news:koghrh$nmg$1...@dont-email.me...
> It's so easy to wind up the English. I won't answer Keith. This one is
> more interesting.
I gather your belief system requires most of the world's population
to be English, given so many people can correct you, repeatedly,
an English population the size of India and China combined would
not be enough.
Interesting you think posting fiction is a fun idea.
Meantime there is always,
"Aviation Gasoline Production and Control",
Army Air Forces Historical Study 65
> On 6/2/2013 9:03 AM, Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
>> "Daryl" <
dh...@nospamtvmoviesforfree.com> wrote in message
>> news:koe321$3nt$1...@dont-email.me...
>>> Time to wind up Keith.
>>
>> Seems to be the latest excuse to post a lot of fiction.
>
> Thanks, I appreciate that.
Nice to know you admit to posting fiction.
> Except, the facts have been obscured.
No, misreported by you.
> Yours is no more accurate than mine.
Actually the information I gave is much more accurate.
>>> I stumbled on some info on the fuels used before, during and after the
>>> BoB.
>>
>> And stumbled straight back out again without any understanding.
>
> Thank you for your vote of confidence.
It is called evidence based conclusions.
>>> Before BoB, all fuels were 87 octane even in fighters.
>>
>> The USAAF was the first to introduce 100 Octane in quantity,
>> a fellow named Doolittle had a lot to do with it.
>>
>> The RAF was using 100 Octane for the aircraft of 3 squadrons
>> in November 1937, using fuel from refineries in the USA. A
>> meeting on 16 March 1939 decided to introduce the fuel into
>> general use with 16 fighter and 2 twin engined bomber squadrons
>> switched by September 1940, with an 800,000 ton stock built up.
>> Trials with a Spitfire began in September 1939, it cost around 53
>> pounds to do the conversion. Refineries at Adaban and in Trinidad
>> were under British control.
>>
>> I have not yet checked the following claim about the actual
>> British supply sources in 1940,
>>
>> "In November 1940, UK supplies of high octane aviation fuel
>> were derived from three Esso refineries handling Venezuelan
>> oil, two in the US and one in the Caribbean (about 45%), the
>> Anglo-Iranian Oil refinery at Abadan (25%) and Shell
>> refineries in Borneo (30%). Half the British supply was
>> non-US in origin.
>>
>> Source for above: "The History of the British Petroleum
>> Company" (Cambridge University Press, 1994). You might also
>> consult the British Official History volume entitled "Oil",
>> by Payton-Smith, (HMSO, 1971)."
>
> You just reinforced what I already stated.
What you stated,
"Before BoB, all fuels were 87 octane even in fighters"
That is wrong for the RAF and even more wrong for the USAAF.
> Going into the war, both 100 and 87 were being used by the RAF depending
> on the aircraft type and command.
So much for he "all fuels" claim.
Just change the claim to what I actually reported. Or did the Battle of
Britain happen before the war?
>>> But Britain was stockpiling 100 octane fuel and the English Fighters
>>> used
>>> the 100 during BoB. In 1943, Britain began using a 125 octane fuel in
>>> fighters. England had enough 100 octane for an estimated 80 weeks of
>>> war.
>>
>> The 80 weeks of war stockpile refers to the planned stockpiles
>> in 1939/40, not 1943. By 1943 there was bulk shipment of 100
>> octane fuel to England and plans for a higher performance fuel.
>
> Noper, the RAF went into B0B with an 80 week war stockpile of 100 octane
> at that current fuel usage.
Ah, I gather you believe the Battle Of Britain occurred some time
other than 1939 or 1940. So tell us all what was the "current fuel
usage" you refer to, mid May during the Battle of France, the early
July lull, or the mid July start point? Given the loss of France the
RAF was about to undergo a major change on operations tempo
and type.
Also given your claim none was being used before the Battle of
Britain the total stockpile would be zero.
> I am saying that the RAF planned well for it's fighter groups and that was
> one of the reasons the BoB was a draw.
I suppose the fact the RAF used squadrons as a base unit is not
understood. The reality is the RAF was building up to switching
over to 100 octane starting pre war, the stockpiles were set at
that time, given they had no real data on actual wartime consumption.
The Battle of France was over too quickly to do any adjustments to
things like fuel stockpiles.
By the way if the Battle of Britain is a draw, then the USAAF lost
the air fighting over Germany in early 1944, given the aircraft
and crew losses of both sides.
> That 80 week stockpile rule goes back to just before the B0B and it was
> dependent on the planned usage, not the tonnage of fuel in it.
So now we are back before the Battle of Britain, like 1939 and early
1940. I know this is silly but the stockpile was measured in tons, and
the planned consumption gave the tonnage required.
> The 80 week rule didn't change in 1943. It just changed from 100 octane
> to 115 octane.
In short no when it comes to octane change over.
The US had produced test quantities of 115/145 octane by the end
of 1944 (75,000 barrels in December 1944). They wanted the new
fuel but they could not produce enough 100/130 even as late as
March 1945, when 100/130 production was 525,000 barrels a day
and more 115 octane meant even less 100 octane.
It is clear some 115 octane fuel made it to the Pacific in 1945, in
what was essentially as series of tests by both the USAAF and
USN.
> And the usage also changed.
RAF home air force usage changed steadily from 1940 onwards,
factors like the switch to using 100 octane in all combat aircraft, the
rise in the number of bombers and their increase in size. The change
in fighter operations. For example in September 1940 Fighter
Command flew around 4,500 sorties a week, in February 1943 it
was about 2,500, but with more offensive operations and bigger
aircraft that needed more fuel.
> Obviously, the RAF planners were a lot smarter than you are.
Collectively and with more data at their disposal they should be
much better than any outsiders. At the same time predicting
the future in things like fuel consumption estimates means you
are usually wrong.
> In fact, those old, grey haired dudes were a lot smarter than the AAF
> planners and
> even the RAF planners of today.
No, they are being misreported, and the planners had a mixture
of people, including non grey hairs and females.
>>> But the adding of the US flying out of England changed that estimate
>>> quickly.
>>
>> Not until 1944.
>
> Oh, that's right, the US didn't enter the war until 1944 and didn't do any
> daylight bombings either.
Good to know, sorts out much.
You might also note the USAAF in the ETO had 63,929 airborne
sorties for all of 1943, versus over 56,000 in March 1944, and
655,289 for all of 1944.
> Newflash: The estimate changes every month or so to keep the 80 week
> stockpile current.
Above you are saying the 80 week rule changed, now you are
saying it stayed but was adjusted according to current fuel
consumption and projected consumption.
So I gather the idea is the rule was supply for 80 weeks, and the
tonnage was changed, which is what I am concentrating on.
> This includes the addition of AAF aircraft starting in 1942.
So essentially you are saying the RAF stockpile was in fact the
allied air force stockpile. So why are the AAF supposed to be
not as smart, since it was the RAF setting the stockpile levels?
> And the addition of the Polish, French and other flyers operating out of
> England.
You really are quite ignorant of the 300 series squadrons in the
RAF, which were for non Empire allies, they were counted as
RAF.
>> From the various logistics histories, basically dealing with the build
>> up to D-Day.
>
> I am sure that the logistics goes further back than that from the English
> Planners. Starting right after the Dunkirk battle. Had it not, the
> Germans would have successfully invaded England.
Given the reality a German invasion of England in 1940 was not
possible unless the British surrendered the second claim is a joke.
The first claim is also a joke, the fuel stockpile rules were worked
out pre war, it was far too late in June 1940 to suddenly try and
ship in 80 weeks worth of aviation fuel.
You might note the considerable performance gain switching
from two pitch to constant speed propellers in mid 1940.
So let me understand this, you are actually saying the 80 week rule
was the time, the actual tonnage stockpiled was the expected
consumption of those 80 weeks which was continually adjusted.
And it was for all aircraft operating out of Britain, not just RAF?
Correct? And the USAAF were at fault when the projections
were wrong, not the RAF people doing the estimates.
And I am pointing out for most of the war the projections were
wrong, mostly over estimates but in one crucial period they were
underestimates. And correcting the problem was difficult given
the tanker shortage.
>>> This meant that the 87 octane with the anti knock addition had to be
>>> used
>>> in the two long ranged fighters. More on this later.
>>
>> No, the USAAF used 100 Octane fuels for its combat aircraft on
>> operations, the cost of the fuel, in both money and production
>> capacity, meant training flights in the US often used 87 Octane.
>> There was a set of rules to follow in using 100 Octane while in
>> the US.
>
> When training with a front lined fighter, the US used 100 and 115 octane.
In the US 87 octane was used to conserve 100 octane fuel,
and 115 octane was simply an exotic test fuel in WWII.
> In the hot fighters, they used 115 and 125.
100/130 octane in all USAAF combat aircraft in war zones except it
seems from mid 1944 the 8th AF fighters on 100/150 and some
operations in the Pacific in 1945 using 115/145.
> In the Pacific, the AAF and others used 115 since it was provided by the
> US. In the MTO, they used 115 as well.
Again 100/130 Octane, 115/145 was around in test batches and not
sent to the front except in small quantities near the end of the war with
Japan.
> The only theater that the English controlled the fuel was the ETO. And it
> affected the High Performance US engines quite a bit. Especially the
> Turbocharged Engines that had higher Compression Ratios.
Given how much US aviation fuel was shipped to England the idea
the English controlled the fuel supply ignores how much came from
America, and was refined to American standards.
>>> Bombers primarily used the 87 octane almost the entire war.
>>
>> Not western allied bombers.
>
> Until the 100 octane was brought up to speed, they certainly did use 87
> octane. Thinking that the change over was done over night is an Arnt
> moment.
Ah the Arnt insult, a sign Daryl is desperate. He made a wrong
statement so time to pretend everyone else is wrong.
>>> The 87 octane was superior in engines that weren't "Super Tuned" like
>>> the
>>> Merlin and the Allison in a fighter application. The Spits and
>>> Hurricanes
>>> both used 100 octane starting just before the BoB. The Bombers
>>> continued
>>> to use 87 octane for dependability sake.
>>
>> Again no.
>
> You have to retune and change parts out like jets, etc. to effectively use
> a higher octane. Just like auto and truck engines. Physics hasn't been
> rewritten to please you.
The 87 octane was not a superior fuel, which is why the allies
went to 100 octane.
Reality cannot be rewritten just to accommodate your fiction. The
bombers changed to 100 octane according to the fuel supply and
engines they were fitted with and well before the end of the war.
>>> The English Inlines may have shared many of the same parts but each one
>>> was tuned differently to accept different fuels. For instance, in order
>>> to use 87 octane in a Spit it required anti knock formula to be added to
>>> the fuel.
>>
>> The early Merlins could handle 87 octane, the later ones were meant
>> for 100 octane, which meant you had to take care using them with
>> 87 octane.
No reply here.
>>> It helped to prevent the pre detonation using the lower fuel. But the
>>> 87
>>> octane also lowered the performance on the Spit.
>>
>> Putting higher octane rating fuels into Spitfires increased speed at
>> lower altitudes, it did not increase top speed at rated altitude. The
>> low level power boost helped take off performance, hence why
>> bombers used it.
>
> You already stated that 87 wasn't used in Western Bombers yet now you say
> it was.
Daryl, I pointed out your claim
"Bombers primarily used the 87 octane almost the entire war"
is wrong for western allied bombers, now you delude yourself
into changing what I said to fit the fiction.
> Of course it was while the 100 octane was ramping up.
So tell us all how long did western allied bombers use 87 octane
in combat? Come on, which bombers and for how long? RAF
and USAAF.
Or perhaps given you claim most did not use 100 octane for most
of the war how about a list of all 100 octane users and when they
changed over, which you claim should be a short list.
> You also stated that there wasn't any difference between a merlin bomber
> engine and a Merlin Fighter Engine.
Actually I pointed out it made little sense to have two grades of
aviation fuel especially as 100 octane had so many performance
advantages. Therefore the bombers switched. You can see my
text below, the line about Lancasters and Halifxes
The allies did a lot to reduce their fuel grade requirements, things
like using MT80 for vehicles and 100 Octane for aircraft. They
did not have the tanker capacity to ship lots of different grades
of fuels to each theatre.
> There was quite a bit of difference. It's like using the Truck 413 engine
> versus the engine that was in the Cross Ram 300J Chrysler engine. They
> shared the block, rods, and crank. Nothing else on the basic engine
> including the pistons and heads.
Given the large number of Merlin versions there are all sort of
permutations in terms of basic engineering.
>>> It had no affect on the bombers whether you used the 87 or the 100
>>> octane.
>>
>> The short answer here is no.
>
> Unless you retuned it for the higher octane, it did no good and just
> dumped more fuel out the tail pipe.
Ah I see, the Daryl air force will use 100 octane but not tune the
engines to use it. 100 Octane improved performance, in bombers
as well as fighters. Apparently people will use the fuel but not
adjust or change the engines.
>>> It's wasteful to run 100 octane or higher in the bomber since they are
>>> tuned and designed to use 87 octane.
>>
>> So the idea is the Merlins fitted to Halifaxes and Lancasters etc.
>> were 87 octane but the fighter ones were 100? Is that the claim?
>> Two grades of fuel in use? The bombers doing without the better
>> take off performance and lower fuel weights per gallon?
No reply here.
>>> So the Spit and Hurricane continued using the 100 octane until the 115
>>> octane was available. But the Hurricane and the Spitfire ran 100 octane
>>> until the higher octane became available.
>>
>> This seems to be a duplication.
>
> And it duplicated the facts.
Except the Hurricane did not go to the higher octane rating,
as it was on the way out in 1944. And 115 octane was not
around, the WWII Spitfire never used it, going with 100/150.
The fact is Daryl is wrong.
>>> In late 1943, the English introduced their "130" fuel with an octane
>>> rating of 115. This fuel was produced by 3 refineries in England and
>>> also
>>> was imported heavily from the US. This fuel was specifically tailored
>>> to
>>> High Performance Engines like the PW2800 and the Allison with the
>>> turbocharger. This is what they were tuned to use.
>>
>> In late 1943 there was a plan to introduce a higher performance
>> fuel that ultimately was only used by fighters, the bombers stayed
>> with 100 Octane.
>
> Until the 100 octane was up to production and storage rates, they used 100
> for the fighters and some bombers and 87 for all others.
You see we have the steady retreat from
"Bombers primarily used the 87 octane almost the entire war"
To a new unspecified change over time.
And the 1943/4 idea was to change to 100/150.
> When the 115 was introduced, this is when the 100 was used in the bombers
> and the 115 went to the fighters.
In short no, 115 Octane was effectively post war.
> And that happened in early 1944.
In short no. 100/150 was introduced in the ETO in 1944.
In 1945 test amounts of 115/145 were sent to the Pacific.
> Yes, they planned on something like this all along. It started in 1937.
So now they know about 115 octane in 1937?
>>> The retuning of the Spit and Hurricane and follow on English Fighters
>>> performance was increased as well by retuning the Merlins.
>>
>> Hurricanes in 1944 were using the 1940 Merlin XX, they did not
>> use the higher octane fuel.
>
> They used the 100 octane in 1940 just like the Spit even though there was
> a much larger surplus of 87 octane. By 1944, the Hurricane entered into
> the same realm as the P-40 who were both eclipsed by newer fighters who
> required the 115 and 125.
Ah yes, ignore the fact Daryl is wrong when it comes to Hurricanes
using the improved 1944 octane 100/150 ratings.
The newer fighters were using 100/130 octane. The 115 octane
was under limited test in the US.
>>> And the anti knock formula was not longer required. That 115 octane
>>> outlasted all the other fuels and is still being used today. Today's
>>> Avgas
>>> is 115 octane. In 1973/74 we ran it in our private vehicles since the
>>> cost of private gas skyrocketed so bad that none of us could afford to
>>> buy
>>> it. They opened an Avgas Station and sold us Avgas instead. Avgas is
>>> roughly equivalent to the old Premium from the old days. I don't know
>>> when that ceased as I PCS'd in March of 1974.
>>>
>>> The P-38 and the P-47 both required the anti knock add even using the
>>> 100
>>> octane since they were tuned for 115 and 125 (125 was not readily used
>>> until very late in the war by the US and Australia).
>>
>> What you are doing here is confusing rich and lean mixture ratings.
>> You are also saying in the 1940 to 1943 period with 100 octane as
>> standard the USAAF was turning out engines requiring 115, a rather
>> bad idea.
>
> 115 was used by the US in the MTO, Pacific, CBI starting in 1942. YEs,
> they still used 100 on their bombers and some "Not Frontline" fighters but
> NEVER 87 octane.
Daryl, 100 octane was the standard USAAF fuel for WWII, the cost
and production capacity meant some training flights in the US would
use 87 octane to reduce demand for 100 octane, even fighters.
115 Octane was a test fuel, used in limited quantities in the Pacific
in 1945.
>>> The P-47 still knocked when using the 87 octane and got a little
>>> predetonation using the 100 even with the booster.
>>
>> Given the P-47 was supposed to use 100 octane then 87 octane
>> will have its problems.
>
> The P-47 was adjusted to 115.
No, 100, it needed adjustments to run the 115 octane.
> It got by with the 100 but it still had a bit of a fuel detonation
> problem.
You seem to have confused the water injection system with a
systematic problem.
> The late model P-47s were tuned for 125 also sometimes known as 150.
Again no, unless with the 8th AF using 100/150.
> But they could get by on 115.
Which was effectively not around.
> Putting 100 octane in them will cause all kinds of problems.
So the P-47 had al sorts of problems in the ETO, given that
was the standard fuel, correct?
> BTW, the late model engines from England would have had the same problem
> with 100 octane as well since they were tuned and designed for higher
> octane.
100/150, versus 100/130, whatever development engines were
available and whatever development fuels as well the reality is
the allies were using 100 octane.
>>> The lower octane fuels didn't hamper the Supercharger though
>>
>> This will certainly be news to many in the engineering trade.
>
> Using a Supercharger requires lower compression than the Turbocharger.
> Hence the engine is less likely to catch on fire.
I simply note Orval Fairbairn's comment.
And the use of water injection in the P-47.
>>> and the P-47 only saw a slight reduction in Performance at certain
>>> altitudes but it cut down on their range and, over time, burnt valves.
>>
>> As noted 87 octane was used in the US but 100 octane in combat.
>
> And the P-47 was tuned and designed for 115.
No, 100 Octane, in any case it was engine, not fighter.
>>> Let's face it, the R2800 outlived all the other engines and still being
>>> used today. It's hard to hurt that puppy (or big dog if you will).
>>
>> In 1944 the 8th AF fighters went over to higher octane, which gave
>> more performance but came with a series of problems and in the end
>> a trade off, more maintenance.
>
> Not in the P-47 or the P-38s case,
Actually given the P-38 was going out of 8th AF service as the
100/150 fuel was introduced it could have avoided the problems,
there were still 4 P-47 groups at the time. Essentially one group
changed from P-47 to P-51 per month in the final 3 months of 1944.
>> There were no significant problems running the 100 Octane fuel,
>> except in P-38s on standard 8th AF escort missions.
>
> And why is that?
Lots of problems with the P-38 arrangements.
> Higher compression and turbochargers. From the E forward, it required 115
> or higher.
You see it goes like this, Daryl wants the P-38 to be a wonder
weapon, but it failed as an escort fighter in the ETO, to explain
this requires the USAAF to deliberately ship the wrong fuel for it
to Europe, and in fact the wrong fuel for all its fighters in theatre.
Alternatively the USAAF shipped the correct fuel, and it was
P-38 problems.
The tanker shortage meant refineries tried to supply their closest
theater, so most ETO fuel came from the Americas, the Middle
East refineries handled the Middle East and India and after the
end of 1942 fuel from the Americas was shipped to the
Mediterranean theatre.
In Britain all fuel arrivals went into a common pool, which
caused a small paper war, Lend-Lease, therefore free
fuel, was supplied to the pool and the users, like the RAF and
USAAF were charged for their consumption. The US had the
system changed.
> And the Antiknock Addon to the 87 and 100 octane would seperate at high
> altitude or heavy load. That would cause a super lean mixture and even
> engine fires. Good reasons to abort.
In short the P-38 problems when with the 8th AF were unique to
it, not due to the wrong fuel.
>>> On the P-38 it was a complete disaster.
>>
>> The more powerful fuels arrived after the P-38 was taken off high
>> altitude escort work.
>
> Two things happened at about the same time. And until the other thing
> happened, the P-38 was still the primary long ranged bomber escort.
The reign of the P-38 as the long range fighter lasted 12 bomber
missions. In December 1943 the P-51 was around and flying
in comparable numbers until a second P-38 group became
operational, then for a time the two types swapped lead effort as
new fighter groups arrived.
> 1. Higher octane arrived in force by early 1944.
No, mid 1944 in test, third quarter in quantity, 100/150.
> 2. The P-51B arrived finally in a large force and the training was
> churning out good pilots.
I do like the way a few P-38s are rated as important but a similar
number of P-51s are not.
> Neither of these two things happened over night. Until then, the P-38 was
> the only escort fighter available for operation over Germany.
12 bomber missions over 6 weeks, but the idea is to announce there
is a large number which applies to P-51s, only when the number is
exceeded does it count, 1 P-38 counts though.
> And they didn't have enough of them nor enough trained pilots to fly them
> if they had them.
I gather this is meant to be P-51, not the P-38 the sentence reads as.
>>> IF all the P-38s that were assigned to Bomber Escort were to generate,
>>> they would still be out numbered by 2 1/2 to one by the Luftwaffe
>>> Fighters
>>> attacking the bombers.
>>
>> I like this, all the Luftwaffe fighters are supposed to meet all the
>> P-38s. In any case there were more Luftwaffe fighters present
>> in Luftflotte Reich than just 2.5 times the number of P-38s in
>> operational USAAF fighter groups in the ETO.
>
> Nice caviat.
Actually reporting the facts.
> If all the P-38s in the ETO were launched and all the Luftwaffe 109s and
> 190s were launched and they met, the P-38 would be facing 16 to 1 odds
> against them.
So Luftflotte Reich as of end December 1943 had 16 times over
70 or 1,100 to 1,200 Fw190 and Bf109, in the Daryl fiction anyway
counting only P-38 sorties, the USAAF had 380 P-38 in the ETO
at the end of 1943. Multiply that by 70.
Luftflotte Reich held 814 single and 198 twin engined day fighters
in late May 1944, numbers that had been largely going up since
1943 even as pilot quality went down.
> The 5 to one odds were when the Luftwaffe Fighters attacked the bomber
> formation. Not the total of aircraft.
Again you are simply making up a number.
>>> Unfortunately, half of the P-38s aborted for engine troubles including
>>> blown engines. There was separation of fuel and antiknock compound at
>>> higher altitudes. This jammed up the intercooler and the turbochargers
>>> on
>>> the Allisons. If the Allison was under heavy power, the engine would go
>>> to an extreme lean condition and burn valves, blow pistons, lose rods
>>> and
>>> even catch on fire. Many even had engine fires and couldn't continue
>>> and
>>> didn't make it home.
>>
>> All of this was done on the standard allied fuel since 1939/40, that
>> is 100 Octane, nothing to do with a new fuel.
>
> The P-38 was NEVER designed to use the 100 octane.
Actually it was. 100/130
> In order to use it, an antiknock compound had to be added and there were
> some real problems with that fuel.
Again 100 octane was the standard USAAF fuel for fighters in WWII.
>>> This means that the P-38 was facing 5 to 1 odds when it entered into
>>> Germany.
>>
>> In short no.
>
> Even shorter, yes.
No is shorter than yes, short is shorter than shorter, in is shorter than
even, Daryl is short a few key realities.
>>> The Luftwaffe was quite aware of this and would normally not attack the
>>> bombers until the P-47 was relieved by the gaggle of P-38s in 1943.
>>
>> Actually once again you really are telling us you have no idea
>> about what was going on.
>>
>> P-38 operations with the 8th AF started on 15 October 1943.
>>
>> First escort mission, 20 October, 39 P-38, no kill claims, 321 P-47
>> 6 kill claims. No USAAF fighters MIA.
>>
>> table is date / number of P-38 / P-38 kill claims / P-38 MIA //
>> number of P-47 / number of P-47 kill claims / P-47 MIA. Bomber
>> escort missions only
>>
>> 3 November / 45 / 3 / 0 // 333 / 11 / 2
>> 5 November / 47 / 5 / 0 // 336 / 13 / 4
>> 7 November / 0 / 0 / 0 // 283 / 1 / 0
>> 11 November / 59 / 0 / 0 // 342 / 8 / 2
>> 13 November / 45 / 7 / 7 // 345 / 3 / 3
>> 19 November / 0 / 0 /0 // 288 / 0 / 0
>> 26 November / 28 / 0 / 0 // 353 / 36 / 4
>> 29 November / 38 / 2 / 7 // 314 / 13 / 9
>> 30 November / 20 / 0 / 1 // 327 / 0 / 5
>> 1 December / 42 / 0 / 5 // 374 / 20 / 2
>
> Let's analyze these figures.
>
> The majority of the target were NOT in Germany.
Country \ date \ target name \ bombs, short tons
Ge \ 20-October-1943 \ Duren \ 208.9
NL \ 20-October-1943 \ Gilze-Rijen \ 39.0
Ge \ 20-October-1943 \ Misc., Ge \ 39.0
NL \ 20-October-1943 \ Woensdrecht \ 5.0
Ge \ 03-November-1943 \ Wilhelmshaven \ 1,450.2
Ge \ 05-November-1943 \ Coesfeld \ 3.0
Ge \ 05-November-1943 \ Gelsenkirchen \ 495.2
Ge \ 05-November-1943 \ Gelsenkirchen/Buer \ 123.2
Ge \ 05-November-1943 \ Gelsenkirchen/Nordstern \ 114.2
Ge \ 05-November-1943 \ Haltern \ 2.8
Ge \ 05-November-1943 \ Munster \ 284.1
Ge \ 07-November-1943 \ Duren \ 84.1
Ge \ 07-November-1943 \ Renderath \ 48.0
Ge \ 07-November-1943 \ Wesel \ 125.0
Ge \ 11-November-1943 \ Munster \ 122.1
Ge \ 13-November-1943 \ Bremen \ 267.2
Ge \ 13-November-1943 \ Flensberg \ 10.8
Ge \ 13-November-1943 \ Heligoland \ 23.5
Ge \ 13-November-1943 \ Kiel \ 2.0
Ge \ 13-November-1943 \ Misc., Ge \ 25.8
NL \ 19-November-1943 \ Arnheim \ 32.0
Ge \ 19-November-1943 \ Misc., Ge \ 249.3
Ge \ 26-November-1943 \ Bremen \ 1,204.8
Ge \ 26-November-1943 \ Misc., Ge \ 41.4
Fr \ 26-November-1943 \ Paris \ recalled
Ge \ 26-November-1943 \ Vegesack \ 5.6
Ge \ 29-November-1943 \ Bremen \ 404.6
Ge \ 29-November-1943 \ Emmerich \ 2.0
Ge \ 29-November-1943 \ Emmerich \ 1.0
Ge \ 29-November-1943 \ Misc., Ge \ 51.9
Ge \ 29-November-1943 \ Oldenburg \ 3.0
Ge \ 30-November-1943 \ Solingen \ 231.7
Ge \ 30-November-1943 \ Wermelskirchen \ 3.0
Ge \ 01-December-1943 \ Misc., Ge \ 5.0
Ge \ 01-December-1943 \ Rossbach \ 2.5
Ge \ 01-December-1943 \ Siegburg \ 42.7
Ge \ 01-December-1943 \ Solingen \ 702.5
So Daryl is very wrong again.
> That means the P-47 was quite capable of escorting the bombers most of the
> way.
Quite correct as the 8th was staying within fighter escort range,
which was essentially Western Germany at the time.
> Your chart doesn't state WHERE the bombers were headed at all.
Note Daryl is certain where they were heading, and is certainly wrong.
> And there were more P-47s present in 1943 than P-38s in the MTO.
Apparently this is unfair.
After all I posted the sorties by fighter type, apparently the number
of P-47s present in the ETO is more important, plus the MTO
P-38s matter to the ETO in 1944 it seems.
> Another factor left out.
As opposed to reporting the actual sorties being done.
> This makes your whole argument null.
Translation, the combat record of the P-38 with the 8th AF is poor,
not a wonder aircraft, so the facts have to be thrown away.
>> The third set of figures is for P-51
> <snipped as to having no relevance>
Put back in. As they clearly show the arrival of the P-51 and
the relative P-38 versus P-51 effort.
5 December / 34 / 0 / 0 // 266 / 0 / 1 // 36 / 0 / 0
11 December / 31 / 0 / 0 // 313 / 20 / 3 // 44 / 0 / 1
13 December / 31 / 1 / 0 // 322 / 0 / 1 // 41 / 0 / 1
16 December / 31 / 0 / 0 // 131 / 1 / 1 // 39 / 1 / 0
20 December / 26 / 0 / 0 // 418 / 16 / 2 // 47 / 3 / 4
22 December / 40 / 0 / 2 // 448 / 9 / 2 // 28 / 6 / 0
24 December / 40 / 0 / 0 // 459 / 0 / 0 // 42 / 0 / 0
30 December / 79 / 0 / 0 // 463 / 8 / 11 // 41 / 0 / 2
31 December / 74 / 3 / 1 // 441 / 4 / 2 // 33 / 2 / 1
Totals, P-38 749 sorties, 21 kill claims, 23 MIA,
P-47 6,877 sorties, 169 kill claims, 54 MIA,
P-51 351 sorties, 12 kill claims, 9 MIA.
>>> If the Luftwaffe went below 18,000 feet, the escort fighter had to
>>> disengage and return to the bombers. The Luftwaffe used dive tactics to
>>> hit the fighters and bombers and quickly get to below 18,000 feet where
>>> the escort fighter had to disengage and climb back to the bomber
>>> formation.
>>
>> Actually the Luftwaffe tried a variety of tactics, head on, diving,
>> rockets and the big one for much of 1943, waiting for the escorts
>> to go home.
No reply here.
>>> The P-38 pilots learned to point their noses to the incoming Luftwaffe
>>> and
>>> fire on them before the Luftwaffe Fighters could start firing
>>> themselves.
>>> The P-47s excellent diving was neutralized by having to disengage at
>>> 18,000 feet.
>>
>> When compared with the Fw190 the P-47 would initially lose ground
>> in a dive, before the extra weight came into play.
>>
>>> The P-51B/C didn't really start coming into the war until early 1944 due
>>> to manufacture and training of pilots.
>>
>> If you are going to say this then as far as the ETO is concerned the
>> same statement can be made of the P-38.
>
> Ah, yes, let's put the P-38 into that time machine of yours.
Interesting, a time machine? That sounds like fun.
> And let's give the P-38 the upgrades it needed early on, let's get those
> pilots properly trained, etc..
Ah the P-38Daryl.
> The reason many of the needed changes starting to show up in the P-38 H
> was the fact that the War Planning Commission turned them down. 1942 they
> modified an E model to accept the new engine that later into the H model,
> put in the changed Lockheed wanted to simplify going from cruise to combat
> mode, installed the Paddle Hamilton Standard 4 bladed Prop along with the
> engine cowling changes to accept the larger spinner, and more. Only one
> was made. In the AAF Tests in September of 1943, it's speed was 432 mph,
> with a predicted top speed of 450 mph, it was judged at that time the best
> Allied Fighter in existance.
Ah yes the wonder aircraft, going to be a super aircraft, but the
bad guys shot it down.
> In order to make it happen, two things.
Unfortunately reality is the main thing.
> First, the Lockheed assembly lines would have to be shut down for 2 to 3
> weeks. The War Planning Board would allow that to happen. The P-38 was
> still the only long ranged fighter to go all the way to Berlin and Back
> and they didn't have enough of them when you include the MTO, PTO and CBI.
The USAAF did not try and bomb Berlin until March 1944, so
which date have you chosen this time?
Production changed from the P-38G to H in May/June 1943,
then from H to J in August 1943.
Lockheed passed the 100 accepted in the month in December 1942,
over 150 in February 1943, the G to H change and then H to J change
overs went like this, in 1943
January 148 G, 3 J
February 168 G
March 132 G, 1 H
April 122 G
May 84 H
June 172 H, 7 J, 1 K
July 264 H
August 80 H, 22 J
September 66 J
October 350 J
November 387 J
You can see quite clearly how the two model change overs
caused a loss of output that cost the equivalent of weeks of
earlier model production.
> Lockheed presented just changing the gearbox and propeller that would have
> greatly increased the P-38 performance by themselves. The War Planning
> said no shut down of manufacture.
You really require lots of bad guys in your fiction.
> Vultee was making the P-38 in smaller numbers. The War Planning wouldn't
> even consider shutting that down to make the changes like they did when
> the P-51B/C was changing over to the D model.
Vultee production of the P-38 started in January 1945, yes 1945,
they built the L model.
Inglewood, P-51B to D change over, 1944, production had been
running at about 250 a month since October 1943,
February 250 B, 2 D
March 245 B, 27 D
April 20 B 182 D
May 340 D
Dallas, the change over from the C to the D and K in 1944
June 251 C
July 245 C, 6 D
August 171 C, 59 D
September 3 C, 134 D, 76 K
October 1 D, 261 K.
> Second, The War Planning Commission didn't believe that Allison could keep
> it's production promise on the new F-15 engine required for the complete K
> production.
No engine, no aircraft.
> It didn't seem to affect the L model too much using that same engine but
> without the Hamilton Standard Prop and gearbox change, it was 7 mph slower
> and climbed slower. The good news is, many of the changes they wanted to
> do in the K went into the J-25 and L such as making it simpler to change
> from cruise to combat quickly. They could have had these changes as early
> as the G model but didn't. How many pilots died because of that poor
> planning.
The G was in production from June 1942 to April 1943.
The K used the V-1710-75/77, the L the V-1710-111/113
And the H used 89/90, all these engines rated 1425 HP
take off and 1600 Combat.
>>> Even in England, it took about 100 hours to get a pilot trained for
>>> combat
>>> in a P-51 in country.
>>
>> Except for the many stories of rapid transition because of the
>> desperate need for more P-51s to be available.
>
> At least the P-51 Jocks trained on P-51s stateside.
I suggest you actually look at the pilot records, the emergency
requirement for long range fighters largely effected the P-51
units.
> Many of the P-38 Pilots were converted bomber twin engine pilots done in
> theater (ETO).
Please list all these pilots and when the conversions were done.
> OR were changed from a P-39 directly into the P-38 in theater (ETO and
> MTO).
Since we are talking about the ETO please list all the P-39 to P-38
pilot conversions from say mid 1943 onwards, given in July 1943
the USAAF had a whole 3 P-39 in theatre, along with 2 P-38,
by January 1944 the last ETO P-39 had been retired or scrapped.
>>> The P-51 got more training than the P-47 and the P-38 training was an
>>> embarrassment.
>>
>> Actually no, US pilots arriving in England in early 1944 had the same
>> basic training, though time in operational aircraft could be low, lots
>> then found themselves having to suddenly switch from a P-38 or P-47
>> to a P-51.
>
> 1944. Look at the date.
I have, note the early 1944 part of my sentence?
> It's a damned site easier to change from the P-38 to a P-51 than it is to
> change from a P-39 to a P-38.
So again show all the P-39 to P-38 conversions in the ETO.
> Same goes for changing from the P-47 to the P-51 which was easier still.
> And those were experienced pilots, not novices directly from the US.
Daryl, the 8th AF had 3 operational P-47 fighter groups from April
1943, the number of P-47 groups rose to 4 in August, 6 in September,
7 in October and 9 by end December. There was 1 operational
P-38 group from mid October and a second just at the end of 1943.
So 11 groups, plus the 354th borrowed from the 9th AF, which
had arrived in early November. In the end the 8th would have
15 fighter groups.
The 354th was the first 9th AF fighter group, 2 P-47 groups
arrived for the 9th at the end of November, 1 P-47 and 1 P-51
group in December. On D-Day the 9th would have 18 fighter groups.
Do you realise how late the USAAF build up in England was?
>>> The P-51B/C arrived with two improvements to the theater; The Fighters
>>> started being able to pursue and destroy enemy fighters attacking the
>>> bombers and the arrival of the 115 octane fuel for the fighters.
>>
>> The fuel upgrade for the 8th AF fighters was in the second half of 1944,
>> trials were run from March, change over from July to September. The
>> change in fighter escort tactics was in the first half of 1944.
>
> Very near the same time in a couple or three months.
Actually try more six months than three.
>>> Both the P-47 and the P-38 no longer required the Antiknock in the fuel
>>> and both ran better at all altitudes.
>>
>> In short no, they were tuned to 100 octane, then needed to be
>> changed to handle the new fuel in the second half of 1944 if
>> they used it. I am not sure whether the 9th AF units switched.
>
> Both were tuned what was being used in all the other theaters which was
> 115 octane. They both needed the antiknock add to run the 100 octane.
You are simply wrong, 100/130 was the standard USAAF fighter fuel.
>>> With the many problems of the P-38 finally cured including the
>>> additional
>>> internal fuel (The H and up)
>>
>> Again no, not for 8th AF escort missions.
>
> There were no H Models and up in the MTO? Right, there old buddy.
The H models did not solve the P-38 problems when flying
8th AF escort missions. Nor did the J models.
The H models did not get the extra internal fuel tanks, hence why it
was out of 8th AF units by around the end of January 1944.
>>> and the introduction of larger drop tanks for both the P-38 and the
>>> P-47,
>>> allowing them to go into ground attack into Germany as well as mix it up
>>> with the Luftwaffe.
>>
>> The ground attack, or strafing, was part of the new escort tactics,
>> giving the fighters the freedom to seek combat after the escort
>> part of the mission was over.
>
> With the 167 gallon twin tanks for the P-47 and the twin 300 gallon tanks
> for the P-38 meant they both could raise a lot of hell on their way back
> if they didn't meet enemy fighters and had to drop their tanks.
Interestingly Roger Freeman indicates the 8th AF kept the P-38s to
a pair of 150 (really 165) gallon external tanks, essentially making sure
there was more internal than external fuel. Also the tanks were not
pressurised, limiting their use to under 20,000 feet. That gave a combat
radius of 425 miles for the aircraft with the larger internal fuel tanks.
The P-47D-15 upped internal fuel from 305 to 375 gallons, plus
the wing pylons. The P-47D-16 had provision for 100/150 fuel.
These versions entered production around October/November
1943. The D-15 with a pair of 108 gallon drop tanks had a radius
of 475 miles.
The P-51 with a pair of 108 gallon drop tanks had a 750 mile radius.
Ranges are for standard 8th AF missions.
The 8th used a lot of drop tank types and the official capacity often
varies from the actual capacity.
>>> While the Allies fuel got better, at the same time, the Luftwaffe fuel
>>> was
>>> becoming problematic. In the end, the Allied Fighters ended up out
>>> numbering and out performing the Luftwaffe Fighters. Even, as one P-51
>>> pilot stated about his D, they were only 2% better than the Luftwaffe,
>>> that's still 2% better.
>>>
>>> Fetch, Keith, fetch.
>>
>> Daryl will stumble into "help" the situation if he can ever figure out
>> how
>> to tie his shoe laces, and also the meaning of fetch.
>>
>> Geoffrey Sinclair
>> Remove the nb for email.
>
> Fetch, Jeffy, Fetch.
Daryl will stumble into "help" the situation if he can ever figure out how
to tie his shoe laces, and also the meaning of fetch.
Daryl, a gentle tip, for me to be insulted in this sort of forum I at least
have to think the person doing the insulting has some credibility. And
then there is what the Neo Nazis and conspiracy theory people use
for insults when they are contradicted.