F14 vs Mig23 in '89
Vincent VAGNER
Do some of you ever tried to transcript the audio chat of the US pilots
during this
encounter ? I did but it's real hard and i'd like to compare with some
other work.
Will publish it someday on my "to be" website.
BTW, read the Tomcat ! by P Gillcrist . Some very slight errors in this
fight story
( regarding exact words said ;) )but good book nevertheless.
Vince
Fritz_Gunter
construction) website of different air battles, which will
include this air battle.
I will also be showing all-new 3-D models and scenes, focusing
on the F-16 but including other military vehicles as well.
Look for my posting for Atrox Graphics this fall when the
construction is done, or look at its ragged, in-process state
now:
Fritz Gunter
iamf...@hotmail.com
-----------------------------------------------------------
Got questions? Get answers over the phone at Keen.com.
Up to 100 minutes free!
http://www.keen.com
g_al...@hotmail.com
vincent...@de.edfgdf.fr wrote:
> Hello all
>
> Do some of you ever tried to transcript the audio chat of the US
pilots
> during this
> encounter ? I did but it's real hard and i'd like to compare with some
> other work.
> Will publish it someday on my "to be" website.
Yeah, I transcribed the whole 7 minutes of the CNN tape. A little of
it's unintelligible or has multiple possible readings, but I've got
it all. If you want, email me your version, and I'll be happy to
compare it with mine. I'm not about to type all of mine in, as I did it
on paper by listening to the tape over and over (I even started out
including the times, but gave up on that about a minute or so in).
Guy
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Vincent VAGNER
g_al...@hotmail.com a écrit :
g_al...@hotmail.com
g_al...@hotmail.com
vincent...@de.edfgdf.fr wrote:
> Do you want it in .doc or in .txt ?
Text is simpler, so if you can do that, please do.
Fritz_Gunter
dogfight, plus higher-quality camera/HUD video than CNN. I
can't get that video to ya, but I'll see what I can do as far as
the audio goes. . .
Fritz
g_al...@hotmail.com
g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
> In article <398FBC09...@de.edfgdf.fr>,
> vincent...@de.edfgdf.fr wrote:
> > Do you want it in .doc or in .txt ?
>
> Text is simpler, so if you can do that, please do.
>
> Guy
Vince, I haven't received anything from you yet, and trying to email you
directly doesn't seem to work (I suppose you've got a few extra
characters in your address as a SPAM trap). Are you stll working on it,
did it get lost in the internet, or did you give it up as not worth the
time?;-)
g_al...@hotmail.com
Fortunately, it was forwarded to me by a friend. I'd hoped not to have
to type my whole transcript in, but the differences are significant
enough that I went ahead and did it. So, here's my version. Oh, you
appear to have a few seconds at the start that the tape I was working
from was lacking.
Guy
----------------------------------------------
Warning (color): Hostile attack is --
Red: imminent or in progress
Yellow: probable
White: improbable (all clear)
Weapons () Fire only --
Free at targets not identified as Friendly under current
RoE.
Tight at targets positively identified as hostile within
current RoE.
Hold (USA, USMC)
Safe (USN) in self defense or in response to a verbal
order
Note. USN/NATO use "Weapons Safe" to avoid confusion with "Hold Fire."
[Obviously, not in effect in 1989. These are current joint service
definitions]
P Pilot of 207
RIO RIO of 207
WM Either of two crew of wingman
E2 E-2C controller
Alpha Bravo (Air Warfare Coordinator on Kennedy)
Unk. Unknown voice
Unt. Unintelligible
Crew abbreviation above followed by ? means I'm not certain of my ID.
Word(s) in parentheses followed by question mark mean I'm not certain of
the word(s). My comments and interpretations of actions, sounds etc.
appear in square brackets [].
E2?: Closeout shows 25 miles separation, turn inbound.
E2?: Contacts appear to be heading 315 now, speed 430, angels
approximately 8,000.
RIO? P?: Roger, ace, take it north.
P: We're gonna have to make a quick loop here.
E2: Come starboard. I'm gonna give you collision [steering] here.
OK, come starboard about 40.
RIO: 207, uh 61 miles now, bearing 180, Angels 8, heading 330.
P?: Steady up.
WM?: Alpha Bravo, this is Closeout.
RIO: Come back port 20 degrees here, 10-4?, he's jinking now, (at
us?).
RIO: Bogeys appear to be coming, uh, jinking to the right now, heading
north, speed 430, Angels 5,000 now in the descent.
RIO: OK, let's take her down now, we're going down.
RIO: Closeout, uh 53 miles now. Bogeys appear to be heading directly
at us. I'm coming port, steady up, 150 for 30 degrees offset, 50 miles.
RIO: 49 miles now, speed 450, Angels 9, I'm going down to 3.
WM: Crossing back over.
P: Roger.
RIO: Roger that, 30 degree offset now, Bogeys heading 340, speed 500,
let's accelerate.
E2? AB?: OK, they look like they're at 9,000 feet now.
RIO: Roger, bogeys have jinked back into us now, let's (cut?) starboard
30 degrees, back the other side.
P?: Coming starboard, say their Angels.
WM?: (Unint.) joined up, set (station?)
RIO: Roger, Angels now 11, Steady up.
AB: Closeout, Warning Yellow, Weapons Hold, I repeat, Warning Yellow,
Weapons Hold, Alpha Bravo out.
E2: (Closeout?), this is pass-up, Alpha Bravo directs Warning Yellow,
Weapons Hold.
P: 35 miles here.
RIO: Roger that, bogeys have jinked back into me now for the third time
with noses on, at 35 miles, Angels 7.
WM? P?: Alpha Bravo, Closeout, you copy?
RIO: OK, I'm taking another offset, starboard, starboard, 210.
WM: Josh, I'm locked up, (Needles?) at 30 miles, and he's at 13,000
feet, the trailer.
RIO: Roger that, level off. OK? Bogeys jinked back into me for the
fourth time, I'm (flying?) back starboard, come back port now.
RIO: Port, 27 miles, bogey's at 7,000 feet.
P?: 45.
Unk.: (Unint.) 340.
Unk.: (Flashing?) bogeys.
Unk.: You're in collision now, steering.
RIO: Bogeys have jinked back at me again for the fifth time, . . .
they're on my nose now, . . . inside of 20 miles [sound of four beeps,
evenly spaced. RIO's voice is getting stressed, pitch going up]
RIO: Master Arm on, Master Arm on.
P: OK, good light, good light.
RIO: 'Kay, centering the (key?), bogey has jinked back into me
again, sixteen miles, center the dot [RIO tells pilot to center the
steering dot]
E2?: Say your Angels.
RIO: I'm at Angels 5, Nose up! [RIO orders pilot to snap up and center
the dot]
E2?: His Angels.
P: Now wait a minute. [The penny has finally dropped for the pilot,
who has just realized that the RIO is getting ready to shoot, despite
the fact that the RoE haven't been met]
P?: Alpha Bravo from 207. [The pilot calls the Kennedy to ask if
they're cleared to fire, and/or get clarification]
RIO: Thirteen miles. . . Fox 1, Fox 1!
P: Oh, Jesus! [Mingled tone of apprehension and disgust, as if the
pilot we're saying, Oh, shit, we've screwed the pooch now]
Unk. ("Did he get away?" or "Did it get away?" or "Did you get a
light?")
RIO: Roger that, 10 miles, he's back on my nose, Fox 1 again!
P?: (Watchin?) em up?! [Watching the missiles head down range]
RIO: Six miles, Six miles!! [voice pitch and stress even higher now]
WM?: Tally 2, Tally 2.
WM: Turning into me.
RIO: Roger that, 5 miles . . . four miles. [probably straining while
pulling G, or else just tensed up]
P: OK, he's got a missile off [Wingman has fired]
RIO: ("Break it," or "Breaking") right.
P: OK.
WM?: Good hit, good hit on 1!!
RIO: Roger that, good kill, good kill!!
P: I've got the other one!
RIO: Select Fox Two, select Fox Two.
P: I (have?) Fox Two.
Unk. Keep a good eye on the trailer.
Unk. Coming hard starboard.
P: No fucking . . .
RIO: Shoot him!
P: I haven't got a tone.
WM?: (Get?) the second one!
P: I got the second one on the nose right now!
WM: OK, I'm high cover on you.
P: Get a (lock?), lock him up.
Unk. (Unint.)
P: Lock him up!
RIO: (unint.) shoot?, Fox Two.
P: I can't, I don't have a fucking tone!, (select?) [Pilot may have
forgotten to change from AIM-7 to AIM-9, despite being reminded by RIO.
Or, he may have had a bad missile, and had to bypass the selected one.
Or, according to one account, the AIM-9 audio had been inadvertently
turned off at some point in the flight. Almost immediately after a word
that sounds like "select," the tone is heard]
<Sound of Sidewinder growl, followed by pitch change>
Unk. Background voices, unint. Sidewinder launch.
P: Good kill, Good kill!!
RIO: OK, good kill!
Unk.: Pilot ejected.
Unk: Roger, get out of there as fast as you can.
Unk. OK, Maestro, let's head north, head north!
WM? OK, port side high, I'm coming down hard.
P: Roger.
RIO: Roger that, (unint.) we're going north, let's go down low, on the
deck, unload, 500 knots, let's get out of here!
Fritz_Gunter
that the the RIO who fired the AIM-7 did so wothout clearance to
fire, and the pilot was disgusted with him. I'll post an actual
source for that as sson as I can find it.
Dave
Dave
"Vincent VAGNER" <vincent...@de.edfgdf.fr> ha scritto nel messaggio
news:398ECFBB...@de.edfgdf.fr...
> Hello all
>
> Do some of you ever tried to transcript the audio chat of the US pilots
> during this
> encounter ? I did but it's real hard and i'd like to compare with some
> other work.
> Will publish it someday on my "to be" website.
g_al...@hotmail.com
Fritz_Gunter <iamfritz...@hotmail.com.invalid> wrote:
> I'll have to look it up, but I remember reading in two sources
> that the the RIO who fired the AIM-7 did so wothout clearance to
> fire, and the pilot was disgusted with him. I'll post an actual
> source for that as sson as I can find it.
Read the transcripts posted starting from "Warning Yellow, Weapons Hold"
and ending with "Oh, Jesus!"
Ain't no doubt about it.
Guy
Dweezil Dwarftosser
> Fritz_Gunter <iamfritz...@hotmail.com.invalid> wrote:
> > I'll have to look it up, but I remember reading in two sources
> > that the the RIO who fired the AIM-7 did so wothout clearance to
> > fire, and the pilot was disgusted with him. I'll post an actual
> > source for that as sson as I can find it.
>
> Read the transcripts posted starting from "Warning Yellow, Weapons Hold"
> and ending with "Oh, Jesus!"
>
> Ain't no doubt about it.
>
> Guy
I'm very surprised. You can't fire an AIM-7 (or any A/A weapon) from
the back seat of an F-4.
- John T.
g_al...@hotmail.com
In the F-14, the RIO can fire Phoenixes or Sparrows. There's a large
red pushbutton "LAUNCH" switch on the missile control panel. Only the
pilot can fire guns and AIM-9s.
The reason for the RIO being given firing authority is presumably due to
the AWG-9/AIM-54's 6 target capability. The RIO has better
radar information available to him than the pilot does, has control of
the radar, and can assign Phoenixes manually to targets if he chooses to
(there's an auto mode where the computer allocates them). I used to
play the Microprose F-14 sim, and it's a hell of a lot easier to keep
track of a BVR tactical situation from the back seat. I almost always
fired AIM-54s from back there, and sometimes AIM-7s.
F-14Ds are presumably more user friendly about sharing info between the
two cockpits (MPDs), but the F-14A/B really needs two people for BVR.
It's not like an F-15E, where the front seater can run the whole A/A
intercept from the front, if he chooses. The F-14A was just too early
for the technology to make that possible.
Vincent VAGNER
I'm back. Got your transcript Guy ! And will work on it tonight. I'm
sure we can have it 100 % ok soon.
Did you read Tomcat story by P. Gillcrist ? There's a description of this
fight
and though the facts seem consistent with the audio, some of the pilots
quotes
are not. anyway, it's a good source. Apparently, the lead RIO was VF32
skipper.
And the wingman was the CAG ops officer. Will confirm that soon.
g_al...@hotmail.com a écrit :
> In article <yUpm5.6642$Cg1....@news3.atl>,
> Dweezil Dwarftosser <wc...@usa.net> wrote:
g_al...@hotmail.com
vincent...@de.edfgdf.fr wrote:
> Hi
> I'm back. Got your transcript Guy ! And will work on it tonight. I'm
> sure we can have it 100 % ok soon.
> Did you read Tomcat story by P. Gillcrist ? There's a description of
this
> fight
> and though the facts seem consistent with the audio, some of the
pilots
> quotes
> are not. anyway, it's a good source. Apparently, the lead RIO was VF32
> skipper.
> And the wingman was the CAG ops officer. Will confirm that soon.
I couldn't remember if he was the CO or XO; my memory said XO. Oh, and
I've been told by those more familiar with navy radio calls than I am,
that "Alpha Bravo" is the call sign used by the fficer in Tactical
Command (OTC), not the AAWC. I'd always assumed that it referred to the
Kennedy's Air Wing in some way (AB tailcodes), and by extension to the
Kennedy herself, but that's apparently not the case.
Ken
r,
Boz
Hi
I'm back. Got your transcript Guy ! And will work on it tonight. I'm
sure we can have it 100 % ok soon.
Did you read Tomcat story by P. Gillcrist ? There's a description of
this
fight
and though the facts seem consistent with the audio, some of the
pilots
quotes
are not. anyway, it's a good source. Apparently, the lead RIO was VF32
skipper.
And the wingman was the CAG ops officer. Will confirm that soon.
g_al...@hotmail.com a écrit :
> In article <yUpm5.6642$Cg1....@news3.atl>,
> Dweezil Dwarftosser <wc...@usa.net> wrote:
> In the F-14, the RIO can fire Phoenixes or Sparrows. There's a large
> red pushbutton "LAUNCH" switch on the missile control panel. Only the
> pilot can fire guns and AIM-9s.
>
> The reason for the RIO being given firing authority is presumably due to
> the AWG-9/AIM-54's 6 target capability. The RIO has better
> radar information available to him than the pilot does, has control of
> the radar, and can assign Phoenixes manually to targets if he chooses to
> (there's an auto mode where the computer allocates them). I used to
> play the Microprose F-14 sim, and it's a hell of a lot easier to keep
> track of a BVR tactical situation from the back seat. I almost always
> fired AIM-54s from back there, and sometimes AIM-7s.
>
> F-14Ds are presumably more user friendly about sharing info between the
> two cockpits (MPDs), but the F-14A/B really needs two people for BVR.
> It's not like an F-15E, where the front seater can run the whole A/A
> intercept from the front, if he chooses. The F-14A was just too early
> for the technology to make that possible.
>
Vincent VAGNER
not
the wingman RIO. And the lead pilot was the VF32 skipper.
About the transcript, Guy, your's is more accurate than mine. You sure have
spent
a lot of time on it. Nevertheless, i've got some corrections, particularly
about
"who speaks". Will send you the last version. Again, it was a pretty job you
made.
Vincent
Ken a écrit :
Vincent VAGNER
Who is exactlythe OTC (off. in tac.cmd), and what is its role regarding the
AWC(air warfare commander or coordonator) ?
Vincent
g_al...@hotmail.com a écrit :
> In article <399AB024...@de.edfgdf.fr>,
> vincent...@de.edfgdf.fr wrote:
> > Hi
> > I'm back. Got your transcript Guy ! And will work on it tonight. I'm
> > sure we can have it 100 % ok soon.
> > Did you read Tomcat story by P. Gillcrist ? There's a description of
> this
> > fight
> > and though the facts seem consistent with the audio, some of the
> pilots
> > quotes
> > are not. anyway, it's a good source. Apparently, the lead RIO was VF32
> > skipper.
> > And the wingman was the CAG ops officer. Will confirm that soon.
>
> I couldn't remember if he was the CO or XO; my memory said XO. Oh, and
> I've been told by those more familiar with navy radio calls than I am,
> that "Alpha Bravo" is the call sign used by the fficer in Tactical
> Command (OTC), not the AAWC. I'd always assumed that it referred to the
> Kennedy's Air Wing in some way (AB tailcodes), and by extension to the
> Kennedy herself, but that's apparently not the case.
>
Vincent et Hélčne Vagner
AE (Indy) to AC (JFK) around 86 . Don't remember about AB. America got AB
(CVW 1 ?)
Brian D. Nelson
March. My brother was there as part of VMFA-251.
--
Tight Lines!
Brian D. Nelson
Diamond N Outfitters, Missoula, Montana
http://www.montana.com/dno/dno.htm
diam...@montana.com
406-626-4022
Vincent et Hélčne Vagner <vincent...@fnac.net> wrote in message
news:8nhcjf$2fmc$1...@news4.isdnet.net...
g_al...@hotmail.com
vincent...@de.edfgdf.fr wrote:
> Hi again Guy
>
> Who is exactlythe OTC (off. in tac.cmd), and what is its role
regarding the
> AWC(air warfare commander or coordonator) ?
>
> Vincent
Those with the official definition will correct me, I hope, but as i
understand it the OTC is the person running the whole task group for
battle, whether that's the Task Group commander or someone designated by
him. He's at the top of the pyramid, with the AAWC, ASWC, ASuWC etc.
working under him.
Christopher Biow
>g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
>>I couldn't remember if he was the CO or XO; my memory said XO. Oh, and
>>I've been told by those more familiar with navy radio calls than I am,
>>that "Alpha Bravo" is the call sign used by the fficer in Tactical
>>Command (OTC), not the AAWC. I'd always assumed that it referred to the
>>Kennedy's Air Wing in some way (AB tailcodes), and by extension to the
>>Kennedy herself, but that's apparently not the case.
>I remember the planes of VF32 transited from
>AE (Indy) to AC (JFK) around 86 . Don't remember about AB. America got AB
>(CVW 1 ?)
Those are tail letters. Nothing to do with radio callsigns.
Guy is correct. As a Navy Task Force callsign, Alpha Bravo is something
like the OTC, who would be an Admiral, in the case of a carrier battle
group. I don't recall them all (there *is* an Alpha Alpha...), but here are
a few.
AP - Strike Warfare Commander
AS - ASW Warfare Commander
AW - AAW Warfare Commander
The first two were a hat worn by the Super CAG when I was at sea, roughly
86-89. He was also FOTC; officially Force Over-the-horizon Targeting
Coordinator, pronounced "fotsee." As in "I'm feeling really fotsee
today--drank too much last night at the Club." All three of these
responsibilities were actually carried out by aviators drawn from the
Airwing, standing a watch we referred to as "Tactical Watch Action Team"
(made for a great acronym). CAG hardly ever stopped by to check on us, so
it was basically a bunch of rank amateurs put in charge of the Surface
battle. For training, they gave us a week at the boat, while a procession
of blackshoes paraded through the compartment, spewing Shoe acronyms at us.
The only adult supervision was the occasional visit from a Flag or Air Wing
staffer. But we considered it revenge for the long-term role of Shoes as
AW, screwing up the Air battle as badly as we screwed up the Surface
picture. I won't even bother going into the politics which gave rise to
this ridiculous situation.
Ken
the RIOs was the CAG ops o.
r,
Boz
Vincent VAGNER
Vincent
g_al...@hotmail.com a écrit :
>
>
Kurt Plummer
Couple Questions?
As I understand it, whatever international aerial navigation laws cover this
kind of situation require one party to a valid intercept to submit to close
approach from a given side, aspect and closure. And the other to make that
safe approach and ID and if need be to issue steering commands relative to
the safety of traffic or military condition applicable (IAR corridor,
declared emergency, state of war or peace etc.).
What I don't get is how this applies to overwater ops in as small a pond as
the Mediterranean and specifically to a given 'globe of territoriality'
around a CVBG.
Is it 'written' somewhere that the CVBG must be treated as a representative
landmass equivalent to say an ++embassy++ a given nm safety zone or is it
simply 'a given' that thou shalt accept escort away or be treated to the
consequences?
And did Khadaffi deliberately violate this or was there some legal merit to
his own challenge inherent to say the disagreement over how wide his
territorial waters mandate should extend (i.e. how close were they to him,
had we been sending 'recce' aircraft even closer to a nominal 12 mile limit
ourselves etc.?)
Next, were the Floggers E/S types or more advanced G/K's (duuuuh, I think I
have my suffixes right Skip Spin vs. High Lark anyhow) and if the latter
could the various buzzes and pings have denoted the Libyans locking up?
The implication for weapons hold until so /very late/ in the game is that
this was a regular occurence and the players were used to mixing it up
without real BVR check moves. I would think that, especially with the AWG,
you could be taking Sparrow shots from as far as 17-19nm out yet they were a
LOT closer?
And once it was all over, did we do anything 'proactively' to stop this from
reoccurring or did Libya herself back down? I'm thinking killing or jamming
the radar. Putting below-horizon second sections to drag the MiG's across
instead of forcing a nose:nose 'refusal of aspect' chicken game and so on.
Lastly, with all the bad mouthing that has occured over the years concerning
the Flogger's G/Sweep limitations, for the given entry airspeed and assuming
we could deny the R-24T or R-60M FQ shot, was there much doubt about the
given maneuver-to-X (stern shot aspects) capability or did the Toms yielding
of altitude without really pumping up the airspeed mean that they couldn't
play an extended vertical game back up and over the threat section?
Oh, I forgot one. /Is there/ evidence that the MiG's, either on their own
eyeballs, through the IRST or by radar, had their own shots set up?
I don't really feel much pity for the man or his countries 'face' but to me,
the pilots were simply being fighter jocks come out to play and wave flag
(albeit with live weapons IIRC the TCS images). It would be nice to know
the legalities around the engagement itself and what we could have done
better.
Thanks- Kurt Plummer
Oh /blast/. Were they using AIM-7F or M and which submodel? Does anyone
know? Thanks again...
g_al...@hotmail.com wrote:
> In article <399BB62B...@de.edfgdf.fr>,
> vincent...@de.edfgdf.fr wrote:
> > Hi again Guy
> >
> > Who is exactlythe OTC (off. in tac.cmd), and what is its role
> regarding the
> > AWC(air warfare commander or coordonator) ?
> >
> > Vincent
>
Yeff
Kurt Plummer<ch1...@earthlink.net> wrote in
rec.aviation.military:
>
> Guy,
>
> Couple Questions?
>
> As I understand it, whatever international aerial navigation laws cover this
> kind of situation require one party to a valid intercept to submit to close
> approach from a given side, aspect and closure. And the other to make that
> safe approach and ID and if need be to issue steering commands relative to
> the safety of traffic or military condition applicable (IAR corridor,
> declared emergency, state of war or peace etc.).
I believe the MiGs had reacted to a RC-135 (Rivet Joint)
which they weren't known to do (USAF having flown many
such missions before). The Tomcats were providing CAP
for the RJ and the ROE defined the Libyan reaction as
"assumed hostile intent." The MiGs were splashed.
I seem to remember the news talking about how the MiGs
had "maneuvered in a hostile way." I also remember the
gun camera footage "proving" the MiGs were carrying
missiles. So what. If an unidentified aircraft penetrates
our ADIZ then we go take a look - loaded for bear.
But this is still a grey area. The Libyans didn't
normally react so if they did then they must have
been up to no good. Do you risk lives waiting to
see if they're going to play nice or do you shoot
'em in the face?
The Libyans had shown us earlier that they weren't
above shooting at our forces so we couldn't take
any chances.
Legal? Doesn't the winning side get to decide?
-Jeff B.
yeff at erols dot com
Vincent VAGNER
your manoeuver aimed at getting offset angle -for a side intercept and escort-,
and
they get head-on with you), and they do that 5 times in a row, then they're
treated as hostile. The decision to shoot was let on the section commander
(lead pilot or lead RIO in this case).
I've never heard of the Rivet Joint presence though ...
Vincent
Yeff a écrit :
g_al...@hotmail.com
Kurt Plummer <ch1...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> Guy,
>
> Couple Questions?
>
> As I understand it, whatever international aerial navigation laws
cover this
> kind of situation require one party to a valid intercept to submit to
close
> approach from a given side, aspect and closure. And the other to make
that
> safe approach and ID and if need be to issue steering commands
relative to
> the safety of traffic or military condition applicable (IAR corridor,
> declared emergency, state of war or peace etc.).
>
pond as
> the Mediterranean and specifically to a given 'globe of
territoriality'
> around a CVBG.
>
> Is it 'written' somewhere that the CVBG must be treated as a
representative
> landmass equivalent to say an ++embassy++ a given nm safety zone or is
it
> simply 'a given' that thou shalt accept escort away or be treated to
the
> consequences?
>
>> And did Khadaffi deliberately violate this or was there some legal
merit to
> his own challenge inherent to say the disagreement over how wide his
> territorial waters mandate should extend (i.e. how close were they to
him,
> had we been sending 'recce' aircraft even closer to a nominal 12 mile
limit
> ourselves etc.?)
Beats me.
>
> Next, were the Floggers E/S types or more advanced G/K's (duuuuh, I
think I
> have my suffixes right Skip Spin vs. High Lark anyhow) and if the
latter
> could the various buzzes and pings have denoted the Libyans locking
up?
They were Bs or Gs. I've long wondered if the four beeps were either
an in-range indication or else the RWR indicating a lock-on, but can't
remember if anyone ever answered that one. Given that we had long since
had them locked up, we can hardly claim that a lock-on is evidence of
hostile intent (as we do frequently over Iraq) without blowing our own
claim for self-defense.
>
> The implication for weapons hold until so /very late/ in the game is
that
> this was a regular occurence and the players were used to mixing it up
> without real BVR check moves. I would think that, especially with the
AWG,
> you could be taking Sparrow shots from as far as 17-19nm out yet they
were a
> LOT closer?
Given the altitudes, speeds and snap-up, I'm not sure that they weren't
at max. range. ISTR being told by someone that the main reason the
Sparrows missed was because they were fired at max. range, but don't
quote me on that. Lodge fired at 8 and 6 miles in a somewhat similar
shot on 10 May 1972 (his targets were at 13-16kft, while this one was at
9kft). He was using AIM-7E-2s; these were almost certainly Fs or Ms
(don't know which) which are often claimed to have approximately twice
the range of the E/E-2.
> And once it was all over, did we do anything 'proactively' to stop
this from
> reoccurring or did Libya herself back down? I'm thinking killing or
jamming
> the radar. Putting below-horizon second sections to drag the MiG's
across
> instead of forcing a nose:nose 'refusal of aspect' chicken game and so
on.
I imagine everyone cooled it for a while.
>
> Lastly, with all the bad mouthing that has occured over the years
concerning
> the Flogger's G/Sweep limitations, for the given entry airspeed and
assuming
> we could deny the R-24T or R-60M FQ shot, was there much doubt about
the
> given maneuver-to-X (stern shot aspects) capability or did the Toms
yielding
> of altitude without really pumping up the airspeed mean that they
couldn't
> play an extended vertical game back up and over the threat section?
No idea. I wouldn't think the Toms would be too worried about getting
in the Floggers sixes, given that they were probably sitting nicely
above corner and ready to haul it around. The wingman was apparently
split high right, so they apparently had them bracketed. There was an
article published in Time or Newsweek back then which included a
diagram showing where everyone was and where they went, but from what I
recall there were the usual errors, so I don't put a whole lot of faith
in it.
>
> Oh, I forgot one. /Is there/ evidence that the MiG's, either on their
own
> eyeballs, through the IRST or by radar, had their own shots set up?
>
> I don't really feel much pity for the man or his countries 'face' but
to me,
> the pilots were simply being fighter jocks come out to play and wave
flag
> (albeit with live weapons IIRC the TCS images). It would be nice to
know
> the legalities around the engagement itself and what we could have
done
> better.
I remember that the U.S. showed some video and stills at the time from
the TCS, in which we claimed that missiles could be seen. Looking at
them, all I could ID were pylons and/or launch shoes (can't remember
which), not missiles themselves. I've seen other stills since, can't
remember if it was from that incident or not, in which the missile
wings/fins can clearly be seen on a MiG-23 taped from the rear. In that
instance it was carrying the full load of 6, plus a C/L tank IIRR. But
again, from the video shown at the UN at the time of the '89 incident,
it was impossible (for me, anyway) to say that the a/c were definitely
armed.
g_al...@hotmail.com
vincent...@de.edfgdf.fr wrote:
> I think the ROE at the time were , if the bogeys jink on you (means
they counter
> your manoeuver aimed at getting offset angle -for a side intercept and
escort-,
> and
> they get head-on with you), and they do that 5 times in a row, then
they're
> treated as hostile. The decision to shoot was let on the section
commander
> (lead pilot or lead RIO in this case).
>
> I've never heard of the Rivet Joint presence though ...
>
> Vincent
I doubt that RoE would ever specify the number of times that a target
corrects back into you as a requirement for hostile determination.
Besides, let's not forget that they were merely countering our attempts
to take an offset so that we could do a stern conversion, which hardly
qualfies as hostility in my book.
Guy
P.S. If Morris was the battle group commander, then he'd presumably be
the OTC if he was present.
Vincent VAGNER
fight,
which you don't seem to have Guy, we hear again the same beeps, and i
always assumed it was the pilot switching master arm off.
Guy, may I ask you if you worked in the US Navy fighter community ?
It's just because of the lot of knowledge you've got about this subject .
g_al...@hotmail.com a écrit :
g_al...@hotmail.com
vincent...@de.edfgdf.fr wrote:
> I think the beep sounds come from the master arm switch. At the end of
the
> fight,
> which you don't seem to have Guy, we hear again the same beeps, and i
> always assumed it was the pilot switching master arm off.
No, I don't think so. The problem is, the master arm switch is in the
front cockpit, and we hear the beeps the first time before the RIO tells
the pilot "Master Arm on, Master Arm on," and the pilot then calls "good
light, good light." ISTM that it's the RIO who initiated that sequence,
rather than the pilot turning the master arm on first.
>
> Guy, may I ask you if you worked in the US Navy fighter community ?
> It's just because of the lot of knowledge you've got about this
subject .
No, Vincent, I've never worked in the business, either military or
private. Let's just say that interest since I was a child has caused me
to read widely in the subject and talk with lots of people who are
involved in it, so I can talk the talk pretty well; when I go to
airshows or similar events, I find that most crews are happy to talk in
depth with someone who doesn't ask them "what kind of a/c is this?", but
who has the background to ask intelligent questions and understand the
answers.
I've also got a good memory that let's me remember details well, and
cross-reference them with information from other sources. I've got a
fair number of friends who are or have been in military-aviation related
jobs, and I've also flown private planes, which helps to get a bit of a
feel for what's involved. And of course, I've benefitted from talking
with the wealth of people on the newsgroup who have 'been there and done
that.' In short, I'm just a buff, like many here on r.a.m.
Guy
Mary Shafer
> And did Khadaffi deliberately violate this or was there some legal
> merit to his own challenge inherent to say the disagreement over how
> wide his territorial waters mandate should extend (i.e. how close
> were they to him, had we been sending 'recce' aircraft even closer
> to a nominal 12 mile limit ourselves etc.?)
There are internationally accepted rules on how to draw the
twelve-mile limit, particularly around bays. The mouth of the shore
indentation (the erstwhile "bay") can't be bigger than some distance
for you to be able to draw a line from side to side and project the
twelve-mile from the line. That is, you can draw a line from one side
of the Golden Gate to the other and measure the twelve miles from that
line, instead of using the Contra Costa shore, because that's only
about a mile, but you can't draw the line from Point Dume to Point
Conception, because that's about 70 miles (the twelve-mile limit would
be inside that line, if you could draw it).
Khadaffi was setting the territorial limit by regarding a coastal
indentation as a bay, which is where the dispute over territoriality
came in.
--
Mary Shafer
sha...@orville.dfrc.nasa.gov Of course I don't speak for NASA
Senior Handling Qualities Research Engineer
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA
For non-aerospace mail, use sha...@spdcc.com please
Christopher Biow
>I've long wondered if the four beeps were either
>an in-range indication or else the RWR indicating a lock-on, but can't
>remember if anyone ever answered that one.
It sounded to me like the beeps occurred just as the jets descended through
5000 feet. It's SOP for Navy pilots to set the radar altimeter alarm at
5000 (the max that the radalt will do) when flying at altitude. That gives
an inattentive aircrew a wake-up call if they aren't paying attention to
their altitude.
When the radalt alarm goes off, the pilot resets it to a lower altitude,
below which he does not intend to fly. It then again serves as a safety
backup.
The ALR-45/50 Radar Warning Receivers puts out all sorts of beeps and
boops--so much that the 50 must often be turned off (by pulling the
breaker) in an electronics-intensive situation. Some mo-ron engineer set
the ALR-50's volume at deafening level, with no facility for adjustment
below depot-level maintenance. So when it's false-alarming every ten
seconds, it becomes worse than useless. But unless my memory of the tones
is failing me, the beeps are from the radalt, not the ALRs.