound.
>
> On the deck the Vark is a renowned bitch to tap, I have been told.
I'd be interested in hearing if the SEA crews ever faced a credible (even
/noticed/) MiG threat. The 19 had a pretty good lolo radii and the (Russian
version at least) had the Alkali I think which might provide a better
aspect/conversion shot, if not exactly great 'ACM' performance.
> The aircraft was generally considered unstoppable until the teenskis
> deployed, and the SA-10 deployed. The latter was/is always the big worry
> since it is optimised as an ALCM killer and has apparently good Doppler
> performance very low. The Clam Shell FMCW acquisition radar also makes a
> big difference.
> The 142 is good stuff for dealing with an SA-10/12 environment, shooting
> from low level you are out of envelope for the SA-10/12.
> The problem is AEW + Su-27, which requires a decent escort. The F/A-18
> does not cut it, in fact I hear that the Bugs even have trouble keeping
> up once the Varks push the levers forward.
Thanks- KP
Kurt Plummer
> > No accident, merely a reflection of the "totally interchangable pilot"
> > in the USAF. By 1967 the USAF was cross-training B-47/52, C-124/141,
> > T-37/38 and assorted staff weinies into the 105 for the purpose of
> > implementing a policy of "no involuntary second combat tours". The
> > result is a lot of folks flew 105s for a short period of time who
> > weren't very competent and didn't really ever learn to use the full
> > weapon system. The result is a bomber pilot mentality that would just
> > "eat up" the concept of this bloated deep-strike platform that you
> > couldn't turn inverted (policy not aerodynamic decision!).
>
> The Vark was a dedicated bomber Ed and nobody here is claiming
> otherwise. Perfesser Robert had other ideas, but we all know what they
> were worth.
>
> If you are used to flying the F-4 style profiles, doing ACM and general
> tac fighter stuff, I am sure you would hate the Vark with a passion - it
> is a very slippery, long range, precision all weather bomb truck. Its
> manoeuvre performance is poor, even I figured that out on the sim when I
> had trouble sustaining any kind of decent load factor in turns.
>
> I am still intrigued that TAC called it the F-111, it should have gotten
> a B series number, or at least an FB prefix for all models. B for bomb
> truck.
The 'interesting point', as I see it, is that the plane was NOT designed as a
'bomber'. Again, I'll quote Mr. Gunston, I know not everybody likes him but I
find his work at least a good basis for further 'argument'...;)
"Another of the bits of mythology that has grown up around the 0ne-Eleven is
that, while hte Navy was crippled by weight restricitons, the Air Force was
unconcerned. In a standard hardback reference, /McNamara: His Ordeal in the
Pentagon/ (Harper & Row) the authotr, Henry L. Trewhitt, writes "the AIr Force
wanted a plane that weight no less than 75,000lbs (34,000kg)..." In fact,
during the crucial years of SOR-183 the thinking in TAC was that a way had to
be found to keep the weight down to levels with which the command was
familiar. The actual target fross weight in June 1959 was 45,000lb (20,412kg),
and Gen Everist is on record as saying "I am not going to accpet any goddamned
70,000-lb (31,750kg) airplane". As late as December 1961, well into the
unprecedednte four rounds of competitive bidding by the rival contractors,
Everst with extreme reluctance agreed to raise teh absolute upper limit on
gross weight to 60,000lb (27,216kg), and only as a last0ditch tradeoff in order
to achieve the desired lo-lo-hi penetration radius of 800nm.
There is no doubt watsoever that it is the difference between weights of this
order and those actually reached by the production versions of the F-111 that
effectively killed the aircraft as a fighter .... (depending on subtype)
between 98,850 and 119,234lb (44,838kg and 54,088kg)."
Page 279 _F-111_.
Well this brings up some 'questions' to say the least:
1. What's the Spec on /payload/?
By 1960's the B-43/B-28 were standard and the B-61 was at least 'close' which
means that even if you carry two (HIGHLY unlikely from what I hear) you are not
going to be needing more than about 4K worth of non-tank payload. I know that
'TFX' (same as SOR-183?) also had semi-STOL and other 'facets' of performance
not necessarily associated with 'B' spec.
2. Are there any web pages showing some residuals on the 'Boeing
Alternative'? I seem to recall that it was an overwing inlet machine with an
even earlier basis on the Vickers 'Weybridge' project (Tu-22 Blinder collides
with Tu-26 Backfire, gets it's nose broken by Concorde, results dumped on the
dumb Amerrycans?;).
3. Fuel to Structural Volumes to External Base/Wetted drag
The book makes some mention of the Tornado and Viggen as 'examples of how it
can be done' (Fighter from Bomber if the base design is decent). Welllll, I've
pissed the Swedes off enough for one week and actually think the Tornado is a
better /interceptor/ than the Eagle, if you arm it correctly.
However, the one thing about the aforementioned (IDS/AJ-37) which are NOT
compatible with the 'interdictor' as opposed the fighter/bomber or frontal
attack ship: Fuel. It all has to be internal IMO, because dumping tanks is
just not practical, for performance as well as logistics/economics reasons.
Yet fuel is unique in that it sloshes and has to be trimmed and monitored and
shielded and self-sealed whenever possible.
I wonder if, using the 'period technology', (VG) we /could/ pack the required
T/Wr into an airframe with the WCTB in front, the bay-below and the engines
behind without running into a constantly backfeeding drag-to-weight-to-fuel
problem?
For myself, the day of the lolo ship is not over. It is simply a matter of
time until the need to accomplish the mission in the face of new high lethality
threats 'above the horizon' causes us to accept flak and MANPADS threats
through a 'corridor low', short-LOS, alternative. I think the means for
getting thar without just a HUGE increase in fuselage width (inlet and gloves)
is to alter the conventional two-pivot system in the current VG for a scissor
wing with TVC.
Would literally 'halve' the WCTB area while 'centralizing' the absolute
structural densities along the hardback of the fuselage with /very little/
residual lift flex on a super reduced AR.
I don't think you can get away from the 30-35K fuel gross to be effective but
with half the 'wing weight' gone, I think you could, today, endup with a
60-70Klb strike fighter capable of doing a sustained 600knots and 200nm
'bursts' of 800 knots with the resulting reduction in cross-sectional area.
The 'problem' of course is going be coming up with a payload that is reasonable
and also capable of high-speed release but here too I think we are getting
closer to a realization of 'not how much but where you put' (on the target) as
being the factor that counts...
KP
Carlo Kopp
>
> Carlo -
>
> Yes, comparing the F-4 and F-111 isn't very meaningful when the two
> were used for such disparate missions. There's no way an F-4 could
> match the range of a -111, especially with a heavy bomb load - and
> yes, the Aardvark eventually "learned" to do some very accurate
> high-speed, low-level "laydown"-style radar-map bombing.
>
> However, I have significant disagreement with one statement of yours
> - and will confine my comments to that point:
>
> On Tue, 23 Feb 1999 21:59:22 +1100, Carlo Kopp
> <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>
> >doubt about it. But also to put it into context, it was a much more
> >complex aircraft in terms of systems than the F-4 or other contemporary
> >tactical jets. Apples vs oranges, as they say :-)
>
John, I've looked at tie in diagrams and talked to maintainers on the
"classic" which is the original analogue system. It was monstrously
complex at a system level, with analogue signals wired all over the
place.
What I was told by the maintainers was that the complexity meant that
getting it all to work together was time consuming. That was the A-model
system.
The D-model system was completely different (we had one maintainer who
used to post here). The FB-111A system and F-model system were different
yet again. AFAIK they got it right by about the F-model.
I agree that it is better to have smart maintainers, and design a
maintenance philosophy where you can fix things down to component level
if possible. But that is IMHO no longer feasible with the highly complex
digital boxes they put in these days.
I will take issue with your comment comparing the complexity against the
F-4, insofar the boxes themselves would mostly have been of similar
complexity at a board or circuit level, but in the Vark you had many
more of them, a lot earlier in the design life cycle. That makes a big
difference.
There is no comparison between an ALR-62 and an ALR-46.
The complaint I hear from most Vark types ex USAF is that spares stocks
were never kept at appropriate levels and this is why uptime was so hard
to keep within reasonble limits.
BTW which Vark models did you maintain ?
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
>
> Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >>
> >> Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hard to draw meaningful loss rate statistics from a statistically
> >> insignificant sortie generation rate. Six sorties a night for 11
> >> nights of LB II doesn't give very good numbers.
> >
> >When why did you raise LB II as an issue in judging the aircraft's worth
>
> I raise the entire operational experience of the aircraft as evidence
> rather than selecting only Desert Storm to reach the conclusion that
> the aircraft is the greatest thing to happen in tactical aviation
> history. I raise the statistical issue to counter your assertion that
> "low loss rate" in LB II was indicative of capability. The aircraft
> was expensive to deploy, difficult to maintain, ineffective in
> employment and more political than practical.
Ed, I won't dispute the expense in deployment and maintenance, that is a
consequence of complexity.
But I disagree with your arguments concerning effectiveness. The
aircraft was not built to do the missions which you used to fly in the
F-4, even if it was sold as such. It was designed to do what a Buff did,
on a smaller scale but with much higher performance/survivability. Go in
deep under any weather day/night and accurately blind bomb by radar in a
single pass, with no supporting assets, from 200 AGL.
You are IMHO arguing the strike package vs penetrator argument. That is
one worth a thread within itself. The issue boils down to how much
hardware and how many bodies do you need to achieve a given P[k] against
a heavily defended aimpoint.
With the Vark it is one A/C and subject to radius possibly zero tankers.
With a strike package you are talking Weasels, bombers, fighter CAP,
tankers, EB-66s etc. Whenever I do the sums the Vark comes up cheaper,
even if the platform is more expensive and complex.
> >?
> >> Apples and oranges are both fruit, so let's go with tactical nuclear
> >> strike systems and point out that the 105D was carrying
> >> terrain-avoidance radar, blind-offset radar capability, multi-mode
> >> autopilot and integrated stand-alone nav system at similar speeds and
> >> similar ranges with similar weapons loads for ten operational years
> >> before the "A" model 111 came online.
> >
> >Could you penetrate a real Soviet IADS in 1980 at 200 AGL in very hilly
> >or mountainous terrain, and not get tapped, Ed ?
>
> Everything must be taken in its historical context. In 1958-1968 when
> the 105 was on alert in Europe it would certainly have penetrated in
> visual conditions at 200 AGL and in night/IFR using the TA at 500 AGL,
> and survived. Ten to fifteen years later one would expect the systems
> to have matured (on both sides of the FEBA).
The issue Ed is that the Vark could penetrate and survive under
conditions where the 105 could no longer. 200 AGL under zero visibility
conditions, anytime, anywhere.
> >
> >Complexity of the Vark was a fact of life, since it had a nav attack
> >system and defensive aids that usually go into a strategic bomber. We
> >use them mostly as such.
>
> My point was that the nav/attack system and defensive aids should be
> automated and ergonomically designed to minimize crew workload, not
> take pride in expanding it.
It is not a question of taking pride in it. I see it Ed from a systems
engineering perspective to be an inevitabl consequence of collapsing the
roles of several crewmembers into one.
Consider that the Whizzo in the Vark is doing the same job as two
navigators and a DSO in the Buff. Even if you automate it as much as you
try, that is still three hats to wear, or rather bonedomes, so to say.
The workload is a consequence of the profile. The first significant
improvement in workload was the F-111D but at the expense of
maintainability since the complexity was even higher.
Our "Pigs" now have a modern fully digital nav attack and that is in the
same league as the F-111D but not quite as good for workload since there
is no moving map display or HUDs as the D-model had. The latter may have
been a bitch to support especially short on spares but everybody I know
who flew them at some stage swears by the aircraft.
> >> >
> >>
> >> Second echelon under Soviet doctrine was very reachable with F-4s.
> >
> >Depends on what you call second echelon and when in the battle it
> >happens. Are you saying that you would be flying F-4s into the Western
> >Ukraine and Eastern Poland ? Permit me to express my doubts here :-)
>
> It all depends upon where you started from. I sat nuclear lines into
> Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Poland, East Germany and Yugoslavia in the
> venerable F-4C. As we worked our way into higher stages of alert and
> hence into new target lists, we began to reach out a bit further.
> Start drawing 800 NM circles from places like eastern Turkey, northern
> Greece and NE Italy...
Sounds to me Ed like these were one way ticket sorties :-( On that basis
a Vark sortiing from the FRG could go very deep.
> >
> >
> >An F-111 driver I know had a CO who flew 105s, and I am old that the CO
> >was very pro-F-111 against the 105. Could that be an accident ?
>
> No accident, merely a reflection of the "totally interchangable pilot"
> in the USAF. By 1967 the USAF was cross-training B-47/52, C-124/141,
> T-37/38 and assorted staff weinies into the 105 for the purpose of
> implementing a policy of "no involuntary second combat tours". The
> result is a lot of folks flew 105s for a short period of time who
> weren't very competent and didn't really ever learn to use the full
> weapon system. The result is a bomber pilot mentality that would just
> "eat up" the concept of this bloated deep-strike platform that you
> couldn't turn inverted (policy not aerodynamic decision!).
The Vark was a dedicated bomber Ed and nobody here is claiming
otherwise. Perfesser Robert had other ideas, but we all know what they
were worth.
If you are used to flying the F-4 style profiles, doing ACM and general
tac fighter stuff, I am sure you would hate the Vark with a passion - it
is a very slippery, long range, precision all weather bomb truck. Its
manoeuvre performance is poor, even I figured that out on the sim when I
had trouble sustaining any kind of decent load factor in turns.
I am still intrigued that TAC called it the F-111, it should have gotten
a B series number, or at least an FB prefix for all models. B for bomb
truck.
> >> >>
>
> >Ed, the F-111 systems were at the time comparable to what went into
> >strategic bombers, eg the fully internal ECM package, auto TFR etc. They
> >took a strategic bomber weapon system and crammed it into a 2 seat
> >aircraft. Expect the workload to go up.
>
> No. Examine again what you wrote. "Auto" TFR means turn it on and
> watch, not increased aircrew workload. Integrated ECM means it gets
> programmed on the ground and then responds without further aircrew
> involvement. Take a look at the way the F-117 handles the
> situation--walk out to the aircraft and plug in the equivalent of an
> 8-track cassette. Then take off and monitor the operation.
>
> In a modern, well-designed airplane the workload should go down!
See my earlier comments, Ed. The workload is to do with a pure blind
bombing at high speed 200 AGL profile. The TFR does auto pitchups but
does not manage energy for you so the pilot has to adjust the throttles
in anticipation of terrain elevation which he sees on a scope. This
could have been fully automated but for some reason they never did so.
The Whizzo is busiest since he has got to handle a temperamental high
drift (then) INS (this means frequent radar fixes off known aimpoints to
bound the INS error) and do the radar blind bomb delivery, choose
ingress and egress routes between hills, do all of the standard nav
waypoint work, manage the stores, watch the RHAWS, manage the ECM as
required and deploy expendables. Very busy boys.
I know you did all of this on your own in the 105, but the difference
was that the Vark was designed to do it in a higher threat density
environment and survive. Go in just as fast but even lower, 100% blind.
> >> >>
>
> >> Ya gotta wonder about an airplane that was around for 25 years before
> >> they found a war for it to fight in. Can't say that about the
> >> F-4/14/15/16/18/117....The mere fact that it wasn't (couldn't?) employ
> >> may tell you a lot about the relative value and reputation of the
> >> system.
> >
> >Are you going to use your big stick in every little scrap ? Especially
> >if you are using it to keep the Sovs at bay in the Eurotheatre ?
>
> Keeping the Soviets at bay was a NATO function and when it came to
> nuclear alert, during most of the period you had Brits, French,
> Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Germans, Belgians, Italians, Greeks, Turks
> all sitting alert plus lots of USAF other than the 'Varks.
>
> The Upper Heyford and Lakenheath guys sat with the bomb at home,
> primarily because the system wasn't very forward deployable. When you
> add the extra distance from the UK to the targets you conclude they
> didn't reach much deeper than the Zippers and Phantoms on the
> continent.
The argument I heard for the UK deployment was keeping the assets out of
easy reach of Sovbloc tacair and SRBMs. That makes good sense
strategically. You would not keep your big stick in a place where it
could be easily taken out with a pre-emptive hit.
> >
> >>
> >> Once again, you suggest "the aircraft were barely used"--reasons like
> >> poor in-commission rate, low sortie generation capability, and
> >> stratospheric expense meant planners were reluctant to employ the
> >> 'Vark. That and a prevalent "can't do" attitude among the crews and
> >> leadership.
> >
> >I suspect Ed that you will be spending the next week defending against
> >some very disagreeable Vark drivers :-)
>
> Things change over time. The -111 was in our inventory for a long
> time. Each year Sen. John Tower of Texas stuffed more of the damn
> things in the USAF budget to keep the GD plant busy (at least until
> the Viper came online.)
The other side of that argument Ed is that original build numbers were
planned to be 1000+, and in the end they built only about 400. They
actually took a number of airframes trashed in accidents and rebuilt
them to airworthy status, and returned them to service. We had one hell
of a time persuading the US Govt to release even four attrition
replacement A-models during the early eighties.
If the aircraft was of such low operational value/merit, Ed, why did we
have to grovel for so long and pay 40M a pop for tired A-models out of a
training wing, just to get them ? AFAIK one at least is ex Combat
Lancer.
>
> When I worked in Europe and particularly when I was doing exercise
> planning in USAFE Hq, I dealt with 111 tasking continually. The
> aircraft was difficult to deploy and ridiculously expensive to
> exercise. When offered exercise opportunities I was usually met with a
> list of reasons why the unit couldn't meet the obligation. Other
> exercise players hated to have 111's introduced because the whole
> exercise slowed down due to the ridiculously low sortie rates.
If they had standing commitments to maintain a certain number for
alerts, and were short of spares, that makes perfectly good sense to me.
>
> One example of the inefficiency of the aircraft that hasn't been
> mentioned (until now) is the equippage of the typical 111 wing, such
> as Mt. Home AFB. Most AF squadrons were equipped with 18 a/c per
> squadron for a 3 sqdn wing total of 54 aircraft. Mt. Home's three
> squadrons totalled 84 aircraft but tasking was always limited to the
> 18 a/c per squadron level. A waste of resources trying to make the
> unit "look good in the shower."
> >> >
> >
> >IDR ran an interesting interview with Vogt in the late seventies. He
> >said that the Vark was his most important asset in USAFE. Only genuine
> >all weather strike asset.
>
> Remember that unified command CINCs must often make statements that
> are more political than tactical. For Vogt to deprecate the 111 by
> acknowledging its shortcomings he would have demoralized two major
> wings in his command, countered the "wisdom" of Congress and raised
> questions from the other members of the alliance. It wouldn't have
> been prudent.
>
Well, Vogt is in a "damned if you do, and damned if you don't" position
here, isn't he ? These BTW were not off the cuff comments alone. That
was a hefty article in which he elaborated on the various things the
Vark did for the USAFE which other assets did not. In his opinion it was
the only genuine all weather blind CAS asset he had for supporting
ground forces. His primary interdiction force, and deep strike force.
I won't fold easily on the Vark, Ed, I have been researching it for 20
years and have as much exposure as you get without driving or
maintaining one operationally. Methinks you are treating it unfairly. It
had its warts but the biggest problem I see was a cultural one, ie
people had expectations that it could do things it wasn't built to do.
TAC speced the Vark to steal nuclear theatre all weather strike budgets
from SAC. Then they ended up with an aircraft that did one job (all
weather accurate blind bombing) in a culture which was firmly multirole
by both history, and operating paradigm.
Cheers,
Carlo
Dweezil Dwarftosser
<Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>BTW which Vark models did you maintain ?
None. All of my info came from other 322x1s ( we were "Q" shredout,
they were "R" ) who found their way back via reassignment when the
USAF revised things. ( The -111 troops were designated as generic
326 test station operators/flightline box-pullers.) All along, their
tech training skipped basic fundamental electronics.
BTW - this doesn't mean they didn't possess some excellent
troubleshooters; the "smart machine/dumb tech" term didn't address the
individual's skills; instead, it referred to ENFORCED reliance on the
machine. Even their tech orders were very light on "theory of
operation" sections - but real heavy on tables of error code numbers
and the particular units/sections to which they apply.
BTW - I found an old F-4E weapons control system "interconnect"
diagram from a 1F-4E-2-19. It runs to 52 triple fold-out pages,
chock full of analog signals shared with other systems on the jet.
( So old, in fact, that it is for "vanilla" jets, before the more
complicated stuff was installed....)
- John T.
Yama
>
> Sorry Tommi, that is what the makers told me quite some time ago.
> Current build airframes of both types.
>
> these days. If you can get them cheaper, good luck to you !
Jarmo might like to comment your intimation that F-18 isn't even
half-decent...
When we bought the things, fly-away cost was quoted to be between 25
and 28 million $. That was seven years ago, I don't think cost has
doubled in that time frame. Actually F-18 is only slightly more
expensive than F-16. So are F-16 and F-15 in same cost category?
F-15E derivatives reportedly tend to cost $40-50M.
Curiously, it was reported that Indian deal of additional 10 Su-30's
was worth of $300M, this would mean that Su-30 costs 30M. Can this
be true?
You sure that maker didn't refer to F/A-18E/F?
Carlo Kopp
>
> Carlo Kopp wrote:
>
> <snipped>
>
> > You are IMHO arguing the strike package vs penetrator argument. That is
> > one worth a thread within itself. The issue boils down to how much
> > hardware and how many bodies do you need to achieve a given P[k] against
> > a heavily defended aimpoint
>
>
> > I am still intrigued that TAC called it the F-111, it should have gotten
> > a B series number, or at least an FB prefix for all models. B for bomb
> > truck.
>
> can expect, ACC nee TAC, to be able to mount a strike package. With the
> number of assets the USAF had, it should not have been a problem. On the other
> nacellle, I am not sure how many assets the Austrialian Air Force has, but I
> suspect that mounting a strike package along with the necessary tanker support
Until recently our guys never trained for packages. Now they do. Plans
are afoot for a serious tanker force and the Wedgetail AEW&C (ie pocket
AWACS) program is well under way. The current philosophy is to provide
package escort for the Pigs if a serious fighter threat is expected.
Otherwise, the "single penetrator" or small flight unescorted strike
model applies.
In terms of assets we have 35 Varks and 72 Bugs. The Varks are a mix of
C model with AUP avionics (essentially a souped up dual CPU, dual INS
Pacer Strike derivative with digital 1760 stores control), and G models
which will be upgraded to a TBD digital config. The Bugs are A models
which are going to get an APG-73 RUG I/II upgrade, current EW upgrade,
ASRAAM and AMRAAM.
By 2010 we expect to have these upgrades completed and Wedgetail and
tankers operational. I am keen to see booms on the tankers so we can
project some serious maritime punch with the Pigs.
Re USAF Varks ou are right it is a cultural perspective issue. Ed is
from the heart of the TAC culture and it would seem he is not too fond
of "cultural deviants" like the Vark community :-)
The Vark was always a bit of a "cultural orphan" in the USAF scheme of
things, too big heavy and bomberish for the TAC guys, and too pointy,
small, fighterish and shortlegged for the SAC guys. The perfect
political outcast :-)
>
> As to way McNamara's Dodo Bird was called the F-111, instead of the FB-111, or
> the B-111 or the A-111, the answer was turf. Fighters were owned by TAC and
> bombers by SAC. If the lads at Langley called the bird an FB the ogres in
> Omaha would have claimed ownership of it.
>
David, I am well aware of the fiefdom issue involved in the history.
That does not mean that I need not find it intriguing if not bemusing
:-)
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
>
> Hey Carlo,
>
> > If one were really serious all of the stats have been published. Some of
> > the loadouts were Mk.82 snakes, ie the classic clip of the snakes coming
> > down on the Ilyushins tails deployed etc. Very draggy store with a MER.
>
> with 'double bubble' tops. BSU-49's.
>
> > and swung in from inland to confuse the bad guys. They had Spark Varks
> > along so there was some serious soft kill work happening.
>
> closure and at least 'by the book' above, the 111's were feet dry at 0001
> and exitted /over/ the USN cleared strike lanes between 0011 and 0013Zulu
> with the missing man notification by 0015.
I must read Venkus' book some day.
>
> > > If I remember right the 111 was the first to have it's ceiling
> > > measured in mountain crossings and it was definitely in the Pikes Peak
> > > range (14,100lbs) when fully fueled and weaponed. It may be that the
> > > 111C and the FB have better performance here but it would still be
> > > marginal with an internals on a boom for IFR which to me means you
> > > takeoff light, refuel 'late and down' and then separate over the
> > > Kattegut or similar right in plain sight of 'All God and Russia'.
>
> Errr, sorry, that should be '14,110ft'. Gunston's _F-111_ says: "With the
> theoretical maximum load, the ceiling is so poor that the aircraft could not
> clear the summit of Pike's Peak, Colorado, which is at 14,110ft (4,301m).
> The FB was castigated back in the 1960s on this account but it is of no
> importance to an aircraft whose operational life is centerred on altitudes
> below 1,000ft (300m) and often below 300ft (90m)."
>
> Which is exactly where you DON'T want to be, today...
Tactially going in with max payload is simply dumb and I always wonder
about these publicity pics of any aircraft loaded to the gills with
stores. What's the point ?
>
> > The Vark is actually not bad for gas burn since it is a very low drag
> > airframe, and the TF30s while not spectacular are not that abysmal
> > either, ie a decent bypass ratio for what they are intended to do. The
> > Vark does carry about 34 klb of internal gas.
>
> > For the big one in Europe consider a loadout of 4 x external 600 USG and
> > two pointy finned cans of sunshine in the internal bay, plus full
> > internal gas. Go to TF at the FEBA and low ingress. Gas up over Holland.
> > You'll get well into Eastern Poland.
> >
> > Going purely conventional about halfway into Poland or Czechoslovakia.
> > Of course if you sortie from an FRG base with full gas that pushes the
> > limits much further East.
>
> My _F-111_ spec page shows internals at 4,191 gallons for every letter up to
> the E and 4,184 gallons for the F and 4,673 gallons for the FB. Around
> 28,079lbs at 6.7 per for the middle figure. Another book (_Modern Attack
> Aircraft_) says 32,715lbs for the A-E, 32,660lbs for the F, 36,477lbs for
> the FB.
>
> The problem with the tanks is the carriage and performance envelope. They
> will /have to/ come off before you go lolo and highspeed and one guy at an
> airshow (yeah, yeah...) said that they couldn't load the inners because the
> fins 'impinged', either directly or by airflow, on the stabs and fuselage
> both.
>
> Most of the FB shots I've seen show the B-61 or SRAM inboard and the tanks
> outwards, with one set on the fixed pylons. I don't /think/ the F-111F
> force had the outboard pylons but I could be wrong. Keep in mind that
> 16,080lbs/2400 gallons will likely not be completely consumed, even without
> an IFR, before you cross into at least the 'threatened' airspace -unless-
> the transit ceiling goes down (cruise efficiencies) as you bring the payload
> up to the 25K 'max'...
The issue is sweep angle. You can use all four swivel pylons with a 44
deg wing no trouble. I would have to check on the 54 wing, but going
beyond that the inboards do get a little ehm tight ?
In any event they prefer to fly tactical low level with a 44 wing since
the spoilers lock out at 45, so that is the best manoeuvrability/energy
compromise. It does give you four swivel stations.
AFAIK the Jugs are rated supersonic so if you carry a pair outboard, and
two GBUs inboard, once you have tossed the bad guys their lunch, there
should be no reason why you can't go to a 72 wing and blast out of there
at some unreasonable number of knots at 200 AGL :-)
>
> > Also it depends on whether the IADS is still up or shot to bits. If it
> > is the latter you can spent more time at 20k inbound and outbound.
> >
> > On the deck the Vark is a renowned bitch to tap, I have been told.
>
> I'd be interested in hearing if the SEA crews ever faced a credible (even
> /noticed/) MiG threat. The 19 had a pretty good lolo radii and the (Russian
> version at least) had the Alkali I think which might provide a better
> aspect/conversion shot, if not exactly great 'ACM' performance.
No hope of finding the Vark by AI radar let alone hanging on for the
ride. And if they do by some accident manage to get too nosey, there is
always a BIF sandwich for the MiG to eat :-)
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
Kurt, all due respect to Bill, but anything with a primary mission
profile of delivering canned sunshine ain't no fighter, so to say :-)
Consider that only the D-model ever had a BVR missile capability
planned, excluding the concoction the Navy was told to buy.
>
> Well this brings up some 'questions' to say the least:
>
> 1. What's the Spec on /payload/?
> By 1960's the B-43/B-28 were standard and the B-61 was at least 'close' which
> means that even if you carry two (HIGHLY unlikely from what I hear) you are not
> going to be needing more than about 4K worth of non-tank payload. I know that
> 'TFX' (same as SOR-183?) also had semi-STOL and other 'facets' of performance
> not necessarily associated with 'B' spec.
I have not had the pleasure of reading the original SOR-183 document.
AFAIK the baseline requirement was for a pair of internal B series
specials. Everything else was a tack on extra at that time.
Part of the weight problem resulted from the low level supersonic
penetration requirement to get the dash endurance right.
>
> 2. Are there any web pages showing some residuals on the 'Boeing
> Alternative'? I seem to recall that it was an overwing inlet machine with an
> even earlier basis on the Vickers 'Weybridge' project (Tu-22 Blinder collides
> with Tu-26 Backfire, gets it's nose broken by Concorde, results dumped on the
> dumb Amerrycans?;).
Never seen a pic of the Boeing mockup, at least not recently. As the
story goes it was being called an F-55.5 :-)
>
> 3. Fuel to Structural Volumes to External Base/Wetted drag
> The book makes some mention of the Tornado and Viggen as 'examples of how it
> can be done' (Fighter from Bomber if the base design is decent). Welllll, I've
> pissed the Swedes off enough for one week and actually think the Tornado is a
> better /interceptor/ than the Eagle, if you arm it correctly.
>
> However, the one thing about the aforementioned (IDS/AJ-37) which are NOT
> compatible with the 'interdictor' as opposed the fighter/bomber or frontal
> attack ship: Fuel. It all has to be internal IMO, because dumping tanks is
> just not practical, for performance as well as logistics/economics reasons.
> Yet fuel is unique in that it sloshes and has to be trimmed and monitored and
> shielded and self-sealed whenever possible.
>
> I wonder if, using the 'period technology', (VG) we /could/ pack the required
> T/Wr into an airframe with the WCTB in front, the bay-below and the engines
> behind without running into a constantly backfeeding drag-to-weight-to-fuel
> problem?
>
> For myself, the day of the lolo ship is not over. It is simply a matter of
> time until the need to accomplish the mission in the face of new high lethality
> threats 'above the horizon' causes us to accept flak and MANPADS threats
> through a 'corridor low', short-LOS, alternative. I think the means for
> getting thar without just a HUGE increase in fuselage width (inlet and gloves)
> is to alter the conventional two-pivot system in the current VG for a scissor
> wing with TVC.
Lo-lo is still viable where the other does not have an SA-10/12/Patriot
class AD SAM or AEW&C/LDSD fighters of decent quality.
However, why expose yourself to barrage AAA etc when you can go in LO at
40k and lob glide JDAM variants from 50 NMI away ?
>
> Would literally 'halve' the WCTB area while 'centralizing' the absolute
> structural densities along the hardback of the fuselage with /very little/
> residual lift flex on a super reduced AR.
>
> I don't think you can get away from the 30-35K fuel gross to be effective but
> with half the 'wing weight' gone, I think you could, today, endup with a
> 60-70Klb strike fighter capable of doing a sustained 600knots and 200nm
> 'bursts' of 800 knots with the resulting reduction in cross-sectional area.
>
> The 'problem' of course is going be coming up with a payload that is reasonable
> and also capable of high-speed release but here too I think we are getting
> closer to a realization of 'not how much but where you put' (on the target) as
> being the factor that counts...
>
> KP
Glidebomb MMTDs is the future, Kurt, IMHO. Something long overdue.
Cheers,
Carlo
Ed Rasimus
>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>>
>
>But I disagree with your arguments concerning effectiveness. The
>aircraft was not built to do the missions which you used to fly in the
>F-4, even if it was sold as such. It was designed to do what a Buff did,
>on a smaller scale but with much higher performance/survivability. Go in
>deep under any weather day/night and accurately blind bomb by radar in a
>single pass, with no supporting assets, from 200 AGL.
I think you need to revisit the McNamara years and review the original
contract specs. The 111 was certainly not a B-52 replacement, it was a
replacement for the tactical ground attack systems of the era such as
the F-100/104/105. It was to have significant nuclear strike
capability, of course, but it also was to carry a heavy tactical
conventional load.
It was only when it failed to meet TAC operational requirements that
the "FB" version was generated to keep the Ft Worth plant
operating--once again the aircraft was a political product not a
military one.
>
>You are IMHO arguing the strike package vs penetrator argument. That is
>one worth a thread within itself. The issue boils down to how much
>hardware and how many bodies do you need to achieve a given P[k] against
>a heavily defended aimpoint.
>
>With the Vark it is one A/C and subject to radius possibly zero tankers.
>With a strike package you are talking Weasels, bombers, fighter CAP,
>tankers, EB-66s etc. Whenever I do the sums the Vark comes up cheaper,
>even if the platform is more expensive and complex.
I'm certainly not introducing a package vs independent argument. I'm
arguing employment. The 105 and F-4 carried a war plan mission called
"selective release" for years during the cold war. A "sel-rel" was a
single ship penetration mission. No problem.
The 'Vark didn't come up cheaper in SEA. The problem with the night
pentration mission was that the aircraft disappeared without a trace.
One airplane/one target is supposed to mean you get the airplane back
after the mission. With the -111 that often didn't happen.
>
>
>The issue Ed is that the Vark could penetrate and survive under
>conditions where the 105 could no longer. 200 AGL under zero visibility
>conditions, anytime, anywhere.
The war you fight is the war you've got. The 105 was penetrating and
surviving in '65-'68 and it was penetrating and surviving in the
Weasel role in '72-73. During both of those periods the -111 was
penetrating and NOT surviving.
>> >
>
>It is not a question of taking pride in it. I see it Ed from a systems
>engineering perspective to be an inevitabl consequence of collapsing the
>roles of several crewmembers into one.
>
>Consider that the Whizzo in the Vark is doing the same job as two
>navigators and a DSO in the Buff. Even if you automate it as much as you
>try, that is still three hats to wear, or rather bonedomes, so to say.
The WSO in the -111 is doing half the job of the pilot in a 105 or
104, not the make-work tasks that had to be handled manually in the
B-52. Modern technology makes it easier not harder. Complexity and
workload do not indicate a superior system.
>
>Sounds to me Ed like these were one way ticket sorties :-( On that basis
>a Vark sortiing from the FRG could go very deep.
Every line I sat was recoverable UNLESS you were launched to orbit and
held until "R" fuel. Then it meant you had the gas for the escape
maneuver and nothing more.
>> >
>
>See my earlier comments, Ed. The workload is to do with a pure blind
>bombing at high speed 200 AGL profile. The TFR does auto pitchups but
>does not manage energy for you so the pilot has to adjust the throttles
>in anticipation of terrain elevation which he sees on a scope. This
>could have been fully automated but for some reason they never did so.
And, that mode of operation was virtually identical to what we did in
the 105.
>
>The Whizzo is busiest since he has got to handle a temperamental high
>drift (then) INS (this means frequent radar fixes off known aimpoints to
>bound the INS error)
(This means not as good as the INS in the F-4???)
> and do the radar blind bomb delivery,
No problem for the single operator in the 105.
>choose
>ingress and egress routes between hills,
A function of pre-flight planning.
>do all of the standard nav
>waypoint work,
Single seat pilots don't??
>manage the stores,
Like setting the weapons switches, changing fuel tanks, ....Still a
single pilot managable task.
>watch the RHAWS,
Been there, done that too.
> manage the ECM as
>required and deploy expendables. Very busy boys.
Maybe "boys" are the problem. Use men. :-))
>
>I know you did all of this on your own in the 105, but the difference
>was that the Vark was designed to do it in a higher threat density
>environment and survive. Go in just as fast but even lower, 100% blind.
See my comments about high threat density and survival. The 105s did,
the 111 didn't in SEA.
>
>The argument I heard for the UK deployment was keeping the assets out of
>easy reach of Sovbloc tacair and SRBMs. That makes good sense
>strategically. You would not keep your big stick in a place where it
>could be easily taken out with a pre-emptive hit.
The platform that carries the B-61 is irrelevant. It's still a B-61
upon arrival. The fact is that the USAFE 111's weren't supportable at
the end of the supply string.
>> >
>If the aircraft was of such low operational value/merit, Ed, why did we
>have to grovel for so long and pay 40M a pop for tired A-models out of a
>training wing, just to get them ? AFAIK one at least is ex Combat
>Lancer.
Poor negotiators I suspect. And maybe the Oz attitude toward US
nuclear sub visitations. Political again, not military.
>>
>If they had standing commitments to maintain a certain number for
>alerts, and were short of spares, that makes perfectly good sense to me.
No different than the F-4/F-15 communities.
>>
>Well, Vogt is in a "damned if you do, and damned if you don't" position
>here, isn't he ? These BTW were not off the cuff comments alone. That
>was a hefty article in which he elaborated on the various things the
>Vark did for the USAFE which other assets did not. In his opinion it was
>the only genuine all weather blind CAS asset he had for supporting
>ground forces. His primary interdiction force, and deep strike force.
That's why the 4-button gets paid the big bucks. And, in all my time
in USAFE (close to 8 years), I NEVER saw the 111 employed in the CAS
role, blind or otherwise.
g_al...@hotmail.com
Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
> Kurt Plummer wrote:
<snip>
> > > > If I remember right the 111 was the first to have it's ceiling
> > > > measured in mountain crossings and it was definitely in the Pikes Peak
> > > > range (14,100lbs) when fully fueled and weaponed. It may be that the
> > > > 111C and the FB have better performance here but it would still be
> > > > marginal with an internals on a boom for IFR which to me means you
> > > > takeoff light, refuel 'late and down' and then separate over the
> > > > Kattegut or similar right in plain sight of 'All God and Russia'.
> >
> > Errr, sorry, that should be '14,110ft'. Gunston's _F-111_ says: "With the
> > theoretical maximum load, the ceiling is so poor that the aircraft could not
> > clear the summit of Pike's Peak, Colorado, which is at 14,110ft (4,301m).
> > The FB was castigated back in the 1960s on this account but it is of no
> > importance to an aircraft whose operational life is centerred on altitudes
> > below 1,000ft (300m) and often below 300ft (90m)."
> >
> > Which is exactly where you DON'T want to be, today...
>
> Tactially going in with max payload is simply dumb and I always wonder
> about these publicity pics of any aircraft loaded to the gills with
> stores. What's the point ?
That "theoretical maximum load" was the nominal 8 pylon - 50 M117s one, not
exactly a realistic one.
> > > The Vark is actually not bad for gas burn since it is a very low drag
> > > airframe, and the TF30s while not spectacular are not that abysmal
> > > either, ie a decent bypass ratio for what they are intended to do. The
> > > Vark does carry about 34 klb of internal gas.
> >
> > > For the big one in Europe consider a loadout of 4 x external 600 USG and
> > > two pointy finned cans of sunshine in the internal bay, plus full
> > > internal gas. Go to TF at the FEBA and low ingress. Gas up over Holland.
> > > You'll get well into Eastern Poland.
> > >
> > > Going purely conventional about halfway into Poland or Czechoslovakia.
> > > Of course if you sortie from an FRG base with full gas that pushes the
> > > limits much further East.
> >
> > My _F-111_ spec page shows internals at 4,191 gallons for every letter up to
> > the E and 4,184 gallons for the F and 4,673 gallons for the FB. Around
> > 28,079lbs at 6.7 per for the middle figure. Another book (_Modern Attack
> > Aircraft_) says 32,715lbs for the A-E, 32,660lbs for the F, 36,477lbs for
> > the FB.
Kurt, we seem to have many of the same sources. I think you'll find that the
author of the ARCO book was English, and so are the (Imp.) gallons:-) Having
suffered from this problem before, I always check the liters/gallons ratio to
see _whose_ gallons are listed. I think you'll find that the tac versions
are around 32,6 - 32,700 lb. Oh, you should use 6.5 for JP-4 (for the
period), not 6.7.
Guy
g_al...@hotmail.com
<snip>
> >You are IMHO arguing the strike package vs penetrator argument. That is
> >one worth a thread within itself. The issue boils down to how much
> >hardware and how many bodies do you need to achieve a given P[k] against
> >a heavily defended aimpoint.
> >
> >With the Vark it is one A/C and subject to radius possibly zero tankers.
> >With a strike package you are talking Weasels, bombers, fighter CAP,
> >tankers, EB-66s etc. Whenever I do the sums the Vark comes up cheaper,
> >even if the platform is more expensive and complex.
>
> I'm certainly not introducing a package vs independent argument. I'm
> arguing employment. The 105 and F-4 carried a war plan mission called
> "selective release" for years during the cold war. A "sel-rel" was a
> single ship penetration mission. No problem.
>
> The 'Vark didn't come up cheaper in SEA. The problem with the night
> pentration mission was that the aircraft disappeared without a trace.
> One airplane/one target is supposed to mean you get the airplane back
> after the mission. With the -111 that often didn't happen.
> >
> >
> >The issue Ed is that the Vark could penetrate and survive under
> >conditions where the 105 could no longer. 200 AGL under zero visibility
> >conditions, anytime, anywhere.
>
> The war you fight is the war you've got. The 105 was penetrating and
> surviving in '65-'68 and it was penetrating and surviving in the
> Weasel role in '72-73. During both of those periods the -111 was
> penetrating and NOT surviving.
6 losses out of 4,030 sorties in 1972-73 (3,980 lo TF), 0.15% is not
SURVIVING?
>> >
> >
> >It is not a question of taking pride in it. I see it Ed from a systems
> >engineering perspective to be an inevitabl consequence of collapsing the
> >roles of several crewmembers into one.
> >
> >Consider that the Whizzo in the Vark is doing the same job as two
> >navigators and a DSO in the Buff. Even if you automate it as much as you
> >try, that is still three hats to wear, or rather bonedomes, so to say.
>
> The WSO in the -111 is doing half the job of the pilot in a 105 or
> 104, not the make-work tasks that had to be handled manually in the
> B-52. Modern technology makes it easier not harder. Complexity and
> workload do not indicate a superior system.
> >
<snip>
>
> >
> >See my earlier comments, Ed. The workload is to do with a pure blind
> >bombing at high speed 200 AGL profile. The TFR does auto pitchups but
> >does not manage energy for you so the pilot has to adjust the throttles
> >in anticipation of terrain elevation which he sees on a scope. This
> >could have been fully automated but for some reason they never did so.
>
> And, that mode of operation was virtually identical to what we did in
> the 105.
> >
Reviewing some history. The F-105 attempted to fly similar missions to the
F-111 in the 1967-68 period. These were Ryan's Raiders 'F' models, with a
radar mod and lots of tweaking to get max. resolution. This was being done
to develop tactics for a proposed deployment of _B-58s_ to SEAsia, to fly the
night, low-altitude precision mission (3-man crew). Radar resolution of the
F-105F wasn't adequate, and IIRC (I'll have to check), it was just too much
work for the aircrew in a high threat environment. Ed has said in the past
that the 105's systems gave adequate precision for nuke blind-bombing, but
not conventional munitions.
It was decided not to send the B-58s, sending the F-111s instead for Combat
Lancer. 3 a/c lost due probably to tail pivot breaks (the last one for sure).
There were also problems with the radar sensing monsoon rain as solid ground,
and commanding a pullup. Okay, teething problems, one airframe-related, the
other avionics. The first was fixed by 1972, not sure about the second.
1972, F-111s are back (2 Sq. of 24 a/c), suffering the lowest loss rate of
any bombing a/c going into NVN, with essentially no support. They were sent
in ahead of the Buffs during LBII to hit the airfields and SAM sites (some RR
yards too, apparently, which they apparently did quite effectively.
Considering that an F-111 could carry 24 M117s compared to a B-52G's 27 (no
wing pylons at the time), and looking at the support assets required for each
one, you could conclude that the G model Buff was a waste for that job (the
Big Belly 'D' was another matter).
My conclusion is that the F-111 was the 1960s-1970s version of stealth, with
all the benefits and disadvantages that accrue to being at the leading edge
of technology. Just as the 105 was when it was introduced, with similar
reliability problems. Or have we all forgotten the exgended period it took
to get the 105 into service, all the problems with the 'B' in the 4th, and
similar problems with the 'D' (Project "Look Alike" among many other
upgrades). The main difference is that the 105 got most of its bugs shaken
out in peacetime, while the 111 had to try and do it during a shooting war.
Jarmo Lindberg
>
> Carlo Kopp wrote:
> >
> > Sorry Tommi, that is what the makers told me quite some time ago.
> > Current build airframes of both types.
> >
> > BTW you'll pay cca USD 50M for any half decent twin engined fighter
> > these days. If you can get them cheaper, good luck to you !
>
> Jarmo might like to comment your intimation that F-18 isn't even
> half-decent...
It's decent alright, but then again I may be a bit biased after all
these years :-)
As I mentioned a bit earlier in another thread it was recently published
that the F/A-18 was the second cheapest from the list of: Mirage 2000-5,
JAS-39 Gripen, F/A-18 and F-16, but it was not stated, how the others
fared in the price competition and what was the actual price on each
fighter in 1992.
--
Jarmo Lindberg
Fighter Squadron 21: http://www.mil.fi/ftrsqn21/
Fighter Tactics Academy: http://www.sci.fi/~fta/welcome.htm
David CL Francis
<jmw...@goodnet.com> writes
>Except that the airplanes leaving Tripoli weighed a whole lot less
>than the airplanes going to Tripoli. Getting rid of the internal
>payload and the external stores does wonders for fuel economy. Of
>course a bomber with no bombs isn't good for much . That is why they
>only had be refueled twice on the way back, and the trip back will be
>almost entirely at altitude. Also you said Combat Radius. That means
>there and back, so 900nm straight ahead is 450nm combat radius.
The Vulcans that bombed (more or less) Port Stanley in the Falklands
from Ascension Island were refueled 4 (or was it 5?) times on the way
there but only once on the way back. 12 tanker aircraft were needed, 10
on the way out, and two on the way back. Tanker refueled tanker to
achieve this.
--
-----------------------------------------------------------
Francis E-Mail reply to <fli...@dclf.demon.co.uk>
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dweezil Dwarftosser
>Reviewing some history. The F-105 attempted to fly similar missions to the
>F-111 in the 1967-68 period. These were Ryan's Raiders 'F' models, with a
>radar mod and lots of tweaking to get max. resolution. This was being done
>to develop tactics for a proposed deployment of _B-58s_ to SEAsia, to fly the
>night, low-altitude precision mission (3-man crew). Radar resolution of the
>F-105F wasn't adequate, and IIRC (I'll have to check), it was just too much
>work for the aircrew in a high threat environment. Ed has said in the past
>that the 105's systems gave adequate precision for nuke blind-bombing, but
>not conventional munitions.
Just a quick note about the F-105's radar: the high-persistence
display scope made it look somewhat muddy. It's resolution was fine -
but the picture wasn't too good. The result, of course, was that the
driver had more difficulty picking out exact IPs along the way.
( The F-105 had no "B-scan"; it was PPI only - really unusual for A/A
modes...)
When I worked them, the TA pop-out reflector still worked, but the
tie-in to the autopilot was disconnected. This appeared to be the
"standard procedure" for fighter-type aircraft. Radar/autopilot
tie-ins survived until there was an accident where the cause was
determined to be a maintenance/equipment screw-up; then they were
modified "out of the loop". ( Happened on the early F-111s, too.)
- John T.
Kurt Plummer
I gotta disagree with some of what you say. If you read what I posted, the
USAF lost about six Varks in 4K missions. I don't think the 105 stands to
that record and if you switch to night profiles, I don't /think/ the 1-man
concept was sufficiently validated back then to handle it. You really want
more than a T/A capability you want an intelligent TFR sweep that can measure
'around as well as over' and at least maintain automatic skitoe clearance
as-while the pilot makes the route timing vs. sun-bloom considered choices.
I doubt mission planning is a considered factor here.
Put another way- I would NOT want to reopen the F-105 line in favor of the
111. I /might/ want to do something a bit better with the F-4 but if I did
it would be with the tacit acknowledgement that I -would- be giving up the
ranged speed of the Vark (at a time when the Sov's were introing the
SU-19/24?).
To me, that's a 250-350nm radii mission after low country tanking (you just
don't have to go deeper to find valid targets) of which the 120-150nm, -each
way- would be above the Mach.
IMO, the 111's best 70-80's era'd mission was loft and laydown with Big
Weapons.
Low Drag, no BRU, Much Punch. X4 .84 is a _very valid_ mission load against
road junction vehicle streams and will drop bridge spans if you can 'align
the long axes' with enough toss passes. It will /shred/ battlefield
formation armor in ways that .82 and cluster never will and in a low slant
runaway fashion that a Tack'ian LGB sling would never 'live to tell about'.
An F-4 OTOH could lift the weight but not the weapon length and certainly not
the fuel AND weapons AND sensors and would not toss as far or as accurate,
IMO. X vs. Ka and about 200knots worth of 'difference'.
Against this theory: Unfortunately we had no BSU-50 'way back when' and we
also didn't think that an interdictor needed ARM or AIM to penetrate the
'battlefield' (har de har har!) CAP's or to survive the roll away at the 5-8K
loft peak which to me is 'equally stupid' fighter-bravado A/A mission hogging
showing through.
Swivelling outer pylons are admittedly 'another facet' which would have been
needed consideration had we been more intelligent this way.
Uhhhm, I'm also not sure on the status of an good radar airburst fuze, I seem
to recall the FZU-39 as being somewhat 'inadequate' in DS.
As for CAS, well, they at least tried. Various platforms (including
other-11's) were tested with the 'AGM-65C/AS' variant of Maverick using the
Vark as the only decent (loitering, fast getaway) night zot capability.
Mind, I don't think much of the SALH mission profile against frontal targets
/either/ but it was at least 'contemplated' until we moved to the
'trisservice produciton seeker' program and stuck the Marines with the E.
There was also Pave Mover/LAD, which was another case of a good sensor/weapon
combo (FAR better than AVQ-26!) being abandoned because of the wrong platform
choice and a bunch of politics. In this case, I like to think it was because
the 111 was already a deep strike bird and nobody wanted to mess with
this-side-of-FEBA taskings. In all likelihood Boeing just got even.
Speaking of which, it's such a shame that even 'TACair' was so dominated by
the nuclear and 'deep mission' thinking that we never gave Real Thought to
how to stop the Russki 70K AFV fighting wedge -without- conventional ceiling
excession on the nukes. It can be done, it just has to be done by
artillery-level massed saturation fires from 'beyond counter battery'
distances/relocation speeds.
IMO, this as much as anything invalidates the "Gimme a B, Gimme an A, gimme
an F->B->A!" arguments. Letters are only letters, mission doctrine says what
and how you by their use. In a confined European war that can only be by
mutual -frontal- blitzkrieg.
While the F-111 has a very valid mission profile in the 'second echelon'
(50-100nm BAI) attack both it /and/ the F-4/16 'fighter for real' community
were waaaay over scheduled towards going deeper and meaner with central
heating or 'smart bomb' missions. Part of the AB2K crap no doubt, the very
definition of 'flexible-response' proves we didn't think it would really
work.
IMO etc.- KP
Carlo Kopp
>
> Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >>
> >
> >But I disagree with your arguments concerning effectiveness. The
> >aircraft was not built to do the missions which you used to fly in the
> >F-4, even if it was sold as such. It was designed to do what a Buff did,
> >on a smaller scale but with much higher performance/survivability. Go in
> >deep under any weather day/night and accurately blind bomb by radar in a
> >single pass, with no supporting assets, from 200 AGL.
>
> I think you need to revisit the McNamara years and review the original
> contract specs. The 111 was certainly not a B-52 replacement, it was a
> replacement for the tactical ground attack systems of the era such as
> the F-100/104/105. It was to have significant nuclear strike
> capability, of course, but it also was to carry a heavy tactical
> conventional load.
Ed, I did not say it was a direct Buff replacement :-) It employed the
same penetration model as the Buff did for strategic deep ops, which was
to go in very low and use EW to frustrate engagements by SAMs, AAA and
fighters.
Let us not disagree about definitions. The issue is the penetration
model. The F-111 extended the penetration model of the Buff to include
elements of the F-105 model, or vice versa extended the F-105 model to
include elements of the Buff model. Its design optimisation is for this
purpose, go in fast, low, using EW and drop bombs.
The F-100, F-104 were primarily air-air assets by design, shifted into
strike roles when their air air capability fell behind the BVR capable
F-4. The F-105 was designed to drop bombs, but had a substantial by
period standards air-air capability as you have always pointed out.
The F-111's air air capability was secondary if not tertiary to its air
ground capabilities. The radar in the A-model suite had one Sidewinder
acquisition mode, and one gun ranging mode, if my memory isn't failing
me here. It could only carry the AIM-9, and that to the exclusion of
air-ground stores or gas on those stations.
The only TAC asset which it bears any comparison to is the F-105. It
extended the F-105 penetration envelope and extended its lethality by
higher accuracy and higher/payload range.
>
> It was only when it failed to meet TAC operational requirements that
> the "FB" version was generated to keep the Ft Worth plant
> operating--once again the aircraft was a political product not a
> military one.
That is a good point but my reading suggests that the SAC purchase was
intended to be a gap filler between the B-58's hurried retirment, and
the LRCA B-1A deployment. Since the latter fell through (was it 244
airframes originally planned ?), the FB-111A remained.
I suspect that situation was a little more complex politically than you
are suggesting here. In any event, SAC's buy was only cca 100 airframes,
most of the Varks (~140 A, ~100 E, ~100 D, ~100 F) went to TAC.
> >
> >You are IMHO arguing the strike package vs penetrator argument. That is
> >one worth a thread within itself. The issue boils down to how much
> >hardware and how many bodies do you need to achieve a given P[k] against
> >a heavily defended aimpoint.
> >
> >With the Vark it is one A/C and subject to radius possibly zero tankers.
> >With a strike package you are talking Weasels, bombers, fighter CAP,
> >tankers, EB-66s etc. Whenever I do the sums the Vark comes up cheaper,
> >even if the platform is more expensive and complex.
>
> I'm certainly not introducing a package vs independent argument. I'm
> arguing employment. The 105 and F-4 carried a war plan mission called
> "selective release" for years during the cold war. A "sel-rel" was a
> single ship penetration mission. No problem.
>
> The 'Vark didn't come up cheaper in SEA. The problem with the night
> pentration mission was that the aircraft disappeared without a trace.
> One airplane/one target is supposed to mean you get the airplane back
> after the mission. With the -111 that often didn't happen.
The statistics of small sample sizes aside, Ed, I suspect that the
F-111s did better than the F-105s in that department, ie survivability
vs sortie count, by a decent margin.
Let's see: F-111A losses per sortie, cca 0.2% (Guy says even better).
AFAIK combat losses to causes other than accidental were surmised to be
random AAA hits, the one surviving crew certainly claims a AAA hit.
F-105 losses per sortie - I have yet to see some solid statistics.
F-105s were being lost to MiGs, AAA and SAMs, and by the latter phase of
the war the 105 was being used mainly as a Weasel.
So the question I will ask Ed is a simple one, ie what was the per
sortie loss rate of the 105 in 65, 66, 67 etc ?
> >
> >
> >The issue Ed is that the Vark could penetrate and survive under
> >conditions where the 105 could no longer. 200 AGL under zero visibility
> >conditions, anytime, anywhere.
>
> The war you fight is the war you've got. The 105 was penetrating and
> surviving in '65-'68 and it was penetrating and surviving in the
> Weasel role in '72-73. During both of those periods the -111 was
> penetrating and NOT surviving.
Given the number of 105s lost in these campaigns, Ed, I am very
sceptical indeed. The F-111s had AFAIK the lowest loss rate per sortie
of any of the USAF's in theatre tacair assets.
> >> >
> >
> >It is not a question of taking pride in it. I see it Ed from a systems
> >engineering perspective to be an inevitabl consequence of collapsing the
> >roles of several crewmembers into one.
> >
> >Consider that the Whizzo in the Vark is doing the same job as two
> >navigators and a DSO in the Buff. Even if you automate it as much as you
> >try, that is still three hats to wear, or rather bonedomes, so to say.
>
> The WSO in the -111 is doing half the job of the pilot in a 105 or
> 104, not the make-work tasks that had to be handled manually in the
> B-52. Modern technology makes it easier not harder. Complexity and
> workload do not indicate a superior system.
The difference Ed is in the profile, the Vark went in lower and was a
more precise bombing platform.
> >
>
> >Sounds to me Ed like these were one way ticket sorties :-( On that basis
> >a Vark sortiing from the FRG could go very deep.
>
> Every line I sat was recoverable UNLESS you were launched to orbit and
> held until "R" fuel. Then it meant you had the gas for the escape
> maneuver and nothing more.
Even the _really_ deep sorties ? Were you expecting to go in and out at
500 AGL, ie Lo-Lo-Lo all the way ?
> >> >
>
> >
> >See my earlier comments, Ed. The workload is to do with a pure blind
> >bombing at high speed 200 AGL profile. The TFR does auto pitchups but
> >does not manage energy for you so the pilot has to adjust the throttles
> >in anticipation of terrain elevation which he sees on a scope. This
> >could have been fully automated but for some reason they never did so.
>
> And, that mode of operation was virtually identical to what we did in
> the 105.
Similar but not identical. The Vark bomb nav system and autopilot were
designed to go 100% blind in TF at 200 AGL. Could you do that in a 105 ?
By your our admission you were limited to TA and 500 AGL penetration.
That means your exposure to SAMs and AAA is much higher, by whatever the
horizon is at 500 AGL.
> >
> >The Whizzo is busiest since he has got to handle a temperamental high
> >drift (then) INS (this means frequent radar fixes off known aimpoints to
> >bound the INS error)
>
> (This means not as good as the INS in the F-4???)
Cumulative drift is a function of mission duration, Ed. Both the F-105
and F-4 were shorter ranging than the Vark. Lower fuel fraction, smaller
airframes.
>
> > and do the radar blind bomb delivery,
>
> No problem for the single operator in the 105.
But how accurately, Ed, that is the question. Are you claiming here that
you could deliver your bombs just as accurately in a 500 AGL 600 KTAS
blind delivery ? Radar aperture size aside, permit me to be a little
sceptical here :-)
>
> >choose ingress and egress routes between hills,
>
> A function of pre-flight planning.
Unless you find a particular route blocked by a SAM system that recon
didn't show up, then you are rerouting and that can get busy as we will
all agree.
>
> >do all of the standard nav
> >waypoint work,
>
> Single seat pilots don't??
>
> >manage the stores,
>
> Like setting the weapons switches, changing fuel tanks, ....Still a
> single pilot managable task.
>
> >watch the RHAWS,
>
> Been there, done that too.
>
> > manage the ECM as
> >required and deploy expendables. Very busy boys.
>
> Maybe "boys" are the problem. Use men. :-))
Ed, this is a very unkind line here, dare I say it. They had a more
difficult mission profile flying a decent bit lower, and I suspect
probably faster as well. I know you 105 drivers were good, but you can't
beat a machine for low level auto TF.
Why weren't you F-105 guys flying night low level TF bombing sorties at
200 AGL 100% of the time in 1965/66 to avoid those MiGs and SAMs ? All
the evidence I have seen suggests mostly packages at medium altitude by
day, with the odd B-66 led radar bombing sorting. Could this have
something perhaps to do with accuracy of delivery ?
> >
> >I know you did all of this on your own in the 105, but the difference
> >was that the Vark was designed to do it in a higher threat density
> >environment and survive. Go in just as fast but even lower, 100% blind.
>
> See my comments about high threat density and survival. The 105s did,
> the 111 didn't in SEA.
I am deeply unconvinced, Ed. Unless every statistic published is a total
fabrication, the Varks did reasonably well for combat losses. The Vark
stats are skewed by several structural failures in the early
deployments, and alleged energy mismanagement in TF on some missions.
For an aircraft that got pushed into production befor EMD was completed,
that is not what I call a genuine combat loss in the sense of taking a
hit and going in as a result.
> >
>
> >The argument I heard for the UK deployment was keeping the assets out of
> >easy reach of Sovbloc tacair and SRBMs. That makes good sense
> >strategically. You would not keep your big stick in a place where it
> >could be easily taken out with a pre-emptive hit.
>
> The platform that carries the B-61 is irrelevant. It's still a B-61
> upon arrival. The fact is that the USAFE 111's weren't supportable at
> the end of the supply string.
Every USAF Vark type I know places that problem firmly in the domain of
undersupply of spares, which BTW caused all of that F-15 pain later on.
> >> >
>
> >If the aircraft was of such low operational value/merit, Ed, why did we
> >have to grovel for so long and pay 40M a pop for tired A-models out of a
> >training wing, just to get them ? AFAIK one at least is ex Combat
> >Lancer.
>
> Poor negotiators I suspect. And maybe the Oz attitude toward US
> nuclear sub visitations. Political again, not military.
We have never had any disagreements with the US, at least not overtly,
over USN onboard specials. That, Ed, is a Kiwi speciality. Not quite the
same thing here.
We have been as good an ally as the US has ever had and I take exception
to that comment. When everybody else abandoned you in Vietnam, we were
there to help out, at considerable political cost internationally and
domestically, I might add here.
> >>
>
> >If they had standing commitments to maintain a certain number for
> >alerts, and were short of spares, that makes perfectly good sense to me.
>
> No different than the F-4/F-15 communities.
> >>
>
> >Well, Vogt is in a "damned if you do, and damned if you don't" position
> >here, isn't he ? These BTW were not off the cuff comments alone. That
> >was a hefty article in which he elaborated on the various things the
> >Vark did for the USAFE which other assets did not. In his opinion it was
> >the only genuine all weather blind CAS asset he had for supporting
> >ground forces. His primary interdiction force, and deep strike force.
>
> That's why the 4-button gets paid the big bucks. And, in all my time
> in USAFE (close to 8 years), I NEVER saw the 111 employed in the CAS
> role, blind or otherwise.
> >
Well, the aircraft has the capability, and all weather CAS was part of
its tasking down here, and we have the then commander of USAFE putting
it down on the public record.
Sorry Ed but this is not the story I hear from the Vark community.
Cheers,
Carlo
Yama
>
> As I mentioned a bit earlier in another thread it was recently published
> that the F/A-18 was the second cheapest from the list of: Mirage 2000-5,
> JAS-39 Gripen, F/A-18 and F-16, but it was not stated, how the others
> fared in the price competition and what was the actual price on each
> fighter in 1992.
Actually this is not that recent information, it was published in
1992...IIRC F-16 was cheapest, then came F-18, Gripen/Mirage and
MiG-29 was most expensive(!). Hornet had lowest lifetime costs.
Ed Rasimus
>Just a quick note about the F-105's radar: the high-persistence
>display scope made it look somewhat muddy. It's resolution was fine -
>but the picture wasn't too good. The result, of course, was that the
>driver had more difficulty picking out exact IPs along the way.
>( The F-105 had no "B-scan"; it was PPI only - really unusual for A/A
>modes...)
I'll have to disagree, particularly if comparing the 105 ground map
modes to the F-4's rather dismal mapping presentations. The 105 had
two transmit options, a "pencil" beam and a "spoil" mode. For low
graze angle presentation the spoil mode was preferred, while for high
altitude mapping the pencil beam provided a very narrow scan and
consequently a reasonable resolution.
Interestingly the 105 simulator (in the days before computer digital
map generation) used a large table with a gantry mounted closed
circuit monochrome TV overhead. As the simulator "flew" the gantry
followed the course and the TV picture was presented in the cockpit as
"radar."
>
>When I worked them, the TA pop-out reflector still worked, but the
>tie-in to the autopilot was disconnected. This appeared to be the
>"standard procedure" for fighter-type aircraft. Radar/autopilot
>tie-ins survived until there was an accident where the cause was
>determined to be a maintenance/equipment screw-up; then they were
>modified "out of the loop".
An autopilot tie to the tie must have been something for much later
than when I was flying the airplane. The autopilot link was always
viewed as the major difference between the 105 and the 111. To do low
level TA work in the 105, you flew on "altitude hold" on the autopilot
and manipulated the tilt and gain on the radarscope manually. If an
obstacle appeared on the centerline/flightpath, you switched from
altitude hold to "mach hold" and advanced the throttle causing a
constant A/S climb until the center cursor was again clear, then you
re-engaged altitude hold. If the center and most of the scope was
clear you reversed the procedure and descended to stay at minimum
preplanned altitude.
The only radar related autopilot maneuver when I was in the aircraft
was the "autoss" function. When you depressed the "pickle" button
based on radar cursors over the target or offset aimpoint the toss
bomb computer would command a pull-up at the appropriate range to toss
the bomb to the target and also provide safe separation from the
blast. If allowed to complete the maneuver, the autopilot flew through
an Immelman for an over-the-shoulder delivery. This was, of course,
nuclear only.
Ed Rasimus
>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>>
>
>> It was only when it failed to meet TAC operational requirements that
>> the "FB" version was generated to keep the Ft Worth plant
>> operating--once again the aircraft was a political product not a
>> military one.
>
>That is a good point but my reading suggests that the SAC purchase was
>intended to be a gap filler between the B-58's hurried retirment, and
>the LRCA B-1A deployment. Since the latter fell through (was it 244
>airframes originally planned ?), the FB-111A remained.
Every political decision (particularly if involves military
acquistion) will usually generate a related military requirement
rationale. B-58s went away because of maintainability issues and B-1As
demise was accurately forecast, so what better way to keep John Tower
happy and simultaneously give TAC some relief from all these damn
swing-wings being stuffed down their throat.
>
>
>The statistics of small sample sizes aside, Ed, I suspect that the
>F-111s did better than the F-105s in that department, ie survivability
>vs sortie count, by a decent margin.
>
>Let's see: F-111A losses per sortie, cca 0.2% (Guy says even better).
>AFAIK combat losses to causes other than accidental were surmised to be
>random AAA hits, the one surviving crew certainly claims a AAA hit.
>
>F-105 losses per sortie - I have yet to see some solid statistics.
>F-105s were being lost to MiGs, AAA and SAMs, and by the latter phase of
>the war the 105 was being used mainly as a Weasel.
>
>So the question I will ask Ed is a simple one, ie what was the per
>sortie loss rate of the 105 in 65, 66, 67 etc ?
In '66 when I was flying F-105Ds out of Korat, Newsweek magazine
published the alarming statistic that a 105 pilot was shot down every
65 missions. That seems reasonable based on the
unofficial/unscientific stats that my room-mate and I kept which on
the one hand showed that Korat lost 110% of the assigned aircraft over
the six months we were there--we were continually being back-filled by
the drawdown in Europe and TAC 105 units. On the other a review of
pilot survival rates showed 60% of the folks starting a 100 mission
tour were shot down.
BUT, if we are going to talk loss rates in '65-'67 than we should
compare stats for 111 losses in that period. That gives us a 33% loss
of the 111s deployed for the period. (2 out of 6 UE).
If we want to compare '72-'73 operations then we are into low loss
rates all around. During the year I was at Korat in the F-4 we lost
less than a half-dozen airplanes downtown and IIRC, only two 105Gs.
The difference was tactics, EW, radar coverage and SEAD effectiveness.
>> >
>>
>> Every line I sat was recoverable UNLESS you were launched to orbit and
>> held until "R" fuel. Then it meant you had the gas for the escape
>> maneuver and nothing more.
>
>Even the _really_ deep sorties ? Were you expecting to go in and out at
>500 AGL, ie Lo-Lo-Lo all the way ?
No, none of the lines were lo-lo-lo. But, neither were the 111 lines
out of the UK.
>> >> >
>> >The Whizzo is busiest since he has got to handle a temperamental high
>> >drift (then) INS (this means frequent radar fixes off known aimpoints to
>> >bound the INS error)
>>
>> (This means not as good as the INS in the F-4???)
>
>Cumulative drift is a function of mission duration, Ed. Both the F-105
>and F-4 were shorter ranging than the Vark. Lower fuel fraction, smaller
>airframes.
That doesn't work out because of in-flight refueling. Although the 111
has longer stand-alone range, the 105 and F-4 both flew as long or
longer missions in SEA. I've flown six hour sorties in the F-4 and
five hour sorties in the 105. Updating of the doppler nav could be
done visually overflying a known position, by radar--fixing a radar
return with the cursor, or by slewing present position to a TACAN
radial/dme. It was an operation requiring less than a minute. Updating
the INS in the Phantom was seldom required (thanks again, Dweezil.)
>>
>> > and do the radar blind bomb delivery,
>>
>> No problem for the single operator in the 105.
>
>But how accurately, Ed, that is the question. Are you claiming here that
>you could deliver your bombs just as accurately in a 500 AGL 600 KTAS
>blind delivery ? Radar aperture size aside, permit me to be a little
>sceptical here :-)
Blind radar qualification criteria for LADD (toss) was 1000 feet, for
laydown was 500. Typically qualified crews could keep the errors to
less than half that. The 111 is better.
>>
>> >choose ingress and egress routes between hills,
>>
>> A function of pre-flight planning.
>
>Unless you find a particular route blocked by a SAM system that recon
>didn't show up, then you are rerouting and that can get busy as we will
>all agree.
That doesn't change for any tactical system. Target study, situational
awareness, employment of radar/INS/GPS and good ol' fashioned pilotage
make it work for everyone in the tac world. You don't need a dedicated
fighter-gator to be advising the pilot which way to turn.
>>
>> >required and deploy expendables. Very busy boys.
>>
>> Maybe "boys" are the problem. Use men. :-))
>
>Ed, this is a very unkind line here, dare I say it. They had a more
>difficult mission profile flying a decent bit lower, and I suspect
>probably faster as well. I know you 105 drivers were good, but you can't
>beat a machine for low level auto TF.
Please note the emoticon at the end of the line.
>
>Why weren't you F-105 guys flying night low level TF bombing sorties at
>200 AGL 100% of the time in 1965/66 to avoid those MiGs and SAMs ? All
>the evidence I have seen suggests mostly packages at medium altitude by
>day, with the odd B-66 led radar bombing sorting. Could this have
>something perhaps to do with accuracy of delivery ?
It has to do with modifying tactics to fit the threat. Low altitude
ingress was the pattern during the first year of NVN operations. By
mid-'66 it became apparent that medium altitude ingress allowed better
navigation, earlier target acquisition, avoidance of small-arms/light
AAA, and best maneuver space for SAM avoidance. It also allowed better
mutual support (not a 111 requirement), and easier pop-ups to high
angle weapon delivery roll-ins. Low altitude was virtually abandoned
except for a few die-hards (pun not intended) who insisted on lo-lo
profiles.
David E. Oakley
Carlo Kopp wrote:
> snip
> The Vark was always a bit of a "cultural orphan" in the USAF scheme of
> things, too big heavy and bomberish for the TAC guys, and too pointy,
> small, fighterish and shortlegged for the SAC guys. The perfect
> political outcast :-)
> >
>
snip
> Cheers,
>
> Carlo
Carlo
In addition to what you say above, I think that peoples opinions are strongly
effected by their own personnal experiences. In my own case, I was involved in the
first attempted deployment of the F-111 to SEA. My opionion of the F-111 is based on
that experience. Conversations that I have had with F-111 crews do not support my
opionion. There for, I will concede that possibily they managed to make an omlet with
the broken eggs that they had. 8-)
I don't think that it would be possible to change the opinion of anyone that had
first hand experience with the F-111 in the 1967-68 time frame. 8-)
David
g_al...@hotmail.com
"David E. Oakley" <david....@lmco.com>
wrote:
And if Thud drivers' first combat experience had
been during the 1958-1964 period, before
"Optimize," "Look Alike," and Safety Packages I
and II, I suspect they never would have
overcome their earlier reputation. I've seen
150+ MMH/FH quoted, chafing of fuel and control
lines leading to fires and crashes, water
leakeage causing innumerable shorts, weak
bulkheads needing reinforcement, plus many
others, all combined with an airframe that was
as hard to work on as a Lightning because
Alexander Kartveli hated to put access panels on
it. Once the Thud got its bugs shaken out, lo and
behold, an Iron Butterfly. Much the same is true
for the 111. It definitely wasn't mature in 1968,
anymore than the F-105D was in 1961-64.
LesB
>If we could find someone to bind this thread, I think we could publish it!
I don't. I get seduced into opening it every night just in case
someone actually mentions a Canberra!
I mean, the subject line says Canberra. But it is all about 'Varks
and other related bits of US brickwork.
Its not fair really. I shall complain to somebody. . . just as soon
as I've finished this glass of Laphroaig.
To level things up - the Canberra is probably the most elegant jet
aircraft ever, with fit-for-purpose oozing from its shape and a
performance in its day that could run rings around contemp fighters.
Oh, and the current PR.9s are the fastest non re-heat jets in the
world!!!
Now, shall I have another single malt before looking for someone to
complain to . . . . . . . %-}
LesB
Tex Bennett
>Donald Harstad wrote:
>
>
>Its not fair really. I shall complain to somebody. . . just as soon
>as I've finished this glass of Laphroaig.
You are a man of taste Les - especially for an ex metal basher :)
Islay - my favourite whisky
Dweezil Dwarftosser
>If we want to compare '72-'73 operations then we are into low loss
>rates all around. During the year I was at Korat in the F-4 we lost
>less than a half-dozen airplanes downtown and IIRC, only two 105Gs.
I'm amazed; during my tour at Korat ('70/'71), this is almost exactly
the number and type of jets we lost to enemy fire...and those guys had
only two "trips downtown" during that time - with no losses over NVN.
( One of them was the Son Tay raid. )
- John T.
Ed Rasimus
>Its not fair really. I shall complain to somebody. . . just as soon
>as I've finished this glass of Laphroaig.
>
--snip--
>
>Now, shall I have another single malt before looking for someone to
>complain to . . . . . . . %-}
Ahhh, my friend, the conversations we could have..."of sailing ships
and sealing wax, of cabbages and kings"
I've you've got a dram of something other than an Islay, I'll stay a
bit longer.
Ed Rasimus
>And if Thud drivers' first combat experience had
>been during the 1958-1964 period, before
>"Optimize," "Look Alike," and Safety Packages I
>and II, I suspect they never would have
>overcome their earlier reputation. ----
SNIP
>----for the 111. It definitely wasn't mature in 1968,
>anymore than the F-105D was in 1961-64.
Couldn't a said it better.
LesB
>Ahhh, my friend, the conversations we could have..."of sailing ships
>and sealing wax, of cabbages and kings"
>
>I've you've got a dram of something other than an Islay, I'll stay a
>bit longer.
Well, lets see now Ed <looks over at the whiskys - all single malts> -
bottle of Talisker? a fine single from Skye. An Oban - quiet, smooth
but satisfying. The Springbank - light hay colouring, great nose - but
don't try to stand after two of them. Oh, and The Mcallan. . . and a
21 year old Springbank -dark and sultry - special occasions only.
There's a Jura as well, but its not up to much, visitors get that ;-).
No, mostly its the Islays. Lagavulian, Laphroaig and Coal Ila.
I've even been to all the Islay distilleries, Talisker as well, and
Oban . . . and I grew up in Campbeltown, home of Springbank.
Canberras aren't *all* there is, especially at my age.
Have a quick visit to my whisky site:
http://netcomuk.co.uk/~lesb/whisky.html
LesB
{take out one to mail}
EE Canberra Tribute Site
http://www.netcomuk.co.uk/~lesb/canberra.html
Steve Hix
(LesB) wrote:
> Donald Harstad wrote:
>
> >If we could find someone to bind this thread, I think we could publish it!
>
> I don't. I get seduced into opening it every night just in case
> someone actually mentions a Canberra!
>
> I mean, the subject line says Canberra. But it is all about 'Varks
> and other related bits of US brickwork.
>
> Its not fair really. I shall complain to somebody. . . just as soon
> as I've finished this glass of Laphroaig.
>
> To level things up - the Canberra is probably the most elegant jet
> aircraft ever, with fit-for-purpose oozing from its shape and a
> performance in its day that could run rings around contemp fighters.
>
> Oh, and the current PR.9s are the fastest non re-heat jets in the
> world!!!
>
> Now, shall I have another single malt before looking for someone to
> complain to . . . . . . . %-}
If I could afford a warbird, I know what it would be.
Heck, I'd settle for a B-57, if that was all that was
available.
You're welcome my glass, btw...I don't drink. (Well, I *do*,
actually, but you know what I mean. Permanent Designated
Driver, and all.)
Ed Rasimus
>Well, lets see now Ed <looks over at the whiskys - all single malts> -
>bottle of Talisker? a fine single from Skye. An Oban - quiet, smooth
>but satisfying. The Springbank - light hay colouring, great nose - but
>don't try to stand after two of them. Oh, and The Mcallan. . . and a
>21 year old Springbank -dark and sultry - special occasions only.
>There's a Jura as well, but its not up to much, visitors get that ;-).
>No, mostly its the Islays. Lagavulian, Laphroaig and Coal Ila.
The Oban will do, or maybe the Talisker. No, let me have a taste of
the McCallan, is it 12 or 18....no, not the 25, save that for a great
occasion or maybe at our age, don't save it.
The Islays are just too smoky for my plebian palette.
Gooney Bird
The Thud and Pig were BOTH immmature for the first few yrs of their
service lifes...!!!! reguardless of combat or peacetime service ok!
END OF ISSUE
Phil
Carlo Kopp
Aah, you are missing the point Phil, this gives us a decent opportunity
to have a good argument ! Think about all of the fun everybody has had !
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
>
> Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
> >>
> >
>
> >> It was only when it failed to meet TAC operational requirements that
> >> the "FB" version was generated to keep the Ft Worth plant
> >> operating--once again the aircraft was a political product not a
> >> military one.
> >
> >That is a good point but my reading suggests that the SAC purchase was
> >intended to be a gap filler between the B-58's hurried retirment, and
> >the LRCA B-1A deployment. Since the latter fell through (was it 244
> >airframes originally planned ?), the FB-111A remained.
>
> Every political decision (particularly if involves military
> acquistion) will usually generate a related military requirement
> rationale. B-58s went away because of maintainability issues and B-1As
> demise was accurately forecast, so what better way to keep John Tower
> happy and simultaneously give TAC some relief from all these damn
> swing-wings being stuffed down their throat.
Well, Ed, they did keep buying Varks until 1977 or so, and kept
rebuilding wrecks damaged in accidents, back to flying condition. So
there must have been some reason behind it other than porkbarrel alone
:-)
> >
> >
> >The statistics of small sample sizes aside, Ed, I suspect that the
> >F-111s did better than the F-105s in that department, ie survivability
> >vs sortie count, by a decent margin.
> >
> >Let's see: F-111A losses per sortie, cca 0.2% (Guy says even better).
> >AFAIK combat losses to causes other than accidental were surmised to be
> >random AAA hits, the one surviving crew certainly claims a AAA hit.
> >
> >F-105 losses per sortie - I have yet to see some solid statistics.
> >F-105s were being lost to MiGs, AAA and SAMs, and by the latter phase of
> >the war the 105 was being used mainly as a Weasel.
> >
> >So the question I will ask Ed is a simple one, ie what was the per
> >sortie loss rate of the 105 in 65, 66, 67 etc ?
>
> In '66 when I was flying F-105Ds out of Korat, Newsweek magazine
> published the alarming statistic that a 105 pilot was shot down every
> 65 missions. That seems reasonable based on the
> unofficial/unscientific stats that my room-mate and I kept which on
> the one hand showed that Korat lost 110% of the assigned aircraft over
> the six months we were there--we were continually being back-filled by
> the drawdown in Europe and TAC 105 units. On the other a review of
> pilot survival rates showed 60% of the folks starting a 100 mission
> tour were shot down.
>
> BUT, if we are going to talk loss rates in '65-'67 than we should
> compare stats for 111 losses in that period. That gives us a 33% loss
> of the 111s deployed for the period. (2 out of 6 UE).
Losses, Ed, mostly attributed to a wing box failure which killed
aircraft in the US as well. Not a particularly useful example to use,
especially given the small sample size involved.
The aircraft was simply not ready for operational use at that stage. It
was a mistake to deploy them.
>
> If we want to compare '72-'73 operations then we are into low loss
> rates all around. During the year I was at Korat in the F-4 we lost
> less than a half-dozen airplanes downtown and IIRC, only two 105Gs.
Indeed, which gets back to the issue of relevance in using the SEA
deployments as a metric of effectiveness. This is why I consider only DS
to be a serious measure, since the aircraft was by then mature, tactics
and doctrine mature, and a sufficiently large number of sorties logged
to get some statistical confidence.
In the early phase of DS the Varks and Tornados were both tasked largely
with shutting down the airfields. Quite a few Tornados went in due to
SAM and AAA (and accidents). No Varks went in. You could hardly call the
AAA and point defence envrionment surrounding Iraqi airfields in the
beginning of the conflict lightweight.
>
> The difference was tactics, EW, radar coverage and SEAD effectiveness.
The Varks were also a little more mature as well by then. BTW I
understand that quite a few of their sorties involved dropping CBUs on
SAM and AAA sites before the Buffs rolled in to deliver. I am sure Guy
or Kurt will have the stats.
> >> >
> >>
> >> Every line I sat was recoverable UNLESS you were launched to orbit and
> >> held until "R" fuel. Then it meant you had the gas for the escape
> >> maneuver and nothing more.
> >
> >Even the _really_ deep sorties ? Were you expecting to go in and out at
> >500 AGL, ie Lo-Lo-Lo all the way ?
>
> No, none of the lines were lo-lo-lo. But, neither were the 111 lines
> out of the UK.
The difference is that the Vark carried much more gas so that it could
cover a much bigger distance on any like profile. A Hi LO LO Hi with a
fairly short low segment allows it to cause turmoil in ByeloRussia or
the Ukraine, assuming the SAMs don't get it inbound.
In this sense I am curious as to how you guys planned to get in with
100s, 104s and 105s tasked with "central heating" missions, Ed. If you
were planning to go deep, Hi-LO-Lo-Hi, how did you plan to survive the
SAM/AAA belts along the DDR/CSR frontiers ?
Would you be flying a Hi-Lo-Hi-Lo-toss-Lo-Hi-Lo-Hi type profile ?
> >> >> >
>
> >> >The Whizzo is busiest since he has got to handle a temperamental high
> >> >drift (then) INS (this means frequent radar fixes off known aimpoints to
> >> >bound the INS error)
> >>
> >> (This means not as good as the INS in the F-4???)
> >
> >Cumulative drift is a function of mission duration, Ed. Both the F-105
> >and F-4 were shorter ranging than the Vark. Lower fuel fraction, smaller
> >airframes.
>
> That doesn't work out because of in-flight refueling. Although the 111
> has longer stand-alone range, the 105 and F-4 both flew as long or
> longer missions in SEA. I've flown six hour sorties in the F-4 and
> five hour sorties in the 105. Updating of the doppler nav could be
> done visually overflying a known position, by radar--fixing a radar
> return with the cursor, or by slewing present position to a TACAN
> radial/dme. It was an operation requiring less than a minute. Updating
> the INS in the Phantom was seldom required (thanks again, Dweezil.)
AFAIK Varks did often gas up on the way home, but the idea was to go in
and out if possible on internal gas only.
One of the problems the Varks had was that they did the emcon thing in a
big way and thus if they got into trouble, nobody usually knew where it
happened.
> >>
> >> > and do the radar blind bomb delivery,
> >>
> >> No problem for the single operator in the 105.
> >
> >But how accurately, Ed, that is the question. Are you claiming here that
> >you could deliver your bombs just as accurately in a 500 AGL 600 KTAS
> >blind delivery ? Radar aperture size aside, permit me to be a little
> >sceptical here :-)
>
> Blind radar qualification criteria for LADD (toss) was 1000 feet, for
> laydown was 500. Typically qualified crews could keep the errors to
> less than half that. The 111 is better.
Well thanks, Ed. Varks could do with the old analogue nav attack a level
laydown 100% blind delivery with a CEP cca 200 feet or less, I have been
told. A really good whizzo could get close to 150 ft 100% blind in TF, I
have been told. That's a big difference in P[k] for dropping iron, if
you look at the fact that the delivery footprint goes up with the
squares of CEP.
With the new digital bomb nav, dual INS, GPS on our birds, or dual
INS/Doppler on the Gs, they won't tell me what the CEPs are. However,
they did tell me that they had to throw away most of the maps they used
since the nav attack is more accurate !
>
> >>
> >> >choose ingress and egress routes between hills,
> >>
> >> A function of pre-flight planning.
> >
> >Unless you find a particular route blocked by a SAM system that recon
> >didn't show up, then you are rerouting and that can get busy as we will
> >all agree.
>
> That doesn't change for any tactical system. Target study, situational
> awareness, employment of radar/INS/GPS and good ol' fashioned pilotage
> make it work for everyone in the tac world. You don't need a dedicated
> fighter-gator to be advising the pilot which way to turn.
Feedback I have had from the Vark crews is that the Whizzo is required
since the 200 AGL TF keeps the pilot very busy watching the engines and
managing energy, ie a loss in power, even partial, requires immediate
pull up to clear terrain. Since there is no auto-throttle, loss of
thrust does not produce the auto-pullup as a TFR fault does.
> >>
> >> >required and deploy expendables. Very busy boys.
> >>
> >> Maybe "boys" are the problem. Use men. :-))
> >
> >Ed, this is a very unkind line here, dare I say it. They had a more
> >difficult mission profile flying a decent bit lower, and I suspect
> >probably faster as well. I know you 105 drivers were good, but you can't
> >beat a machine for low level auto TF.
>
> Please note the emoticon at the end of the line.
I suppose that gets you off the hook :-)
> >
> >Why weren't you F-105 guys flying night low level TF bombing sorties at
> >200 AGL 100% of the time in 1965/66 to avoid those MiGs and SAMs ? All
> >the evidence I have seen suggests mostly packages at medium altitude by
> >day, with the odd B-66 led radar bombing sorting. Could this have
> >something perhaps to do with accuracy of delivery ?
>
> It has to do with modifying tactics to fit the threat. Low altitude
> ingress was the pattern during the first year of NVN operations. By
> mid-'66 it became apparent that medium altitude ingress allowed better
> navigation, earlier target acquisition, avoidance of small-arms/light
> AAA, and best maneuver space for SAM avoidance. It also allowed better
> mutual support (not a 111 requirement), and easier pop-ups to high
> angle weapon delivery roll-ins. Low altitude was virtually abandoned
> except for a few die-hards (pun not intended) who insisted on lo-lo
> profiles.
>
It would seem to me that the driving issue must have been delivery
accuracy, accepting that all of the other factors were valid. If your
CEPs for a low level laydown were 500 ft, that pushes up your required
sortie count for anything other than a factory sized target.
Small arms is an issue for low level ingress, I won't dispute that, but
if you can go in at 200 AGL you have shrunk their envelope and warning
time considerably.
If the TFR facility on the 105 had every worked properly perhaps history
would have been quite different.
What is the story on the TF in the F-105 ? I gather it had to be turned
off.
Cheers,
Carlo
Gooney Bird
WHY the B-57, when our own CAC Canberra mk20 was way BETTER huh?
Anyday Canberra over a hotship F-16!
Phil
r.pa...@worldnet.att.net
Raymond A. Pyles, Hyman L. Shulman
Online at RAND.org I think it is...
"...On the other hand, F-111Es and F-111Fs did not need their
terrain-following subsystems for the mid- to high-altitude Desert
Storm missions, so demands for the related components fell."
"...The development of F-111F "tank plinking"[7] led to an urgent need
to move 500-lb bombs to the F-111F base..."
Paul Saccani
wrote:
>WHY the B-57, when our own CAC Canberra mk20 was way BETTER huh?
>Anyday Canberra over a hotship F-16!
I suppose he wants his missus to have a canopy and not a porthole.
Alun
<one...@netcomuk.co.uk> writes
>Donald Harstad wrote:
>
>>If we could find someone to bind this thread, I think we could publish it!
>
>I don't. I get seduced into opening it every night just in case
>someone actually mentions a Canberra!
>
Me too, Les. I just love that aircraft!
>I mean, the subject line says Canberra. But it is all about 'Varks
>and other related bits of US brickwork.
>
>Its not fair really. I shall complain to somebody. . . just as soon
>as I've finished this glass of Laphroaig.
>
Don't mention alcohol (shudder). I had far too much fine brandy last
night, and my insides are feeling a little delicate...
>To level things up - the Canberra is probably the most elegant jet
>aircraft ever, with fit-for-purpose oozing from its shape and a
>performance in its day that could run rings around contemp fighters.
>
>Oh, and the current PR.9s are the fastest non re-heat jets in the
>world!!!
>
And some of the sexiest.
--
Alun
Ed Rasimus
>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>> so what better way to keep John Tower
>> happy and simultaneously give TAC some relief from all these damn
>> swing-wings being stuffed down their throat.
>
>Well, Ed, they did keep buying Varks until 1977 or so, and kept
>rebuilding wrecks damaged in accidents, back to flying condition. So
>there must have been some reason behind it other than porkbarrel alone
Actually the 1977 date tells it all. They kept buying 111's even
though TAC was very unhappy with the airplane because there was
nothing else for GD to do until the Viper came along. When F-16
production reached the necessary levels to keep the proper cash flow
into the Dallas-Ft. Worth area, the annual stuffing of additional 111s
into the budget ended.
>> >
>
>Losses, Ed, mostly attributed to a wing box failure which killed
>aircraft in the US as well. Not a particularly useful example to use,
>especially given the small sample size involved.
You've mentioned the wing box failures before in this thread, and I'll
confess it as being new information to me. The losses during the
Rolling Thunder deployments were AFAIK unexplained. The airplanes
simply didn't return from the missions. Suspicions were of TFR related
failures without time to broadcast an "oh shit" before impact. How did
these combat losses get attributed to structural failure, was there
evidence discovered after cessation of hostilities?
I'm familiar with two 111 accidents, the initial operational
capability accident at Nellis in '67 in which the ergonomic logic of
the wing sweep control resulted in a full sweep selection rather than
full forward and the aircraft sinking into the ground and burning on
final approach. A couple of ex-105 100-mission buddies were killed in
that one.
And, the night ground impact of a D model out of Cannon AFB in '69 or
'70 in which a friend who had been an instructor with me at Williams
AFB was killed. Neither of these were wing-box related.
>
>>
>> The difference was tactics, EW, radar coverage and SEAD effectiveness.
>
>The Varks were also a little more mature as well by then. BTW I
>understand that quite a few of their sorties involved dropping CBUs on
>SAM and AAA sites before the Buffs rolled in to deliver. I am sure Guy
>or Kurt will have the stats.
There again, the targeting you cite during LB II isn't consistent with
my experience during the campaign. (And, first let me note that B-52s
don't "roll in to deliver"--they cruise along at FL 400 and release on
radar.)
SAM sites were extremely mobile during the entire NVN war. Although we
had intel lists of more than 140 known (i.e. surveyed for deployment
and possibly observed active at some point), there were usually an
estimated 40 or so occupied. It was a shell game and even during LB II
we never knew where they would be on any given day.
That means night, blind targeting of SAM sites wasn't an option.
Additionally let me note that SAM suppression was a
Weasel/Hunter-Killer function. Coordination of 111 SAM attacks with
H/K flights would have been essential to avoid fratricide either by a
'Vark getting Shriked or a Weasel getting fragged or mid-aired by the
111. The night H/K mission was primarily flown by secondary Weasel
forces, the F-4C Weasels from Kadena deployed to Korat and backup
killer crews out of my squadron, the 34th TFS flying D or E Phantoms.
I'm unaware of anyone ever hearing or being pre-briefed on 111
anti-SAM sorties.
>> >> >
>In this sense I am curious as to how you guys planned to get in with
>100s, 104s and 105s tasked with "central heating" missions, Ed. If you
>were planning to go deep, Hi-LO-Lo-Hi, how did you plan to survive the
>SAM/AAA belts along the DDR/CSR frontiers ?
Frontal defenses were penetrated low and a large dependence for
tactical strike aircraft on disruption of the electromagnetic spectrum
by early nudets from SSBNs.
>
>Would you be flying a Hi-Lo-Hi-Lo-toss-Lo-Hi-Lo-Hi type profile ?
That's a section of the dash-1 I never got to review, but it certainly
was likely.
>> >> >> >
>
>Feedback I have had from the Vark crews is that the Whizzo is required
>since the 200 AGL TF keeps the pilot very busy watching the engines and
>managing energy, ie a loss in power, even partial, requires immediate
>pull up to clear terrain. Since there is no auto-throttle, loss of
>thrust does not produce the auto-pullup as a TFR fault does.
That's a stretch. Loss of thrust at high IAS has lots of cues that
mitigate the need to stare at engine gauges. Engine sound,
longitudinal accel/decell, yawing, caution panel lights, etc. You
still haven't made the convincing case for this "high-tech/high
workload" solution.
>> >>
>> >Why weren't you F-105 guys flying night low level TF bombing sorties at
>> >200 AGL 100% of the time in 1965/66 to avoid those MiGs and SAMs ? All
>> >the evidence I have seen suggests mostly packages at medium altitude by
>> >day, with the odd B-66 led radar bombing sorting. Could this have
>> >something perhaps to do with accuracy of delivery ?
Pictures of "Sky Spot" pathfinder missions led by B-66s are common
primarily because they depict groups of airplanes in a single frame
for press purposes and they were in permissive environments. The
primary delivery method of F-105s and F-4s in high threat areas
(virtually all of NVN) was high angle dive bomb.
>>
>It would seem to me that the driving issue must have been delivery
>accuracy, accepting that all of the other factors were valid. If your
>CEPs for a low level laydown were 500 ft, that pushes up your required
>sortie count for anything other than a factory sized target.
Please note that the CE of 500 ft I mentioned was for radar,
blind-offset NUCLEAR delivery with the Toss Bomb Computer.
Qualification criteria for conventional dive bomb delivery was 140
feet. The F-105D had no automated conventional delivery system (except
for the Ryan's Raider/Thunderstick II conversions). All conventional
bombing was manually depressed reticle--i.e. fly the airplane to
preplanned release parameters, dive angle, airspeed, altitude, wind
offset, etc. The F-4D and E had Dive Toss for automated delivery and
in the E model it was very good.
>
>Small arms is an issue for low level ingress, I won't dispute that, but
>if you can go in at 200 AGL you have shrunk their envelope and warning
>time considerably.
You've also shrunk your maneuver options, your navigation capability,
your target acquistion time and you've increased the climb requirement
to get to weapons delivery parameters.
>
>If the TFR facility on the 105 had every worked properly perhaps history
>would have been quite different.
>
>What is the story on the TF in the F-105 ? I gather it had to be turned
>off.
We never used TA (Terrain Avoidance) for conventional
delivery--although I do recall one instance having a flight lead close
us to tight fingertip formation and go "feet wet" off Dong Hoi in
Route Pack I, then descend through 20K feet of clouds to break out at
800 AGL over the Gulf.
There were two modes on the radar for low level work--Contour Map
which generated an adjustable ground clearance for the radar. Set 500
feet and anything that is more than 500 feet below the aircraft
doesn't display on the radar. CM was slaved to the gyro meaning the
clearance plane was parallel to the ground.
The other mode was TA which was slaved to the aircraft flight path. If
the aircraft was going uphill/climbing the TA clearance plane was
angled upward, telling you when you would clear an obstacle in front
of you.
The plane was flown on autopilot, although there was no radar to
autopilot link. The pilot manipulated the altitude/mach hold options
on the autopilot control panel, adjusted the throttle to maintain
desired speed in altitude hold and desired climb/descent in mach hold.
The pilot also manipulated the radar controls to change ranges,
antenna tilt, gain control and back/forth between CM and TA depending
upon what you needed at the time.
Again, it was never used in conventional weapons combat missions and
level delivery was not the typical mode of employment.
g_al...@hotmail.com
> >Losses, Ed, mostly attributed to a wing box failure which killed
> >aircraft in the US as well. Not a particularly useful example to use,
> >especially given the small sample size involved.
>
> You've mentioned the wing box failures before in this thread, and I'll
> confess it as being new information to me. The losses during the
> Rolling Thunder deployments were AFAIK unexplained. The airplanes
> simply didn't return from the missions. Suspicions were of TFR related
> failures without time to broadcast an "oh shit" before impact. How did
> these combat losses get attributed to structural failure, was there
> evidence discovered after cessation of hostilities?
Actually, the SEAsia "Combat Lancer" losses were attributed to breakage of
the horizontal stab pivot, IIRC (I can check). The 3rd (3 out of 6, not 2
out of 6) a/c was found, I think, shortly after it went in (I think the crew
may have been recovered, but I forget the exact details). Inspection of that
showed the cause, and shortly afterwards another bird was lost in the states
to the same cause.
The WCTB was a different problem, which resulted in the fleet being grounded
while it was repaired or replaced (that's why Australia's a/c sat in storage
for several years). This is all from memory, so I'll have to check my
sources. Kurt, want to jump in?
> >> The difference was tactics, EW, radar coverage and SEAD effectiveness.
And the 'Varks needed virtually none of that support to achieve that low loss
rate. Typical day support/strike sortie ratios on PGM missions were 3:1 or
greater (somewhat less for dumb bomb missions). The 'Varks didn't need SEAD
(MiGs? Not hardly. SAMs? At 2-300 feet? Radar-aimed AAA? Not much
chance.) 'Golden BB' AAA was the main threat (and the ever-present
cumulo-granite), but even that was lessened at night, especially if the enemy
didn't know they were coming and can't see where they're going (they never
used A/B).
> >The Varks were also a little more mature as well by then. BTW I
> >understand that quite a few of their sorties involved dropping CBUs on
> >SAM and AAA sites before the Buffs rolled in to deliver. I am sure Guy
> >or Kurt will have the stats.
>
> There again, the targeting you cite during LB II isn't consistent with
> my experience during the campaign. (And, first let me note that B-52s
> don't "roll in to deliver"--they cruise along at FL 400 and release on
> radar.)
Ed, Carlo was using 'rolled in to deliver' in the sense of 'lumbered
ponderously up to the bomb release point.'
>
> SAM sites were extremely mobile during the entire NVN war. Although we
> had intel lists of more than 140 known (i.e. surveyed for deployment
> and possibly observed active at some point), there were usually an
> estimated 40 or so occupied. It was a shell game and even during LB II
> we never knew where they would be on any given day.
>
> That means night, blind targeting of SAM sites wasn't an option.
> Additionally let me note that SAM suppression was a
> Weasel/Hunter-Killer function. Coordination of 111 SAM attacks with
> H/K flights would have been essential to avoid fratricide either by a
> 'Vark getting Shriked or a Weasel getting fragged or mid-aired by the
> 111. The night H/K mission was primarily flown by secondary Weasel
> forces, the F-4C Weasels from Kadena deployed to Korat and backup
> killer crews out of my squadron, the 34th TFS flying D or E Phantoms.
> I'm unaware of anyone ever hearing or being pre-briefed on 111
> anti-SAM sorties.
Ed, we bombed SAM sites at night using blind targeting quite a bit in LB II.
The Varks did it, and the Buffs did it. The 111s were doing it out in front
of the whole package, including the H/K guys like yourself who were there to
take out anyone who came on the air. See the URL I re-posted a day or two
ago re: Jamming Uplink Antennas, which lists the sorties against each target
in LB II. You'll note that the Buffs were going after VN 243, 549, etc., and
F-111s were doing likewise. Plus Hanoi radio and other C3 targets.
Obviously, there might be nobody home when they came knocking. See below.
> >It would seem to me that the driving issue must have been delivery
> >accuracy, accepting that all of the other factors were valid. If your
> >CEPs for a low level laydown were 500 ft, that pushes up your required
> >sortie count for anything other than a factory sized target.
>
> Please note that the CE of 500 ft I mentioned was for radar,
> blind-offset NUCLEAR delivery with the Toss Bomb Computer.
> Qualification criteria for conventional dive bomb delivery was 140
> feet. The F-105D had no automated conventional delivery system (except
> for the Ryan's Raider/Thunderstick II conversions). All conventional
> bombing was manually depressed reticle--i.e. fly the airplane to
> preplanned release parameters, dive angle, airspeed, altitude, wind
> offset, etc. The F-4D and E had Dive Toss for automated delivery and
> in the E model it was very good.
Ryan's Raider birds aka Commando Nail (which were 105Fs, not Ds as the T-Stick
II birds were) had the radar modified, and had an expanded scope display to
improve resolution (I'm not sure if this involved a larger scope or a smaller
range scale).
Let me quote some of what Momyer had to say about night/all-weather bombing:
"Because of the MSQ deficiencies and the target restrictions, we tried
alternative weapons and methods. The F-105, originally designed for the
nuclear low level mission, was an excellent fighter-bomber for the day
strikes over NVN. Its radar, however, had insufficient discrimination to make
it suitable for night and all-weather bombing missions. Nevertheless, during
1966 and 1967, some all-weather missions were run against Yen Bai, a railroad
marshalling yard on the northwest railroad. However, this experiment was
abandoned because the accuracy was insufficient to be effective.
"Similar missions were tried with the F-4, which had radar designed for
air-to-air fighting. It lacked the needed target definition for air-to-ground
radar bombing. Furthermore, defenses in the Hanoi delta demanded the same
suppresion for a night raid as for a day raid. The fighter simply wasn't
accurate enough to sustain the campaign at night. . . .
[He then goes on to describe the Combat Lancer deployment, and says that the
a/c was too new to the crews and the systems were still immature, which we
know]
". . . As a result of this very limited combat test (only 55 missions), the
F-111 returned to the U.S. for further work on the radar system. Some
modified F-105s were then brought in to determine their suitability for the
task.
"These a/c, "Thunderstick II," received a very limited evaluation. They
required extensive radar modification and, once modifed, required a high
level of maintenance skill to remain operational. The system had to be at
peak performance to achieve the sought-after CEPs of less than 500 feet. the
modified F-105s, nevertheless, showed promise against marshalling yards and
did make a number of attacks against the northwest railroad. However, they
were never used against the Northeast railroad before the President decided
to halt the bombing north of the 20th parallel on 31 March 1968. [Note: it's
unclear to me if he's confusing the T-Stick II Thuds with the Ryan's Raider
birds, something that's quite common. My impression is that the T-Stick II
'D's didn't show up till 1970 or so, while the Ryan's Raider F-105Fs were
operating in 1967 for sure]
[skipping ahead to 1972]
"The F-111s returned to combat on 28 September 1972. They then played a
major role in the night attacks against airfields, SAM sites, marshalling
yards, and power plants. Before they returned, the terrain-following radar
had all the bugs out; it proved to be a significant new factor in the
ever-changing scene of air combat. The low altitude attacks (below the
effective altitude of the SAMs), and the high speed (above Mach .9) made the
a/c almost immune to the anti-aircraft fire that had caused the heaviest loss
in the 1965-1968 campaign. As a rule, the F-111s preceded the B-52s to the
target to suppress the fighters and reduce the ability of the command system
to employ SAMs and AAA in a cohesive manner. Because the F-111s with the F-4
fighter screen and the Wild Weasels, did their job well, the MiGs were never
a very important factor in the night [B-52] attacks."
> >Small arms is an issue for low level ingress, I won't dispute that, but
> >if you can go in at 200 AGL you have shrunk their envelope and warning
> >time considerably.
>
> You've also shrunk your maneuver options, your navigation capability,
> your target acquistion time and you've increased the climb requirement
> to get to weapons delivery parameters.
The highest the Varks ever popped up at night for delivery was 2500 feet when
dropping Mk. 84 slicks (no Mk. 84 Snakeye or BSU ballutes then), which made
using them very unpopular. At least one a/c got tagged while up there, and
they stopped using them thereafter. Snakes and (especially) CBUs were the
preferred ordnance, for SAMs, airfields, etc.
g_al...@hotmail.com
> >Losses, Ed, mostly attributed to a wing box failure which killed
> >aircraft in the US as well. Not a particularly useful example to use,
> >especially given the small sample size involved.
>
> You've mentioned the wing box failures before in this thread, and I'll
> confess it as being new information to me. The losses during the
> Rolling Thunder deployments were AFAIK unexplained. The airplanes
> simply didn't return from the missions. Suspicions were of TFR related
> failures without time to broadcast an "oh shit" before impact. How did
> these combat losses get attributed to structural failure, was there
> evidence discovered after cessation of hostilities?
Actually, the SEAsia "Combat Lancer" losses were attributed to breakage of
the horizontal stab pivot, IIRC (I can check). The 3rd (3 out of 6, not 2
out of 6) a/c was found, I think, shortly after it went in (I think the crew
may have been recovered, but I forget the exact details). Inspection of that
showed the cause, and shortly afterwards another bird was lost in the states
to the same cause.
The WCTB was a different problem, which resulted in the fleet being grounded
while it was repaired or replaced (that's why Australia's a/c sat in storage
for several years). This is all from memory, so I'll have to check my
sources. Kurt, want to jump in?
> >> The difference was tactics, EW, radar coverage and SEAD effectiveness.
And the 'Varks needed virtually none of that support to achieve that low loss
rate. Typical day support/strike sortie ratios on PGM missions were 3:1 or
greater (somewhat less for dumb bomb missions). The 'Varks didn't need much
SEAD (MiGs? Not hardly. SAMs? At 2-300 feet? Radar-aimed AAA? Not much
chance.) 'Golden BB' AAA was the main threat (and the ever-present
cumulo-granite), but even that was lessened at night, especially if the enemy
didn't know they were coming and can't see where they're going (they never
used A/B).
> >The Varks were also a little more mature as well by then. BTW I
> >understand that quite a few of their sorties involved dropping CBUs on
> >SAM and AAA sites before the Buffs rolled in to deliver. I am sure Guy
> >or Kurt will have the stats.
>
> There again, the targeting you cite during LB II isn't consistent with
> my experience during the campaign. (And, first let me note that B-52s
> don't "roll in to deliver"--they cruise along at FL 400 and release on
> radar.)
Ed, Carlo was using 'rolled in to deliver' in the sense of 'lumbered
ponderously up to the bomb release point.'
>
> SAM sites were extremely mobile during the entire NVN war. Although we
> had intel lists of more than 140 known (i.e. surveyed for deployment
> and possibly observed active at some point), there were usually an
> estimated 40 or so occupied. It was a shell game and even during LB II
> we never knew where they would be on any given day.
>
> That means night, blind targeting of SAM sites wasn't an option.
> Additionally let me note that SAM suppression was a
> Weasel/Hunter-Killer function. Coordination of 111 SAM attacks with
> H/K flights would have been essential to avoid fratricide either by a
> 'Vark getting Shriked or a Weasel getting fragged or mid-aired by the
> 111. The night H/K mission was primarily flown by secondary Weasel
> forces, the F-4C Weasels from Kadena deployed to Korat and backup
> killer crews out of my squadron, the 34th TFS flying D or E Phantoms.
> I'm unaware of anyone ever hearing or being pre-briefed on 111
> anti-SAM sorties.
Ed, we bombed SAM sites at night using blind targeting quite a bit in LB II.
The Varks did it, and the Buffs did it. The 111s were doing it out in front
of the whole package, including the H/K guys like yourself who were there to
take out anyone who came on the air. See the URL I re-posted a day or two
ago re: Jamming Uplink Antennas, which lists the sorties against each target
in LB II. You'll note that the Buffs were going after VN 243, 549, etc., and
F-111s were doing likewise. Plus Hanoi radio and other C3 targets.
Obviously, there might be nobody home when they came knocking. See below.
> >It would seem to me that the driving issue must have been delivery
> >accuracy, accepting that all of the other factors were valid. If your
> >CEPs for a low level laydown were 500 ft, that pushes up your required
> >sortie count for anything other than a factory sized target.
>
> Please note that the CE of 500 ft I mentioned was for radar,
> blind-offset NUCLEAR delivery with the Toss Bomb Computer.
> Qualification criteria for conventional dive bomb delivery was 140
> feet. The F-105D had no automated conventional delivery system (except
> for the Ryan's Raider/Thunderstick II conversions). All conventional
> bombing was manually depressed reticle--i.e. fly the airplane to
> preplanned release parameters, dive angle, airspeed, altitude, wind
> offset, etc. The F-4D and E had Dive Toss for automated delivery and
> in the E model it was very good.
Ryan's Raider birds aka Commando Nail (which were 105Fs, not Ds as the T-Stick
[skipping ahead to 1972]
> >Small arms is an issue for low level ingress, I won't dispute that, but
> >if you can go in at 200 AGL you have shrunk their envelope and warning
> >time considerably.
>
> You've also shrunk your maneuver options, your navigation capability,
> your target acquistion time and you've increased the climb requirement
> to get to weapons delivery parameters.
The highest the Varks ever popped up at night for delivery was 2500 feet when
g_al...@hotmail.com
thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
> wc...@usa.net (Dweezil Dwarftosser) wrote:
>
> >Just a quick note about the F-105's radar: the high-persistence
> >display scope made it look somewhat muddy. It's resolution was fine -
> >but the picture wasn't too good. The result, of course, was that the
> >driver had more difficulty picking out exact IPs along the way.
> >( The F-105 had no "B-scan"; it was PPI only - really unusual for A/A
> >modes...)
>
> I'll have to disagree, particularly if comparing the 105 ground map
> modes to the F-4's rather dismal mapping presentations. The 105 had
> two transmit options, a "pencil" beam and a "spoil" mode. For low
> graze angle presentation the spoil mode was preferred, while for high
> altitude mapping the pencil beam provided a very narrow scan and
> consequently a reasonable resolution.
<snip>
BTW, the F-111's APQ-113 was Ku-band; was the F-105's R-14A X or Ku (I/J or J
for the ECM guys)?
Guy
P.S. Ed, according to the article by Walter Boyne in Air Force Magazine
(http://www.afa.org/magazine/1197lineback.html), the Buffs themselves flew 21
sorties against 8 SAM sites during LB II (probably 3 a/c aborted or were shot
down first, as three attacks were only 2 a/c instead of three).
Ed Rasimus
>P.S. Ed, according to the article by Walter Boyne in Air Force Magazine
>(http://www.afa.org/magazine/1197lineback.html), the Buffs themselves flew 21
>sorties against 8 SAM sites during LB II (probably 3 a/c aborted or were shot
>down first, as three attacks were only 2 a/c instead of three).
You can frag anyone against anything, but that doesn't mean it's going
to be effective. The way that was probably done was to target
coordinates that recce had recorded as active within the previous
24/48 hours.
Typically, however, the sites were seldom there two days in a row
during LB II. Our standard sequence for a Hunter/Killer mission during
the period was: phase one--Weasel monitors, warns and pre-empts with
ARMs. Phase two if missiles fired, second element attacks visually
with CBU. Phase three with Weasel winchester or prior to egress, the
second element takes the flight lead and visually recces using current
target photos or coordinates of previously active site. Phase four,
second element expends remaining ordinance on any airfield during
egress.
Phase 3 was seldom productive.
Paul J. Adam
<Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> writes
>Aah, you are missing the point Phil, this gives us a decent opportunity
>to have a good argument ! Think about all of the fun everybody has had !
It's always a fine sight, to watch gentlemen fence so skilfully.
--
There are four kinds of homicide: felonious, excusable, justifiable and
praiseworthy...
Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Kurt Plummer
> James Matthew Weber wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, 22 Feb 1999 21:51:56 +1100, "Graeme Hogan"
> > <gho...@netspace.net.au> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >jacko wrote in message <36d10d5a...@news.optusnet.com.au>...
> > >>I would have thought the F-4 way superior in all capabilities - speed,
> > >>loadout, range, handling, electronics etc. Can you expand a bit
> > >>please?
> > >>
> > >
> > >
> > >Apparently the F4-E had a very small combat radius, something like 190
> n.m.
> > >Melb. to Albury.
> > >It was said that with enough power, even a brick will fly.
>
> 190 nm sounds about right. Loads and range will vary enormously, but without
> tanking they will be short..
>
> > >
> > I would find that hard to believe. F4 is a naval fighter, and Naval
> > fighters always have always had long legs.
>
> Rubbish. The F4s got airborne off a carrier and immediately (or so it
> seemed) looked for a tanker. And what's this about naval aircraft and long
> legs. Quite the contrary. When your runway is only 150 feet long (or 90 in
> the case of the Melbourne), you plan on doing any fuelling (not just
> refuelling) airborne.
>
> >At Maximum weight (about
> > 61,000 pounds), it is reported to have a combat radius of about 300
> > nmiles (and that is carriyng 8 tons of ordinance)... 190nm is pretty
> > worthless in a carrier based aircraft.
>
> It's worthless in any case, but it is all that you would get in many
> situations.
>
> 300 miles. Hi - lo - hi. Not inconsistent with the 190 figure.
>
> Let's change aircraft to one I know better. The A4G.
> Ferry - 3 2000 lb drop tanks (but not dropping them when empty) roughly 2000
> miles.
>
> Hi, lo, hi. 5 * 500 lb Mk82, and 2 * 2000 lb tanks, roughly 600 miles radius
>
> Lo Same load. 350 miles radius
>
> Lo 9 * Mk82. 170 radius
>
> Those figures are a bit rough (it's a long time ago now...), but they are in
> the ballpark.
>
> John Bartels
Hey John,
I know I read somewhere that the RAAF quietly cried a bit when the last
Phantom's left. They were 'all four' keeping them. Probably joyride mentality
but Joe Baugher's datafiles show a lot more impressive (585 'miles') legs than
does your brief. Also keep in mind that '2,000lbs' sounds impressive but is
really still just a 300-330 gallon tank. And the A-4 would carry those
there-and-back while Phantoms would drop the centerline and occasionally (not
often carried at all in many of my USN F-4 shots) the 370's and come home
relatively (AAM) 'clean'.
Lastly, lets not forget that it doesn't matter if you've got a carqual'd 777;
it's what you do about what the enemy does /at the far end/ of the radii that
First Foremost And Always determines 'whether you're coming home'. The A-4
doesn't do so good here, largely, IMO, because it couldn't 'deliver' from high
enough, accurately enough, FAST enough to be viable. An F-4 can energy-afford
to play at 20-30K with heavier and/or standoff weapons and then -come home- the
same way, /daring/ anybody to make themselves an A/A nuissance.
I have my doubts about an A-4 even lifting all that gas and ordnance above 25K
so 'hi' becomes a function of effective ceiling as much as a ranged profile one.
Heinemann's Hottie was a fine nuclear delivery machine in the 50's, a 'passing
failure' as a conventional light striker in Rolling Blunder and always a decent
CAS ship for the Marines. I'm not sure that any of those apply to your radii
comments, due to varying CTOL/RATO 'field length' effects and overall
survivability factors on ordinance and threat (one B-43/57 does NOT a MER make
and if Thor has already swung his IRBM hammer...).
KP
Kurt Plummer
> jacko wrote:
>
> <snipped>
>
> > As a taxpayer I'd like a reasoned explanation as to
> > 1. Why RAAF personnel across the ranks are better trained
> > 2. Why Australia is more secure today against immediate threats
> > with a handful of F-111s rather than several squadrons of Phantoms.
> >
> > And finally what is the marginal cost of that additional security.
> >
> > All hindsight I know, but it may be useful when we have similar
> > choices to make in the future.
>
> As s rule of thumb, I don't tend to say that one aircraft is better than another. The F=111 and
> the F-4 are very different aircraft. The F-4 is a multirole fighter, that does everything.
> The F-111 is medium bomber that does long range interdiction and precision attack better than
> maybe any aircraft in ever made. If you want to fly close air support, CAP, SEAD and myriad of
> other tasks with only one type, the F-4 for the bird for you. On the other pylon you want and
> aircraft that can fly a long way, carry heavy amount of ordinance and drop them with great
> precision, the F-111 is what you want. While certainly the F-4 handles many more missions that
> the F-11, for what the F-111 does, nobody does it better.
>
> As for what Australia's defense's needs are, why beyond my realm.
>
> David
Hey David,
To be honest, I can only see Australia's 'need' for the F-111 as revolving around 'externals'
commitments that are rapidly leaping beyond a 70's level ASEAN/SEATO ability to reinforce.
The religious/political and particularly economic dynamic is spooling up to another war or a MAJOR
'amalgamation' of power bases in that part of the world (the Far East will rule the 21st and 22nd
centuries as England and the U.S. did the 19th/20th) and I'm not sure even the /U.S./ can stop it
from happening.
From another perspective, if Australia only needed to defend herself and had stayed with the F-4 to
'prove it', I can see an ICE meets Super Phantom (FAST pack and possibly 1120 engines) level
aircraft being easily the equal of the F-16ES or the early versions of the F-15 as a
'self-defending' (swing) strike fighter.
Add the current commitment to various Israeli and British Ordnance options and at least within the
'local area' you get survivable standoff options too.
And without the Pig of a budget commitment and previous 'superfighter' experience to endorse
themselves, perhaps OzAF could have skipped the Hornet and bought straight into the sequeagle, again
perhaps 'doing the Israeli' with a large percentage of two seaters and the last D's being basically
unmarked E (i.e. long range strike).
100 F-4's and 40-50 F-15's sounds /very much/ the 'HiLo' swing force I would want to have facing
somebody operating in a big way in the Timor/Afura/Celebes areas, though the choice and ratio of
hard boom to homo in the fuel-for-sex IFR profile extension options might get 'interesting'.
People put too much emphasis on the lolo game and on absolutes of range. Australia is in a more
'extended' position to be sure but this very distance and her closer ties to the West may alienate
her from any -useful- role in the WPR powergames if she tries to play Policeman like we stupidly do.
Without the 'exportable' military need, it's more a function of scheduled sortie rates and
percentage use of PGM as a function of where you bring on the major direct attrition vs. harrassment
gaming. If you have to, shift your economics interests FIRST and avoid the Hong Kong Flu.
Add to this, I think that even with the nuclear failure of ANZUS, we would have to be pretty hard
pressed not to come to their aid in direct threat situation. If only because, without the PI and
Clarke especially, there just aren't that many other suitable/'humane' basing choices in that
festering armpit part of the world (errr, NOT including the Koala Kountry of course...;).
KP
Kurt Plummer
> 1972, F-111s are back (2 Sq. of 24 a/c), suffering the lowest loss rate of
> any bombing a/c going into NVN, with essentially no support. They were sent
> in ahead of the Buffs during LBII to hit the airfields and SAM sites (some RR
> yards too, apparently, which they apparently did quite effectively.
> Considering that an F-111 could carry 24 M117s compared to a B-52G's 27 (no
> wing pylons at the time), and looking at the support assets required for each
> one, you could conclude that the G model Buff was a waste for that job (the
> Big Belly 'D' was another matter).
>
> Guy
Hello Guy,
Thanks for the check on the fuel, I should have considered the Impie factor.
I also compliment you on everything in this post but the above paragraph. In
doing research for a game mod, most of my shots show 'warload' X24 -only- with the
Mk.82, and then rarely with snakes and never with daisy cutters. The 117RE is
presumeably applicable for the majority of the TFR missions (is there a knot
limiter as with the Mk.115?) and these are shown strictly in slant four loading,
presumeably because the mass went up, possibly because of separation/sequencer
problems.
While we're at it, could I ask a favor of you in providing a 'brief brief' on the
BUFF? It's not among my favourite aircraft so my documentation on it is limited
and I need to know things like lo-hi banded ALQ/ASE installations and especially
the expendables fits. For instance, where they using the corridor rocket pylon
option at that time?
Thank You- Kurt Plummer
David Lentz
Dweezil Dwarftosser wrote:
> On Sat, 27 Feb 1999 20:37:51 GMT, g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> ><snip>
> >
> >BTW, the F-111's APQ-113 was Ku-band; was the F-105's R-14A X or Ku (I/J or J
> >for the ECM guys)?
>
> The F-105 radar was X-band.
>
> - John T.
It looks like the first poster was mixing up the frequency designation systems.
Not that I recall either system in too much detail. If I reall and have my
magnitudes rights, the band that went from 9.5 to 10.5 GHz under the old system
was called X Band and the new one I Band. I think the F-105's frequency was given
under the old system and the F-111 under the new.
I recall whenI worked on the TLQ-11 a ground based I Band (new system) we jammed
BUFF's, but never the F-111. Their bomb radar was in higher frequency band beyond
our capacity.
David
Kurt Plummer
> Kurt,
>
> One observation to be made here is that if Asia goes bad in a big way
> and the US loses Korea, Kadena, Japanese basing etc, all that is left is
> Guam and Oz.
>
> Oz was the primary logistical/staging area for most of the major
> offensives during the WW2 SWPA campaigns.
>
> Strategically, if the West loses its access to Japan/Korea, the only
> remaining basing out here is Guam, Palau and further down, Oz. Clarke is
> buried, AFAIK, under many feet of ash, and in any event there are issues
> regarding the willingness of the Phillipines to allow a redeployment.
> Maybe if they are scared enough of being invaded they might.
>
> Other than Oz, most of the basing in Asia falls within the reach of PRC
> IRBMs, and if/when the NK start putting canned sunshine in theirs, then
> most of the forward basing in Asia can be held at risk.
>
> Our primary defence strategy revolves about keeping the bad guys at a
> decent distance, and drown them in the moat if they dare cross. The
> "Air-Sea" gap is our last ditch defensive barrier for killing their
> aircraft and warships.
>
> Needless to say if Indonesia is overrun, we are exposed, as was the case
> in 1942, to air attack from Indonesian territory.
>
> What has changed is that these days whoever holds Indonesia can lob
> IRBMs at us and unless we have the air capability to Scud-hunt them
> down, we are very exposed.
>
> Unlike 1942, we now have a lot of GDP generating assets in the Deep
> North. Large oil/gas fields on the North West shelf, the Timor Sea,
> major mining operations in W.A., N.T. and Northern QLD. All of these
> could be shut down by either air attack, air launched ASM attack, or
> IRBM attack, from Indonesian territory.
>
> From our perspective this means that we have to be able to defend
> Indonesia if necessary, and it it falls to an invader, have the
> capability to make their lives unbearable as long as they choose to
> remain there.
>
> In early 1942 we were left quite exposed when Singapore fell, with most
> of our pilots tied up in RAF units, and grunts in North Africa, when the
> barbarians stood at the gates. I for one, and many others in Oz, do not
> want to ever, ever again be caught in the situation which we were in
> during early 1942, with the prospect of a possible invasion, bad guys
> dropping bombs on Darwin, and strafing the place to bits, with no
> ability to hit back and take out their bases, let alone keep them out of
> our airspace. And our primary ally tied up elsewhere trying to survive.
> Luckily, in 1942 the US was prepared to spare enough assets and people
> to make the decisive difference.
>
> About all we rated in terms of supply were P-40s which became our
> principal fighter during WW2. We were flying Wirraways (AT-6 with guns)
> in 1942.
>
> While the politics behind the Vark purchase were essentially to provide
> a possible nuclear delivery platform for dealing with a Soviet client
> Sukarno Indonesia, and we got as close as signature away from building
> our own nuclear deterrent during the sixties (the PM changed his mind at
> the very last moment), we are still a little uncomfortable with the idea
> of anybody sortiing out of Indonesian territory to hit us.
>
> What the Vark/Pig gives us is the ability to take out any shipping in
> the moat, even well defended shipping, using AV-MF style saturation ASM
> attacks. It also gives us the ability to lay waste to any airbases in
> striking range, and any ports from which bad guys might sortie. The same
> applies to garrisoned troops, logistics and any other assets.
>
> Indonesia has not been regarded as a threat since the sixties, and could
> only have been such with a massive infusion of SovBloc hardware and
> "advisors". However, Indonesia is a bit of a political, military and
> economic basketcase, and will be such for 10-20 years given current
> circumstances. This creates a major power vacuum in SEA, and should
> Indonesia fragment during this period, then you have a gaggle of little
> nation states incapable of supporting themselves, predominantly Muslim,
> and thus with no cultural or political ties to the West.
>
> The kind of entities which could be "purchased" by outside powers with
> agendas in the region (read PRC).
>
> So combat radius is an issue for us, and we will always need some kind
> of capability to do damage out to a 900-1100 NMI radius. The Vark has
> done this well and it will be extremely hard to replace. Think of it as
> our "pocket-Buff".
>
> The problem with the F-4 in our context is that it never had the range
> or the unescorted penetration capability of the Vark. Therefore as it
> lost potency in the A/A game, its utility in the A/G game would be very
> marginal to us. Comparisons with Israel can be misleading, insofar as
> they have the opposite problem with distances to us, and they also have
> the F-15 which they have frequently used for long range A/G work. The
> F-4 multirole niche is one filled by the F/A-18 down here. Were we to
> have used large numbers of F-4s, we would have to had to replace them
> with Lawn Darts or Bugs anyway as they lost their A/A effectiveness.
>
> Probably a bit too long for a potted summary, but I thought it
> appropriate to educate people out there as to our strategic issues down
> here.
>
> Stopping the bad guys in the moat or on the beach means that we have
> failed to play our strategic game properly. Never forget that we have a
> population < 20M spread over a landmass the size of the ConUS. It tends
> to bias your opinion :-)
>
> Cheers,
>
> Carlo
Hey Carlo,
Read it all, and disagree in but few areas:
1. Japan will go /after/ Oz. Too much 'face' (bases, time, relationships) invested,
did I mention $$?
2. Since Korea is the springboard to not only the islands but all of Alaska (and has
as much $$ invested) we will do whatever we can to prevent a 'stupid' (belly up,
throat arched) reunification. Since NK is not about to go with an arff! into the
night they will do the rest. It then becomes an economics reinforcement race
when they DO go belly up, one which I think China will/is letting us win.
3. If you can strike garrisoned forces, so much the better for you. If you can strike
hardened or mobile IRBM, again good. Repeat sorties with a 111 to take out
even just military 'infrastructure' are not so easy to see. These are area targets
and I would think that the Popeye expenditure would quickly become prohibitive.
4. F-111's cannot overflight penetrate MiG's (29's) /today/. The cannot
volume penetrate Su -tomorrow-. An F-4 is like a B-17 except that, with
AMRAAM or Sparrow, it has a helluva lot better 'gun turrets'.
5. I think you will have tankers regardless. The asset count vs. target valuement
just isn't worth the risk of an extended burner running ending up Very Wet.
Think Cuba with an extra 500nm 'Tacked' on, each way. The F-4, with the
1,100gallon 'slipper tank' has very clean carriage of conformal missiles or bombs
(up to 12) with 75% less drag, and 43% more range, even using GE-8 engined
B/D. Equally important, supersonic release of these weapons occured at 30K
and Mach 1.8. Think about a winged late-spread JDAM attack from /that/ kind
of extension.
6. I just don't buy the 'outmoded' song. The Germans needed something for the
Eurofront after about 1978. The Israeli's needed a better strike platform than the
D-PMIII Falcon. But guess what they 'soldiered with'? The F-111 was so
screwed up when the 6/22/73 departure date arrived that I'm sure at least a
'lease extension' (they were offered with option to buy) would have been
possible.
Even more importantly, the Eagle can 'handle', barely, a non-ARH'd Flanker
attack above 25K and at least 'shoot down' on it below that. A Hornet, for all
it's marvels cannot make the same sprint-to-shotgun claim and with Phantoms to
act as swing-lo force (/must/ be cheaper than 111) you'd have had all the excuse
you needed to ask for an established system/contractor 'upgrade' on the failed
GD Varks. Especially if these latter were as popular to TAC/USAFE as you
indicate.
7. Without farfield saturation of the basing infrastructure, I don't think similar attack
doctrine would work against a fleetlevel IADS. You would get zapped I would
by the air umbrella and if trying to work a day-night constant sortie rate would
run out of airframes.
To be honest, I would have to see what kind of OAB missile system and radar
horizon the Chinese are looking at but to me, it would be better to pull off the
FORCAP with 'selective rollback' on the pickets and far fewer total missiles per
boat. 'Saturation' would come for the centerpiece vessels and possibly the
UnREP or separate amphibgru trailers; using tossed ballistic or glide weapons.
But Targeting gets to be serious here too, I'd want to have many fast-drones to
put ISAR or opticals across their flanks and have datalinked minute-minute
updates rather like the Brits do putting their GR.1A's through the gate but with
something 'noticeably' smaller and fleeter than the Nimrod or P-3. AEW blips or
F-111 recce packs and attack systems don't count. Not enough rez to give
target valuement and trusting to the U.S. or commercial overhead is even worse.
KP
P.S. RE: Lofting. Read this in another post and 'just couldn't resist'...;) IMO,
the key to a good radar loft is to have a WSO that can put you in the basket with
3-4 positional/velocity updates from any feature skew angle AFTER an early IP
and and then give you the heads up on a smoooooth, _Continuously
Accelerating_, trophy-pull with Big Game weapons (.84). The latter let's you
adjust the pickle intervals 'long' and the former means the compute is running off
the very last good doppler update input without a single table or ADC falter on
the pitchup.
One of the few times when being ahead of the 'computer' and waiting for it to
'catch up' can be lethal; I've seen countless wannabe tossers at sim composiums
do a CCIP style tiger pull that chins the waterline marker on the pitch up line
alright but ruins the inertial pathing of the climbout profile on the rotation (On a
narrow capture window LCOSS like the ASG-23 without pitchbars and an
onspeed indicator I bet it was 'blind leading the blonde' awful?:).
The BRL then 'jumps' from it's initial fall rate intercept positioning to the newly
computed (IAS bleed with pitot 'rotation' error) range-rate indication and the
'ride the bucking BFL' process began as the lucky fellow tried to get the nose on
the NEW command pitch (aging Doppler/INS sample) without further screwing
the NEW flight ADC airspeed datum on the release crossing index.
He/She -inevitably- added a roll component rowing the oar around and this just
further exacerbated the speed change calc delay losses; ending up slow and
short, often off laterally, sometimes even stalled, over a Very High rollaway that
could easily be confused with an LABS/timer profile as the poor hapless
shooter was literally looking at the target 'over his shoulder'!
Though there are fewer of them, Heavy weapons don't have MER drag, sling
further across a less exaggerated parabola and while a degree of practice is still
needed to develop the 'accelerating' pull, the lower proximity of a typical warlit
horizon contrast helps, subconciously at least. On the one game I tried the most
until I was successful-often, I got so I could pull to a 'star chart' angular reference
and put four Mk.83 onto a HAS complex, blowing the doors off any given
'culdesac' worth of TAB-Vee with (gasssp, Dweezil'kill me!;) an F-16. My best
was weapons off from 4.2nm at 610knots weapon release with a 2.7K bloom.
Non-racked weapons should also have about four less electrical points to start
doing funky things to the yaw and tumble once the release sequence actually
starts pickling off and again, ammunition weights help immensely on consecutive
shock secondaries 'interface damage'.
If we really did SEA-SEAD this way I would bet that would bet that 'Soft
Targets' got an airburst with something like a Mk.43 or FMU-113 if it fits the
grazing 'cap' on low angle sidelobe clutter intrusion. I didn't think the .84 got
radar'd until the errrr, DS FMU-139 though??
Today, the need may have passed but on some targets, if we just had a low angle
penetrator warhead that could poststrike 'turn' (likely fire secondaries) from such
a profile without the need for a set of 'fins at the front' (SALH 109) there could
be a few more WMD/subterranean target matrixes which we could handle
without overflight or atmospheric release constraints (airbase fuel bunkers and
subshaft duct 'pulsing' collapse of bunker/igloo ventillation systems come to
mind). Maybe off a CM or Drone...
KP
Ed Rasimus
>That is correct Guy, I incorrectly stated wing box, which was the cause
>of one or more losses stateside. However it is worth pointing out that
>the cause of loss for the never found aircraft is unknown. Speculation
>covers TFR energy mismanagement, wing box and stab pivot. I doubt we
>will ever know.
And, the "disappearance without a trace" syndrome was precisely what
gave the aircraft such a bad reputation in TAC for so many years.
>>
>The very low penetration altitude of 200 AGL combined with high speed
>meant that warning times for initiating AAA barrage fire were much
>reduced. There are some funny stories about including one about a AAA
>gun crew which got thrown off its mount by centrifugal forces when a
>attempting to track a Vark.
The image is worth savoring. But, seriously, the effectiveness of low
altitude single-ship penetration can be quite high and direct
comparison with mutually supporting multi-aircraft formations can't be
readily made. One of the significant defensive threats in NVN was the
small arms/automatic weapon response. Air defense doctrine for the NV
included the automatic response of firing all weapons into the air
whether or not a target was in sight or in range. Must have made those
bamboo helmets we see in the pictures close to worthless when all that
stuff rained back down.
>
>A point to add here, and Ed I think I may have given you a little too
>much ground on the SEA sortie count issue:
>
>Constant Guard V ops in late 1972 involved 6,000 combat sorties for the
>Varks, cited as being 96% effective. Six aircraft were lost for an
>aggregate of 0.1% per sortie loss rate. Targets included RP 5 and RP 6.
I'll confess to operating primarily on recollection rather than book
statistics on the issue of sortie count. Here again, however, we've
got one of those "bean-counter" stats--"96%" effective usually meaning
the aircraft got airborne and came back with the pylons bare.
I can't offer a counter stat for F-4/F-105G ops during 1972 other than
to note that losses from all causes were down considerably from the
'65-67 period.
>
>BTW stats for Combat Lancer were not that monstrously bad either, given
>the immaturity of the aircraft. 2 lost in 55 sorties which amounts to
>3.6% per sortie prior to the deployment of extra aircraft, loss of one
>more, and termination of the deployment.
Those numbers track very well with my recollection. Note that if you
factor "loss of one more" into the sortie count you get an even higher
loss/sorte number.
>>
>One important capability the Vark offered against the regular H/K
>packages was surprise. Coming in at 200 AGL and 550 KTAS and judiciously
>choosing terrain, they did not provide a SAM site or other target with
>much warning of impending attack.
No doubt about the surprise factor, but my issue was the virtual
impossibility of knowing on any given mission what the location of
SA-2 sites would be. As I mentioned the probable mode of operation was
fragging against recently observed occupied sites and blind delivery
on the location regardles of reaction (or lack thereof.) The
effectiveness of H/K ops was principally because of the willingness to
"troll" for SAMs. The worst thing a SAM operator could do was give up
his location by taking a shot.
>
>I should also point out that the RHAWS on the A-model avionics had a tie
>in to support Shrikes, and also was capable of cueing the bomb nav in
>the same manner as Weasels. I have yet to see evidence that this
>facility was used in SEA for SAM killing, but it certainly existed as an
>option for honing the accuracy of a low level delivery on a SAM site, or
>nailing a TOO.
And, I've previously mentioned the Shrike input to the 105D ADI
pitch/bank steering bars. Sounds similar.
>>
>
>Ed, this is why the Vark profile is regarded to be "high workload",
>since you are juggling your ingress, delivery and egress parameters
>within a very narrow geometrical window. This is also why the Whizzo can
>be very busy, since he is radar blind outside the valley he is
>navigating in. Acquisition time is always very short on these profiles,
>and you are extremely busy dropping the ARS range down as you close in
>and continuously refine the aimpoint. The navigation accuracy to the IP
>has to be very high, since if you are out of position when you get to
>the range of the planned IP, your whole delivery can be screwed up if
>you aren't very quick off the mark.
No disagreement there. You are describing the same issues we dealt
with on nuclear lines in the 105. The reason we were able to do that
kind of job on a nuc line was the availability of target study. With
conventional targets changing daily and sometimes flying two missions
a day, you can't do the necessary intense memorization and analysis of
what radar return and navigation waypoints are going to look like.
>
>Toss involves disengaging the TFR with a paddle switch on the stick, a
>4G pullup, maintaining heading exactly, and keeping the nose on the
>vertical flightpath indicator bars on the ASG-20-something or one of the
>strip indicators, while holding the pickle button down. The bomb-nav
>then releases the stores, and you then try your damndest to get below
>the target's visual/radar horizon as quickly as possible. A typical
>profile is to roll past 90 degrees to kill the vertical velocity, pull
>the nose around to reverse heading, roll out, release the TFR paddle
>switch and get low again.
Here again we have a similarity (need I say superiority) in the 105
system which was ten years older. Autoss didn't have the conventional
accuracy, but for nuclear delivery it automatically flew the maneuver
you are describing. At the appropriate pull-up point (the computer
actually anticipated a bomb release solution and pulled up so as to
reach the release point immediately after entering the safe
separation/max toss range) the autopilot initiated a wings level 4G
pullup. The pilot only needed to dis-engage the A/P after weapon
release to hand fly the wingover and pull down to egress heading.
>
>I've done this on the simulator quite a few times and I find it to be a
>bitch to fly precisely, especially blind off the strips and ADI. Granted
>I don't do this every day, but it can be a little difficult until you
>learn to visualise it in your head. I compare it to flying an aerobatic
>manoeuvre at 200 AGL IF :-)
That's why the autopilot pull was such a nice feature.
>
>An observation here, Ed, if I may. The Varks' delivery profile and
>penetration technique was quite unique in SEA, even the A-6 was
>different, insofar is it was much slower, and due a lack of TFR tended
>to penetrate at higher altitudes. The Vark's penetration model is what I
>call "stealth by terrain masking", and only the Vark, Tornado, B-1A/B
>and B-2A have the genuine capability to do this in a blind IF
>environment. The Buff tries but without a proper auto TFR it can never
>achieve the treetop clearances you get with TFR.
I understand the 111 tactic. My experience using "stealth by terrain
masking" during day visual conditions is that it wasn't very viable
(without a radar delivery conventional accuracy qualified system such
as the 111). NVN and particularly Route Pack VI is a small area with
lots of high terrain upon which to mount radars and observers. It is
difficult to effectively mask, particularly since there are only a
limited number of routes, waypoints and suitable terrain areas--i.e.
Thud Ridge and Phantom Ridge, Banana Valley, etc.
One of my worst days in the 105 was doing a low level (day/visual, of
course) ingress down Phantom Ridge from the north coast to the NE
railroad. At 600 kts and around 200 feet (although often lower and
occasionally higher), we got SAM launches from three sites enroute and
a completed (although a bit too "hot") intercept by a MiG-17.
>
>I suspect you may have fallen into the same trap Art Kramer has fallen
>into at times, of assuming the other guy is doing it the same way you
>did. The Vark was very different from other TAC assets in many ways, and
>you can only objectively assess its effectiveness in the context of its
>unique profiles and capabilities.
No, I've never assumed that 111 employment was at all similar. I've
merely drawn from my admittedly anecdotal experience with the aircraft
and the people in the USAF who flew it during the period my active
duty overlapped with the 'Vark's operational life (1967-1987). During
that time I was less than impressed (obviously).
wal...@oneimage.com
>Carlo Kopp wrote:>
>> Kurt Plummer wrote:
>> >>> > David Lentz wrote:
>> >>> > > jacko wrote:
>> >>> > > <snipped>
Lofting may be neat for nukes or a dozen CBU but dang if I
think a real-world dumb Mk84 will hit anything but the ground.
There are too many variables for such a small weapon envelope.
Even 4xMk84s tossed 'into the blue' minus any sort of guidance
other than the laws of motion would be essentially worthless.
OTH with some help from GPS tossing becomes a viable way to
make the oppo enlarge the protected perimeter.
Remember, tossing was developed for nukes, the bigger the better.
I've tossed and I've LADDed and neither is exactly a precision
delivery (except my very last VLADD was a shack; ie w/in 50 feet; okay
for a Mk61; not good enough for a Mk84).
My 2 cents . . . Walt BJ ftr plt ret
Carlo Kopp
Ed, Guy, due to local network problems I am missing Ed's reply to my
posting, so I will do a combined reply in this posting. Thanks.
That is correct Guy, I incorrectly stated wing box, which was the cause
of one or more losses stateside. However it is worth pointing out that
the cause of loss for the never found aircraft is unknown. Speculation
covers TFR energy mismanagement, wing box and stab pivot. I doubt we
will ever know.
>
> > >> The difference was tactics, EW, radar coverage and SEAD effectiveness.
>
> And the 'Varks needed virtually none of that support to achieve that low loss
> rate. Typical day support/strike sortie ratios on PGM missions were 3:1 or
> greater (somewhat less for dumb bomb missions). The 'Varks didn't need SEAD
> (MiGs? Not hardly. SAMs? At 2-300 feet? Radar-aimed AAA? Not much
> chance.) 'Golden BB' AAA was the main threat (and the ever-present
> cumulo-granite), but even that was lessened at night, especially if the enemy
> didn't know they were coming and can't see where they're going (they never
> used A/B).
The very low penetration altitude of 200 AGL combined with high speed
meant that warning times for initiating AAA barrage fire were much
reduced. There are some funny stories about including one about a AAA
gun crew which got thrown off its mount by centrifugal forces when a
attempting to track a Vark. This might be mythology, but makes good
sense. Penetrations speeds on the deck varied between 550 and 650 KTAS
depending on wing, thrust setting and loadout. BTW not a very comfy ride
in TF "hard" setting if the terrain is bumpy.
A point to add here, and Ed I think I may have given you a little too
much ground on the SEA sortie count issue:
Constant Guard V ops in late 1972 involved 6,000 combat sorties for the
Varks, cited as being 96% effective. Six aircraft were lost for an
aggregate of 0.1% per sortie loss rate. Targets included RP 5 and RP 6.
I stumbled on this tidbit when browsing the latest issue of API, in a
piece on USAF Spark Varks.
BTW stats for Combat Lancer were not that monstrously bad either, given
the immaturity of the aircraft. 2 lost in 55 sorties which amounts to
3.6% per sortie prior to the deployment of extra aircraft, loss of one
more, and termination of the deployment.
>
> > >The Varks were also a little more mature as well by then. BTW I
> > >understand that quite a few of their sorties involved dropping CBUs on
> > >SAM and AAA sites before the Buffs rolled in to deliver. I am sure Guy
> > >or Kurt will have the stats.
> >
> > There again, the targeting you cite during LB II isn't consistent with
> > my experience during the campaign. (And, first let me note that B-52s
> > don't "roll in to deliver"--they cruise along at FL 400 and release on
> > radar.)
>
> Ed, Carlo was using 'rolled in to deliver' in the sense of 'lumbered
> ponderously up to the bomb release point.'
Guy you are correct and I apologise to all for the poor choice of words.
>
> >
> > SAM sites were extremely mobile during the entire NVN war. Although we
> > had intel lists of more than 140 known (i.e. surveyed for deployment
> > and possibly observed active at some point), there were usually an
> > estimated 40 or so occupied. It was a shell game and even during LB II
> > we never knew where they would be on any given day.
> >
> > That means night, blind targeting of SAM sites wasn't an option.
> > Additionally let me note that SAM suppression was a
> > Weasel/Hunter-Killer function. Coordination of 111 SAM attacks with
> > H/K flights would have been essential to avoid fratricide either by a
> > 'Vark getting Shriked or a Weasel getting fragged or mid-aired by the
> > 111. The night H/K mission was primarily flown by secondary Weasel
> > forces, the F-4C Weasels from Kadena deployed to Korat and backup
> > killer crews out of my squadron, the 34th TFS flying D or E Phantoms.
> > I'm unaware of anyone ever hearing or being pre-briefed on 111
> > anti-SAM sorties.
>
> Ed, we bombed SAM sites at night using blind targeting quite a bit in LB II.
> The Varks did it, and the Buffs did it. The 111s were doing it out in front
> of the whole package, including the H/K guys like yourself who were there to
> take out anyone who came on the air. See the URL I re-posted a day or two
> ago re: Jamming Uplink Antennas, which lists the sorties against each target
> in LB II. You'll note that the Buffs were going after VN 243, 549, etc., and
> F-111s were doing likewise. Plus Hanoi radio and other C3 targets.
> Obviously, there might be nobody home when they came knocking. See below.
One important capability the Vark offered against the regular H/K
packages was surprise. Coming in at 200 AGL and 550 KTAS and judiciously
choosing terrain, they did not provide a SAM site or other target with
much warning of impending attack.
I should also point out that the RHAWS on the A-model avionics had a tie
in to support Shrikes, and also was capable of cueing the bomb nav in
the same manner as Weasels. I have yet to see evidence that this
facility was used in SEA for SAM killing, but it certainly existed as an
option for honing the accuracy of a low level delivery on a SAM site, or
nailing a TOO.
>
> > >It would seem to me that the driving issue must have been delivery
> > >accuracy, accepting that all of the other factors were valid. If your
> > >CEPs for a low level laydown were 500 ft, that pushes up your required
> > >sortie count for anything other than a factory sized target.
> >
> > Please note that the CE of 500 ft I mentioned was for radar,
> > blind-offset NUCLEAR delivery with the Toss Bomb Computer.
> > Qualification criteria for conventional dive bomb delivery was 140
> > feet. The F-105D had no automated conventional delivery system (except
> > for the Ryan's Raider/Thunderstick II conversions). All conventional
> > bombing was manually depressed reticle--i.e. fly the airplane to
> > preplanned release parameters, dive angle, airspeed, altitude, wind
> > offset, etc. The F-4D and E had Dive Toss for automated delivery and
> > in the E model it was very good.
Ed, I was referring specifically to low level IFR blind delivery only. I
don't have numbers for visual dive / CCIP for the Vark, but I would
expect them to be similar to the 105 given the nature of the profile. It
is needless to say never been a preferred Vark delivery profile.
Providing the offset aimpoint was close to the target aimpoint, and
provided good radar contrast, and the offset coordinates were accurate,
the Vark could achieve pretty much the same accuracy as in a direct
delivery. The AJQ-20A had specific provisions for punching in offset
aimpoint coords and the system automatically accounted for this.
I remember using this on the simulator many years ago. Took a bit of
getting used to, I must add. "Carlo, put the crosshairs on that hill
over there !".... "Which hill... errr ...got it ... sh*t, where's the
target !".
>
<snipped good stuff>
>
> > >Small arms is an issue for low level ingress, I won't dispute that, but
> > >if you can go in at 200 AGL you have shrunk their envelope and warning
> > >time considerably.
> >
> > You've also shrunk your maneuver options, your navigation capability,
> > your target acquistion time and you've increased the climb requirement
> > to get to weapons delivery parameters.
Ed, this is why the Vark profile is regarded to be "high workload",
since you are juggling your ingress, delivery and egress parameters
within a very narrow geometrical window. This is also why the Whizzo can
be very busy, since he is radar blind outside the valley he is
navigating in. Acquisition time is always very short on these profiles,
and you are extremely busy dropping the ARS range down as you close in
and continuously refine the aimpoint. The navigation accuracy to the IP
has to be very high, since if you are out of position when you get to
the range of the planned IP, your whole delivery can be screwed up if
you aren't very quick off the mark.
In terms of deliveries, the level autobomb was preferred for accuracy,
but tossing was also used quite frequently, especially for area targets.
The typical weapons were M-117 and Mk.82, with CBUs for defence
suppression and soft area targets.
Toss involves disengaging the TFR with a paddle switch on the stick, a
4G pullup, maintaining heading exactly, and keeping the nose on the
vertical flightpath indicator bars on the ASG-20-something or one of the
strip indicators, while holding the pickle button down. The bomb-nav
then releases the stores, and you then try your damndest to get below
the target's visual/radar horizon as quickly as possible. A typical
profile is to roll past 90 degrees to kill the vertical velocity, pull
the nose around to reverse heading, roll out, release the TFR paddle
switch and get low again.
I've done this on the simulator quite a few times and I find it to be a
bitch to fly precisely, especially blind off the strips and ADI. Granted
I don't do this every day, but it can be a little difficult until you
learn to visualise it in your head. I compare it to flying an aerobatic
manoeuvre at 200 AGL IF :-)
My admiration to all who have flown a blind toss from low level. I have
never managed to get my bomb inside a 1000' CEP, even if I can get the
profile about right.
>
> The highest the Varks ever popped up at night for delivery was 2500 feet when
> dropping Mk. 84 slicks (no Mk. 84 Snakeye or BSU ballutes then), which made
> using them very unpopular. At least one a/c got tagged while up there, and
> they stopped using them thereafter. Snakes and (especially) CBUs were the
> preferred ordnance, for SAMs, airfields, etc.
>
I don't recall seeing references to Mk.84 deliveries, Guy, which is not
to say they weren't used. It seems to me that most of the work was being
done with Mk.82s and CBUs.
An observation here, Ed, if I may. The Varks' delivery profile and
penetration technique was quite unique in SEA, even the A-6 was
different, insofar is it was much slower, and due a lack of TFR tended
to penetrate at higher altitudes. The Vark's penetration model is what I
call "stealth by terrain masking", and only the Vark, Tornado, B-1A/B
and B-2A have the genuine capability to do this in a blind IF
environment. The Buff tries but without a proper auto TFR it can never
achieve the treetop clearances you get with TFR.
I suspect you may have fallen into the same trap Art Kramer has fallen
into at times, of assuming the other guy is doing it the same way you
did. The Vark was very different from other TAC assets in many ways, and
you can only objectively assess its effectiveness in the context of its
unique profiles and capabilities.
A Vark mission involves typically higher preflight planning workload due
to the more difficult chore of navigating in at 200 AGL and thus having
a much shorter radar horizon and "peripheral" radar visibility once down
low. Once you are penetrating, all of the timelines become much shorter,
in comparison with other profiles.
The workload is therefore higher, despite the better automation compared
to other TAC fighters of the period. We seemed to be in a bit of
disagreement earlier concerning the workload issue. I've had a little
bit of think about it and recalled various briefings I've had from our
Vark guys. Since the blind autobomb has not been used down here since
Pave Tack came online cca 85, I haven't had much cause to think about
the issues involved in recent years. Suffice to say there are unique
difficulties resulting from 200 AGL TF hard ride 550 KTAS penetration,
which is the price to be paid for avoiding most of the SAMs and AAA, and
all of the MiGs.
Guy, thanks for the superb historical notes, as always you add a cogent
and well researched contribution to the debate.
Cheers,
Carlo