Operation Linebacker II - Dana Drenkowski
mya...@erols.com
(USAFA 1968 and 200+ combat missions over Southeast Asia in F-4s and
B-52s).
He documented the suicidal flight tactics used in Operation
Linebacker II over North Vietnam in 1972. His article on SAC
incompetence illustrates that superior resrouces and logistics alone are
not what win wars.
I was told he is now a laywer somewhere in the U.S.
Thanks.
Mike Yared
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
SoBernardo
No. 3, September 1977, and Vol. 2 No. 4, November 1977. Even SOF used to print
some worthwhile history.
Ed Rasimus
> Hello. I am looking for an article written by Dana Drenkowski
>(USAFA 1968 and 200+ combat missions over Southeast Asia in F-4s and
>B-52s).
If that is meant to establish credibility then it needs some fill-in.
Was he a pilot? How many missions in F-4s vs how many in BUFFS? And,
how many NVN missions?
> He documented the suicidal flight tactics used in Operation
>Linebacker II over North Vietnam in 1972.
I assume you must be referring to B-52 tactics (is that an oxymoron?),
since tactical aircraft procedures during LB II were not significantly
different than durin LB I or Rolling Thunder.
And, if you are going to use the adjective "suicidal" you'd have to
show that the loss rates were exorbitant. That clearly wasn't the case
with 11 days of B-52 sorties at rates ranging from 150/night to no
less than 75/night, and only 15 combat losses the rate is about 0.1%.
> His article on SAC
>incompetence illustrates that superior resrouces and logistics alone are
>not what win wars.
Since it only took eleven days of LB II to bring the NVN and VC to
terms in Paris and since the POWs were released within 60 days of
completion, the "incompetence" seems quite effective.
> I was told he is now a laywer somewhere in the U.S.
And we all know what Shakespeare said about "laywer"s.
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
*** Ziff-Davis Interactive
*** (http://www.zdnet.com)
BUFDRVR
Aww come on Ed, those were tactics...stupid tactics, but tactics none the less.
>And, if you are going to use the adjective "suicidal" you'd have to
>show that the loss rates were exorbitant. That clearly wasn't the case
>with 11 days of B-52 sorties at rates ranging from 150/night to no
>less than 75/night, and only 15 combat losses the rate is about 0.1%
Yeah, but Ed, most of those 15 were lost on the 19th, 20th or 21st. Once the
"tactics" allowed the BUFF's to ingress and egress from different points, loss
rates went down. Also most of these losses were G models from Guam who did not
have the new ECM suites. Putting D model and G model formations in close
proximity during the bomb runs helped lower losses as well. Anyway, I would
concede that a tactic is suicidal if, once on the bomb run, you rely totaly on
ECM and Chaff without appropriate maneuvers.
BUFDRVR
"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"
David Lentz
BUFDRVR wrote:
>
> >I assume you must be referring to B-52 tactics (is that an oxymoron?),
>
> Aww come on Ed, those were tactics...stupid tactics, but tactics none the less.
>
> >And, if you are going to use the adjective "suicidal" you'd have to
> >show that the loss rates were exorbitant. That clearly wasn't the case
> >with 11 days of B-52 sorties at rates ranging from 150/night to no
> >less than 75/night, and only 15 combat losses the rate is about 0.1%
>
> Yeah, but Ed, most of those 15 were lost on the 19th, 20th or 21st. Once the
> "tactics" allowed the BUFF's to ingress and egress from different points, loss
> rates went down. Also most of these losses were G models from Guam who did not
> have the new ECM suites. Putting D model and G model formations in close
> proximity during the bomb runs helped lower losses as well. Anyway, I would
> concede that a tactic is suicidal if, once on the bomb run, you rely totaly on
> ECM and Chaff without appropriate maneuvers.
In hindsight SAC's tactic could have been less dogmatic. As
noted SAC did change tactics. However by the end of Linebacker
II, it would not have made any difference, SAM wise, what tactics
were used. The North was out of SAM's and could not get any
more.
The question of suicidal tactics is not really important. The
question is whether the probable risks is worth the expected
gain. As Linebacker II was about the only operation which
motivated the North Vietnamese, if any operation during the war
was worth the risk, Linebacker II was it.
On the other end of the scale, We, USAF, attacked a North
Vietnamese SAM site where the real missiles were known to have
been replaced by telephone poles painted white. Not worth asking
any pilot to risk his life to attack a telephone pole.
David
Ed Rasimus
BUFDRVR <buf...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:19990908094620...@ng-ba1.aol.com...
> >I assume you must be referring to B-52 tactics (is that an oxymoron?),
>
> Aww come on Ed, those were tactics...stupid tactics, but tactics none the
less.
Lighten up, if you're driving a strategic platform you employ it with a
strategy. When you drive a tactical weapons system you generate tactics. It
merely points to the entire oxymoronic war--the strategic systems spent most
of the years working down South, tactically, while the tactical fighters
were going deep doing a strategic mission.
>
> >And, if you are going to use the adjective "suicidal" you'd have to
> >show that the loss rates were exorbitant. That clearly wasn't the case
> >with 11 days of B-52 sorties at rates ranging from 150/night to no
> >less than 75/night, and only 15 combat losses the rate is about 0.1%
>
> Yeah, but Ed, most of those 15 were lost on the 19th, 20th or 21st. Once
the
> "tactics" allowed the BUFF's to ingress and egress from different points,
loss
> rates went down. Also most of these losses were G models from Guam who did
not
> have the new ECM suites. Putting D model and G model formations in close
> proximity during the bomb runs helped lower losses as well. Anyway, I
would
> concede that a tactic is suicidal if, once on the bomb run, you rely
totaly on
> ECM and Chaff without appropriate maneuvers
My point was the original poster's search for a paper written by someone
with a political bone to pick (I suspect, from the credentials listed, that
he was a wormy-wing type who wasn't pleased with the mission tasking on the
18th of December). My point was that suicidal missions have much higher loss
rates than 0.1%. And, the follow-on point was that the "incompetent"
decision makers got a rapid outcome of the war when sufficient force was
applied (however suicidal it might have been.)
As I recall, the losses were 3 on the night of the 18th, 3 on the 19th and 6
on the 20th--then none for a couple of days and only singles there-after.
Frank Bull
Would you define "wormy-wing" please?
FBull
Tucson, Arizona USA
Peter A. Stoll
>
<snip>
>
> And, if you are going to use the adjective "suicidal" you'd have to
> show that the loss rates were exorbitant. That clearly wasn't the case
> with 11 days of B-52 sorties at rates ranging from 150/night to no
>
<snip)
Ed, your numbers suggest approximately a 1% loss rate, not 0.1%.
Peter A. Stoll (totally arm-chair understanding of aviation, I confess,
but I count pretty well)
I don't speak for Intel, nor they for me.
wal...@oneimage.com
>>I assume you must be referring to B-52 tactics (is that an oxymoron?),>
>Aww come on Ed, those were tactics...stupid tactics, but tactics none the less.
not recall the exact name nor do I have a copy. The initial losses, as Bufdrvr
says, were disproportionate because of HQ-dictated tactics that afforded the SA2
sites time to reload their launchers. Essentially the B52s came in 3 ship cells
on the same heading and spaced, as I recall it, about 15 minutes between cells.
(Ducks in a shooting gallery?) Once the tactics were changed to concentrate time
and space (as was well learned in WW2) the enhanced ECM/chaff overwhelmed the SAM
sites and the rest of LB II suffered greatly reduced losses.
All I can say is hey guys, RTFMs.
Walt Bj ftr plt ret
Jim Carriere
> Ed Rasimus wrote:
> <snip)
>
> Ed, your numbers suggest approximately a 1% loss rate, not 0.1%.
>
> Peter A. Stoll (totally arm-chair understanding of aviation, I confess,
> but I count pretty well)
> I don't speak for Intel, nor they for me.
Apparently, or you might have said 0.999999999% :) (That one just came
to me...)
BUFDRVR
>>less.
>Lighten up
Wow Ed, I thought I was being light, geeze.
>As I recall, the losses were 3 on the night of the 18th, 3 on the 19th and 6
>on the 20th--then none for a couple of days and only singles there-after.
According to Appendix 6 of Robert Dorr's book "B-52 Stratofortress" the
Linebacker losses were as follows:
18 Dec - 1 B-52G
19 Dec - 1 B-52G
1 B-52D
20 Dec - 3 B-52G's
1 B-52D
21 Dec - 2 B-52G's
1 B-52D
22 Dec - 2 B-52D's
Then 2 D models each on the 26th and 27th.
This adds up to 16
Ed Rasimus
> According to Appendix 6 of Robert Dorr's book "B-52 Stratofortress" the
> Linebacker losses were as follows:
>
> 18 Dec - 1 B-52G
> 19 Dec - 1 B-52G
> 1 B-52D
> 20 Dec - 3 B-52G's
> 1 B-52D
> 21 Dec - 2 B-52G's
> 1 B-52D
> 22 Dec - 2 B-52D's
>
> Then 2 D models each on the 26th and 27th.
>
> This adds up to 16
I won't argue with the author, he apparently did some research. I'd suspect
that the discrepancies between my recollection and those figures might
relate to the date. I consider the "first night" as the 18th, when it
obviously started on the 18th and finished on the 19th. If we were to look
at actual calendar date at the time of the loss, we could get different
numbers (although the same totals) for losses by day.
There also were several other losses related to the action with crashes in
Thailand and at sea. Total for the campaign was somewhere in the low
twenties (24??).
Regardless, the effort was remarkable as a show of airpower. (BTW, the
Hunter-Killers were credited with more than 30 confirmed SAM site kills
during the period.)
BUFDRVR
Absolutely, too bad it wasn't done in 1965!
>(BTW, the
>Hunter-Killers were credited with more than 30 confirmed SAM site kills
>during the period.)
I'd guess B-52 losses would have been 10-15% higher had the SEAD guys not done
such a good job. Every now and again you pointy nosed guys are good for
something ;)
SteveM8597
>Was he a pilot? How many missions in F-4s vs how many in BUFFS? And,
>how many NVN missions?
Dana was a WSO squadron mate of mine for a short time in the 366 TFW
Gunfighters when it was at Takhli in the summer and fall of '72. The unit had
so many losses that it disbanded and I believe he went to Ubon. The squadron
(forget the designator) there had a black panther as a mascot that he took care
of. Don't know about his education but I do know that he also flew as a
mercenary in S Africa and last time I talked to him he was looking to buy a
MiG-21. He is on AOL somewhere. Not sure when he flew BUFFs.
There is another account that a friend of mine wrote called Linebacker II.
written by Lt Col (ret) Karl Eschmann. Karl was in Florida last time I heard
from him. He was a 2Lt maintenance officer at Korat during LBII and the book
was developed from a thesis he wrote while at Air Command and Staff College af
Maxwell AFB.
Steve
BUFDRVR
>written by Lt Col (ret) Karl Eschmann.
Outstanding book ! As a matter of fact I can see my copy from here. Should be
mandatory reading for any US aircrew. You can learn alot about what the USAF
did right and wrong during LB II.
g_al...@hotmail.com
wal...@oneimage.com wrote:
> buf...@aol.com (BUFDRVR) wrote:
> >>I assume you must be referring to B-52 tactics (is that an
oxymoron?),>
none the less.
it but do
> not recall the exact name nor do I have a copy. The initial losses,
as Bufdrvr
> says, were disproportionate because of HQ-dictated tactics that
afforded the SA2
> sites time to reload their launchers. Essentially the B52s came in 3
ship cells
> on the same heading and spaced, as I recall it, about 15 minutes
between cells.
> (Ducks in a shooting gallery?) Once the tactics were changed to
concentrate time
> and space (as was well learned in WW2) the enhanced ECM/chaff
overwhelmed the SAM
> sites and the rest of LB II suffered greatly reduced losses.
> All I can say is hey guys, RTFMs.
> Walt Bj ftr plt ret
Walt, I believe you're referring to "Linebacker II: The View [or "A
View," I forget which] from the Rock," By Brig. Gen Charles MacCarthy
et al, IIRR.
Guy
g_al...@hotmail.com
Here's a consolidated list compiled from several separate ones in an
article by Walter Boyne, published in Air Force magazine, Nov. 1997
(vol. 80 No. 11):
Date Sorties Losses Loss rate (%)
(D/G)
18 129 1/2 2.33
19 93 0/0 0.00
20 99 2/4 6.06 (1)
21 30 2/0 6.67 (2)
22 30 0/0 0.00
23 30 0/0 0.00
24 30 0/0 0.00
26 120 2/0 1.67 (3)
27 60 2/0 3.33
28 60 0/0 0.00
29 60 0/0 0.00
--------------------------------------------------
Totals 741 (4) 9/6 2.02 (5)
Notes.
1. All the lost Gs on this mission were unmodified with the latest
ECM. After this mission, unmodified Gs were no longer sent into the
Hanoi area, and were kept away from the heavier SAM concentrations
around Haiphong). Actual loss rate is higher as 9 sorties were
apparently lost to aborts.
2. D's from U-Tapao only, IIRR for the next several nights, while the
tactics were modified.
3. New tactics fully in use.
4. Total includes all sorties launched; 12 were abortive, for 729
counters.
5. Loss rate for effective sorties is 2.06.
> There also were several other losses related to the action with
crashes in
> Thailand and at sea. Total for the campaign was somewhere in the low
> twenties (24??).
No, Boyne's list includes all losses, regardless of where they crashed,
including Thailand etc.
g_al...@hotmail.com
thu...@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus) wrote:
> mya...@erols.com wrote:
<snip>
> > His article on SAC
> >incompetence illustrates that superior resrouces and logistics alone
are
> >not what win wars.
>
> Since it only took eleven days of LB II to bring the NVN and VC to
> terms in Paris and since the POWs were released within 60 days of
> completion, the "incompetence" seems quite effective.
Let's remember what these terms were: Essentially identical to the
terms the North Vietnamese had agreed to back in September (or was it
October?). It was because South Vietnamese President Thieu balked at
accepting them (because they allowed NVA forces to remain in place in
SVN) that the U.S. went back to Paris and tried to renegotiate. The
NVN said "no way, we've already agreed to a deal," and left the talks.
Nixon did his damnedest to get Thieu to agree, but no joy. So, because
Congress was in recess, he figured he had awhile to try bombing (not so
much to convince the North Vietnamese, but Thieu). Many have said
that, if only we'd have continued the bombing, we'd have won. That's
complete fantasy, as Congress was ready, willing and able to cut off
all funds for the war as soon as they came back in January.
So, Linebacker II, and the North Vietnamese come back to the bargaining
table and agree to the same terms as they had prior to the bombing.
Thieu still balks, but Nixon tells Thieu to take it or leave it, as we
were going to pull out regardless. If he agreed, then we would
guarantee support if needed in future; if he didn't, then SVN was on
its own. So he signed (see Kissinger's and Nixon's books, as well as
many other sources). One has to wonder if the same result could have
been achieved without the bombing by giving Thieu the same ultimatum
the first time around.
SteveM8597
>>Was he a pilot? How many missions in F-4s vs how many in BUFFS? And,
>>how many NVN missions?
>
>Dana was a WSO squadron mate of mine for a short time in the 366 TFW
>Gunfighters when it was at Takhli in the summer and fall of '72
Dana's e-mail is DK...@aol.com
William H. Wright
years ago) for B-52 combat losses in SEA:
B-52D 55-0110 crashed in Thailand after hit by SAM 11/22/72
B-52D 56-0608 shot down by SAM 12/18/72
B-52G 58-0201 shot down by SAM 12/18/72
B-52G 58-0246 crashed in Thailand after hit by SAM 12-18-72
B-52G 57-6496 shot down by SAM 12-20-72
B-52G 58-0169 shot down by SAM 12-20-72
B-52G 58-0198 shot down by SAM 12-20-72
B-52G 57-6481 crashed in Thailand after hit by SAM 12-20-72
B-52D 56-0622 shot down by SAM 12/20/72
B-52D 55-0050 shot down by SAM 12/21/72
B-52D 55-0061 shot down by SAM 12/21/72
B-52D 56-0669 shot down by SAM 12/21/72
B-52D 56-0674 shot down by SAM 12/26/72
B-52D 56-0584 crashed on landing at U Tapao AB, Thailand after hit by SAM
12/26/72
B-52D 56-0599 crashed in Thailand 12/27/72 after being hit by SAM
B-52D 56-0605 shot down by SAM 12/27/72
B-52D 55-0056 shot down by SAM 1/3/73
This one I am not too sure of
B-52D 55-0116 made emergency landing 1/13/73 at Da Nang AB, South Vietnam
with battle damage, scrapped 3/29/73
That looks like 15 kills during LBII. Of course NVAF claim two were Mig
kills.
--
William H. Wright
Systems Architect
The Boeing Company