P-51 D mustang vs F-4u corsair
Mindy
I would say that the P-51 and the F-4u corsair were the 2 best American
fighters of world war 2,of these 2 fighters which was the best?I would
say the corsair because it beats the p-51 D in almost all areas except
for top speed.I would like to hear other comments on this subject.
Randy Wilson
Mindy wrote:
Could we at least use the correct designation for the WWII Vought Corsair
figher - F4U, not F "dash" 4U. Lets also remember that P-51s did not have
to land on carrier decks, eh? It makes a difference in design and
performance. I won't even bring up the FG or F3A. Sorry, but as an
historian, I get tired of the common misuse of incorrect designations. If
anyone is interested, I've got an article on my home page about the USN's
WWII aircraft designation system. Fly safe.
--
Randy Wilson
Aviation Historian & Pilot
Email: avhi...@lx.net
My Aviation History Page: http://www.lx.net/rwilson/
C.C. Jordan
On Sat, 31 Jan 1998 15:19:23 -0800, Mindy <lo...@pacbell.net> wrote:
>I would say that the P-51 and the F-4u corsair were the 2 best American
>fighters of world war 2,of these 2 fighters which was the best?I would
>say the corsair because it beats the p-51 D in almost all areas except
>for top speed.I would like to hear other comments on this subject.
Let's see.......... The F4U-1D was a bit slower than the P-51D........
Ah, and then there was the late war F4U-4. It was a tad faster than the Mustang,
out climbs it at any altitude as well. It can out turn it at any speed, match it
in a roll, and fly just about as high too. The F4U-4 can haul about twice the
bomb load, and has a radius of action that is quite impressive. The big Corsair
has the advantage of an extremely durable airframe combined with the absolute
reliability of the R-2800 powerplant vs the P-51's delicate ethylene glycol
cooling system. The Mustang offers better outward vision and a higher critical
mach number. The Corsair's trump card is it's ability to fly from both land and
carrier, giving it a big edge in utility. Both aircraft display handling
qualities that made them a handful for the novice, especially at low speed.
In the classic equal pilot skill dogfight, I feel the advantage goes to the
F4U-4. However, an equally well flown P-38L will kill either. ;-)
I would vote for the F4U-4 as the best OVERALL single engine fighter of
WWII. The P-38L wins the twin engine catagory hands down, and is a better
air to air fighter than either the F4U or P-51, especially down in the tree
tops.
Best regards,
C.C. Jordan
"Passion and prejudice govern the world; only
under the name of reason".
John Wesley
http://www.Aerodyne-controls.com
Aerodyne Controls Corporation: A division of Circle Seal Controls.
Pierre Henri Baras
I totally agree with your first conclusion, even if some purists often
oppose the F-6F to the F-4U. But they are 2 completely different planes,
just as the Corsair and the Mustang.
The Mustang had a high top speed, to intercept high german bombers. He
also had a greater climb rate. The Corsair, meant to be carrier based, was
much more tougher: a shot in the engine would not kill the pilot. In the
P-51 it did. The F-4 was easier to maintain, but also had a bit less
firepower on most versions. The late F-4U-2 had a radar for night
interception, which I don't think the Mustang ever had.
I think the Mustang made more aces than the Corsair(so did the Hellcat)
.
Both planes entered service approximately at the same time, the Corsair
in the pacific and the Mustang over europe, but the Corsair lasted longer.
The only report of ever lasting P-51's was the use of them by Israel in the
late 50's with Spitfires to cut arabe power lines. The Corsair however was
used by many countries: Australia, New Zealand, France in Indochina, and the
USAF (or NAVY i'm not sure) in Korea. I don't recall the Mustang being
operationnal anywhere later exept in the beginning of the Korean war .
Further more, the F-4U downed at least one Mig-15; I don't think the P-51
ever did.
But to stay in WW II, the 2 planes were too different to be compared,
even if the Corsair was a lot more polyvalent than the Mustang.
Mindy a écrit dans le message <34D3B1...@pacbell.net>...
Emmanuel Gustin
Mindy wrote in message <34D3B1...@pacbell.net>...
>I would say that the P-51 and the F-4u corsair were the 2 best American
>fighters of world war 2,of these 2 fighters which was the best?I would
>say the corsair because it beats the p-51 D in almost all areas except
>for top speed.I would like to hear other comments on this subject.
Speed: The P-51 was indeed slightly faster, despite its lower engine
power, being a far better streamlined design. Higher altitudes probably
favour the P-51 even more. At low altitudes the advantage would probably
go to an F4U with water injection.
Handling: The F4U probably has the higher roll rate. But the P-51 has the
better handling, if not overloaded with fuel. Handling characteristics of
the P-51 have been described as excellent, if perhaps a bit bland. The F4U
had
poorly balanced controls and some tricky characteristics.
Cockpit: The P-51B had an unsatisfactory cockpit canopy with too many
frames on little rearward view, but the P-51D had an excellent "bubble"
cockpit. The F4U-1 started with one of the worst of the war, but the
raised cockpits of later models gave their pilots a marginally acceptable
outside view.
Vulnerability: The F4U is the sturdier and more damage-resistant aircraft.
Armament: The same, except for the F4U-1C that had four 20mm cannon,
a far more powerful armament, but apparently the installation was not
reliable enough to be satisfactory.
Conclusion: Outcome of course depends on the pilot and the tactical
conditions more than on the aircraft. I think the P-51 was the better,
more balanced, more refined design. The F4U represented the
"brute force" approach to engineering.
Emmanuel Gustin
tay
Pierre Henri Baras <lba...@infonie.fr> wrote in article
<886343456.192487@si2-paris>wrote:
> The only report of ever lasting P-51's was the use of them by Israel in
the
> late 50's with Spitfires to cut arabe power lines. The Corsair however
was
> used by many countries: Australia, New Zealand, France in Indochina, and
the
> USAF (or NAVY i'm not sure) in Korea.
I take no stand on this issue but here is a small factual and chronological
correction. P-51D Mustang was used by the IAF to cut Egyptian
communication
lines rather than power line. That was on 29th October 1956, during the
Sinai
campaign and no Spitfire was involved.
> I don't recall the Mustang being operationnal anywhere later exept in the
> beginning of the Korean war .
The Sinai campaign took place several years after termination of
hostilities in
Korea and in it the P-51D has been used operationally in scores of ground
attack
missions. Pilots lieutenant Uri Shlezinger and squadron leader Moshe
Tadmor
hit by AA and were killed. Pilot captain Eldad Paz was hit by AA fire,
belly landed
and spent 37 hours walking in the desert until rescued.
Tay
Jeff Shultz
On Sun, 1 Feb 1998 15:26:21 +0100, Pierre Henri Baras
wrote:
:>The only report of ever lasting P-51's was the use of them by Israel in the
:>late 50's with Spitfires to cut arabe power lines.
I believe that the Dominican Republic was flying P-51's as
it's frontline aircraft into the 1980's... They weren't
really effective at it, but it was all they had...
Jeff Shultz
http://www.netcom.com/~jbshultz
Less than a year left in the Army - and this time I mean it!
ch1...@earthlink.net
Hey Emmanuel,
A lot (most, all?) of the F4U-4 shots I've seen also show the quad 20's.
So to do the later F4U-5/U-7 I think. Were these 'fixed' versions
(differences in ROF, Magazine counts, Mv as well as action-jam
improvements)?
Also, which is better for A/G use as manifested in so many post-war
Corsair ops, more/faster .50's or heavier-explosive 20mm's? Were any
Corsairs given a 'universal Spitfire' type wing and therefore able to
field-switch their gun armaments?
Thanks.
Jeff Harrison
Of course the US Navy concluded after WW2 that the best fighter to come out
of that conflict (no exceptions) was the Ki-84 "Frank".
Jeff
David Lesher
"Jeff Shultz" <jbsh...@ix.netcom.com> writes:
>I believe that the Dominican Republic was flying P-51's as
>it's frontline aircraft into the 1980's... They weren't
>really effective at it, but it was all they had...
Remember that most 3rd World countries {and trust me on this,
I've been to DR & it IS one...} use their AF in ground-attack
mode.
The mere fact they fly, and are armed, is more important than
how well they dogfight against MIG-25's or F-14's....
--
A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
Ron
In article <6b0tnm$l...@bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net> C.C. Jordan,
C.C.J...@Worldnet.att.net writes:
>Let's see.......... The F4U-1D was a bit slower than the P-51D........
>Ah, and then there was the late war F4U-4. It was a tad faster than the Mustang,
>out climbs it at any altitude as well. It can out turn it at any speed, match it
>in a roll, and fly just about as high too. The F4U-4 can haul about twice the
>bomb load, and has a radius of action that is quite impressive. The big Corsair
>has the advantage of an extremely durable airframe combined with the absolute
>reliability of the R-2800 powerplant vs the P-51's delicate ethylene glycol
>cooling system. The Mustang offers better outward vision and a higher critical
>mach number. The Corsair's trump card is it's ability to fly from both land and
>carrier, giving it a big edge in utility. Both aircraft display handling
>qualities that made them a handful for the novice, especially at low speed.
>
I had always thought the Corsair had a larger engine than the R-2800.
I never see anyone mention the Jug in these discussions (it did use the
R-2800) and had always thought that many of the actual WWII types thought
it to be the best.
Ron
C.C. Jordan
On Sun, 1 Feb 1998 00:32:12 -0900, "Jeff Harrison" <jsh...@ptialaska.net> wrote:
>Of course the US Navy concluded after WW2 that the best fighter to come out
>of that conflict (no exceptions) was the Ki-84 "Frank".
>
>Jeff
Gee Jeff, do you have a citation for this, or did you just happen to read
it somewhere? The reason I ask is that there is a huge volume of data
available and sifting through it, I have not seen any such report published
by the Navy. It may exist, but I haven't seen it.
I have seen a Navy test report that detailed the Ki-84's strong performance,
but I don't recall them making such a strong claim.
So lets discuss what what the Ki-84 could do, and could not do.
It could out climb all allied fighters below 5,000 ft.
Above 5,000 ft, it's climb ability fell off quickly. It had a slight edge on the
P-38L until 5,000 feet where the they were about equal. Above this altitude
the P-38L pulled away and at 10,000 ft, the P-38L was climbing at a rate 30%
better than the Ki-84.
Early models of the Ki-84 had a maximum speed of about 390 mph at 20,000 ft.
Slower than the F6F-5, F4U-1, P-47D, P-51D and any model of the P-38.
Later models of the Ki-84 (tested by the US military) could reach 426 mph at
20,500 ft in WEP for about 4 minutes. It has been reported that this is slightly
faster than a P-51D. Well, it is IF the P-51 is at full military power. In WEP,
the Mustang will walk away.
At 21,000 ft, the P-38L, in WEP can exceed 440mph (for about 6 minutes)
Additionally, the Japanese did not have available the high octane fuel required
to develop the power to attain the aircraft's maximum speed. It can be safely
stated that no Japanese Ki-84 ever came close to the 426 mph figure obtained
in the US test program with US fuel.
The Ki-84 displayed terrific low speed maneuverability. The only American
fighter able to hang with it being a superbly flown late model P-38J or P-38L.
However, any error would be rewarded with the "Frank" getting around on them
quickly.
Unfortunately, the Ki-84 did not possess this advantage at highers speeds ( over
300 mph ). It too suffered from stiff and ineffective ailerons at higher speeds.
It's excellent speed was was offset by it's inability to roll worth a damn at
that high speed.
Worse still, was the relatively light construction of the Frank. It was only
slightly more damage resistant than the Zero. The Ki-84 was not stressed to
handle G loadings greater than 6 g's. It was not unlikely that a hard turn at
high speed would pull off the wings.
The Ki-84 wasn't very fast in a dive. It could not quite reach 500 mph. Whereas,
the lowly Wildcat could exceed that.
In summary, the Ki-84 was a potent low to medium altitude fighter. it was
capable of excellent speed, but was not very maneuverable until below
300 mph. At medium altitudes it did not climb better than it's enemies.
It suffered from light construction, not being able to absorb much battle
damage. It's engine was not very reliable and produced power in an
indifferent manner at times. Above 25,000 ft, it was badly outclassed by
virtually every allied fighter. As a low to medium altitude fighter, it was
always at a disadvantage to the fighter who held the edge in altitude.
Why? Because the pilot with the altitude advantage, has the energy
advantage. There is little that a Frank jock could do in dealing with a
P-38 or an F4U rolling in at better than 500 mph, except execute a hard
turn to spoil the attackers aim. That same hard turn will bleed energy,
while the attacker will trade speed for altitude and retain the altitude
advantage. In a fight such as this, the Ki-84's excellent speed is easily
negated. Moreover, he is forced to fight defensively, which in this case
means low speed turning. If the Frank had decent high altitude performance,
the pilot may try a spiraling climb..........
The published combat reports of allied pilots flying against the Frank
generally indicate that it was not a difficult plane to kill, IF YOU COULD
CATCH IT. The real danger was that if caught low and slow, the allied
pilot was in grave trouble. Can't out run the Frank, can't out turn it, big
trouble indeed. The solution to this was simple. Don't get caught low
and slow.
Fight the Frank to it's strength and you will lose more often than not.
Fight the Frank to it's weakness and it is much less formidable.
Jeff Shultz
On Mon, 2 Feb 1998 02:30:42 GMT, David Lesher wrote:
::>Remember that most 3rd World countries {and trust me on
this,
:>I've been to DR & it IS one...} use their AF in ground-attack
:>mode.
:>
:>The mere fact they fly, and are armed, is more important than
:>how well they dogfight against MIG-25's or F-14's....
The article mentioned that any time they ticked off the
Cubans, the Cubans would send a Mig-21 or 23 over to
harrass them - the P-51 pilots stayed in the hanger and
played poker.
I think that the article was as much a plea for FMS money
for a decent COIN acft like the A-37 as it was a
testimonial to the P-51 and it's D-R pilots.
CDB100620
>the Ki-84 "Frank".
The last dogfight (or one of the very last) of the war involved Ki-84s of the
47th Sentai and P-38Ls of the 35FS of the 8FG on Aug. 14, 1945. Five P-38s
flew up from Ie Shima to provide top cover for PBYs off Cape Sata in the Bungo
Strait. The P-38s were at 12,000 ft. when the Franks, diving from 18,000 ft.,
bounced them. The Ki-84 drivers' gunnery was bad, however, and they missed the
best chance they had to draw blood. The resulting fight saw one P-38 and five
Ki-84s go down.
Some time after the war, Shozo Oishi, who, had been leading the Japanese
formation that day, commented that the Ki-84 was not a stable gun platform, and
that in attacking the P-38s, the Ki-84 pilots that day--who had never seen a
P-38 before, let alone engaged one in a dogfight--had some problems. One was
the instability of their aircraft. But the others had to do with the nature of
the P-38. First, when they got on the tail of the Lockheed, it looked like a
razor blade seen edge on with three bumps along it--which bump should they aim
at? The other was that the slipstream from the twin engines of P-38 would toss
the Ki-84 around so roughly that it was impossible to hold the aircraft on the
target long enough to make an aimed shot. The P-38 that went down overshot a
Ki-84 and the Frank pilot hosed it.
Shozo thought the P-38s were monstrously ugly airplanes that moved with the
swiftness and maneuverability of eels. He broke off the engagement after
running out of blammo and scooted for Usa Field on Kyushu.
The 35th's Unit Mission Report for the day praised the combat skills of the
Japanese pilots, and noted that "not until all but one were shot down did the
single remaining enemy pilot try for a getaway." The P-38 pilots believed they
had shot down all the Japanese fighters, and also believed they only
encountered six. In fact, there were eight and three returned to based. Three
Japanese pilots bailed out and were rescued, and two were killed.
ch1...@earthlink.net
Hey Ron,
I think it was in Johnson's _Thunderbolt_ that I heard the famous quote
"If you want to be an ace, take the -51, if you want to be a veteran,
take the -47". Not word for word but close...
The P-51 is a sweet ship from all accounts but particularly once the Big
Men say that you will go down and blow up anyone you refuses to decently
come to you and be shot down, the Jug really earns it's last
name: gernaut (Indian demon-form representation of Krishna, also given
as a large, unstoppable, spiked rolling wheel).
In the later M/N models which were supposedly /so fast/ (allied to a
high terminal diving Mach) as well as Pacific-useful escort legs; I
might even prefer the 47 in the A/A role. (At that time) there were
three important things about an ACM fighter: speed, Speed, and SPEED.
Especially with the Jug's BnZ mass, everything else (inertial climb,
ceiling, unload-accel) derived from that. Mind you two more guns and a
good sight-stability factoring are nice too!:)
A/G I think the 2Khp of the 2800 would also enhance the (more commonly
seen in WWII) outer-stubpylon combinations of rockets and bombs while
/still/ allowing a centerline tank too. At least in theory, there's
probably a gross limiter in here somewhere...
R A L
Hey
Hate to be a purist nit picker, but a Corsair is an 'F4U', not an
'F-4U'. Stands for fighter - 4th design - Chance Vought. Also the same
applies to Hellcats (cited in an earlier part of this thread), 'F6F',
not 'F-6F'; fighter - 6th design - Grumman.
Thanks
Regards
R
For email, do the obvious
Gregory W Shaw
Pierre Henri Baras <lba...@infonie.fr> wrote:
> The Mustang had a high top speed, to intercept high german bombers. He
> also had a greater climb rate.
The Mustang was originally little more than an army coop, interdiction,
light strike aircraft. Designed by North American to British contract in
preference to producing the Curtis P-40. Even the early Merlin P-51B was
first used in that role, it took some maneuvering by the 8th AF to get
them reassigned from the 9th AF.
Interception was never one of the P-51s roles. The earlier P-38 and P-47
were meant as interceptors. Speed is a benefit for any fighter role. The
Mustang was blessed with probably the lowest flat plate area of any WWII
aircraft. The wing was also better at high speeds than traditional
airfoil designs. (ie it didn't start getting into compressibility
problems quite so soon) Speed was incredible considering the mediocre
installed power and fairly high weight.
Maximum usable lift co-efficient of the wing was rather low however.
This led to a mediocre climb rate and a turning circle poorer than the
wing loading would suggest. The F4U-1, F6F as well as the paddle-bladed
P-47D's were overall better climbers than the Mustang. The P-38 was in a
different class altogether.
The Mustang was a great wing/fueselage design that once given an engine
with decent altitude performance and increased internal and external
fuel capacity became a successful long-range escort.
Overall I think the P-38 was the best USAAF fighter, maybe the best
piston fighter of the war, but that has been the subject of another
thread for some time now.
>The Corsair, meant to be carrier based, was
> much more tougher: a shot in the engine would not kill the pilot. In the
> P-51 it did.
Air-cooled engines were generally more damage resistant than
liquid-cooled. Other than that the F4U might have been a little more
damage resistant, its hard to say. Pilot protection was similar, the F4U
had better protection for the main fuel tank. Fueselage strength would
probably go to the F4U and its multi-spar, fabric covered wing was
probably less vulnerable as well.
>The F-4 was easier to maintain, but also had a bit less
> firepower on most versions. The late F-4U-2 had a radar for night
> interception, which I don't think the Mustang ever had.
The F4U-1, -1a and -1d all carried six .50cal M2 Brownings. The P51B
only carried four, in a jam prone, unsatisfactory arrangement. The P51D
matched the six .50 arrangement of the F4U but with less ammunition per
gun. The F4U-1d carried a ground attack load that the Mustang couldn't
even approach.
The USAAF never had a satisfactory night fighter. I don't believe the
P-51 did ever carry a radar, I doubt its performance would have stood up
well after adding a big, draggy radar pod.
> I think the Mustang made more aces than the Corsair(so did the Hellcat)
Maybe, maybe not, I don't have my list of aces at work with me.
Different roles, different environments, not a useful comparison.
> Both planes entered service approximately at the same time, the Corsair
> in the pacific and the Mustang over europe, but the Corsair lasted longer.
I believe the Allison Mustangs were in service with the British
considerably before the Corsair entered combat in Feb '43. The P-51B
didn't begin bomber escort until Oct-Nov '43.
They both lasted through Korea in US use. They were both in foreign use
until the late '60s at least, possibly considerably later.
I would probably give a slight edge to the F4U, if only because it could
have successfully flown the P51s roles, while the reverse wasn't true.
They are both great planes and evenly enough matched that pilot skill
and altitude would be the dominant factors in any comparison between
them. Of course pilot skill and using relative strengths and weaknesses
is _always_ going to be the most important factor in any comparison.
Greg Shaw
Agtabby
>I had always thought the Corsair had a larger engine than the R-2800.
No, almost all corsairs had the 2800, same 'plant used in the hellcat, jug, and
B26.
A *few* corsairs had huge 28 cyl R4360's, but only few. I don't think they saw
combat, but not sure.
andrew
Ron
In article <34D676...@earthlink.net> , ch1...@earthlink.net writes:
>In the later M/N models which were supposedly /so fast/ (allied to a
>high terminal diving Mach) as well as Pacific-useful escort legs; I
>might even prefer the 47 in the A/A role. (At that time) there were
>three important things about an ACM fighter: speed, Speed, and SPEED.
>Especially with the Jug's BnZ mass, everything else (inertial climb,
>ceiling, unload-accel) derived from that. Mind you two more guns and a
>good sight-stability factoring are nice too!:)
>
As I recall off the top of my head, the Jug had a Mach limit above .8,
somewhere in the .82 to .84 range. That was well above the limit for the
P-80/T-33 and might have even been faster than the straight wing F-84.
Ron
Ron
In article <19980203065...@ladder02.news.aol.com> Agtabby,
agt...@aol.com writes:
>No, almost all corsairs had the 2800, same 'plant used in the hellcat, jug, and
>B26.
>
>A *few* corsairs had huge 28 cyl R4360's, but only few. I don't think they saw
>combat, but not sure.
>
I think it's those latter ones with the "corncob" on the front end that I
remember so well for the long nose.
My few hours behind R2800's were in DC-6's where they only had the engine
driven superchargers where as the fighters also had turbochargers as well.
Ron
Emmanuel Gustin
ch1...@earthlink.net wrote in message <34D54B...@earthlink.net>...
>A lot (most, all?) of the F4U-4 shots I've seen also show the quad 20's.
F4U-4 production included 297 F4U-4Bs with four 20mm cannon, but the
bulk (2050 F4U-4s) had six .50s. Only the F4U-5 (spring 1946)
standardised on the 20mm.
>So to do the later F4U-5/U-7 I think. Were these 'fixed' versions
The best explanation I have heard for the unreliability of the Hispano
cannon in the F4U-1C is insufficient gun heating (guns have to be kept
warm if you want them to function properly). Nothing some redesign
could not cure, but that would probably have interrupted production,
an undesirable thing during wartime. Anyway, the F4U-5 did have an
improved gun, the Hispano M3: Rate of fire increased to 850 rpm.
>Also, which is better for A/G use as manifested in so many post-war
>Corsair ops, more/faster .50's or heavier-explosive 20mm's?
Both for A/A and A/G use the four 20mms are the better armament.
Of course the six .50s put out more rounds, 4500 vs. 2400 per
minute; but because the 20mm projectiles were heavier the weight
of fire was 3:2 in favour of the 20mm installation. The big difference
is that a 20mm projectile had almost three times the kinetic energy
of the .50, and of course can contain much more high explosive or
incendiary material.
The USN converted almost entirely to four 20mm cannon after the
war, and even put such weapons (Colt Mk.12, not a very good gun)
on the Vietnam-era F8U Crusader.
>Were any Corsairs given a 'universal Spitfire' type wing and therefore
>able to field-switch their gun armaments?
I don't think so. Apparently cannon-armed F4Us were always built
that way. It is possible, however, that field modifications were made
to the aircraft, especially because the 20mm installation proved
troublesome. It would certainly not be the only field modification: The
bomb racks also started as a local addition.
Emmanuel Gustin
Chuck Harris
Gregory W Shaw wrote:
...
> Air-cooled engines were generally more damage resistant than
> liquid-cooled. Other than that the F4U might have been a little more
> damage resistant, its hard to say. Pilot protection was similar, the F4U
> had better protection for the main fuel tank. Fueselage strength would
> probably go to the F4U and its multi-spar, fabric covered wing was
> probably less vulnerable as well.
Fabric covered wing?...F4U?... It's always looked like aluminum to
me. Jane's says the wing is a: "Single-spar all-metal construction
with spot-welded smooth skin."
or, am I missing something?
-----
Chuck Harris - WA3UQV
cfha...@erols.com
Gregory W Shaw
Matthew Saroff (Remove 123456. to reply) <msa...@123456.pobox.com>
wrote:
> Hi,
> There was a dedicated ground attack version of the
> mustang, the A-36 (Invader?). It was used in the Mediterranean.
> It was replaced by the P-47.
The name was Apache actually. It was used as a dive bomber. The Apache's
use as a dive bomber was part of the reason the P51B was originally
assigned to the 9th AF in England rather than the 8th AF.
The British used the Allison P51 as an intruder and low-level recon
aircraft over France. I've never understood why they didn't use their
Mustang's to intercept the Jabo FW190s the Luftwaffe was raiding
southern England with at the time. The Allison Mustang was probably the
fastest fighter in service below 5k in '42-43. It would have been much
more successful in that role than the Spit Mk V or Mk IX were.
Greg Shaw
Matthew Saroff (Remove 123456. to reply)
Randy Wilson <avhi...@lx.net> wrote:
>Could we at least use the correct designation for the WWII Vought Corsair
>figher - F4U, not F "dash" 4U. Lets also remember that P-51s did not have
>to land on carrier decks, eh? It makes a difference in design and
>performance. I won't even bring up the FG or F3A. Sorry, but as an
>historian, I get tired of the common misuse of incorrect designations. If
>anyone is interested, I've got an article on my home page about the USN's
>WWII aircraft designation system. Fly safe.
This begs the question: For the Phantom, it was
originally the F4H for the navy, but it became the F-110 (I
think) and then F-4 with the air force.
--
Matthew Saroff | Standard Disclaimer: Not only do I speak for
_____ | No one else, I don't even Speak for me. All my
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Matthew Saroff (Remove 123456. to reply)
greg...@burgoyne.com (Gregory W Shaw) wrote:
>Air-cooled engines were generally more damage resistant than
>liquid-cooled. Other than that the F4U might have been a little more
>damage resistant, its hard to say. Pilot protection was similar, the F4U
>had better protection for the main fuel tank. Fueselage strength would
>probably go to the F4U and its multi-spar, fabric covered wing was
>probably less vulnerable as well.
>
Hi,
There was a dedicated ground attack version of the
mustang, the A-36 (Invader?). It was used in the Mediterranean.
It was replaced by the P-47.
The P-51 was suited to a lot of things, but it was not
the best choice for ground attack. 90% of the ground fire that
hits a plane hits in the rear fusalage, and a radiator hit means
a very short time left.
Gregg Germain
Seems to me that when you want to compare two planes like the P-51
and the F4U, you have to compare each version which coincided in time.
In other words, the P-51 vs corsair in 1942. Then compare the two
planes in '43, then '44, then '45. Comparing the best of each is only
a very small part of the picture because use decisions were made at
fixed points in time at the development of the aircraft AT that time.
And yes, the Corsair had fabric covered wings: there wwas fabric skin
aft of the main spar. Check Flying the Old Planes by Frank Tallman.
(I think it was the main spar - could have been an after spar)
--
--- Gregg
"I don't want to die, baby.
gr...@head-cfa.harvard.edu but if I gotta die......
Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics I'm gonna die last."
Phone: (617) 496-7237 Robert Mitchum
Adam Steineck
> The P-51 was suited to a lot of things, but it was not
> the best choice for ground attack.
** 90% of the ground fire that
> hits a plane hits in the rear fusalage,** and a radiator hit means
**
> a very short time left.
> --
> Matthew Saroff | Standard Disclaimer: Not only do I speak for
> _____ | No one else, I don't even Speak for me. All my
> / o o \ | personalities and the spirits that I channel
> ______|_____|_____| disavow all knowledge of my activities. ;-)
> uuu U uuu |
> | In fact, all my personalities and channeled spirits
Why is that? Doesn't flak gunnerws lead enough when they aim?
Adam Steineck
Nigel Wright
In article <1d3we8t.1kd...@pmc1.burgoyne.com>,
> The Allison Mustang was probably the
> fastest fighter in service below 5k in '42-43.
Errr.... what about the Typhoon? I thought that that was a fair bit
quicker at low level. That was in service then.
Maury Markowitz
In article <19980203065...@ladder02.news.aol.com>,
agt...@aol.com (Agtabby) wrote:
> A *few* corsairs had huge 28 cyl R4360's, but only few. I don't think
they saw
> combat, but not sure.
Nope. That was the F2G version from Goodyear, it also had a bubble
canopy. Low level performance was pretty good but it suffered higher
(which was a design tradeoff) but by the time it was ready to roll the
F4U-4's had basically the same performance.
Maury
Hawkeye
On 2 Feb 1998 11:24:52 GMT, Ron <jr...@netcom.com> wrote:
>In article <6b0tnm$l...@bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net> C.C. Jordan,
>C.C.J...@Worldnet.att.net writes:
>>Let's see.......... The F4U-1D was a bit slower than the P-51D........
>>Ah, and then there was the late war F4U-4. It was a tad faster than the Mustang,
>>out climbs it at any altitude as well. It can out turn it at any speed, match it
>>in a roll, and fly just about as high too. The F4U-4 can haul about twice the
>>bomb load, and has a radius of action that is quite impressive. The big Corsair
>>has the advantage of an extremely durable airframe combined with the absolute
>>reliability of the R-2800 powerplant vs the P-51's delicate ethylene glycol
>>cooling system. The Mustang offers better outward vision and a higher critical
>>mach number. The Corsair's trump card is it's ability to fly from both land and
>>carrier, giving it a big edge in utility. Both aircraft display handling
>>qualities that made them a handful for the novice, especially at low speed.
>>
>
>I had always thought the Corsair had a larger engine than the R-2800.
>
>I never see anyone mention the Jug in these discussions (it did use the
>R-2800) and had always thought that many of the actual WWII types thought
>it to be the best.
>
>Ron
You also can't count out the F6F Hellcat, which I believe got more
kills than any other Pacific arena aircraft. Granted, there were a lot
of them, and they were in the action longer than the Corsair, but a
lot of pilots swore by them. The P-38 can't be forgotten either, as
America's highest scoring Ace, Mr. Bong, got most of his kills in one.
Now according to Capt. Brown of the R.A.F., who made it a point to fly
as many fighter planes as he could get his hands on, rated the Mustang
as the best all around American fighter plane, but placed it 3rd
behind the FW190-D and the Spit IVX. (I think, can't say fer sure)
I really believe it all came down to pilot ability and who saw whom
first. IMO, of course.
Hawkeye
Gregory W Shaw
"Nigel Wright" <niwr...@cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote:
Different sources show the Allison Mustang at anywhere from 335-340mph
to 355- 360mph on the deck. Take your pick, one sounds awfully low, the
other a bit high, 350mph makes a good compromise. The very limited data
I have seen for the Typhoon shows it about 350-355mph.
I was recalling the 360mph figure when I wrote the above. Further
investigation shows it is probably a bit to high. Thats what I get for
posting from work when I don't have all my references with me.
The two aircraft are close enough to be tough to pick a clear winner.
Variations in individual aircraft could easily make the difference. Any
better data for the Typhoon would be welcomed.
Greg Shaw
CDB100620
>The P-38 can't be forgotten either, as
>America's highest scoring Ace, Mr. Bong, got most of his kills in one.
All of his kills in the P-38.
>according to Capt. Brown of the R.A.F., who made it a point to fly
>as many fighter planes as he could get his hands on, rated the Mustang
>as the best all around American fighter plane, but placed it 3rd
>behind the FW190-D and the Spit IVX.
This is a perfect example of how you really can't choose a "best all around
fighter." The P-51 was capable of being a long-range escort fighter, and it
was in that capacity that it earned its fame. But in that role, both the
Spitfire XIV and FW 190D were about as useful as boat anchors. Obviously,
Brown, with his FAA point of view, didn't rate the P-51's range capability as
of any great value. But for American commanders both in the ETO and the
Pacific, with the missions they were charged with carrying out, the great
range of the P-51 was its key asset.
From the American point of view, the P-51 and P-38 were the two greatest
land-based fighters of the war because they gave the USAAF force projection
capabilities far beyond anything offered by any other fighter, allied or axis.
Hawkeye
To be honest, I may have messed up Brown's estimates. I don't have
the book here in my hands, so I was relying on my memory (heh)
Now that I think harder on the subject, I think he rated the Spit IX
in first, with the FW190A-8 in second, with the mustang third. Again
here I could be wrong again. Maybe if someone has his book they could
correct me if I'm wrong. He also stated that he was rating the
fighters for their impact on the war, and not necessarily for the best
dogfighter. On another note I remember a special 5 or 6 bladed prop
that was added to the P-47 that made it a great climber, would you
happen to know about it, and the stats that show the difference in
performance? Thanks.
Hawkeye
adf...@psu.edu
> > There was a dedicated ground attack version of the
> > mustang, the A-36 (Invader?). It was used in the Mediterranean.
> > It was replaced by the P-47.
>
> use as a dive bomber was part of the reason the P51B was originally
> assigned to the 9th AF in England rather than the 8th AF.
>
> The British used the Allison P51 as an intruder and low-level recon
> aircraft over France. I've never understood why they didn't use their
> Mustang's to intercept the Jabo FW190s the Luftwaffe was raiding
> southern England with at the time. The Allison Mustang was probably the
> fastest fighter in service below 5k in '42-43. It would have been much
> more successful in that role than the Spit Mk V or Mk IX were.
>
> Greg Shaw
Actually, at about that same time (1942-43) the Hawker Typhoon was in
service. At the time, the Tiffie was the fastest fighter below 5K, IIRC.
It was used to intercept those jabo 190s during that period. It was also
a better attack aircraft.
Andy Fuller
-------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====-----------------------
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Post to Usenet
Bob Andrew
Another way to look at this: If you were a general in command of an air force and
you had to choose only 1 of these 3 fighter types to equip your fighter wings,
would you choose the FW 190-D9, the Spit 14, or the P-51D? The answer is obvious.
Nigel Wright
In article <1d403hf.19f...@pma10.burgoyne.com>,
> "Nigel Wright" <niwr...@cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > In article <1d3we8t.1kd...@pmc1.burgoyne.com>,
> > greg...@burgoyne.com (Gregory W Shaw) wrote:
> >
> > > The Allison Mustang was probably the
> > > fastest fighter in service below 5k in '42-43.
> > Errr.... what about the Typhoon? I thought that that was a fair bit
> > quicker at low level. That was in service then.
>
> Different sources show the Allison Mustang at anywhere from 335-340mph
> to 355- 360mph on the deck. Take your pick, one sounds awfully low, the
> other a bit high, 350mph makes a good compromise. The very limited data
> I have seen for the Typhoon shows it about 350-355mph.
>
> I was recalling the 360mph figure when I wrote the above. Further
> investigation shows it is probably a bit to high. Thats what I get for
> posting from work when I don't have all my references with me.
>
> The two aircraft are close enough to be tough to pick a clear winner.
> Variations in individual aircraft could easily make the difference. Any
> better data for the Typhoon would be welcomed.
>
> Greg Shaw
>
I don't have any data to hand but, I thought that the Typhoon was capable
of somewhere around 380 on the deck... certainly fast enough to allow it
to chase V1's & FW190's.
Dave Sutton
I cannot keep track of the >>, >>>, >>>> etc.... so I cut it all out!
Edited for clarity:
> > > > The Allison Mustang was probably the
> > > > fastest fighter in service below 5k in '42-43.
> > > Errr.... what about the Typhoon? I thought that that was a fair bit
> > > quicker at low level. That was in service then.
> > Different sources show the Allison Mustang at anywhere from 335-340mph
> > to 355- 360mph on the deck. Take your pick
> > The two aircraft are close enough to be tough to pick a clear winner.
> > Variations in individual aircraft could easily make the difference. Any
> > better data for the Typhoon would be welcomed.
> I don't have any data to hand but, I thought that the Typhoon was capable
> of somewhere around 380 on the deck... certainly fast enough to allow it
> to chase V1's & FW190's.
Any specs on the Yak-9? Just wondering. The Yak-11 (same wing as
Yak-9) is far faster per HP than the P-51 wing. Just curious. The Yak
enjoyed an excellent reputation as a low level fighter in the East...
Dave Sutton pil...@planet.net
Yak-50, Fouga Magister, DeHavilland Vampire, MiG-17
"There is no substitute for horsepower...."
Emmanuel Gustin
Bob Andrew wrote in message <34DF74AD...@fred.net>...
>Another way to look at this: If you were a general in command of an air
force and
>you had to choose only 1 of these 3 fighter types to equip your fighter
wings,
>would you choose the FW 190-D9, the Spit 14, or the P-51D? The answer is
obvious.
Not so. You would pick the P-51 if you needed an escort fighter (because
the others just don't have the range for it), the Fw 190D-9 if you needed an
high-altitude interceptor (with its 30mm MK 108 cannon it is the only one
with armament powerful enough to shoot down a B-17 or even B-29), and
probably the Spitfire Mk XIV if you need a short-range air superiority
fighter
(it is the most manoeuverable one, the one with the best climb performance,
and the one with the best armament for general targets).
Emmanuel Gustin
Yama
Bob Andrew wrote:
> Another way to look at this: If you were a general in command of an air force and
> you had to choose only 1 of these 3 fighter types to equip your fighter wings,
> would you choose the FW 190-D9, the Spit 14, or the P-51D? The answer is obvious.
If it so obvious, would you tell us too? Because it all depends what you need. If you
are concerned about intercepting bombers, you surely wouldn't choose P-51 which is
lame interceptor with it's machine-gun armament and mediocre climb rate. If you need
escort fighter you would abandon Spitfire because of it's lack of range. If you need
tactical fighter-bomber, you would abandon all mentioned planes and pick maybe Tempest
or Thunderbolt.
I find whole question of best all-around fighter completely academic and moot (sorry
Mr Jordan!). Success of fighting aircraft were (and are) not measured by their
suitability to roles which air force in question does not require. Many extremely
successful fighters were bad all-around planes.
It all depends what you need. What, for example, USAAF or USN would have done with
Bf-109 or Spitfire? Absolutely nothing. In a similar manner, Luftwaffe would have
found most of the famous Allied planes as completely useless for their purposes.
Yama
Bob Andrew
Emmanuel Gustin wrote:
> Bob Andrew wrote in message <34DF74AD...@fred.net>...
>
> >Another way to look at this: If you were a general in command of an air
> force and
> >you had to choose only 1 of these 3 fighter types to equip your fighter
> wings,
> >would you choose the FW 190-D9, the Spit 14, or the P-51D? The answer is
> obvious.
>
> Not so. You would pick the P-51 if you needed an escort fighter (because
> the others just don't have the range for it), the Fw 190D-9 if you needed an
> high-altitude interceptor (with its 30mm MK 108 cannon it is the only one
> with armament powerful enough to shoot down a B-17 or even B-29), and
> probably the Spitfire Mk XIV if you need a short-range air superiority
> fighter
> (it is the most manoeuverable one, the one with the best climb performance,
> and the one with the best armament for general targets).
>
> Emmanuel Gustin
Yes, you state the obvious. In a game of rock-paper-scissors, 1 plane is
superior to the other 2, depending on the situation. However, if you had to be
ready for any tactical or strategic situation which may arise, the P-51D is the
only pick. It is the only plane which can perform intercept, long-range escort,
AND ground attack roles. The other 2 are more specialized. The P-51D carried
twice the bomb load of the others, and had triple the range. That versatility
is what sets it apart.
BTW, I believe the standard armament on the 190D-9 was 2 12.7mm mgs and 2 20mm
cannons, not 30mm.
Bernard Johnson
Dave Sutton wrote:
> > > Different sources show the Allison Mustang at anywhere from 335-340mph
> > > to 355- 360mph on the deck. Take your pick
> > of somewhere around 380 on the deck... certainly fast enough to allow it
> > to chase V1's & FW190's.
I served on an RAF Squadron on fighter/recce. Our squadron leader took
great pride in his Mustang 1 (Allison) and insisted on it being given
special attention, including a glossy shine. He claimed he got 390 on
the deck. It was assigned to me (one of his newer pilots) one day,
because mine was u/s. I had a head-on collision (not my fault,
fortunately) with another Mustang that wrote off both planes. The boss
was not happy!
Maury Markowitz
In article <6bpdvc$8ka$1...@fu-berlin.de>, "Emmanuel Gustin"
<NoSpam...@uia.ac.be> wrote:
> Not so. You would pick the P-51 if you needed an escort fighter (because
> the others just don't have the range for it)
I was under the impression that XIV and late war 38's and 47's were
capable of similar ranges.
> the Fw 190D-9 if you needed an
> high-altitude interceptor (with its 30mm MK 108 cannon it is the only one
> with armament powerful enough to shoot down a B-17 or even B-29)
I believe you have it confused with the D-12/13, the D-9 had 2x13mm and
2x20mm. Of course those 20's were the MG151's, so...
Maury
Matthew Saroff (Remove 123456. to reply)
Bob Andrew <ran...@fred.net> wrote:
> Yes, you state the obvious. In a game of rock-paper-scissors, 1 plane is
>superior to the other 2, depending on the situation. However, if you had to be
>ready for any tactical or strategic situation which may arise, the P-51D is the
>only pick. It is the only plane which can perform intercept, long-range escort,
>AND ground attack roles. The other 2 are more specialized. The P-51D carried
>twice the bomb load of the others, and had triple the range. That versatility
>is what sets it apart.
Hi,
I'd go with the P-47N, the Tempest (I'm not sure of the
range on this), The F7F Panther, P-38, or that perennial
favorite, the F2A Buffalo, which had good range (just kidding,
except about the Buffalo's range).
The P-51 while well suited to escort duty, was too
lightly armed, and too vulnerable to ground fire (yeah, the
gunners on the ground don't lead well) for ground attack, and too
lightly armed to serve as an interceptor.
However, I did see some film of a P-51B with 4 20mm
cannon on Wings, it just never saw service.
--
Matthew Saroff | Standard Disclaimer: Not only do I speak for
_____ | No one else, I don't even Speak for me. All my
/ o o \ | personalities and the spirits that I channel
______|_____|_____| disavow all knowledge of my activities. ;-)
uuu U uuu |
| In fact, all my personalities and channeled spirits
C.C. Jordan
On Tue, 10 Feb 1998 14:53:41 +0200, Yama <tj...@paju.oulu.fi> wrote:
>
>
>Bob Andrew wrote:
>
>> Another way to look at this: If you were a general in command of an air force and
>> you had to choose only 1 of these 3 fighter types to equip your fighter wings,
>> would you choose the FW 190-D9, the Spit 14, or the P-51D? The answer is obvious.
>
>If it so obvious, would you tell us too? Because it all depends what you need. If you
>are concerned about intercepting bombers, you surely wouldn't choose P-51 which is
>lame interceptor with it's machine-gun armament and mediocre climb rate. If you need
>escort fighter you would abandon Spitfire because of it's lack of range. If you need
>tactical fighter-bomber, you would abandon all mentioned planes and pick maybe Tempest
>or Thunderbolt.
>
>I find whole question of best all-around fighter completely academic and moot (sorry
>Mr Jordan!).
No sweat. ;-)
> Success of fighting aircraft were (and are) not measured by their
>suitability to roles which air force in question does not require. Many extremely
>successful fighters were bad all-around planes.
Such as?
>
>It all depends what you need. What, for example, USAAF or USN would have done with
>Bf-109 or Spitfire? Absolutely nothing. In a similar manner, Luftwaffe would have
>found most of the famous Allied planes as completely useless for their purposes.
>
>Yama
>
Well............ Didn't Galland tell Herr Herman that he would like a few
squadrons of Spitfires? I don't think it was said tongue in cheek either.
The P-38 would have been very useful. Rearm it with 4 or 5 MG151's and
it could deal with heavy bombers and the escorts. Hell, it's concentrated
Browning .50's and the 20mm were probably adequate for heavy bombers.
They buzzsaw the wings off Ju-52's quite nicely. Yet, 5 MG151's in a 30 inch
concentrated circle, that would be something to behold !!
Even the P-51 would be useful. Finally, a fighter that could stay over Britain
for more than 5 minutes. Unfortunately, 3 years too late to count for anything.
I think Bob Andrews' point was this: If you had to pick a single fighter design
to fulfill all your fighter mission roles, what would choose? Bob picks the
Mustang. I would favor the P-38, preferably a P-38J-25-LO or the P-38L-5-LO.
It's a reasonable question and Bob gave a reasonable answer.
Best regards,
C.C. Jordan
"Take care to sell your horse before he dies.
The art of life is passing losses on."
Robert Frost
dlam...@tir.com
Let me try to quote Wings (Discovery Channel):
"The Mustang wasn't very successful as a ground attack aircraft
due to the fact the engine was liquid cooled. Just one bullet could disable
a Mustang. Whereas a Pratt/Whitney radial could take sustained hits and
continue the battle with rods and pistons shooting from the cowl".
Dean
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Maury Markowitz wrote in message ...
Yama
C.C. Jordan wrote:
> On Tue, 10 Feb 1998 14:53:41 +0200, Yama <tj...@paju.oulu.fi> wrote:
> > Success of fighting aircraft were (and are) not measured by their
> >suitability to roles which air force in question does not require. Many extremely
> >successful fighters were bad all-around planes.
>
> Such as?
Spitfire, Hurricane, P-47, P-51, Bf-109, almost all Soviet fighters...
> >It all depends what you need. What, for example, USAAF or USN would have done with
> >Bf-109 or Spitfire? Absolutely nothing. In a similar manner, Luftwaffe would have
> >found most of the famous Allied planes as completely useless for their purposes.
> >
> >Yama
> >
>
> Well............ Didn't Galland tell Herr Herman that he would like a few
> squadrons of Spitfires? I don't think it was said tongue in cheek either.
Galland also said he has been widely misunderstood for this statement; he did not consider
Spitfire to be better plane than Bf-109; he wanted to point out that even British might
have better clue about what qualities are required from fighters than RLM or Luftwaffe top
brass.
> The P-38 would have been very useful. Rearm it with 4 or 5 MG151's and
> it could deal with heavy bombers and the escorts. Hell, it's concentrated
> Browning .50's and the 20mm were probably adequate for heavy bombers.
> They buzzsaw the wings off Ju-52's quite nicely. Yet, 5 MG151's in a 30 inch
> concentrated circle, that would be something to behold !!
Very likely. But - see below.
> Even the P-51 would be useful. Finally, a fighter that could stay over Britain
> for more than 5 minutes. Unfortunately, 3 years too late to count for anything.
Yes. P-51 or Zero probably would have won BoB for Luftwaffe, but beyond that, range was not
that critical issue for Luftwaffe.
> I think Bob Andrews' point was this: If you had to pick a single fighter design
> to fulfill all your fighter mission roles, what would choose? Bob picks the
> Mustang. I would favor the P-38, preferably a P-38J-25-LO or the P-38L-5-LO.
I also have an opinion that P-38L had probably best all-around capability of all WWII
fighters, but it was by no means 'ideal' plane, because it wasn't economically viable. Even
US considered that it was somewhat dubious build P-38's which were costy to maintain and
build - and USA was far by richest nation participating to WWII. P-38 costed about twice
the price of P-51 and no less than 5-6 times the price of Bf-109, and P-47 was almost as
expensive. There's no way Germany could have afforded P-38 without serious sacrifices in
other areas, not to mention Allied fighters required high-octane fuels Germany lacked.
From year 1943 onwards, Spitfire was probably only Allied fighter which Luftwaffe _might_
have found useful. P-51 - rather useless. P-47 - expensive, bad interceptor, useless. P-38
- expensive. Typhoon/Tempest, P-63, all Soviet fighters - useless, as they had Fw-190
already.
Emmanuel Gustin
Bob Andrew wrote in message <34E0D0B1...@fred.net>...
>ready for any tactical or strategic situation which may arise, the P-51D is
the
>only pick. It is the only plane which can perform intercept, long-range
escort,
>AND ground attack roles.
The big problem is the interceptor role. The .50 just does not have
enough firepower. The Luftwaffe calculation was that to kill a B-17
you need 20 hits with 20mm, 3 with 30mm, or 1 with 55mm: Destructive
power scaling roughly with the third power of the calibre, i.e. with the
volume. (The Germans preferred thin-walled high-explosive ammunition.)
Even if one would use a thin-walled .50 HE round (an unlikely concept) it
would have only a quarter of the destructive power of the German 20mm
shell. Rate of fire is about the same, so four .50s would be equivalent to
a single MG 151/20. And a 30mm MK 108, despite its low velocity and
more modest rate of fire, is worth at least ten .50 guns.
The attack role is also a problem, though less so. The A-36 was a fine
close-support aircraft. The problem is that the P-51, with its long coolant
lines, is so vulnerable to small arms fire. Radial-engined aircraft are much
preferable for ground attack. On the German side, the "General der
Schlachtflieger" did not want any more liquid-cooled engines in his attack
squadrons. He preferred the radial-engined Fw 190 over the Ta 152C.
>BTW, I believe the standard armament on the 190D-9 was 2 12.7mm mgs and
>2 20mm cannons, not 30mm.
Correct, I was mistaken. The 30mm cannon were fitted to later models and
to the Ta 152.
Emmanuel Gustin
CDB100620
>The big problem is the interceptor role. The .50 just does not have
>enough firepower.
For the interception role, the USAAF was moving toward HVAR with proximity
warheads, rather than guns. HVAR can be carried by just about any fighter,
unlike heavy-caliber cannon, turning them into formidable bomber busters.
Bomber interception was not a major concern of the US after c. 1942, so the
programs were put on the back burner.
Had the USAAF needed a point-defense heavy bomber interceptor in c.1944, it
would probably have turned to the P-63 with HVAR, the M10 37mm, perhaps
replacing the wing .50s with 20mm--or maybe dumping them entirely so as to
carry more HVAR. Salvos of HVAR with proximity warheads slicing through
bunched bomber formations would have created a horrific slaughter. Certainly
the twin-engined "rocket ships" of the Luftwaffe, even without proximity
warhead-equipped missles, caused the most damage to USAAF bombers over Germany
in the days before fighter escort.
In the Pacific, where the USAAF had the most need of an anti-bomber fighter, it
was found that the most effective way to destroy enemy bombers was on the
ground in their lairs. Thus, the best anti-bomber weapon in your arsenal was
not some heavy-cannon-equipped fighter--but your own bomber force. A B-25
gunship loaded with parafrags and Kenney cocktails was the ultimate solution to
any enemy bomber threat. The 5AF's viewpoint was that it was silly to wait
around for your opponent to waltz over to your corner, wind up and hammer a
haymaker into your face. Better to sneak over to his corner and plant a
steel-toed boot in his butt while he was bent over tying his shoe laces.
By protecting your own bombers while they hit the enemy's airfields, long-range
fighters such as the P-51 actually served as very effective bomber
interceptors, once-removed: They kept the enemy fighters away from your
bombers while they destroyed the enemy's offensive capability.
So it's all in how you play the game. In the SWPA the USAAF played a very
shrewd game, indeed, and was extremely successful very early on, even when its
assets were limited.
It's astonishing that the Germans did not devote serious attention to attacking
the bomber fields of England as part of their own air defense program.
Apparently they had their glorious leader to thank for that (as did the
Allies).
Andreas Mueller
Maury Markowitz wrote:
>
> In article <6bpdvc$8ka$1...@fu-berlin.de>, "Emmanuel Gustin"
> <NoSpam...@uia.ac.be> wrote:
>
> > the Fw 190D-9 if you needed an
> > high-altitude interceptor (with its 30mm MK 108 cannon it is the only one
> > with armament powerful enough to shoot down a B-17 or even B-29)
>
> I believe you have it confused with the D-12/13, the D-9 had 2x13mm and
> 2x20mm. Of course those 20's were the MG151's, so...
>
> Maury
Hi Maury et al,
I'm a great Luftwaffe enthusiast and fairly new to this newsgroup - I'm
glad I found it.
I have closely followed your thread about which fighter is best
allround. Depending on the tactical/stategical requirements you have to
choose a different fighter be it long-range escort or short-range
interception or ground attack or ....
No single fighter meets all specifications and therefore it is widely
academical to try and pinpoint any such fighter.
As to the Fw 190: you are right about the armament question, but let me
clear up a little of the confusion that may have led to this question
arising in the first place:
The Fw 190 D-9 had two MG131, 13 mm mounted in the fuselage and 2
MG151/20, 20 mm guns mounted in the wing roots.
Additionally it could carry two wing-mounted MK108, 30 mm guns as a
special add-on - it was then to be called a Fw 190 D-9/R2 which stands
for Ruestsatz 2.
Perhaps this helps to sort things out,
Andy
--
email : mad...@intetra.net
Michael Williamson
Maury Markowitz wrote:
> > Not so. You would pick the P-51 if you needed an escort fighter (because
> > the others just don't have the range for it)
>
> I was under the impression that XIV and late war 38's and 47's were
> capable of similar ranges.
>
The late war 47's were indeed capable of long range, although this was more
useful for the type in the Pacific, as by the time they were available in
Europe, operations were taking place from bases in France(IIRC), moving them
closer to the targets. The P-38s were capable of equal or longer range than
the P-51 at about any time during the war.
Mike Williamson
Michael Williamson
> Bob Andrew wrote in message <34E0D0B1...@fred.net>...
>
> >ready for any tactical or strategic situation which may arise, the P-51D is
> the
> >only pick. It is the only plane which can perform intercept, long-range
> escort,
> >AND ground attack roles.
Not to throw a wrench in an argument, but...
The P-38 was able to do all three, and did two of them (long range escort,
high alt. intercept) before the P-51. As far as ground attack, the Mustang I
was used in this role by the British (interdiction mostly, as I recall), but the
38 had an equal or heavier bombload.
Mike Williamson
Gregory W Shaw
<adf...@psu.edu> wrote:
> In article <1d3we8t.1kd...@pmc1.burgoyne.com>,
> greg...@burgoyne.com (Gregory W Shaw) wrote:
munch
>>The Allison Mustang was probably the
> > fastest fighter in service below 5k in '42-43. It would have been much
> > more successful in that role than the Spit Mk V or Mk IX were.
> >
> > Greg Shaw
>
> Actually, at about that same time (1942-43) the Hawker Typhoon was in
> service. At the time, the Tiffie was the fastest fighter below 5K, IIRC.
> It was used to intercept those jabo 190s during that period. It was also
> a better attack aircraft.
>
> Andy Fuller
I have already responded to the Typoon vs P51 a couple of days ago but
I'll give it another shot.
The only data I have seen on the Typhoon shows it at 350-355mph @ SL. I
definitely do need more complete sources for British aircraft.
Different sources for the Allison Mustang range from 335mph all the way
to 360mph. That speed range can easily be explained by the different
engines and armaments used in the various Allison Mustangs.
I was thinking of the 360mph figure when I replied above, it probably is
a bit to high for RAF Mustangs. The Typhoon could very well have been
faster than the early RAF Mustangs, in which case I was mistaken. Later
Allison Mustangs could at least make it a good contest.
Greg Shaw
Yama
CDB100620 wrote:
> Had the USAAF needed a point-defense heavy bomber interceptor in c.1944, it
> would probably have turned to the P-63 with HVAR, the M10 37mm, perhaps
> replacing the wing .50s with 20mm--or maybe dumping them entirely so as to
> carry more HVAR. Salvos of HVAR with proximity warheads slicing through
> bunched bomber formations would have created a horrific slaughter. Certainly
> the twin-engined "rocket ships" of the Luftwaffe, even without proximity
> warhead-equipped missles, caused the most damage to USAAF bombers over Germany
> in the days before fighter escort.
Hmm, how they would have affected to the fighting qualities of the carrying
aircraft? Because Luftwaffe found that rockets and other special toys were useless
if you couldn't penetrate fighter escort. Only Me-262 had enough performance to
break through, but Allied had no comparable plane before P-80.
> In the Pacific, where the USAAF had the most need of an anti-bomber fighter, it
> was found that the most effective way to destroy enemy bombers was on the
> ground in their lairs. Thus, the best anti-bomber weapon in your arsenal was
> not some heavy-cannon-equipped fighter--but your own bomber force. A B-25
> gunship loaded with parafrags and Kenney cocktails was the ultimate solution to
> any enemy bomber threat. The 5AF's viewpoint was that it was silly to wait
> around for your opponent to waltz over to your corner, wind up and hammer a
> haymaker into your face. Better to sneak over to his corner and plant a
> steel-toed boot in his butt while he was bent over tying his shoe laces.
>
> By protecting your own bombers while they hit the enemy's airfields, long-range
> fighters such as the P-51 actually served as very effective bomber
> interceptors, once-removed: They kept the enemy fighters away from your
> bombers while they destroyed the enemy's offensive capability.
>
> So it's all in how you play the game. In the SWPA the USAAF played a very
> shrewd game, indeed, and was extremely successful very early on, even when its
> assets were limited.
>
> It's astonishing that the Germans did not devote serious attention to attacking
> the bomber fields of England as part of their own air defense program.
> Apparently they had their glorious leader to thank for that (as did the
> Allies).
It's completely ridiculous to compare situations at PTO and ETO. Neither USAAF nor
USN never had to face such numeric odds than Luftwaffe, and Japanese bomber force
had only a tiny fraction of that capability what USAAF and RAF had. Building and
sending large bomber force in the teeths of British air defence would have been
utterly stupid. Btw Luftwaffe did attack those airfields which were in Russia,
where Allied bombers refueled and -armed. Operation was success, but drop in the
ocean in big picture.
CDB100620
>It's completely ridiculous
> to compare situations at PTO and ETO. Neither USAAF nor
>USN never had to face such numeric odds than Luftwaffe,
In 1942 they certainly did. The numbers on both sides were smaller, but the
odds against the Americans were very, very large.
Apparently, the point was lost in my post, so I will restate it. There are two
"tactical" ways to handle a bomber threat: 1) Wait for it to come to you and
try to defeat it in the air over your own territory. 2) Destroy the bomber
threat on the ground on its own airfields
The USAAF chose course No. 2 in the Pacific and the MTO.
In the SWPA the 5AF became masters of the low-level surprise attack to destroy
enemy air assets on the ground. The tone was set when the first USAAF fighter
squadron arrived at Port Moresby, New Guinea in April, 1942. At that time, the
Japanese possessed air supremacy. Rather than wait for their bombers to come
over and send his fighters up to contend with them, the very day they arrived
fighter director Col. Boyd Wagner launched them on an attack on the Japanese
airfields whence the bomber threat originated.
It didn't matter to Wagner that he was only able to attack the Japanese
airfields with 11 fighter planes that would have only enough fuel for a single
straffing pass. It didn't matter that he was sending them into a hornet's nest
of enemy air activity, against superior enemy aircraft (P-39s vs. Zeros)
piloted by expert pilots, while his pilots were novices on their first combat
mission. What mattered was that such an attack offered the best chance of
destroying the maximum number of enemy bomber assets.
Though its numbers were always small in 1942 and 1943, the 5AF began a
relentless offensive campaign to destroy the enemy air threat at its source.
It never adopted a defensive posture and so had no need for a point defense
fighter. That's why when 5AF boss Gen. Kenney was offered the P-63 for his
forces--an excellent point-defense fighter--he refused it, instead requesting
the P-38, an excellent escort and ground attack fighter.
As the campaign was pursued, hundreds of Japanese aircraft were destroyed on
the ground at Rabaul, Wewak, Hollandia, and elsewhere. The Japanese actually
fed more air assets into the "north of Australia front," as they termed it,
than the USAAF did (in fact, the Japanese Army Air Force was virtually
annhilated in New Guinea; Gen. Curtis LeMay said that the battle for air
superiority over Tokyo was won in New Guinea). But the majority of these air
assets were destroyed on the ground, the USAAF never giving them a chance to
become an offensive threat.
In the MTO, the USAAF adopted similar tactics, taking the fight to the enemy.
For example, the raids on the huge Foggia airfield complex in Italy devastated
Axis air assets--on the ground. In a typical action, P-38s of the 1FG, flying
from North African bases on Aug. 25, 1943, swept in on a low level attack and
destroyed (as verified by photo recon), 43 Ju-88s, one Ju-52 and one Me-109
plus damaging some dozens of other aircraft for the loss of two of their own to
flak. That was 43 Ju-88s that would not attack the allied invasion fleet off
Sicily the next month. And no matter how good the air defense over the fleet,
shooting down 43 Ju-88s before they made their bomb runs would have been a
monumental task.
Such offensive actions are a much more effective use of your air assets to
counter a bomber threat than investing in point defense. Once the enemy is in
the air and attacking--no matter how small his numbers might be--the risk is
great that he might get through and cause serious damage, no matter how good
your own defensive force might be.
In the ETO, the threat the USAAF needed to counter was enemy fighters, and once
its air assets were in place it switched from what might be called "air point
defense" (bombers trying to defend themselves with their own defensive
firepower) to attacking Luftwaffe fighters on the ground (as well, of course,
as in the air).
As far as the Luftwaffe attacking allied bomber assets on the ground in
England, General of Night Fighters Josef Kammhuber, creator of the
Luftwaffe's anti-RAF bomber defense force, as part of his strategy, immediately
created an intruder force of Ju 88s and Do 217s to attack British bomber bases.
As he said, "If I want to smoke out a wasps nest, I don't go for the
individual insects buzzing about, but the entrance hole where they are all
inside."
However, on Oct. 13, 1941, by direct order of Hitler, the Luftwaffe's attacks
on British bomber fields were stopped. This was a fundamental blunder, as the
British Air Ministry's publication, "The Rise and Fall of the German Air
Force," points out. It notes that the RAF's bombers were extremely vulnerable
to intruder operations. 'The German Luftwaffe's failure to exploit this
opportunity must be reckoned as one of its biggest failures." It points out
that the fact that Bomber Command was able to operate undisturbed from its home
airfields throughout the war was crucial to the ultimate defeat of Germany.
Germany settled on point defense not because it made sense, nor because it was
unable to mount an offensive against allied air bases, but for politcal
reasons. Hitler reasoned that the German people needed to see wrecked allied
bombers on their own soil to be reassured that he was effectively directing the
defense of the country.
ch1...@earthlink.net
Hey CBD,
An interesting argument but I would say that, at least for the Bf-109
there was ALSO a /technical/ shortfall, in range.
I must also point out that the Allies rather rapidly invested in CMW
radar that provided a VERY short horizon on even tip 'n' run jabos and
while I don't have a clue as to what there losses were, they
(FW-190A4/R5 I *think*) seldom penetrated very far inland and even so
struggled to make it home with two, permanently installed, wing tanks.
Could the Germans have fought a prolonged 'drop tank war'?
Also, Kamhuber had a good idea but not only was the politicking behind
the operations order at fault, so too was the technical lag which
permitted the Brit's to develop (again) CMW radar which functioned
effectively at low level as both an AI and occasional mapping/TA aid
whereas the longwave FuG 212-218-220 systems would've been virtually
-swamped- in clutter here. Operating at medium-hi altitudes the RAF did
a pretty fair job 'taking care of trade' on those intruders that
navigated high for reasons of nav or radii.
On direct-C/A. I wouldn't be surprised if the Axis didn't have /far/
more effective and certainly _dense_ early warning and medium/light flak
systems. It should perhaps also be noted that if you come down into the
enemy airframes (Focke and Messerschmitt again) optimum operating zone,
where you are only marginally if at all superior, you will suffer
comparibly worse odds than if you bring them hacking and wheezing up to
25K you. Zero's/Oscars/Hien's etc. had the same on-hi problems but were
also so much slower and less BnZ tolerant, even at low level, that the
comparison of tactics may not be fair.
To an extent also I wonder if the terrain types had an effect. Consider
in the Desert you've got short ranged fighters operating with virtually
ZERO overhead or even 'background variance' camouflage and who's
operations will leave HUGE dust clouds visible for miles to boot.
In BOTH the PTO/MTO areas you've also got large areas of _water_. This
means that unless it's on a boat (and thereby a target) EWR systems and
even eyeball-alert 'GCI' is apt to be pretty far and few between. By
comparison, you KNOW (generally) where they are going and where they are
coming from and given the horrendously long supply lines cannot very
well afford to home-wait, much as you said, lest a lucky get through.
Attacking the other guy at home is therefore much more viable,
especially if he has relatively minimal 'depth' (associated fields and
flak lanes etc.) in his basing/AD scenario.
However, I do agree with your emphasis on the OFFENSIVE nature of
tactical C/A operations offering a more direct-target rapidity in eating
up enemy assets -when- the scenario permits or allows no other option.
A prime case of this were indeed the Flying Tiger raids into and out of
'forward' (behind lines) airfields within range of major city-defense
airfield complexes on the mainland, both before and after the AVG fold
into the USAAF.
In this case however, quite a bit of thought was put into drag and bag
and feint attacks to ensure that the enemy (fighters) DID come up and
WERE pounded, in air.
Flak has a certain exposure-Pk per pass but a good bounce and run
tactical formation can be nearly 'clean' if there is not too much
disparity in ceilings and speeds.
Robert Sveinson
Gregory W Shaw wrote:
>
> <adf...@psu.edu> wrote:
>
> > In article <1d3we8t.1kd...@pmc1.burgoyne.com>,
> > greg...@burgoyne.com (Gregory W Shaw) wrote:
>
> munch
>
> >>The Allison Mustang was probably the
> > > fastest fighter in service below 5k in '42-43. It would have been much
> > > more successful in that role than the Spit Mk V or Mk IX were.
The Allison Mustang was relegated to work at low level because of its
poor performance
even at 12,000 feet. Used for low level photo work. This Mustang had
1000 H.P. with
1,150 H.P. at take off. The Spit V speed at 13,000 ft. was 374 mph and
357 mph at
6,000 ft, faster in both cases than the Allison Mustang.
The Spit IX was 416 mph at 27,500 ft. Ceiling was 45,000 ft.
> > >
> > > Greg Shaw
> >
> > Actually, at about that same time (1942-43) the Hawker Typhoon was in
> > service. At the time, the Tiffie was the fastest fighter below 5K, IIRC.
> > It was used to intercept those jabo 190s during that period. It was also
> > a better attack aircraft.
The Typhoon had a speed in excess of 400 mph in level flight.
> >
> > Andy Fuller
>
> I have already responded to the Typoon vs P51 a couple of days ago but
> I'll give it another shot.
>
> The only data I have seen on the Typhoon shows it at 350-355mph @ SL. I
> definitely do need more complete sources for British aircraft.
Typhoon speed in excess of 400 mph in level flight.
>
> Different sources for the Allison Mustang range from 335mph all the way
> to 360mph. That speed range can easily be explained by the different
> engines and armaments used in the various Allison Mustangs.
The Mustang III [P-51 B and C] with the RR Merlins had a maximum speed
of 445 mph at 24,000 ft,
an absolutely tremendous increase in performance. Climb to 20,000 ft in
6.5 minutes.
>
> I was thinking of the 360mph figure when I replied above, it probably is
> a bit to high for RAF Mustangs. The Typhoon could very well have been
> faster than the early RAF Mustangs, in which case I was mistaken. Later
> Allison Mustangs could at least make it a good contest.
All of the Allison Mustangs had no more than 1,200 H.P. and that was at
take off,
and 1,100 hp to 1,150 hp at cruise. With that hp it was a good low level
attack, and low level photo aircraft.
It became a whole lot more exciting at all altitudes with the Merlins.
Gregory W Shaw
"Nigel Wright" <niwr...@cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote:
munch stuff about Allison Mustang vs Tiffy
(newserver requires more new than posted text)
> >
> I don't have any data to hand but, I thought that the Typhoon was capable
> of somewhere around 380 on the deck... certainly fast enough to allow it
> to chase V1's & FW190's.
380mph on the deck sounds awfully high for a Typhoon. Tempest V could
probably manage that fast, Tempest II probably better it, but a thick
winged Typhoon?
Greg Shaw
CDB100620
>at least for the Bf-109
>there was ALSO a /technical/ shortfall, in range.
Regarding range in an interceptor fighter, this thread has pretty much taken it
for granted that it was not important, rate of climb being the key factor.
Thus, comments have been made that the P-51 would make a poor interceptor.
For interception purposes, the Luftwaffe considered its fighters to have a
flight duration of 70 minutes (an Me 109 typical had a total wheels up--wheels
down air time of 90 minutes and a radius of action of 170 miles). At a March
21, 1944, meeting of the Luftwaffe general staff, Gen. Karl Koller, chief of
the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, stated that in order for interceptions to be
successful, the Luftwaffe needed a fighter with a flight duration capability of
a minimum of four hours. In his view, flight duration was the key to a
successful interceptor.
Had the Luftwaffe had a fighter with such time-in-air capability, it would have
also had a versatile fighter, one much more suitable for jabo attacks on allied
airfields in Britain. One of the chief advantages possessed by the USAAF in
WWII was the force projection capabilities provided by its long range fighters.
Germany never possessed significant force projection capabilities, even
though, as Gen. Koller himself said, "The only weapon that is strongest in
attack is air power." He added, rather sarcastically--his comment was made to
Erhard Milch--"The Americans are giving us evidence of this fact every day."
Kammhuber's choice for attacking British bomber bases was the Ju-88, since
German single-engine fighters didn't have sufficient range or payload
capability. In the 1941-42 time frame, had the Luftwaffe devoted sufficient
numbers of these aircraft to interdicting RAF Bomber Command bases, it's likely
that, while the Luftwaffe would have suffered losses on the raids, they could
have inflicted losses on the British large enough to justify their own losses.
Later in the war, at their peak of success against the 8AF during the second
Schweinfurt raid, Oct. 14, 1943, in shooting down 60 USAAF bombers, the
Luftwaffe lost 31 fighters (by their own count), or about 4 percent of the
total Luftwaffe fighter aircraft available in the West. Had they been willing
to suffer similar losses of Ju-88s (or other suitable aircraft) in attacks on
8AF airfields, they might well have destroyed far more bombers than their
fighter interceptors were able to in the air. Combine losses inflicted by
German interceptors with losses inflicted by Ju-88s attacking airfields and the
8AF might well have faced a crisis.
That said, Hitler may have been right to stop Kammhuber's original plan. At
that time--1941-- the only effect Bomber Command's raids on Germany had was to
the morale of the civilian population. So why not devote Luftwaffe efforts to
boosting civilian morale as an offset? Unfortunately for Germany, that mindset
did not allow the Luftwaffe to evolve techniques and equipment to counter what
soon became a life-or-death threat.
>It should perhaps also be noted that if you come down into the
>enemy airframes (Focke and Messerschmitt again) optimum operating zone,
>where you are only marginally if at all superior, you will suffer
>comparibly worse odds than if you bring them hacking and wheezing up to
>25K
Luftwaffe pilots debriefed by allied intelligence after the war often opined
that if the war had been fought below 20,000 ft. they would have won.
Actually, a lot of it was fought below 20,000 ft., with the medium bombers
flying at 9,000 ft. or so (where they were able to place 26 percent of their
bombs within 500 ft. of the aiming point) and fighter-bombers down on the deck.
Low level attacks always were much more dangerous than high altitude
penetrations. Attacks on airfields were particularly dangerous. But the USAAF
was willing to suffer the losses. (On March 11, 1944, Hap Arnold told Carl
Spaatz that "the depletion of the GAF is the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in
Europe's sole purpose." Spaatz was to do "everything possible" to destroy the
Luftwaffe.) The Germans were willing, apparently to suffer huge losses over
their own territory, but shied away from risking significant air assets over
allied territory. The "Little Blitz" of 1944 was an exception to this, and it
cost them about 400 aircraft (by their count), but accomplished little; they
did not make dedicated attacks on allied bomber bases. The allies were always
willing to risk high losses over Germany.
> Zero's/Oscars/Hien's etc. had the same on-hi problems but were
>also so much slower and less BnZ tolerant, even at low level, that the
>comparison of tactics may not be fair.
Not sure how this applies to destroying enemy air assets on the ground. Zero
not all that much slower than Me 109. Hien performance on par or superior to
the 109 within its (Hien's) altitude envelope. Tojo a much better performer
than the 109, about equivalent to the FW 190, but with a superior rate of
climb. Frank (encountered over the PI and later) was better than the 190. The
Jack (PI and later) also had very good performance, as did the George. (The PI
campaign was brutal: The 49FG alone lost 60 P-38s in the first two weeks of
fighting, and 35 pilots killed in the first two months.)
Regarding the effectiveness of Japanese counter air, when the Royal Navy
attacked Indonesian oil fields in Jan, 1945, when the Japanese Army Air Force
was a mere shadow of its former self, the British force of 48 TBFs escorted by
70 F4Us and 2 photo recon F6Fs was savaged, losing 17 TBFs, 8 F4Us and one of
the Hellcats to the intercepting Nicks, Oscars, Zeros and Tojos. Fourteen more
made it back to their carriers but were pushed over the side as unrepairable.
The USAAF 5AF had raided this same target the previous fall with B-24s escorted
by P-38s and suffered minimal losses while dealing the defending fighters
serious losses.
The point is that the the USAAF (and USN) were successful agaisnt the Japanese
not because the Japanese were inferior to the Germans, but because they
developed tactics to deal with them. But, as the PI campaign demonstrated,
they could be a dangerous adversary even late in the war. (It's worth pointing
out that the Japanese army air threat in the PI was effectively eliminated by
USN attacks that, by sheer luck, caught large numbers of Japanese fighters *on
the ground.*) When another air force (British) that had limited experience (if
any) fighting the Japanese, but was trained to fight the Germans, encountered
the Japanese they got slammed up against the wall pretty hard.
>Attacking the other guy at home is therefore much more viable,
>especially if he has relatively minimal 'depth' (associated fields and
>flak lanes etc.) in his basing/AD scenario.
>
When the 5AF went after Rabaul in the fall of 1943, it was a very heavily
defended target. The harbor was generally more or less filled with IJN
warships loaded with AAA. On land, the AAA consisted of 8 127mm, 15 120mm, 20
80mm, 75 70mm, 110 40mm, 92 25mm, 157 20mm, and one 13mm. These were
distributed among 7 AAA battalions and five field machinecannon companies.
Many were mounted on the slopes of the two volcanoes dominating the harbor so
they could fire down on low level intruders.
Defensive air assets comprised 265 fighters, mostly Navy Zeros, based on five
airfields with 429 reinforced revetments. 200+ bombers were also based there.
5AF raids consisted of low-level B-25 attackers, high-level B-24s and P-38
escorts for both. Total force available for Rabaul attacks consisted of 11
B-25 squadrons, 8 B-24 squadrons and 6 P-38 squadrons (note squadrons--not
groups).
"Most Secret" Sitreps of the actions concluded 448 e/a destroyed
on the ground and 112 in the air. Highest mission losses to enemy action were
27.3 percent of the B-24, 40 percent for the B-25, 27.6 percent for the P-38
(Some missions had few aircraft over the target due to aborts and weather, so
percentage losses appear inordinately high. Actual loss figures are unclear,
but they weren't low. There were some terrific air battles and low-level
losses were quite high. Three or four Medals of Honor were won over Rabaul.)
Wewak was considered a far tougher target than Rabaul, and Hollandia was
tougher than Wewak.
>quite a bit of thought was put into drag and bag
>and feint attacks to ensure that the enemy (fighters) DID come up and
>WERE pounded, in air.
This was the strategy the USAAF finally settled on in the ETO to destroy the
Luftwaffe. It has the advantage of killing the pilot as well as the aircraft.
And pilots are always tougher to replace than airplanes.
Very interesting and intelligent post.
CDB100620
>
>> Zero's/Oscars/Hien's etc. had the same on-hi problems but were
>>also so much slower and less BnZ tolerant, even at low level, that the
>>comparison of tactics may not be fair.
>
>
A short codicil: The Japanese were not loathe to use their fighter assets in
low level strafing attacks on allied airfields. Over the airstrips at Morseby
it was said that the Jap pilots flew so low you could tell what brand of
cigarette they were smoking. Their propwash routinely blew down tents. Over
Gusap Ki-61s cut the cook's clothesline they were flying so low. Bombers
(Nells) also came over on the deck, dropping daisy cutters and delayed action
HEs.
CDB100620
>>
>When the 5AF went after Rabaul in the fall of 1943, it was a very heavily
>defended target.
Japanese fighters (Zeros) generally intercepted about 150 miles out inbound
and continued engaging until about 75 miles out on the return. That's
something an Me 109 could never do. Made for a very interesting hour plus of
full throttle flight time. A P-38 driver would generally lose about 10 pounds
of body weight on a mission.
Yama
CDB100620 wrote:
> >It's completely ridiculous
> > to compare situations at PTO and ETO. Neither USAAF nor
> >USN never had to face such numeric odds than Luftwaffe,
>
> In 1942 they certainly did. The numbers on both sides were smaller,
> but the
> odds against the Americans were very, very large.
>
> Apparently, the point was lost in my post, so I will restate it. There
> are two
> "tactical" ways to handle a bomber threat: 1) Wait for it to come to
> you and
> try to defeat it in the air over your own territory. 2) Destroy the
> bomber
> threat on the ground on its own airfields
Unfortunately point 2) is not always an option.
>
>
> The USAAF chose course No. 2 in the Pacific and the MTO.
Where environment favoured such tactics. There were relatively small
number of planes stretched over large territory. Japanese had little or
no radars.
> In the MTO, the USAAF adopted similar tactics, taking the fight to the
> enemy.
> For example, the raids on the huge Foggia airfield complex in Italy
> devastated
> Axis air assets--on the ground. In a typical action, P-38s of the
> 1FG, flying
> from North African bases on Aug. 25, 1943, swept in on a low level
> attack and
> destroyed (as verified by photo recon), 43 Ju-88s, one Ju-52 and one
> Me-109
> plus damaging some dozens of other aircraft for the loss of two of
> their own to
> flak. That was 43 Ju-88s that would not attack the allied invasion
> fleet off
> Sicily the next month. And no matter how good the air defense over
> the fleet,
> shooting down 43 Ju-88s before they made their bomb runs would have
> been a
> monumental task.
Again, odds in air didn't favour Germans. What were German reporting as
their losses btw? 45 a/c sounds too good to be true, knowing how limited
German resources were back then. It is well known that there's huge
overclaiming when trying to estimate damage done by airfield attacks.
> However, on Oct. 13, 1941, by direct order of Hitler, the Luftwaffe's
> attacks
> on British bomber fields were stopped. This was a fundamental
> blunder, as the
> British Air Ministry's publication, "The Rise and Fall of the German
> Air
> Force," points out. It notes that the RAF's bombers were extremely
> vulnerable
> to intruder operations. 'The German Luftwaffe's failure to exploit
> this
> opportunity must be reckoned as one of its biggest failures." It
> points out
> that the fact that Bomber Command was able to operate undisturbed from
> its home
> airfields throughout the war was crucial to the ultimate defeat of
> Germany.
I agree this might have worked against RAF night raids (Finns tried the
same against Soviets with success) but against daylight raids it would
have been foolish. British air defence was very sophisticated, RAF alone
having flocks of almost unemployed interceptors just waiting for Germans
trying something like that. Using Allied experiences in Pacific or
Mediterrian as example what Germans should have done is, as I said,
ridiculous.
Yama
CDB100620 wrote:
> >at least for the Bf-109
> >there was ALSO a /technical/ shortfall, in range.
>
> Regarding range in an interceptor fighter, this thread has pretty much
> taken it
> for granted that it was not important, rate of climb being the key
> factor.
> Thus, comments have been made that the P-51 would make a poor
> interceptor.
> For interception purposes, the Luftwaffe considered its fighters to
> have a
> flight duration of 70 minutes (an Me 109 typical had a total wheels
> up--wheels
> down air time of 90 minutes and a radius of action of 170 miles). At
> a March
> 21, 1944, meeting of the Luftwaffe general staff, Gen. Karl Koller,
> chief of
> the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, stated that in order for interceptions
> to be
> successful, the Luftwaffe needed a fighter with a flight duration
> capability of
> a minimum of four hours. In his view, flight duration was the key to
> a
> successful interceptor.
The climb speed is definetly required from interceptor, whether you need
ranger depends from situation; obviously Gen. Koller thought that flight
duration is needed to attack escorts as early as possible. He may have
been right. About P-51 being bad interceptor, climb speed of Pony was
not THAT bad, more serious defiency was it's machine-gun armament. It
was just that Spitfire, FW-190D and Bf-109 were better in interceptor
roles.
> capability. In the 1941-42 time frame, had the Luftwaffe devoted
> sufficient
> numbers of these aircraft to interdicting RAF Bomber Command bases,
> it's likely
> that, while the Luftwaffe would have suffered losses on the raids,
> they could
> have inflicted losses on the British large enough to justify their
> own losses.
That might be.
> Later in the war, at their peak of success against the 8AF during the
> second
> Schweinfurt raid, Oct. 14, 1943, in shooting down 60 USAAF bombers,
> the
> Luftwaffe lost 31 fighters (by their own count), or about 4 percent of
> the
> total Luftwaffe fighter aircraft available in the West. Had they been
> willing
> to suffer similar losses of Ju-88s (or other suitable aircraft) in
> attacks on
> 8AF airfields, they might well have destroyed far more bombers than
> their
> fighter interceptors were able to in the air. Combine losses
> inflicted by
> German interceptors with losses inflicted by Ju-88s attacking
> airfields and the
> 8AF might well have faced a crisis.
That might be not. Note that loss of one Ju-88 is by no means comparable
to a loss of single.engined fighter. I believe such raids would have
been very counter-productive.
> > Zero's/Oscars/Hien's etc. had the same on-hi problems but were
> >also so much slower and less BnZ tolerant, even at low level, that
> the
> >comparison of tactics may not be fair.
>
> Not sure how this applies to destroying enemy air assets on the
> ground. Zero
> not all that much slower than Me 109. Hien performance on par or
> superior to
> the 109 within its (Hien's) altitude envelope.
This is something you have said many times, but could you please state
some evidence? That what I know about the performances of two planes, at
least 109G and -K leave Ki-61 biting the dust.
Emmanuel Gustin
CDB100620 wrote in message
<19980211172...@ladder02.news.aol.com>...
> For the interception role, the USAAF was moving toward HVAR with proximity
> warheads, rather than guns. HVAR can be carried by just about any
fighter,
> unlike heavy-caliber cannon, turning them into formidable bomber busters.
On the long term, this was the better option. Of course rockets displaced
big cannon after the war, and the USAAF used folding-fin rockets, virtually
copying the German R4M. But wartime US rockets, especially the types with
bazooke-style launchers, seem unpractical. Mid-1944 seems to be the earliest
possible moment to deploy an useful weapon.
In any case, the P-51 can not be claimed to be a better interceptor just
because it could have been equipped with a weapon that did not actually
exist. The only ones who deployed rockets in the AA role were the Soviets
and the Germans.
> Thus, the best anti-bomber weapon in your arsenal was
> not some heavy-cannon-equipped fighter--but your own bomber force. A
B-25
> gunship loaded with parafrags and Kenney cocktails was the ultimate
solution to
> any enemy bomber threat. The 5AF's viewpoint was that it was silly to
wait
> around for your opponent to waltz over to your corner, wind up and hammer
a
> haymaker into your face.
The situation is not entirely comparable. The Germans had a good defensive
system, the Japanese had too few good fighters, too few good pilots,
inferior
radar, and inferior anti-aircraft guns. If the enemy protects its bases
well,
attacking enemy aircraft on the ground can be far more costly than attacking
them in the air. "Bodenplatte" is a good example: The Luftwaffe could
probably
have achieved more at less cost in conventional interception missions.
It must be added that the claims of the 5th AF were greatly exaggerated,
perhaps because of their aggresive style, perhaps also because of a
competition with the Navy. But they claimed to have destroyed several times
more aircraft than the Japanese actually had.
> It's astonishing that the Germans did not devote serious attention to
> attacking the bomber fields of England as part of their own air defense
> program.
The problem was the superiority of the Allied fighter force over it own
bases, at day and at night. Night intruder operations were a good idea
in 1940-1941, when the British nightfighter force was in its infancy.
Emmanuel Gustin
CDB100620
>obviously Gen. Koller thought that flight
>duration is needed to attack escorts as early as possible.
What Gen. Koller *obviously thought* would seem difficult to determine at this
late date. What he *said* is not. And what he said is that the limited flight
duration of his air defense fighters made it very difficult to get around
weather and intercept before they had to break off because of fuel status.
(Luftwaffe pilots had very limited IFR capability.) He also pointed out that
the limited flight duration made it impossible to coordinate fighter intercepts
from southern and northern units depending on whether a raid was coming from
the 8AF in England or the 15AF in Italy, not to mention the need to hold
fighters on the ground to the last possible moment in any case, limiting
options.
Rapid rate of climb was obviously important in an airplane with limited flight
duration--but the need to climb rapidly through weather put an unnecessarily
severe strain on low-time service pilots.
Koller also complained about the poor instrument flight platforms his fighters
made, leaving his pilots exhausted even before they encountered the enemy. He
wanted to know why the German aircraft industry couldn't build something
comparable to the P-38, which was a stable instrument platform with excellent
flight endurance.
> That what I know about the performances of two planes, at
>least 109G and -K leave Ki-61 biting the dust.
The K obviously had good on-paper performance. But it was an over-development
of the airframe that had many problems from a piloting perspective (as did the
109 in general). It was, however, a good effort and definitely would have left
the Ki-61 behind in many performance areas. But whereas the Luftwaffe
preferred to squeeze the most of of a single airframe, the Japanese AAF tended
to go for completely different designs. In the 3.5 years of the Pacific War,
they went from the Ki-27 (admittedly obsolete, but still in service) to the
Ki-43--both maneuver fighters--then switched to energy fighters with the Ki-44,
Ki-61, Ki-84 and the Ki-100. That considered, the Me 109K should more properly
be compared with the Ki-84 or Ki-100.
The G (let's say the -6) would be a more appropriate airplane to compare the
Ki-61 to. At c.15,000 ft., top speeds were about the same, on paper, with the
nod going to the G-6. The Ki-61 had fewer horsepower to play with, but the
design was much cleaner than the 109, and suffered much less from drag. It was
also 1,000 lbs lighter. The G-6 had a little better power loading, the Ki-61
had a little better wing loading. In fly-offs by the USAAF Air Materiel
Command at Olmsted Field in 1946, the big difference between the two planes
that became immediately apparent was that the pilots did not care to fly the
109 and enjoyed flying the Ki-61. The Ki-61 was a much better design, with
balanced control forces and moderate stick forces. Little retrimming was
required. The 109 was a royal pain in the ass in all these areas. In an
intial roll-on at 15,000 ft, the Ki-61 could out-accelerate the G-6. It could
easily outdive the G-6, which had a practical limit of about 400 mph because
the controls became too stiff to manage. This was also true in level flight,
the on-paper superiority in speed of the 109 becoming moot because it became,
essentially, a flying brick. The Ki-61 stick forces increased at speed, but
remained manageable--and balanced. As speeds increased above 300 mph, the
Gustav became increasingly pressed to deal with the Hien because its pilot had
increasing trouble making the damned thing move out of a straight line, while
the Tony pilot was still able to swan all over the sky. All-in-all, the Ki-61
was considered the much better fighter (of course, it had much greater range
than the 109) than the Gustav. In a mock dogfight at, say, 250 mph at 15,000
ft, the Ki-61 driver with a Gustav on his six needed only roll to the right
(the 109 felt like it was stuck in the mud when forced to roll right), split-S,
extend away, zoom climb up, pull over in a loop, dive and park behind the 109
(all that, of course, would depend on what the joker in the 109 was doing; his
best bet when the Tony broke right was to break left and climb into the sun to
reposition for another bounce--he shouldn't even try to follow the Kawasaki
machine). The only major advantage the Mess had was in high altitude
performance. That's what made it so useful in Western Europe, the only theater
where high altitude performance was of crucial importance.
Comparisons of the Me 109K with the Ki-84 or Ki-100 would come up about the
same. The 109's claim to fame, whatever the model, was high altitude
performance, and Willy's boys obviously squeezed an impressive amount of
performance out of a 1936 airframe.
Japanese aircraft designers hued to the concept of "kansei" (literally
"completeness"), a concept coming down from the days of the samurai and his
relationship to his sword. It implies a blending of warrior with weapon so
subtle and complete that the two become one functioning unit. They were so
successful at doing this that an airplane like Ki-43, with an obviously limited
performance envelope, was a far more dangerous foe, even in the hands of a
low-time pilot, than its on-paper specs would imply. Forcing the most brute
performance out of an airframe no matter what that did to the harmony of the
whole design was something that, for the Japanese, simply did not compute.
Back in the 1950s, I had a number of conversations with Kobayashi Teruhiko, who
flew the Ki-61 during the war (about two dozen kills, as I recall, including a
number of B-29s), and had rejoined the JASDF, and was flying F-86s out of
Iruma. He had flown the Me 109E and did not like it. "It made the pilot work
too hard. If a fighter plane is really good, you never know you are flying it,
simply, YOU are flying."
CDB100620
>the German R4M. But wartime US rockets, especially the types with
>bazooke-style launchers, seem unpractical.
Right. Highly inaccurate, and the drag of the launch tube seriously degraded
flight performance even after the spitball was launched to wobble off to miss
the target by 1,000 yards.
>The Germans had a good defensive
>system, the Japanese had too few good fighters, too few good pilots,
>inferior
>radar, and inferior anti-aircraft guns.
See my follow-up post on Rabaul defenses. In 1942 and 1943, the Japanese were
formidable, and were able to marshall enough strength to be so again during the
initial weeks of the PI campaign.
American pilots who flew in the Pacific and then did a tour in Europe often
felt they were moving from hell to purgatory, noting particularly the lack of
aggressiveness of German pilots compared to Japanese. American pilots who flew
a tour in Europe and then another in the Pacific got a nasty surprise, and many
were shot down. This was not always the case, of course, but it was common
enough to be noted and talked about. Many a group CO in the SWPA getting a
replacement squadron CO who had done a tour in the ETO had to caution the cocky
combat vet, who would ignore the advice and go out and duel with a Ki-43 and
suddenly find himself low and slow and very shortly dead. And more than one
PTO tour vet who was never able to do much in the air against the Japanese
blossomed into a multiple ace against the Germans--George Preddy immediately
springs to mind.
>If the enemy protects its bases
>well,
>attacking enemy aircraft on the ground can be far more costly than attacking
>them in the air.
This is true. That's why there has been a relentless hunt over the years for an
accurate stand-off weapon.
One key weakness the Japanese exhibited was that they repeatedly allowed
themselves to be surprised. This is not only because they did not devote
enough attention to developing defensive measures, but because of what appeared
to be a certain denseness. While the Japanese pilot quality and leadership up
to the squadron and perhaps group level was quite good, above that level, the
Japanese AAF suffered from poor tactical and strategic thinking. They never
seemed to quite grasp the nature of the 5AF's offensive against them. Partly
this was because the boys running the 5AF were very smart, and made maximum use
of the range capabilities of their aircraft, and ever squeezed greater range
from their aircraft (P-40Ns were even fitted with 300-gallon drop tanks that
gave them time-in-the air of 7.5 hours; this was an impractical set-up, but
illustrates the drive to extend the range of every airplane in the 5AF's
arsenal), so enabling them to repeatedly strike bases the Japanese assumed were
safe from attack. But, at some point the Japanese should have realized what
was happening and stopped feeding air assets into the theater and beefed up
airfield AAA defense, turning vulnerable targets into deadly traps.
Jim Erickson
I've lost track of who said what, so to summarize
Point 1:
> It's astonishing that the Germans did not devote serious attention to
Reply:
>That might be not. Note that loss of one Ju-88 is by no means >comparableto a loss of single.engined fighter. I believe such raids >would have been very counter-productive.
Reply
>The problem was the superiority of the Allied fighter force over it own >bases, at day and at night. Night intruder operations were a good idea >in 1940-1941, when the British nightfighter force was in its infancy.
My reply,
The idea would likely have worked very well even when the RAF night
fighter forces reached their Zenith. You've got to consider the immense
difficulty of locating, tracking, and then shooting down high speed,
low-level intruders at any time. If you add the difficulties of working
in the aerial zoo produced by the return of four-, five-, or six hundred
heavy bombers you can see the difficulties facing the RAF defenses would
have been enormous. The presence of just a few German intruders would
likely have proved catastrophic for the RAF in late 43 and early 44.
Loses over Germany were almost prohibitive by that time. If they had
been increased by the aircraft shot down by German intruders and the
extra losses/crashes that would have resulted from the disruptions in
landing, its hard to see how the RAF bomber offensive could have been
maintained. This last point is worth reemphasizing. Although the
German intruders would certainly have shot down a number of planes, I
suspect that they would have had caused many more losses as a
consequence of their disrupting the normal landings. Consider the
difficulties facing a dog-tired bomber pilot, low on fuel, trying to
land a plane--that he had probably never really mastered--at night, in
crowded skies. Under the best of circumstances this was an enormously
difficult task. If you douse the airfield lights because of an
intruder, or if you close the strip because of a crashed bomber, and
divert the planes to other airfields the problems are compounded
immensely. As it was the loss rate due to crashes in England was
dangerously high. Its hard to see how Bomber Command could have kept up
the offensive if its problems had been compounded by German intruders in
43 and early 44
Point 2
> edited Had (the luftwaffe)they been willing
> to suffer similar losses of Ju-88s (or other suitable aircraft) in
> attacks on 8AF airfields, they might well have destroyed far more >bombers than their fighter interceptors were able to in the air. >Combine losses inflicted by German interceptors with losses inflicted >by Ju-88s attacking airfields and the> 8th AF might well have faced a >crisis.
Reply:
>I agree this might have worked against RAF night raids (Finns tried the >same against Soviets with success) but against daylight raids it would >have been foolish. British air defence was very sophisticated, RAF >alone having flocks of almost unemployed interceptors just waiting for >Germans trying something like that. Using Allied experiences in Pacific >or Mediterrian as example what Germans should have done is, as I said, >ridiculous.
My reply,
Done judiciously intruders might have been effective against the 8th
Air Force as well. There was at least one instance when German
intruders shot down a number of B24s that were returning after dark. If
the Germans had made good use of the short Northern European winter days
and caught the US bombers at dusk or after dark they might have caused a
serious increase in US losses.
Jim Erickson
CDB100620
>In a mock dogfight at, say, 250 mph at 15,000
>ft, the Ki-61 driver with a Gustav on his six
Someone has e-mailed me to ask what the situation would be like at 25,000 ft.
In that situation, the 109 driver would hold the best cards. The Tony would
not be able to outaccelerate, outclimb or outdive the Gustav. He might try
rolling to the right and cranking around into a tight turn to open up a little
room between them. But at that altitude his turning radius would not be
appreciably better than the 109's--if at all--and, besides, the maneuver would
bleed off speed and what the Ki-61 boy needed to do was get an extra 100 mph
under his belt as quickly as possible so that the 109 driver would find himself
vexed by heavy stick forces. Unfortunately, the 109 would accelerate in the
dive about as quickly as the Ki-61; in fact, at that altitude, it might
accelerate a little quicker. The best hope the Tony tiller-minder had was to
break right (the 109 not being able to roll to the right very well) and plunge
into a dive as quickly as possible (this maneuver would also draw the 109 down
into prime Kawasaki fighting territory). If the 109 driver followed through to
the right as well, the Tony had a chance of escaping by accelerating through
400 mph while the 109 was still some distance behind, beyond which speed no
prudent 109 pilot would follow because his his stick would become immovable.
The smart 109 driver, upon seeing the Tony break right, would break left and
haul back into a diving scissors to plant himself on the tail of the Tony. The
smarter Ki-61 driver would feint a break to the right. If he saw the 109 break
left, he would break back to the left and roll in behind the 109.
In the end, it would come down to, as always, which pilot understood his own
airplane's capabilities best, understood his opponent's airplane's capabilities
best, and was, simply, the better fighter pilot. When pilots choose to get
into dogfights, the duel is between brains--not planes.
a...@dustdevil.com
>overclaiming when trying to estimate damage done by airfield attacks.
>
>> attacks
>> on British bomber fields were stopped. This was a fundamental
>> blunder, as the
>> British Air Ministry's publication, "The Rise and Fall of the German
>> Air
>> Force," points out. It notes that the RAF's bombers were extremely
>> vulnerable
>> to intruder operations. 'The German Luftwaffe's failure to exploit
>> this
>> opportunity must be reckoned as one of its biggest failures." It
>> points out
>> that the fact that Bomber Command was able to operate undisturbed from
>> its home
>> airfields throughout the war was crucial to the ultimate defeat of
>> Germany.
>
British airfields were largely just that---- Fields------- and with
radar most of the fighters were in the air waiting to meet any "sneek"
attack. Couple that with the limited range of German fighters, and
the Luftwaffe simply could not continue such attacks on British
airfields.>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
Yama
CDB100620 wrote:
> duration of his air defense fighters made it very difficult to get around
> weather and intercept before they had to break off because of fuel status.
> (Luftwaffe pilots had very limited IFR capability.) He also pointed out that
> the limited flight duration made it impossible to coordinate fighter intercepts
> from southern and northern units depending on whether a raid was coming from
> the 8AF in England or the 15AF in Italy,
I wonder whether those problems could have fixed with better GCI. Or
were German radars good enough for such task.
enemy. He
> wanted to know why the German aircraft industry couldn't build something
> comparable to the P-38, which was a stable instrument platform with excellent
> flight endurance.
Probably because P-38 would have bankrupted Germany...
> The G (let's say the -6) would be a more appropriate airplane to compare the
> Ki-61 to. At c.15,000 ft., top speeds were about the same, on paper, with the
> nod going to the G-6. The Ki-61 had fewer horsepower to play with, but the
> design was much cleaner than the 109, and suffered much less from drag. It was
> also 1,000 lbs lighter.
This contradicts with the info I have about those planes. Ki-61-I should
be compared to Bf-109E, because they had practically same engines. My
sources give top speed of Ki-61 as 570kmh, compared to 540kmh of
Bf-109E-3. From Emil it takes 7.3 minutes to reach 6,000 meters, opposed
to 8.2 minutes of Ki-61. Noting that Ki-61 was heavier and had bigger
wing but definetly better aerodynamics, this makes sense.
109F-4 could do slightly over 600kmh, having more powerful engine and
much improved aerodynamics compared to -E. G-2 was able to do 636kmh at
best. Now, if you are referring to Ki-61-II-Kai, with it's 1500hp Ha.140
engine, it makes good comparison to Gustav, having about equally
powerful engine. Top speed of Ki-61-II is given as 610kmh, as opposed to
about 620kmh of G-6. But in any case, Ha.140 traded reliability for
power. Did they ever solve those problems?
Also, Ki-61-II should be compared to G-10 and -14 models, which entered
service about same time. Trouble with many comparisons is that they take
109G-6 which was not last nor best of 109 or even Gustav family.
Comparing 109, Ki-61 and Macchi C.202/5 families is very interesting, as
they were powered by different versions of same engine. 109E, Macchi
C.202 and Ki-61-I had about same engine. Emil seems to be clearly
inferior to both of it's Axis rivals, OTOH time frame must be also
considered; Emil enter service 1939, Folgore November '41 and Ki-61
March '43.
Data about Macchi is a bit vague; My sources give top speed of 600kmh
and climb to 6,000 meters as 6 minutes, which seems bit too good to be
true; they are probably manufacturer claims. In any case, it seems that
aside from range, C.202 could do about same than Ki-61. It was very good
climber, excellent diver and had good maneuverability. Had Allied any
fly-offs with Folgore? C.205V Veltro is even more interesting, entering
service at June '43. I take it could match or outperform G-2 in all
imaginable respects. I think it's no big exaggaration to claim that
C.202 and -5 were best fighters of their day, (un)fortunately capability
of Italian industry never reached the superiority of their designers.
> machine). The only major advantage the Mess had was in high altitude
> performance. That's what made it so useful in Western Europe, the only theater
> where high altitude performance was of crucial importance.
> Comparisons of the Me 109K with the Ki-84 or Ki-100 would come up about the
> same.
I seem to remember that Ki-100 was actually slower than Ki-61-II, it
just was improving in all other areas.
Teruhiko, who
> flew the Ki-61 during the war (about two dozen kills, as I recall, including a
> number of B-29s), and had rejoined the JASDF, and was flying F-86s out of
> Iruma. He had flown the Me 109E and did not like it. "It made the pilot work
> too hard. If a fighter plane is really good, you never know you are flying it,
> simply, YOU are flying."
Japanese also disliked He-112. All air forces had their own preferances
- RAF and Soviets both disliked P-47, though USAAF was very successful
with it. Finns and Soviets both hated the Hurricane, whichs merits in
RAF hands are well known and so on. It was quite common that pilots with
little experience about 109 didn't like it at first.
-
Rick Beach
Gregory W Shaw wrote:
> 380mph on the deck sounds awfully high for a Typhoon. Tempest V could
> probably manage that fast, Tempest II probably better it, but a thick
> winged Typhoon?
I have two sources that show 374 at 5500' and 405 at 18,000' for the
Typhoon and 392 at sea level and 435 at 17,000 for the Tempest V.
Rick
CDB100620
>The idea [Luftwaffe intruder operations] would likely have worked very well
even when the RAF night
>fighter forces reached their Zenith. You've got to consider the immense
>difficulty of locating, tracking, and then shooting down high speed,
>low-level intruders at any time. If you add the difficulties of working
Some very good points made. Had the Luftwaffe actually made a major effort to
disrupt allied bomber operations over Britain, failed, suffered heavy losses
and ended the attempt, that would be one thing. But to make a few promising
early attempts only to have the program ended for political reasons, and never
seriously make a sustained attempt to do it again....
>The presence of just a few German intruders would
>likely have proved catastrophic
Recall during the Berlin Airlift walking around the ruins of Dusseldorf and
Berlin in the company of ex-8AF bomb delivery boys and listening to them talk
about the war. One of the big worries they had in those days was that the
Luftwaffe would pay them a visit while they were sitting in line for some
mission, with bombers stuck nose to tail, fully gassed and bombed up, crews
aboard, all with props turning over and going nowhere because of another snafu
somewhere along the line. All that was necessary for a disaster was for, as
they would put it, "one kraut with a match" to show up and torch the whole
shebang. But no kraut ever showed up.
> Consider the
>difficulties facing a dog-tired bomber pilot, low on fuel, trying to
>land a plane--that he had probably never really mastered--at night, in
>crowded skies. Under the best of circumstances this was an enormously
>difficult task.
This is a point that needs to be highlighted and underlined--for all the air
forces involved in that war. While discussions of hardware and which airplane
had a higher speed or greater range than another are interesting, they can be
misleading. The war wasn't fought by machines, it was fought by people. That
may seem banally obvious but it doesn't get nearly the serious attention it
deserves.
In stark constrast with the inertia of the Germans, the Japanese, even when
they were reduced to minimal air resources, never gave up efforts to interdict
American air fields. When weary aircrews, low on gas, with battle damage, came
crowding home only to find their base closed and the sky filled with flak
because some cowboy in a Kawasaki had followed a flight of A-20s home and
torched one as it touched down, blocking the runway, chaos was usually the
result as planes jockeyed for position at other airfields, bombers came in at
fighter bases and vice versa, planes cut each other off on final.... The
situation could quickly go from the snafu to the momfu.
On Biak, a night intruder attack killed the entire headquarters staff of the
49th Fighter Group. Zemke's Wolfpack never had to worry about anything like
that happening to them.
And while Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force got a free security pass from
the Luftwaffe for their home bases, the Japanese never gave up going after the
B-29 bases of the 20th Air Force in the Marianas, giving the P-61s plenty of
customers. They sent fast Peggy bombers in at night, and fighters in during
the day. During night attacks, they used chaff or "window" as it was called
then, to disrupt radar intercepts, which the Americans countered with MEW.
As late as the spring of 1945, long after Rabaul had become a bypassed
backwater, the Japanese holed up there cobbled together a couple of torpedo
bombers from wrecks and used them to attack the fleet anchorage at Seeadler
Harbor in the Admiralties, three hours flying time distant. These guys just
wouldn't quit.
One of the big shocks for ETO vets doing a tour in the PTO was that they were
not safe at night in their beds. Slit trenches outside the tent were not for
show. You could go over to a German's house and kick the crap out of him and
then go home, have a good meal and get a good night's sleep, with no worry that
the German would come visit you and try to get a little revenge. The Japanese
was a different story. He was going to come back at you. If he had only one
airplane and one bomb, then, by God, he was going to climb into that airplane
and fly over your airbase and drop that bomb on you.
David G. Bell
In article <34E4E9...@columbia.edu> jw...@columbia.edu "Jim Erickson" writes:
> My reply,
> The idea would likely have worked very well even when the RAF night
> fighter forces reached their Zenith. You've got to consider the immense
> difficulty of locating, tracking, and then shooting down high speed,
> low-level intruders at any time. If you add the difficulties of working
> in the aerial zoo produced by the return of four-, five-, or six hundred
> heavy bombers you can see the difficulties facing the RAF defenses would
> have been enormous. The presence of just a few German intruders would
> likely have proved catastrophic for the RAF in late 43 and early 44.
> Loses over Germany were almost prohibitive by that time. If they had
> been increased by the aircraft shot down by German intruders and the
> extra losses/crashes that would have resulted from the disruptions in
> landing, its hard to see how the RAF bomber offensive could have been
> maintained. This last point is worth reemphasizing. Although the
> German intruders would certainly have shot down a number of planes, I
> suspect that they would have had caused many more losses as a
> consequence of their disrupting the normal landings. Consider the
> difficulties facing a dog-tired bomber pilot, low on fuel, trying to
> land a plane--that he had probably never really mastered--at night, in
> crowded skies. Under the best of circumstances this was an enormously
> difficult task. If you douse the airfield lights because of an
> intruder, or if you close the strip because of a crashed bomber, and
> divert the planes to other airfields the problems are compounded
> immensely. As it was the loss rate due to crashes in England was
> dangerously high. Its hard to see how Bomber Command could have kept up
> the offensive if its problems had been compounded by German intruders in
> 43 and early 44
If you hypothesize an increased effort by the Luftwaffe to attack enemy
airfields, with development of appropriate weapons, you have the
potential for a big shift in the course of the war.
The Battle of Britain showed what the Luftwaffe could do--their attacks
on RAF airfields were, when they managed to hit the _right_ airfields,
doing a lot of damage to Fighter Command. And the Germans did develop
some cluster-bomb weapons.
For instance, the Butterfly Bomb, dropped on Grimsby, would have made a
mess of a bomber airfield.
So if the will had been there, the Luftwaffe had some effective weapons.
If they'd pushed the weapon development, it isn't hard to imagine low-
flying Ju-88s doing Tornado-style airfield denial.
--
David G. Bell -- Farmer, SF Fan, Filker, Furry, and Punslinger..
CDB100620
>Ki-61-I should
>be compared to Bf-109E, because they had practically same engines. My
>sources give top speed of Ki-61 as 570kmh, compared to 540kmh of
>Bf-109E-3.
Cogent evaluations of the two types. The inclusion of the MC 202 is
interesting. Believe 540kph (335 mph) is at least 30 mph slower than the
slowest Tony shipped overseas. All versions encountered in Guinea could outrun
the P-40K. The slowest Tonys were about in a dead heat with the P-40N. Some
versions were faster than the N. The K could turn with the Tony; the N could
outturn it--just barely, not enough to make much difference.
The appearance of the Tony was a hard blow to the P-40 boys because, up to that
point, the one sure advantage they had against the Oscars and Zeros was that
if the situation got out of hand they could escape by diving away. The Tony
could stay right with the P-40 all the way to the deck, and then overtake it in
a footrace over the tree tops. Bad news.
Towards the end of 1943, Bob DeHaven, one of the best natural fighter pilots
there ever was, and seven other of the boys of the 8FS were coming back in
their P-40Ns from a morning sweep of Hansa Bay when they encountered Tonys of
the 68th Sentai out of Madang. They were heading towards Alexischafen to see
what they could ventilate. There was about 7/10 cloud cover. The two groups of
fighters threw themselves at each other, and a violent dogfight, centered above
Madang village, erupted. Almost immediately, one P-40 and two Ki-61s went
down, one of the Tonys smashing into the village mission's churchyard at
terrific speed. Its engine was later found 30 ft. down at the bottom of the
huge hole it dug.
Bob DeHaven had sent this one down, shooting it off his flight leader's tail.
But DeHaven in turn found a Tony glued to his tail that he could not shake no
matter what he did. He tried the P-40 driver's favorite escape tactic--a
violent aileron roll--to no effect. He dove and skidded, hurled his Curtiss up
into screaming zooms. The Tony stayed with him and inched closer, firing a
burst whenever DeHaven kept the Warhawk steady for more than half a second.
The Tony driver shot out his rudder controls, shot out his radio, shot out his
ammo bays--which spewed exploding .50 cal rounds everywhere--shot out his
hydraulics. No matter what DeHaven did, the joker piloting the Tony coolly
followed. DeHaven worked toward Gusap field, and with his P-40 shuddering its
last, slammed down on the field wheels up and skidded to a stop in a huge cloud
of dust. The Tony roared over the field, snapped up into a chandelle and
disappeared into the clouds. DeHaven shut off the switches, slid back the
canopy, unbuckled his straps, hauled his sorry carcass out of the airplane,
took a couple of steps away from it and stood shaking uncontrollably, his knees
buckling, unable to make his body do anything more.
Tamela R. Germano
>
> Probably because P-38 would have bankrupted Germany...
I have read that Lockheed never thought that there would be mass
production of the P-38, and so did not design them for that. Lots of
skilled hand work and hard to make parts. When the large production orders
came in, they just built them anyway.
> Comparing 109, Ki-61 and Macchi C.202/5 families is very interesting, as
> they were powered by different versions of same engine. 109E, Macchi
> C.202 and Ki-61-I had about same engine. Emil seems to be clearly
> inferior to both of it's Axis rivals, OTOH time frame must be also
> considered; Emil enter service 1939, Folgore November '41 and Ki-61
> March '43.
Ah, but remember that the MC-202 used the wings and tail of the MC-200,
designed in '35, and built in '37.
>
> Data about Macchi is a bit vague; My sources give top speed of 600kmh
> and climb to 6,000 meters as 6 minutes, which seems bit too good to be
> true; they are probably manufacturer claims....................
These are about the same numbers that I have found, including ones
claimed to be from individual Italian acceptance tests. The MC-200 showed
a good turn of speed and climb, given the low horsepower/high drag radial
engine, so the numbers may be right.
>..............................................In any case, it seems that
> aside from range, C.202 could do about same than Ki-61. It was very good
> climber, excellent diver and had good maneuverability. Had Allied any
> fly-offs with Folgore? C.205V Veltro is even more interesting, entering
> service at June '43. I take it could match or outperform G-2 in all
> imaginable respects. I think it's no big exaggaration to claim that
> C.202 and -5 were best fighters of their day, (un)fortunately capability
> of Italian industry never reached the superiority of their designers.
I have thought that as well, but low production and too light a weapon
set (untill the MC-205 series III), along with the '43 side change, have
kept them out of the spotlight.
Dino in Reno
Gregory W Shaw
Rick Beach <rjb...@cris.com> wrote:
Thanks, that is better info than any I have for the Typhoon. The Tempest
V data agrees with what I have.
A look at comparable speed/altitude curves shows typically a 15-20mph
increase going from SL to 5k. That would put the Typhoon at about
355-360mph @ SL, about 5mph faster than my original info. About the same
as the high end numbers for the Allison Mustang, probably faster than
the first RAF Mustangs.
Greg Shaw
Bill Kambic
Actually, the Germans did have a strike weapon that could have been used
against 8AF bomber bases, the V-weapons.
I would have to look at map, but seems to me that at least SOME of the
bomber bases would have been within the envelope of a V1/V2. Now I
recognize that the accuracy of these things was not great, but being
targeted sure would have given an ulcer to some Bomber Command gold
hats.
Happily for the Good Guys, Herr Hitler's astrologist never foresaw this
use.
Bill Kambic, CDR, USNR(RET)
Bright Star Farm, Kingston, TN
http://www.geocities.com/heartland/hills/1816
Believer in the Great Ambiguous Blessing:
"Dear Lord, for what we are about to receive, may we be truly thankful."
Bill Kambic, CDR, USNR(RET)
Bright Star Farm, Kingston, TN
http://www.geocities.com/heartland/hills/1816
Believer in the Great Ambiguous Blessing:
"Dear Lord, for what we are about to receive, may we be truly thankful."
Yama
Tamela R. Germano wrote:
> In article <34E57B46...@paju.oulu.fi>, Yama <tj...@paju.oulu.fi>
> wrote:
>
> > Comparing 109, Ki-61 and Macchi C.202/5 families is very
> interesting, as
> > they were powered by different versions of same engine. 109E, Macchi
>
> > C.202 and Ki-61-I had about same engine. Emil seems to be clearly
> > inferior to both of it's Axis rivals, OTOH time frame must be also
> > considered; Emil enter service 1939, Folgore November '41 and Ki-61
> > March '43.
>
> Ah, but remember that the MC-202 used the wings and tail of the
> MC-200,
> designed in '35, and built in '37.
Indeed. Tells something about the talent and skill of Macchi designers.
> >
> > Data about Macchi is a bit vague; My sources give top speed of
> 600kmh
> > and climb to 6,000 meters as 6 minutes, which seems bit too good to
> be
> > true; they are probably manufacturer claims....................
>
> These are about the same numbers that I have found, including ones
> claimed to be from individual Italian acceptance tests. The MC-200
> showed
> a good turn of speed and climb, given the low horsepower/high drag
> radial
> engine, so the numbers may be right.
If they are comparable to Fiat G.50 specs, they are inflated by almost
10% =)It is claimed Fiat could do 484km/h; but in reality best speeds
achieved were about 430km/h, plus WEP giving about ~15km/h more speed.
> > service at June '43. I take it could match or outperform G-2 in all
> > imaginable respects. I think it's no big exaggaration to claim that
> > C.202 and -5 were best fighters of their day, (un)fortunately
> capability
> > of Italian industry never reached the superiority of their
> designers.
>
> I have thought that as well, but low production and too light a
> weapon
> set (untill the MC-205 series III),
Most Folgores having 2x12.7mm and 2x7.7mm, this is indeed lightly armed,
especially when Breda's were not exactly the best possible guns. OTOH if
your concern is mainly to fight enemy fighters, you can come along with
quite light armament.
JHAREK
>I would have to look at map, but seems to me that at least SOME of the bomber
bases would have been within the envelope of a V1/V2. Now I recognize that the
accuracy of these things was not great, but being targeted sure would have
given an ulcer to some Bomber Command gold hats.>>
Problem with this is that airbases are pretty darn small compared to a
city,,and your chances of hitting hangars or aircraft are even smaller. The
allied air forces were already devoting much time to hunting down V2 sites
since they were being used on civilian targets with great effect. I think they
would've been glad to know that the V2's were being used on airbases. In the
case of the VI...sending them towards airbases would've been stupid, since an
aircraft with decent speed can intercept them. Right into the mouth of the
enemy....
David Heller
Yama
David G. Bell wrote:
> In article <34E4E9...@columbia.edu> jw...@columbia.edu "Jim
> Erickson" writes:
>
> > divert the planes to other airfields the problems are compounded
> > immensely. As it was the loss rate due to crashes in England was
> > dangerously high. Its hard to see how Bomber Command could have
> kept up
> > the offensive if its problems had been compounded by German
> intruders in
> > 43 and early 44
>
> If you hypothesize an increased effort by the Luftwaffe to attack
> enemy
> airfields, with development of appropriate weapons, you have the
> potential for a big shift in the course of the war.
Unlikely. Though RAF night bombings caused vast economical damage to
Germany, their actual military signifance was somewhat
counter-productive. Intruder-tactics might have worked against night
raids (there are examples), but RAF might just shifted to daylight
raids. Setback, but far from changing the course of war.
> The Battle of Britain showed what the Luftwaffe could do--their
> attacks
> on RAF airfields were, when they managed to hit the _right_ airfields,
>
> doing a lot of damage to Fighter Command. And the Germans did develop
>
> some cluster-bomb weapons.
IMHO Battle of Britain showed completely opposite; RAF lost something
like 20 planes as destroyed to airfields during whole BoB. Fighter
Command suffered damage from exactly same reasons than Luftwaffe later;
outfighting the escorts. But they survived, and by '43 or '44 they were
ones who outnumbered the enemy.
> For instance, the Butterfly Bomb, dropped on Grimsby, would have made
> a
> mess of a bomber airfield.
>
> So if the will had been there, the Luftwaffe had some effective
> weapons.
> If they'd pushed the weapon development, it isn't hard to imagine low-
>
> flying Ju-88s doing Tornado-style airfield denial.
But it is much harder to imagine 1) how that Ju-88 ever reaches Grimsby
at daylight2) how that Ju manages to escape after dropping the bomb.
Single intruding bomber or Jabo might have chances to slip through but
that's hardly more than a nuisance, and even then every raid is
practically suicide one, at least for bomber.
Originally this thread evolved from idea that P-51 is good interceptor
because it can escort bombers to hit enemy bomber airfields. While
taking the initiative sounds like a good idea, you have to be realistic.
Can you imagine possible result when (hypothetical) Bf-51D's escort
Do-217's to strike 8th AF airfields at '43 or '44? I think Spitfires
would make it a very sorry raid.
Also, primary concern of Luftwaffe was not avalailability of planes but
pilots. If pilot attrition was too high over the Germany, how high it
would have been over the Britain?
Yama
CDB100620 wrote:
> Cogent evaluations of the two types.
Flattering comments always welcome=)
> The inclusion of the MC 202 is
> interesting. Believe 540kph (335 mph) is at least 30 mph slower than
> the
> slowest Tony shipped overseas. All versions encountered in Guinea
> could outrun
> the P-40K. The slowest Tonys were about in a dead heat with the
> P-40N. Some
> versions were faster than the N.
I remember that P-40K could do about 585km/h (363mph) and lightened
(4-gun) version of N about 610km/h(379mph). OTOH I don't know origin of
the source (Curtiss or Army claims). At least in the case of P-36,
Curtiss somewhat exaggarated the performance of it's machine. FAF had
one captured P-40M, and performance tests were surely flown but alas I
haven't seen them published anywhere. Depending how we twist the
numbers, we got that Ki-61-I could do about 580-600km/h, which is 'close
enough' mentioned 570km/h, knowing that exact speed of any aircraft type
is impossible to define accurately. Anyways, Hien was impressively fast
regarding it's somewhat mediocre power load.
> The K could turn with the Tony; the N could
> outturn it--just barely, not enough to make much difference.
> The appearance of the Tony was a hard blow to the P-40 boys because,
> up to that
> point, the one sure advantage they had against the Oscars and Zeros
> was that
> if the situation got out of hand they could escape by diving away.
I've been under influence that one reason for success of Tony was that
it was only Japanese fighter with inline engine, making it more
difficult to Allied to tell whether it was friend or foe.
CDB100620
>I've been under influence that one reason for success of Tony was that
>it was only Japanese fighter with inline engine, making it more
>difficult to Allied to tell whether it was friend or foe.
>
>
There were some friendly fire accidents--but there always were. Bombers would
shoot at ANY fighter plane that got too close. Usually what the airplane was
doing was the instant tip-off to whether it was friend or foe.
CDB100620
>
>It must be added that the claims of the 5th AF were greatly exaggerated,
Done some checking on this, and it doesn't seem to true. The best estimate is
that they were overclaiming by a factor of about 2 to 1--at the most--which is
pretty good, and compares well with any other air force. The big discrepancy
was not in counting the number of aircraft that took serious hits, either on
the air or ground, but in underestimating the Japanese ability to resurrect
flyable airplanes from wrecks. The 5AF gave the Japanese a huge junkyard from
which to pull parts to put airplanes back into flying condition. It also
allowed them to put out decoys--unflyable junkers that looked in good shape to
a straffer lining up a target at 250mph.
All 5AF claims eventually had to be filtered through MacArthur's own G-2, Brig.
Gen. Charles Willoughby, who was so good at his job that MacArthur kept at it
from 1941 to 1951--and a good G-2 makes a commanding general look like a
genius. Willoughby was a notorious skeptic and 5AF boss George Kenney was an
equally notorious optimist. If Kenney passed on info Willoughby thought was
spurious, he would kick it back, informing Kenney that any conclusions he
forwarded to MacArthur had to be based on evidence and logic. Kenney got the
message very quckly.
An example of Willoughby's accuracy came in the decision to invade the
Admiralties, an action which is generally considered to have shortened the war
by at least a month. Willoughby estimated there were 4,050 Japanese on the
islands. The 1st Cavalry, after conquering the Japanese garrison, buried 3,280
enemy and captured 75. An additional 1,100 graves of Japanese killed by air
and naval bombardment were discovered, for a total of 4,455. So Willoughby was
off by about 10 percent. Not bad.
Since its harder to count people than airplanes, and since Willoughby was the
man ultimately responsible for the figures for 5AF e/a destroyed, they seem to
be based on a pretty solid foundation.
It was Willoughby who initially seriously questioned 5AF claims of e/a
destroyed at Rabaul because he had conflicting evidence from other sources, and
also because he just couldn't credit the enormous destructive power of the B-25
gunships, which could not only dump tons of parafrags and WP on enemy
airfields, but had the ability to single out individual aircraft tucked inside
revetments and attack them with their battery of up to 14 heavy machineguns.
Part of the problem he and others in his position faced was what weight to give
what information. Intelligence did not merely evaluate after-action pilot
reports and recon fotos of Rabaul, but aerial reconnaissance of Japanese
support facilities, submarine reports of shipping as far away as the Japanese
home islands, radio traffic, and Japanese air activity in other areas.
Arriving at accurate assessments of damage done to the enemy by air strikes has
always been difficult, but the 5th Air Force did an admirable job. They
equipped bombers with not only still cameras (the gunships mounted them astern
so that the results of their attacks could be clearly seen) and motion picture
cameras. (The fotos they took were among the most spectacular air warfare
images ever shot.) They adopted the use of color film in fighter gun cameras to
help show details black & white film couldn't. Civilian reporters were
welcomed on the raids so they could be debriefed and the action examined from
their point of view. And high ranking officers went along to make direct
assessments of the action; in fact, Brig. Gen. Kenneth Walker, the Commander
of V Bomber Command, was killed in action over Rabaul. Maj. Skip Chase, Gen.
Kenney's personal aide, routinely rode as observer to report directly to the
general what happened.
>perhaps also because of a
>competition with the Navy.
Not a chance of something like that happening. The Navy provided much
intelligence to the Military Intelligence Section of the General Staff at GHQ
SWPA. The Navy and the Army cooperated to reduce Rabaul. They were engaged in
winning a war not a boasting contest.
SIBs would always include information provided by the Navy. An example from
an SIB:
"Northeast Sector
a)Navy: Activity declined, a minumum of 33 aircraft being observed. These were
based as follows: Rabaul area 12, Kavieng 8, Vunakanau 7, Faisi 3, and
unidentified 3. 14 aircraft of 958 Naval Air Group were aloft, the majority
being from Matupi. Three floatplanes of the 938 Kokutai were active from Faisi
on reconnaissance over the Central Solomons. Seven divebombers of the 582
kokutai were active from Kavieng.
b)Army: Activity slightly increased, a minimum of 13 aircraft from 5 bases
being noted...."
It goes on to describe in detail the analysis of aerial photographs taken by
F-5 foto joes. From the summary:
"Photographs taken at 0915L showed 294 planes by actual count. Yesterday,
photographs with incomplete coverage revealed 143 planes...."
The report also goes on to contrast the estimate of fighter strength on Rabaul
on this particular day--83 fighters--with the actual count revealed--145--and
discuss the reasons for the discrepencies.
Intelligence officers were professionals who went about their job with deadly
seriousness. It is inconceivable that they would inflate figures to outdo a
rival military service during time of war--or if they had that they would have
kept their jobs for very long. The careers of senior officers were cut short
for failure to get results, and one sure way to guarantee failure is to base
decisions on deliberately falsified information.
The bottom line is that by Feb., 1944, the air strength at Rabaul had been
destroyed, one of the most heavily defended bastions in any theater of the war
neutalized by air power alone.
Emmanuel Gustin
CDB100620 wrote in message
<19980217180...@ladder02.news.aol.com>...
>Done some checking on this, and it doesn't seem to true. The best estimate
is
>that they were overclaiming by a factor of about 2 to 1--at the most--which
is
>pretty good, and compares well with any other air force.
My source for this was "Combined Fleet Decoded" by John Prados, an
"intelligence history" of the Pacific war. Excellent book BTW. He took his
data from a detail study of the 5th AF's operation over Rabaul, but I don't
remember the title.
By their own account and from reconnaissance pictures, the Japanese
had less than 300 airworthy aircraft on Rabaul. Maybe 500 in total, given
their maintenance problems. After a series of attacks --- most of them
in October and November --- the 5th AF claimed about 600 Japanese
aircraft destroyed in air-to-air combat alone. After that, reconnaissance
pictures still showed that the Japanese had about 200 aircraft available.
I don't believe that this came about by the quality of Japanese repair
efforts. These claims were air-to-air kills, and there should have been
very little recoverable from them. And my impression is that they even
lacked the spare parts and trained people to maintain the aircraft they
had properly.
The problem was that when confronted with the gap between their
own claims and photographic evidence, the 5th AF tended to fill it by
insisting that the Japanese had received new aircraft. The resulting
picture was almost totally wrong. (Prados is sarcastic about this habit,
describing it as a positive detriment to the conduct of the war.)
>Not a chance of something like that happening. The Navy provided much
>intelligence to the Military Intelligence Section of the General Staff at
GHQ
>SWPA. The Navy and the Army cooperated to reduce Rabaul. They were
>engaged in winning a war not a boasting contest.
Later the Navy habitually reduced the claims of the 5th AF by 40%, unless
they were backed up by solid evidence.
>The bottom line is that by Feb., 1944, the air strength at Rabaul had been
>destroyed, one of the most heavily defended bastions in any theater of the
war
>neutalized by air power alone.
Agreed. But the 5th AF took undue credit for it. Rabaul was not even on top
of their target list. Their contribution was significant, but not decisive.
Emmanuel Gustin
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CDB100620
> the 5th AF claimed about 600 Japanese
>aircraft destroyed in air-to-air combat alone.
Can't imagine where Prados got this figure. If this is an example of his
scholarship, the book is of questionable value.
For the nine raids over Rabaul in Oct. and Nov. 1943 the 5AF carried out,
official air-to-air credits were:
12 Oct = 3
23 Oct = 13
24 Oct = 40
25 Oct = 1
29 Oct = 18
2 Nov = 29
5 Nov = 2
7 Nov = 6
11 Nov = 0
Total = 112
HQ AAF Intelligence Situation Reports estimated that, in total--aircraft
destroyed in the air *and* on the ground--the series of attacks destroyed about
600 aircraft. That may be the figure Prados is referring to. But if he says
this is an air-to-air figure, he is dissembling.
The big problem 5AF analysts had was figuring out what non-combat operational
losses to attribute to the Japanese. Basing this on their own experience, they
generally overestimated by a wide margin. (One reason was that the P-40 was
notoriously ground-loop prone in the hands of inexperienced pilots, and the
P-38's and P-39's nose gear frequently collapsed on the rough fields they flew
from; on the other hand, all the Japanese fighter planes were easy and
forgiving to land and take-off, so even low-time pilots rarely bent them.)
Japanese records indicate that as a result of 5AF attacks, 18 Japanese Naval
Air Force groups were withdrawn from combat in the SWPA or disbanded: 1,4,
938, 958, Tainan, Ginzan, Kisaragu, 705, 253, 204, 151, 251, 702, 201, 751,
501, 552, 582. These comprised seven medium bomber (G4M), three light bomber
(D3, B5N), three reconnaissance (E13A, F1M), and five fighter groups (A6M).
From the Japanese 4th Army's Intelligence Report 102 (which discusses the
effects of 5AF attacks on Rabaul): "Great numbers of parachute bombs
[parafrags] are used to inflict casualties on personnel and aircraft. The
horizontal burst effect is very great and very effective." It also notes that
the "12.7mm" bullet the straffers fired was "very destructive."
This report dismisses U.S. Navy dive bombing attacks as "causing little damage
except when by luck a direct hit with a bomb is made." It also contrasts the
method of Navy air attack--largely dive bombing, the planes coming down from
14,000 ft. or so, and lumbering torpedo bombers "glide bombing"--with the
method of Army attack--low level straffers coming in at high speed on the
deck--planes packed with heavy machineguns that depart leaving a trail of
parafrags and WP. The report specifically cites the B-25 gunship as the most
dangerous and destructive airplane in the American arsenal.
>Prado is sarcastic
Obviously he has an ax to grind. Dunno why.
For some reason, the Pacific War is generally written about from the U.S.
Navy/Marine point of view. Navy admirals get admiring portraits, U.S. Army
generals, except MacArthur, are ignored; MacArthur gets trashed. The
Australians aren't even noticed. Generally, the Pacific War is written about
as Pearl Harbor--Midway--Guadalcanal--Marianas Turkey Shoot--Battle of Leyte
Gulf--Iwo Jima--atomic bombs. What the Army or Air Force were doing, what the
allies were doing, is denigrated or ignored. The whole New Guinea theater is
overlooked and the Philippine Islands campaign is dismissed as unnecessary. If
it wasn't for the Flying Tigers episode and the lore of flying "the Hump," the
CBI would be largely ignored, as well.
>the Navy habitually reduced the claims of the 5th AF by 40%
Prados says this?
Here's the text of an official communication:
Subject: Commendation
To: Commander Allied Air Forces
1. Admiral Ghormley has informed me that he and Admiral Turner are convinced
that the attacks upon Vunakanau [Rabaul] contributed materially to the
successful accomplishment of Admiral Turner's mission in Guadalcanal. Admiral
Ghormley asks that there be conveyed to the [air] crews his commendation, 'Well
done.'
2. It gives me great pleasure to convey to you this message.
Douglas MacArthur
>Rabaul was not even on top
>of their [5AF] target list.
Busy hands are happy hands. The 5AF went after Rabaul because the Navy asked
them to. It helped the gobs handle the Japanese in the Solomons (which they
were just barely able to do). The 5AF's main job was to support the Australian
Army/ U.S. Army advance in Rabaul. The U.S. Navy hardly ever--and always with
great reluctance--detached elements of SOPAC to help the Army win in New
Guinea.
In one of the most well known cases of Navy reluctance to aid the Army, when
the decision was made to invade the Admiralties, a bold and dangerous move, the
Navy initially only provided a paltry four destroyers to escort the invasion
force and provide fire support. MacArthur could not pursuade Adm. Kincaid to
provide anything more until he told Kincaid that he was going in with the first
wave of troops himself and invited Kincaid to join him. Kincaid didn't dare
appear too chicken to go with MacArthur, so he came along--bringing with him
two cruisers and four more destroyers. It was only by such strategems that
the Army got the Navy to help it out. All the Navy had to do to get help from
the Army was ask.
Here's a well-known anecdote that expresses how much Douglas MacArthur thought
of the 5AF:
George Kenney, boss of the 5AF, stopped by MacArthur's quarters one evening.
MacArthur was reading a biography of Robert E. Lee.
"George," he said. "I've been reading about a remarkable coincidence. When
Stonewall Jackson was dying, the last words he said were, 'Tell A.P. Hill to
bring up his infantry.' Years later, when Lee died, his last words were,
'Hill, bring up the infantry.'
MacArthur paused, lit his corncob pipe, sucked on it pensively, looked at
Kenney and said, "If I should die today, or tomorrow or any time, if you listen
to my last words, you'll hear me say, 'George, bring up the 5th Air Force."
CDB100620
>y
>were just barely able to do). The 5AF's main job was to support the
>Australian
>Army/ U.S. Army advance in Rabaul.
Meant New Guinea
Emmanuel Gustin
CDB100620 wrote in message
<19980304042...@ladder02.news.aol.com>...
>> the 5th AF claimed about 600 Japanese aircraft destroyed in air-to-air
combat
>> alone.
> Can't imagine where Prados got this figure.
To be precise, he writes "combat claims alone total more than 600 planes
downed". The key word is "downed", which should be "destroyed". A fairly
minor error in editing, but a misleading one. Prados quotes Lex MacAulay
on this issue. The book is not bad at all -- I would recommend it. It
is basically an overview of the intelligence behind Navy operations in the
Pacific, and as such, it suffers from lack of detail on things outside
its direct scope.
Even so, the point is that 600 was more than the Japanese actually had.
A reconnaissance on 11 October showed 294 aircraft, and the IJN latter
added 173. By New Year they were down to 120-130, and to that the
52 surviving Navy aircraft (pulled out in November) should be added.
That puts their losses at about 300, maybe a little more from salvaging
and make unserviceable aircraft combat-ready. But this damage has
to be distributed over the 5th AF, the forces of COMAIRSOL (that flew
four times more missions against Rabaul than the 5th AF did), and the
carrier air strikes.
(Judging from these figures, the IJN "Air Fleet" suffered much more than
the Army units based on Rabaul, losing over 2/3 of its strength in a
few attacks. That suggests that the measures of active and passive
defense of army air bases on Rabaul were really effective. I can
imagine that the Navy commanders, flown in from a non-combat zone,
were typically unwilling to listen to the advice of their army colleagues!)
> This report dismisses U.S. Navy dive bombing attacks as "causing little
damage
> except when by luck a direct hit with a bomb is made."
Probably the primary targets for the USN were ships, and this sounds
as if they were using AP instead of fragmentation or HE bombs.
>> Prado is sarcastic
> Obviously he has an ax to grind. Dunno why.
The reason is fairly obvious. Prados' work is a book about intelligence,
and he felt that the 5th did some very bad intelligence work --- that
it was directly responsible for a great overestimation of the Japanese
ability to recover.
>> the Navy habitually reduced the claims of the 5th AF by 40%
> Prados says this?
Yes, although in a later part of the book, when discussing the
operation in the Phillipines. He writes that the Army intelligence
still accepted 5th AF claims as they were, but that the Navy
counterpart systematically reduced them by 40%.
>MacArthur was reading a biography of Robert E. Lee.
>"George," he said. "I've been reading about a remarkable coincidence.
When
>Stonewall Jackson was dying, the last words he said were, 'Tell A.P. Hill
to
>bring up his infantry.' Years later, when Lee died, his last words were,
>'Hill, bring up the infantry.'
>MacArthur paused, lit his corncob pipe, sucked on it pensively, looked at
>Kenney and said, "If I should die today, or tomorrow or any time, if you
listen
>to my last words, you'll hear me say, 'George, bring up the 5th Air Force."
A beautiful anecdote. Wasn't it Eisenhower who said that he had "studied
dramatics" under MacArthur?
Anyway, I would never say that the 5th AF did not support the operations
of the army in a very effective way. Certainly it was very successful. But
apparently it overestimated both the enemy it was figthing and his losses.
Qualitatively, the effect was the same: The Japanese were defeated.
Emmanuel Gustin
CDB100620
>But this damage has
>to be distributed over the 5th AF, the forces of COMAIRSOL (that flew
>four times more missions against Rabaul than the 5th AF did), and the
>carrier air strikes.
It's not the number of missions so much as the destruction visited by them.
The Navy basically only had single-engine light bombers that did very little
damage to Rabaul installations. 13AF at its peak before it was absorbed into
5AF had two B-24 groups, two fighter groups and one B-25 group. Of the two
B-24 groups, the 5BG was a good outfit, but the 307BG was a collection of
abort-happy bad luck artists who never figured out how to fly formation, always
seemed to screw up rendevous, miss their fighter cover, bomb the wrong target
and get the shit shot out of them. The B-25 group, while competent, was not
equipped initially with gunships nor did it initially use low-level attack
techniques with parafrags, thus reducing its effectiveness. The two P-38 FGs
did good work.
The 5AF sent B-24s and B-25s against Rabaul. The two B-24 groups were both
good, with the 90BG being exceptional. The B-24s were used mainly against
the town of Rabaul, harbor installations and shipping in the harbor, although
they were also used to attack airfields. The B-25s were the main anti-airfield
weapon. Each was loaded with 60 parafrag bombs. In addition, each carried 10
fixed forward-firing .50 machineguns with 500 rounds of ammunition each. It
was these B-25 gunships (along with A-20s) that proved the most effective at
destroying Japanese air assests on the ground, not only at Rabual but at Wewak,
Hollandia, and elsewhere. Other air units operating against Rabaul simply did
not have a comparably effective weapon. Whatever air asset destruction the
Japanese suffered at Rabaul can be attributed almost exclusively to the 3AG,
38BG and 345 BG. The crews of these groups performed with exceptional skill
and heroism against the most difficult circumstances of navigation, weather and
enemy opposition. The credit due them for an extraordinary job should not be
denied.
>the point is that 600 was more than the Japanese actually had.
The original point was that the assertion was made that the 5AF overclaimed to
a much greater extent than other air forces. This assertion is disputed.
Everybody overclaimed, and the 5AF was not out of line.
>the Army units based on Rabaul, losing over 2/3 of its strength in a
>few attacks. That suggests that the measures of active and passive
>defense of army air bases on Rabaul were really effective.
The Japanese Army and Army Air Force have always dwelt in the shadows of
histories of the Pacific War. The navies, both US and Japanese get center
stage. But the Japanese Army was a collection of pretty tough nuts, who had
been fighting in Asia for years and had their ducks pretty well lined up.
There were never any "turkey shoots" involving the JAAF, and the Japanese Army
in New Guinea missed capturing the island by a bare thead.
(And it was the Japanese Navy that screwed the pooch and left them in the
lurch--as it did again in the second PI campaign.)
>felt that the 5th did some very bad intelligence work --- that
>it was directly responsible for a great overestimation of the Japanese
>ability to recover.
Possibly they did, but since the 5AF's main credo was to keep hitting a target
again and again until there was nothing left--bomb craters left unfilled, weeds
growing on the runways--what was the harm? Overestimating the enemy's ability
to recover from your attacks is a good thing--far, far better than
underestimating, which, based on the Navy's repeated bloody fiascos in the
central Pacific, from Tarawa to Peleliu to Iwo Jima, was what it and the
Marines did. Contrast what the Navy did at Iwo Jima with what 5AF did for the
reconquest of Fortress Corregidor: Some weeks of light air raids followed by a
limited, if intense, shore bombardment by naval vessels was all the preparation
provided before the Marines went ashore at Iwo. At Corregidor, 5AF, 13AF plus
an attached Marine Air Wing bombarded the island for 10 straight days with
every aircraft at their disposal, including fighters loaded up with napalm.
They dumped more than 4,000 tons of HE, 1,500 tons of napalm and 380,000 rounds
of .50 machinegun ammo on "The Rock." One parachute regiment and one infantry
battalion landed against almost no opposition. The two week campaign to secure
the island cost 210 dead. Japanese losses were never known exactly, as many of
the caves and tunnels were collapsed by the bombing and never opened, but the
bodies of more than 6,000 Japanese soldiers were recovered, most killed by the
intense air attack. Contrast that with 60,000 Marines (rising to 110,000
troops ultimately) going against 22,000 Japanese at Iwo Jima and suffering
almost 6,000 killed. Doubtless the Marines would have been quite happy to have
had the Navy overestimate the ability of the Japanese to recover from air and
naval bombardment and shoveled on a few thousand more tons of HE before the
landing.
>operation in the Phillipines. He writes that the Army intelligence
>still accepted 5th AF claims as they were, but that the Navy
>counterpart systematically reduced them by 40%.
>
A 40 percent reduction is not bad. By how much did the Navy reduce its own
intelligence estimates?
Actually, the Navy was most obvious in the Philippines after the first few days
by its absence, courtesy of Adm. King, who threw a fit because his pet project
of invading Formosa was sidelined in favor of reconquering the PI. (It was
sidelined, among other reasons, because estimates were that it would require
200,000 more troops than were available in the entire Pacific Theater.) King
wouldn't let his fleet carriers stick around PI waters to aid the invasion
(afraid the Japs would sink them). So it was up to the 5AF to take up to task
of providing air cover for the invasion, which it did, its fighter operating
from airfields in the combat zone. Brig. Gen. Ennis Whitehead's 5AF command HQ
was actually cut off and surrounded by Japanese parachutists for five days
during the worst of the fighting, which saw the Japanese penetrating
Whitehead's own camp, his staff personnel, armed with .45 pistols and M1
carbines, fighting savagely hand-to-hand to repel them. This was a time when
the air war was so furious that as soon as a P-38 landed it was refueled,
rearmed and took off again immediately, the pilot never getting out of the
plane, and never mind about flying in elements of two or flights of four. No
time for any of that, nor, with Japanese air raids so frequent, no sense in
risking a plane staying on the ground any longer than necessary. Fighters took
off alone and often encountered enemy air before their gear had fully
retracted.
>A beautiful anecdote. Wasn't it Eisenhower who said that he had "studied
>dramatics" under MacArthur?
>
If he did, he must have slept through the class. Eisenhower, a natural-born
bureaucrat, was one of the most boring and inept public speakers ever to cause
an audience's eyes to glaze over and roll back in their heads.
MacArthur praised the 5AF because it saved his ass in the early days of the New
Guinea campaign and enabled him to gain victory after victory with minimal cost
thanks to the techniques of air attack it developed, including the often
overlooked skill of air lift. It was said that there was nothing the 5AF
couldn't fit into a C-47. From Moresby to Manila, the 5AF never failed
MacArthur, and it was only fitting that he pay it the tribute it was due.
Maury Markowitz
In <19980307182...@ladder02.news.aol.com> CDB100620 wrote:
> The Japanese Army and Army Air Force have always dwelt in the shadows of
> histories of the Pacific War. The navies, both US and Japanese get center
> stage. But the Japanese Army was a collection of pretty tough nuts, who
had
> been fighting in Asia for years and had their ducks pretty well lined up.
> There were never any "turkey shoots" involving the JAAF
Not completely true, due mostly to the average plane quality of the JAAF's
front line units, which were terribly outdated. The Ki-43, forming it's
backbone, was simply no match for other planes even of it's own era, let
alone those it faced later in the war. It had all the weaknesses of the Zero
to an even greater extreme. They did have good planes, the Ki-61 was fine
and the Ki-84 was untouchable, but these served in too small numbers to do
any good. Had a concerted effort been made to switch to the 61 (which was
available at the right time frame) their fighting
Maury
CDB100620
The Ki-43 was, in some ways, more dangerous to deal with than the A6M, chiefly
because it had a better rate of roll and was armed with two 12.7mm machineguns.
The P-40 driver with a Zero on his tail could usually break the contact with
an aileron roll. This was much less likely with the Ki-43. The Oscar boy
could plant himself behind the P-40 and stay there no matter what the Curtiss
driver did, all the while hammering .50 cal nails that could do some real
damage.
In contrast, the Zero pilot, even if he couldn't be shaken, was doing most of
his firing with rifle caliber mgs which did less damage (although enough of
them in the right places could do the job). The 20mms generally didn't come
into play unless the Zero was in point blank range. A way to stay out of
point blank range was to execute a series of violent aileron turns; this would
allow the P-40 pilot to gradually pull away from the Zero. Once he had
extended sufficiently, he could go into a fast, shallow climb and leave the
Zero behind.
The best bet for the P-40 driver was to have sufficient altitude to dive away
from either the Oscar or Zero, but that wasn't always the situation.
The Ki-43 had better wing loading and power loading than the Zero, had superior
initial acceleration, a better roll rate and a tighter turning circle. It also
had a substantially better rate of climb. That made it an awesome aerobatic
fighter that you absolutely, positively did not dare engage in a dogfight. It
also meant that if you bounced an Oscar and the pilot spotted you, he was
probably going to escape scott free because, should he choose to turn, he could
roll into a tight turn faster than you could follow, whereas if you bounced a
Zero, should he choose to turn, you could follow him, outrolling him and
staying with him for a considerable portion of his turn, often enough to do him
in. (In practice, Oscar and Zero drivers both generally preferred to snap up
into tight loops when bounced, leaving the P-40 driver the option of blowing on
by and clearing the vicinity or sticking around to get a Nip on his six.)
In a typical scenario early in the game, P-40s could be flying top cover for
B-26s flying at 9,000 ft. that were attacking an airstrip, note Oscars taking
off below, make a turn away from the B-26s to position themselves up-sun to
dive on the Oscars once they approached the bombers, turn and come back, taking
less than three minutes for the entire maneuver, and find the B-26s already
under attack from those Oscars they had seen just taking off. Amazing little
buggers.
P-40 escort quickly learned to dive on any Oscars they spotted, no matter how
far below they were, and the bomber boys had to learn not to howl when they saw
their escort peel off for the deck, even though there were no Jap planes
anywhere close by.
The chief advantages of the Zero over the Oscar besides the two 20mm cannon
were a somewhat faster maximum speed and a much, much greater range. Since the
P-40 was faster than the Zero, its superior speed to the Ki-43 wasn't too
important. Range was, because it meant that Zeros could be encountered almost
anywhere at anytime. That was a key reason they were so dangerous.
The Ki-61 was a very serious airplane, no doubt, and was by no means a rare
fighter in New Guinea, being routinely encountered from about mid-1943 on. The
Ki-84 wasn't encountered until the second PI campaign. Definitely a topflight
performer.
Not to be overlooked is the Ki-44, the performance of which was more or less
comparable to the FW 190A series, but with a faster rate of climb. It was met
over the oil refineries in the Dutch East Indies and was used in China and was
quite formidable. The P-40 was simply outclassed by it, and had the Japanese
Army pushed Ki-44 units into New Guinea in 1942, it would definitely been bad
news for the allies. In the nearly failed Buna campaign (the US 32nd Infantry
Division suffered 90 percent casualties, the worst rate of the entire war) in
late summer, for example, the chief allied fighter was the P-40, Es flying
escort for Ks which were used as dive bombers. The P-40s flew three and four
missions a day, desperately fighting to stave off disaster on the ground. No
way the old E could have handled the Ki-44. The Ki-44 could have cut a wide
swath through New Guinea at just the right time--pre-P-38. Apparently, the
JAAF considered holdings in the DEI, Manchuria and CBI more important than
Australian New Guinea, so reserved the Ki-44s to protect them, leaving the
Ki-43 to handle the "North of Australia Front" that the navy had gotten it
entangled in, then choosing to supplement the Ki-43 with the Ki-61, which fell
prey to the P-38.
The Ki-44 was replaced by the Ki-84, theoretically a good move, but it might
have made more sense to keep the Ki-44 in production anyway, perhaps shutting
down Ki-43 production at Tachikawa replacing it with Ki-44 production.
Tachikawa built Ki-43s until the end of the war; Nakajima itself stopped
building Ki-43s in Oct., 1944 and ended Ki-44 production in favor of Ki-84
production in Dec., 1944.
It's worth pointing out that while the Japanese Navy stuck pretty much with the
A6M manuever fighter, the Japanese Army went from the Ki-43 maneuver fighter to
the Ki-44, Ki-61 and Ki-84, all energy fighters.
As the USAAF introduced superior fighers, so did the JAAF. When an American
Army pilot was flying the P-40, he met the Ki-43. He got the P-47 or the P-38
and he met the Ki-44 and Ki-61. He got the P-51 and he met the Ki-84. When
the USN/USMC pilot was flying the F4F, he met the Zero. When he was flying
the F6F he met the Zero. When he was flying the F4U, he met the Zero. It's
another point of superiority of the JAAF over the JNAF that is largely
overlooked.
It's certainly true that the Ki-43 was kept in production long after its
virtues had largely become irrelevant or surpassed(true, too, of the Zero), but
that can be said as well of the Me 109 and, for that matter, the P-40. It's
worth remarking that while neither Messerschmitt nor Curtiss ever came up with
a better single-engine piston fighter than the one they started the war with,
and just monkeyed around with their original design, Nakajima came up with two
entirely new fighter planes, each substantially superior to its predecessor.
Maury Markowitz
In <19980309203...@ladder02.news.aol.com> CDB100620 wrote:
> The Ki-43 was, in some ways, more dangerous to deal with than the A6M,
chiefly
> because it had a better rate of roll and was armed with two 12.7mm
machineguns.
> The P-40 driver with a Zero on his tail could usually break the contact
with
> an aileron roll. This was much less likely with the Ki-43.
Good points.
> could plant himself behind the P-40 and stay there no matter what the
Curtiss
> driver did, all the while hammering .50 cal nails that could do some real
> damage.
Yeah, but 2 of them against a P-40? It's not so much an issue of not being
able to get one guy, but while you're doing it it takes so much time they
nail ya.
> The best bet for the P-40 driver was to have sufficient altitude to dive
away
> from either the Oscar or Zero, but that wasn't always the situation.
> The Ki-43 had better wing loading and power loading than the Zero
I was under the impression manuverability was actually worse until they
introduced the combat flaps though.
> initial acceleration, a better roll rate and a tighter turning circle. It
also
> had a substantially better rate of climb. That made it an awesome
aerobatic
> fighter that you absolutely, positively did not dare engage in a dogfight.
However as they demonstrated against the Zero, this means little in combat.
For that matter the Nate was even better in most of these ways, yet when the
Nate met the F4U it was a slaughter.
> The Ki-61 was a very serious airplane, no doubt, and was by no means a rare
> fighter in New Guinea, being routinely encountered from about mid-1943 on.
The
> Ki-84 wasn't encountered until the second PI campaign. Definitely a
topflight
> performer.
As I understood it though, the Ki-43 was always the #1 fighter from 41 on
in terms of deployed units, with all others coming in a distant second until
late in the war.
> Not to be overlooked is the Ki-44, the performance of which was more or
less
> comparable to the FW 190A series, but with a faster rate of climb. It was
met
> over the oil refineries in the Dutch East Indies and was used in China and
was
> quite formidable.
This I didn't know, I thought all of the 44's were kept at home.
Interesting!
> The P-40 was simply outclassed by it, and had the Japanese
> Army pushed Ki-44 units into New Guinea in 1942, it would definitely been
bad
> news for the allies.
Was the 44 superior to the 61?
> swath through New Guinea at just the right time--pre-P-38. Apparently, the
> JAAF considered holdings in the DEI, Manchuria and CBI more important than
> Australian New Guinea
Astounding, and lucky.
> It's worth pointing out that while the Japanese Navy stuck pretty much with
the
> A6M manuever fighter, the Japanese Army went from the Ki-43 maneuver
fighter to
> the Ki-44, Ki-61 and Ki-84, all energy fighters.
Yes, this is interesting. And don't discount the Toryu either, it was
likely the best plane of it's type (althout the 38 still had the edge there)
and it's lucky they didn't sell the design to Germany.
> As the USAAF introduced superior fighers, so did the JAAF. When an
American
> Army pilot was flying the P-40, he met the Ki-43. He got the P-47 or the
P-38
> and he met the Ki-44 and Ki-61. He got the P-51 and he met the Ki-84.
When
> the USN/USMC pilot was flying the F4F, he met the Zero. When he was
flying
> the F6F he met the Zero. When he was flying the F4U, he met the Zero.
It's
> another point of superiority of the JAAF over the JNAF that is largely
> overlooked.
Wellll, they did get some of the George's into battle. Not a superb plane,
but a match for the F4 overall (what it lacked in speed it had in
manuverability, strength, and [wow] firepower) and it could eat up 'cat's.
> It's certainly true that the Ki-43 was kept in production long after its
> virtues had largely become irrelevant or surpassed(true, too, of the Zero),
but
> that can be said as well of the Me 109
I don't know about the later. Although it's high speed characteristics
left a lot to be desired, the 4800ft/min climb rate and it's SUPERB power
loading turned it into an interesting plane for sure.
> worth remarking that while neither Messerschmitt nor Curtiss ever came up
with
> a better single-engine piston fighter than the one they started the war
with,
> and just monkeyed around with their original design, Nakajima came up with
two
> entirely new fighter planes, each substantially superior to its
predecessor.
This is true.
Maury
CDB100620
>2 of them [12.7mm mg] against a P-40? It's not so much an issue of not being
>nail ya.
Very true. But through 1942 the AAF boys were always outnumbered and the
Ki-43s would swarm over them like piranhas. The bite of a single one might not
be fatal, but a school of them in a feeding frenzy could bring down the biggest
prey. The P-40s would come home riddled with bullet holes, belly in on the
runway to be dragged off and rebuilt. The P-39s wouldn't come home.
>However as they demonstrated against the Zero, this [superior maneuverability]
means little in combat.
In New Guinea through 1942 and well into 1943, the chief U.S. opponent of the
Ki-43 was the P-39, and the Ki-43 generally made short work of any P-39 it
encountered (since all the P-39's plumbing was in the rear, and poorly
protected, only a few well-placed rounds would finish it off). The boys in the
8 and 35 FGs had a very tough time of it, and soon gave the Bell fighter the
nickname "Fearless Fosdick." They didn't think much of the P-39's fighting
qualities at all. Yet against another opponent on another front, the P-39
proved itself formidable--the Soviets apparently thought very highly of the
P-39 and many of their aces flew it. One key to why they thought so highly of
it might be discovered in the flight tests the RAF carried out with a P-39C
against an Me 109E at Duxford in mid-1941. The Bell demonstrated clear
superiority to the 109 in all but one category up to 15,000 ft.--the lower the
altitude the greater the superiority. (The exception was rate of climb, the
advantage of the Bell held only briefly). It was noted that when the 109 was
planted on the tail of the P-39, the Bell was able to out-turn it to such an
extent that it would be on the 109's tail in less than two 360s and there was
nothing the 109 driver could do to shake it--he couldn't outrun it, outdive it
or outturn it.
So if the Russians in their P-39s were getting in low-level dogfights with
109s, the superior maneuverability might have been very important--it might
have been what kept them from getting those few deadly rounds in the cooling
system that would put the Bell down.
It's a reminder not to dismiss the Ki-43 c.1942 as a completely inferior
fighter since it could best a fighter that could best the vaunted 109. But by
the latter half of 1943 in Guinea, the Oscar was increasingly encountering the
P-38 and P-47, airplanes whose pilots did not dogfight but floated high in the
sky like hawks looking for pigeons, swooped, struck and rose to the heights
again. Against these opponents, the best the Ki-43 could do was dodge. But if
the Lockheed or Republic pilot ever abandoned those tactics, the Oscar would
fix its teeth in him like an enraged terrier. It was always a bad idea to be
low on altitude, airspeed and ideas when in the presence of a Ki-43.
>I thought all of the 44's were kept at home.
The 87th Fighter Regiment, equipped with Ki-44s defended the oil fields of the
DEI. The 49FG (P-38s) had some terrific fights with Tojos over Balikpapen in
the fall of 1944. Ops Exec Gerry Johnson got into a desperate one-on-one with
a Tojo over Manggar airfield in Oct., the fight dropping from 24,000 ft down to
the deck and back up to 19,000 ft before he was able to nail the Ki-44. Both
planes could dive AND climb like sonsuvbitches so the dogfight wasn't the usual
nose-below-the-horizon spiral.
> Was the 44 superior to the 61?
Put my money on the Ki-44.
> JNAF >
> Wellll, they did get some of the George's into battle.
Jacks as well. These were encountered in the 2nd PI campaign and over Japan.
It was a good airplane.
All in all, whatever the attributes of the Ki-43, the JAAF made a major mistake
in not taking it out of production two years before it did, shifting all
Nakajima and Tachikawa fighter production to the Ki-44 until the Ki-84 became
available. My guess is that until the grim results of the battlefield became
too obvious to ignore, JAAF high-rankers weren't sold on the superiority of the
energy fighter over the maneuver fighter, and by the time they were, it was too
late.
Maury Markowitz
In <19980310203...@ladder03.news.aol.com> CDB100620 wrote:
> Very true. But through 1942 the AAF boys were always outnumbered and the
> Ki-43s would swarm over them like piranhas.
Fair enough.
> In New Guinea through 1942 and well into 1943, the chief U.S. opponent of
the
> Ki-43 was the P-39, and the Ki-43 generally made short work of any P-39 it
> encountered (since all the P-39's plumbing was in the rear, and poorly
> protected, only a few well-placed rounds would finish it off). The boys in
the
> 8 and 35 FGs had a very tough time of it, and soon gave the Bell fighter
the
> nickname "Fearless Fosdick." They didn't think much of the P-39's fighting
> qualities at all. Yet against another opponent on another front, the P-39
> proved itself formidable--the Soviets apparently thought very highly of the
> P-39 and many of their aces flew it.
However there's a difference here that's often hidden. As I understand it
the P-39 was switched mid-developement from interceptor (which they decided
was being filled with the P-40 and P-38) to ground attack and thus the
removal of the high alt gear. Gee, what a surprise then that it does better
as a ground pounder!
> > Was the 44 superior to the 61?
>
> Put my money on the Ki-44.
Huh, wow.
> > Wellll, they did get some of the George's into battle.
>
> Jacks as well. These were encountered in the 2nd PI campaign and over
Japan.
> It was a good airplane.
Which was the Jack? Wasn't that the George with floats?
Maury
ch1...@earthlink.net
CDB100620 wrote:
>
> >2 of them [12.7mm mg] against a P-40? It's not so much an issue of not being
> >able to get one guy, but while you're doing it it takes so much time they
> >nail ya.
>
> be fatal, but a school of them in a feeding frenzy could bring down the biggest
> prey. The P-40s would come home riddled with bullet holes, belly in on the
> runway to be dragged off and rebuilt. The P-39s wouldn't come home.
>
> >However as they demonstrated against the Zero, this [superior maneuverability]
> means little in combat.
>
> Ki-43 was the P-39, and the Ki-43 generally made short work of any P-39 it
> encountered (since all the P-39's plumbing was in the rear, and poorly
> protected, only a few well-placed rounds would finish it off). The boys in the
> 8 and 35 FGs had a very tough time of it, and soon gave the Bell fighter the
> nickname "Fearless Fosdick." They didn't think much of the P-39's fighting
> qualities at all. Yet against another opponent on another front, the P-39
> proved itself formidable--the Soviets apparently thought very highly of the
>
> Put my money on the Ki-44.
>
> > Wellll, they did get some of the George's into battle.
>
> Jacks as well. These were encountered in the 2nd PI campaign and over Japan.
> It was a good airplane.
>
> in not taking it out of production two years before it did, shifting all
> Nakajima and Tachikawa fighter production to the Ki-44 until the Ki-84 became
> available. My guess is that until the grim results of the battlefield became
> too obvious to ignore, JAAF high-rankers weren't sold on the superiority of the
> energy fighter over the maneuver fighter, and by the time they were, it was too
> late.
Two Questions if I may-
What did they replace those awful 45mm outer-panel guns with on the
Shoki that made it a fighter-fighter?
Isn't it unfair to compare the Bf-109E to the P-39? I would think that
the 109F was pretty much standard in the non-schlact/jabo units by the
time of Barbarossa?
Could you give us some rough performance comparitors for the Friedrich
and 39C (or even later Gustav vs. 63?).
Mind you, it doesn't break your argument (P-39 beats 'superior'
Messerschmitt) but it does remind me of Hartmann's initial 'training
flight' and the seeming indication of a haphazard nature of combat
theatre initiation for newbies /on both sides/ (compared to later USAAF
standards in the West say).
In any case, I think your comment on 'Aces Mount' is telling (Didn't the
LL Aerocobra's also have better lead-ship radio gear?)...
With Thanks.
CDB100620
The Jack was the J2M, a Mitsubishi machine. The George was the N1K, a
Kawanishi.
Don't believe that either of these Navy jobs was ever launched from a carrier,
but AAF pilots in the 2nd PI campaign did encounter the Jack. They may well
have met the George but misidentified it as something else. All these green
radial-engined fighters tended to look alike.
The 21 and 15 FGs, which flew P-51 escort missions for the B-29s as well as low
level straffing missions over Japan, met everything, including the Ki-100. In
their fights with the Japs in the spring of 1945, you couldn't have convinced
them that the best Japanese pilots were dead. For example, on May 29, 1945,
101 P-51s and appx. 150 Japanese fighters, mostly Tojos, but also Tonys plus
some Jacks barreling up from Atsugi, brawled over Yokohama as the B-29s turned
the city into flaming rubble. The skill and daring of the Japanese impressed
the Americans. Capt. Todd Moore commented in debrief that he saw Japanese
pilots do things that if an American had done them would earn him a nomination
for the Medal of Honor. Lt. Col. Charles Taylor, deputy CO of the 21, who had
only a few of months before been flying P-51 escort missions to Berlin, said
in debrief that the Japanese pilots made the Americans "look like a bunch of
truck drivers." Interesting times.
Maury Markowitz
In <19980311032...@ladder02.news.aol.com> CDB100620 wrote:
> The Jack was the J2M, a Mitsubishi machine. The George was the N1K, a
> Kawanishi.
Hmmm, I don't know this plane. What was it like? J means interceptor,
right? Is this the Raiden you refer to?
> Don't believe that either of these Navy jobs was ever launched from a
carrier,
> but AAF pilots in the 2nd PI campaign did encounter the Jack. They may
well
> have met the George but misidentified it as something else. All these
green
> radial-engined fighters tended to look alike.
The George was pretty unique though, looking rather tubby. Oh by the way,
the one at WPAFB is looking mighty good!
> only a few of months before been flying P-51 escort missions to Berlin,
said
> in debrief that the Japanese pilots made the Americans "look like a bunch
of
> truck drivers." Interesting times.
I also remember a story (perhaps not true) of a SINGLE Zero taking off
under the cover a 10 or so 'cat's, and battling them all at the same time,
getting several and exhausting everything.
Maury
Maury Markowitz
In <35061C...@earthlink.net> ch1...@earthlink.net wrote:
> Isn't it unfair to compare the Bf-109E to the P-39? I would think that
> the 109F was pretty much standard in the non-schlact/jabo units by the
> time of Barbarossa?
Yes, early 190's too IIRC (although it would be in low numbers if any).
> Could you give us some rough performance comparitors for the Friedrich
> and 39C (or even later Gustav vs. 63?).
The issue here is that the Brits HAD a E, getting their hands on a F was
likely tougher. The F was about the same in turn ability, and I doubt it
could make up for the differences noted here. The G was much less so. The F
was notably faster though, the G more so, and both improved climb performance
as well. I'd bet even an E could beat a 39 in a E fight, notably on B&Z, the
later models improving on that.
Maury
CDB100620
>
> Hmmm, I don't know this plane. What was it like? J means interceptor,
>right? Is this the Raiden you refer to?
>
>
Right J2M was the Raiden aka Jack. The N1K George was the Shiden, aka George.
CDB100620
An interesting book on the P-39 in Soviet Air Force service is "Eagles East" by
Richard Lukas. Apparently, the Russians dumped the wing guns, which is what
the AAF boys in New Guinea did, in order to improve performance. The Russians
also dumped radio equipment for the same reason. And, apparently, they mostly
used the P-39 as a fighter. The Germans, also apparently, chose to fly most of
their missions at low and medium altitudes, putting the P-39 right at its prime
fighting height.
Within its altitude envelope the Bell was, yet again apparently, competitive
with the 109, so using it as a fighter made sense. Seventy-five percent of US
lend-lease fighters sent to the USSR were P-39s and P-63s, which the Soviets
specifically requested. So they must have liked them.
In New Guinea, the AAF did not like the P-39 because the Japanese bombers came
over at around 22,000 ft., sometimes higher, sometimes as low as 18,000 ft.,
but in any case well above the optimum fighting altitude of the P-39. The P-39
also had to climb over high mountain ranges, not fight over Iowa-like terrain.
And to reach the enemy it had to fly to the very limit of its fuel
capacity--sometimes, as it would prove, beyond it. Also, at any altitude the
P-39 was not competitive as a fighter with the Ki-43 or Zero. And the 37mm was
useless against such agile fighters, leaving the P-39 to fight with only its
two cowl .50s.
I also wonder about pilot skill. The Soviets must have had a leavening of
Spanish Civil War veterans in their air units, while the AAF kids coming up
against veterans of the war in China and the Soviet border incident, were
pretty green.
The P-39 pilots who went to Guadalcanal were pure green peas. Their group, the
58th, had only been formed at the beginning of 1941. It didn't get any pilots
until that fall, kids fresh out of flying school. It had no veteran officers.
It was shipped overseas way understrength in Feb, 1942, to Australia, then sent
to New Caledonia. It's 40 pilots had 45 P-400s delivered to them, all neatly
packed in crates, but with no manuals or assembly equipment, and no ground
crews. The kids spend the next weeks unloading the planes, dragging them to
the airstrip, figuring out how to assemble them and doing that. Only then
could they, for the very first time, fly a P-39. About the time they had got
the planes put together, learned how to navigate the pattern with them and
land, they were sent to Guadalcanal, where the Japanese Navy's Zeros ate them
alive. Big surprise.
Maury Markowitz
In <19980311174...@ladder02.news.aol.com> CDB100620 wrote:
> Right J2M was the Raiden aka Jack. The N1K George was the Shiden, aka
George.
Well I can answer one question for you then, the J2M definitely didn't fly
from carriers - it couldn't! This points to another problem they had, both
the Navy and Army were buying their own versions of land based interceptors,
which of course they shouldn't have. And then there's that Army 20mm
junker...
Maury
Maury Markowitz
In <350789...@earthlink.net> "Lorne D. Gilsig" wrote:
> What you are remembering is an episode from that book by the Zero ace, I
> can't remember his name.
>
> He was jumped by 10 Hellcats and survived. He took heavy damage, didn't
> score any kills, but made it home alive.
Actually it's NOT that one (at least I don't think so). Are you referring
to Sakii flying from some island (Formosa I think)? And I made a mistake,
this was against F4U's no less.
Maury